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India DA + Aff Answers - ENDI 16
India DA + Aff Answers - ENDI 16
Glossary
Trilateral refers to the involvement of 3 parties
Zero sum a situation in which what is gained by one side is lost by the
other; indicates a direct trade-off
1NC
US/India relations are growinga coordinated stance on
China is key
Saurabh, 15 senior faculty member at International Centre for
Entrepreneurship & Career Development and researcher in the domain of
technology innovation management and International relations and has
handled government innovation programs in India in the past (Punit, 6/15.
Opinion: India and U.S. Grow Closer Against a Backdrop of An Expansionist
China. https://news.usni.org/2015/06/15/opinion-india-and-u-s-grow-closeragainst-a-backdrop-of-an-expansionist-china)
Indo-U.S. relations have been the subject of interest for many policy analysts
and with the emergence of an economic and military powerhouse in India,
they have major implications for the United States and rest of the world. The
divorced relationship that existed since the Cold war has gone beyond mutual
suspicion and emerged as trusted friends. The liberalization of the Indian
economy in 1991 brought new-found opportunities for both the nations.
Today, India-U.S. bilateral cooperation is broad-based, covering trade and
investment, defense and security, education, science and technology, cyber
security, high-technology and civil nuclear energy. Both nations enjoy vibrant
people-to-people contact and support cutting across the political spectrum,
which helps stimulate the relationship even further.
The bond of democracy is the largest similarity the nations share. The mutual
visits by the heads of state of both the nations have given a considerable
boost to the existing bond of friendship existing between them. Since the
exchange of visits of Indian Prime Minister Modi and President Obamas India
visit in 2014 and 2015, a sustained momentum to the bilateral relations
between the nations has been provided.
The last visit of Modi, in September 2014, had several visible outcomes with
mechanisms to enhance trade and investment, particularly in infrastructure;
new modalities to implement cooperation in energy, including nuclear and
renewable energy; new approaches to defense trade, security and counterterrorism collaboration; and new areas of cooperation between India and the
United States in third countries.
But of all the deals and agreements, what stuck the most was the
mutual convergence in the view of both nations with respect to the
Asia Pacific and South China Sea and the joint voicing for unrestricted
access and freedom of sea routes to conduct their businesses. In view of the
rapid movements of Chinas navy in the Spratly Islands and Chinas claim of
the entire IOR region as its own, it seems that the joint call by both nations is
directed rightly to call the Chinese bluff.
diplomatic efforts yielded their first real gains on Saturday when India
welcomed a pledge by Pakistan's military ruler to stop permanently the
infiltration of militants into Kashmir. India indicated that it would soon take
steps to reduce tensions, but a million troops are still fully mobilized along
the border -- a situation likely to persist for months -- and the process of
resolving the crisis has just begun. India has linked the killing of civilians in
Kashmir to a Pakistan-backed insurgency there and has presented its
confrontation with Pakistan as part of the global campaign against terrorism.
India itself made an unstinting offer of support to the United States after
Sept. 11, and Washington responded by ending the sanctions placed on India
after its 1998 nuclear tests. With that, the estrangement that prevailed
between the world's two largest democracies during the cold war, when India
drew close to the Soviet Union and the United States allied with Pakistan, has
eased. India, for decades a champion of nonalignment, seeks warmer ties
with the United States in hopes of gaining access to sophisticated military
technology and help in dealing with Pakistan. From the start of President
Bush's term, some influential officials in his administration saw India as a
potential counterweight to that other Asian behemoth, China, whose growing
power was seen as a potential strategic threat. But since Sept. 11, the
priority has been terrorism. The United States is hoping its deeper military
and political ties with India will give it some measure of leverage to prevent a
war between India and Pakistan that could lead to a nuclear holocaust and
would play havoc with the hunt for Al Qaeda in Pakistan. The military
relationship has certainly accelerated in recent months. "We've moved from
crawling to walking and we're preparing to run," said an American military
official. American warships have been docking in the Indian cities of Bombay,
Cochin and Madras. The first major sale of military equipment to India -- $140
million of artillery-finding radar made by Raytheon -- has been approved by
Congress. Aircraft engines, submarine combat systems and helicopter parts
are in the pipeline. In the largest-ever joint ground and air operations,
American and Indian paratroopers jumped last month from the same aircraft
over the city of Agra. Later this year, for the first time, Indian troops will
venture to the United States for exercises in Alaska. American and Indian
naval ships are jointly patrolling the Strait of Malacca to protect commercial
shipping, while the number of Indian military officers training in the United
States has jumped to 150 this year from 25 in 1998. A parade of military
brass has been marching through each other's capitals. "The current level of
military to military cooperation between our nations is unprecedented," Gen.
Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said upon arriving in
New Delhi in February.
The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned
with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex.
the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and
sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the
estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear
volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe . The United States
would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central
intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir
at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like
thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their
defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending
Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.
Links
Uniqueness
region. India also has voiced opposition to some of Chinas actions in the East
and South China seas, where Beijing has attempted to assert its sovereignty.
This is ambition in action, Harris said, speaking at the Raisina Dialogue, a
conference in New Delhi focused on geopolitics and geo-economics. It
ensures the vision of our countrys leaders by strengthening military-tomilitary collaboration and in the process, it will improve the security and
prosperity of the entire region.
Harriss comments also came as the Obama administrations ability to curb
Chinas ambitions have been called into question by analysts. China has
installed military radar, HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles and fighter jets on
several atolls in the South China Sea in recent months. Defense Secretary
Ashton B. Carter and other U.S. officials have said repeatedly that Chinas rise
is not a problem, but the way it is exercising its power can be.
Carter and Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition,
technology and logistics, are expected to visit India next month as the two
countries continue to deeper relations. It will mark Carters second trip to
India in a year, and comes after the Navys top officer, Adm. John Richardson,
visited last month along with the heads of other navies, including Chinas,
Russias and Irans.
Harris did not mention China directly in his latest remarks, but clearly seemed
to call the country out.
While some countries seek to bully smaller nations through intimidation and
coercion, I note with admiration Indias example of peaceful resolution of
disputes with your neighbors in the waters of the Indian Ocean, Harris said.
India, indeed, stands like a beacon on a hill, building a future on the power
of ideas not on castles of sand that threaten the rules-based architecture
that has served us all so very well.
the first time that an American president visited India twice while in office.
Those facts alone speak to the importance both governments place on
building the bilateral relationship. In the United States, there is bipartisan
support for building the relationship with India, which is viewed as a possible
net security provider in South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean Region, a
potential balance against China, an attractive economic market, and a
natural partner given that it is the worlds largest democracy.
Q: Why has Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made improved U.S.-Indian
relations a priority since his landslide election victory last May?
A: Prime Minister Modi has stressed, since before he was elected, that he
believes India and the United States have a fundamental stake in one
anothers success. Strong bilateral relations are beneficial to India in various
ways, and Id note several of them here.
First, Modi has made revitalizing the Indian economy the centerpiece of his
administration, and that requires boosting investment and manufacturing in
India. The United States is an important partner in this regard.
Second, the conventional wisdom is that India does not view security through
a realist lens, but that may be changing under Modi, who is more hawkish
on China than his predecessor and appears to view strengthening U.S.
relations as a critical component of his foreign policy.
Third, and related to the first observations, India views the defense
relationship with the United States as a way to procure technology that India
lacks. Thats necessary both from a defense perspective, and as a way to
build the Indian economy, which helps explain why New Delhi is so insistent
that the United States agrees to technology transfers as part of defense trade
agreements.
has responded positively to Mr. Modis overtures, but the presidents own
record is decidedly mixed.
For much of Mr. Obamas tenure, U.S.-India relations have been marked more
by drift than dynamism. Unlike George W. Bush, Mr. Obama failed to
designate an influential point-person to shepherd the India file. (Mr. Bush had
Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns.) The appointment of a special U.S.
representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan diminished the State
Departments South Asia bureau and robbed top officials of a say in policies
crucial to the bilateral relationship.
