Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Actual Case or Controversy
Actual Case or Controversy
Actual Case or Controversy
Citizenship
Read and understand all the provisions of Article VI
and Republic Act No. 9225
A. Aznar v. Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA 703.
B. Co. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692
(1991).
C. Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630.
D. Valles V. Commission on Elections, 337 SCRA 543 (2000).
E. Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA
545 (2001).
F. Nicolas- Lewis v. Commission on Elections, 497 SCRA 649 (2006).
G. Poe- Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221697,
221698-700, 08 March 2016.
Legislative Department
Read and understand Article VI, Sections 1-7;
Sections 21-22
A. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, 21 April 2009,
586 SCRA 210.
B. Romualdez- Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976,
248 SCRA 300.
C. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, 18 September
1995, 248 SCRA 400.
D. Senate of the Philippines V. Ermita, G.R.. No. 169777, April 20, 2006,
488 SCRA 1.
E. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 014
September 2008, 564 SCRA 152.
Legislative Department
Please read and understand Article VI, Sections 8-20, 23-32, and
Bernas (2009 Edition), page 721 to 819. We shall revisit Sections 21-22
for greater clarity on the distinction of the two constitutional
provisions.
Executive Department
Please read and understand Article VII, Section 1-23, especially the
powers of the President, and Bernas, pages 820-945.
Judicial Department
Please read and understand Article VIII, Sections 1-16, and Bernas,
pages 946-1034. Internalize the Constitutional safeguards to ensure
the independence of Constitutional Commissions.
Leland R. Selna, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs was Matthew P. Mitchell. [405 U.S. 727, 728]
Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for respondents. With him
on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Kashiwa, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Kiechel, William Terry Bray, Edmund B. Clark, and
Jacques B. Gelin.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Anthony A. Lapham
and Edward Lee Rogers for the Environmental Defense Fund; by
George J. Alexander and Marcel B. Poche for the National
Environmental Law Society; and by Bruce J. Terris and James W.
Moorman for the Wilderness Society et al.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by E. Lewis Reid and
Calvin E. Baldwin for the County of Tulare; by Robert C. Keck for the
American National Cattlemen's Assn. et al.; and by Donald R. Allen for
the Far West Ski Assn. et al.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
The Mineral King Valley is an area of great natural beauty nestled in
the Sierra Nevada Mountains in Tulare County, California, adjacent to
Sequoia National Park. It has been part of the Sequoia National Forest
since 1926, and is designated as a national game refuge by special Act
of Congress. 1 Though once the site of extensive mining activity,
Mineral King is now used almost exclusively for recreational purposes.
Its relative inaccessibility and lack of development have limited the
number of visitors each year, and at the same time have preserved the
valley's quality as a quasiwilderness area largely uncluttered by the
products of civilization. [405 U.S. 727, 729]
The United States Forest Service, which is entrusted with the
maintenance and administration of national forests, began in the late
1940's to give consideration to Mineral King as a potential site for
recreational development. Prodded by a rapidly increasing demand for
skiing facilities, the Forest Service published a prospectus in 1965,
inviting bids from private developers for the construction and operation
of a ski resort that would also serve as a summer recreation area. The
proposal of Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc., was chosen from those of six
bidders, and Disney received a three-year permit to conduct surveys
and explorations in the valley in connection with its preparation of a
complete master plan for the resort.
The final Disney plan, approved by the Forest Service in January 1969,
outlines a $35 million complex of motels, restaurants, swimming pools,
parking lots, and other structures designed to accommodate 14,000
visitors daily. This complex is to be constructed on 80 acres of the
valley floor under a 30-year use permit from the Forest Service. Other
facilities, including ski lifts, ski trails, a cog-assisted railway, and utility
installations, are to be constructed on the mountain slopes and in other
parts of the valley under a revocable special-use permit. To provide
access to the resort, the State of California proposes to construct a
highway 20 miles in length. A section of this road would traverse
Sequoia National Park, as would a proposed high-voltage power line
needed to provide electricity for the resort. Both the highway and the
power line require the approval of the Department of the Interior,
which is entrusted with the preservation and maintenance of the
national parks.
