Chinese Politics and Government

Thesis:
Most discussions of China today are dominated by questions about whether or not it can
rise peacefully; its relations with America, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and other
states in its backyard; socio-economic conditions within the China and human rights. In my
paper, I will focus my paper on a comparative study of Chinese policy towards Uyghur
Separatism in the XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) and Israeli policy towards
Palestinian autonomy in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. Ill do a brief overview of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and the Sino-Uyghur conflict and look at the socio-political causes of each
insurgency. Ill also look at the narratives each government chooses to employ along with their
counter-insurgency strategies, and determine how successful each government has been in
achieving meaningful progress on these issues. Lastly, Ill look at the impact of each
governments counter-insurgency has had on their relations with other countries in their
respective regions.
The main thrust of this paper is that international pressures are commensurate with a
states ordinal ranking in the international system. Position affects the urgency of a states
response to ethnic conflicts of this nature. That being said, ordinal ranking, international
pressures may vary in robustness and form. Also, state policy changes may not necessarily occur,
even with mounting international and internal pressure. Israel, for example, has maintained the
same policies towards Palestinian separatism; and China is re-purposing anti-ISIS narratives for
use against Uyghur separatists, adding more sticks, instead of carrots in terms of finding a
mutually beneficial outcome for Uyghurs and the CCP.
Introduction:
Both the Israeli and Chinese governments strategies thus far have leaned toward a more
heavy-handed approach focused on policing, the use of military force and exclusion. In addition,
neither government has addressed the larger political and social issues underlying each conflict.
Moreover, both governments face increasingly exigent demographic problems. While these
problems havent been seriously addressed in Israel, in China, as recently as July 2014, the CCP
has discussed population control of in Xinjiang as a possible solution to the regions unrest.
Alexa Oleson, a writer at Foreign Policy reported that Xinjiangs most senior CCP leader argued
for more stringent family planning measures for the fast growing Uyghur population. This news
burned further in the hearts of Uyghurs as the CCP began allowing Han Chinese to have two
children.
Unrest aside, given Chinas size, great power status, mostly unitary ethnic society, and
overwhelming 92% majority Han population (1.22 billion), its internal issues do not represent
the same existential threat that the Israeli government faces. It does, however, have the potential
to make already fomented feelings of alienation worse, fuel Islamic radicalism and exacerbate
security issues in Xinjiang; and act as a monkey wrench in its relations with Muslim countries in
the Middle East and Central Asia.

Comparative Analysis:

The similarities between the current Israeli administration, the Likud Party and the CCP
are more so in short term goals, counter-terrorism and reducing Muslim extremism. The methods
they choose to employ, however, are somewhat different. The intensity of each respective
separatist movement is felt differently, and to different extents by other parts of society in both
countries. Also, each country's relations with other countries have been affected to different
degrees by their approaches to separatism.
While Gaza, and the West Bank especially are contiguous with Israel, security policies
(some necessary, some not) and the wall act as significant barriers to a political settlement. In
China, distance, social (population control, political exclusion and restriction of religious
freedoms) and economic policies (government economic development in Xinjiang) have until
recently been the most responsible for fueling resentment between Han and Uyghur, and more
importantly between Uyghur and the CCP.
China, Uyghurs, Security and Ethnic Unity
On December 28th 2015, the CCP put into effect a new counter-terrorism law in response
to, Terrorist attacks (that) have caused heavy losses of people's lives and properties, posing a
serious threat to our security, stability, economic development and ethnic unity... (Xinhua News
Agency) Chinas conception of ethnic unity, though Han comprise 92 percent of Chinas
population, largely ignores the other 55 minority ethnic groups, including Uyghur Muslims. Ill
discuss ethnic unity later especially in the context of education. Going back to counterterrorism in China, one most recent attack occurred on March 14th in Kunming. Six men and two
women entered a Kunming train station and launched a brutal knife attack killing 29 and
wounding 143. In 2009, 171 residents of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang province, were attacked
with syringes. Almost all victims of the attack were Han Chinese, while the terrorists were
Uyghur Muslims. Another attack occurred in in Urumqi in April 2014. The East Turkestan
Islamic Party or ETIM, a Uyghur extremist group, launched a bombing and knife attack killing
three and injuring 79. In May 2014, two SUVs carrying five militants were driven into a popular
market in Urumqi. The attackers flung explosives from their SUVs at shoppers, and eventually
began running people over. Eventually they ran into each other, killing themselves. 43 people
were killed, including four of the militants, and 90 were injured. ETIM didnt take responsibility
for this attack, which demonstrates that growing discontent over the CCPs treatment of Uyghurs
have alienated and polarized Uyghurs that may have been passive supporters of terrorism against
Han Chinese as opposed to becoming militants themselves.
According to Brian Jenkins, in recent years, one stream of Uighur separatism has taken
on a more militant Islamist complexion reflected in the shadowy East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM). The United States designated ETIM a foreign terrorist organization in 2001
but later removed it, stating it no longer had any operational capacity. Although some analysts
say that ETIM has many supporters, and reports credit the ETIM with more than 200 terrorist
attacks between 1990 and 2001, others expressed skepticism about its operational capabilities.
(Jenkins, 2) While ETIM doesnt pose an existential threat or for that matter high casualty
attacks, they still have can conduct small, violent terror attacks against Han Chinese, especially
in Xinjiang. One plausible reason for not seeing as deadly or frequent attacks like those that
shook XUAR in 2014, other than enhanced security measures by the CCP are described in a
December 2015 report by Seymour Hersh. He wrote, the analyst, whose views are routinely

