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United States v. Castro-Taveras, 1st Cir. (2016)
United States v. Castro-Taveras, 1st Cir. (2016)
Before
Barron, Lipez, and Hawkins*,
Circuit Judges.
________________________
* Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
a coram nobis petition, defendant-appellant Vincent F. CastroTaveras ("Castro") argues that his guilty plea entered more than
a decade ago should be vacated because of Fifth and Sixth Amendment
violations.
Castro
asserts
that
(i)
his
counsel
provided
should
conduct
an
evidentiary
We,
to
determine
if
- 2 -
fraud.
It also contained a
He subsequently cooperated
- 3 -
2004.
In June 2011, Castro consulted an immigration attorney
to apply for naturalization.
him that his guilty plea in 2002 barred him from becoming a U.S.
citizen, and that he was subject to mandatory removal based on his
- 4 -
conviction.2
nobis.
to show cause, Castro also alleged that the Assistant United States
Attorney ("AUSA") in the case provided a similar assurance during
the plea negotiations that he would not face a risk of deportation
as a result of his plea.
The court
- 5 -
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364-74 (2010), and Padilla does
not apply retroactively to Castro's claim in light of Chaidez v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110-12 (2013).
In Padilla, the
559
U.S.
at
364-71.
In
so
holding,
the
Padilla
Court
few years later, the Supreme Court decided in Chaidez that Padilla
announced a new rule at least as to failure-to-advise claims
concerning immigration matters.
The district court also dismissed Castro's claim against
the prosecutor, which the court understood as inextricably linked
to
his
Sixth
Amendment
claim,
consistent
with
Castro's
- 6 -
show "how the purported remarks by the AUSA interfered with his
lawyer's ability to make independent decisions about his defense."
Additionally, the court denied his request for an evidentiary
hearing because it would be futile.
II.
In reviewing a district court's decision on a coram nobis
petition,
"we
afford
de
novo
review
to
[the
court's]
legal
Id.
Id. at 253.
To show that the writ is warranted, "a coram nobis petitioner must
explain his failure to seek earlier relief from the judgment, show
that he continues to suffer significant collateral consequences
from the judgment, and demonstrate that the judgment resulted from
an
error
of
the
most
fundamental
character."
Id.
at
254.
Id. at 255.
Castro claims
that the alleged violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
- 7 -
claim
is
not
governed
by
Padilla
because
Padilla
argument
assistance claim.
separate
and
apart
from
his
ineffective
trial
at
which
Castro
testified
as
government
witness.
We decline to consider the transcript in assessing the
merits of Castro's constitutional claims.
As a general matter, we
"do not consider evidence that was not part of the district court
record."
- 8 -
F.2d 12, 22 n.8 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting that courts of appeals
"may not ordinarily consider factual material not presented to the
court below").4
for
an
evidentiary
hearing
to
determine
whether
Castro
can
Retroactivity
from
conviction.
new
rule
Id. at 310.
in
collateral
challenge
to
his
- 10 -
by
precedent
existing
at
the
time
the
defendant's
An outcome is
will
not
retroactivity bar.
give
rise
to
"new
rule"
subject
to
the
1107 (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment)) (first alteration in Chaidez).
To put it differently, when a holding "appl[ies] a general standard
to the kind of factual circumstances it was meant to address,"
that holding "will rarely state a new rule for Teague purposes."
Id. (emphasis added).
- 11 -
That
conviction
became
final,
was
consistent
with
the
at 527-28; see, e.g., United States v. Kovacs, 744 F.3d 44, 50-51
(2d Cir. 2014) (identifying the circuit precedents that preceded
Padilla).
In general, then, a defendant in collateral proceedings
may benefit from a favorable Supreme Court holding only if he would
have been entitled to the same outcome at the time his conviction
became final -- either because the holding is not a new rule under
Teague or because the holding, even if a new rule, nonetheless
reflects the law that would have governed his own case.
Castro concedes that his conviction became final in May
2003, long before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla.
Thus, we must first examine the decision in Padilla to determine
what portion of its holding constituted a new rule.
Specifically,
we must determine whether the new rule the Court articulated for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims included misadvice on
- 12 -
of
the
new
rule
guides
our
review
of
the
The
lower-court
held
deportation
that
an
attorney's
consequences
of
failure
guilty
to
plea,
advise
or
the
559 U.S. at
(articulating
assistance
of
the
counsel
two-pronged
claims).
As
inquiry
Chaidez
for
later
ineffective
clarified,
misadvice
or
non-advice
regarding
such
matters
is
even
though
deportation
matters
are
collateral,
not
- 13 -
133 S. Ct. at
1108; see Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 (holding that "advice regarding
deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel").
that
deportation
consequences
are
suited"
to
the
then-
This
The
- 14 -
id. at 1108, the Court noted that Padilla answered the latter
before addressing the former, or, more precisely, it had to do so
in light of the then-prevalent collateral-direct distinction.
at 1108-09.
