G.R.No.

74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested,
tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was
high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2Later, the information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and
likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a
motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against
the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25,
1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to
him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of
what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she
conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator
hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have

been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock
room of the PC headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin
testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of
his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other,
although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not
even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face
and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accusedappellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been
set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his
release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he
was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest
of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the
time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a
third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting
team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the
coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we
have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June
25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days
before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the
activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of
Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of
information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the
person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo
with marijuana was received by you many days before you received
the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days
before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that
minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was
coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the
information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act
of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel
Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.

Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search
of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you
do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the
PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws
and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant
as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to
return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as
the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial
court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree,
to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed
by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accusedappellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

Shortened version

Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City.
The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one
their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked
liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two
bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were
later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the
information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been
arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting
officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted,
and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that
all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirtsand two
pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately
handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and
arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he
did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling
watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations.
Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not
sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131492. September 29, 2000]

ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU

LAMBINO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was
killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In
a letter dated December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P.
Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation for
assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. In response to the
request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the
NBI, and his men went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed
positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of
Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station
for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a
certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did
not have warrants of arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the
suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and
Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day.[1] However, criminal charges
were filed later against the two student suspects.[2]
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging
petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security
Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829, [3] which makes it
unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
On May 18, 1995, an information[4] was filed against them, alleging that:

That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, namely: ROGER POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU - Vice
Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO - Asst. Legal Counsel; and COL.
EDUARDO BENTAIN - Chief, Security Force, all of the University of the

Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers, while in the performance of
their respective official functions, taking advantage of their official duties and
committing the crime in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with
each other and with a certain ATTY. VILLAMOR, did then and there wilfully,
knowingly and criminally obstruct, impede and frustrate the apprehension of
FRANCIS CARLO TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal suspects
involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P. graduating student
and Chairperson of the UP College of Administration, Student Council, and delaying
the investigation and prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and concealing
said suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and another
principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above acts were done by the
above-named accused public officials despite their full knowledge that said suspects
were implicated in the brutal slaying of said Dennis Venturina, thus preventing the
suspects arrest, prosecution and conviction.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the
dismissal of the case. But the recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum,
dated September 8, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman directed the Special
Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan. Hence
this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's
office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.
Petitioners contend that:
I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN HE RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT
WARRANT ON MERE SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT
WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION; AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS
AND RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER, THE DEPUTY
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO
CONDUCTED THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE; AND FINALLY WHEN HE
RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC TRIAL
WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO BASIS.

II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.[5]

Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the
student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether
there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829. We
answer these questions in the negative.
First. In view of Art. III, 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made
except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions when an arrest may be made
even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which reads:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The
arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the
students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The
question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed
and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan
were probably guilty.
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts
gathered by them in the course of their investigation indicating that the students sought
to be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime. [6] They invoke the ruling in People v.
Tonog, Jr.[7] in which it was held:

It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they
apprehended Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified under
Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a
peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just
been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to

be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of
Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course
of his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.
In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who
later noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching
the police station, the accused was asked to take off his pants for examination at the
crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the admissibility of the maong pants
taken from the accused. It is clear that Tonog does not apply to this case. First, the
accused in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's invitation. Second,
the arresting officer found blood stains on the pants of the accused, on the basis of
which he concluded that the accused probably committed the crime for which reason
the latter was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same day the crime
was committed. In the words of Rule 113, 5(b), the crime had "just been committed" and
the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to
be arrested had committed it."
In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four
days after the commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact
which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they
had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is
insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of
the arresting officers:

"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule
113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.[8]
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near
the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest
Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything
that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary,

Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a
peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.
To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect
allow them to supplant the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause
that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law
authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if
the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to
the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil
liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can
order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, 2 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural
requirements, we hold that their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant
was illegal.
Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829,
1(c), the Office of the Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:

From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to
suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested participated in the clubbing of
Dennis Venturina, eventually leading to the latter's demise. It must be remembered
that these SJ members were positively identified by two eyewitnesses. A reasonably
prudent mind could not just ignore this positive identification. In fact, respondents do
not dispute the identification made on the alleged participants in the clubbing of
Dennis Venturina.
Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from
arresting the SJ members on the ground that the warrantless arrest sought to be
effected did not conform with Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby
averting, what would be in their opinion, an illegal arrest. While this justification may,
at best, show their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that they had reasonable

ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested committed the heinous
crime of murder as a result of the positive identification made by two
eyewitnesses. Besides, the reliance on the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the
clear intent, on respondents' part, to wilfully obstruct, frustrate or, at the least, delay
the apprehension and investigation and prosecution of the SJ members positively
identified.
To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless
arrests. It is in this forum where the prosecutor conducting the inquest may rule on
their opinion on whether or not the warrantless arrest effected was valid; he having the
quasijudicial authority to rule on this matter. Of course, there are various remedies
under the law which respondents may have likewise availed of or resorted to in order
to secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested, without prejudice
to any criminal or administrative actions that they may have filed against the arresting
NBI agents. However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands in a
manner that obstructed and delayed the investigation being conducted by a law
enforcement agency like the NBI. They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members
pinpointed by eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death Dennis Venturina. [9]
The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the
suspects were guilty. The question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in
the absence of a warrant issued by a court, considering that, as already explained, the
attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in Rule 113, 5. Regardless
of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest without
warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide
the question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flagrante
delicto. As the Special Prosecutor stated in his memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in
recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioners:

All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December
12, 1994, the accused knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who
were then at the U.P. police headquarters had committed a crime. Neither were the
warrantless arrest being sought to be made on campus that night, legal. The U.P.
officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of
students on campus.
Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause
to charge Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating

Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender
a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been committed and
that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section
1, Rule 12, Rules of Court). The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of
knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the accused to believe that the students
had committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend an
investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the
accused with Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the
accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law.
[10]

Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No.
1829:

SEC. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging
from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly
or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the
following acts:
....
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing
penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;
The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. [11] But as has
been held, "[i]nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of
criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary
arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution." [12] As we
held in the similar case of Venus v. Desierto:[13]

Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained
either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court
ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the

corresponding information with the appropriate courts. There are, however, settled
exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, to wit:
a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs.
Albano, et al. L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs.
Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs.
Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109
Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CAG.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R,
October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128
SCRA 577);
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985,
134 SCRA 438); and

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L- 6374, August 1,
1953) cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed
as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, 1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had
a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted
arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have interfered with the prosecution of the
guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in
investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just because petitioners had
asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to
disregard constitutional requirements.
The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners
resulted in the escape of the student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor
failed in their undertaking to surrender the students the following day. [14] Hence, the
information against them charged that petitioners willfully obstructed the apprehension
of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the successful escape of these students
and another principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta. [15] The student suspect
mentioned by both the resolution dated May 18, 1995 and the information, a certain Joel
Carlo Denosta, was not one of the students whose arrest by the NBI agents petitioners
prevented on December 12, 1994. Moreover, whether or not petitioner Posadas
surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is immaterial. In
the first place, they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their
undertaking. In the second place, the fact remains that the NBI agents could not have
validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station as they did not have a
warrant at that time. Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their
inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. If the NBI believed the information given to them
by the supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI should have applied for a warrant before
making the attempted arrest instead of taking the law into their own hands. That they
chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their
responsibility alone. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.
We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public
clamor to bring to justice those responsible therefor. We also recognize the pressures
faced by law enforcement agencies to effect immediate arrests and produce results
without unnecessary delay. But it must be remembered that the need to enforce the law
cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights. The absence of probable cause for
the filing of an information against petitioners is evident from the records. They cannot
be indicted because they dared to uphold the rights of the students. Hence, we see no

other recourse but to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman from proceeding
with the case against petitioners.
Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider
petitioners' challenge to P.D. No. 1829, 1(c). For a cardinal rule of constitutional
adjudication is that the Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground
such as the application of a statute or general law.[16]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are
hereby prohibited from prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 1(c) as a
result of the incident complained of in Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan
is ORDERED to dismiss the information in Criminal Case No. 22801 against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185719

