The Effect of Airline Mergers on On-Time Performance:

A Case Study of the Delta-Northwest Merger

By Royce Yap
June 2, 2014
1. Introduction
The potential impact of a merger on product prices is often the focus in antitrust decision-making
when determining whether the possible efficiency gains from a merger outweigh the potential
increase in prices resulting from an increase in market power following a merger. However, a
merger may have consequences on consumer welfare, beyond product prices. Changes in the
concentration in the industry may impact other aspects of non-price competition.

In particular, this paper looks at the airline industry, a commonly studied industry in the analysis
of merger issues, and the impact of an airline merger on the on-time performance of airlines.
Thus far, analyses of mergers in the airline industry, including Borenstein (1990, 1992), Kim and
Singal (1993), and Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010), have largely focused on the price effects of
mergers.

However, beyond prices, airline on-time performance, as part of service quality, is another aspect
on which airlines compete and could be affected by changes in the industry concentration. Back
in 2001, concerns over poor on-time flight performance amidst the American-TWA merger led to
the modification of the Airline Customer Service Act, which would require airlines to include
customer service commitments in their contract of carriage (Kocher, 2001). As one of the most
common category of customer complaints in the January 2008 Air Travel Consumer Report, poor

airline on-time performance contributes to decreased consumer welfare and should be considered
alongside price when determining the effects of a merger on consumer welfare.

This paper examines the impact of the $3.1 billion merger between Delta Air Lines and
Northwest Airlines in 2008 on airline on-time performance across different routes and carriers.
The results show that the overall arrival delays in routes with Delta but not Northwest flying premerger further decreased by 1.2 percentage points, relative to other routes. However, on these
same routes, even after including route-month and carrier fixed effects, Delta flights experienced
a further 4.4 percentage-point increase in arrival delays, relative to other airlines flying the same
route. On the six selected routes that both Delta and Northwest flew pre-merger, no significant
results are found.

2. Background and Literature Review

The timeline for the merger between Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines began in April 2008
when Delta announced its plans to acquire Northwest Airlines for $3.1 billion. Six months later,
due to the minimum overlap between the two airlines' routes, the Department of Justice approved
the merger on October 29, 2008. However, it was only more than a year later on December 31,
2009 that the operating certificates of the two airlines were merged. The merger of the
reservations on January 31, 2010, officially completed the merger.

Given the relatively recent nature of this merger, there has only been one published paper
examining the price effects of this particular merger. Luo (2013) found that, other things equal,

the fares for airport-pairs where Delta and Northwest competed prior to the merger did not
increase by much following the merger.

In 2010, the first full year in which Delta combined operations with Northwest, however, Delta
was reported as being last among major carriers in terms of its on-time performance, with 77.4%
of its flights arriving on time (Yamanouchi, 2011). According to a Delta spokesman, the airline
had "a number of operational challenges throughout 2010", including maintenance delays from a
"dis-synergy with the merger", as described by Richard Andersen, Deltas CEO. 1 An example
given was how Delta was unprepared when Northwest planes that were moved onto Delta routes
needed maintenance.

Beyond causing increases in operational inefficiencies, airline mergers could impact on-time
performance by changing the level of competition on a route. Mazzeo (2003) found that flight
delays were higher in frequency and more severe on routes where a single airline provided direct
service and through airports where the single airline had a larger share of total flights. Mazzeo
argues that airlines could undertake actions to improve their on-time performance. However,
given that such measures incur significant costs, an airline's decision to undertake such actions
would be dependent on the likelihood of consumers changing airlines as a result of decreased
utility from worsened on-time performance.

Suzuki (2000) confirms that passengers with delay experience are more likely to switch carriers.
With decreased competition on a particular route, there would be fewer options available for
1 These quotes were obtained from a news article in the Atlantic Journal-Constitution, reporting on Deltas poor ontime performance in 2010 [http://www.ajc.com/news/business/delta-ranks-near-bottom-in-on-timeperformance/nQqYp/]

consumers to choose from and hence, worsened on-time performance would have a smaller
impact on an airline's revenues. Thus, airlines on less competitive routes would have less of an
incentive to undertake actions that improve on-time performance.

At this point, however, the verdict on the impact of route competitiveness on airline on-time
performance is inconclusive. On the other hand, if we consider that airlines compete for
customers via both price and schedule, the monopolist carrier on a route would schedule flights
further apart in order to maximize profits. Based on Hotellings (1929) model of spatial
competition, with two firms in the market, assuming that the firms match each other's prices,
minimum brand differentiation in terms of scheduling would occur. This is supported by
Borenstein and Netz (1999) who show that multiple carriers on a route would locate flight
departures with timings closer to one another, as compared to a single firm. Empirically, Rupp et
al. (2001), in an analysis of 50 nonstop domestic city-pairs across 48 months, found that more
competitive routes had worse on-time performance.

Across existing literature, the relationship between the competitiveness of airline routes and
airline on-time performance has been examined using concentration measures such as the
number of carriers on the route (Rupp et al., 2001) and the Hershman-Herfindahl Index for all
carriers offering service between origin and destination airports (Mazzeo, 2003). However, in
this paper, the Delta-Northwest merger provides a "quasi-experiment" in examining the impact of
a change in the level of competition, assumed to be exogenous, on airline on-time performance.

The change in the level of competition of airline routes could occur on different levels. Firstly,
on routes that both Delta and Northwest flew pre-merger, the merger would lead to an
unambiguous increase in Delta's market share on the route, assuming that it continues to run
Northwest's flights following the merger. On other routes which either Delta or Northwest flew
pre-merger, any overlap in the airports they flew to would imply that the merger would increase
the post-merged firm's overall share of passengers enplaned at the endpoint airport, which
Borenstein (1989) showed as a factor determining the degree of market power exercised by an
airline. Overall, with a higher post-merger market share of the U.S. air travel market, Deltas
market power would increase, decreasing the general competitiveness on the network of routes.

3. Data
The data for this paper was obtained from the publicly available databases on the U.S. Bureau of
Transportation Statistics website2. The first dataset contains on-time arrival data at the flight
level for non-stop domestic flights by major carriers and contains key details including: origin
and destination airports, airline, non-stop distance and arrival delays. The second dataset,
obtained from the T-100 Domestic Market and Segment databases, contains data on the monthly
number of passengers on a route and the number of enplaned passengers at airports.

Following Luo (2013), a market size restriction for nonstop markets requiring at least 10
passengers per day each way across all carriers was imposed on the aggregated number of
passengers on a route in 2008; aggregating this market restriction over a year, all routes with less

2 The databases used in the paper can be found at: http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table_ID=236 and
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table_ID=259

than 3,650 passengers in 2008 were excluded from the dataset. Ensuring a minimum level of
traffic for the routes being compared reduces any potential noise from less-frequented routes.

The dependent variable in this paper is the percentage of arrival delays a carrier experiences on a
route in a given month. This paper follows the U.S. Department of Transportation's definition of
"arrival delay" as arriving at the destination airport later than 15 minutes of the scheduled arrival
time. On-time arrival data is aggregated across multiple flights of a given carrier-route in a
particular month, to obtain the percentage of delayed flights on a given carrier-route in a month.
While the magnitude of the delay might be another possible measure of on-time performance, the
average number of minutes delayed is likely to be skewed by one-off events that may bias a
carriers on-time performance on a particular route. All flights that were cancelled, diverted or
did not have arrival delay data are excluded.

The main independent variables in this paper are dummy variables that indicate whether a route
had Northwest, Delta or both Delta and Northwest flying on it in the pre-merger period, with the
merged firm continuing service in the post-merger period. A second set of dummy variables
indicate whether the carrier-route was operated by either Delta or Northwest and allows us to
investigate if the post-merger change in airline on-time performance for Delta and Northwest
flights differed from that of other airlines.

For the study, the 12 months of 2008 and the 12 months of 2010 are defined as the pre-merger
and post-merger periods respectively. Data from 2009 is excluded because it is the transition
period during which the merging of operations occurs at different times on different routes.

January 2010, the month in which Northwest stops reporting as a separate carrier, serves as the
cut-off point between the pre- and post-merger periods.

In maintaining a balanced data set across the time period, carrier-routes, other than Northwest
routes, that were not operated for the full 24-month time period were omitted. Our final dataset
contains 98,232 carrier-route-month observations, across 3,149 routes, flown by 19 different
airlines, including Delta and Northwest. Out of the 3,149 routes, only 6 routes are operated by
Delta and Northwest pre-merger.3

Table 1 provides the means and standard deviations for the percentage of arrival delays for a
given carrier-route in a month, across four types of routes: routes with neither Delta nor
Northwest pre-merger, routes with Delta pre-merger, routes with Northwest pre-merger and
routes with both Delta and Northwest pre-merger, with the latter three being the treatment routes.
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the arrival delay statistics across the 24 months of the time
period. Pre-merger, the different types of routes have similar trends in their percentages of arrival
delays, which lends support to the use of a difference-in-differences model.

Table 2 further breaks down the statistics for arrival delays across Delta/Northwest versus other
carriers flying the treatment routes. From Figure 2, we observe that for routes that Delta flew on
pre-merger, up to April 2010, the percentage of arrival delays for Delta flights followed a similar
trajectory as non-Delta flights, with Delta flights having consistently lower percentages of arrival
delays. Following April 2010, however, there is an observable hike in the percentage of arrival
3 The small number of routes on which both Delta and Northwest overlapped prior to the merger does not come as
a surprise, given that the DOJ cited the minimal overlap of routes as a reason for approving the merger.

delays for Delta flights, resulting in a trend of Delta flights having higher percentages of arrival
delays relative to non-Delta flights.

4. Methodology
To determine if airline on-time performance in routes with both Delta and Northwest pre-merger
changed differently following the merger relative to other routes, we employ a difference-indifferences model. The model of interest is:

Arr _ Delijt 1RiDL Postt + 2 RiNW Postt + 3 RiDLNW Postt 4 Xijt jt ij ijt
where Arr_Delijt represents the percentage of flights delayed on a route i for carrier j in month t,

DL
i

is a dummy variable for routes flown by Delta pre-merger,

routes flown by Northwest pre-merger,

DLNW
i

NW
i

is a dummy variable for

is a dummy variable for routes flown by both

Delta and Northwest pre-merger, Postt is a dummy variable for months in the post-merger period,
Xijt is a vector of control variables, jt represents carrier-month fixed-effects, ij represents carrierroute fixed effects, and ijt represents unobservable determinants of arrival delays. This model is
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the calculated standard errors are consistent in
the presence of heteroskedasticity in the error terms. The standard errors are also clustered by
route carrier, in order to account for serial correlation.

Our main coefficient of interest, 3, would give us the effect of the merger on on-time
performance in routes with both Delta and Northwest. Separately, the coefficients 1 and 2 would

indicate if routes with either merging firm prior to the merger were differentially affected by the
merger, possibly as a result of the overall increase in market power of the merged firm.

Xijt is a vector of control variables, most of which are defined by j and t, namely the number of
flights flown on the given route in a month, the number of passengers flown on the route in a
given month and the number of enplaned passengers at the origin and destination airports in the
given month. In addition to these variables, we control for the percentage of flights flown by a
given carrier j, out of all flights on route i in month t. All these variables are possible
determinants of airport congestion levels, which have been cited as an explanation for poor ontime performance (Mazzeo, 2003). The issue of endogeneity arises, when we consider that
ceteris paribus, passengers will tend to avoid routes and airports associated with poorer on-time
performance. Hence, poorer on-time performance would have a negative feedback effect on the
number of passengers on these routes or enplaned at these airports. However, this effect is
expected to be relatively small, given the limited flexibility passengers have in choosing routes
from point to point, after taking into account other factors such as price and flight duration. The
number of non-Delta/Northwest competitors on the route is also included to control for changes
in competition arising from the entry or exit of airlines across the 24-month period.

The large data set also allows for the inclusion of carrier-month fixed-effects, jt, and carrierroute fixed effects, ij. The percentage of variance in on-time performance due to the various
fixed effects is provided in Table 3. Among the three possible two-way fixed effects, route-month
fixed effects explain 87.8% of the variation in on-time performance. This should serve as caution
against finding any possibly significant results in this first model, given that such significance

might arise from heterogeneity in route-month-specific errors arising from variables other than
our control variables.

The second part of the analysis goes further by investigating whether the post-merger change in
airline on-time performance for Delta/Northwest flights differed from that of other airlines,
within routes with either carriers or both of them. The model is as follows:

Arr _ Delijt 1RiDL FjMerged Postt + 2 RiNW FjMerged Postt + 3 RiDLNW FjMerged Postt
4 Xijt it j ijt
The additional variable included in this model is

Merged
j

, which is a dummy for a carrier being

either one of the merging firms. The fixed effects included in this model are route-mouth fixed
effects, represented by it, and carrier fixed effects, represented by j. With the route-month fixed
effects, most of the control variables that were previously used in the first model become
perfectly collinear and the only control variable used in this equation is the percentage of flights
flown by a given carrier j, out of all flights on route i in month t.

Our main coefficient of interest, 3, would give us the effect of the merger on on-time
performance for the merged carrier in routes with both Delta and Northwest. Separately, the
coefficients 1 and 2 would also indicate if the change in on-time performance for either merging
carrier was different from that of other carriers, on routes they operated on.

5. Results
Table 4 presents the results from the first model. Across Columns (1) to (4), the main coefficient
of interest, 3, is statistically insignificant, implying that the merger did not have a significant
10

impact on on-time performance in routes with both Delta and Northwest pre-merger. This
implies that the change in on-time performance in these Delta-Northwest routes is statistically
indistinguishable from the significant fall of 3.9 percentage points in the percentage of arrival
delays in the control group of routes, based on the coefficient of Post.

In Columns (1) and (2), without any fixed effects, the coefficient on RNWPost is positive and
significant. However, once fixed effects are accounted for, this coefficient is no longer
significant. This implies that even though routes that Northwest operated on prior to the merger
did experience an smaller decrease in delay relative to the control group, this arose from carrierroute or carrier-month specific errors.

With the inclusion of the carrier-route and carrier-month fixed effects, the explanatory power of
the model increases significantly, with the R-squared increasing by ten times, from 0.050 in
Column (2) to 0.560 in Column (4). In Columns (3) and (4), after accounting for the variation
within carrier-month groups and carrier-route groups, there is a negative and significant
coefficient for RDL Post, implying that the percentage of arrival delays for routes that were
flown by Delta pre-merger fell by 1.2 percentage points more than the control group.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of this coefficient is relatively small, when we consider that the
mean percentage of arrival delays for these routes was 23.0% pre-merger.

A potential source of bias could arise from the fact that Northwest and Delta routes that Delta
stopped operating following the merger were excluded. Deltas decision to stop operating these
routes might not have been exogenous, for cases where the discontinued routes flew to airports

11

that were over-served by other carriers and thus, not profitable for Delta (Risher, 2013). On these
routes, it is possible that Delta would have less of an incentive to care about airline on-time
performance following the merger, since these routes were already unprofitable for Delta and it
is unlikely that they could have increased profitability by improving on-time performance. Thus,
the estimate for increase in delays for the continued carrier-routes might be biased downwards.

The results of the second part of the analysis are presented in Table 5. Amongst the coefficients
of interest, the coefficient for RDL FMerged Post remains positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level, after the inclusion of route-month and carrier fixed effects. The coefficient in
Column (3) implies that compared to the other airlines on the same routes in a given month, on
average, Delta had an increase of 4.4% in its arrival delay rate. This could be explained by
Deltas reported unpreparedness in the case of Northwest planes that were moved onto Delta
routes needing maintenance (Yamanouchi, 2011).

Before the inclusion of route-month fixed effects, we observe that the coefficient for RDLPost
is significant at -0.0175. Previously, results from the first regression showed that routes that were
flown by Delta pre-merger fell by 1.2 percentage points more than the control group. Here, after
excluding Delta flights, we see that percentage of arrival delays amongst all other non-Delta
firms on the pre-merger Delta routes fell by 1.75 percentage points more than the firms in the
control group. This improvement in on-time performance amongst non-Delta firms could fit a
story of competing firms improving their service quality, in a bid to remain competitive against a
post-merger Delta with greater market power across the domestic US airline market.
Nevertheless, more analysis is required to establish any clear causal relationship.

12

To ensure the robustness of the results from the regressions, analytic-weighted regressions were
run on the same variables. The dependent variable, namely the percentage of arrival delays a
carrier experiences on a route in a given month, was calculated based on a given number of
flights a carrier flew in a particular month. Therefore, the analytic-weighted regressions assign
larger weights to arrival delay percentages calculated from a larger number of flights, since these
arrival delay percentages would be more accurately measured. Tables 6 and 7 show the results
from the analytic-weighted regressions. The results from these regressions do not change our
previous conclusions.

From Figure 2, it could be possible that any worsening in on-time performance might not have
been experienced within the first few months of the post-merger period before the full impact of
the merger on on-time performance had been felt. There might have been significant changes in
on-time performance in the later post-merger months that might not have surfaced in the
regression because of the aggregation of all data within one single post-merger period. To test for
this, we conduct a robustness check for both parts of the analysis by replacing dummies for postmerger period with dummies for the individual months.

In Table 8, all the coefficients for RDLNW interacted with the post-merger dummy variables are not
significant at the 5% level, implying that for routes that Delta and Northwest both flew premerger, changes in the percentage of arrival delays in any of the post-merger months, relative to
the pre-merger period, are statistically insignificant from 0. On the contrary, in Table 9, for routes
that that Delta but not Northwest flew pre-merger, relative to the pre-merger period, we observe

13

significant changes in the post-merger months from January 2010 to July 2010. The nonmonotonicity of the coefficients across these seven months prevents any generalized postulation
of trends in on-time performance. However, it seems that the effect of the merger on on-time
performance on these routes was most strongly felt during the first seven months.

In Table 10, we further explore whether there was any differential effect in the on-time
performance for the merged firm on routes that Delta and Northwest both flew pre-merger. At the
5% level, we also observe statistically insignificant coefficients for the triple interactions
between RDLNW, FMerged and the post-merger month dummy variables.

Nevertheless, for the months from April 2010 to December 2010, we observe a differential effect
in the on-time performance for the merged firm, relative to the other firms, on routes that Delta
but not Northwest flew pre-merger. As shown in Table 11, the triple interactions between R DL,
FMerged and the post-merger month dummy variables, from April 2010 to December 2010, have
positive coefficients, ranging from 0.0298 to 0.0825. This corroborates with the raw data
graphically represented in Figure 2. The data implies that worsening arrival delays only hit Delta
in April 2010 and the difference-in-differences estimate between reached a peak of 8.25
percentage points in June 2010, which is substantial, given that the mean percentage of arrival
delays for these routes post-merger was 20.7 percentage points.

6. Conclusion
The impact of the Delta-Northwest merger on airline on-time performance was most strongly felt
on routes that had Delta but not Northwest flying pre-merger. Overall, arrival delays on these

14

routes further decreased by 1.2 percentage points, relative to the other routes. However, when the
results are broken down into Delta and non-Delta flights, Delta flights experienced a 4.4
percentage points increase in arrival delays, relative to other airlines flying the same route. Using
analytic-weighted regressions and breaking down this effect across the post-merger months, we
see that the effect for Delta flights is the largest in June 2010, which has an increase of 8.25
percentage points in arrival delays, relative to other carriers on the same route. On the six
selected routes that both Delta and Northwest flew pre-merger, no significant results are found,
possibly because of the large standard errors arising from the relatively small sample size.

While there are relative improvements in the on-time performance of non-merging airlines on
routes that Delta flies, the airline merger has significant negative implications on the merged
Deltas on-time performance at least within the first year of the merged airlines. While there is
anecdotal information on Deltas unpreparedness in handling Northwest planes moved onto
Delta routes (Yamanouchi, 2011), more qualitative research is needed to explain why this effect
is only limited to routes that Delta but not Northwest flew on pre-merger.

In terms of policy-making, the increased arrival delays resulting from a merger should be
considered alongside price when determining the effects of a merger on consumer welfare. The
overall effect, however, would require further analysis over a longer timeframe to determine
whether this effect is a temporary or permanent one. Other measures of on-time performance
such as the average minutes of delay should also be evaluated.

15

References
Borenstein, S., 1990, Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance and Market Power, American
Economic Review, 80(2), 400404.
Borenstein, S., 1989, Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the US Airline
Industry, Rand Journal of Economics, 20, 344-368.
Hotelling, H., 1929, Stability in Competition, The Economic Journal, 39(153), 41-57.
Kim, E. H., & Singal, V., 1993, Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the Airline
Industry, American Economic Review, 83(3), 549569.
Kocher, D., 2001, Apr 2, Airline Competition, Flights Delays Continue to Worry Congress,
Nations Cities Weekly. Retrieved from http://www.thefreelibrary.com.
Kwoka, J. E, Jr, & Shumilkina, E., 2010, The Price Effect of Eliminating Potential Competition:
Evidence from an Airline Merger, Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(4), 767793.
Luo, D., 2013, The Price Effects of the Delta/Northwest Airline Merger, Review of Industrial
Organization, 44(1), 27-48.
Mazzeo, M. J., 2003, Competition and Service Quality in the U.S. Airline Industry, Review of
Industrial Organization, 22(4), 275-296.
Rupp, N. G., D.H. Ownes, and L.W. Plumly, 2006, Does Competition Influence Airline OnTime Performance, in: Lee, D. (Ed.), Advances in Airline Economics: Competition Policy
and Antitrust, vol. 1. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Risher, Wayne, 2013, Jun 4, Delta Cutting 30 More Memphis Flights, Eliminating Hub Status,
The Commercial Appeal. Retrieved from http://www.commercialappeal.com.
Suzuki, Y., 2000, The Relationship Between On-Time Performance and Airline Market Share: A
New Approach, Logistics and Transportation Review, 36, 139-154.
Yamanouchi, K., 2011, Feb 11, Delta Ranks Near Bottom In On-Time Performance, The
Atlanta Journal Constitution. Retrieved from http://www.ajc.com.

16

Table 2. On-time Performance Summary Statistics for Selected Carrier-Routes in 2008 & 2010
Carrier Routes

Variable

Time
Period

% of flights Pre-Merger
(2008)
delayed by
15 minutes
Sample Size
or more, for
Post-Merger
a given
(2010)
carrier-route
in a month
Sample Size

Delta on
Pre-Merger
Delta
Routes

Other
Carriers on
Pre-Merger
Delta
Routes

Northwest
on PreMerger
Northwest
Routes4

Other
Carriers on
Pre-Merger
Northwest
Routes

0.215
(0.116)

0.246
(0.135)

0.224
(0.134)

0.238
(0.140)

Delta &
Northwest
on Routes
with DL
and NW
pre-merger
0.230
(0.119)

3000

2712

2208

876

144

144

0.196
(0.098)

0.190
(0.104)

0.211
(0.111)

0.196
(0.111)

0.231
(0.114)

0.177
(0.137

3000

2712

2208

876

72

144

All Oth
Carriers
Routes w
DL and N
pre-merg

Note: Means are represented in the table above, with the standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 1. On-time Performance Summary Statistics for Selected Routes in 2008 & 2010
Routes
Variable

% of flights
delayed by
15 minutes
or more, for
a given
carrier-route
in a month

Time Period

All Other
Routes

Routes with
Delta (DL)
pre-merger

Routes with
Northwest (NW)
pre-merger

Routes with
DL and NW
pre-merger

Pre-Merger (2008)

0.218
(0.125)

0.230
(0.127)

0.228
(0.136)

0.222
(0.118)

Sample Size

40068

5712

3084

288

Post-Merger (2010)

0.179
(0.100)

0.193
(0.101)

0.207
(0.111)

0.195
(0.132)

Sample Size

40068

5712

3084

216

Post-Merger Change

-0.0389

-0.0370

-0.0213

-0.0270

Note: Means are represented in the table above, with the standard deviations in parentheses.

4ThesecarrierroutesarerecordedasbeingflownbyDeltain2010,followingthemerger.
17

0.214
(0.117

Figure 1. Mean Percentage of Arrival Delays Across Types of Routes in 2008 & 2010

Figure 2. Mean Percentage of Arrival Delays Across Delta Pre-Merger Routes in 2008 & 2010

Table 3. Sources of Variation for Overall On-time Performance Data

18

Variable

Mea
n

Media
n

Standard
Deviatio
n
0.116

Route
Variation

Carrier
Variation

Month
Variation

CarrierRoute
Variation
26.5%

CarrierMonth
Variation

RouteMonth
Variation

33.2%

87.8%

% of
0.201 0.184
22.8%
3.8%
19.5%
flights
delayed
Table
4. Regressions of Percentage of Arrival Delays on Route and Month Independent
by 15
Dummy Variables
minutes
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
or more
RDLPost

-0.0123*** -0.0120***
0.00194
0.00254
(0.00335)
(0.00335)
(0.00440)
(0.00443)
NW
R Post
0.00212
0.00377
0.0177***
0.0179***
(0.00570)
(0.00551)
(0.00840)
(0.00827)
RDLNWPost
0.0207
0.0209
0.0119
0.0146
Table 5. Regressions
of
Percentage
of
Arrival
Delays
on
Route,
Carrier
and Month
(0.0166)
(0.0167)
(0.0160)
(0.0164)
DL
Independent
Dummy
Variables
R
0.0120***
-0.00561
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(0.00373)
(0.00413)
NW
R
0.0102**
0.00588
(0.00495)
(0.00510)
RDLFMergedPost 0.00424
0.0381***
0.0437***
0.0436***
RDLNW
-0.0210**
(0.00605)
(0.00940)
(0.00941)
(0.00930)
(0.0100)
NW
Merged
R
F
Post
0.0290***
0.0249
0.0180
Post
-0.0389***
-0.0385***
(0.0108)
(0.0217)
(0.0454)
(0.00123)
(0.00124)
DLNW
Merged
R
F
Post
0.0405
0.0436
0.0392
Number of Flights on
-1.80e-05
-8.68e-06
(0.0327)
(0.0324) (1.63e-05)
(0.0397)
Routes
(1.27e-05)
DL
Merged
R

F
-0.0290***
-0.0269***
-0.00925
Carriers Share of
-0.00688
-0.0117*
(0.00672)
(0.00821) (0.00640)
(0.0205)
Flights on Route
(0.00529)
NW
Merged
R

F
-0.00601
0.000858
-0.0158
Passengers on route
0.00525
0.0618***
(0.0106)
(0.0187) (0.0174)
(0.0397)
(00 000)
(0.0105)
DLNW
Merged
R

F
0.00627
0.0100
0.00622
Enplaned Passengers
0.00221***
0.00255***
(0.0187)
(0.0316)
(0.00984)
at Origin Airport
DL
(0.000123)
(0.000513)
-0.0175***
(00 000) R Post
(0.00483)
Enplaned Passengers
NW
0.000721***
0.000225
R Post
-0.00285
at Destination
Airport
(0.000121)
(0.000509)
(0.00860)
(00 000)
DLNW
R
Post
0.00219
Non-DL/NW
-0.00322**
(0.0196)
5.74e-05
DL
Competitors
(0.00153)
R
0.00965
(0.00178)
(0.00606)
0.218***
0.199***
0.193***
0.206***
NW
Constant R
0.0102
(0.00133)
(0.00699)
(0.00132)
(0.0105)
(0.00942)
Carrier-month
fixed
No
No-0.0242
Yes
Yes
RDLNW
effects?
(0.0150)
Carrier-route fixed
No
No
Yes
Yes
Post
-0.0385***
effects?
(0.00124)
Observations
98,232
98,232
98,232
98,232
R-squared
0.029
0.050
0.559
0.560
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and have been adjusted for clusters by carrierroute groups.

19

Carriers Share of Flights on Route

-0.00698
(0.00535)

0.00503
(0.0103)

-0.0449
(0.0449)

Route-Month Specific Control

Variables

Yes

No

No

Route-month fixed effects?

No

Yes

Yes

Carrier
effects?
No
NoDelays on Route
Yes and
Table
6. fixed
Analytic-Weighted
Regressions of Percentage
of Arrival
Month Independent Dummy Variables
0.199***
Constant
0.197***
0.205***
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(0.00703)
(0.00736)
(0.0179)
RDLObservations
Post
-0.0123*** 98,232
0.00210
0.00350
-0.0130***
98,232
98,232
(0.00362)
(0.00359)
(0.00440)
(0.00466)
R-squared
0.051
0.879
0.889
NW
R ***
Post
0.00212
0.0119*
0.0125**
-0.00342
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(0.00840)
Robust standard errors are (0.00644)
in parentheses and (0.00633)
have been adjusted
for clusters(0.00844)
by
RDLNW
Post
0.0207
0.0124
0.0125
0.00881
carrier-route groups.
(0.0117)
(0.0130)
(0.0160)
(0.0130)
RDL
0.0155***
-0.00761*
(0.00394)
(0.00454) of Arrival Delays on Route,
Table 7. Analytic-Weighted
Regressions of Percentage
RNW
0.0181***
0.0114**
Carrier and Month Independent
Dummy Variables
(0.00571)
(0.00580)
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
RDLNW
0.0106
-0.0243**
(0.0102)
(0.0113)
RDLFMergedPost
0.0373***
0.0425***
0.0426***
Post
-0.0397***
-0.0403***
(0.00641)
(0.00733)
(0.00722)
(0.00138)
(0.00136)
RNWFMergedPost
0.0408***
0.0387*
0.0162
Number of Flights on
-6.19e-05***
-1.25e-05
(0.0111)
(0.0223)
(0.0482)
DLNW
Merged
Routes
(1.41e-05)
(1.43e-05)
R
F
Post
0.0314
0.0389
0.0260
Carriers Share of
-0.00134
-0.0171***
(0.0252)
(0.0322)
(0.0379)
DL on Route
Merged
Flights
(0.00598)
(0.00539)
R F
-0.0290***
-0.00169
-0.00953
Passengers on route
0.0356***
0.0575***
(0.00694)
(0.0200)
(0.0221)
NW
Merged
(00R000)
(0.0106)
(0.0157)
F
-0.0148
0.0206
-0.0101
Enplaned Passengers
(0.0116)
(0.0332)
(0.0459)
0.00244***
0.00184***
at Origin
Airport
RDLNW
FMerged
0.0218
0.00172
0.00820
(0.000161)
(0.000491)
(00 000)
(0.0206)
(0.0145)
(0.0108)
Enplaned
Passengers
RDLPost
-0.0168***
0.00105***
-0.000740
at Destination Airport
(0.00547)
(0.000161)
(0.000480)
NW
(00R000)
Post
-0.0183**
(0.00838)
Non-DL/NW
0.00128
-0.00177
DLNW
R
Post
-0.00680
Competitors
(0.00190)
(0.00131)
(0.0149)
DL
0.219***
0.192***
0.163***
0.158***
R
0.00813
Constant
(0.00163)
(0.00748)
(0.00106)
(0.00945)
(0.00658)
Carrier-month
fixed
RNW
0.0228**
No
No
Yes
Yes
effects?
(0.00996)
Carrier-route
fixed
RDLNW
-0.0352***
No
No
Yes
Yes
effects?
(0.0133)
Observations
98,232
98,232
98,232
98,232
R-squared
0.038
0.072
0.647
0.648
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and have been adjusted for clusters by carrierroute groups.

20

Table 8. Robustness Check for Column (4) of Table 6, with

Post-Merger Period for RDLNW Split By Month Independent
Dummy Variables
Variable
(1)
Post

-0.0403***
-0.0130***
(0.00136)
(0.00466)
Carriers Share
of Flights on Route
-0.000539
-0.0196***
-0.0501
RNWPost
-0.00342
(0.00608)
(0.00690)
(0.0466)
(0.00844)
Route-month
Specific
Control
Variables
Yes
No
No
Table
10.
Robustness Check
Check for
for Column
Column (3)
(3)
of Table
Table 7,
7,
Table
11. Robustness
of
RDLNW
Jan2010
0.0566
DLNW
Merged
DL F
with
Post-Merger
Split
By
Route-month fixed
effects?
Yes
Yes
with
Post-MergerPeriod
Periodfor
forRRNo
FMerged
Split
By
(0.0451)
Month Independent Dummy
Carrier fixed
effects?
No Variables
No
Yes
RDLNW
Feb2010
0.0516
Variable
(1)
Variable
(1)
(0.0331)
Constant DLNW
0.191***
0.201***
0.197***
R
Mar2010
-0.0208
(0.00757)
(0.0106)
(0.0174)
DL
Merged
R
0.0426***
(0.0146)
0.0161
RNWF
FMergedPost
Post
RDLNWApr2010
-0.00166
(0.0482)
Observations
98,232 (0.00722)
98,232
98,232
NW
Merged
DLNW
Merged
R
F
Post
0.0162
(0.0191)
F
Post
R-squared
0.074 0.0264
0.893
0.906
DLNW
(0.0482)
R
May2010
0.00321
(0.0378)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DLNW Merged
Merged
DL
R
F
Jan2010
(0.0127)
0.0219*
R
F
Jan2010
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and have been-0.0169
adjusted for clusters by
DLNW
(0.0808)
R groups.
Jun2010
0.0188*
carrier-route
(0.0112)
DLNW Merged
R
FMerged
Feb2010
-0.0160
(0.0105)
0.00698
RDLF
Feb2010
DLNW
(0.0897)
R
Jul2010
-0.0198
(0.0111)
DLNW Merged
Merged
DL
F Mar2010
Mar2010
-0.0402
(0.0135)
0.00464
R F
DLNW
(0.0425)
R
Aug2010
0.00253
(0.0108)
Merged
DL
Merged
RDLNW
F
Apr2010
0.0183
(0.00974)
0.0298***
F
Apr2010
(0.0415)
RDLNWSep2010
0.00401
(0.00955)
DLNW
Merged
DL
Merged
F May2010
May2010
0.0826**
(0.0150)
0.0695***
R F
DLNW
(0.0394)
R
Oct2010
0.00401
(0.0114)
DLNW Merged
Merged
DL
R
F
Jun2010
0.0283
(0.0119)
0.0825***
R F
Jun2010
(0.0461)
RDLNWNov2010
0.00400
(0.0112)
DLNW
Merged
DL
Merged
R
F
Jul2010
0.0305
(0.0158)
0.0815***
R F
Jul2010
(0.0375)
RDLNWDec2010
0.0125
(0.0119)
DLNW Merged
Merged
DL
F Aug2010
Aug2010
0.0296
(0.0184)
0.0463***
R F
(0.0372)
0.157***
(0.00982)
Constant
DLNW
Merged
DL
Merged
(0.00952)
R
F
Sep2010
0.0657
0.0679***
R F
Sep2010
Controls Included
Yes
(0.0443)
(0.00940)
DLNW
Merged
DL
Merged
F fixed
Oct2010
0.0490
Carrier-month
effects?
Yes
0.0472***
R F
Oct2010
(0.0303)
Carrier-route fixed effects?
Yes
(0.0112)
Merged
DL
Merged
RDLNW
F
Nov2010
0.0251
0.0565***
F
Nov2010
(0.0451)
Observations
98,232
(0.00951)
Merged
DL
Merged
RDLNW
F
Dec2010
0.0464
0.0535***
F
Dec2010
R-squared
0.649
(0.0658)
(0.0124)
*** Constant
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.197***
0.197***
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and
have been adjusted
(0.0174)
(0.0175)
for clusters
carrier-route
groups.
Controls
Other
Yes
Controlsbyand
and
Other Dummy
Dummy
Yes
Table
9.
Robustness
Check
for
Column
(4)
of Table 6,
Variables
Included
Variables Included
DL
with
Post-Merger
Period
for
R
Split
By
Route-month
Yes
Route-month fixed
fixed effects?
effects?
YesMonth
Dummy Variables
Carrier fixed Independent
effects?
Yes
Carrier
fixed
effects?
Yes
Observations
98,232
Variable
(1)
Observations
98,232
R-squared
0.906
0.907
RNWPost
-0.00359
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust
standard errors are in parentheses(0.00845)
and have been
DLNW
R
Post
0.00894
adjusted for clusters by carrier-route groups.
RDLPost

21