History, Motives, and Tactics of Abu Sayyaf (Research Paper Sample)

1. ABU SAYYAF 1 HISTORY, MOTIVES, AND TACTICS OF ABU SAYYAF Client Name
Institutional Affiliation
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I. Introduction
There are many sects of Islam, most of which are not violent and do not condone
violence against non-believers. However, within Islam, there are also certain sects
that do condone an extremist point of view, and these sects can sometimes also
condone violence against those who do not hold the same worldview. In certain
extreme cases, these violent, extremist sects even advocate violence against other
Muslims that do not conform to their particular worldview. The Islamic extremist
group named Abu Sayyaf is one of the few Islamic splinter groups that does
condone violence against those outside their particular set of beliefs. The group is
somewhat unique in that it is one of the few Islamic extremist groups that is based
out of the southern Philippines; it is, at its core, a separatist group, repeatedly
requesting that the government of the Philippines provide the group with a separate
province or state that would be governed by Islamic law (Abuza, 2005). The group
mainly finds solace in the southern part of the Philippines, where there has been
separatist violence and insurgencies in the Philippines for a number of years (Abuza,
2005). However, Abu Sayyaf is one of the longest-running and most successful
groups.
II. History
The southern part of the Philippines has long been home to a number of Islamic
separatist groups with varying levels of extremist philosophy (Abuza, 2005). In the
1970s, the southern Philippines was home to one Islamic separatist sect in
particular, named the Moro National Liberation Front (otherwise known as the
M.N.L.F.); the leaders of this group were known to interact with the leadership of al
Qaeda, notably Osama bin Laden (Elegant, 2004).
According to Elegant (2004), Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, the brother of Khadaffy
Janjalani, another militant Islamist, went to study abroad in the Middle East. It was
during this time that he allegedly met Osama bin Laden and received funding to
militarize and radicalize the Islamic groups in the Philippines, on the condition that
the groups remain sympathetic to the ideals and struggles of al Qaeda (Elegant,
2004). When Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani returned from his studies in the Middle
East in 1990, the situation in the Philippines had changed significantly. Notably, the
Moro National Liberation Front had become more moderate, and the separatist
sentiment had cooled overall in the area (Elegant, 2004). Janjalani returned, full of
vigor and mobilized old members of the Moro National Liberation Front, forming Abu
Sayyaf as a new separatist movement (Elegant, 2004). He remained the leader of

the group until he was killed in 1994 during a shootout with Philippine police
(Elegant, 2004). After his death, his brother, Khadaffy Janjalani assumed leadership
of the group, maintaining control until his death (FBI, 2013). United States
government sources claim that Khadaffy Janjalani was killed during a battle with
police or military forces sometime in 2006 (FBI, 2013). After Khadaffy Janjalani's
death, the group continued its attempts to retain control of the territory in the
southern part of the Philippines, using guerrilla tactics and terroristic violence (FBI,
2013).
III. Ideology and Motivation
Abu Sayyaf is, at its core, a separatist group. The group defines itself by its struggle
to create a separate Islamic state in the Philippines, a state which would be
governed entirely by Sharia law (Elegant, 2004). Ideologically, the group stands
alongside al Qaeda; they have often expressed anti-American sentiment, and wish
to create a world in which Sharia law is the only rule of law (Banlaoi, 2006).
According to Shay, Abu Sayyaf has always said it is fighting for an independent
Islamic nation in the southern Philippines, but during the late 1990s, the movement
began to show cracks, and members started behaving more like a gang of wellarmed bandits driven by greed, not creed. Since about 2002, however, the
extremist group has been reverting to its original separatist goals, and its bombings
and assassination attempts have increased accordingly (Shay, 2009). Although the
group claims to be focused on forming an Islamic state within the confines of the
Philippines, most of their tactics are similar to those used by al Qaeda within
existing Islamic states. According to Shay (2009), Abu Sayyaf are known to utilize
kidnappings, bombings, rape, child sexual assault, gun violence, extortion and drug
trafficking to finance and support their operation. Violence in the Philippines
between Abu Sayyaf and other, outside entities has only gotten worse since the
death of Khadaffy Janjalani, according to most researchers (Shay, 2009). After the
death of Khadaffy Janjalani and the subsequent power vacuum, the United States
began to station United States military personnel in the southern parts of the
Philippines (Shay, 2009). As a result of this and the growing anti-American
sentiment in the region, violence between the separatists and others began to
escalate-- including but not limited to violence between the American troops and
the members of Abu Sayyaf, as well as other foreign travelers and members of the
separatist group (Shay, 2009). According to Shay (2009) and Frake (2008), in the
time since the death of Khadaffy Janjalani, progress from the government of the
Philippines against the Abu Sayyaf group has slowed, although the United States
continues to donate money towards the disbandment of the group. This is because
the ideological ideas of the group still hold sway over the Muslims in the area, and
many of the people living in the southern part of the Philippines feel disenfranchised
by the Philippine government in some way. Similarly, these people feel as though
they are victimized by the fact that there are American troops passing through the
area regularly, training a moderately-corrupt police force (Banlaoi, 2006). Banlaoi