June 17, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
MARCELINO COLLADO Y CUNANAN, MYRA COLLADO Y SENICA, MARK CIPRIANO Y
ROCERO, SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO Y ENRIQUE,* AND REYNALDO RANADA Y
ALAS**, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Mere allegations and self-serving statements will not overcome the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties accorded to police officers. There must be a showing of clear and
convincing evidence to successfully rebut this presumption.
On appeal is the February 28, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02626 which affirmed with modification the December 7, 2005 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154 in Criminal Case Nos. 13781-D, 13783-D and 13784-D. The RTC
convicted the appellants and several other accused for violations of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or

the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and imposed upon them the penalty of
imprisonment and payment of fine in each of their respective cases.
Factual Antecedents
On October 14, 2004, appellants Marcelino Collado (Marcelino) and Myra Collado (Myra) were
charged with the crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and maintenance of a den, dive or resort in
violation of Sections 5 and 6 of Article II, RA 9165 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 13781-D and
13782-D, respectively, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13781-D
On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Richard N. Noble, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance,
which was found positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in
violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.3
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13782-D
On or about or immediately prior to October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously maintain a
den, dive or resort located at No. 32 R. Hernandez St., Brgy. San Joaquin, Pasig City, where x x x
dangerous drugs are used or sold in any form, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.4
Marcelino was also charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of
the same law docketed as Criminal Case No. 13783-D, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13783-D
On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heatsealed transparent plastic sachet containing six centigrams (0.06 gram) of white crystalline
substance, which was found to be positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.5

On the other hand, appellants Mark Cipriano (Cipriano), Samuel Sherwin Latario (Latario), Reynaldo
Ranada (Ranada), together with co-accused Melody Apelo (Apelo), Marwin Abache (Abache),
Michael Angelo Sumulong (Sumulong), and Jay Madarang (Madarang), were charged with
possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Section 14, Article II of RA 9165, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 13784-D, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13784-D
On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, each being in the proximate company of two (2) persons and in conspiracy with one
another, without having been duly authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control the following paraphernalias
[sic], fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering or introducing any dangerous drug into
the body, to wit:
a. one (1) strip aluminum foil containing traces of white crystalline substance marked as ExhD;
b. one (1) improvised glass tooter containing traces of white crystalline substance marked as
Exh-D1;
c. one (1) pack transparent plastic sachet marked as Exh-D2;
d. two (2) plastic disposable lighters marked as Exhs. "G-H";
e. one (1) tape-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) rolled aluminum foil
marked as Exh. D5;
f. five (5) unsealed transparent plastic sachets marked as Exh. D6;
g. one (1) stainless scissor marked as Exh. D7;
h. one (1) rectangular glass marked as Exh. D8; and
i. one (1) roll of aluminum foil marked as Exh. D9.
[Specimens] marked as Exh-D and Exh-D1 were found positive to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.6
Upon arraignment on November 4, 2004, all the appellants and the other accused pleaded not
guilty.7 Pre-trial and joint trial on the merits subsequently ensued.
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as witnesses PO2 Richard Noble (PO2 Noble) and SPO2 Bernardo Cruz
(SPO2 Cruz) who were involved in the buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of the appellants.
Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On October 9, 2004, PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino
and Myra were engaged in selling shabu and that drug users, including out-of-school youth, were
using their residence in 32 R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, for their drug sessions. 8 After
recording the report in the police blotter, PO2 Noble relayed the information to his superior, P/Insp.
Earl B. Castillo (P/Insp. Castillo), who in turn ordered the conduct of a surveillance operation. 9 PO2
Noble, SPO2 Cruz and PO1 Anthony Bitbit, conducted a surveillance on the couples residence.
After confirming the reported activities, SPO2 Cruz looked for an asset who could introduce them to
Marcelino and Myra in the ensuing buy-bust operation.10
A buy-bust operation team was thereafter formed. After coordinating with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency as evidenced by a Pre-Operation Report, 11 the team proceeded to Marcelinos
and Myras residence on board two private vehicles. Upon reaching the target area, the asset
introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. 12 When asked how much shabu he
needed, PO2 Noble replied, "dalawang piso," which means P200.00 worth of drugs. But when PO2
Noble was handing over the marked money to Marcelino, the latter motioned that the same be given
to his wife, Myra, who accepted the money. Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal
container from which he brought out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
and gave the same to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke
coming from a table inside the house of the couple around which were seven persons. 13 When PO2
Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup team rushed to the scene. Simultaneously, PO2
Noble introduced himself as a policeman and arrested Marcelino. He frisked him and was able to
confiscate the metal container that contained another sachet of white crystalline substance. PO2
Noble wrote the markings "MCC-RNN October 9, 2004" on both the plastic sachets of white
substance sold to him by Marcelino and the one found inside the metal container.
Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and Myra,
where they found Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario gathered
around a table littered with various drug paraphernalia such as an improvised water pipe, strips of
aluminum foil with traces of white substance, disposable lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of
aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was recovered from Ranada. The buy-bust team arrested
all these persons, advised them of their constitutional rights, and brought them to police
headquarters for investigation and drug testing.
A chemistry report14 on all the seized items yielded positive results for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. Another chemistry report15 showed Marcelino, Apelo, Cipriano, and Ranada positive
for drug use while Myra, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang, and Latario were found negative.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented the testimonies of Marcelino, Myra, and Ranada, who all essentially put up
the defense of denial. The following is their version of the story.

