Journal of Public Economics 5 (1976) 169-177.

0 North-Holland

Publishing Company

THE MEDIAN VOTER RULE AND

THE THEORY OF POLITICAL CHOICE
William

S. COMANOR*

Vniuersity of California Santa Barbara, CA 93106, U.S.A.

Received January 1974, revised version received October 1974
This paper examines the relationship between voter preferences and political decisions. The
behavior of political candidates is investigated under conditions where either the expected
number of votes or the probability of election is maximized. The primary conclusion is that
distributions of preferences which are skewed to the right are likely to be associated with
political decisions which understate the point of median preferences. However, under reasonable assumptions regarding the degree of skewness, the extent of the difference may be relatively
small so that the median voter rule remains a useful means of approximating the results
obtained from the process of political choice.

1. Introduction

This paper examines the relationship between voter preferences and political
decisions. In most studies of this question, there is wide agreement that political
decision-makers adopt the preferences of the median voter. In this acceptance,
these studies rest on a foundation most clearly stated in a paper by Barr and
Davis (1966).2 The object of this paper is to examine this foundation in some
detail and propose an alternate model for political decisions.
2. Models of voter behavior
Barr and Davis (1966, p. 154) assume that each voter has a desired level of
government expenditures and that his voting behavior depends on the relationship between the desired level of expenditures and the platforms of competing
political candidates. A voting rule is suggested such that an individual will vote
for the candidate whose platform is closest to his own preferred level of
*I am grateful to MS. Feldstein, J.E. Jackson, H.E. Leland, J. Margolis, R.J. Milgrim and
W.F. Sharpe for helpful comments and discussion during the preparation of this paper.
R.H. Smiley and R.M. Costrell served as valuable research assistants. An earlier version was
presented at the New York meeting of the Econometric Society, December 1973.
See, for example, Bowen (1943). Barlow (1970), Borcherding and Deacon (1972), and
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973).
For further development of their model, see Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970).

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W.S. Comanor, Median voter rule and political choice

expenditures. Where the two candidates set identical platforms, the voter will
flip a fair coin to make his decision.
The median voter rule follows directly from this assumed rule of voter
behavior. To appeal to as many voters as possible, both candidates move towards
the point of median preference. Barr and Davis argue that if one candidate
selects a nonmedian level of expenditures while the other adopts a median
strategy, the latter is certain to win the election.
As the median voter rule follows directly from the suggested voting rule, we
need to examine the latter in some detail. It can be described by the solid line
in fig. 1. On the vertical axis is the probability that the ith voter will vote for a

1.0 /

0.5
1

//

fi
/ \

L
a

//

\
\

\\

\\

\\

20 -Q

a:

\\

\\
\\
b

Fig. 1

particular candidate, while on the horizontal axis is the level of expenditures

proposed by a political candidate. Consider the platform of the opposition
candidate as predetermined at Q.
The desired level of expenditures for the ith voter is Q:. According to the
proposed voting rule, a candidate can obtain an individuals vote with certainty
so long as he proposes a level of expenditures between Q) and Q.3 If he adopts
a level of expenditures equal to Q, he has a probability of 0.5 of obtaining this
vote, while if he sets a greater volume of expenditures, the probability falls
instantly to zero. Barr and Davis assume also that voters have symmetrical loss
functions as political choices depart from their preferred values. The response
31n this paper, as in that of Barr and Davis, we assume that all registered voters know the
platform of each candidate, that they all vote on election day, that the winning politician not
only selects but also has the power and willingness to set the level of expenditures announced
in his platform, and that there is only a single expenditure at issue.

