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Republicvs.Cagandahan,GRNo.166676
Posted:October5,2011inCaseDigests

0
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan led before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certicate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Je
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suering
fromCongenitalAdrenalHyperplasiawhichisararemedicalconditionwhereaictedpersonspossess
bothmaleandfemalecharacteristics.JenniferCagandahangrewupwithsecondarymalecharacteristics.
To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certicate evidencing that she is
sueringfromCongenitalAdrenalHyperplasiawhichcerticateisissuedbyDr.MichaelSionzonofthe
DepartmentofPsychiatry,UniversityofthePhilippinesPhilippineGeneralHospital,who,inaddition,
explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court
decidedinherfavorbuttheOceoftheSolicitorGeneralappealedbeforetheSupremeCourtinvoking
thatthesamewasaviolationofRules103and108oftheRulesofCourtbecausethesaidpetitiondidnot
impleadthelocalcivilregistrar.
ISSUE:Theissueinthiscaseisthevalidityofthechangeofsexorgenderandnameofrespondentas
ruledbythelowercourt.
HELD:ThecontentionoftheOceoftheSolicitorGeneralthatthepetitionisfatallydefectivebecauseit
failedtoimpleadthelocalcivilregistraraswellasallpersonswhohaveorclaimanyinterestthereinis
not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil
registraracopyofthepetition,theordertopublishonDecember16,2003andallpleadings,ordersor
processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the
SupremeCourtheldthatthedeterminationofapersonssexappearinginhisbirthcerticateisalegal
issuewhichinthiscaseshouldbedealtwithutmostcareinviewofthedelicatefactspresentinthiscase.

In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality

In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality
whichistheconditionorletussayadisorderthatrespondentisundergoing.INTERSEXUALITYapplies
tohumanbeingswhocannotbeclassiedaseithermaleorfemale.Itisthestateofalivingthingofa
gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determinedtobeneitherexclusivelymalenorfemale.Itissaidthatanorganismwithintersexmayhave
biologicalcharacteristicsofbothmaleandfemalesexes.Inviewoftheforegoing,thehighesttribunalof
thelandconsiderthecompassionatecallsforrecognitionofthevariousdegreesofintersexasvariations
whichshouldnotbesubjecttooutrightdenial.
ThecurrentstateofPhilippinestatutesapparentlycompelsthatapersonbeclassiedeitherasamaleor
as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negatessuchrigidclassication.Thatis,Philippinecourtsmustrenderjudgmentbasedonlawandthe
evidencepresented.Intheinstantcase,thereisnodenyingthatevidencepointsthatrespondentismale.
Indeterminingrespondenttobeafemale,thereisnobasisforachangeinthebirthcerticateentryfor
gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classication would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of
intersexpersonsmakesthegenderclassicationatbirthinconclusive.Itisatmaturitythatthegenderof
such persons, like respondent, is xed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosingtoundergotreatmentinordertobecomeorremainasafemale.NeitherwilltheCourtforce
respondenttoundergotreatmentandtotakemedicationinordertotthemoldofafemale,associety
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
withhisintersexanatomy.Tohimbelongsthehumanrighttothepursuitofhappinessandofhealth.
Thus,tohimshouldbelongtheprimordialchoiceofwhatcoursesofactiontotakealongthepathofhis
sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent
andintheabsenceofevidencetoshowthatclassifyingrespondentasamalewillharmothermembers
ofsocietywhoareequallyentitledtoprotectionunderthelaw,theSupremeCourtarmedasvalidand
justiedtherespondentspositionandhispersonaljudgmentofbeingamale.