(2006) notes that the group has a tendency to oscillate in extremes, sometimes
laying dormant for a significant amount of time before finally resurfacing (Banlaoi,
2006). When the group is lying dormant, it does not disband; instead, Banlaoi
(2006) indicates that it becomes more moderate in its beliefs for a short time before
some outside event changes the tide of its ideology (Banlaoi, 2006).
IV. Notable Attacks
The group Abu Sayyaf uses a number of different tactics to inspire fear in the
citizenry in its territory, but it is particularly well-known for kidnappings, bombings,
executions, drive-by shootings, and rape (Filler, 2004). Filler (2004) suggests that
the group takes part in most activities that are endemic to guerrilla groups,
including extortion, human trafficking, child sexual assault, and drug trafficking. It is
because of these guerrilla tactics, as well as the classification of the group as a
terrorist group by the United States government that disbanding the group has
become so important to diplomatic ties between the Philippines and the United
States. According to Shay (2009), ...the army launched a major offensive against
the organization in August 2006 And once again, Abu Sayyaf is back to kidnapping
for ransom money as a means of funding its operations. In January, the group held
three Red Cross workers hostage, and analysts suspect they were released only
after large ransoms were paid (Shay, 2009). These attacks were acts of violence
against innocent civilians, and came on the heels of a few other attacks of note. In
April of 1995, Abu Sayyaf became active in a bombing campaign that resulted in the
hostage of thirty civilians, and the eventual death of fifty-three (Shay, 2009). In
February of 2004, the group committed another bombing on the Superferry 14,
which resulted in the death of 116 people (Banlaoi, 2006). This attack was the
worlds deadliest terrorist attack at sea. Finally, in 2007, seven workers were
abducted and beheaded; Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility for the beheadings
(Shay, 2009). V. Leadership and Membership The leadership of Abu Sayyaf has long
been the province of radical Muslims. According to Shay, ... [in 2006] Khadaffy
Janjalani and two other high-ranking Abu Sayyaf leaders with important connections
to funding in the Middle East were killed. According to one analyst, Abu Sayyaf is
running low on funds, and no new leader has come forward to unite the disgruntled
factions within the group (Shay, 2009). Current-day leadership is confusing within
the organization, although the FBI (2013) claims that the religious leader Yasser
Igsan was posted to the position after Khadaffy Janjalani and other high-ranking
officials were killed. Membership consists largely of Muslims from the Philippines
who feel disenfranchised and downtrodden by the current system. VI. Abu Sayyaf
and al Qaeda Abu Sayyaf has long been thought to have ties to al Qaeda; indeed,
Abu Sayyaf is thought to have gotten its first flush of money from Osama bin Laden
when Khadaffy Janjalanis brother initially left the Philippines to study Arabic and
Islamic scholarship in the Middle East (Filler, 2004). In addition, a number of alQaeda-associated terrorists, including the famous Ramzi Yousef, trained and
operated in the Philippines in the 1990s (Filler, 2004). Until the United States

cracked down on terrorist activity after September 11, 2001, the ties between al
Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf were very tightly wrought.
VII. Conclusion
Abu Sayyaf calls itself a separatist group that supports the institution of Sharia law
in a separate Muslim province of the Philippines, but in reality, the group engages in
behavior that is similar to other separatist movements around the world. There
seems to be very little that the group will not do to achieve their ends, including
kidnapping and executing innocent civilians, both inside the Philippines and outside.
Although many analysts hoped that the death of Khadaffy Janjalani would cripple
the organization, the organization continues to limp on, spurred forth by ideological
ties to a more powerful global organization. The organization continues to be
dangerous, if not powerful, and the Philippine government is having continued
difficulty removing the group from society as a whole. If the Philippine government
did grant the group a separate state, there is no indication that the group would be
able to acquire funding to truly fund a government well enough to remain stable
without resorting to kidnappings and extortions.

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