Representatives of the Sierra Club, who favor maintaining Mineral King
largely in its present state, followed the progress of recreational
planning for the valley [405 U.S. 727, 730] with close attention and
increasing dismay. They unsuccessfully sought a public hearing on the
proposed development in 1965, and in subsequent correspondence
with officials of the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior,
they expressed the Club's objections to Disney's plan as a whole and to
particular features included in it. In June 1969 the Club filed the
present suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California, seeking a declaratory judgment that various aspects of
the proposed development contravene federal laws and regulations
governing the preservation of national parks, forests, and game
refuges, 2 and also seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions
restraining the federal officials involved from granting their approval or
issuing permits in connection with the Mineral King project. The
petitioner Sierra Club sued as a membership corporation with "a
special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the
national parks, game refuges and forests of the country," and invoked
the judicial-review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. 701 et seq. [405 U.S. 727, 731]
After two days of hearings, the District Court granted the requested
preliminary injunction. It rejected the respondents' challenge to the
Sierra Club's standing to sue, and determined that the hearing had
raised questions "concerning possible excess of statutory authority,
sufficiently substantial and serious to justify a preliminary
injunction . . . ." The respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 433 F.2d 24. With respect to the
petitioner's standing, the court noted that there was "no allegation in
the complaint that members of the Sierra Club would be affected by
the actions of [the respondents] other than the fact that the actions are
personally displeasing or distasteful to them," id., at 33, and
concluded:
"We do not believe such club concern without a showing of more
direct interest can constitute standing in the legal sense sufficient to
challenge the exercise of responsibilities on behalf of all the citizens by
two cabinet level officials of the government acting under
Congressional and Constitutional authority." Id., at 30.
Alternatively, the Court of Appeals held that the Sierra Club had not
made an adequate showing of irreparable injury and likelihood of
success on the merits to justify issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The court thus vacated the injunction. The Sierra Club filed a petition
for a writ of certiorari which we granted, 401 U.S. 907 , to review the
questions of federal law presented.
II
The first question presented is whether the Sierra Club has alleged
facts that entitle it to obtain judicial review of the challenged action.
Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is what
[405 U.S. 727, 732] has traditionally been referred to as the question
of standing to sue. Where the party does not rely on any specific
statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of
standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a "personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 , as to ensure that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 . Where,
however, Congress has authorized public officials to perform certain
functions according to law, and has provided by statute for judicial
review of those actions under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to
standing must begin with a determination of whether the statute in
question authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff. 3
The Sierra Club relies upon 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. 702, which provides:
"A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency [405 U.S. 727, 733] action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."
Early decisions under this statute interpreted the language as adopting
to seek judicial review under the statute, but once review is properly
invoked, that person may argue the public interest in support of his
claim that the agency has failed to comply with its statutory mandate.
12 It was in the latter sense that the "standing" of the appellant in
Scripps-Howard existed only as a "representative of the public
interest." It is in a similar sense that we have used the phrase "private
attorney general" to [405 U.S. 727, 738] describe the function
performed by persons upon whom Congress has conferred the right to
seek judicial review of agency action. See Data Processing, supra, at
154.
The trend of cases arising under the APA and other statutes authorizing
judicial review of federal agency action has been toward recognizing
that injuries other than economic harm are sufficient to bring a person
within the meaning of the statutory language, and toward discarding
the notion that an injury that is widely shared is ipso facto not an injury
sufficient to provide the basis for judicial review. 13 We noted this
development with approval in Data Processing, 397 U.S., at 154 , in
saying that the interest alleged to have been injured "may reflect
`aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as economic
values." But broadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in
support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the
requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered
an injury.
Some courts have indicated a willingness to take this latter step by
conferring standing upon organizations [405 U.S. 727, 739] that have
demonstrated "an organizational interest in the problem" of
environmental or consumer protection. Environmental Defense Fund v.
Hardin, 138 U.S. App. D.C. 391, 395, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097. 14 It is clear
that an organization whose members are injured may represent those
members in a proceeding for judicial review. See, e. g., NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 . But a mere "interest in a problem," no
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the
organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to
render the organization "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" within the
meaning of the APA. The Sierra Club is a large and long-established
organization, with a historic commitment to the cause of protecting our
Nation's natural heritage from man's depredations. But if a "special
interest" in this subject were enough to entitle the Sierra Club to
commence this litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis
upon which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide "special interest"
organization, however small or short-lived. And if any group with a
bona fide "special interest" could initiate such litigation, it is difficult to
perceive why any individual citizen with the [405 U.S. 727, 740] same
bona fide special interest would not also be entitled to do so.
The requirement that a party seeking review must allege facts showing
that he is himself adversely affected does not insulate executive action
from judicial review, nor does it prevent any public interests from being
protected through the judicial process. 15 It does serve as at least a
rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought
in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome. That
goal would be undermined were we to construe the APA to authorize
judicial review at the behest of organizations or individuals who seek to
do no more than vindicate their own value preferences through the
judicial process. 16 The principle that the Sierra Club would have us
establish in this case would do just that. [405 U.S. 727, 741]
As we conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in its holding that
the Sierra Club lacked standing to maintain this action, we do not reach
any other questions presented in the petition, and we intimate no view
on the merits of the complaint.
