Zulueta v.

CA
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources governments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In the case at bar, the threat comes
from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures
the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the
pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping
power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No.
308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin,
Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable
record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its
record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious
to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right
to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to
privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

SABIO vs. GORDON (G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704)
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc,51 the Court, in line with
Whalen v. Roe,52 employed the rational basis relationship test when it held that
there was no infringement of the individual's right to privacy as the requirement to
disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the
opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public
service, and promote morality in public administration.53 In Valmonte v.
Belmonte,54 the Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of the former
Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary

individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into
consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people to access information on
matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions.

Bayan Muna v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 169659)

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to
evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a
right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of
invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.

People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693

September 19, 2006)

According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented,
through a parent or guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the
expectation of privacy which the child may later invoke because child victims
cannot be presumed to have intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the
termination of their case to the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the
Web Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the
various statutes and rules which reveal the intention of the State to maintain the
confidentiality of information pertaining to child abuse cases.