Marcelino and Myra owned an electronics and appliance repair shop annexed to their house. In the
evening of October 9, 2004, Marcelino was in the living room with his children and nieces fixing a
VCD player. Apelo, their househelp, was in the kitchen preparing food while Ranada, their
repairman, was outside the house fixing Sumulongs motorcycle. Cipriano and Madarang were also
present at the shop, the former to redeem his car stereo and the latter to borrow a play station CD.
Latario, a housemate of Marcelino and Myra, was also present at the time.
Marcelino suddenly heard someone say "Walang tatakbo!" Four armed men rushed inside the house
and pointed their guns at him and said "Wag ka nang pumalag." He was thereafter dragged outside
where he saw the other accused already in handcuffs. Marcelino was later informed that they were
being arrested for selling shabu. Marcelino protested and disclaimed any knowledge about drugs.
When the officers frisked all the accused, Marcelino claimed that nothing illegal nor incriminating was
recovered from them.
When Myra arrived at the scene, she was shocked to see her husband being arrested. The police
officers then brought all the accused to the police station for further questioning.
At the police station, PO2 Noble asked Marcelino for P50,000.00 as settlement of their case.
Marcelino, Apelo, Cipriano, and Ranada were also made to drink water that according to Marcelino
tasted bitter.16 They were then brought to Camp Crame for medical examination and drug tests.
Those who drank the bitter water tested positive for drugs use while the others, who did not drink,
tested negative.
Marcelino surmised that their arrest was due to a misunderstanding he had with a former police
officer named Rey who bought a VCD player from his shop. He specifically instructed Rey not to let
anyone repair the VCD player should it malfunction. However, when the VCD player malfunctioned,
Rey had it repaired by somebody else, hence Marcelino refused to accept the VCD player and return
Reys money. This earned the ire of Rey who threatened him with the words "Humanda ka pagbalik
ko."17
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision18 dated December 7, 2005, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Crim. Case No. 13781-D, finding the accused MARCELINO COLLADO y Cunanan and MYRA
COLLADO y Senica GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9165 (sale of dangerous drug) and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT.
Additionally, the two accused are ordered to pay a fine of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00)
EACH.
In Crim. Case No. 13782-D, judgment is rendered finding the accused MARCELINO COLLADO y
Cunanan and MYRA COLLADO y Senica NOT GUILTY of the crime of violation of Section 6.

In Crim. Case No. 13783-D, finding the accused MARCELINO COLLADO y Cunanan GUILTY of the
offense of violation of Section 11 of R.A. 9165 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15)
YEARS.
The accused Marcelino Collado is also ordered to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P300,000.00).
In Crim. Case No. 13784-D, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused MELODY APELO y
Roman, MARK CIPRIANO y Rocero, MARWIN ABACHE y Aquilino, MICHAEL ANGELO
SUMULONG y Belarmino, JAY MADARANG y Gomez, SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO y Enrique and
REYNALDO RANADA y Alas GUILTY of the offense of violation of Section 14 of R.A. 9165 and they
are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS imprisonment. Each of them is also ordered to pay a fine of
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00).
Let the shabu and paraphernalia alleged to be the subject[s] of the Information be turned over and
delivered immediately to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.19
Accused Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and Madarang applied for probation.20 Hence, only Marcelino,
Myra, Cirpriano, Latario and Ranada appealed to the CA.21
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court found the warrantless arrest of the appellants to be lawful considering that they
were caught in the act of committing a crime.22 Thus, the CA affirmed the conviction of Marcelino and
Myra for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 (sale of dangerous drugs), as well as the conviction of
Marcelino for violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs). Anent the
violation of Section 14 of RA 9165 (possession of drug paraphernalia), the CA affirmed the
conviction of Ranada as he was caught having custody and control of a drug paraphernalia intended
for smoking and injecting illegal drugs into ones body.23 As regards Cipriano and Latario, as well as
the other accused Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and Madarang, the CA found them guilty not as
principals but only as accessories.
Thus, the appellate court affirmed with modification the trial courts Decision through a
Decision24 dated February 28, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with respect to the conviction and imposition of
the respective penalties against the following: (A) appellants Marcelino Collado and Myra Collado in
Crim. Case No. 13781-D25 for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA No. 9165; (B) appellant Marcelino
Collado in Crim. Case No. 13783-D for violation of Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165; (C) appellant
Reynaldo Ranada in Crim. Case No. 13784-D for violation of Section 14, Article II, RA No. 9165.