The judgment is Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners case has met the requirements for a
judicial review.
Ruling:
The fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is
grossly lacking.
1) The petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse
injury or hardship from the act complained of.
2) House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of
proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No
convention has yet transpired, no rules of procedure have yet been
adopted, and no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no
usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken
place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a typical example of an
uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated
or may not occur at all.
There is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight since the proposed
amendments is still unacted. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to
submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted.
Locus standi or standing to sue: Generally, a party will be allowed
to litigate only when he can demonstrate that
1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy of sought.
The petitioners have not shown the elemental injury that would
grant them with the standing to sue. They failed to show that they
have sustained or will sustain direct injury in the promulgation of the
act. Moreover, the claim of the petitioners that they are instituting the
cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens do not grant them
with locus standi.
It is because a taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
Transcendal Importance
- Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus
standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners
have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under
the principle of transcendal importance. [David v. Arroyo G.R. No.
171396 (2006)]
US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E.
GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER,
petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of
Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO
DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos
Facts:
Issue/s:
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the
respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs
against the private respondent.
Ratio:
Issues:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e.
Whether or not this is a suit against the State with its consent)
Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the
Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims,
and by public addresses made by President Aquino, the State has
consented to be sued
Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State
Holding:
No.
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
Ratio:
Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued
without its consent
The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way
mean that liability automatically attaches to the State
The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall
serve only as cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State
immediately
President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State;
they are not tantamount to a waiver by the State
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:
When the Republic is sued by name;
When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the
case is such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but
to the government
Although the military officers and personnel were discharging
their official functions during the incident, their functions ceased to be
official the moment they exceeded their authority
There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use
of firearms.
Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order,
but they fired at the crowd instead
No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.
suit against the State that for them the State has waived its immunity
when the Mendiola Commission recommended the government to
indemnify the victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts and
utterances of President Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is
indicative of State's waiver of immunity and therefore, the government
should also be liable and should be compensated by the government .
The case has been dismissed that State has not waived its immunity.
On the other hand, the Military Officer filed a petition for certiorari to
review the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and
therefore should the State be liable for the incident?
HELD:
No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission
regarding the indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the
victims of the incident does not in any way mean liability automatically
attaches to the State. The purpose of which is to investigate of the
disorders that took place and there commendation it makes cannot in
any way bind the State. The acts and utterances of President Aquino
does not mean admission of the State of its liability. Moreover, the case
does not qualify as suit against the State.While the Republic in this
case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government.The military officials are held liable for the damages for
their official functions ceased the moment they have exceeded to their
authority. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would be
peaceful and orderly and should guarantee the safety of the people.
The court has made it quite clear that even a high position in the
government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another. The court rules that there is no reversible error and no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge in issuing the
questioned orders.
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district
of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in
the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners,
Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of
the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent
premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established
his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he
bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of
residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in
China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community
of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was
baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a
natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who
was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to
put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life
in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result,
a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong
Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of
where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong
Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of
Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final
and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old,
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace
were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent,
in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his
secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed
the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were
better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in
Shauf v. CA
Loida Q. Shauf & Jacob Shauf, petitioners v. Hon. CA, Don E. Detwiler & Anthony Persi,
respondents
Second Division
Doctrine: official v. personal capacity
Keywords: void for overbreadth
Date: November 27, 1990
Ponente: Justice Regalado
Facts:
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a
member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of
Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air
Base, for which she is eminently qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages
and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private
respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and
Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by
reason of her nationality and sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant
Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if
a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the
vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be
released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if shes
available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary
Abalateos was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos
appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to
said position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was extended
indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the
complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation.
He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in
accordance of with the applicable regulation.
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as
the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine
Regional Trial Court, etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49
as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorneys fees +
P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of
the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the
other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune
from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance
of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military
Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does
not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the
exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim
that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus
case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According
to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private
capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government which
would require consent.
Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further
claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers &
employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in
the Philippines & is not part of international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of
the US Armed
Forces
Held:
No they are not immune.
Ratio:
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and
may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his
private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak
of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government
is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable
in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen
Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts
of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State
officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the
personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which
he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without
its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any
arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of
the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts
of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable.