Tolentino

vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

G.R. No. 115455
235 SCRA 630 (1994)
FACTS
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various
suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and
it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article
VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the
revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage
of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.

SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the
requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount
to
a
violation
of
the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo
made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call,
the Chairdeclared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After
Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report.
The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being
none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking,
What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously.
Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President
Ramos.


Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules
of
the
House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to

revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum
but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void
for
being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call
for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National

Police
(PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house
of
Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress,
valid
and
constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree
as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it
is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it
must
be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013
JOSE
MIGUEL
T.
ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; et al, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:

NATURE:
These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that
the Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their
petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents Commission on Elections
(Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator
Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee)
and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results
in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato,
and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S.
Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage and manipulating the election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Teams Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID.
However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the
Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE
for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule
112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,
the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence
of the Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized
by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction

HELD:
1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a
provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee
finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in
accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that
we the the court cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication
of the Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent
jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction
means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the
contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a
complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for
preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the refiling of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The
subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not
be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance
of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

FALLO: petition is denied

CHAVEZ V. JBC
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Coronas departure.

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the
creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to
act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having
only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman
Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the
legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the

National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with
the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on
July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made
aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one,
they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress
in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive
the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBCs purpose of providing balance
nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide
balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2)
of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.

Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform
the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly
and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution that in the phrase, a representative of Congress, the use of the singular
letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for
any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to

the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or
phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its
meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to
this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1)
of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is
made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but
that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into
the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the
records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be
divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the
sitting members of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from the
Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the
records of Constitutional Commission, held that Congress, in the context of JBC
representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still
differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the
Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three
branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of
the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more
quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with
one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole
vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in
recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides
of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and
much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people
who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC,
all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit
as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform

Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011

R E S O L U T I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I. THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court
cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as
HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and
explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their
choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in
the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over
their printed names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court
decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac

Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs
SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable
to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657
lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage
through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now
be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they
have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified
FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents
PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court
thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified
FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, andUNANIMOUSLY
directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in
this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only
to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or
the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the
nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences
that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be
applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC
Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the
operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to
the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they
received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose
for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover,
the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the
modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011
decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but
found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that
may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of
the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then
the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the
agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural
lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were
supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other
portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these
may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB
the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the
area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs
decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each
qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use
and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare
SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the
assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the

proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land
used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is
November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that
the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita.
To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the
stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21,
1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice
of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is
determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority
noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution
scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and
is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an
original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just
compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657
has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed
to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or
conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent
(EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs
have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance
of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.
Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their
interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered
nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not
entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option
to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be
given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will
never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings
in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just]
33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI
stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control
means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other
voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that
will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares
divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP
approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs
to acquire control over HLI.]

Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.

ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW
NAVIGATION CO., INC.
GR No. 167614 - March 24, 2009
En banc


FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12
months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month
overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.


Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence,
Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on
May 26, 1998, serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February
199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and
exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770,
representing his salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid
contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees
equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for damages as
prayed was awarded.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50,
representing three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and
10% for attorney's fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was
made into law on July 15, 1995.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which
reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but
skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.

ISSUES:


1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on
non-impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.


HELD:

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes
with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary
package he will receive is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however,
as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a
part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in
application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing
acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the
parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the
execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998.
Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired
the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998
employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions
of R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be
declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for
the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a
business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs,
with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs
wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to

promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare
of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those
already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate
measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.


On the second issue.


The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally
enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne
by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is
enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to
incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be
valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on
substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to
existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the
government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state
interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the

peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is

upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;


In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment
who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the
adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in
that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in
the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of
OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the
Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and
determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive
means.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount
interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public

interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining

access to information on matters of public concern.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state
interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.

In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination
against OFWs under the subject clause.

Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect
the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such
callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification
for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes
the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of
private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea
that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest
is odious.

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of
placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in
place that can be
employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of
OFWs.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of LandBased Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary
measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to
migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from
temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains
similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of
aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign
principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative
of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Note:

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its
co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that
there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination; (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party and at the
earliest opportunity; and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the
case, otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other
ground.
----
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was
applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.

