Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Oh Cho Vs Director of Lands G
Oh Cho Vs Director of Lands G
HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under
the Land Registration Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors
in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of
the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of
the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain.
Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of
registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration of
the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by the
Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This
possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an
alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an
alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe 5 parcels of land
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M
worth of improvements
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES, already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient. it had already ceased to be of the
public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does
not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the
patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply
to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO, If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to
which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29,
1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that
Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition. The only limitation then
extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares
since time immemorial. Such possessions justify the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest.
3. Yes. In this case, the court declared that it is contingent upon the issuance
of title before juridical entity may have acquired possession over the
property. That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a piece of
land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains
public land. Thus, any levy and execution were void. As between the State
and the Meralco, the land in question remains a public land. The court also
took notice that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction
between (on one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no
occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of
the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject
to judicial confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not
distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification.
Facts:
A complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of
Lands, praying for judgement: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute
owner of the parcel of land: (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of
Lands in favour of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private
property: (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to
said Angela Razon.
The Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein
and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property
of the Government of the United States under the administration and
control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was
made in accordance with law.
The Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgement declaring the
plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by
the Director of Lands in favour of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Namesio Pinlac sold the
land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza.
After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish
pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza sold it
to Valentin Susi.
Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its
price and sown bacawan on said land, availing himself of the firewood
gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the
price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in
question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by
Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any
interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when
Angela Razon commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga to recover the possession of said land.
Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question
through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the
purchase therof.
After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands
overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela
Razon and issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon.
Issue:
Heid:
SC in their decision favoured Valentin Susi. According to SC there is, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No.
2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of
the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26,
1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
favour, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right
to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be a public domain and have become
a private property, at least by presumption of Valentin Susi, beyond the control
of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela
Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of the land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was void, and Angela Razon thereby
did not acquire any right.