THE COST OF LIVING JEWISHLY AND JEWISH CONTINUITY

Author(s): Carmel U. Chiswick and Barry R. Chiswick

Source: Contemporary Jewry, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 2000), pp. 78-90
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23455314
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CONTEMPORARY JEWRY

THE COST OF LIVING JEWISHLY

AND JEWISH CONTINUITY

Carmel U. Chiswick
and

Barry R. Chiswick
Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Chicago

Introduction

Like most other Diaspora countries at the turn of the 21st century, the
United States is a free and open society. Long gone are the days when
Jews were compelled by non-Jewish authorities to live in ghettos, to
wear distinctive clothing, or to be otherwise publicly identified so that
their activities could be restricted. Over the course of the last two
centuries these barriers have fallen at a faster or slower rate in various

Diaspora countries, with periods of backsliding and periods of greatly

expanding freedoms and secular opportunities. American Jews are now

to be found in nearly all sectors and major institutions of society business, government, education, professions and the arts.
In this era of freedom the issue of Jewish continuity takes on a

different meaning. Can Judaism and Jewish identity survive from

generation to generation in a free and open society in which one's
Jewishness may be no more significant to others than the city in which

one was born or the baseball team one cheered for as a youth? This
paper will explore both the costs and benefits of living Jewishly and
their effects on American Jewish continuity. Pat II focuses on the costs

faced by Jewish families and their consequences for the American

Jewish community. Part III takes a broader view of Jewish continuity,
looking at the cost of living Jewishly as it affects the marriage and
career choices of young Americans.

The Cost of Jewish Living

Jewish living can be very expensive. ^ Although synagogue

memberships vary considerably as to cost, most of them involve

substantial annual dues (often accompanied by an obligatory

contribution to the "building fund" or its counterpart) as well as a

continuous stream of "opportunities" to make additional contributions
for special occasions or causes. Yet only one third of all American Jews
affiliate with a synagogue, and it is estimated that typically less than

three percent of Jewish family income is allocated to Jewish

philanthropies and synagogue memberships (Kosmin 1988; B.
Chiswick 1991; Kosmin 1991; Rebhun 1997). Compared to other

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CHISWICK

American religious groups the financial obligation associated with

Jewish living is fairly high, but not extremely so. Even considering

such collateral expenses as Jewish education, summer camps, or

Bar/Bat Mitzvahs, few Jewish families spend as much of their income

as the 10 percent tithe expected in some Protestant denominations.

Indeed, by any objective standard the American Jewish community can
well afford to sustain itself and support its own institutions.

So why does everyone say that Judaism is so expensive? One

reason is because Judaism tends to be a very time-intensive religion

and time budgets are seriously constrained. We speak of "spending"

time on an activity, of being unable to "afford" the time for everything

we'd like to do, and of avoiding activities that "waste" time because
they preclude spending it on a "better" alternative. Although money

incomes have risen during the last century, the amount of time
available for daily life is relatively fixed, effectively constrained (despite
a shorter work week and longer life expectancy) by the finiteness of the
day, year and life. The value of a unit of time is now very high, in part
because of the generally high productivity of American workers, in part
because of the relatively high skill levels of American Jews, and in part
because of the expanding array of non-work opportunities available to

American consumers. Indeed, it is the value of time in these many

activities that effectively measures the value of scarce time. 2
Although turn-of-the-century Jewish immigrants to America may

have been fairly traditional in their Jewish observance by today's

standards, most of them were not especially religious by the standards

of their own era. Indeed, the Jewish observance of immigrants was

typically casual at best, the perception being that old-countiy Judaism

was "unsuited" to life in the New World (i.e., "too" expensive). In

this context the major American synagogue movements (mainly the
Reform, Conservative and "modern" Orthodox) were accepted as
religious innovations that adapted Judaism to its modem environment,
primarily by reducing the time cost of Jewish observance (C. Chiswick

1995, C. Chiswick 1999). Religious innovations that raise the

efficiency of Jewish resources constitute a decline in the real cost of

being Jewish and a net gain for Jewish consumers, and indeed this is
the economic basis for the strength of these "modern" forms of Judaism
in the United States today.

