Co-ownership

Robles v. C.A.
328 SCRA 97
DOCTRINE: It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other coowners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. in
order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur: 1.) the co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; 2.) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners;
and 3.) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
Acevedo v. Abesamis
217 SCRA 186
FACTS:
Herodotus and 7 others were left an estate consisting of real
properties in Quezon City and Caloocan City. Herodotus
became the administrator pending partition. For the meantime,
the property is owned in common by the heirs.
Paulmitan v. C.A.
215 SCRA 866
DOCTRINE: Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is
because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in
the partition of the thing owned in common.

Del Campo v. C.A.

351 SCRA 1
DOCTRINE:
1. The co-owners undivided interest could properly be the object
of the contract of sale.
2. Also, undisturbed possession by a co-owner has the effect of a
partial partition of the co-owner property which entitles the
possessor to the definite portion which he occupies.
Villanueva v. Florendo
139 SCRA 329
DOCTRINE: Where a surviving spouse sold his
undivided portion of the conjugal property to the
wife of one of his sons, the vendors other children
are entitled to exercise the right of redemption as
co-owners of the right portion sold.
Adille v. C.A.
157 SCRA 455
DOCTRINE: Prescription, as a mode of terminating
a relation of co-ownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The
act of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain
conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
made known to the other co-owners; (3) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4)
he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the property for the period required by law.

Delima v. C.A.
201 SCRA 641
DOCTRINE: The issuance of the new title constituted an open
and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership.
Mariategui v. C.A.
205 SCRA 337
DOCTRINE: Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation
of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of
the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to
certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is
clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.
Estreller v. Ysmael
G.R. No. 170264
DOCTRINE:Section 2 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2016,
reinforced by P.D. No. 1517, which prohibits the eviction of
qualified tenants/occupants, extends only to landless urban
families who are rightful occupants of the land and its
structures, and does not include those whose presence on the
land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract,
those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose
possession is under litigation.
Pada-Kilario v. C.A.
322 SCRA 481
DOCTRINE: It is not required that partition among heirs be in
writing and registered in order to be valid. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to third persons

who might have interest on the said property. Thus, it follows

that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved.
Maestrado v. C.A.
327 SCRA 678
DOCTRINE: A possessor or real estate property is presumed
to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a
better right. partition is the separation, division and assignment
of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong. If may be effected extra-judicially by the heirs
themselves through a public instrument filed before the
register of deeds. However, as between the parties, a public
instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent element of a
contract of partition. Since registration serves as constructive
notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if
no creditors are affected.
Pilapil v. Briones
GR 150175
DOCTRINE: Since an implied trust is an obligation created by
law, then respondents had 10 years within which to bring an
action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximinos
properties. The general rule is that an action for reconveyance
of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years
from registration and/or issuance of the title to the property, not
only because registration under the Torrens system is a
constructive notice of title, but also because by registering the
disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had
already unequivocally repudiated any other claim to the same.
Oliveros v. Lopez

168 SCRA 431

DOCTRINE: Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, coownership of an estate should not exceed twenty years, while
the agreement to keep a thing undivided should not exceed
ten years. When parties stipulated a definite period to keep a
thing undivided which exceeds the maximum allowed by law,
said stipulation shall be void only as to the period beyond such
maximum. Thus, co-ownership of an estate cannot exceed
twenty years so property should be divided after twenty years.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Sering v. Plazo
166 SCRA 84
DOCTRINE:
1.
Anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may
bring an action in ejectment. A co-owner may bring an
ejectment action without joining the other co-owners, the
suit being deemed instituted for the benefit of all.
2.
The term, "action in ejectment," includes a suit
of forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer
(desahucio).
Adlawan v. Adlawan
G.R. No. 161916
DOCTRINE: A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to
bring an action without necessity of including all the co-owners
as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if
the action of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
(batasnatin)

Cruz v. Leis
327 SCRA 570
DOCTRINE: Redemption by co-owner does not terminate the
co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the
co-ownership.
Mariano v. CA
222 SCRA 736
DOCTRINE: Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner
does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will
inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not
put an end to the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption
is not a mode of termination of a co-ownership
Tan v. CA
172 SCRA 660
DOCTRINE: Consolidation of ownership by mortgagee after
expiration of redemption period terminates co-ownership. A coowner who redeems a property with her own funds after such
consolidation becomes the sole owner thereof.
Heirs of Maninding v. CA
276 SCRA 601
DOCTRINE: Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a
co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. Co-owners cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. It must be clearly shown that
he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were
apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership,
before the prescriptive period would begin to run.
Aguilar v. CA