Article 605 of the Code of Commerce provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent
should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment
of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery,
theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice
or manifest or proven negligence.

Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, in which the Court
held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its
illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.

While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, Article 299 of the Code of
Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain
time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause,
before the fulfillment of the contract.

Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corp. G.R. No.

166006, March 14, 2008

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 156278 March 29, 2004

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision dated July 19,
20021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67434, and its Resolution dated
December 4, 2002 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Planters Products, Inc. ("PPI") and respondent Fertiphil Corporation
("Fertiphil") are domestic corporations engaged in the importation and distribution of
fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals. On the strength of Letter of Instruction
No. 1465 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 3, 1985, Fertiphil and
other domestic corporations engaged in the fertilizer business paid P10.00 for every bag
of fertilizer sold in the country to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), the
government agency governing the fertilizer industry. FPA in turn remitted the amount to
PPI for its rehabilitation, according to the express mandate of LOI No. 1465.2

After the EDSA I revolution in 1986, the imposition of P10.00 by the FPA on every bag of
fertilizer sold was voluntarily stopped. Fertiphil demanded from PPI the refund of
P6,698,144.00 which it paid under LOI No. 1465. PPI refused. Hence, on September 14,
1987, Fertiphil filed a collection and damage suit against FPA and PPI before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City docketed as Civil Case No. 17835 demanding refund
of the P6,698,144.00. Fertiphil contended that LOI No. 1465 was void and
unconstitutional for being a glaring example of crony capitalism as it favored PPI only.
PPI filed its answer but for failure to attend the pre-trial conference, it was declared in
default and Fertiphil was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.


On November 20, 1991, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 147, decided in favor of Fertiphil
declaring LOI No. 1465 void and unconstitutional. It ordered PPI to return the amount
which Fertiphil paid thereunder, with twelve percent (12%) interest from the time of
judicial demand. PPIs motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated
February 13, 1992. Hence, it filed notice of appeal on February 20, 1992. At the same
time, Fertiphil moved for execution of the decision pending appeal. The trial court
granted the motion and a writ of execution pending appeal was issued upon the posting
of a surety bond by Fertiphil in the amount of P6,698,000.00. PPI assailed the propriety
of the execution pending appeal before the Court of Appeals and, thereafter, to this
Court. We resolved the case in its favor in our Decision dated October 22, 1999 in G.R.
No. 106052.3 Fertiphil was ordered to return all the properties of PPI taken in the
course of execution pending appeal or the value thereof, if return is no longer possible.
After the decision became final and executory, PPI moved for execution before the trial
court and Fertiphils bank deposits were accordingly garnished.

On January 5, 2001, Fertiphil moved to dismiss PPIs appeal from the trial courts
Decision dated November 20, 1991 citing as grounds the non-payment of the appellate
docket fee and alleged failure of PPI to prosecute the appeal within a reasonable time.
The trial court denied the motion in an Order dated April 3, 2001 ruling that the
payment of the appellate docket fee within the period for taking an appeal is a new
requirement under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which was not yet applicable when
PPI filed its appeal in 1992. Moreover, the court found that PPI did not fail to prosecute
the appeal within a reasonable time.

On April 5, 2001, the court issued another order, upon PPIs motion, directing Fertiphils
banks to deliver to the Deputy Sheriff the garnished deposits maintained with them and
for the levying upon of the surety bond posted by Fertiphil.

Fertiphil moved to reconsider the Orders dated April 3 and 5, 2001, to no avail. Hence,
on October 30, 2001, it filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the two
orders.4 The Court of Appeals partially granted the petition and set aside the Order
dated April 3, 2001. It ruled that although PPI filed its appeal in 1992, the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure should nevertheless be followed since it applies to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of its passage. Due to PPIs failure to pay the appellate docket
fee for three (3) years from the time the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on

July 1, 1997 until Fertiphil moved to dismiss the appeal in 2001, the trial courts decision
became final and executory. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the petition, viz:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the Order of 03 April 2001
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 147, is SET ASIDE. The decision of 20
November 1991 of the said court is hereby declared final and executory.