Yet social innovations often have unintended consequences, and

the changes introduced by American streams of Judaism may be
perceived as reducing the quality of Jewish living in some respects even

as they increase it in others. Recent research on the economics of

religion suggests that religions most vulnerable to such a decline in
quality would share certain characteristics, including an important
social dimension to the life of the religious group and an emphasis on

religious "human capital" (Iannaccone 1988; Iannaccone 1990;

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CONTEMPORARY JEWRY

Iannaccone 1992). Both of these characteristics are very important to

Judaism, and their economic implications apply a fortiori to the

experience of American Jews. In effect, they raise the possibility that

reductions in the cost of Jewish living have been accompanied by a

decline in the quality of Jewish experience that at least partially offsets
the gain in communal welfare. The remainder of this section presents a
brief sketch of the economic analysis as it applies to American Judaism.

A religious group may be thought of as a special kind of "club"

which people can join for motives which are essentially social rather
than (or as well as) spiritual (Iannaccone 1988). In this respect Judaism
must compete with other "clubs" for the money, time and energy of its

members. Such competition may have been unimportant when Jews

were restricted in their memberships outside the community, but in
today's environment of freedom Jews participate widely and actively in

many social groups and political organizations. This expanded

opportunity alone would imply a reduced amount of time and other

resources spent on Jewish organizations (holding everything else
constant), and hence less participation in Jewish life (B. Chiswick

1991). But the sense of belonging to a group (whether family,

synagogue, community, or the entire Jewish People) is deeply

embedded in Jewish ritual, to the point where attempts to separate

religious adherence from Jewish identity (peoplehood) are often artificial

at best. Where the social and spiritual dimensions of Judaism are

inextricably entwined, substituting secular for religious social activities
necessarily carries with it some decline in the intensity or quality of
religious observance.
The decline in the quality of Jewish life is further exacerbated by a
"bandwagon" effect in reverse. Members who participate actively in any

social group typically raise the value of belonging not only for
themselves but for other members as well, effectively increasing the

efficiency of resources (expenditures of time and money) for all

members. People thus tend to be attracted to groups in which others
participate actively, and there is a disincentive to join groups in which

participation by others is marginal. Jewish institutions and

organizations are especially vulnerable to this bandwagon effect because

of the interaction between spiritual and social values, whereby the

spiritual life of the community is adversely affected when participation

declines. So as more people devise Jewish lifestyles that involve

relatively low time on their own part, those who continue to devote a
high level of resources to Jewish life would find that they are obtaining
less satisfaction than before. As a result, they can be expected to reduce
their own expenditures of time and money on Jewish life.
The importance of religious human capital for Judaism can scarcely
be exaggerated. Often associated with Jewish education and scholarship,
religious human capital includes any knowledge or skill that raises the

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CHISWICK

efficiency of resources devoted to current religious observance but has

no corresponding effect on efficiency for secular activities (lannaccone
1990). Religious human capital is acquired through previous activities,

not only religious education (formal or informal) but also through

experience with Jewish family, synagogue and community life. Perhaps

the best example of Jewish human capital is the Hebrew language itself;
the role of which is so important that basic religious education is often

called "Hebrew School." Knowledge of Hebrew has virtually no

implications for American Jews in their secular activities. Yet even a
rudimentary grasp of that language contributes greatly to the value of
any Jewish experience, and a sophisticated knowledge of Hebrew is an
entre into the rich body of literature at the core of Jewish intellectual
life.

Knowledge tends to beget knowledge, and the high levels of

secular education characteristic of American Jews can be expected to
facilitate (i.e., increase the efficiency of) Jewish learning. Yet because
skill-formation activities tend to be fairly time-intensive, making them
especially costly for a population with many attractive alternative uses
of time, the trends in Jewish education have been ambiguous at best

and often on the decline (Wertheimer 1989; Fishman and Goldstein

1993). A decline in Jewish participation for any reason, including the

social motives discussed above, carries with it the implication of a

reduction in the time spent in Jewish experience, a major avenue for
acquiring the memories, knowledge, and skills which are an important
component of Jewish human capital.

