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Consti 1 Leg Dep
Consti 1 Leg Dep
DELACRUZ
A novel case was recently decided by the Supreme Court where a suit was filed
by resident marine mammals, like whales, dolphins, etc. in order to prevent the
exploration, development and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tanon
Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and
Cebu. One of the basic questions is whether they have the capacity to sue or
otherwise known in constitutional law as locus standi.
This case arose when DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX)
entered into an agreement for the exploration, development and production of
petroleum resources at the offshore of Tanon Strait.
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, claimed that they have
the legal standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in this suit. Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also asserted their
right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal
environmental laws created in their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they
propounded that they have the right to demand that they be accorded the
benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the
Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.
The Stewards contended that there should be no question of their right to
represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as
forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of
Taon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the
Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the
public trust doctrine. (See: Oposa case).
They also contended that the Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as
an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. (See: Oposa case).
Public respondents argued that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing
because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to
be either natural or juridical persons.
They also contested the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners
therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.
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Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of
procedure may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenged their claim
of legal standing on the ground that they are representing animals, which cannot
be parties to an action. Moreover, the public respondents argued that the
Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they
stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this case.
Since the petition was not brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it
should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, the Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus
standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the Court allowed the suit to be brought
in the name of generations yet unborn based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Furthermore, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right
that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal
standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a
steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth
noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not
just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are
therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
Held: Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal
personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a
creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride
on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a person for purposes of the
adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or
charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries,
beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the
destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The river, for
example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishesfish, aquatic
insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including
man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life.
The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those
people who have a meaningful relation to that body of waterwhether it be a
fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a loggermust be able to speak for the
values which the river represents and which are threatened with destruction.
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give
animals and inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the
strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court
demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of
the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:
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appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds
refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited
by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget
deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the
case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that
the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer
or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no
cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this
was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of
funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some
projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the
GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer
to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by
the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus,
since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP,
there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared
at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
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Argument: The respondents argue that the Executive has not violated the GAA
because savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls
for legislative, instead of judicial, determination.
Held: Untenable. The interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a
foremost judicial function. This is because the power of judicial review vested in
the Court is exclusive.
Endencia and Jugo v. David: The interpretation and application of said laws
belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and
apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine
whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the
meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution
in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is,
then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
2.) Strict construction on the accumulation and utilization of savings
The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its
being an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to
the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their
utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against expanding
the scope of the power to augment.15 Such a strict interpretation is essential in
order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of
their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly
transgressing Congress power of the purse.
Pertinent provisions
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared
as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for
the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections
have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an
act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they
received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers,
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
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or encumbrance, and that the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized has been completed, discontinued or abandoned.
Although the withdrawal of unobligated allotments may have effectively resulted
in the suspension or stoppage of expenditures through the issuance of negative
Special Allotment Release Orders (SARO), the reissuance of withdrawn
allotments to the original programs and projects is a clear indication that the
program or project from which the allotments were withdrawn has not been
discontinued or abandoned.
At this point, it is likewise important to underscore that the reversion to the
General Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations savings included
pursuant to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code does not
apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the
Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on
Elections, Commission on Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section
25(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve
the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for
programs and projects of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in
any other item of the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the
mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority of the
President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department
out of the savings in other items of his own Departments appropriations.
Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border
transfers under the DAP.
Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its
department shall, however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section
25(5) are complied with.
3.) The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the
GAA
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Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only
DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation
by legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects
had appropriation cover and were validly augmented require factual
determination that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions
under Rule 65.
Cross-border transfers are constitutionally impermissible
Argument: Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution prohibits only the transfer
of appropriation, not savings.
Held: Section 25(5) is clear. The Court stood by its previous pronouncement.
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FACTS
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT
16. International Service for the Acquisition of AgriBiotech Applications, Inc., et.al. v. Greenpeace Southeast
Asia (Philippines), et.al.
(G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301 and 209430)
DATE: 8 December 2015
PONENTE: J. Villarama, Jr.