Silveriovs.Republic,GRNo.174689
Posted:October5,2011inCaseDigests

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FACTS:OnNovember22,2003,RommelJacintoDantesSilverioledapetitionforthechangeofhisrst
namefromRommelJacintotoMellyandsexofbirthfrommaletofemaleinhisbirthcerticate
intheRegionalTrialCourtofManila.OnJune4,2003,thetrialcourtrenderedinfavorofpetitionerasit
wouldbemoreinconsonancewiththeprincipleofjusticeandequity.Thatgratingthepetitionerwould
bring much awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her anc and the realization of their
dreams.ONAugust18,2003,theRepublicofthePhilippines,thrutheoceoftheSolicitorGeneral,led
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entriesinthebirthcerticatebyreasonofsexalteration.
ISSUE:Whetherornotapersonbornmalewouldbeentitledtochangeofgenderonthecivilregistrar
andafterwardsbelegallycapacitatedtoenteredintomarriagewithanotherman.
HELD:No.Sexreassignmentisnotagroundforchangeofgender.Thereisnolawpresentthatallows

HELD:No.Sexreassignmentisnotagroundforchangeofgender.Thereisnolawpresentthatallows
suchinourcountry.Neithermayentriesinthebirthcerticateastorstnameorsexbechangedonthe
groundofequity.Theremediespetitionerseeksinvolvequestionsofpublicpolicytobeaddressedsolely
bythelegislature,notbythecourts.Astocontractingmarriage,ourlawallowsonlymaleandfemale
with the main reason of procreation. Sex reassignment scientically has not yet made one completely
intofemale,withthecompletefunctionforreproduction.

DiwataRamosLandinginvs.Republic,G.R.No.164948
Posted:October5,2011inCaseDigests
Tags:Adoption

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FACTS:DiwataRamosLandingin,acitizenoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica(USA),ofFilipinoparentage
and a resident of Guam, USA, led a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma
Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the natural children of
ManuelRamos,petitionersbrother(deceased),andAmeliaRamoswhowenttoItaly,remarriedthere
andnowhastwochildrenbyhersecondmarriageandnolongercommunicatedwithherchildren.
ISSUE:Whetherornotthepetitionforadoptionisinvalidforlackofconsentofthebiologicalmother?
HELD:
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunitytosafeguardthebestinterestsofthechildinthemanneroftheproposedadoption.When
she led her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in eect. Section 9 thereof
providesthatifthewri enconsentofthebiologicalparentscannotbeobtained,thewri enconsentof
thelegalguardianoftheminorswillsuce.If,asclaimedbypetitioner,thatthebiologicalmotherofthe
minorshadindeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced thewri enconsentoftheirlegal
guardian.

InReAdoptionofStephanieGarcia,GRNo.148311
Posted:October5,2011inCaseDigests
Tags:Adoption,IllegitimateChild
ADOPTION;ILLEGITIMATECHILD

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig led a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga
Garcia.HeaverredthatStephaniewasbornonJune26,1994;thatStephaniehadbeenusinghermothers

middlenameandsurname;andthatheisnowawidowerandqualiedtobeheradoptingparent.He

middlenameandsurname;andthatheisnowawidowerandqualiedtobeheradoptingparent.He
prayedthatStephaniesmiddlenamebechangedtoGarcia,hermotherssurname,andthathersurname
GarciabechangedtoCatindighissurname.
TheRTCgrantedthepetitionforadoption,andorderedthatpursuanttoarticle189oftheFamilyCode,
theminorshallbeknownasStephanieNathyCatindig.
Honorato led a motion for classication and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to
usethesurnameofhernaturalmother(Garcia)ashermiddlename.Thelowercourtdeniedpetitioners
motionforreconsideration holdingthat there is no law or jurisprudenceallowinganadoptedchildto
usethesurnameofhisbiologicalmotherashismiddlename.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
whensheissubsequentlyadoptedbyhernaturalfather.
Held:
Oneoftheeectsofadoptionisthattheadoptedisdeemedtobealegitimatechildoftheadapterforall
intentsandpurposespursuanttoArticle189oftheFamilyCodeandSection17ofArticleVofRA8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
providedbylawtoalegitimatechildwithoutdiscriminationofanykind,includingtherighttobearthe
surnameofherfatherandhermother.ThisisconsistentwiththeintentionofthemembersoftheCivil
Code and Family Law Commi ees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the
mothershouldimmediatelyprecedethesurnameofthefather.