sought by senior government officials, told me that Erdoan has been bringing Uyghurs into
Syria by special transport while his government has been agitating in favor of their struggle in
China. Uyghur and Burmese Muslim terrorists who escape into Thailand somehow get Turkish
passports and are then flown to Turkey for transit into Syria. (Hersh, 2015) Asia Times
correspondent Peter Lee further reported, He added that there was also what amounted to
another rat line that was funneling Uyghurs estimates range from a few hundred to many
thousands over the years from China into Kazakhstan for eventual relay to Turkey, and then to
IS territory in Syria. (Lee, 2015) Lee posits, the CCP sees Chechnya as the worst-case
template/resolution: a national liberation struggle co-opted and discredited by an influx of
Islamist-tinged terrorists who are, in turn, destroyed by the state in a brutal, prolonged war,
shattering the secular/moderate independence movement in the process. (Lee, 2015) Moreover,
Shannon Tiezzi at the Diplomat wrote about Sino-Turkish relations in July 2015, Still, China
sees room for cooperation on anti-terrorism activities, and has been heavily emphasizing
Turkeys increased efforts against Islamic State in its state media outlets. Fighting against Islamic
State provides ample common ground between Beijing and Ankara. Also, though Turkey is
extremely sensitive to Chinese treatment of Uyghursboth bases, the governments are intensely
concerned about separatist sentiments among an ethnic minority group and both China and
Turkey have had to deal with terrorists from those ethnic groups seeking to gain their objectives
by force. With the old conflict with Kurdish groups heating up in Turkey, Beijing may find
Ankara a bit more receptive to its normal complaints about Uyghur separatists. (Tiezzi, 2015)
This flow of Uyghur Muslim extremists from their homeland to Syria echoes an august
2015 report conducted by a Russian newspaper, Novaya Gazeta, and reported in English, by the
Daily Beast. According to the Daily Beast, Based on extensive fieldwork in one village in the
North Caucasus, reporter Elena Milashina has concluded that the Russian special services have
controlled the flow of jihadists into Syria, where they have lately joined up not only with ISIS
but other radical Islamist factions. (Weiss, 2015) The report continues, The FSB established a
green corridor to allow them to migrate first to Turkey, and then to Syria. Russians, including
those living in the North Caucasus, can catch any of the daily non-stop flights to Istanbul and
visit Turkey without a visaI know someone who has been at war for 15 years, Akhyad
Abdullaev, head of the village, tells Milashina. He fought in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
now in Syria. He surely cannot live peacefully. If such people go off to war, its no loss. In our
village there is a person, a negotiator. He, together with the FSB, brought several leaders out of
the underground and sent them off abroad on jihad. The underground resistance has been
weakened, were well off. They want to fightlet them fight, just not here. (Weiss, 2015) Weiss
persuasively argues, The tactic of encouraging hijrah, or jihadist emigration, has appeared to
help the Russian government pacify its decades-long insurgency in the North Caucasus. (Weiss,
2015) Novaya Gazeta also reported that Russian security officials credit the success of the
government in fighting the insurgency; in reality, it seems the drop derives from the fact that all
the aggressive, competent fighters are no longer fighting in Dagestan but are in Syria as part of
ISIS. (Weiss, 2015) Given the above evidence, I posit China might be emulating Russias not so
prudent counter-insurgency tactic, and in an attempt to avoid a 90s like Chechnya scenario, has
been a funneling militant out of Xinjiang, and into Syria. The CCP would rather see would
Uyghur militants, ETIM or otherwise, fight and die in Syria instead of causing trouble in China.