The Clerk of Court is directed to return to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
147, the record of Civil Case No. 17385 (sic) entitled "Fertiphil Corporation vs. Planters
Product(s) Inc., and Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority," for the computation of the
amount due the petitioner Fertiphil Corporation pursuant to the 20 November 1991
decision.

SO ORDERED.5

Hence, this petition by PPI.

As a general rule, rules of procedure apply to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage, hence, retrospective in nature. However, the general rule is not
without an exception. Retrospective application is allowed if no vested rights are
impaired.6 Thus, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. de Leon7 our ruling that the
appropriate mode of review from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts is a petition for
review under Sec. 60 of R.A. No. 6657 and not an ordinary appeal as Sec. 61 thereof
seems to imply, was not given retroactive application. We held that to give our ruling a
retrospective application would prejudice petitioners pending appeals brought under
said Sec. 61 before the Court of Appeals at a time when there was yet no clear
pronouncement as to the proper interpretation of the seemingly conflicting Secs. 60 and
61. In fine, to apply the Courts ruling retroactively would prejudice LBPs right to appeal
because its pending appeals would then be dismissed outright on a mere technicality
thereby sacrificing the substantial merits of the cases.

In the instant case, at the time PPI filed its appeal in 1992, all that the rules required for
the perfection of its appeal was the filing of a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or order appealed from, within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof.8 PPI complied with this requirement when it filed a notice of appeal on
February 20, 1992 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 147, after receiving copy of its
Order dated February 13, 1992 denying its motion for reconsideration of the adverse

Decision dated November 20, 1991 rendered in Civil Case No. 17835. PPIs appeal was
therefore already perfected at that time.

Thus, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997 and which
required that appellate docket and other lawful fees should be paid within the same
period for taking an appeal,9 can not affect PPIs appeal which was already perfected in
1992. Much less could it be considered a ground for dismissal thereof since PPIs period
for taking an appeal, likewise the period for payment of the appellate docket fee as now
required by the rules, has long lapsed in 1992. While the right to appeal is statutory, the
mode or manner by which this right may be exercised is a question of procedure which
may be altered and modified only when vested rights are not impaired.10 Thus, failure
to pay the appellate docket fee when the 1997 Rules of Procedure took effect cannot
operate to deprive PPI of its right, already perfected in 1992, to have its case reviewed
on appeal. In fact the Court of Appeals recognized such fact when it gave PPI a fresh
period to pay the appellate docket fee in an Order dated April 9, 2002 issued in UDK-CVNo. 030411 directing it to pay the fee within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

This is not all. We have also previously ruled that failure to pay the appellate docket fee
does not automatically result in the dismissal of an appeal, dismissal being discretionary
on the part of the appellate court.12 And in determining whether or not to dismiss an
appeal on such ground, courts have always been guided by the peculiar legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case. Thus, in Pedrosa v. Hill13 and Gegare v.
Court of Appeals,14 the appeals were dismissed because appellants failed to pay the
appellate docket fees despite timely notice given them by the Court of Appeals and
despite its admonitions that the appeals would be dismissed in case of non-compliance.
On the other hand, the appeal in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Mangubat15 was not dismissed because we took into account the fact that the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure had only been in effect for fourteen (14) days when the Office
of the Solicitor General appealed from the decision of the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City on July
14, 1997 without paying the appellate court docket fees as required by the new rules.
Considering the recency of the changes and appellants immediate payment of the fees
when required to do so, the appeal was not dismissed. We can do no less in the instant
case where PPI was not even required under the rules in 1992 to pay the appellate
docket fees at the time it filed its appeal. We note moreover that PPI, like the appellant
in Mactan, promptly paid the fees when required to do so for the first time by the RTC
of Makati in its Order dated April 3, 2001, and informed the Court of Appeals of such
compliance when it in turn notified PPI that the fees were due, in an Order dated April
9, 2002. The remedy of appeal being an essential part of our judicial system, caution

must always be observed so that every party-litigant is not deprived of its right to
appeal, but rather, given amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.16

Having so ruled, we shall refrain from delving into the merits of petitioners other
contentions, discussion of one being the proper subject of the appeal before the Court
of Appeals,17 and the other, being premature at this point.18

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision dated July 19,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67434 and its Resolution dated
December 4, 2002 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration are SET ASIDE.