The Obama administration was also slow to acknowledge Mr. Modis
emergence as Indias most popular politician. Following the 2002 Gujarat
riots, which happened on Mr. Modis watch and claimed more than 1,000 lives
about three-fourths of them Muslimmost Western democracies cooled to
Gujarats then-chief minister. But as evidence of Mr. Modis culpability in the
violence failed to emerge, and as he built a reputation for personal probity,
sensible economics and sound administration, European diplomats began to
warm to him and recognize his national popularity. By January 2013, British
and European Union diplomats ended their boycott of Mr. Modi. Yet it took the
Obama administration more than another year to follow suit.
Mr. Obamas broader foreign policy hasnt reassured Indians. During his
tenure, China has grown ever more assertive in its territorial disputesnot
just with India, but with Japan, Vietnam and others. U.S. military cuts have
deepened doubts about the seriousness of the so-called pivot to Asia. Mr.
Obama virtually abdicated his responsibility to lead what used to be called
the war on terror. New Delhi has watched with quiet alarm as U.S. troops
have drawn down from Afghanistan and U.S.-led airstrikes have failed to
thwart Islamic State. Terrorist groups have thrived in Pakistan, threatening
regional stability.
Barely a year ago, the U.S.-India relationship was on the rocks. The arrest of
an Indian diplomat in New York over a dispute with her nanny escalated into a
full-blown crisis, complete with diplomatic expulsions and public
recriminations. A series of trade and commercial disputes spanning
intellectual-property rights, immigrant visas and market access drained
goodwill on both sides. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2009 76% of
Indians held a favorable view of the U.S. By 2014, this had shrunk to 55%.
To be sure, the populist Manmohan Singh government, which preceded Mr.
Modis, did more than its share of damage, crash landing the once-soaring
Indian economy and quietly reviving a strain of anti-Americanism that harked
back to the Cold War. Mr. Singhs defense minister, A.K. Antony, stonewalled
the Pentagons best efforts to deepen cooperation with India. Mr. Obamas
administration certainly displayed no antipathy toward India. Four years ago
Mr. Obama became the first U.S. president to back Indias longstanding bid
for a permanent seat on an expanded United Nations Security Council.
Yet credit for the dramatic turnaround in bilateral ties belongs largely to Mr.
Modi. Ignoring advice from hardliners within his party, the prime minister
chose not to bear a grudge either for the Bush administrations 2005
revocation of his U.S. visa or by Mr. Obamas slowness to make amends after
Mr. Modi had been cleared of culpability, both by the Indian courts and
indirectly by the voters of Gujarat.
After his overwhelming election victory in May, Mr. Modi quickly accepted an
invitation from Mr. Obama to visit Washington. There he made it clear that he
regards the U.S. as a critical partner in his effort to revive Indias economy
and modernize its large but creaky military.
Impacts
higher. The United States cannot publicly orchestrate such cooperation, but it
can (and should) work behind the scenes at high levels to facilitate it.
Indo-Pak WarExtinction
Indo-pak risks extinction comprehensive study
Telegraph 13 [India-Pakistan nuclear war could 'end human civilisation',
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10507342/IndiaPakistan-nuclear-war-could-end-human-civilisation.html]
A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would set off a global famine that
could kill two billion people and effectively end human civilization, a study said Tuesday.