American Judaism is especially vulnerable to this decline in

religious human capital not only because it is a skill-intensive religion
(using a language that has little or no secular value) but also because of
the centrality of intergenerational continuity to Judaism itself. Parents
teach Judaism to their children in part by example and in part through
the integration of Jewish experience into ordinary family life. Low
levels of Jewish observance in the home, perhaps because low levels of
human capital make Jewish observance a less satisfying activity, give
children fewer opportunities to acquire Jewish skills and memories.
Thus a decline in Jewish human capital for one generation can have a
cascading effect on succeeding generations, a downward spiral that can
seriously erode the quality of Jewish life not only for the individual but
also for the community as a whole.

The American Jewish community has been mindful of these

concerns and remedial steps have been (and are being) taken. Indeed,

American Jewish culture exhibits many examples of an increase in

Jewish education and experiences in many dimensions of its intellectual

and spiritual life. Yet at the same time there have developed a variety of
Jewish lifestyles compatible with very high values of time and very low
levels of Jewish human capital. These Jewish identities require little or

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82

no religious education and emphasize elements common to Judaism

and the non-Jewish society in which Jews live and work. To the extent

that these Jewish lifestyles have been accepted by the Jewish

community, they further reduce the incentive to acquire Jewish human

capital and thus contribute to the perception of a decline in the quality

of Jewish life.

Consider a continuum along which American Jews would be

ranked not by their religious beliefs or even practices but by the
importance of specifically Jewish human capital for their preferred
lifestyle. At one extreme would be those who ignore (or characterize as

"obsolete") Jewish religious ritual, who avoid associating themselves

with the particularistic aspects of Jewish society, or who limit their
definition of Judaism to its humanistic or universalistic precepts. At the

other extreme would be those who emphasize specifically Jewish

culture in any of its various manifestations, not only as religious ritual
but also as politics, literature, history and the arts. The former would

see little point to investments in Jewish human capital, focusing

instead on acquiring skills that are of general use for both work and
leisure in the larger society. But everywhere else along the continuum

there would be some benefit to acquiring Jewish knowledge and

experience, so the optimal investment decisions would include some
Jewish as well as general human capital.
Although American Jews have experimented with lifestyles nearly
all along this continuum, economic incentives tend to discourage those
in the center of the continuum. Many attractive alternatives compete
with Judaism for their time, and high levels of secular human capital
raise productivity in these other activities. The implicit cost of Jewish
life is thus veiy high. If Judaism is perceived as an inferior choice the

optimal response would be to allocate less time to it, thus beginning

the downward spiral that leads to low levels of Jewish human capital
and little commitment to Jewish communal life. If instead Judaism is

perceived as a valuable "economic good" the optimal response would

be to raise efficiency by acquiring more Jewish human capital, making
Jewish life more satisfying and further stimulating the time and effort
devoted to Jewish activities and communal participation. Both of these
economically "rational" responses have contributed to the paradox of
American Judaism described by one observer as "apathy and renewal"
(Wertheimer 1993).
Love and Work

The cost of Jewish living in a free and open Diaspora community goes
beyond the immediate concern with expenditures of money and time,
whether on current activities or on investments in Jewish human capital
for the future. "Jewish living" refers to a lifestyle, and lifestyle choices

have implications for selection of a mate and for labor market

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CHISWICK

opportunities. To the extent that different Jewish lifestyles impose

different constraints, they may be viewed as having different cost

implications for these two spheres of activity. Each of these very

personal decisions on the part of individual Jews can collectively have

an enormous impact on the Jewish community as a whole.
Marriage is an enterprise that entwines two persons in multiple
aspects of their adult lives, especially in the family life that they share
as parents, as adult siblings, as cousins, and as the children of aging

seniors. Although romantic love can strike anywhere, selection of a

marriage partner is inevitably influenced by the potential for mutual
productivity gains associated with this enteiprise. For various reasons,