Id.
rule,
the
Padilla's
answer
to
"preliminary
question
about
Id. at
1108, 1110.
- 15 -
deportation
consequences
from
the
collateral-direct
respect
to
failure-to-advise
claims
--
the
new
rule
so
premised
on
the
necessity
of
rendering
deportation
1110,
statement
which
suggests
that
the
Chaidez
Court
- 16 -
id. (noting that Padilla held that, "however apt [the collateraldirect distinction] may be in other contexts, it should not exempt
from Sixth Amendment scrutiny a lawyer's advice (or non-advice)
about a plea's deportation risk" (emphasis added)).
Indeed, at
that
pre-Padilla
"precedent
did
not
dictate
that
immigration
consequences
- 17 -
could
constitute
an
of the Padilla decision suggests that the Court forged a new rule
specifically to extend the Sixth Amendment's protection to nonadvice claims.
Padilla claimed that his counsel "not only failed to advise him of
[the deportation] consequence prior to his entering the plea, but
also told him that he 'did not have to worry about immigration
status since he had been in the country so long.'"
359 (quoting the lower court opinion).
559 U.S. at
Kentucky,
559
U.S.
356
(2010),
2009
WL
1497552,
at
*i
result
in
deportation,
can
that
misadvice
constitute
- 18 -
at
360.
Consistently,
after
finding
that
the
risk
of
counsel
deportation."
must
advise
her
client
regarding
the
risk
of
under
Strickland,
while
providing
no
comparable
- 19 -
that the Kentucky Supreme Court had applied the collateral bar to
both, Padilla's holding had to address both claims, even if the
Court decided that non-advice claims are not subject to Strickland.
The Court, however, did decide to include non-advice claims in the
scope of the Sixth Amendment's ambit, rather than simply including
misadvice claims, as the Solicitor General had urged the Court to
do.
to
consequences
advise
is
not
the
defendant
cognizable
as
- 20 -
of
a
possible
claim
for
deportation
ineffective
assistance of counsel").
holding does not speak to what the Padilla Court construed as the
scope of a new rule.9
We do not go so far as to say, however, that Padilla and
Chaidez
have
to
be
read
as
affirmatively
excluding
There is
similar
rule in
Teague,
Padilla
at 1113
to the
holding
- 21 -
Moreover, as we previously
Ct.
at
1110
("It
was
Padilla
that
first
rejected
th[e]
for
misrepresentation
claims
prior
to
Padilla
(i.e.,
- 22 -
misrepresentations
taken
in
the
three
aforementioned
federal
Id. at 1112.
courts
for
misadvice
claims,
viewing
their
favorable
recognized
by
the
three
courts
"lived
in
- 23 -
suggests
specifically
to
failure-to-advise
that
the
extend
Padilla
the
claims
Sixth
Court
The context of
forged
Amendment's
regarding
new
protection
immigration
rule
to
consequences.
and
whether
the
application
of
lower
courts
Strickland
to
in
a
2003
would
misadvice
have
claim
considered
regarding
- 24 -
rule in 2003 based on the state of the law in the lower courts,
then Castro's Sixth Amendment claim would be barred under Teague,
unless he can show that the First Circuit was an exception -- i.e.,
we had a case prior to 2003 that would have dictated the same
outcome as Padilla would in this case.
F.3d at 50-51.
of
Our Circuit
these
two
grounds
for
resolving
the
to
Strickland,
nor
did
we
explicitly
exclude
such
As to the
- 25 -
collateral bar appears to have been very much alive in our circuit
with respect to immigration matters before 2003, at least when it
concerned a failure-to-advise claim.
outright
guilty
plea"
for
Strickland
purposes
(internal
is
also
the
misrepresentations
case,
on
however,
immigration
that
we
matters
never
from
excluded
the
Sixth
- 26 -
Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973), Cepulonis
v. Ponte, 699 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1983), and Wellman v. State of
Maine, 962 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1992).
Correale involved a claim that a guilty plea should be
vacated as involuntary under the Fifth Amendment because the
prosecutor,
during
the
plea
negotiations,
had
made
479
prosecutor's
"obligations
of
knowledge
and
clarity"
in
Id. at 949.
advice
regarding
"the
details
of
parole
- 27 -
While
Id.
See
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) ("[T]he fact that a
court says that its decision is within the 'logical compass' of an
- 28 -
at
25-26
(citing,
in
support
of
the
collateral-direct
distinction, United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 921, 923 (2d
Cir. 1954), in which the Second Circuit applied the collateral bar
to a misadvice claim).