Funneling the most extreme Uyghurs out of China also assists in deals a blow to the Uyghur
separatist movement, in that the fighters are being purged from Xinjiang.
A War on the Rocks article, written by Jeffery Bristol offered an alternative explanation
to the Syrian refugee crisis, and one that may shed additional light on Chinas anti-separatist
strategy. He wrote, The creation of refugees is a major component of the Islamic States
strategy, emerging from the groups utopian project to renew Islamic society. The Islamic
States refugee-creation is a project of social engineering and its calculated barbarity, far from
being a symptom of its radicalism, is a tool used to advance this project. (Bristol, 2015) I dont
argue Chinas short-term strategy of funneling militants to Syria is necessarily barbarous, or
part of some grandiose utopian project. However, it is plausible that this strategy is a project of
social engineering, albeit on a smaller, more directed scale targeting urgent threats to Chinas
ethnic unity, ETIM affiliated or not.
The Other in Israel
Internally, there is a similar dynamic at play in terms of how most Han, and the CCP (at
least in practice) perceive "the other," Uyghurs, and how the majority of Israeli non-Haredi Jews,
and Likud Party perceive "the other," Palestinians, and their bid for a state. Tensions are
obviously very high in Israel and the Palestinian Territories with talk of a possible third intifada.
However, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Muslims do in some cases intermingle, and have
friendships with each other. Though these cases may not be the paradigm across all of Israel,
Hugh Naylor at the Washington Post wrote an article in November 2015 that finds a glimmer of
light in an otherwise poor situation. Naylor wrote after a series of Palestinian attacks and a
robust Israeli reaction, Despite this citys notoriously volatile divisions, Bassem Zidani (a
Palestinian who works in the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem) had felt fairly comfortable working in
a cafe on the Jewish side of town His commute was only a 10-minute walk from his
impoverished neighborhood on the citys Palestinian side. He was friendly with his Israeli boss.
In fluent Hebrew, his conversations with Israeli co-workers centered on mostly breezy topics like
the weather. (Naylor, 2015) The crackdown involving checkpoints, military patrols and
arrest raids in Palestinian areas has been especially troublesome for (Palestinians.) (Naylor,
2015) In addition to bolstered security measures, there have been cases of extreme right wing
Israelis attacking Palestinian workers who commute from the Muslim quarter. On the flipside,
although, Micha Meir, a 61-year-old Israelifundamentally disagrees with Palestinian
nationalist politics, as a result of recent tensions, he has taken extra precautions to protect the
Palestinian waiters and dishwashers at his small restaurant that sells hummus and falafel on the
west end of town. (Naylor, 2015) I call taxis at night, which I pay for, to make sure they get
home safely, said Meir, who speaks Arabic fluently. They are my friends. (Naylor, 2015) Ron
Gerlitz, co-director of Sikkuy, the Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality said, the
Jerusalem economy simply cant Despite, intense security measures, occasional right-wing
settler attacks, and news of Jerusalems mayor, Nir Barkat, calling on Israelis to carry arms,
Barkat himself was filmed walking around town with what he later said was a Glock 23,
Israeli-Palestinian relations, especially in areas where there is daily interaction, leads to a more
sanguine assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian relations vis--vis Sino-Uyghur relations. The
Israeli government is also not trying to encourage an ethnic or religious unity but it does see
Israel as a Jewish state. I posit population problems will eventually force whatever