In Crim. Case No. 13784-D, MODIFICATION is hereby ordered as to appellants Mark Cipriano and
Samuel Sherwin Latario, including co-accused Melody Apelo, Marwin Abache, Michael Angelo
Sumulong and Jay Madarang insofar as they were found GUILTY, not as principals, but as
ACCESSORIES in the offense of violation of Section 14, Article II of RA No. 9165, in relation to the
aforecited provision of the Revised Penal Code. Each of them shall suffer the straight penalty of
Four (4) Months of arresto mayor. The fine of Ten Thousand Pesos already imposed by the trial court
upon each of them is MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.26
Not satisfied, the appellants are now before this Court arguing that irregularities attended their arrest
and detention as well as the procedure in handling the specimen allegedly seized from them.
Because of these, they assert that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
The appealed Decision should be affirmed, with modification.
The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties must
be upheld in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overturn the
same.
Appellants question the validity of the buy-bust operation and point out the following irregularities
which they claim attended its conduct: (1) lack of warrant of arrest; (2) non-compliance with the
procedures laid down under Section 21 of RA 9165; and, (3) the alleged extortion of money from
them by PO2 Noble in exchange for dropping the charges against them. Due to these irregularities,
appellants argue that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties accorded to
police officers does not apply in this case.
Lack of a warrant of arrest
Appellants argue that the arrest, search, and seizure conducted by the police were illegal since it
was not supported by a valid warrant. They thus posit that their right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated. 27
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for lawful warrantless arrests, viz:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be
valid, two requisites must concur: "(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." 28 A common example of
an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a buy-bust operation.
This is precisely what happened in the present case. The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in
flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was
effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of
shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Thus, there is no
other logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the police officers was a valid warrantless
arrest since the same was made while the appellants were actually committing the said crimes.
Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no longer
question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same before their
arraignment. Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations on such ground. 29 They only
raised this issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. By this omission, any objections on the
legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by them. 30
Anent their claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that under the Constitution, "a search
and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."31 This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest.32
The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a]
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." The factual
milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested.
Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent search and seizure made by the police
officers were likewise valid. Hence, appellants claim of unreasonable search and seizure must fail.
1wphi1

Extortion
Appellants aver that PO2 Noble tried to extort money from them in exchange for dropping the drug
charges against them.

The defense of extortion and/or frame-up is often put up in drugs cases in order to cast doubt on the
credibility of police officers. This is a serious imputation of a crime hence clear and convincing
evidence must be presented to support the same. There must also be a showing that the police
officers were inspired by improper motive. In this case, we find such imputation unfounded.
In People v. Capalad,33 this Court held thus:
Charges of extortion and frame-up are frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are, thus, cautious
in dealing with such accusations, which are quite difficult to prove in light of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of the police officers duties. To substantiate such defense, which can
be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show that the members
of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their
duty. Otherwise, the police officers testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.
Here, aside from Marcelinos self-serving testimony, appellants claim of extortion is not
substantiated by other convincing evidence. Neither was it established during trial that PO2 Noble or
the other members of the buy-bust team were impelled by improper motive. Appellants allegation
that PO2 Noble and his team arrested them because of Marcelinos previous misunderstanding with
a certain retired policeman named Rey deserves no credence. No evidence was presented to show
any connection between Rey and the buy-bust team. It was not even shown by the defense who this
person Rey really is. Also, it is highly unlikely that a team of police officers would pursue a
surveillance, conduct a buy-bust operation, and arrest all the accused for a measly P1,000.00 VCD
player. In view of these, appellants allegation of extortion and improper motive deserves no
credence.
Chain of Custody
Appellants argue that the procedure laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 was not followed. They
specifically harp on the fact that the confiscated drugs were not photographed and inventoried.
Moreover, they contend that the police officers who handled the seized specimen were not
presented in court to testify on the condition in which they received the said specimen. For the
appellants, these defects constitute a clear break in the chain of custody and, consequently, the
prosecution failed to establish corpus delicti.34
The Court, however, finds this argument unmeritorious.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the
confiscated drugs, to wit:
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof;

