ACADEMIC FREEDOM

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO

CAPULONG
(G.R. 99327 May 27, 1993)
FACTS: Aguila Legis, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites
upon neophytes. As a result thereof, one neophyte named Leonardo "Lennie"
H. Villa, a first year law student, died of serious physical injuries. Another
freshman student by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized
for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted
upon him on the same occasion. Dean del Castillo created an investigating
committee

Which was tasked to investigate and submit a report regarding

the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. The respondent
students were asked to submit their written statements but failed to do so. In
the meantime, they were placed in preventive suspension. The investigating
committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent
students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
"Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written
answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to
hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found
respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School
Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities.
However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board
on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to
the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty
of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with
RTC Makati a temporary restraining order (TRO) since they are currently
enrolled. Judge Capulong, upon students appeal, ordered Ateneo to reverse
its decision and reinstate the said students.
ISSUE/S: Whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its
academic community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards
RULING: YES. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher
learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies,
academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure.
The Supreme Court consistently upheld the salutary proposition that
admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school,

the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right.
While under the education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely
choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to
the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution.

ARIEL NON ET.AL., petitioners. vs. HON. SANCHO DAMES II, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
5th Regional Trail Court, Br. 38, and
MABINI COLLEGES, INC., respondents
G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. were not allowed to reenroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in
student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the
protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
The trial court dismissed the petition referring to the ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA stating,
that being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or reenrolled, respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for reenrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school.
The respondents, in justifying their action, stated that 8 of the petitioners have incurred
failing grades. In response, the petitioners stated that: (a) three of them were
graduating. (b) Their academic deficiencies do not warrant non-readmission. (c) The
improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise of the cognate rights
of free speech and peaceable assembly. (d) There was no due investigation that could
serve as basis for disciplinary action. (e) Respondent school is their choice institution
near their places of residence, which they can afford to pay for tertiary education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school has the right not to re-admit the petitioners.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court cannot anchor the Termination of
Contract theory the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by
the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory

powers over all educational institutions. It is intended merely to protect schools wherein
tuition fees are collected and paid on installment basis. It cannot be construed to mean
that a student shall be enrolled for only one semester.
The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be
utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to
speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal
protection. It provides that every student has the right to enroll in any school college or
university upon meeting its specific requirements and reasonable regulations; . . . and
that the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is
expected to complete the course, without prejudice to his right to transfer.
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000

Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundations school
paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after
letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school
paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the
disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written statement
to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants,
instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they
alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation
ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them
disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition
with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the
jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.

Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the
defendants.

Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and
the Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2),
Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college
to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and
inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free

speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for
the freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on
the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act
provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the
power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of
a safe and orderly educational environment conducive tolearning. That power, like the
power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has
the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.

FREEDOM OF PRESS AND SPEEECH

NON VS. DAMES [185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY 1990]
Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet,
Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic
year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in
the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the
pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the
school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse
its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that
petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent
college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of
school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to
deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to
require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college.
Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of
conduct and discipline.

Issue: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.

Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by
the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction.
However there are limitations. The permissiblelimitation on Student Exercise of
Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

G.R. No. 168338

February 15, 2008 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department
of Justice; and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC),
respondents.

Facts : Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci
Tapes where the parties to the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of
the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential
spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in Malacaang
Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact
disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye
identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that
the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced" to make it
appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the
NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing
the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation
of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June 2005, NTC
officers met with officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga
Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP), to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and
KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom
Issue : WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression

Held : When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this

jurisdiction to only four categories of expression, namely: pornography, false
or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior
restrain Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or
high-value expression. Any content-based prior restraint on protected
expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression
means what it says it is absolutely protected from censorship Prior restraint
on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or
idea of the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based
restraint. If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the
expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens expression The NTC action
restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint
because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTCs claim
that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful
misrepresentation," and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission
that the restraint is content-based The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a
protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing
categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The
airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it
exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations
with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last
presidential elections. The content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the
sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is
indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint.
Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the
highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost
protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political
expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule, which recognizes no
exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected
expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional.
Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping,
illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the
tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint.
However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of
the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would
endanger the security of the State. The alleged violation of the AntiWiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the
airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the
enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing
freedom of expression. The only exceptions to this rule are the four
recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the content of

the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected
expression.

G.R. No. 157643

March 28, 2008

CRISTINELLI S. FERMIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public
officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public
interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal
and civil liability
Fermin versus CA
Facts:
On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie)
Gutierrez, two (2) criminal informations for libel were filed against Cristinelli
Salazar Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City. Fermin was charged being the publisher of Gossip Tabloid
while Tugas was editor-in-chief.
The Informations quoted the portion of the article complained against which

was published on June 14, 1995, which read:

"MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA
NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE"
"IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN
ANG ASUNTO NILA DU'N, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA
HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN
NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA,
NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES
NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI
LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA"
Fermin raised the defense of press freedom. She admitted to having a close
association with congressman Roilo Golez and Paranaque Mayor Joey
Marquez, and that she used her skills as writer to campaign for them during
the 1995 elections where Eddie Gutierrez, was also a candidate for congress
running against Golez.
Fermin also argued that to sustain a conviction for libel it is mandatory that
the publisher knowingly participated in or consented to the preparation and
publication of the libelous article.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Fermin can validly raise trhe defense of press freedom.
2. Whether or not as publisher she is liable for libel.
Held:
1. Fermin cannot validly raise the defense of press freedom.
If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer's
performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving
public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While
complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the
entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers
and commentators such as Fermin, do not have the unbridled license to
malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and
malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their
personal lives.
Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical
utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official
duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism
does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected
speech.
2. Fermin, as publisher is guilty of libel, whether or not she had actual
knowledge and participation, having furnished the means of carrying on the
publication of the article purportedly prepared by the members of the Gossip
Reportorial Team, who were employees under her control and supervision. It

is worthy to note that Fermin was not only the "publisher", as shown by the
editorial box of Gossip Tabloid, but also its "president" and "chairperson" as
she herself admitted on the witness stand. She also testified that she
handled the business aspect of the publication, and assigns editors to take
charge of everything. Obviously, Fermin had full control over the publication
of articles in the said tabloid. Her excuse of lack of knowledge, consent, or
participation in the release of the libelous article fails to persuade TEAcCD
Note:
Instead of the penalty of imprisonment of 3 months 11 days to one year 8
months and 21 days, the Supreme removed the penalty of imprisonment
(pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 08-2008) and imposed a fine of
P6,000 each. But the Supreme Court slapped Fermin with moral damages of
P500,000 each private complainant.

UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 205728, 21 January 2015, EN BANC
(Leonen, J.) What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms:
expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate
contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates or political parties to
entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions
for their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage. The
diocese of Bacolod posted 2 tarpaulins within a private compound housing
the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately
six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of
the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or
Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists
candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH)
Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by the diocese as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted
against it form Team Buhay. The Election Officer of Bacolod ordered the
removal of the 2nd tarpaulin. Claiming it to be an election propaganda, the
COMELEC issued an order prompting for the removal of the tarpaulin for
being oversized. The Diocese assailed the said order of the COMELEC for
being violative of their constitutional right to freedom of expression and that

it is a violation of the separation of the state and the church. The Diocese
likewise assails that the tarpaulins are beyond the regulatory powers of the
COMELEC regarding election materials since they are neither candidates nor
belonging to any political party. ISSUES: 1. Can the COMELEC regulate the
expression made by the Diocese of Bacolod, the latter being private citizens?
2. Did the COMELEC order violate the constitutional right of the Diocese of
Bacolod to freedom of speech and expression? 3. Was the regulation applied
by the COMELEC a content-neutral regulation? RULING: 1. NO. COMELEC had
no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens. UST Law
Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 COMELEC considered the tarpaulin as a
campaign material in their issuances. The provisions under the Constitution,
the Fair Election Act, and COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 regulating the
posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties,
and petitioners are neither of the two. The tarpaulin was not paid for by any
candidate or political party. There was no allegation that the Diocese
coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its
posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their
advocacy against the RH Law. While the tarpaulin may influence the success
or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is an election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for
or posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group. 2. YES. The regulation is a violation of the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. The message of the Diocese in this case will
certainly not be what candidates and political parties will carry in their
election posters or media ads. The message of the Diocese, taken as a
whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. Through
rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of the Diocese that the
positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be
determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a
social issue; only secondarily even almost incidentally will cause the
election or non-election of a candidate. The twin tarpaulins consist of satire
of political parties. Satire is a literary form that employs such devices as
sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies, and this may
target any individual or group in society, private and government alike. It
seeks to effectively communicate a greater purpose, often used for political
and social criticism because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts,
and unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to
have the high-and-mighty lampooned and spoofed. Northrop Frye, well
known in this literary field, claimed that satire had two defining features:
one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque and
absurd, the other is an object of attack. Thus, satire frequently uses
exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical devices. The tarpaulins

exaggerate. Surely, Team Patay does not refer to a list of dead individuals
nor could the Archbishop of the Diocese of Bacolod have intended it to mean
that the entire plan of the candidates in his list was to cause death
intentionally. The tarpaulin caricatures political parties and parodies the
intention of those in the list. Furthermore, the list of Team Patay is
juxtaposed with the list of Team Buhay that further emphasizes the theme
of its author: Reproductive health is an important marker for the church of
petitioners to endorse. UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 Embedded
in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by Diocese. It is a specie of
expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to
invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated
by the interpretation of Diocese of their ecclesiastical duty, but their
parishioners actions will have very real secular consequence. 3. It is a
CONTENT BASED REGULATION Content-based restraint or censorship refers
to restrictions based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In
contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents
of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. Size limitations
during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin
is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. If we apply the test for
content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of COMELEC will not pass the
three requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation,
only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity, and it is
subject only to the intermediate approach. This intermediate approach is
based on the test that we have prescribed in several cases. A content-neutral
government regulation is sufficiently justified: [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. On the first requisite, it is not
within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As
discussed earlier, this is a protected speech by the petitioners who are noncandidates. On the second requirement, not only must the governmental
interest be important or substantial, it must also be compelling as to justify
the restrictions made. The third requisite is likewise lacking. The court looks
not only at the legislative intent or motive in imposing the restriction, but
more so at the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The restriction
must not be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be
demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the actor to make
speech. In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of
speech. Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective

the Dioceses message and violate their right to exercise freedom of

expression. The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower
test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations. The action of
the COMELEC in this case is a strong deterrent to further speech by the
electorate. Given the UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 stature of
the Diocese and their message, there are indicators that this will cause a
chilling effect on robust discussion during elections.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Estrada vs Escritor (August 4, 2003)

Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of
rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her
husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the
other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not
related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of
Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court
allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has
been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and
procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses
and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge
of gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by
maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is
nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the
Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should
override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for
the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be
given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.
The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise
Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing
look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the
compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court
Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it
will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on
the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest
is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should
be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt
of this Decision.