St.MarysAcademyvs.Carpitanos,GRNo.143363
Posted:October5,2011inCaseDigests
TheCase

ThecaseisanappealviacertiorarifromthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsaswellastheresolution
denyingreconsideration,holdingpetitionerliablefordamagesarisingfromanaccidentthatresultedin
thedeathofastudentwhohadjoinedacampaigntovisitthepublicschoolsinDipologCitytosolicit
enrollment.
TheFacts
Thefacts,asfoundbytheCourtofAppeals,areasfollows:
Claimingdamagesforthedeathoftheironlyson,SherwinCarpitanos,spousesWilliamCarpitanosand
LuciaCarpitanosledonJune9,1995acaseagainstJamesDanielIIandhisparents,JamesDanielSr.
andGuadaDaniel,thevehicleowner,VivencioVillanuevaandSt.MarysAcademybeforetheRegional
TrialCourtofDipologCity.
On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the
dispositiveportionofwhichreadsasfollows:
WHEREFORE,PREMISESCONSIDERED,judgmentisherebyrenderedinthefollowingmanner:

WHEREFORE,PREMISESCONSIDERED,judgmentisherebyrenderedinthefollowingmanner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintis William
CarpitanosandLuisaCarpitanos,thefollowingsumsofmoney:
a.FIFTYTHOUSANDPESOS(P50,000.00)indemnityforthelossoflifeofSherwinS.Carpitanos;
b.FORTYTHOUSANDPESOS(P40,000.00)actualdamagesincurredbyplaintisforburialandrelated
expenses;
c.TENTHOUSANDPESOS(P10,000.00)fora orneysfees;
d.FIVEHUNDREDTHOUSANDPESOS(P500,000.00)formoraldamages;andtopaycosts.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby
ordered to pay herein plaintis the amount of damages abovestated in the event of insolvency of
principalobligorSt.MarysAcademyofDipologCity;
3.DefendantJamesDanielII,beingaminoratthetimeofthecommissionofthetortandwhowasunder
special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the above
stateddamages,samebeingadjudgedagainstdefendantsSt.MarysAcademy,andsubsidiarily,against
hisparents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not being in
orderasearlierdiscussedinthisdecision,isherebyDISMISSED.
ITISSOORDERED.(Decision,pp.3233;Records,pp.205206).
Fromtherecordsitappearsthatfrom13to20February1995,defendantappellantSt.MarysAcademy
ofDipologCityconductedanenrollmentdrivefortheschoolyear19951996.Afacetoftheenrollment
campaignwasthevisitationofschoolsfromwhereprospectiveenrolleeswerestudying.Asastudentof
St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the
fatefulday,Sherwin,alongwithotherhighschoolstudentswereridinginaMitsubishijeepownedby
defendantVivencioVillanuevaontheirwaytoLarayanElementarySchool,Larayan,DapitanCity.The
jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the
la erdrovethejeepinarecklessmannerandasaresultthejeepturnedturtle.
SherwinCarpitanosdiedasaresultoftheinjurieshesustainedfromtheaccident.
Induetime,petitionerSt.MarysacademyappealedthedecisiontotheCourtofAppeals.
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages to
P25,000.00butotherwisearmingthedecisionaquo,intoto.
OnFebruary29,2000,petitionerSt.MarysAcademyledamotionforreconsiderationofthedecision.
However,onMay22,2000,theCourtofAppealsdeniedthemotion
Hence,thisappeal.
TheIssues