This rule is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
9165, viz:
a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/ team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
(Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the above-cited provisions, this Court has consistently ruled that the failure of the police
officers to inventory and photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to the prosecutions
cause,35 provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized substance were preserved, as
in this case. Here, PO2 Noble, after apprehending Marcelino and confiscating from him the sachets
of shabu, immediately placed his markings on them. He testified thus:
PROSECUTOR PAZ:
Q: What did you do with that sachet containing white substance that was bought from Marcelino and
the one that you were able to confiscate from him?
A: I put my markings.
Q: What were those markings?
A: MCC-RNN October 9, 2004.36
In the Request for Laboratory Examination37 the seized items were listed and inventoried. After the
conduct of the laboratory examination, Chemistry Report No. D-807-0438 revealed that the contents
of the said sachets tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Moreover, it is of no moment that Forensic Chemist Alejandro De Guzman who conducted the
laboratory examination was not presented as a witness. The non-presentation as witnesses of other
persons who had custody of the illegal drugs is not a crucial point against the prosecution. 39 There is
no requirement for the prosecution to present as witness in a drugs case every person who had
something to do with the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the prohibited drugs from him. 40 To
stress, the implementing rules are clear that non-compliance with the requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.41

Criminal Case No. 13784-D

With regard to Criminal Case No. 13784-D for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, we find it
imperative to re-examine the findings of both the RTC and the CA.
The RTCs findings are as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution clearly shows that certain things or paraphernalia which are fit or
intended [for] smoking shabu were found in the house of the accused Marcelino and Myra Collado
on the same occasion that the said spouses were arrested by the police officers. This fact makes all
the accused without exception liable for violation of Section 14. While it was only Reynaldo Ranada
who was caught having in his possession an item used in smoking marijuana, i.e., a strip of
aluminum foil x x x and nothing was found in the possession of the other accused, this fact
nonetheless does not render Reynaldo Ranada the only person liable for violation of Section 14.
[Take note] that the law speaks not only of possession but also of having under ones control the
paraphernalia intended for smoking. In the instant case, the paraphernalia were found by the police
on top of the table around which the accused were gathered. Hence, even if the x x x accused other
than Ranada did not have in their possession any of the paraphernalia, it can, however, be said that
the paraphernalia found on top of the table were under their control. x x x42
Thus, the RTC found Ranada, Cipriano, Latario, Apelo Abache, Sumulong and Madarang all equally
guilty of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia.
On appeal, however, the CA found Ranada guilty as principal while Cipriano, Latario, Apelo, Abache,
Sumulong and Madarang were adjudged as accessories only for the crime of illegal possession of
drug paraphernalia. The CA ratiocinated thus:
On the one hand, we sustain the conviction of Raada in Crim. Case 13784-D. He was actually
caught having custody and control of the confiscated drug paraphenalia intended for smoking,
injecting, etc. into ones body. It was also indubitably shown that he failed to present authority to
possess the prohibited articles, much less, an explanation of his possession thereof. However, as
regards the other accused who were seen in the company of Raada, the evidence of conspiracy
against them was insufficient.
To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Responsibility of a conspirator
is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral
acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.
It may be that appellants Mark Cipriano and Samuel Sherwin Latario and co-accused Melody Apelo,
Marwin Abache, Michael Angelo Sumulong, Jay Madarang were in close proximity [to] Raada at the
time and place of the incident. But mere presence at the scene of the crime does not imply
conspiracy. The prosecution failed to show specific overt acts that would link these accused to
Ranadas possession of the said contrabands. As to why they were there [in] the vicinity of the crime
scene was not explained. They could be mere innocent onlookers although they were aware of the
illegality of the principals acts.