227 SCRA 472

DOCTRINE: Any of the Co-owners may demand

the sale of the house and lot at any time and the
other cannot object to such demand; thereafter
the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally
according to their respective interests.
JGY
Coronel v. Constantino
397 SCRA 128
DOCTRINE: The sale of the subject property made by a coowner is limited to the portion which may be allotted to her
upon the termination of co-ownership over the subject property
with her children.
POSSESSION (ART. 523-561)
FXRL
Yu v. Pacleb
G.R. No. 130316
DOCTRINE: Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there
are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates
of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title;
and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed
in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings.
De Jesus v. CA
217 SCRA 307
DOCTRINE: Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive

period required for acquisition of immovable property is ten

years if the possession is in good faith, and thirty years if in
bad faith
SMPSM v. BCDA
G.R. No. 142255
DOCTRINE: Prescription does not apply if the subject land is
covered by a Torrens Title, as in the case at bar. Moreover,
prescription does not run against the State.
Heirs of Soriano v. CA
363 SCRA 87
DOCTRINE: Possession and ownership are distinct legal
concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one
person is complete does not own it and cannot evict themly
subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and
consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain
rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the
thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from
possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined
as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally,
to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing
with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two
ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession
of a holder.
RGGM
State Investment House v. CA
254 SCRA 368
DOCTRINE: A mortgagee who has foreclosed property is not
considered in good faith when such mortgagee has or is
expected to have knowledge of any defect in the title; a prior
buyer in good faith, although merely under a contract to sell, is
preferred over a mortgagee since if the original owner

delivered title, he would not anymore be able to mortgage the

thing.
San Miguel Corporation v. CA
185 SCRA 727
DOCTRINE: Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of
land. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
Equatorial Realty Development v. Mayfair Theatre
370 SCRA 56
DOCTRINE: Under Article 1380 to 1381(3) of the Civil Code, a
contract otherwise valid may be rescinded by reason of injury
to third persons, like creditors. Nonetheless, acquisition by a
third person of the property subject of the contract is an
obstacle to the action for its rescission where it is shown that
such third person is in lawful possession of the subject of the
contract and that he is in good faith.
Maglucot v. Maglucot
329 SCRA 78

3. Under the present rule, the proceeding of the commissioners

without being confirmed by the court are not binding upon the
parties.
4. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under
partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to
them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to
another party.
5. In cases involving oral partition under which the parties went
into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise
partly performed the partition agreement, equity will confirm
such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance
with the possession in severalty.

Gabrito v. CA
167 SCRA 771
DOCTRINE: Pending final adjudication of ownership by the
Bureau of Lands, the Court has jurisdiction to determine in the
meantime the right of possession over the land.

DOCTRINES:
1. Partition; The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is
taken up with the determination of whether or not a coownership in fact exists, (i.e. not otherwise legally proscribed)
and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property.

DOCTRINE: Prescription for actions involving forcible entry

and unlawful detainer is one year.

2. Partition; The second phase commences when it appears that

the parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by
the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties
by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners.

Wilmon Auto Supply v. CA

208 SCRA 108

Vda. De Borromeo v. Pogoy

126 SCRA 217

DOCTRINE: An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an

action filed in the RTC based on tenants claim that his right of
preemption (or prior purchase) was violated.
Semira v. CA
230 SCRA 577
DOCTRINE: The issue of ownership can be decided
provisionally for the sole purpose of resolving priority of
possession and does not bar an action between the same
parties involving title to the land.
Javier v. Veridiano
237 SCRA 565
DOCTRINE: A final judgment on forcible entry or unlawful
detainer is NOT a bar against to an action for determination of
ownership. A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of
possession is conclusive only as to possession, not
ownership. It is not a bar against an action for determination of
ownership
Lim Kich Tong v. CA
195 SCRA 398
DOCTRINE: Any person deprived of possession of any land or
building may file an action for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding
possession from him. This relief is not only available to
landlord, lessor but to lessee and tenant as well within one
year from such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession.
Penas v. CA
233 SCRA 744

DOCTRINE: The notice giving the lessee the alternative either

to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not
the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful
detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to
stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be
ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary
demand is first made.
Francel Realty Corporation v. CA
G.R. No. 117051
DOCTRINE: The action here is not a simple action to collect
on a promissory note; it is a complaint to collect amortization
payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a
subdivision lot under PD. Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly
falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to
regulate the real estate trade and industry, and to hear and
decide cases of unsound real estate business practices.
Calagan v. CFI of Davao
95 SCRA 498
DOCTRINES:
1. Purpose of the law on homesteads: to conserve ownership in
the hands of the homesteader and his family
2. Under Article 547, the homesteader desiring to repurchase
should be given the option to require the vendee a retro to
remove the useful improvements on the land subject of the
sale a retro, such option is not granted the vendor a retro
under Article 1616.
Cruz v. Pahati
98 Phil. 788