BACKGROUND
In 1990, President Corazon Aquino signed Executive Order (EO) No. 430
creating the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP)
which was tasked to identify and evaluate potential hazards involved in
initiating genetic engineering experiments and introducing new species and
genetically engineered organisms and recommend measures to minimize risks.
In 1991, NCBP formulated the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines which governs
the regulation of the importation or introduction, movement and field release
of potentially hazardous biological materials in the Philippines. The same was
followed by the Guidelines on Planned Release of Genetically Manipulated
Organisms (GMOs) and Potentially Harmful Exotic Species (PHES).
On 29 December 1993, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) came
into force. This is a multilateral treaty recognizing the great potential of
modern biotechnology for human well-being if developed and used with
adequate safety measures for the environment and human health.
In January 2000, an agreement was reached on the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol), a supplement to the CBD, which aims to
ensure an adequate level of safe transfer, handling and use of living modified
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ISSUES
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Protection Order (TEPO) alleging that the Bt talong field trials violate their
constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering that:
The required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under PD
1151 was not secured prior to the project implementation
There is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bt
talong for human consumption and the environment
There was a study conducted showing adverse effects on rats who
were fed Bt corn, local scientists likewise attested to the harmful
effects of GMOs to human and animal health
Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species
There is a failure to comply with the required public consultation
under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code
The case calls for the application of the precautionary principle, it
being a classic environmental case where scientific evidence as to
the health, environmental and socio-economic safety is insufficient
or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates
reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially dangerous
effects on human health and the environment
The following reliefs are prayed for by Greenpeace, et.al., to wit:
Issuance of a TEPO enjoining BPI and Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA) of the Department of Agriculture (DA) from
processing for field testing and registering as herbicidal product Bt
talong in the Philippines, stopping all pending field testing, and
ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong; and
Issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus commanding the
ISAAAI, et.al.: (1) to submit to an environmental impact statement
system under the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-EMB);
(2) to submit an independent, comprehensive, and rigid risk
assessment, field tests report, and regulatory compliance reports; (3)
to submit all issued certifications on public information, public
consultation, public participation and consent from the LGUs
affected by the field testing; (4) to submit an acceptable draft of an
amendment of the NBF and DAO 2002-08; and (5) for BPI of DA to
conduct balanced nationwide public information on the nature of Bt
talong and Bt talong field trial, and a survey of its social
acceptability.
On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB,
BPI, FPA and UPLB, ordering them to file a verified return.
The contentions of the respondents are as follows:
All environmental laws were complied with, including public
consultations in the affected communities
The Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental
Impact Statement Law
There is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed,
on the safety of Bt talong for human consumption
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5.
All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities
who intend to undertake activities or projects which will affect the quality of
environment are required to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity.
6.
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WON there is neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public
respondents in the processing and evaluation of the applications for Bt talong
field testing
WON the Precautionary Principle applies
RULING
An environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as likely
to have significant adverse impact that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse
and which include activities that have significant environmental consequences.
In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on
the potential hazards of GMOs to human health and the environment, their release
into the environment through field testing would definitely fall under the category
of ECP.
5.
Yes. It must be stressed that DAO 2002-08 and related DA order are not the only
legal bases for regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO 514
clearly provides that the NBF applies to the development, adoption and
implementation of all biosafety policies, measures and guidelines and in making
biosafety decisions concerning the research, development, handling and use,
transboundary movement, release into the environment and management of
regulated articles.
The NBF requires the use of precaution, as provided in Section 2.6 which
reads:
2.6. Using Precaution. In accordance with Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration of 1992 and the relevant provisions of the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Article 1, 10 (par.
6) and 11 (par. 8), the precautionary approach shall guide
biosafety decisions. The principles and elements of this
approach are hereby implemented through the decision-making
system in the NBF.
It likewise contains general principles and minimum guidelines that the
concerned agencies are expected to follow and which their respective rules and
regulations must conform with. In cases of conflict in applying the principles, the
principle of protecting the public interest and welfare shall always prevail, and no
provision of the NBF shall be construed as to limit the legal authority and mandate
of heads of departments and agencies to consider the national interest and public
welfare in making biosafety decisions.