Even if limited in scope, a conflict with nuclear weapons would wreak havoc in the
atmosphere and devastate crop yields, with the effects multiplied as global food
markets went into turmoil, the report said. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility released an
initial peer-reviewed study in April 2012 that predicted a nuclear famine could kill more than a
billion people. In a second edition, the groups said they widely underestimated the
impact in China and calculated that the world's most populous country would face severe food
insecurity. "A billion people dead in the developing world is obviously a catastrophe unparalleled in human
history. But then if you add to that the possibility of another 1.3 billion people in China being at risk, we are
entering something that is clearly the end of civilization," said Ira Helfand, the report's author. Helfand said
that the study looked at India and Pakistan due to the longstanding tensions between the nuclear-armed
states, which have fought three full-fledged wars since independence and partition in 1947. But Helfand
said that the planet would expect a similar apocalyptic impact from any limited nuclear war. Modern
nuclear weapons are far more powerful than the US bombs that killed more than 200,000 people in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. "With a large war between the United States and Russia, we are talking
about the possible - not certain, but possible - extinction of the human race. "In this kind of war,
biologically there are going to be people surviving somewhere on the planet but the chaos that would
the black
carbon aerosol particles kicked into the atmosphere by a South Asian nuclear
war would reduce US corn and soybean production by around 10 percent over a decade. The
result from this will dwarf anything we've ever seen," Helfand said. The study said that
particles would also reduce China's rice production by an average of 21 percent over four years and by
another 10 percent over the following six years. The updated study also found severe effects on China's
wheat, which is vital to the country despite its association with rice. China's wheat production would
plunge by 50 percent the first year after the nuclear war and would still be 31 percent below baseline a
decade later, it said. The study said it was impossible to estimate the exact impact of nuclear war. He
called for further research, voicing alarm that policymakers in nuclear powers were not looking more
thoroughly at the idea of a nuclear famine. But he said, ultimately, the only answer was the abolition of
nuclear weapons. "This
Indo-Pak WarLikely
Escalation likely recent changes
Montgomery & Edelman 15 - Senior Fellow at the Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Distinguished
Fellow at CSBA, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-inResidence at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies [Evan Braden Montgomery & Evan Braden
Montgomery, Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the
Competition for Escalation Dominance, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume
38, Issue 1-2, 2015, pages 159-182]
Conclusion
attitudes toward the IndiaPakistan rivalry are generally characterized by a mixture of fatalism and
complacence. That is, observers often assume that both sides will remain locked in a
perpetual stand-off, but are also confident that low-level hostilities will not
escalate to full-scale conventional or nuclear war. Unfortunately, current trends on the subcontinent
suggest that these attitudes should be revised . India and Pakistan are now engaged in a
competition for escalation dominance, one that is deeply rooted in enduring structural
Consistent with the logic of the stability-instability paradox,
factors, such as Islamabads attempt to preserve one of the only coercive strategies available to it as the
weaker side, as well as New Delhis efforts to exploit its advantages as the stronger actor.
Specifically,
The tense nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan may be the
most dangerous pink flamingo in todays world. The Indian subcontinenthome to both India
and Pakistanremains among the most dangerous corners of the world, and
continues to pose a deep threat to global stability and the current world order. Their
1,800-mile border is the only place in the world where two hostile, nuclear-armed
states face off every day. And the risk of nuclear conflict has only continued to
rise in the past few years, to the point that it is now a very real possibility. India and Pakistan
unknown.
have fought three wars since they gained independence in 1947, including one that ended in 1971 with
Pakistan losing approximately half its territory (present-day Bangladesh). Today, the disputed Line of
Both the
Kargil crisis of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistansupported militants brought both nations once again to the brink of war. Yet, unlike earlier major
Control that divides the disputed Kashmir region remains a particularly tense flashpoint.
wars, these two crises occurred after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states. Quick and
forceful diplomatic intervention played a pivotal role in preventing a larger conflict from erupting during
These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today. Since 2004,
India has been developing a new military doctrine called Cold Start , a limited war
option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring irregular attacks against New Delhi. It
each crisis.
involves rapid conventional retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick armoured
assaults into Pakistan and rapidly securing limited objectives that hypothetically remain below Pakistans
nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to mobilise half a million
The problem is, unlike its neighbours India and China, Pakistan has
not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have stated that they
troops in less than 72 hours.
may have to use nuclear weapons first in order to defend against a conventional attack from India.
this nuclear programme to be the fastest growing in the world. Pakistan will reportedly have enough fissile
material by 2020 to build more than 200 nuclear warheadsmore than the UK plans to have by that time.
escalation, Pakistans growing tactical nuclear weapons programme also brings a wide array of other
destabilising characteristics to this already unstable mix:
range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the
need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signalling a nuclear threat;
and the prospects of local commanders being given decentralised control of the weapons
a use it or lose it danger if facing an Indian armoured offensive . Furthermore,
large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increase the risk that some will fall
into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of
the most frightening potential spin-offs of the current arms race. Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that
could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10 terrorists
launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security
forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence that the attackers
were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation
were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure from the US and immense
restraint exerted by then-Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory strike averted.