47 SCRA 160
DOCTRINE: The common law principle that the one who has
made the happening of fraud possible through misplaced
confidence must suffer the consequence cannot be applied
since there is an express provision covering the case. Article
559, a statutory provision, prevails over a common law
principle.
Aznar v. Yapdiangco
13 SCRA 486
DOCTRINE: Ownership is not transferred by contract merely
but by tradition or delivery. Contracts only constitute titles or
rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery
or tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same.
De Garcia v. CA
37 SCRA 160
DOCTRINE: Article 559 of the Civil Code: The possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable loss of which has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price paid thereof.
As stated in Cruz v Pahati, the rightful owner may not be
prevented from recovering his property by reason of good faith
alone. The only exception that is acknowledged by the law is
when the property was acquired in good faith at a public sale.
Still, in such case, recovery may only take place after
reimbursement.
Dizon v. Suntay

DOCTRINE: The possession of movable property acquired in

good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has
lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may
recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the
possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has/acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price paid therefore. The only exception the law allows is
when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a
public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price.
EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. v. Santos
184 SCRA 614
DOCTRINE: Possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to title. There is no need to produce a
receipt.
Ledesma v. CA
213 SCRA 195
DOCTRINE: Article 559 cannot be applied when the property
was lawfully divested from the original owner.
Chua Kai v. Kapunan
104 Phil. 110
DOCTRINE:
1. That the acquirer and possessor in good faith, of a chattel or
movable property is entitled to be respected and protected in
his possession, as if he were the true owner thereof, until a
competent court rules otherwise;
2. That being considered, in the meantime, as the true owner, the

possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to I surrender

possession nor to be required to institute an action for the
recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is
issued in his favor
USUFRUCT (ART. 562-612)
NHA v. CA
G.R. No. 148830
DOCTRINE: A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of
another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise
provides.
Gaboya v. Cui
38 SCRA 85
DOCTRINE: The reserved usufructuary right of a seller on a
property doesnt include rentals from the buildings
subsequently constructed on the sale, but it entitles the
usufructuary to a reasonable rental for the portion of the land
being occupied by the building.
Gaboya v. Cui
38 SCRA 85
DOCTRINE: The reserved usufructuary right of a seller on a
property doesnt include rentals from the buildings
subsequently constructed on the sale, but it entitles the
usufructuary to a reasonable rental for the portion of the land
being occupied by the building.
NUISANCE (ART.694 TO 707)

FZC
Sitchon v. Aquino
98 Phil. 720
DOCTRINE: Houses constructed, with governmental authority,
on public streets, and waterways obstruct at all times the free
use by the public of said streets and waterways, and,
accordingly, constitute nuisance per se, aside from public
nuisances. As such, the summary removal thereof, without
judicial process or proceedings may be authorized by the
statute or municipal ordinance, despite the due process
clause.
Velasco v. Manila Electric
40 SCRA 342
DOCTRINE: A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance
but it must be a noise which affects injuriously the health or
comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable
extent. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of
specially sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an
actionable nuisance. In the conditions of present living, noise
seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary
occupations. Its presence is a nuisance in the popular sense in
which that word is used, but in the absence of statute noise
becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of
reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of
the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener.
Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council
24 Phil. 471
DOCTRINE: City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or
motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not
theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so
adjudged by judicial determination.

Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan

91 Phil. 488
DOCTRINE:Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance One who
maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and
who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises.

DOCTRINE: An action for partition will not lie if the claimant

has no rightful interest over the subject property. A donation as
a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer
of title over the property from the donor to the donee and the
donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted.
the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property
donated.
Aluad v. Aluad
G.R. No. 176943

The attractive nuisance doctrine, generally, is not applicable to

bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of
some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere
water and its location.

DOCTRINE: The donation being mortis causa, the formalities

of a will must be observed. Absent that, the donation is void.
The following are the characteristics of a donation mortis
causa:

DONATION (ART. 725-772)

Republic v. Guzman
326 SCRA 90
DOCTRINE: There are three (3) essential elements of a
donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent
to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a
donation of an immovable property, the law further requires
that the donation be made in a public document and that there
should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated
that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form,
to be noted in both instruments.
Heirs of Velasquez v. CA
325 SCRA 552

1. It
conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before
the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the
same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
2. Th
at before the death of the transferor, the transfer should
be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of
a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
3. Th
at the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.