Notably, Section 7 of NBF mandates a more transparent, meaningful and
participatory public consultation on the conduct of field trials beyond the posting
and publication of notices and information sheets, consultations with some residents
1.
Yes. The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental
cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules collapses the tradional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature,
and aims to further encourage the protection of the environment.
2.
No. The case falls under the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to
the mootness principle, the human and environmental health hazards posed by the
introduction of a genetically modified plant which is a very popular staple vegetable
among Filipinos is an issue of paramount public interest.
3.
No. The provisions of DAO 2002-08 do not provide a speedy or adequate remedy
for the respondents to determine the questions of unique national and local
importance raised in this case that pertain to laws and rules for environmental
protection, thus Greenpeace, et.al. is justified in coming to the Supreme Court.
4.
Yes. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most particularly
petitioners DENR-EMB, BPI and FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS
system should apply to the release of GMOs into the environment and issue joint
guidelines on the matter.
The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the
direct and indirect impacts of a project on the biophysical and human environment
and ensuring that these impacts are addressed by appropriate environmental
protection and enhancement measures. It aids proponents in incorporating
environmental considerations in planning their projects as well as in determining the
environments impact on their project. There are six stages in the regular EIA
process. The proponent initiates the first three stages while EMB takes the lead in
the last three stages. Public participation is enlisted in most stages.
Even without the issuance of EO 514, GMO field testing should have at least
been considered for EIA under existing regulations of EMB on new and emerging
technologies, to wit:
g) Group V (Unclassified Projects): These are the projects
not listed in any of the groups, e.g. projects using new
processes/technologies with uncertain impacts. This is an
interim category unclassified projects will eventually be
classified into their appropriate groups after EMB evaluation.
(Emphasis supplied)
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inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the
environment without legal consideration of the environmental
rights of those affected.
Parenthetically, during the hearing at the CA, Atty. Segui of the EMB was
evasive in answering the questions on whether his office undertook the necessary
evaluation on the possible environmental impact of Bt talong field trials and the
release of GMOs into the environment in general. While he initially cited lack of
budget and competence as reasons for their inaction, he later said that an
amendment of the law should be made since projects involving GMOS are not
covered by Proclamation No. 2146, entitled Proclaiming Certain Areas and Types
of Projects as Environmentally Critical and Within the Scope of the Environmental
Impact Statement System Established Under Presidential Decree No. 1586.
The Supreme Court took the above as an indication of the DENR-EMBs lack
of serious attention to their mandate under EO 514 to ensure that environmental
assessments are done and impacts identified in biosafety decisions.
There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of the GMOs into the
environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites,
and eventually the health of our people once the Bt eggplants are consumed as food.
Adopting the precautionary approach, the Supreme Court ruled that the
principles of the NBF need to be operationalized first by the coordinated actions of
the concerned departments and agencies before allowing the release into the
environment of genetically modified eggplant.
Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs from stakeholders,
including marginalized famers, not just the scientific community. This proceeds
from the realization that acceptance of uncertainty is not only a scientific issue, but
is related to public policy and involves an ethical dimension.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
1.
2.
3.
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Yes. The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the
normative idea that governments are obliged to foresee and forestall harm to the
environment. The Rules incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:
SEC.1. Applicability. When there is a lack of full scientific
certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity
and environmental effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
SEC 2. Standards for application. In applying the
precautionary principle, the following factors, among others,
may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2)
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estimate and a program of administration for the succeeding fiscal year. During
budget hearings, administrative officials defend their budget proposals.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or
activity to be funded.[140] Hence, the holding of budget hearing has been the
usual means of reviewing policy and of auditing the use of previous appropriation
to ascertain whether they have been disbursed for purposes authorized in an
appropriation act. The consideration of the budget is also an opportunity for the
lawmakers to express their confidence in the performance of a Cabinet Secretary
or to manifest their disgust or disfavor of the continuance in office of a
bureaucrat.[141] Congress can even curtail the activities of the administrative
agencies by denial of funds.[142] In the United States, for instance, Congress
brought to end the existence of the Civilian Conservation Corps, the National
Youth Administration and the National Resources Planning Board, simply by
denying them any appropriation.[143]
But legislative scrutiny does not end in budget hearings. Congress can ask the
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either House of
Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments. Section 22, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days
before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State
or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
The heads of departments upon their own initiative or upon the request of the
National Assembly on any matter pertaining to their departments unless the
public interest shall require otherwise and the President shall state so in writing.