W.S. Comanor, Median voter rule and political

choice

171

function to the left of QT is therefore the mirror image of the function to the
right of this point.
This view of voting behavior implies that the gap between desired and offered
levels of expenditures has no influence on voting behavior so long as the offered
level is preferred to that of the opposition. Whether the offered level of expenditures equals the voters desired level or is just slightly preferable to the rival
position, he will always vote for this candidate.
The discontinuous function described by the solid line in fig. 1 has some appeal
only if there is but one basis on which to choose among candidates. However,
there are always other factors which intrude, if only the personality of the candidates. In the discussion below, we allow for the influence of other factors in the
making of voting decisions, referred to collectively as the personality of the
candidate, which is regarded as exogenous.4
What is required is a voter response function which allows for the influence
of this other factor as well as for the level of government expenditures. This is
accomplished by permitting the distance between desired and offered levels of
expenditures to influence voter behavior, As the proposed level departs from the
desired level and approaches that of his rival, voters pay increasing attention to
other considerations. If the level of expenditures proposed by one candidate is
only slightly preferable, the voter will not make his choice solely on the basis of
the small difference at hand, but rather will choose largely on other grounds.
Consider a political candidates view of a representative voter. A voters
response to a candidates personality is considered as a probabilistic process,
as it must surely seem to the candidates. In this setting, the relationship between
the desired levels of expenditures and the levels proposed by the two candidates
determines the ex ante probabilities that he will vote for specific candidates,
while the actual vote ex post depends as well on the specific voters reaction to
the other exogenous factors.
If the appeal of this other factor is on average no greater for one candidate
than for another, then the ex ante probabilities are equal at one-half when the
proposed levels of expenditures are also equal. This does not indicate that a
specific individual is indifferent between the two candidates when the platforms
are the same, but that a voter chosen at random is as likely to prefer the
personality of one candidate as that of the other.
When the proposed levels of expenditures differ, the situation changes in
important respects. For most voters, one proposed level is preferred to another,
and therefore he pays less attention to other considerations. The relevant
probabilities now exceed one-half for one candidate and fall below one-half
for the other. Moreover, the difference between the probabilities should increase
with the difference between the two platforms. How a specific vote is actually
4An approach consistent with the one suggested here is to view choice behavior as innately
stochastic rather than deterministic, so that decisions can only be described ex ante by probabilities. For an extended discussion of this approach, see Lute (1959).

172

W.S. Comanor, Median voter rule and political choice

cast depends of course on the implicit trade-off between proposed policy and
personality for the individual voter,
Whether the probability for the preferred candidate approaches unity when
the proposed level of expenditures equals the level desired by the voter is
problematical; for this would require that no weight be given to any other
consideration, In any event, we would expect to find a more continuous function
than that implied by the Barr-Davis rule : It should equal 0.5 when the proposed
levels of the two candidates are equal, 5 and reach a maximum when the proposed
level of one candidate equals the voters preferred level of expenditures.6
While various functional relationships could be proposed, we posit the linear
form indicated by the dashed line in fig. 1. Since these probabilities can never
be negative, the function equals zero at levels of Q below a and above b. Where,
however, the opposition platform equals the desired level of expenditures for a
given voter, the value of Pi is one-half when Q equals this same level and zero
elsewhere.
3. Models of political behavior
In this section we consider the actions of political candidates, who are assumed
to be concerned only with the number of votes they receive in the next election.
They respond to the wishes of their constituents, who have similar response
functions although with different levels of preferred expenditures. However,
these preferences are known by all candidates.
In this model, an individuals vote is regarded as a random variable arising
from a single Bernoulli trial with probabilities Pi and (1 -Pi). If all votes are
independent, the actual number received by a candidate is a random variable
arising from a drawing of N independent Bernoulli trials. The mean and variance
of this distribution are generalizations of the appropriate formulas for the binomial distribution [Feller (1957, pp. 216-217)]: EV = c Pi, and var V =
C Pi (1 -Pi). Furthermore, it can be readily approximated, like the binomial,
by the normal distribution for large numbers.
In this context, the actions of a political candidate depend on his objectives
as reflected in his utility function. * There are two leading alternatives. First, it
may be linear in the number of votes received. In this case, the maximization of
expected utility is the same as maximizing the expected number of votes. A
second alternative is that actions are taken which maximize the probability that
In general, of course, this is not the case, for it requires the assumption that the personal
appeal of the two candidates is, on average, equal and independent of the level of expenditures.
61n the analysis below, this maximum is unity. The best defense for this assumption is
probably that there is no other natural value that this function should take at its maximum.
This assumption follows in the tradition of the early work of Downs (1957) and Buchanan
and Tullock (1962).
*A related paper which focuses on the utility functions of political candidates is Hinich
and Ordeshook (1970).

