A.C. No.

6656
May 4, 2006
[Formerly CBD-98-591]
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARMELITA S. BAUTISTA-LOZADA, * Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada seeks reconsideration of our December 13, 2005 resolution finding her guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals and suspending her from
the practice of law for two years.
Respondent contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), the complaint against her was already barred by prescription. She also asserts that her December 7, 1990 loan agreement with
complainant complied with Rule 16.04 because the interest of complainant was fully protected.
Respondents contentions have no merit.
Respondent anchors her defense of prescription on Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides:
SECTION 1. Prescription. A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional
misconduct.
However, as early as 1967, we have held that the defense of prescription does not lie in administrative proceedings against lawyers. 1 And in the 2004 case
of Heck v. Santos,2 we declared that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe.
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long
as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they
ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time
has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them
from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer.3 (emphasis supplied)
The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative complaints against lawyers from this Court which has the inherent power to
regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated power to entertain administrative complaints
against lawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court.
Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints
against lawyers runs afoul of the settled ruling of this Court. It should therefore be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.
Moreover, assuming that prescription is a valid defense, respondent raised it only at this late stage. We presume she was familiar with that rule yet she
failed to invoke it at the earliest opportunity. Instead she opted to insist on her innocence.
On the other ground raised by respondent, we have sufficiently discussed the implications of her loan agreement with complainant in relation to Rule 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility in our December 13, 2005 resolution. Considering the fiduciary character of respondents relationship with
complainant, the nature of their agreement and complainants lack of independent advice when she entered into it, there is neither sufficient ground nor
compelling reason to reconsider our earlier resolution.
WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby declared null and
void.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Representing conflicting interests is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Unless all the affected clients written consent is given after a full
disclosure of all relevant facts, attorneys guilty of representing conflicting interests shall as a rule be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a sworn Letter-Complaint1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by
Ben A. Nicolas, acting for himself and on behalf of Northwestern University, Inc. In that Letter-Complaint, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo was charged with deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney by representing conflicting interests. The material averments of the Complaint are
summarized by the IBP-CBD as follows:
"Herein [c]omplainants, Northwestern University, Inc. and Mr. Ben A. Nicolas, accuses (sic) herein [r]espondent, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, of engaging
in conflicting interest in a case before the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando, La Union.
"Complainant alleges that in a consolidated case, herein [r]espondent appeared and acted as counsels for both complainants (eight out of the eighteen
complainants therein) and respondent (one out of the ten respondents therein).
"In a consolidation of NLRC Cases [Nos.] 1-05-1086-97, 1-05-1087-97, 1-05-1088-97, 1-05-1091-97, 1-05-1092-97, 1-05-1097-97, 1-05-1109-97, 1-051096-97 ("consolidated cases"), herein [r]espondent appeared as counsel for complainants therein, Teresita A. Velasco, Gervacio A. Velasco, Mariel S.
Hernando, Virginio C. Rasos, Bonifacio S. Blas, Ronald A. Daoang, Luzviminda T. Urcio and Araceli Quimoyog. In the very same consolidated case,
[r]espondent was also the counsel of one of the respondents therein, Jose G. Castro.
"Complainants, as their evidence, submitted the Motion to Dismiss dated August 12, 1997 filed by Jose G. Castro, represented by his counsel, herein
[r]espondent filed before the NLRC of San Fernando, La Union. Sixteen (16) days later or on August 28, 1997, [r]espondent filed a Complainants
Consolidated Position Paper, this time representing some of the complainants in the very same consolidated case."2 (Citations omitted)
Respondent failed to file his Answer to the Complaint despite a June 24 1998 Order 3 of the IBP-CBD directing him to do so. Even after receiving five
notices, he failed to appear in any of the scheduled hearings. Consequently, he was deemed to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings.
Thereafter, the complainants were ordered to submit their verified position paper with supporting documents, after which the case was to be deemed
submitted for decision.4 In their Manifestation5 dated August 30, 2004, they said that they would no longer file a position paper. They agreed to submit the
case for decision on the basis of their Letter-Affidavit dated March 16, 1998, together with all the accompanying documents.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his Report,6 Commissioner Dennis B. Funa found respondent guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, the former recommended the latters suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-415 dated October 7, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Funa, with the modification that the period of suspension was increased to two (2) years.
On December 12, 2004, the Resolution and the records of the case were transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court. On January 20, 2005, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2004-415. The IBP denied the
Motion.
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the recommended period of suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their
clients.7 Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients written consent, given after a full
disclosure of the facts.8
When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1)
when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the
acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to
use against the first one any knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of an attorneys duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty.9
In the present case, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, as counsel for Respondent Jose C. Castro in NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1083-97 to I-05-1109-97, filed a Motion to
Dismiss those cases. Shortly thereafter, a position paper was filed by Atty. Arquillo as counsel for several complainants in consolidated NLRC Case Nos. I05-1087-97, I-05-1088-97, I-05-1091-97, I-05-1092-97, I-05-1096-97, I-05-1097-97, and I-05-1109-97. All the cases in the second set were included in the
first one, for which he had filed the subject Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, in his position paper for the complainants, Atty. Arquillo protected his other
client, Respondent Jose C. Castro, in these words:
"3. More than lack of valid cause for the dismissal of complainants, respondents, except Atty. Jose C. Castro and Atty. Ernesto B. Asuncion, should be
made accountable for not according complainants their right to due process."10
In his two-page Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Arquillo claims that there was no conflict of interest in his representation of both the respondent and the
complainants in the same consolidated cases, because all of them were allegedly on the same side. Attaching to the Motion the Decision of Labor Arbiter
Norma C. Olegario on the consolidated NLRC cases, Atty. Arquillo theorizes that her judgment absolved Castro of personal liability for the illegal dismissal
of the complainants; this fact allegedly showed that there was no conflict in the interests of all the parties concerned.
This Court does not agree. Atty. Arquillos acts cannot be justified by the fact that, in the end, Castro was proven to be not personally liable for the claims of
the dismissed employees. Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should have known that there was an obvious conflict of
interests, regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed employees were the complainants in
the same cases in which Castro was one of the respondents. Indeed, Commissioner Funa correctly enounced:
"As counsel for complainants, [r]espondent had the duty to oppose the Motion to Dismiss filed by Jose G. Castro. But under the circumstance, it would be
impossible since [r]espondent is also the counsel of Jose G. Castro. And it appears that it was [r]espondent who prepared the Motion to Dismiss, which he
should be opposing [a]s counsel of Jose G. Castro, Respondent had the duty to prove the Complaint wrong. But Respondent cannot do this because he
is the counsel for the complainants. Here lies the inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is very clear.
"Thus it has been noted
The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with vigor and zeal, the clients claim against the other and to properly represent the latter in the
unrelated action, or, if he can do so, he cannot avoid being suspected by the defeated client of disloyalty or partiality in favor of the successful client. The
foregoing considerations will strongly tend to deprive the relation of attorney and client of those special elements which make it one of trust and
confidence[.] (Legal Ethics, Agpalo, p. 230, 4th ed.; In re De la Rosa, 21 Phil. 258)"11
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyers representation of both sides of an issue
is highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such conflict may
be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith. 12
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years. Considering, however, prior rulings in
cases also involving attorneys representing conflicting interests, we reduce the suspension to one (1) year.13
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTY of misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, ChicoNazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Corona, J., on official leave.

G.R. No. MTJ-95-1053 January 2, 1997

SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The case before us stemmed from a verified complaint filed by Spouses Makadaya and Usodan Sadik charging Judge Abdallah Casar, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Kolambugan-Tangcal, Lanao del Norte with misconduct and misappropriation.
Judge Casar filed his answer dated February 28, 1995 averring that the complaint is merely for harassment and intended to ruin his reputation.
In the resolution of August 14, 1995, this Court referred this case to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City and Lanao
del Norte, Branch 6 for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated November 25, 1995, the Investigating Judge made the following findings:
The basic facts are not in dispute are not in dispute, to wit:
1. On February 14, 1985, one Lekiya Paito filed an application for life insurance with the Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife) in Cotabato
City, Exh. 5. The application was approved and Policy No. 0503033 was issued in her name for the amount of P30,000.00 with an accidental death benefit
rider. Named as beneficiaries were her daughters, Linang Minalang and Makadaya Sadik. She paid the initial premium of P410.00.
2. On October 12, 1985, Lekiya Paito died in Pagayawan, Tampara, Lanao del Sur.
3. The beneficiaries and/or through their representatives sought for and obtained the assistance of respondent, who was then a trial attorney of the Bureau
of Forest Development, Cotabato City, to pursue the approval of their claim for payment of the insurance benefits with Grepalife. Respondent made the
necessary follow-ups but in due course Grepalife denied the claim on the grounds of misrepresentation and concealment.
4. On October 10, 1986, respondent, as counsel for the beneficiaries, filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 13, Cotabato City which was
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2747 entitled: "Makadaya L. Sadik and Linang Minalang, plaintiffs versus Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation,
defendant" for Specific Performance.
5. On November 17, 1989, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay to the
former the sum of P30,000.00 as "benefit due them under Insurance Policy No. 503033." The court denied plaintiffs" claim for double indemnity of
P60,000.00 under the accidental death rider. At this time, respondent was already the presiding Judge of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Kolambugan-Maigo (now, MCTC of Kolambugan-Tangcal), having assumed such office on September 1, 1989, EXh.7.
6. Upon receipt of the decision, respondent as counsel for plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals even as defendant likewise filed an
appeal. Respondent represented the plaintiffs in the appeal. On September 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court.
Defendant elevated the case on petition for review to the Supreme Court which dismissed the petition.

7. After the dismissal of its petition by the Supreme Court, Grepalife filed a Manifestation dated 6 July 1993 with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 13, Cotabato
City declaring its willingness to pay the judgment award and depositing with said court RCBC check No. 62837 in the amount of P30,000.00 payable to the
plaintiffs. Copy of the manifestation was furnished to "Atty. Abdallah M. Casar, Counsel for the Plaintiffs, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte" (pp. 44 & 55,
Records).
8. On October 1, 1992, respondent collected the check from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Br, 13, Cotabato City and thereafter cashed it.
9. Respondent did not deliver the said money judgment to the plaintiffs.
10. On January 26, 1995, complainants filed their administrative complaint.
Respondent admitted that he retained the sum of P30,000.00 representing the judgment award in civil Case No. 2747 and that he did not deliver it to the
plaintiffs. He interposes the following defenses:
1. He is not guilty of any misconduct because he accepted the case long before he became a judge;
2. He did not misappropriate the money he collected from the court. It is intact but he has the right to retain the amount of P30,000.00 until he is paid his
expenses pursuant to Section 137, Rule 138 on attorney's lien;
3. The complainant, Makadaya Sadik is not the real Makadaya Sadik, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2747 and being an impostor she is not entitled to the
money.
There is no dispute that when respondent agreed to file the complaint in behalf of Makadaya Sadik and Linang Minalang, he was not yet a member of the
judiciary. He was a trial attorney of the Bureau of Forest Development. He claimed that he was authorized to engage in practice in behalf of relatives but
presented no documentary authority. He continued to represent the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2747 when he joined the Citizens Legal Assistance Office in
a private capacity. In fact he took pains to emphasize that he handled the case not as a CLAO lawyer (tsn, p. 39; 11-13-95) although in his notices of
change of address, he gave his new addresses as follows: "Atty. Abdallah M. Casar, CLAO, Capitol, Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte" Exh. 10 and
"CLAO, Kabacan District Office, Municipal Hall Bldg., Kabacan, Province of Cotabato" Exh. 11. (pp. 119-120, Records). Similarly in his Memorandum dated
24 October 1988, he signed as "Attorney for Plaintiffs, CLAO, Kabacan, Cotabato," Exh. B (pp. 89-96, Records). In those instances, while he was actually
prosecuting the case in his private capacity, he gave the impression that he was handling the case for the CLAO. By his own admission, he was engaged
in a private practice while employed as trial attorney with the BFD and citizen's attorney with the CLAO. He failed to produce proof of authority. But as he
correctly states, those were acts performed before he joined the judiciary. However, he failed to mention that even after he became a municipal judge, he
continued to act as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2747 on appeal to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. He assumed office on
September 1, 1989. The decision of the Regional Trial Court was rendered on November 17, 1989. He filed an appeal in behalf of the plaintiffs even as
Grepalife also appealed. He testified:
"Q. After that what happened?
A. The case' decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and eventually appealed again to the Supreme Court where I made several manifestations".
(tsn, p. 36; 11/13/95).
He actively handled the case on appeal. He violated Rule 5:07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that "A judge shall not engage in the private
practice of law." He reasoned out that he was forced to continue as counsel for the plaintiffs because he failed to get in touch with them after he received
the decision of the lower court. He even went to Davao to look for them but failed. A transparent and flimsy justification. At that time he was stationed in
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. He knew that plaintiffs are from Pagayawan, Tamparan, Lanao del Sur. He is himself a native of Tatayawon, Tamparan. He
could have easily went to his hometown or sent someone there to get in touch with plaintiffs. He did not have to go to Davao which is much further from
Kolambugan than Tamparan. At any rate failure to contact his clients is not reason enough to continue as counsel for plaintiffs on appeal. The least which
he should have done was to secure permission from the Supreme Court before proceeding with the case on appeal.
He also denies having converted and misappropriated the judgment award of P30,000.00. He claims the amount is intact but he has the right to retain the
same until he is paid for his expenses pursuant to Sec. 37, Rule 138 of the Rule of Court. He declared:
"A. They failed to come and for all these, I estimated my expenses to be more than Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos.
Q. What is your right in getting the amount of P30,000.00?
A. Well, pursuant to Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court known as attorney's liens by virtue of that I have the right to retain the amount until payment
of my expenses was paid . . ." (sic) (tsn, pp. 38-39; 11/13/95).

This is ridiculous. The judgment award is only P30,000.00 but he spent more than P30,000.00 to recover it. Thus despite winning the case, the client could
not collect a single cent and will still have to pay his lawyer. This may be one reason why the ordinary layman holds an unflattering perception of lawyers.
His evidence fails to prove the amount of expenses claimed by him. He said that to follow-up the claim, he went to Manila six times spending for fare alone
P3000.00 for each trip. When the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, he went to Manila to follow-up thrice (tsn, p. 38; 11/13/95). Except for his
uncorroborated testimony, there are only two documents showing he was indeed in Manila. Those are Exhs. 26 and 32 indicating that he personally served
those letters to Grepalife in Manila. But there is no evidence that he went there for this purpose alone. It is highly probable that the visit to Grepalife was
merely one of his purposes in going to Manila. On the other hand, his claim that he went to Manila three times to follow-up the case while it was pending
with the Supreme Court is unworthy of credence. He was then already a municipal judge. He could not have openly exposed himself to the Supreme Court
as being engaged in private practice. Besides there is no reason to follow-up in person any case with the Supreme Court. Similarly, his claims that he spent
a lot of money in looking for witnesses and trying to trace the whereabouts of his clients are self-serving, devoid of corroboration and unsupported by
document evidence. Finally, he presented the receipts for the payment of docket fees in the amount of P580.00, Exhs. 28 and 29, which he alleges was
paid by him out of his own pocket. Standing alone, those receipts do not prove his claim. The normal practice is for the client to advance to his lawyer the
amount for the filing fees. It is the lawyer who pays the docket fees and he can easily procure the issuance of the receipts in his own name. Complainant
Makadaya Sadik declared that her husband took care of the payment of the docket fees. Respondent did not cross-examine Usodan Sadik on this point.
In sum, respondent failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he did indeed spent more than P30,000.00 to prosecute the insurance claim. His
various claims of expenses for travels to Manila, to find witnesses and to look for his clients are all designed to inflate his demand for reimbursement and
justify his withholding of the judgment award from his clients. To be generous, the sum of P6,000.00 corresponding to his trips to Manila in March and May,
1986 may be allowed. Added to that may be his claim for attorney's fees, although to be generous again, he is not really entitled to it. From the testimonies
of both Usodan Sadik and respondent, it appears that there was an agreement for the payment of P10,000.00 if respondent succeeds in recovering the
sum of P60,000.00 under the accidental death rider. But this amount was not obtained and only the basic claim of P30,000.00 was adjudged by the court. It
is logical to assume that in such case, the amount of attorney's fees should also be proportionally reduced to P5,000.00. Thus his total claim is not more
than P11,000.00. Nonetheless, it appears that his reliance on Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is nothing more than an afterthought. If indeed, he
was claiming attorney's lien pursuant to said section, then he should have known that to be entitled thereto he must comply with.certain pre-conditions.
Said section provides that with respect to judgments for payment of money, like in Civil Case No. 2747, a lawyer shall have a lien thereto "from and after
the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment . . . and shall
have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and the adverse party." From July, 1993 when he learned of the dismissal of Grepalife's
petition by the Supreme Court until now, he did not file the necessary pleadings to enforce his alleged lien. It surfaces only when the administrative case
was filed.
His last line of defense is that the complainant Makadaya Sadik is not the real Makadaya Sadik who is the beneficiary of Lekiya Paito and plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 2747. He declared:
A. As far as I know they were recruited as witnesses.
COURT: Q. You said they, are you referring to Usodan Sadik and Makadaya Sadik?
A. Yes, Your Honor, because of the failure of the beneficiaries to come to Court.
COURT: Proceed.
Judge Casar:
Q. Do you have any evidence for that, that Makadaya Sadik or referring to these persons who are complainants, Usodan Sadik and Makadaya Sadik were
recruited to testify in this case, but these are not the true complainants?
A. Yes.
Q. Who recruited them?
A. The claimants. (tsn, pp. 21-22; 11/13/95).
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: WHO FAILED TO APPEAR?
A. Makadaya Sadik and Linang Minalang despite notice. The claimants failed to appear and procured another persons (sic) who are impostors. This Kunug
Minalang and Sadik Paito took charge of the witnesses and they presented another witnesses (sic).

COURT: I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS. ANOTHER WITNESSES OR ANOTHER PERSON WAS PRESENTED TO TESTIFY AS LINANG MINALANG
AND SADIK?
A. At that time we needed more witnesses so the parties and Barogong Paito agreed to testify but two persons who are principal witnesses failed to come.
COURT: SO WHEN THEY FAILED TO COME, WHAT DID SADIK PAITO DO?
A. They took charge of presenting another witnesses (sic).
Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY "TOOK CHARGE", YOU MEAN, THEY PRESENTED TO YOU PERSONS WHO WERE NOT REALLY LINANG MINALANG
AND MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. They told me that instead of them who could not go to court, they faked another persons (sic).
Q. AND THESE PERSONS WHO WERE FAKED APPEARED AND TESTIFIED AS LINANG MINALANG AND MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. As a matter of fact, only Makadaya Sadik took the stand because Linang Minalang failed to come.
Q. MAKADAYA SADIK TESTIFIED IN COURT?
A. In reality, Makadaya Sadik failed to appear also.
Q. BUT SOMEBODY TESTIFIED AS IF HE IS MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. Yes.
Q. I WANT THIS VERY CLEAR, HADJI SARIP PAITO PRESENTED TO YOU ANOTHER PERSON WHO CLAIM TO BE MAKADAYA SADIK BUT HE IS
REALLY NOT MAKADAYA?
A. Yes.
Q. AND THAT PERSON WHO ACTUALLY TESTIFIED CLAIMING TO BE MAKADAYA SADIK WAS THE PERSON WHO TESTIFIED THE LAST TIME AS
MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. That is what I can recall.
COURT: PROCEED.
Judge Casar:
Q. What was the arrangement for that matter for the recruitment of other substitute witnesses?
A. Well, I told my client, I have to give them Five Thousand (P5,000.00) pesos.
COURT: TO WHOM WILL THE P5,000.00 BE PAID?
A. To the substitute witnesses.
Q. YOU TOLD SARIP PAITO AND KUNUG MINALANG THAT THESE WITNESSES BE PAID P5,000.00?
A. Yes.
Q. DID THEY AGREE?
A. I presume so because they testified.

Q. KUNUG MINALANG AND SARIP PAITO AGREED THAT THE P5,000.00 BE PAID TO THE SUBSTITUTE WITNESSES?
A. Seems to me that they agreed. (tsn, pp.34-36; 11/13/95).
By his own categorical admission, he deliberately, knowingly and willfully agreed to procure a substitute witness, an impostor, to pose as claimant
Makadaya Sadik and testify in Civil Case No. 2747. He even proposed that such witness be paid P5,000.00. And he actually presented such witness as
Makadaya Sadik in that case and that impostor is the Makadaya Sadik who is the complainant in this case. She is, respondent says, the step-daughter of
Lekiya Paito, the daughter of Batobarani Lugpangan and another woman (tsn, p. 17; 11/13/95). By any language, this is subornation of perjury.
To make matters worse, he declared that even before he filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2747, he was already informed that the insurance policy of
Lekiya Paito was fraudulent. Thus:
"Q. What else happened?
A. Naga Datumanong approached me and told me about the facts of the case and that this was done by unscrupulous persons.
COURT: WHAT WAS DONE BY UNSCRUPULOUS PERSONS?
A. The insurance application of Lekiya Paito, in fact, at the time of the insurance, Lekiya Paito was killed in her hometown.
COURT: YOU MEAN LEKIYA PAITO WAS ALREADY SICK WHEN THE INSURANCE FORM WAS MADE?
A. Yes, she was sick in Pagayawan, not in Cotabato City.
Judge Casar: So, whose work is that insurance
A. As far as I know, that is the work of Usodan Hadji Ibrahim.
COURT: THIS USODAN HADJI IBRAHIM IS NOT THE PERSON NOW IN COURT?
A. As far as I know, he is Usodan Ibrahim.
Q. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS IS OR THE PERSON WHO APPEARED AS COMPLAINANT IS ACTUALLY USODAN IBRAHIM?
A. As far as I know, he is not working with me.
Q. SO THAT THIS PERSON NAMED USODAN SADIK, ONE OF THE COMPLAINANTS, IS ACTUALLY USODAN IBRAHIM?
A. Yes.
Q. AND YOU NOW CLAIM THAT USODAN IBRAHIM WAS THE ONE WHO PREPARED THE FRAUDULENT POLICY FOR LEKIYA PAITO?
A. As far as I was told. (tsn, pp. 30-31; 11/13/95).
Yet knowing that the insurance claim was fraudulent, he filed the complaint and compounded it by presenting false witnesses in court. He transgressed not
only the Canons of Professional Ethics but also the Revised Penal Code. In his single-minded intent to keep the insurance proceeds for himself and
deprive complainant Makadaya Sadik of her share, respondent duga deep hole for himself. His cure is worse than the disease.
It is possible that the insurance taken for Lekiya Paito was indeed a scam. It is not an uncommon occurrence in these parts to insure a person who is near
death or for an insured to fake his death and collect the proceeds. But scam or not we are convinced that the complainant Makadaya Sadik is not an
impostor. She denied that she is the step-daughter of Lekiya Paito. She insisted she is the youngest daughter and she named all her brothers and sisters.
And it was respondent who presented her in Civil Case No. 2747 as Makadaya Sadik daughter of Lekiya Sadik and one of the beneficiaries of the latter's
insurance policy.
The Investigating Judge then recommended that a penalty ranging from a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000. 00) pesos to suspension for six (6) months be
imposed depending on respondent's record. Respondent was likewise ordered to pay to herein complainant, Makadaya Sadik, the sum of fifteen thousand
(P15,000.00) pesos less the sum of five thousand five hundred (P5,500.00) pesos equivalent to one-half of the expenses and attorney's fees demanded by
respondent.