human capital characteristics are generally subject to positive

assortative mating in this selection process (homogomy), so that

highly educated, very healthy, or especially attractive men and women
tend to marry each other, as do those with low levels of these desirable

traits (Becker 1981; C. Chiswick and Lehrer 1991). A lifestyle that

makes heavy use of Jewish human capital is far easier (less costly) to

sustain with a partner who has chosen a similar lifestyle, and the
human capital intensity of Jewish observance enhances the gains from
marriage the higher the spouse's level of Jewish human capital. The
greater the human capital intensity of one's Jewish lifestyle, the greater
the gain from marriage to a person with more Jewish human capital and
the lower the likelihood of selecting a non-Jewish partner. Conversely a
lifestyle in which specifically Jewish human capital plays little role
extends the pool of potential marriage partners by including non-Jews
whose religious human capital is similarly non-specific, or specific to
another religion that is less family oriented.

If there are many human capital attributes to which the marriage

market is sensitive, the complexity of the search process is greatly
reduced by the tendency for them to be mutually correlated with each

other. The highly educated tend to devote more resources to

maintaining good health and vice versa, for example, and people with
high skill levels in the workplace are more efficient at developing high

skills related to home and family (Michael 1973; Becker 1981). But

Jewish human capital seems to be something of an exception, in part

because of the destabilizing forces discussed in the previous section of

this paper. So the marriage market in which Jews participate is

effectively sorting on two dimensions, one being a bundle of various
types of secular attributes and the other a somewhat smaller bundle of
Jewish skills and experiences. Those persons whose Jewish lifestyle is
towards the low end of the Jewish human capital continuum will be
sorting primarily on the secular dimension, while those at the high end

of the Jewish human capital continuum will be sorting on both

dimensions simultaneously. Searching simultaneously on both secular

and Jewish dimensions introduces the possibility of tradeoffs and hence

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84

a "poorer" outcome with respect to one or the other (secular vs. Jewish)

attributes.

The pool of potential marriage partners is also much larger for

those satisfied by low levels of Jewish human capital, for it includes
many non-Jews with similarly low levels of religious human capital.

The 20th century has seen the breakdown of many social barriers
between Jews and non-Jews, virtually removing the adverse effects for
Jews of residential segregation and discrimination in higher education,
the labor market, clubs, etc. With the expansion of social interactions
between Jews and non-Jews there is less of the anti-Jewish prejudice
that would make interfaith dating and interfaith marriage unacceptable
to the non-Jewish party. Taken together with reduced levels of religious
human capital in many non-Jewish groups, this further reduces the
proportion of Jews in the relevant potential marriage market pool. The
number of non-Jewish potential marriage partners in the United States
can be substantial, since Jews comprise only two percent of the total

population and less than four percent of the college educated (B.
Chiswick 1992; Goldstein 1992; B. Chiswick 1993; C. Chiswick
1995).3
Jewish lifestyles also vary considerably in the extent to which they
impose costs when Jewish identity or observance interferes with secular
educational attainment and with the labor force processes of hiring,
promotion and career advancement. For many these costs may be small
or trivial, while for others they may be substantial. Undoubtedly, the
cost is larger the greater the extent of involvement in visible Jewish

practices. In the corporate or academic world (outside of Jewish

Studies) wearing a kipa might be considered embarrassingly parochial,
observing kashrut perceived as irrational, and not working on Shabbat
and Jewish holidays viewed as a sign of low commitment to firm or
profession.^ These are certainly not new issues, but neither have they

entirely disappeared with the reduction of social barriers between

American Jews and non-Jews.

While such costs may be reduced by entering a sheltered sector of

the economy (for example, Jewish communal service, the rabbinate or a
profession in which these penalties are smaller), this has little appeal for
most American Jews. Jews are too diverse in their career choices, and
too small a minority in most of occupations, for the development of an
enclave economy which would not substantially limit the scope of their

labor force activities and hence incomes. Moreover, most American

Jews value their interactions with the non-Jewish world and believe

that the Jewish community as a whole would be disadvantaged if the

observant were to be segregated into a "Jewish" economic sphere. Yet

the secular labor market, nevertheless, imposes a cost to Jewish

observance that is greater the greater the "visibility" of Jewish practice

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CHISWICK

85

and the closer its adherence to the Jewish calendar and rhythms of daily

life (C. Chiswick 1996).

Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Jewish

"assimilation" referred to integration into the larger society and was

viewed as a highly desirable goal in itself as well as a prerequisite for
financial and political security. Jewishness itself was taken for granted
as an ascribed characteristic which could not be shed, but which might
become transparent in an "Americanized" Jewish community. By the
end of the century it was economic and social integration that was taken
for granted by American Jews and "assimilation" refers to the loss of
Jewish identity associated with outmarriage and apathy. Human capital
has played a key role in this reversal, for in the earlier period Jews
allocated most of their educational investments to secular achievements
without fully appreciating the extent to which Judaism requires Jewish
specific human capital to sustain itself in an open society (C. Chiswick

1999).

Policy Recommendations
The Jewish community has made many adjustments to enhance its
intergenerational continuity as a religious group, focusing its concern

on both the number of Jews and the content of what it means to be

Jewish in a modem, democratic, free Diaspora. Even so, the American

Jewish community has not yet stabilized and the challenges that remain

are enormous. The economic perspective developed in this paper is

suggestive of some directions for continuing adjustment in the future.
Jewish continuity requires the transmission of Jewish knowledge,
skills, experiences and memories. These must be imparted to Jewish

youth by their parents (many of whom may require education

themselves in order to fill this role) and by Jewish institutions in the
community. Yet they can not come at the expense of the high level of
secular education that not only generates economic security but also
constitutes an important aspect of American Jewish identity. Moreover,
the suburban Jewish community of today can not benefit from the
concentrated residence patterns of the past, whether a European-style
ghetto or a densely Jewish urban neighborhood. Thus the formation of

Jewish human capital must rely on a system of Jewish education,

whether formal or informal, that supplements and reinforces the secular

education received by Jewish children.5 Jewish day schools that

combine the secular and Jewish subjects are promising in this respect,
insofar as they educate youth to live and work simultaneously in both

the secular and Jewish spheres. Yet much of Jewish human capital
requires maturity beyond childhood, suggesting the need to develop
comparable institutions for the education of older youths and adults.
The expansion of Jewish education will be very expensive (in both
time and money), and even families who desire Jewish continuity may

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CONTEMPORARY JEWRY

find it too great a sacrifice. Greater emphasis needs to be placed in fund

raising on the importance of Jewish education for continuity. Yet

contributions to Jewish philanthropies are under increased competitive
pressure as declines in Jewish identity, increases in secular activities,
and rising intermarriage rates have all been associated with a shift in
giving toward non-Jewish causes (B. Chiswick 1991). At this point in
American Jewish history the will to acquire a Jewish education may be
the key factor in the decision to finance it. Perhaps a redirection of
fiindraising priorities would be appropriate, placing less emphasis on

the amount of money to be raised and more on the function of

contributions (of time and/or money) as an expression of Jewish
identity. A reappraisal of priorities may also be necessary for the
expenditures of philanthropic dollars. With the low birth rate and

consequent aging of the American Jewish population, many

communities find themselves providing high-quality services to the

aged but low-quality services for youth. A partial redirection of
resources from the aged to the young may be a necessary adjustment for
Jewish communal survival, and one would hope that the grandparents
would appreciate the importance of this reallocation of resources.
While hardly a panacea for the American Jewish community, the

school choice/school voucher movement has some promising

implications (Wertheimer 1999b). Zero-tuition public schools present

tough competition for tuition-charging Jewish day schools. A voucher
program that successfully levels the playing field by reducing (or
eliminating) the discrepancy in the money cost for the two types of
schooling may be very effective in promoting Jewish education among
American youth. Moreover a substantial increase in Jewish school
enrollments would permit "economies of scale," reducing the average
commuting time for Jewish students, encouraging the development of
new educational materials and techniques, and lowering the cost per
student of providing Jewish schooling.
Although much Jewish human capital is formed in the home, there

are many parents who largely missed out on this aspect of Jewish
education when they were young. Rather than viewing them as a lost

generation, they should be viewed as an opportunity. "Night school"

was an essential part of the American education of adult Jewish
immigrants at the turn of the 20th century. A new night school
movement may be needed for the Jewish education of young adults at
the turn of the 21st century. The facilities exist in synagogues, JCCs
and Jewish day schools, and most are already providing some form of

adult education. But its scope needs to be broadened, including

community-wide efforts that promote the idea that "Jewish education is

not just for children anymore" and that continuity begins with Jewishly
educated and involved parents.