1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of

1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of
SherwinCarpitanos.
2)WhethertheCourtofAppealserredinarmingtheawardofmoraldamagesagainstthepetitioner.
TheCourtsRuling
WereversethedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos
under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in
allowingaminortodriveandinnothavingateacheraccompanytheminorstudentsinthejeep.
UnderArticle218oftheFamilyCode,thefollowingshallhavespecialparentalauthorityoveraminor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers;or(2)theindividual,entityorinstitutionengagedinchildcare.Thisspecialparentalauthority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the
school,entityorinstitution.Thus,suchauthorityandresponsibilityappliestoeldtrips,excursionsand
otheraairsofthepupilsandstudentsoutsidetheschoolpremiseswheneverauthorizedbytheschool
oritsteachers.[9]
UnderArticle219oftheFamilyCode,ifthepersonundercustodyisaminor,thoseexercisingspecial
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
theunemancipatedminorwhileundertheirsupervision,instruction,orcustody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a nding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connectiontotheaccident.
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for
whichrecoveryissoughtmustbethelegitimateconsequenceofthewrongdone;theconnectionbetween
thenegligenceandtheinjurymustbeadirectandnaturalsequenceofevents,unbrokenbyintervening
ecient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
negligence,noma erinwhatitconsists,cannotcreatearightofactionunlessitistheproximatecause
oftheinjurycomplainedof.Andtheproximatecauseofaninjuryisthatcause,which,innaturaland
continuous sequence, unbroken by any ecient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
whichtheresultwouldnothaveoccurred.
Inthiscase,therespondentsfailedtoshowthatthenegligenceofpetitionerwastheproximatecauseof
thedeathofthevictim.
RespondentsDanielspousesandVillanuevaadmi edthattheimmediatecauseoftheaccidentwasnot
thenegligenceofpetitionerortherecklessdrivingofJamesDanielII,butthedetachmentofthesteering
wheelguideofthejeep.
Intheircommenttothepetition,respondentsDanielspousesandVillanuevaadmi edthedocumentary
exhibitsestablishingthatthecauseoftheaccidentwasthedetachmentofthesteeringwheelguideofthe
jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical
defectinthejeepofVivencioVillanueva.Respondents,includingthespousesCarpitanos,parentsofthe

deceasedSherwinCarpitanos,didnotdisputethereportandtestimonyofthetracinvestigatorwho

deceasedSherwinCarpitanos,didnotdisputethereportandtestimonyofthetracinvestigatorwho
statedthatthecauseoftheaccidentwasthedetachmentofthesteeringwheelguidethatcausedthejeep
toturnturtle.
Signicantly,respondentsdidnotpresentanyevidencetoshowthattheproximatecauseoftheaccident
was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the
respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the authority and
responsibilityundertheprecedingArticleshallbeprincipallyandsolidarilyliablefordamagescaused
byactsoromissionsoftheunemancipatedminorwasunfounded.
Further,therewasnoevidencethatpetitionerschoolallowedtheminorJamesDanielIItodrivethejeep
of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
JamesDanielII,aminor,todrivethejeepatthetimeoftheaccident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily.
ThenegligenceofpetitionerSt.MarysAcademywasonlyaremotecauseoftheaccident.Betweenthe
remotecauseandtheinjury,thereintervenedthenegligenceoftheminorsparentsorthedetachmentof
thesteeringwheelguideofthejeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
ecientinterveningcause,producestheinjury,andwithoutwhichtheresultwouldnothaveoccurred.
Consideringthatthenegligenceoftheminordriverorthedetachmentofthesteeringwheelguideofthe
jeepownedbyrespondentVillanuevawasaneventoverwhichpetitionerSt.MarysAcademyhadno
control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the
deathresultingfromsuchaccident.
Consequently,wendthatpetitionerlikewisecannotbeheldliableformoraldamagesintheamountof
P500,000.00awardedbythetrialcourtandarmedbytheCourtofAppeals.
Thoughincapableofpecuniarycomputation,moraldamagesmayberecoverediftheyaretheproximate
resultofthedefendantswrongfulactoromission.Inthiscase,theproximatecauseoftheaccidentwas
nota ributabletopetitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted.
Moreover,thegrantofa orneysfeesaspartofdamagesistheexceptionratherthantherule.Thepower
of the court to award a orneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and
equitablejustication.Thus,thegrantofa orneysfeesagainstthepetitionerislikewisedeleted.
Incidentally,therewasnoquestionthattheregisteredownerofthevehiclewasrespondentVillanueva.
Heneverdeniedandinfactadmi edthisfact.Wehaveheldthattheregisteredownerofanyvehicle,
evenifnotusedforpublicservice,wouldprimarilyberesponsibletothepublicortothirdpersonsfor
injuriescausedthela erwhilethevehiclewasbeingdrivenonthehighwaysorstreets.Hence,withthe
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident
occurredbecauseofthedetachmentofthesteeringwheelguideofthejeep,itisnottheschool,butthe
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
TheFallo

TheFallo
WHEREFORE,theCourtREVERSESandSETSASIDEthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsandthatof
the trial court. The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of
defendants,excludingpetitionerSt.MarysAcademy,DipologCity.
Nocosts.