administration is in power in Israel to consider thinking of itself and establishing a more pluralist
state. The smaller size, and geographical proximity of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza; location
in between Arab countries (and active warzones: Syria to the East, Lebanese-Syrian border to the
North and Sinai to the South); limited ability to influence politics in its backyard (unlike China
which has been able to deflect criticism of its policies through its influence on Muslim allies)
lead to Palestinian issues being more urgent to address in Israel than Uyghur issues are in China.
The other in China, and Socio-Economic Causes of Uyghur Separatism
In this section, Ill address educational reform, affirmative action, and job availability,
wage differences between Han and Uyghur, and economic reform. As it pertains to education
reform, Timothy Grose asserts that programs like the 2000 CCP sponsored Xinjiang Class which
provides funds to send Uyghur middle school students to schools in predominantly Han regions
has done little to achieve CCP goals of instilling ethnic unity and nationalism in XUAR. He says
the program has had the opposite effect, strengthening some Uyghur students sense of ethnic
identity. (Grose, 97) Grose backs up his claim through data collected from 2006-2008 from
Chinese documents concerning the Xinjiang Class program. While the Xinjiang Class in theory
is supposed to encourage Han-Uyghur interaction, Grose finds that cross-cultural interaction is
limited. It is also highly monitored and controlled closely by school administrators. (Grose,
104) Based on interviews with current Uyghur college students and Xinjiang Class alumni,
Grose demonstrates that though students would attend class with Han, they would socialize
mostly with other Uyghur, or Kazakh students. Some of these college graduates and Xinjiang
alumni obtained positions in Beijing, but were prohibited by Xinjiang Education Bureau from
working outside XUAR. Grose found that other students wanted to use their schooling and
improve their home province, Xinjiang. While the CCP has enacted policies that guarantee the
use of minority languages and helped minority students attend high school and college, Grose
finds many Uyghur are dissatisfied with the current state of educational development in
Xinjiang. (Grose, 106) His summary corroborates this papers argument that Chinas Uyghur
policies are counter-productive, although the Xinjiang Class is providing Uyghurs with the type
of modern education that may not be accessible in Xinjiang, the Xinjiang Class is falling short of
its political aims. After examining instances of HanUyghur interactions, the minimal use of
Mandarin by Uyghurs outside of the classroom, and the degree in which Uyghurs are willing to
return to Xinjiang, suggest many Uyghurs are resisting integration. The CCP must continue to
actively address the problems plaguing the Xinjiangs education system or the Uyghurs will
likely become a dislocated minority instead of contributing members of Chinese society.
(Grose, 106)
In regards to the Uyghurs in Chinas labor market, Zhang finds, Industrial restructuring
has been implemented nationwide, including in Xinjiang. Since the losers of industrial
restructuring are likely to be disadvantaged social groups, it is questionable whether the state
affirmative action policy has been effective in protecting minority workers in the labor market.
(Zhang, 347) Zhang continued, and summed up previous literature on minorities in the labor
market, discrimination has become a major determinant of ethnic inequality in Xinjiang. It is