[149]
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Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased
frequency to check the perceived exponential accumulation of power by the
executive branch.[133] By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has
delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch
and the administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to
make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the
authority delegated to them.[134]
The oversight power has also been used to ensure the accountability of
regulatory commissions like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Federal Reserve Board, often referred to as representing a headless fourth
branch of government.[135] Unlike other ordinary administrative agencies, these
bodies are independent from the executive branch and are outside the executive
department in the discharge of their functions.[136]
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers
may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and
supervision.[137]
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to
administrative operations.[138] Its primary purpose is to determine economy and
efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative
scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches
of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved.
Legislative scrutiny is based primarily on the power of appropriation of Congress.
Under the Constitution, the power of the purse belongs to Congress.[139] The
President may propose the budget, but still, Congress has the final say on
appropriations. Consequently, administrative officials appear every year before
the appropriation committees of Congress to report and submit a budget
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with the merits of the issue at hand. The fact that we also impose a time limit
means that the government is obliged to furnish the information asked for and
this obligation is what gives the procedure its real strength.[151]
This proposal was vigorously opposed on the ground of separation of powers.
CONCOM Delegate Christian Monsod pointed out that the provision was
historically intended to apply to members of the legislature who are in the
executive branch typical in a parliamentary form of government. In fine, the
question hour was conducted on a peer basis. But since the delegates decided
to adopt a presidential form of government, cabinet members are purely alter
egos of the President and are no longer members of the legislature. To require
them to appear before the legislators and account for their actions puts them on
unequal terms with the legislators and would violate the separation of powers of
the executive and the legislative branches.[152] Delegate Monsod, however,
recognized that a mechanism should be adopted where Cabinet members may
be summoned and may, even on their own initiative, appear before the
legislature. This, he said, would promote coordination without subordinating one
body to another. He thus suggested that the original tenor of the provision in the
1935 Constitution be retained.[153]
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The whole tenor of the provision was permissive: the department heads could
appear but the legislative was not obliged to entertain them; reciprocally, the
legislature could request their appearance but could not oblige them especially if
the President objected.[150] The rule radically changed, however, with the
adoption of the 1973 Constitution, establishing a parliamentary system of
government. In a parliamentary system, the administration is responsible to the
Parliament and hence, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Members may be
required to appear and answer questions and interpellations to give an account
of their stewardship during a question hour, viz:
Sec. 12 (1) There shall be a question hour at least once a month or as often as
the Rules of the Batasang Pambansa may provide, which shall be included in its
agenda, during which the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister or any
Minister may be required to appear and answer questions and interpellations by
Members of the Batasang Pambansa. Written questions shall be submitted to the
Speaker at least three days before a scheduled question hour. Interpellations
shall not be limited to the written questions, but may cover matters related
thereto. The agenda shall specify the subjects of the question hour. When the
security of the State so requires and the President so states in writing, the
question hour shall be conducted in executive session.