In any event, appellants Cipriano and Latario and the rest of the accused cannot be totally
exonerated. [However, we] downgrade their culpability corresponding to their criminal design and
participation. Evidently, they are guilty as accessories who, according to paragraph 1, Article 19 of
the Revised Penal Code, are criminally liable by profiting themselves or assisting the offender to
profit by the effects of the crime.43
1wphi1

We find that the CA erred in convicting Cipriano, Latario, Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and Madarang
as accessories. As pointed out by Justice Arturo D. Brion:
"[I]llegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs during parties, social gatherings or meetings under Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is a crime of
malum prohibitum, that is, the act is made wrong or evil because there is a law prohibiting it. x x x
Since violation of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is a crime of mala prohibita, the degree of
participation of the offenders is not considered. All who perpetrated the prohibited act are penalized
to the same extent. There is no principal or accomplice or accessory to consider. In short, the degree
of participation of the offenders does not affect their liability, and the penalty on all of them are the
same whether they are principals or merely accomplices or accessories. 44
In addition, Section 98 of RA 9165 specifically provides that "[n]otwithstanding any law, rule or
regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as amended,
shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor offenders. Where the
offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein
shall be reclusion perpetua to death." It is therefore clear that the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly Article 19 on Accessories, cannot be applied in determining the degree of
participation and criminal liability of Ranadas co-accused.
At any rate, this Court is convinced that only Ranada should be held liable for violation of Section 14
of RA 9165. It is clear that it was only Ranada who was caught having in his possession an
aluminum foil intended for using dangerous drugs.45 As to the other co-accused, namely Apelo,
Abache, Cipriano, Latario, Madarang, and Sumulong, not one drug paraphernalia was found in their
possession. The police officers were only able to find the other drug paraphernalia scattered on top
of a table. It is already established that there was no conspiracy between Ranada and the other coaccused. As the CA correctly held, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not imply
conspiracy.46
PO2 Noble, when placed on the witness stand, only testified as follows:
AWhile I was checking the item that I bought, I saw several persons inside their house.
QWhat were these persons doing?

ASome were seated, some were standing and there was x x x smoke.
QWhere was this smoke coming from?
AI did not see where the smoke [was] coming from because some of the persons were blocking [my
view].
QAbout how many persons were inside who were seated and who were standing?
ASeven (7).
QWill you tell us if they are male or female or both?
ASix (6) male persons and one (1) female.
QWhat are these persons who were seated inside the house doing?
AThey were allegedly engaged in drug session.
COURT:
QWhat do you mean allegedly?
ABecause there was smoke and I did not see what they were using.

PROSECUTOR PAZ:
QWhat about those who were standing, what were they doing?
AThe persons who were standing were looking at the persons who were sitting. I could not see them
clearly because some of them were blocking my view.
QHow far were they, those who were seated and those who were standing?
AThey were close to each other.
QHow long did you take a look at these persons inside the house?
AOnly for a while, only for a glance, sir.47
On the other hand, SPO2 Bernardo Cruz testified that it was only Ranada who was caught holding
the aluminum foil, viz:
QHow about the aluminum foil that you recovered from another?
AI saw him holding the strip of aluminum foil, sir.
QSo, nothing was confiscated in the person of all other accused except for Ranada?
AYes, sir.48

Therefore, Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario, Madarang, and Sumulong should be acquitted of the
charge of violation of Section 14, RA 9165 on possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs.
All told, this Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the
police officers involved in this case. The defense was not able to show by clear and convincing
evidence why the presumption should be overturned. The prosecution, on the other hand, was able
to establish that Marcelino, Myra and Ranada committed the crimes imputed against them, they
having been caught in flagrante delicto. This Court, being convinced that the guilt of Marcelino,
Myra, and Ranada have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, must uphold their conviction.
As to Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario, Madarang, and Sumulong, the Court finds that they should
be acquitted of the offense of violation of Section 14, Article II, RA 9165, since the prosecution was
not able to clearly show specific overt acts that would prove that they were in possession of drug
paraphernalia.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The February 28, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02626 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Mark
Cipriano and Samuel Sherwin Latario, including co-accused Melody Apelo, Marwin Abache, Michael
Angelo Sumulong, and Jay Madarang are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Section
14, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. They are ordered released unless they are being lawfully held
for some other cause.
SO ORDERED.