noted that when a state firm downsized its workforce, managers first chose to sack minority
workers. Educated ethnic youths were unable to obtain good jobs because of Han discrimination
against minority nationalities in Xinjiang. (Zhang, 347) In addition, Uyghurs complained
that the government has forsaken the preferential policy for national minorities. Moreover,
thousands of minority youth, newly graduated from colleges and universities, are without jobs.
By comparison, Han graduates from local or inland universities can easily land a job in the
government. (Yee, 181) Finally, Zhang posits, A lot of state interests are at stake in the
interaction between the CCP and the Uyghur. Not surprisingly, the Chinese government is ready
to suppress Uyghur separatism with an iron hand. At the same time, it may try to integrate the
Uyghur into the PRC regime in an effort to counterbalance Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang. It
may be cost-effective for the Chinese government to accommodate the Uyghur with equal
opportunity programs. A less threatening minority group could be ignored, but the government
cannot afford to ignore the Uyghur. (Zhang, 361)
In another paper, Zhang addresses the earnings gap between Han and Uyghur more
directly. Discussing the history of CCP social transformation in Xinjiang, Zhang tells us , The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engineered profound social transformation in Uyghur society
after it conquered Xinjiang in 1949. During the course of fieldwork in Urumchi, I heard
repeatedly that, before the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, the Uyghur poor regarded the CCP as
their savior. The Chinese government demolished Islamic establishments, carried out land
reforms in rural Xinjiang and raised a large group of Uyghur intellectuals and professionals in
urban areas. The CCP also set up factories, schools and other institutions in the region, and
recruited many Uyghurs into the state workforce. The majority of Uyghurs benefited from
upward mobility and improved their living standards greatly. Yet, during the Cultural Revolution
decade (1966-76), many Uyghur intellectuals and officials were persecuted despite their
commitment to the PRC and enthusiastic participation in socialist construction in the pre-1966
era. (Zhang, 143) I argue the CCP are engaging in new social transformation, or rather social
engineering today. Like the past, it involves dismissing the Uyghur-Islam connection, however it
eschews any of the positive outcomes of Chinese government action in XUAR prior to the
Cultural Revolution. Instead, XUAR is rife with anti-Uyghur discrimination. Zhan concludes
that, attributes are unduly assigned to Han workers. Uyghur workers are viewed as less capable
and industrious, even if they are in fact equally productive; this reflects the government's own
description of minorities as backward. During the course of my fieldwork in Urumchi, I found
evidence of the acceptance of this official assessment of ethnic differences by local residents.
Quite a number of Han Chinese held strong views on Uyghur inferiority. Some Han informants
described Uyghurs using terms such as "laziness" and "savagery Others asserted that Han
Chinese were more trustworthy, intelligent and rational, and had a more long-term perspective
than Uyghurs. (Zhang 147) Moreover, Zhang found in his fieldwork that a, Uyghur woman
thought that Uyghurs were not hard-working, whereas Han Chinese were diligent, wasted no
time, were never satisfied with what they had achieved, were confident and were always
forward-thinking. Such perceptions partly explain why Han workers are preferred to and
rewarded more than Uyghur workersthat most private firms have no formal remuneration
schemes or grievance procedures to address this injustice exacerbates the problem. (Zhang, 147)
In sum, many empirical and theoretical questions about Uyghur-Han earnings differentials in

the region have remained unanswered (But) Data analyses show that, overall, Uyghurs earn 31
per cent less than Han Chinese in Urumchi When background characteristics are controlled in
data analysis, the earnings differentials between Uyghur workers and Han workers in the state
sector fade away, though no similar patterns are found among workers in non-state sectors:
everything being equal, Uyghur workers earn 52 per cent less than Han workers in non-state
sectors. The Chinese government has been apparently committed to affirmative action in the
state sector. These findings are consistent with the sectoral model of the Uyghur-Han earnings
differentials in Xinjiang. (Zhang, 155) Finally, Zhang advocates one possible solution to
alleviate the Uyghur-Han earning gap might be increased oversight in the private sector, and
penalties for businesses or firms that discriminate against Uyghur applicants.
Israel and China, Intersection of Domestic and Foreign Policy
As of now, China's position in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its political
and economic ties with certain Arab countries, several Muslim Central Asian republics and Iran
have up until now shielded it from any meaningful consequences as a result of its handling of the
Uyghur separatist movement. In terms of what we can learn from doing such a comparative
study, it could show the difficulties middle powers face in handling internal issues such
as separatism, and how their ability to maintain international support can be a hindrance that
great powers like China are more insulated from. It is also true that the Israeli government has
had a uniquely special relationship with the US government that has shielded it, for now, from
most international action. That being said, America's ability to influence internal politics in
Middle Eastern countries, and politics between Middle Eastern countries has faded in recent
years. Realist IR scholars like Barry Posen argue for the US to put Israel's "reckless driving" to a
stop by engaging in hard ball diplomacy on issues such as settlements, excessive military force,
and barring of Palestinians from accessing the Al Aqsa Mosque (recent development).
In sum, while it is imperative that Israel has the ability to defend itself against terrorism,
enabling the Israeli government to continue policies that make a political solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict harder is a problem for the United States. I'd argue that based on recent
counter-insurgency history, and America's own counter-terrorism efforts, force in the form of
strategic bombing and leadership decapitation alone could only achieve so much. In
addition, force should be used in support of a broader political objective. Some causes of war
scholars see war as a bargaining process. The problem is neither side is any closer to a bargain. If
anything, the Israeli Government and Hamas have lengthened the gap between their ideal
outcomes. The existence of two Palestinian governments with two different preference structures
further complicates any future political process. Hamas is seen to be more legitimate due to its
active struggle against Israel as opposed to Fatah, which is seen as an Israeli collaborator.
I once read, that Palestinian political leaders are judged by their constituencies more on
what they have done to fight against Israel, "how many times they had been arrested," than on
what they did in terms of social and economic development in the territories. This plagued
former PA presidential candidate Salaam Fayyads campaign dynamic. Moreover, because he
prioritized security, and a willingness to work with the Israeli government, he was seen as a
potential "puppet" for Tel Aviv.
While China's rising power status affords it a level of complacency on
purposefully dealing with its internal issues, there are similar dynamics at play. For example,