W.S. Comanor, Median voter rule and political choice

173

the number of votes received exceeds one-half of the total. Here the candidates
utility function assumes only two values, a high value for success and a low
value for failure.
If the distribution
of the number of votes received is normal, a candidate
concerned with maximizing
the probability
of election will choose that value
of government expenditures which maximizes

The denominator
is the standard deviation of the distribution
of votes. If this
quantity were constant, maximizing this ratio would be equivalent to maximizing
the expected number of votes. Note that if the relevant probabilities
lie between
0.3 and 0.7, the standard deviation is nearly constant, and actions implied by the
two functions are not widely different.
In this model, we assume that each candidate believes that his proposed level
of government
expenditures
does not influence the platform of his rival. The
assumption
may be defended by noting that platforms are not readily changed
during the course of an election campaign without unfortunate
effects on the
confidence of an electorate. Moreover, it may be quite difficult for an incumbent
candidate to propose a different level of expenditures than was adopted while in
office. Since there is generally one incumbent and one challenger, the roles of the
two candidates are not fully symmetrical. Referring again to fig. 1, Q may then
be viewed as the predetermined
platform of the incumbent,
while the variable
Q refers to the platform chosen by the challenger. Through a process of successive
elections, a Cournot equilibrium
is reached where the two candidates find it
optimal to propose the same level of expenditures.
Note that the slope of each response function depends on the distance between
his preference and Q. Voters whose preferred levels of expenditures are relatively
near Q have response functions with steeper slopes than those with more distant
preferences, and therefore count for more than those whose preferences place
them at the extremes of the distribution.
In this manner, we are consistent with
the position taken on a related topic by Stigler (1970).

4. The determination

of political

equilibrium

Consider the response function for the ith voter, described in fig. 1, and the
value taken by this function at an arbitrary point Q 5 Q. For this case, there
are three distinct regions of the function which depend on particular values of Qr.
For QT < Q < Q,

p(Q; Qf> = 1- KQ: - QMQ? - Q>l.

For Q < Qr < Q, the function is unchanged except that a plus replaces
minus sign; while for Q < Q < QT, the original function is maintained.

the

174

W.S. Comanor, Median voter rule and political choice

Now let

WQ) =

i;mJYQ; Qh

where Qz is that value of Q: which equals Q. If this function is considered

continuous rather than discrete, it can be written,

(2)
whereZ = Q*. Since the function equals zero for some values of Z, the limits of
integration are set such that these values are excluded.
Political candidates maximize this function if they wish to maximize the
expected number of votes. A necessary condition for this maximum is

dWQ) _
dQ

s
s

0 2(Z- Q) dZm

(2Q+Q)/3

Q &m

g(Z) dZ =O.

ZQ'-Q 2(z--

Q>

g(Z)
2(Z- Q) dZ
(3)

Comparable results can be obtained for Q 1 Q.

If j, k(Z)/(Z- Q>ldZ = 0, the optimum is at Q. Returning to the case of a
discrete function, this condition can be written xi+,,, [l/Q+ - Q]Ni = 0, where
Ni is the number of voters with the same value of QF. In equilibrium, therefore,
the sum of the reciprocals of the deviations of the desired levels of expenditures
from the equilibrium value must equal zero.
Furthermore, the optimal value of Q, indicated here by &, is that value for
which
(4)
Each observation is weighted by a factor [l/(Q: - Q)], where Q here is a given
test value. The optimum equals Q if the distribution is symmetrical around Q.
Therefore, a sufficient condition for the median to be the equilibrium value is that
the distribution be symmetrical about the median. Only with an asymmetrical
distribution can the equilibrium value be different.

