EEE 2503 Reliability Engineering

Institution: Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology

Monday, 15th November 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS
2

Flight Information................................................................................................. 2
2.1

Aircraft Design............................................................................................... 2

2.2

Pylon to Wing Attachment Design..................................................................2

FAILURE MODE EFFECT AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS..................................................2

3.1

Severe Degree of Classification.....................................................................3

3.2

Probability of Failure....................................................................................... 3

3.3

Likelihood of DETECTION............................................................................... 4

3.4

Detailed Procedure to Make FMECA...............................................................4

3.5

Critical Analysis.............................................................................................. 5

3.6

Risk Priority Number (RPN)............................................................................5

FMECA TABLE OF WING ATTACHMENT ON BOEING 747-200 FREIGHTER..............5

1 FLIGHT INFORMATION
On October 4, 1992, at 17:20 UTC, El Al Israel Airlines (ELY) Flight 1862, a Boeing
747-200 Freighter, with three crew members and one non-revenue passenger on
board, took off from runway OIL at Schiphol Airport and followed the Pampus
departure as cleared by air traffic control services. At 17:27 .30 UTC, with the
aircraft at flight level 65, engine no. 3 and its pylon separated from the aircraft and
damaged part of the leading edge of the right wing. The no. 3 engine then struck
engine no. 4, causing this engine and its pylon to depart the wing. During an
attempt to return to Schiphol Airport control was lost and at 17:36 UTC the aircraft
crashed into a residential area in a suburb of Amsterdam.

Damage to Aircraft At the time the pylons and the engines separated from the wing,
the leading edge of the right wing, between engine no. 3 and 4, was extensively
damaged, along with several airplane systems. At final impact, the aircraft was
destroyed by impact forces and the ensuing explosion and fire.

1.1 AIRCRAFT DESIGN

1.2 PYLON

TO

WING ATTACHMENT DESIGN

The design of the engine nacelle and pylon incorporates provisions that preclude a
wing fuel cell rupture in case of engine separation, by means of structural fuses. A
clean breakaway of the nacelle and/or pylon from the wing is ensured when the
shear loading of the fuse pins exceeds the design load conditions.
The structural fuse concept utilizes hollow shear pins at the four wing attachment
fittings between pylon and wing. The wing support structure and fittings have been
designed sufficiently stronger than the fuse pins thus safeguarding the wing from
structural damage in case of an overload condition.
Failure of any component connected to the wing including the fuse pin, beam, has
very serious consequences on the function of the wing and may lead to a disaster. It
is necessary to make FMECA (FAILURE MODE EFFECT AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS) of the
wing and wing attachment structure to help have a basic understanding about the
failure, providing reference to the failure diagnosis.

2 FAILURE MODE EFFECT AND CRITICAL

ANALYSIS
FMECA is a tool to find the potential failure and come up with a solution to this
failure. We mainly concentrate on the structural failure of a wing attachment, such
as flaw, fracture, metal ageing, ignoring the functional failures. As is mentioned
above, the wing constitutes different components and each part has different kinds
of failures in structure due to different reasons. All of them have to be taken into
consideration to make a detailed analysis about the failures.

2.1 SEVERE DEGREE

Effect
Hazardous
without warning

OF CLASSIFICATION
SEVERITY of Effect

Rankin
g
10

High

Very high severity ranking when a potential

failure mode affects safe system operation
without warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential
failure mode affects safe system operation
with warning
System inoperable with destructive failure
without compromising safety
System inoperable with equipment damage

Moderate

System inoperable with minor damage

Low

System inoperable without damage

Very Low

System operable with significant degradation

of performance

Hazardous with
warning
Very High

8
7

Minor

Very Minor

System operable with some degradation of

performance
System operable with minimal interference

None

No effect

2.2 PROBABILITY OF FAILURE

Very High: Failure is almost
>1 in 2
inevitable
High: Repeated failures

Moderate: Occasional failures

Low: Relatively few failures

Remote: Failure is unlikely

10

1 in 3

1 in 8

1 in 20

1 in 80

1 in 400

1 in 2,000

1 in 15,000

1 in
150,000

<1 in
1,500,000

2.3 LIKELIHOOD
Detection
Absolute
Uncertainty
Very Remote

Remote

Very Low

Low

OF DETECTION
Likelihood of DETECTION
Design control cannot detect potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure
mode
Very remote chance the design control will
detect potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode
Remote chance the design control will detect
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent
failure mode
Very low chance the design control will detect
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent
failure mode
Low chance the design control will detect
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent

10

failure mode
Moderate

Moderately
High
High

Very High

Almost Certain

Moderate chance the design control will

detect potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode
Moderately High chance the design control
will detect potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode
High chance the design control will detect
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent
failure mode
Very high chance the design control will
detect potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode
Design control will detect potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure
mode

2.4 DETAILED PROCEDURE

TO MAKE FMECA
Find the potential system failure mode. In this step find the form of the failures. To
this wing, there are mainly five parts of the wing structure where most failures
occur, including fuse pin, skin, beams, ribs, wing-body joint.
According to the severe degree of classification and probability of failure,. To the
wing, different parts have different kinds of failures, which have different severe
degrees.
Take measures to eliminate the failure or compensate for the unacceptable impact.
To every failure of the wing, find possible methods to deal with it.

2.5 CRITICAL ANALYSIS

C = Criticality = Risk = Severity Level*Probability of Occurrence
Criticality is typically qualitative and indicated by the severity level. It can also be
quantitative and indicated by the probability of occurrence.

2.6 RISK PRIORITY NUMBER (RPN)

Risk Priority Number (RPN) is a measure used when assessing risk to help identify
critical failure modes associated with your design or process. The RPN values range
from 1 (absolute best) to 1000 (absolute worst).
RPN= Severity Level*Probability of Occurrence*Detection

3 FMECA TABLE OF WING ATTACHMENT ON

BOEING 747-200 FREIGHTER
Comp
onent

Fuse
pin

Failure
Mode

metal
ageing

Skin
bumps

Skin

Flaw

Hiatus

Beam

Flaw

Reasons

stress
overload
Uneven
pressure
and the
accumulati
on of
corrosion
product

Corrosion
and stress
concentrati
on

Collision

Fatigue
load

Results
Severe
wing
damag
e

Affect
the
airflow

Strengt
h
reducti
on

Severe
wing
damag
e
Strengt
h
reducti
on

Severe
Degree

Probab
ility

recomme
ndation

10

Replace
ment

Dete
ction

RPN

critica
lity

630

90

144

48

Spray
aluminu
m
powder
paint or
replace it
if
necessar
y

160

40

Cut the
damaged
part and
cover it
with a
patch

162

54

135

45

Dig the
small
region to
replace it

Erase
the flaw
or we
can use
a
strength
ening
piece

Gap

Strike,

External
load is too
large

The
beam is
destroy
ed

10

Deforma
Large load
tion

Strengt
h
reducti
on

Fracture

Rib
Flaw

Wingbody
joint

Strengt
h
reducti
on

Wearing

Fracture

Stress
concentrati
on

Strengt
h
reducti
on

Installing or
fatigued
load

Strengt
h
reducti
on

Load is too
large

Destroy
ed

Sand
paper
polishing
and
cover it
with
primer

90

45

60

60

72

36

36

36

96

48

36

36

Replace
ment

Shaping

Use
strength
ening
plate
Replace
ment
Replace
ment