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CHISWICK

87

While out-marriage should be recognized as symptomatic of low

levels of Jewish human capital, reducing the relative cost of in-marriage
should be a high priority for the American Jewish community. Surely
the synagogues should try to develop roles for Jewish singles, whether
teenagers or adults, that would integrate them into the community as
well as providing a social outlet. Yet it is on the college and university
campuses, while in undergraduate, graduate or professional school, that

so many youths find their mates. Hillel Houses (or a comparable

institution) can serve a useful function there, but they require
imaginative programming and perhaps more linkages to other Jewish
communal institutions.

If the entire community would probably benefit by paying more

attention to the Jewish potential of its youth, the traditional two-parent,

and the increasingly common single-parent, Jewish family also needs to

be better integrated into Jewish communal life. Synagogues, Jewish

Community Centers and Jewish summer camps need to be more

responsive in their dues/fee structures to lower income households. The

increasing family orientation of synagogues is a plus. Yet most

communal institutions need to broaden their approach so as to

incorporate single-parent families and Jewish singles of all ages into

their structures.

Workplace barriers to Jews have fallen dramatically over the past

century. Yet many professions (outside of Jewish communal service
itself) still present barriers to members who wish to combine Jewish
religious practice with full participation in their profession. The goal
should be that Jewish religious practice should not have to come at the
expense of occupational choice and professional advancement. Usually
this merely requires raising the level of consciousness of others, but
sometimes it may require legal action. Always, however, it requires the
support of other Jews, for nothing is more undermining of the exercise
of Jewish observance than the lack of support from Jewish colleagues
who prefer other lifestyles. The community as a whole needs to focus
attention on mutual supportiveness among Jews and to work toward
removal of remaining workplace barriers, whether implicit or explicit.
Judaism has survived 3,500 years, mostly in Diaspora. There has

been no period in which Judaism and Jewish continuity has been

achieved without cost, and today is no exception. Jews and Judaism
have in the past shown a remarkable resilience to stresses introduced by
these costs and by changes in the secular world around them. Surely
modern Jewry should be able to do the same. Indeed, the ingredients
exist for a successful response to the challenges ahead in the early 21st
century United States. All that is required is the imagination and will
of a committed Jewish community.

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CONTEMPORARY JEWRY

NOTES

1 For an interesting estimate of the out-of-pocket costs for various

categories of Jewish expenditures see (Monson and Feldman 1995).

2 By this measure even children can have a high value of time. For
example, time in Hebrew school competes with time for secular school

studies as well as the myriad of after-school and weekend activities

ranging from ballet lessons to football practice.

3 Suppose, for example, that by ignoring Jewish human capital a

person would be willing to consider as a potential spouse any highly
educated person (which for the sake of this example would include all
Jewish partners). Then the pool of potential partners would be 25 times
larger than if it were limited to Jews only. Even if only 40 percent of
these non-Jews were available because of the low specificity of their
own religious human capital, the pool of potential marriage partners
would still be larger by a factor of ten.

4 As but one example of the cost of Shabbat observance, many

academic professional associations now schedule their meetings over
the weekend to take advantage of reduced airfares if there is a Saturday
overnight and the lower hotel room rates on weekends. Or consider the

long-time Shabbat-observing employee who Chrysler Corporation

wishes to fire after reassigning him to a shift that includes Friday night

(Forward 1997).

5 See (Wertheimer 1999) for an excellent delineation of the Jewish

education system in the U.S.

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CHISWICK

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