W.S. Comanor, Median voter rule and political choice

5. The difference between equilibrium

175

and median values

In the previous section an equilibrium condition was determined on the basis

that candidates maximize the expected number of votes. Unfortunately, the
analysis is far more complex when candidates maximize the probability of
election. Even in the former case, moreover, the equilibrium condition is not
stated in closed form. For both reasons, it seemed necessary to apply the model
of political choice directly to assumed distributions of voter preferences.
As indicated above, individual voter response functions, except those in which
QT equals Q, are comprised of four linear segments, with three critical values
at which the function changes direction. The range of all possible values of Q can
therefore be divided into regions depending on the critical values for all response
functions. Within each region, the graph of c Pi is linear, so that the maximum
value is necessarily reached at an endpoint.
Where political officials maximize the probability of election, this is no longer
so, since the function is now curvilinear within regions, and extremal values
may exist in some of them. It is necessary, therefore, to compare values of the
probability of election at relevant extremal values as well as at endpoints.
In this analysis, the equilibrium value is determined by choosing an optimal
value of Q for a given value of Q and iterating this procedure with regard to Q.
In the first iteration, Q is set equal to the median value of the distribution of Q).
An equilibrium is reached when the new value departs from the old value by less
than one percent of the latter. The utility function used throughout is the
maximization of the probability of election.
Since the equilibrium value is the median for symmetrical distributions, a
skewed distribution is required to investigate possible differences between the
two. A convenient distribution for this purpose is the lognormal distribution.
Two experiments were carried out. In each, five samples of 1001 observations
were drawn from a lognormal distribution. In the first, a relative variance
coefficient of 0.55 was specified, which is the value estimated for the distribution
of household disposable income in the United States.g This value would be
appropriate if the degree of skewness in the distribution of voter preferences
equaled that of the distribution of income, and both were described by the
lognormal distribution. r Alternatively, a relative variance coefficient of twice
that value was specified; this indicates greater skewness.
Of the ten samples drawn, eight showed equilibrium values below the median,
while in one other the two values were equal. It thus appears that distributions
gSeeFeldstein (1972, p. 184).
roThe lognormal distribution is completely specified by the parameters fi and a*, which
are the mean and variance of the distribution of the logarithms. The relative skewness coefficient, which is the ratio of the third moment to the cube of the standard deviation, equals
{qJ+3q}, where v is the coefficient of variation, or the square root of the relative variance
coefficient. See Aitchison and Brown (1966, pp. 8-9).
That the lognormal distribution may adequately describe the distribution of income is
suggested in Aitchison and Brown (1966, pp. 107-120).

W.S. Comanor, Median voter rule and political choice

176

of preferences which are skewed to the right are likely to have equilibrium values
which are less than the median.
A second observation is that these equilibrium values are, in all cases, identical
to those reached by maximizing the expected number of votes. The variance of
the expected number of votes is apparently sufficiently stable so that the alternate
political utility functions lead effectively to the same actions.
The results of this analysis are presented in table 1. The average relative
variance coefficients in the five samples in each experiment are reported so as to
provide a comparison
with the population
value. In the first experiment, the

Table 1
Relation between equilibrium and median values of political choice.
Experiment
Population relative variance coefficient
Average sample relative variance coefficient
Average sample percentage decline of
equilibrium below median values

II

0.55
0.57

1.10
1.08

1.8

3.4

equilibrium value on average is only 1.8 percent below the median, while in the
second this figure rises to 3.4 percent. While the median voter rule seems
generally to overstate equilibrium values where the distribution
of preferences is
skewed to the right, the size of the difference is relatively small.

6. Concluding

comments

A conclusion which may be drawn from this analysis is that, under certain
reasonable assumptions,
the entire distribution
of preferred expenditures,
and
not simply the median value, affects the decisions of political officials. While the
proposed voter response function may well be more complicated than that drawn
in fig. 1, this conclusion is unchanged.
A more important
result is that there may be many circumstances
in which
political officials allocate less funds for government
expenditures
than is suggested by the median voter rule. This is the case where. the distribution
of
preferences is skewed to the right. Since this is a characteristic
of income distributions
generally, we might expect to find it as well in the distributions
of
preferences. While studies founded on the median voter would in these cases
overstate actual levels of government
expenditures,
these findings suggest that
the degree of overstatement
may be relatively small, so that the median voter
rule remains a useful means of approximating
the results obtained from the
actual process of political choice.

W.S. Comanor, Median voter rule and political choice

177

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