Vancilvs.Belmes,358SCRA707,GRNo.132223
Posted:October5,2011inCaseDigests
Tags:ParentalAuthority

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FACTS:Petitioner,BonifaciaVancil,isthemotherofReederC.Vancil,aNavyservicemanoftheUnited
StatesofAmericawhodiedinthesaidcountryonDecember22,1986.Duringhislifetime,Reederhad
two(2)childrennamedValerieandVincentbyhiscommonlawwife,HelenG.Belmes.
SometimeinMayof1987,BonifaciaVancilcommencedbeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofCebuCitya
guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as
SpecialProceedingsNo.1618CEB.Atthetime,Valeriewasonly6yearsoldwhileVincentwasa2year
oldchild.ItisclaimedinthepetitionthattheminorsareresidentsofCebuCity,Philippinesandhavean
estate consisting of proceeds from their fathers death pension benets with a probable value of
P100,000.00.
Findingsuciencyinformandinsubstance,thecasewassetforhearingaftera3consecutiveweekly
publicationswiththeSunstarDaily.
OnJuly15,1987,petitioner,BonifaciaVancilwasappointedlegalandjudicialguardianoverthepersons
andestateofValerieVancilandVincentVancilJr.
On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submi ed an opposition to the
subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already led a similar petition for
guardianshipunderSpecialProceedingsNo.2819beforetheRegionalTrialCourtofPagadianCity.
Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of
GuardianandAppointmentofaNewOne,assertingthatsheisthenaturalmotherinactualcustodyof
and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur
wheretheyarepermanentlyresiding;thatthepetitionwasledunderanimpropervenue;andthatat
the time the petition was led Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City,
Colorado,U.S.A.beinganaturalizedAmericancitizen.
OnOctober12,1988,afterdueproceedings,thetrialcourtrejectedanddeniedBelmesmotiontoremove
and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner
BonifaciaVanciltoentertheoceandperformherdutiesassuchguardianuponthepostingofabond
ofP50,000.00.Thesubsequenta emptforareconsiderationwaslikewisedismissedinanOrderdated
November24,1988.
ISSUE:

ISSUE:
WhobetweenthemotherandgrandmotherofminorVincentshouldbehisguardian.
HELD: YES, the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be
hisguardian.
Article211oftheFamilyCodeprovides:
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.Incaseofdisagreement,thefathersdecisionshallprevail,unlessthereisajudicialordertothecontrary.
BeingthenaturalmotheroftheminorVincent,shehasthecorrespondingnaturalandlegalrighttobein
hercustody.Petitionersclaimtobetheguardianofsaidminorcanonlyberealizedbywayofsubstitute
parentalauthoritypursuanttoArticle214oftheFamilyCode,thus:
Art.214.Incaseofdeath,absenceorunsuitabilityoftheparents,substituteparentalauthorityshallbeexercisedby
thesurvivinggrandparent.
Petitioner,asthesurvivinggrandparent,canexercisesubstituteparentalauthorityonlyincaseofdeath,
absenceorunsuitabilityofrespondent.Consideringthatrespondentisverymuchaliveandhasexercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the
minorsguardian,respondentsunsuitability.
Petitioner asserts this based on the allegation that Valerie was raped several times by the a live in
partner.HoweverthiscasepertainstoVincentandisthusnotdirectlya establetothatfact.Moreover
thestatusasU.S.resident,heroldageandherconvictionoflibelinthecountrydeemherunlikelytobe
able to execute the duties of a guardian (has not been in RP since 87). Moreover courts should not
appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will nd it
diculttoprotectthewards.