The chances of such Indian government restraint in a similarly deadly future scenario are
unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution and former US
ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian prime minister
Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors.
Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised
by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But
level dialogue between the two stateslast Augusts planned meeting between the two national
security advisers was cancelled after disagreements about Kashmiri separatists. There may be little the US
or the world can do to forestall this conflict still looming just over the horizon. Nevertheless, the
tremendous dangers of this situation require US policymakers to devote more time and energy in trying to
do so, and some small steps may help. The US should work hard to catalyse confidence-building measures
between the two sides, seeking to open more peacetime channels to create dialogue and potential conflict
mediation options for the future. Neither nations military currently has any direct communications. Quiet,
off-the-record meetings between senior military leaders would help lessen tensions and establish some
degree of mutual dialogue and understanding before a crisis erupts. The US should also sponsor unofficial
tabletop exercises involving representatives of each side to explore how escalation in a nuclear conflict
could unfold. The US should also reach out to current (and former) civil and military decision-makers on
both sides to develop and grow bilateral relationships that could prove vital in the next crisis. And the US
should continue to encourage Pakistan to slow its fielding of tactical nuclear weapons, and keep them
under tight central control well away from vulnerable forward-deployed positions. The lack of any tangible
results from the US governments recent outreach to Pakistan on this topic should only encourage renewed
A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would dramatically alter the
world as we know it. The damage from fallout and blast, the deaths of potentially millions,
and the environmental devastation of even a few weapons detonations would suddenly
dwarf any other global problem. There is no shortage of conflicts and crises around the world
demanding the attention of policymakers in Washington and other capitals. But the stakes of a war
between two of the worlds most hostile nuclear powers deserves attention
before the next inevitable flare-up. Taking a series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst
efforts.
outcomes from this dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well worth making.
ImpactGlobal Warming
Strong US/Indian relations key to solve climate change
Armitage et al., 10 President of Armitage International. He has served
in a number of senior national security posts in government, most recently as
Deputy Secretary of State (Richard L., with R. Nicholas Burns and Richard
Fontaine, October. Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India
Relations. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Natural
%20Allies_ArmitageBurnsFontaine.pdf)
Indias emergence as a key actor at the Copenhagen summit on climate
change in December 2009 rep - resented a turning point in its global
activism. The Copenhagen talks put new stresses on the bilateral
relationship when India sided with the BASIC (i.e., Brazil, South Africa, India,
and China) bloc rather than with the United States and its other partners. At
the same time, direct Indian engagement in these global negotiations
demonstrated that it is essential to any international solution to this press ing problem. While real differences exist and will likely con - tinue on the
best methods for reducing carbon emissions, this effort should not be seen
as a competition between developed and developing countries. On the
contrary, any meaningful reduc - tion in carbon emissions will require the
active collaboration of the worlds largest energy consum - ers. India, one of
the two fastest-growing energy markets in the world today, is critical to this
effort.
tidal waves, and glacier melting could affect major rivers upon which a large percentage of the
population depends. Well see increases in flooding, storms, disease, droughts, species
extinctions, ocean acidification, and a litany of other impacts, all as a consequence of man-made
climate change. Arctic ice melting, CO2 increases, and ocean warming are all occurring much
faster than previous IPCC forecasts, so, as dire as the forecasts sound, theyre actually
conservative . Pg. 7-8
ImpactEconomy
Relations are key to the economy.