The question hour was retained despite the reversion to the presidential system
in 1981. During the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, the report of the
legislative committee called for the adoption of the question hour for the following
reasons:
Its purposes are to elicit concrete information from the administration, to request
its intervention, and when necessary, to expose abuses and seek redress. The
procedure provides the opposition with a means of discovering the governments
weak points and because of the publicity it generates, it has a salutary influence
on the administration. On the whole, because of the detailed facts elicited during
the interpellation or in the written answers, it will help members to understand the
complicated subject matter of bills and statutory measures laid before the
Assembly. It may be added that the popularity of this procedure can be attributed
to the fact that in making use of his right to ask questions, the member is a
completely free agent of the people. The only limits on his actions are the rules
governing the admissibility of questions concerned with matters of form and not
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Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the
end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information which is not frequently true recourse
must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed The fact that the Constitution
expressly gives the Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly
behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for
contempt any other person.[171]
The Court further ruled that the power of the Senate to punish a witness for
contempt does not terminate upon the adjournment of the session.[172] It held
that the investigation was within the power of the Senate since the transaction
involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of
no less than P5,000,000.00 of public funds, of which the Congress is the
constitutional guardian.[173] The investigation was also found to be in aid of
legislation. As result of the yet unfinished investigation, the Court noted that the
investigating committee has recommended, and the Senate has approved three
bills.[174]
The Court further held that once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within
the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the
power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry,
subject to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution.
Hence, a witness can not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no
relation to the subject of the inquiry. But the Court explained that the materiality
of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the
inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The
reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form
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b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the
facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more
intense digging of facts.[157] The power of Congress to conduct investigation is
recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, viz:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
But even in the absence of an express provision in the Constitution,
congressional investigation has been held to be an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. In the United States, the lack of a
constitutional provision specifically authorizing the conduct of legislative
investigations did not deter its Congresses from holding investigation on
suspected corruption, mismanagement, or inefficiencies of government officials.
Exercised first in the failed St. Clair expedition in 1792, the power to conduct
investigation has since been invoked in the Teapot Dome, Watergate, IranContra, and Whitewater controversies.[158] Subsequently, in a series of
decisions, the Court recognized the danger to effective and honest conduct of
the Government if the legislative power to probe corruption in the Executive
branch were unduly unhampered.[159]
Upholding the power of the Senate to punish Arnault for contempt, the Court
ruled as follows:
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
(3) the referral by the Committee on Rules to the appropriate committee, after
making a determination on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of inquiry
by such committee, of a petition filed or information given by a Member of the
House requesting such inquiry and endorsed by the Speaker: Provided, That
such petition or information shall be given under oath, stating the facts upon
which it is based, and accompanied by supporting affidavits.[183]
The committee to which a privilege speech, resolution, petition or information
requesting an inquiry is referred may constitute and appoint sub-committees
composed of at least one-third (1/3) of the committee for the purpose of
performing any and all acts which the committee as a whole is authorized to
perform, except to punish for contempt. In case a privilege speech is referred to
two or more committees, a joint inquiry by the said committees shall be
conducted. The inquiries are to be held in public except when the committee or
sub-committee deems that the examination of a witness in a public hearing may
endanger national security. In which case, it shall conduct the hearing in an
executive session.[184]
The Rules further provide that the filing or pendency of a case before any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial or administrative bodies shall not stop or abate any
inquiry conducted to carry out a specific legislative purpose.[185] In exercise of
congressional inquiry, the committee has the power to issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any part of the country, signed by the
chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker.[186]
Furthermore, the committee may, by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its members
constituting a quorum, punish for contempt any person who: (a) refuses, after
being duly summoned, to obey such summons without legal excuse; (b) refuses
to be sworn or placed under affirmation; (c) refuses to answer any relevant
inquiry; (d) refuses to produce any books, papers, documents or records that are
relevant to the inquiry and are in his/her possession; (e) acts in a disrespectful
manner towards any member of the Committee or commits misbehavior in the
presence of the committee; or (f) unduly interferes in the conduct of proceedings
during meetings.[187]
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and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of
such information elicited from a single question.[175]
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
G.R. No. 166715
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law transforms the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters as
they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
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E.E.M.DELACRUZ
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction
is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary.
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following:
(1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear
that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement
laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral
to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the overaccumulation of power in the executive branch.
Rulings:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided
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Issues:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to
the President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the
creation of a congressional oversight committee.