In the resolution of March 13, 1996, this Court referred this case to the Office of the Court Administrator fo revaluation, report and recommendation.
In its memorandum of August 15, 1996, the Office of the Court Administrator made the following findings and evaluation:
The undersigned concurs with the finding of Executive Judge Salazar that respondent be found guilty of the charges of misconduct and misappropriation,
but differs insofar as the recommended penalty is concerned. It is an established rule that the personal behavior of a member of the judiciary in the
performance of his official duties and in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. Respondent's act of collecting the judgment award of P30,000.00
from the Clerk of Court of RTC, Cotabato City and his refusal to turn over the amount to his client, complainant Makadaya Sadik and her sister, is an act of
misappropriation amounting to gross misconduct and/or dishonesty. His defense that he has the right to retain the entire P30,000.00 as attorney's lien in
unacceptable. For he has no right to retain the judgment award allegedly to secure payment of litigation expenses and attorney's fees. He had no authority
to practice law while in government service. In continuing to handle the case of herein complainants against Grepalife after he joined the government and
without first securing proper authority is no less constitutive of abuse of authority. Furthermore, he violated Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
prohibits a judge to engage in the private practice of law. He likewise violated the Attorney's Oath in agreeing to file Civil Case No. 2747 for the purpose of
claiming the insurance proceeds from Grepalife despite his having been informed that the insurance policy of Lekiya Paito was fraudulently applied for.
Agreeing to handle the claim said to have arisen from a fraudulent act against the insurer certainly speaks of a moral flaw in his character.
This Court has held that: "A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever
about his honesty . . . He should ever strive to preserve the good name of the court on which he sits and avoid any indiscretion that will defile its probity.
The respondent has not lived up to these exacting standards. He has betrayed his oath and debased his position. He has impaired the image of the
Judiciary to which he owes the duty of loyalty and obligation to keep it at all times above suspicion and worthy of the people's trust. No less importantly, he
has also injured the herein complainant, who has yet to receive the money entrusted to the respondent for the satisfaction of the judgment that became
final and executory more than three years ago." (Dr. Ernesto J. Yuson vs. Judge Federico V. Noel, AM No. RTJ-91-762, 1 October 1993).
Records show that in MTJ-92-728 filed by Mayor Perlita Libardos against herein respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, etc. he
was fined P5,000.00 and sternly warned. He has still five (5) other administrative cases docketed against him namely: 1) MTJ-95-1048, for gross ignorance
of the law, gross incompetence, violation of Section 7, 15 and 17 of Rule 37 of the New Comelec Rules of Procedures, etc.; 2) 95-1061 for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions; 3) OCA-IPI No. 95-59-MTJ for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Incompetence; and 4) OCA IPI No. 95-59MTJ for Falsification of Public Documents. The first two (2) cases are pending investigation by the Executive Judge while the two (2) others are now
pending with the Court with respondent's Comment dated 29 November 1995 and 7 December 1995 and pending evaluation by this Office, respectively.
It is clear from the facts established that respondent does not deserve to remain in the service of the Judiciary where honesty, probity and integrity are
indispensable credentials.
It then recommended:
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation that: a) Judge Abdallah M. Casar, MCTC Kolambugan-Tangcal,
Lanao del Norte be DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to his appointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except this accrued leave credits; and b) he be ORDERED to turnover to complainant
Makadaya-Sadik and Linang Minalang (co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2747) the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) which he received from the
Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 13, Cotabato City last 1 October 1993 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice.
The Court has thoroughly studied the record of this case and has ascertained that the findings of the investigating judge, concurred in by the Office of the
Court Administrator, are adequately supported by the evidence and are in accord with applicable legal principles. Consequently, the Court hereby adopts
the OCA's recommendation of meting out the supreme penalty of dismissal on herein respondent judge.
It must be borne in mind that courts exist to dispense and to promote justice. 1 However, the reality of justice depends, above all, on the intellectual, moral
and personal quality of the men and women who are called to serve as our judges. 2 In a piece written by Rosenberg, this point was emphasized, thus:
Justice is an alloy of men and mechanisms in which, as Roscoe Pound remarked, "men count more than machinery." Assume the clearest rules, the most
enlightened procedures, the most sophisticated court techniques; the key factor is still the judge. In the long run, "There is no guarantee of justice except
the personality of the judge. The reason the judge makes or breaks the system of justice is that rules are not self-declaring or self-applying. Even in a
government of laws, men make the decisions." 3
In the recent case of Jocelyn Talens-Dabon v. Judge Hermin E. Arceo, 4 the Court emphasized the importance of the role played by judges in the judicial
system, thus:
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community
that the people who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily
create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly
judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the

highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the
wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.
Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for judicial office reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity
of the damage that can be done to the legal order by judicial corruption. The rationale for this was succinctly put by Jones, thus:
If a physician or a professor or a businessman is discovered to be a thief or an influence peddler, the disclosure will not put medicine, higher education, or
business into general disrepute. But judges are different and more representative; revelations of judicial corruption create suspicion and loss of confidence
in legal processes generally and endanger public respect for law. 5
Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of exceptional integrity and honesty. The special urgency for requiring these qualities in a judge is
not hard to understand for the judge acts directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his countrymen. Hence, being in a position of such grave
responsibility in the administration of justice, a judge must conduct himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office.
Respondent judge, however, not only failed in this respect but proved himself repeatedly unworthy of his post.
The records show that even after he became judge, respondent acted as counsel for herein complainants and misappropriated the judgment award of
P30,000.00 which rightfully belongs to complainants. Moreover, respondent's line of defense revealed a significant and deplorable flaw in his character. In
hoping to redeem himself, he categorically admitted that he deliberately, knowingly and willfully agreed to handle a case involving a fraudulent insurance
claim and in the process procured and presented false witnesses in court. Under the circumstances, this Court is amazed at how brazen respondent has
comported himself and without compunctions at leaving a "paper trail" behind him.
This Court notes that respondent had been previously fined P5,000.00 and sternly warned for knowingly issuing an order without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion. 6 Moreover, he has four other administrative cases docketed against him involving various charges such as gross ignorance of the law,
gross incompetence, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions and falsification of public documents.
Respondent judge's seeming propensity to transgress the very law he is sworn to uphold makes him unfit to discharge the functions of a judge. Judicial
office demands the best possible men and this Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards effective and
efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.
WHEREFORE, Judge Abdallah M. Casar is hereby DISMISSED from the service for misconduct and misappropriation with FORFEITURE of all retirement
benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations. He is further ordered to turn over to complainant Makadaya Sadik and Linang Minalang the sum of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) which he received from the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 13, Cotabato City last October 1,1993.
This judgment is immediately executory and the respondent judge is further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his office upon
receipt of this decision. Let a copy be entered in the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5804

July 1, 2003

BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative complaint 1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline, against respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They alleged that
respondent is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, which was the retained counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA).
Respondents brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA Board which approved respondents engagement as retained counsel of PPSTA.
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and
1995-1997 before the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. Respondent entered
his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in the said cases. Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest

because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its corporate funds where complainants have
contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest, respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases.
Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.062 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the
PPSTA Board and assured its members that he will win the PPSTA cases.
In his Answer,3 respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and
Associates. As a partner in the said law firm, he only filed a "Manifestation of Extreme Urgency" in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. 4 On the other hand, SEC
Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who
instigated, orchestrated and indiscriminately filed the said cases against members of the PPSTA and its Board.
Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; and that when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA
Board, he did so, not in his individual capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA Board in
the case he was handling. He merely assured the Board that the truth will come out and that the case before the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, considering that respondents therein are not public officials, but private employees. Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the same
was being handled by the law firm of Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that complainant Atty. Ricafort was himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of office
amounting to gross misconduct, malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the
complaint against him be dismissed and, instead, complainant Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.
The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Board of Governors thereafter adopted Resolution
No. XV-3003-230 dated June 29, 2002, approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client."5 This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.6 Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require
the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in
his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. 7 Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.8
In this jurisdiction, a corporations board of directors is understood to be that body which (1) exercises all powers provided for under the Corporation Code;
(2) conducts all business of the corporation; and (3) controls and holds all property of the corporation.9 Its members have been characterized as trustees or
directors clothed with a fiduciary character.10 It is clearly separate and distinct from the corporate entity itself.
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling
to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring
about a redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders.11 This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is
the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for the corporations behalf is only nominal
party. The corporation should be included as a party in the suit.12
Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to derivative suits, we come now to the threshold question: can a lawyer
engaged by a corporation defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue, the following disquisition is
enlightening:
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early cases found joint representation permissible where no conflict of interest
was obvious, the emerging rule is against dual representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one of the
defendants. The cases and ethics opinions differ on whether there must be separate representation from the outset or merely from the time the corporation
seeks to take an active role. Furthermore, this restriction on dual representation should not be waivable by consent in the usual way; the corporation should
be presumptively incapable of giving valid consent.13(underscoring ours)