ManuelvsPeopleofthePhilippines,GRNo.165842
Posted:October5,2011inCaseDigests
Tags:Bigamy

0
EDUARDOP.MANUEL,petitioner,vs.PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondent
G.R.No.165842
November29,2005
FACTS:
ThiscaseisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionofCourtofAppealsarmingthedecision
oftheRegionalTrialCourtofBaguioCity,convictingthepetitionerforthecrimeofbigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was rst married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who,
accordingtotheformer,waschargedwithestafain1975andthereafterimprisonedandwasneverseen
againbyhimafterhislastvisit.ManuelmetTinaB.GandalerainJanuary1996whenthela erwasonly
21yearsold.Threemonthsaftertheirmeeting,thetwogotmarriedthroughacivilweddinginBaguio
CitywithoutGandalerasknowledgeofManuelsrstmarriage.Inthecourseoftheirmarriage,things

CitywithoutGandalerasknowledgeofManuelsrstmarriage.Inthecourseoftheirmarriage,things
gotrockyandGandaleralearnedthatEduardowasinfactalreadymarriedwhenhemarriedhim.She
then led a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The la ers defense being that his
declarationofsingleinhismarriagecontractwithGandalerawasdonebecausehebelievedingood
faiththathisrstmarriagewasinvalidandthathedidnotknowthathehadtogotocourttoseekfor
thenullicationofhisrstmarriagebeforemarryingTina.TheRegionalTrialCourtruledagainsthim
sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f
P200,000.00formoraldamages.
EduardoappealedthedecisiontotheCAwhereheallegedthathewasnotcriminallyliableforbigamy
because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious
intent.TheCAruledagainstthepetitionerbutwithmodicationontheRTCsdecision.Imprisonment
wasfrom2years,monthsand1daytotenyears.Pecuniaryrewardformoraldamageswasarmed.
Hence,thispetition.
ISSUES:
1.WhetherornottheCourtofAppealscommi edreversibleerroroflawwhenitruledthatpetitioners
wifecannotbelegallypresumeddeadunderArticle390oftheCivilCodeastherewasnojudicial
declarationofpresumptivedeathasprovidedforunderArticle41oftheFamilyCode.
2.WhetherornottheCourtofAppealscommi edreversibleerroroflawwhenitarmedtheawardof
Php200,000.00asmoraldamagesasithasnobasisinfactandinlaw.
HELD:
1.Thepetitionisdeniedforlackofmerit.Thepetitionerispresumedtohaveactedwithmaliceorevil
intentwhenhemarriedtheprivatecomplainant.Asageneralrule,mistakeoffactorgoodfaithofthe
accusedisavaliddefenseinaprosecutionforafelonybydolo;suchdefensenegatesmaliceorcriminal
intent.However,ignoranceofthelawisnotanexcusebecauseeveryoneispresumedtoknowthelaw.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse
maycontractasubsequentmarriageonlyaftersecuringajudgmentdeclaringthepresumptivedeathofthe
absentspousetoavoidbeing charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse willhavetoadduce
evidencethathehadawellfoundedbeliefthattheabsentspousewasalreadydead.Suchjudgmentis
proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
presentspouseislaterchargedwithbigamyiftheabsenteespousereappears,hecannotbeconvictedof
thecrime.
Thecourtruledagainstthepetitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriagewiththeprivatecomplainantwerewillful,deliberateandwithmaliceandcausedinjurytothe
la er.TheCourtthusdeclaresthatthepetitionersactsareagainstpublicpolicyastheyundermineand
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perdy, she is not barred
fromclaimingmoraldamages.Consideringthea endantcircumstancesofthecase,theCourtndsthe
awardofP200,000.00formoraldamagestobejustandreasonable.
OriginalSource:here(h p://mviendavalle.blogspot.com/2010/12/manuelvspeopleofphilippines.html)

Republicvs.Nolasco,GRNo.94053
Posted:October4,2011inCaseDigests
Tags:FamilyCode,PresumptiveDeath
PresumptiveDeath

On5August1988,respondentGregorioNolascoledbeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofAntique,Branch
10,apetitionforthedeclarationofpresumptivedeathofhiswifeJanetMonicaParker,invokingArticle
41oftheFamilyCode.Thepetitionprayedthatrespondentswifebedeclaredpresumptivelydeador,in
thealternative,thatthemarriagebedeclarednullandvoid.
RespondentNolascotestiedthathewasaseamanandthathehadrstmetJanetMonicaParker,aina
barinEngland.On15January1982,respondentmarriedJanetMonicaParkerinSanJose,Antique.
Afterthemarriagecelebration,heobtainedanotheremploymentcontractasaseamanandlefthiswife
with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent
receivedale erfromhismotherinforminghimthatJanetMonicahadgivenbirthtohisson.Thesame
le erinformedhimthatJanetMonicahadleftAntique.
HiseortstolookforherhimselfwheneverhisshipdockedinEnglandprovedfruitless.Healsostated
that all the le ers he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool,
England,theaddressofthebarwhereheandJanetMonicarstmet,wereallreturnedtohim.Healso
claimedthatheinquiredfromamongfriendsbuttheytoohadnonewsofJanetMonica.
Oncrossexamination,respondentstatedthathehadlivedwithandlatermarriedJanetMonicaParker
despitehislackofknowledgeastoherfamilybackground.Heinsistedthathiswifecontinuedtorefuse
togivehimsuchinformationevenaftertheyweremarried.Healsotestiedthathedidnotreportthe
ma erofJanetMonicasdisappearancetothePhilippinegovernmentauthorities.
ThetrialcourtgrantedNolascospetitioninaJudgmentdated12October1988.
TheRepublicofthePhilippinesopposedthepetitionthroughtheProvincialProsecutorofAntiquewho
had been deputized to assist the SolicitorGeneral in the instant case. The Republic argued, rst, that
Nolascodidnotpossessawellfoundedbeliefthattheabsentspousewasalreadydead,2andsecond,
Nolascos a empt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning a empt to
circumventthelawonmarriage.
ISSUE:WhetherornotNolascohasawellfoundedbeliefthathiswifeisalreadydead.
HELD:Inne,respondentfailedtoestablishthathehadthewellfoundedbeliefrequiredbylawthathis
absentwifewasalreadydeadthatwouldsustaintheissuanceofacourtorderdeclaringJanetMonica
Parkerpresumptivelydead.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals arming the trial courts decidion declaring that Parkera
presumptive death is reversed, both decisions were nullied and set aside with costs against the
respondent.
BASIS:

BASIS:
Article1oftheFamilyCode
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordancewithlawfortheestablishmentofconjugalandfamilylife.Itisthefoundationofthefamily
andaninviolablesocialinstitutionwhosenature,consequences,andincidentsaregovernedbylawand
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage se lements may x the property relations during the
marriagewithinthelimitsprovidedbythisCode.
Note: While the Court understands the need of respondents young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal
care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear
requirementsofthelaw,hispetitionforajudicialdeclarationofpresumptivedeathmustbedenied.
ArticleII,Section12oftheConstitution
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomoussocialinstitution
Article149oftheFamilyCode
Thefamily,beingthefoundationofthenation,isabasicsocialinstitutionwhichpublicpolicycherishes
andprotects.Consequently,familyrelationsaregovernedbylawandnocustom,practiceoragreement
destructiveofthefamilyshallberecognizedorgiveneect.

RepublicofthePhilippinesVS.BermudezLorino,G.R.
No.160258
Posted:October4,2011inCaseDigests
Tags:PresumptiveDeath
RepublicofthePhilippinesVS.BermudezLorino
G.R.No.160258.January19,2005

FACTS:GloriaBermudezandFranciscoLorinoweremarriedinJune1987.Thewifewasunawarethat
herhusbandwasahabitualdrinkerwithviolenta itudeandcharacterandhadthepropensitytogoout
withhisfriendstothepointofbeingunabletowork.In1991shelefthimandreturnedtoherparents
togetherwithherthreechildren.Shewentabroadtoworkforhersupportherchildren.Fromthetime
shelefthim,shehadnocommunicationwithhimorhisrelatives.
In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria led a veried petition with the RTC under the
rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an order for the
publicationofthepetitioninanewspaperofgeneralcirculation.
In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the judgment was nal and
executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of the
Philippinesledanoticeofappeal.
ISSUE:Whetherornotthefactualandlegalbasesforajudicialdeclarationofpresumptivedeathunder

ISSUE:Whetherornotthefactualandlegalbasesforajudicialdeclarationofpresumptivedeathunder
Art41oftheFamilyCodeweredulyestablished.
HELD:Art.238oftheFamilyCodeunderTitleXISummaryJudicialProceedingintheFamilyLaw,sets
thetenorforcasesscouredbytheserules,towit:
Art238.UntilmodiedbytheSupremeCourt,theproceduralrulesinthisTitleshallapplyinallcases
providedforinthisCoderequiringsummarycourtproceeding.Suchcasesshallbedecidedinan
expeditionsmannerwithoutregardstechnicalrules.
ThejudgeoftheRTCfullycompliedwiththeabovecitedprovisionbyexpeditiouslyrendingjudgment
withinninety(90)daysaftertheformaloerofevidencebythepetitioner.

SSSv.Jasquevda.DeBailon,GR.No165545
Posted:October4,2011inCaseDigests
Tags:PresumptiveDeath
Article4142FamilyCode

FACTS:In1955ClementeBailonandAliceDiazmarriedinBarcelona,Sorsogon.Fifteenplusyearslater,
ClementeledanactiontodeclarethepresumptivedeathofAlice,shebeinganabsentee.Thepetition
wasgrantedin1970.
In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until Clementes death in 1998. Jarque then
soughttoclaimherhusbandsSSSbenetsandthesameweregrantedher.Ontheotherhand,acertain
Cecilia BailonYap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned
beforetheSSSthattheybegiventhereimbursementforthefuneralspendingforitwasactuallythem
whoshoulderedtheburialexpensesofClemente.
TheyfurtherclaimthatClementecontractedthreemarriages;onewithAlice,anotherwithElisaandthe
otherwithJarque.CeciliaalsoaverredthatAliceisaliveandkickingandAlicesubsequentlyemerged;
CeciliaclaimedthatClementeobtainedthedeclarationofAlicespresumptivedeathinbadfaithforhe
wasawareofthewhereaboutsofAliceorifnothecouldhaveeasilylocatedherinherparentsplace.
She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had
beenhavingextramaritalaairs.
SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to
Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benets should go to Alice because her
reappearance had terminated Clementes marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTCs
decisionindeclaringAlicetobepresumptivelydeathiserroneous.Teresitaappealedthedecisionofthe
SSSbeforetheSocialSecurityComissionandtheSSCarmedSSS.TheCAhoweverruledthecontrary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead
automaticallyterminatesthesubsequentmarriage.
HELD: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clementes death. Likewise

HELD: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clementes death. Likewise
thereisnosubsequentmarriagetoterminateforthesameisterminateduponClementesdeath.SSSis
correctinrulingthatitisinutileforAlicetopursuetherecordingofherreappearancebeforethelocal
civil registrar through an adavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the
declarationmadebytheRTC.
TheSSCortheSSShasnojudicialpowertoreviewthedecisionoftheRTC.SSSisindeedempoweredto
determineastowhoshouldbetherightfulbeneciaryofthebenetsobtainedbyadeceasedmemberin
case of disputes but such power does not include the appellate power to review a court decision or
declaration.Inthecaseatbar,theRTCrulingisbindingandJarquesmarriagetoClementeisstillvalid
becausenoadavitwasledbyAlicetomakeknownherreappearancelegally.Alicereappearedonly
afterClementesdeathandinthiscaseshecannolongerlesuchanadavit;inthiscasethebadfaith
[or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised the marriage herein is considered voidable and
mustbea ackeddirectlynotcollaterallyitishoweverimpossibleforadirecta acksincethereisno
longeramarriagetobea ackedforthesamehasbeenterminateduponClementesdeath.
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