Discussions:
The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,
which states that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
CONSTI 1
in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law
concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct
primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the
collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent
functions taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
Facts:
House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT
System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these
Purposes)
Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different from
that of the House Bill
Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and 3rd reading of
the Bill on the same day
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in
fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the
provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has
recognized the following as sufficient standards: public interest, justice and
equity, public convenience and welfare and simplicity, economy and
welfare.33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA,
BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law
may be considered moot and academic.
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
their situation not because of any defect in title but because they might have not
noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its existence.
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E.E.M.DELACRUZ
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the
second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15,
2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that
the COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for
the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until
further orders of the Court.
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Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to
address the following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises.
More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785."
Facts:
On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set
the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001.
During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the COMELEC "to
refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall
remain in force until after the COMELEC itself will have complied and reported its
compliance with the foregoing disposition.
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the
COMELEC a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be
deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It
also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be
counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On April
11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed COMELEC Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed respondents
to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from
notice.
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the partylist system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to
"formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules."
Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need
for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available."
In view of the participation of political parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the
inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable
portion of the questioned Resolution." For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects
to the participation of "major political parties."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or
a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office."
In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party or any organization or group for that matter
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941.
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither
does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
CONSTI 1
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas
hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park.
The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's
position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst
are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them
that the party-list system was enacted to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the
specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice
in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State.
CONSTI 1
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the
handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
These groups can possibly include other sectors.
CONSTI 1
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a
sectoral partyor a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a
sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a"political
partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government."On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an
organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is
clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a
sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or
the same governance principles and policies,regardless of their economic status
as citizens.
Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional,
and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may
have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties
they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may
have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for
their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may
have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify,
even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
CONSTI 1
and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the
sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their
existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng
Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of
Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the
cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated
cases.
Political Law- Party-list system
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,
stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the
party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety,
of the party-list system.As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution."
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements
the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution.
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully,
and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations
contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include
the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be
remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now
possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections
under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
Petitions Granted
CONSTI 1
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "welldefined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and
the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
CONSTI 1
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA.
The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the
Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around
since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed
that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been
facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being
used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit
was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
ISSUES:
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about
1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of
the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund
or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40
million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance,
livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve
purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,
or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the
projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on nondelegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged
in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the
individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
a. Separation of Powers
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HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds
(power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws
this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to
which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that
pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will
still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their
own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the
LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
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of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the
Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the
pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that
it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of
the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular
legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from
certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya
Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and
for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs
earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund)
which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of
the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a
particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD
910 and PD 1869.
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
4. Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible.
5.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof
may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials
are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions
indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure.
CONSTI 1
Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both
were subsequently relieved for defying the Presidents order.
4.
Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group), for
certiorari and prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court
challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
Congress
YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress,
hence it deprives it of the information in possession of these officials.
1.
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article
VI of the Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The
power of inquiry with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and when it does not possess the
required information, recourse must be had on others who possess it. This power
is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The operation of the
government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault case.
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
11. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464,
however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is
impermissible. Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive
branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise,
we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the
operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater
value our right as a people to take part in government.
CONSTI 1
7.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege, and not by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the president on whom the
executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by
the power of impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from this power
of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as
well as the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
On the constitutionality of EO 464
8.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the
Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,
must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department
heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of
Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances
must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it
constitutional. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such
inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
9. Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of
E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that
it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and
assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is
valid. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section
2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of
providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464,
coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is
woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
10. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of
E.O. 464 is, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the
senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was
cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow
and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among
others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries
in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject
of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our
Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and nondelegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
CONSTI 1
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
24. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services
for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed
by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and
during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that
he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1)
The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and nondelegable presidential power. - i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2)
The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that
an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3)
The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
CONSTI 1
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
FACTS:
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the
Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of
Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo
warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that
Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional
district representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and
not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first
nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R.
189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay partylist group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to
sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay
represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person
since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and
assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that
he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility
as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
CONSTI 1
E.E.M.DELACRUZ
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when
it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and
Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
CONSTI 1
HELD:
although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not
the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the
members of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, partylist nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives no less
than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,