Compare
United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
that "where, as here, counsel has not merely failed to inform, but
has
effectively
misled,
his
client
about
the
immigration
under
contemporary
standards
for
attorney
competence"); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir.
2002) (holding that "an affirmative misrepresentation by counsel
as to the deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today
objectively unreasonable"); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765
F.2d 1534, 1540-41 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that, under certain
circumstances,
"counsel's
[potentially
- 29 -
erroneous]
advice
to
Castro's
claim,
as
it
does
not,
by
itself,
render
That is to
say, while no case of our own can support the proposition that
"all reasonable jurists," Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 528, would have
agreed
that
an
affirmative
misrepresentation
on
deportation
simply
"awaiting
an
instance
11
in
which
it
would
be
We conclude so here.
- 30 -
b.
deportation
consequences
can
give
rise
to
an
ineffective
F.
Supp.
2d
210,
214
(D.
Mass.
1999)
(recognizing
that
under
certain
circumstances,
constitute
ineffective
1213
(E.D.
Va.
1995)
("[C]ounsel's
affirmative
12
- 31 -
guilty
plea
may,
but
does
not
automatically,
constitute
and
earned
necessarily
agree
good
conduct
that
credits,"
Acevedo's
"[w]e
counsel
do
not
performed
- 32 -
advice
given
to
Mr.
Hill
was
ineffective
about
it
by
his
lawyer,
and
relies
upon
that
- 33 -
See Roberti
v. State, 782 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Goodall
v. United States, 759 A.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. 2000); State v. Vieira,
760 A.2d 840, 843-44 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000); People v. Ping Cheung,
186 Misc. 2d 507, 510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); State v. Goforth, 503
S.E.2d 676, 678 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); People v. Garcia, 815 P.2d
937, 942 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Hinson v. State, 377 S.E.2d 338,
339 (S.C. 1989); Matter of Peters, 750 P.2d 643, 646 n.3 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1988); Meier v. State, 337 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 1983).
These cases are particularly relevant here because, as
the Chaidez Court noted, when a holding "appl[ies] a general
standard to the kind of factual circumstances it was meant to
address," that holding will "rarely state a new rule for Teague
purposes."
Much as we
Cordero,
533
F.2d
at
726,
we
find
here
no
cognizable
- 34 -
and
misadvice
removal
concerning
in
collateral
particular
can
consequences
never
give
rise
in
to
ineffective assistance.").13
Hence, the legal landscape in the lower courts as of
2003
indicates
that
the
underlying
principle
for
Padilla's
13
- 35 -
(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that a particular rule is not
new under Teague, despite the absence of a Supreme Court decision
announcing it, because it is "so deeply embedded in the fabric of
due process that everyone takes it for granted").
14
That is to say,
- 36 -
retroactivity.
15
- 37 -
matters": Teague and the New Rules, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423, 424
(1994) (arguing that Teague's "dictated by precedent" test is
"virtually impossible to satisfy"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel
J.
Meltzer,
New
Law,
Non-Retroactivity,
and
Constitutional
addition,
the
Teague
analysis
is
particularly
difficult here because the Supreme Court had not, prior to Padilla,
addressed the Sixth Amendment's application to the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea in other, analogous, contexts.
See
to
parole
eligibility
may
be
deemed
constitutionally
- 38 -
prior law without the guidance that could be drawn from comparable
Supreme Court precedent.
decisions
applying
Strickland
to
collateral
matter
is
See
thought
they
were
living
in
Padilla-like
world,"
misrepresentations
on
deportation
consequences
and
other
See,
circuit and seemingly no other lower courts (other than the state
supreme court in Padilla) excluded misadvice on any collateral
matters from the Sixth Amendment's scope makes it an inescapable
deduction that we would have been bound to join the prevailing
view, if the precise issue had been presented.
- 39 -
Accordingly, we vacate
part
of
that
determination,
the
court
may
consider
the
regarding
of
his
In
particular,
he
the
lack
claims
of
on
immigration
appeal
that
consequences
the
district
court
the
Fifth
Amendment
involuntary
plea
standards.
We
conclude that the district court did not commit any error.
In his motions to show cause, Castro alleged that the
AUSA incorrectly advised him that he would not face adverse
immigration consequences as a result of his plea.
Castro relied
- 40 -
Castro
Sixth
Amendment
argument.
Castro
argued
that
his
Accordingly,
16
- 41 -
Castro
of
immigration
consequences.
Hence,
the
Santiago, 804 F.3d 453, 459-60 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting "the maxim
that
any
issue
not
raised
in
party's
opening
brief
is
- 42 -
Castro's
We
in
support
of
his
allegations
contained
only
his
- 43 -
we
affirm
the
district
court's
rejection
of
On remand, the
whether
Castro's
Sixth
Amendment
claim
satisfies
Castro's
19
- 44 -