many Uyghur, including the World Uyghur Congress as a puppet for the CCP, saw the previous
chairman of the XUAR, Nur Bekri. Whether or not the new XUAR chairman is more popular
with the Uyghurs is still in doubt, as China's main concern in Xinjiang has been security and
economic development, not placating Uyghurs by alleviating political, social and economic
conditions for them. In terms of foreign policy, Michael Clarke finds that China will face more
pressure to increase its involvement in combating the Islamic State. Given its strategic
partnerships, it would likely join Russia and Iran, and aid the Assad regime in Syria and bolster
the Abadi government in Iraq. Since Clarke wrote his paper, his prediction has come true.
Indeed, "Beijing's strategy of internationalizing the Uyghur issue has now become a
double-edged sword...President Xi Jinping's call for a people's war to make terrorists like rats
scurrying across the street has resulted in an increased security presence in the region, including
mass arrests of suspected terrorists and their sympathizers and regular house-to-house sweeps
in search of suspected militants. Thousands of CCP cadres have been dispatched to the
countryside to educate the population regarding the threats of Islamism and the virtues of
ethnic unity and stability. Beijing's security policies are more recently mirroring those of
Israel. Mass arrests and house-to-house sweeps are similarly conducted by the IDF. On the other
hand, re-education and propaganda campaigns attempting to instill "ethnic unity" and "stability"
are unique to China. Moreover, I doubt that these policies would work in Israel. If anything, reeducation and propaganda would further fuel Palestinian support for Hamas and other jihadi
organizations, and heighten tensions between the PA and those living under it. Its effectiveness in
China is also dubious. If an ethnic Uyghur regional chairman is thought of by the World Uyghur
Congress as a CCP puppet, it is highly unlikely the CCP, an external force, will have much
success in gaining support of Uyghurs living in the XUAR through re-education or ethnic unity
campaigns.
According to David A Lake, the only way for a state to successfully manage an internal
ethnic conflict is through Effective management (which) seeks to reassure minority groups of
both their physical security and, because it is often a harbinger of future threats, their cultural
security. Demonstrations of respect, power-sharing, elections engineered to produce the
interdependence of groups, and the establishment of regional autonomy and federalism are
important confidence-building measures that, by promoting the rights and positions of minority
groups, mitigate the strategic dilemmas that produce violence. (Lake, 42) If there is anything we
can take away from the literature review and my analysis it is that China is not doing most of
what is on Lakes checklist. When the CCP does any of these things, it is in accordance with
CCP interests, security, ethnic unity and increasing economic power in mind. In sum, Uyghur
issues largely take a backseat. Instead, half-measures are put in place that do not protect the
Uyghurs, infringe upon their religious freedoms, hurt their job prospects (even after college)
and, I argue send those that cant be rehabilitated, Islamic militants, to fight in conflicts abroad
as opposed to against Han Chinese or the CCP.

In the beginning of my research, I thought if China were to continue the status quo in Xinjiang,
internal challenges are likely to worsen and lead to weakening of its economic relationships with
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the PA, Jordan and Egypt. Externally, if it chose to become more involved