The Order dated April 3, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 147, in
Civil Case No. 17835 is reinstated, and the Court of Appeals is ordered to proceed with
the resolution of petitioners appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75501 entitled
"Fertiphil Corporation v. Planters Products, Inc."

SO ORDERED.
Puno, J.,(Chairman) Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ. concur.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

Yap v. Thenamaris Ships & Intermare Maritime

G.R. No. 179532: May 30, 2011

CLAUDIA S. YAP, Petitioner, v. THENAMARIS SHIPS MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE
MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,Respondents.

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed as an electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT by Intermare
Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited.The contract
was for 12 months.On 23 August 2001,Yapboarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his
job as electrician. However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping
bonus.However, he insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired
portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed from employment.He alleged that
he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.

Respondents contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed.They further alleged that
Yaps contract was validly terminated due to the sale of the vessel and no arrangement
was made for Yaps transfer to Thenamaris other vessels.

Thus, Yap brought the issue before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled that petitioner
was illegally dismissed; that respondents acted in bad faith when they assured
petitioner of re-embarkation but he was not able to board; and that petitioner was
entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a period of nine
months (US$12,870.00), P100,000 for moral damages, and P50,000 for exemplary
damages with 10% of the same for Attys fees.

Respondents sought recourse from the NLRC which modified the award of salaries from
that corresponding to nine months to only three months (US$4,290.00) pursuant to
Section 10 R.A. No. 8042.

Respondents and petitioner both filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

NLRC affirmed the finding of Illegal Dismissal and Bad Faith on the part of respondent.
However, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision, holding that "there can be no choice to
grant only 3 months salary for every year of the unexpired term because there is no full
year of unexpired term which this can be applied."

Respondents filed an MR, which the NLRC denied. Undaunted, respondents filed a
petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 before the CA.

The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC. However, the CA ruled
that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LAs interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
The CA relied on the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.

Both parties filed their respective MRs which the CA denied. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:

[1] Whether Section 10 of R.A. 8042, to the extent that it affords an illegally dismissed
migrant worker the lesser benefit of "salaries for [the] unexpired portion of his
employment contract for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term,whichever is less" is constitutional;

[2] Assuming that it is, whether the CA gravely erred in granting petitioner only three (3)
months backwages when his unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the "every year
of the unexpired term" threshold.

HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.

We have previously declared that the clause "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of
(OFWs) to equal protection. Moreover, the subject clause does not state any definitive
governmental purpose, hence, it also violates petitioner's right to substantive due
process.

Generally, an unconstitutional act is not a law. An exception to this is the doctrine of
operative fact applied when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. This case should not be included in

the exception. It was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of
illegal dismissal committed by respondents.

Also, we cannot subscribe to respondents postulation that the tanker allowance of
US$130.00 should not be included in the computation of the lump-sum salary. First, fair
play, justice, and due process dictate that this Court cannot now, for the first time on
appeal, pass upon this question. Second, the allowance was encapsulated in the basic
salary clause.

Luz Farms vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 86889




Supreme Court En Banc (Paras, J.)
Luz Farms vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
December 4, 1990

FACTS:

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business. Along with
others in the same business, Luz Farms stand to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of some provisions of RA 6657 and its implementing guidelines. The
petition prayed for the declaration of the aforesaid laws and guidelines
unconstitutional. Luz Farms contend that the term agriculture as used by the law, did
not mean to include livestock, poultry and swine.

ISSUE:

Are the aforementioned provisions of CARL unconstitutional?

LAW:

Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the

payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect
the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.

RULING:

The Supreme Court declared section 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of RA 6657 insofar as the
inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage NULL and VOID.
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it can be concluded
that the framers of the law did not intend to include livestock and poultry industry in
the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The Constitution only includes
agriculture as subject of the agrarian reform program. The intention of the legislators
in drafting the law was to provide farmers and regular farmworkers to own the lands
they till and receive just share of its fruits. To include livestock, poultry and swine within
the ambit of the agrarian reform program, is giving expanded interpretation of the law,
which is in itself, clear and unambiguous. The decision of the Court to render the
provision null and void is in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution. No one
must be deprived of his property without due process of law.