In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise
to a conflict of interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the individual corporate
officials.14 The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us. After due deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced
that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board of directors in a derivative suit brought
against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled "Philippine Public School Teachers Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of
Directors of the Philippine Public School Teachers Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits
that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the
respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his
other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of
Extreme Urgency wherein he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By filing the said pleading, he
necessarily entered his appearance therein.15 Again, this constituted conflict of interests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the
name of the individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the corporation.
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering however, that this is his first offense, we find the penalty of suspension,
recommended in IBP Resolution No. XV-2002-230 dated June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish respondent to observe a higher
degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree
of fidelity in the practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5098

April 11, 2012

JOSEFINA M. ANION, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of: (1) violating the lawyers duty to preserve confidential
information received from his client;1 and (2) violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.2
In her complaint, Josefina M. Anion (complainant) related that she previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and
execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly
violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal
wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.
Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any
confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the
disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint for this reason.
The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated November 28, 2003, IBP Commissioner Pedro A.
Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined:
In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a contract which he prepared and thereby take up inconsistent positions.
Granting that Zenaida L. Caete, respondents present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not initially learn about the sale executed by Bontes in favor of
complainant thru the confidences and information divulged by complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation of the said deed of sale,
respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline his current employment as counsel of Zenaida Caete in view of the rule prohibiting representation of
conflicting interests.

In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no such written consent was secured by respondent before accepting employment as Mrs. Caetes
counsel-of-record. x x x
xxx
Complainant and respondents present client, being contending claimants to the same property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to
be inconsistency of interest when on behalf of one client, it is the attorneys duty to contend for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose.
In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. Such is the case with which we are now
confronted, respondent being asked by one client to nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true and valid sale between Bontes and the complainant.
(footnotes omitted)3
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.4
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules. 5 The IBP Board of Governors agreed with the
IBP Commissioners recommended penalty.
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of
information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of
utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the
client.6 Part of the lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility quoted below:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in
an unrelated action."7 The prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to
oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the
two actions are wholly unrelated."8 To be held accountable under this rule, it is "enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the
suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of
undivided fidelity to both clients."9
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn [emphasis ours]

On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support Atty. Sabitsanas violation of the above rule, as established by the
following circumstances on record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal
advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainants favor.
Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latters legal interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty.
Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Caetes interest clashed with the complainants interests.
Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Caete.
Four, Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case
against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Caete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was
for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action; he also accepted a new engagement that
entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services had been previously retained.
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an exception to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to
apply the exception due to Atty. Sabitsanas failure to comply with the requirements set forth under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of
facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Caete before he accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Caete. The records likewise show that although
Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Caetes adverse claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging
her to settle the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida
Caete.11 Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we find as the IBP Board of Governors did Atty. Sabitsana guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree
with the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This penalty is consistent with
existing jurisprudence on the administrative offense of representing conflicting interests. 12
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground that the charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure
of confidential information, not for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due
process rights since he only answered the designated charge.
We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsanas due process rights. Although there was indeed a specific charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the
complaint itself contained allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition against representing conflicting interests. As
stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint:
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now Zenaida Caete, to recover lands from Complainant, including this
land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.]
Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer.13 He also averred in his Answer that:
6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Caete was his former client
(herein complainant), respondent asked [the] permission of Mrs. Caete (which she granted) that he would first write a letter (Annex "4") to the complainant
proposing to settle the case amicably between them but complainant ignored it. Neither did she object to respondents handling the case in behalf of Mrs.
Caete on the ground she is now invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint against her.141wphi1
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be informed of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.15 These opportunities were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances.
All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.16 In the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession. We likewise aim to ensure
the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.17 This is all that we did in this case. Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser
than what the powers of this Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that we can determine the reckoning point when his
suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.