internationally in combating ISIS through its allies, Russia, Syria, Iran and Iraq, it risks
further inciting Uyghurs at home and hurting its geo-economic goals in the Middle
East. However, after accumulating more research, carefully checking my analysis, I have found
that the first part of my hypothesis is more persuasive than the second. That is, internal
challenges from Uyghur separatists will continue or worsen. That being said, thanks to Chinas
militant relocation strategy, the more dangerous Uyghur separatists in ETIM are most likely
fighting abroad in Syria or Iraq. Additionally, Turkeys relationship with China has not changed
much, despite the Turkish-Uyghur connection. Realpolitik is the name of the game, and Erdoan
is willing to forsake the future of Uyghurs in China if it means ensuring Turkish security, fanning
flames upon the Syrian Civil War, and countering the Kurdish threat that he sees as more urgent
than ISIS. The Saudis are engaged in their own proxy war in Yemen, and have supported Al
Nusra and ISIS. That being said, according to Fahed Nazer at the National Interest, SaudiChinese energy relations extend beyond trade in crude and include sizable Saudi investments in
Chinese refineries and Chinese companies helping develop Saudi Arabias own refineries and
natural-gas fields. As Saudi Arabias own domestic energy needs have risen rapidly in recent
yearselectricity consumption has doubled since 2000and are expected to continue to
increase, policy makers have tried to meet increased demand by tapping into the kingdoms
natural gas, allowing more-lucrative crude to be exported. (Nazer, 2015) Sino-Saudi bilateral
economic interests can help China circumvent its support of Abadi in Iraq and Assad in Syria.
Ironically, the funneling of ETIM members to Sunni jihadi groups in Syria is indirectly
supportive of the Kingdoms perceived interests. The PA is too weak to have any effect on
Chinese domestic foreign policy. Sino-Egyptian relations are also unlikely to be greatly effected
by Beijings Uyghur policies. Acknowledging China's importance as one of the largest and
fastest growing economies in the world, Cairo expressed its readiness to engage Beijing on a
long-term basis. For Egypt, China is the 17th largest market for its exports, accounting for nearly
2% of its global exports. Consequently, there is considerable scope to increase Egyptian exports
to the Chinese market. In terms of imports by Egypt, China ranks first and is the source of
around 10.5% of Egypt's total imports. (Tamimi, 2014) Politically, Dr. Nasser Tamimi finds,
Through Cairo's lens, China could be regarded as a valuable source of political support as Egypt
continues on a path of economic reforms whilst also seeking to deflect Western pressure in the
area of democratization. Most importantly, China may play an important role in supplying Egypt,
especially with weapons that the United States refuses or is reluctant to sell (Tamimi, 2015)
Lastly, in spite of Jordans strong relationship the America, and its position in the Syrian Civil
War, Trade between Beijing and Amman has increased at a very rapid pace in recent years. In
fact, China has become Jordans second largest import partner and an important source of muchneeded investments. Amman mainly exports phosphate and sylvite to Beijing and imports textile,
electronics, grains, and light industrial products. It is reported that several Chinese companies
have made their way to Jordan. Last year for example, an agreement was signed by the two
countries to construct a $2.5 billion dollar oil shale power plant in Jordan to produce 900
megawatts of electricity. (Rakhmat, 2014) As it pertains to security, Rakhmat finds,
Cooperation in the military sector has also become increasingly visible. Early this year, China
provided a grant of $4.9 million to the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) to procure Chinese-made
military equipment. This offer came three months after the two countries struck a deal to develop

a defense industrial partnership between JAF and Chinas State Administration for Science,
Technology, and Industry for National Defense. (Rakhmat, 2015) China has also donated a
small albeit helpful sum of 200,000 dollars to help alleviate Jordans Syrian refugee crisis.

Conclusion:
In sum, Beijing can afford to maintain the status quo in XUAR because of its pseudosuperpower status, and other countries, even those not generally considered its allies, will to have
prosperous political, economic and military relations. Internally, the funneling out of ETIM and
other more active Uyghur separatists has enabled Beijing to procrastinate trying to resolve the
Han-Uyghur ethnic conflict. Israel, a middle power, however, surrounded by conflict on all sides,
and in the eyes of the world, will soon be forced to seriously address the Palestinian question.
America will only defend the Israeli government for so long before it hurts its political interests
in the region. Moreover, population issues and the regional war will force Israel to act with more
urgency. Optimistically, my research has led me believe that there is a stronger starting point for
reconciliation between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Muslims. The multi-actor, multi-interest
problem in the power struggle between PA and Hamas will be an impediment Tel Aviv will have
to tackle with an open, creative mind. Basically, internationally, if core interests intersect, even
with countries who may find Sino-Uyghur relations unsatisfactory, bilateral cooperation can
continue, and states can continue policies that other states may find undesirable. These internal
issues can take a backseat if there are more pressing issues that states can work on together. More
powerful states like China are in a better position to take advantage of this dynamic.