Danguilan v. IAC
168 SCRA 22

indicate that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime but
that the donor merely reserves power to destroy the donation
at any time.

DOCTRINE: In order to determine whether or not said

donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to
demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the
law requires and is valid and effective, although not recorded
in a public instrument.
Donation of real property should be in a public instrument.

David v. Sison
76 Phil. 118
DOCTRINE: When the donor maintains the essential rights of
ownership over the property during his lifetime, the donation is
mortis causa.

Aldaba v. CA
27 SCRA 263

Alejandro v. Geraldez
78 SCRA 245

DOCTRINE: A letter showing an intention to donate is not

sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly not the form
required by law in donations.

DOCTRINE: A transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a

last will and testament (Art. 728). It should not be called
donation mortis causa. It is in reality a legacy. If not embodied
in a valid will, the donation is void.

Jutic v. CA
153 SCRA 269
DOCTRINE: An affidavit is
transferring title by donation.

an

inadequate

Reyes v. Masqueda
187 SCRA 661
means

of

Howard v. Padilla
96 Phil. 983

DOCTRINE: Donations must be in accordance

with the law
Puig v. Penaflorida
16 SCRA 136
DOCTRINE: The reservation by the donor of the right to
dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed does not

DOCTRINES:
1.
The title given to a deed of donation is
not the determinative factor which makes the donation
inter vivos or mortis causa.
2.
Characteristics of a donation inter vivos
and mortis causa distinguished in Bonsato et al. v. Court of
Appeals et al.
3.
Whether a donation is inter vivos or
mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition
made.

Cagaoan v. Cagaoan
43 Phil. 554
Gestopa v. CA
342 SCRA 105
DOCTRINE: Acceptance makes a donation inter vivos. There
cannot be acceptance mortis causa in the lifetime of a donor
because this would be in a form of a will.
Quijada v. CA
299 SCRA 645
DOCTRINE: Donation is perfected once the acceptance by the
donee is made known to the donor. Accordingly, ownership is
immediately transferred and that ownership will only revert to
the donor if the resolutory condition is not fulfilled.
Lagazo v. CA
287 SCRA 18

DOCTRINES:
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality
(no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which
is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the
Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities
required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is indispensable, its
absence makes the donation null and void.

DOCTRINE: Applying the rules on double sale, if the

one who first registered the property is in bad faith, the
one who first took possession of the property shall
have the better claim.
JLT Agro v. Balasag
453 SCRA 211
DOCTRINE:
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones,
which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object
of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered
into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the
exception is partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA
198 SCRA 300
DOCTRINE: There is no need for prescription to be applied
where a stipulation for automatic reversion is expressly
provided for in the terms of the deed of donation. Hence, there
is no need for a judicial declaration for the rescission of a
contract because the law of the contract governs.
Genato v. Lorenzo
23 SCRA 618
DOCTRINE: The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by
done must be simultaneous and the acceptance by a person
other than the true done must be authorized by a proper power

of attorney set forth in a public document

Cruz v. Court of Appeals
140 SCRA 245

49 Phil. 142
DOCTRINE: A condition which cannot be complied with except
after giving effect to the donation is not a condition precedent.

DOCTRINE: In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor

by one who had previously donated some or all of his
properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or
reduction of the donation within four years from the date of
adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted,
taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of
the adoption of the child. Of course, the burden of proof is on
the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the
requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which
annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.

DOCTRINE: Whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis

causa depends on whether the donor intended to transfer
ownership over the properties upon the execution of deed.
When the deed of donation provides that the donor will not
dispose or take away the property donated, he in effect is
making a donation inter vivos.

Central Phil. University v. CA

246 SCRA 511

Eduarte v. CA
253 SCRA 391

DOCTRINE:
Onerous Donation: one executed for a valuable consideration
which is considered the equivalent of the donation itself, e.g.,
when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value of
the donation.

DOCTRINE: All crimes which offend the donor are considered

manifests of ingratitude and are cause for revocation of
donation.

When a person donates land to another on the condition that

the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition
imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive
condition but a resolutory one.
Parks v. Province of Tarlac

Austria-Magat v. CA
375 SCRA 556

Noceda v. CA
313 SCRA 504

DOCTRINE: Usurpation with regard to donee

towards donor is a definite act of ingratitude and
neecessitates only to be proved to effect
revocation