Tellis, 05 Senior Associate @ the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Served in US Department of State as Senior Adviser to the
Ambassador @ the Embassy of the US in India (Ashley, US-India
Partnership, House International Relations Committee Testimony, 11/16)
If I am permitted to digress a bit, let me say parenthetically, that advancing
the growth of Indian power, as the Administration currently intends, is not
directed, as many critics have alleged, at "containing" China. I do not believe
that a policy of containing China is either feasible or necessary at this point in
time. (India too, currently, has no interest in becoming part of any coalition
aimed at containing China.) Rather, the Administration's strategy of assisting
India to become a major world power in the twenty-first century is directed,
first and foremost, towards constructing a stable geopolitical order in Asia
that is conducive to peace and prosperity. There is little doubt today that the
Asian continent is poised to become the new center of gravity in international politics . Although
lower growth in the labor force, reduced export performance, diminishing
returns to capital, changes in demographic structure, and the maturation of
the economy all suggest that national growth rates in several key Asian
states in particular Japan, South Korea, and possibly China are likely to
decline in comparison to the latter half of the Cold War period, the spurt in Indian
growth rates, coupled with the relatively high though still marginally declining
growth rates in China, will propel Asia's share of the global economy to some 43% by 2025, thus
making the continent the largest single locus of economic power worldwide. An Asia that hosts economic
power of such magnitude, along with its strong and growing connectivity to the American economy, will
become an arena vital to the United States in much the same way that Europe was the
grand prize during the Cold War. In such circumstances, the Administration's policy
of developing a new global partnership with India represents a considered effort at "shaping" the
emerging Asian environment to suit American interests in the twenty-first century. Even as
the United States focuses on developing good relations with all the major
Asian states, it is eminently reasonable for Washington not only to invest additional
resources in strengthening the continent's democratic powers but also to deepen
the bilateral relationship enjoyed with each of these countries on the assumption
that the proliferation of strong democratic states in Asia represents the best
insurance against intra-continental instability as well as threats that may
emerge against the United States and its regional presence. Strengthening
New Delhi and transforming U.S- Indian ties, therefore, has everything to do
with American confidence in Indian democracy and the conviction that its
growing strength, tempered by its liberal values, brings only benefits for
Asian stability and American security. As Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Burns succinctly stated in his testimony before this Committee, " By cooperating
with India now, we accelerate the arrival of the benefits that India's rise brings to the region and the
world."
ImpactTerrorism
Strong US/India relations key to preventing terrorism
facilitates effective cooperation
Ayoob, 2000 - Professor of International Relations @ Michigan State
University(Mohammed, India Matters, Washington Quarterly, Winter)
Indian and U.S. concerns do not coincide merely on the issue of maintaining a
stable and secure order in Asia in general and in South Asia in particular. A
major threat to both regional and global stability and security comes from a
particular variety of terrorism that has targeted both India and the United States. This is the threat
posed by Islamic extremists who have found a safe haven in Talibanized Afghanistan.
The August 1998 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
drove this point home to Washington with great force. The retaliatory U.S.
bombing of terrorist bases in Afghanistan exposed the fact that terrorist cadres
were being trained in these camps not merely to indulge in anti-American ventures but also to infiltrate
Indian Kashmir to create further mayhem in the Valley. India had been warning Washington of the
nexus between anti-American terrorist groups and the foreign militants -- Afghans, Pakistanis,
and Arabs -- being trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan for terrorist attacks in Kashmir.
Indeed, by the mid-1990s the nature of the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley
had changed from a largely indigenous operation, albeit armed and trained
by Pakistan to a substantial extent, to one primarily conducted by foreign
mercenaries trained in the killing fields of Afghanistan and paid and supplied
by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Pakistan's connection with the
Taliban was no secret. Had it not been for Pakistan's material help, extended
primarily for domestic political reasons, the predominantly Pushtun Taliban
would not have been able to overwhelm decisively and speedily the better
trained and largely Tajik and Uzbek forces of their opponents then ruling
Kabul. In the context of these connections, it appears that the network of
terror comprises not merely the Taliban and the terrorist elements under their
protection but also segments of the Pakistani military establishment. India and
the United States have a major shared interest in foiling the designs of this terrorist network , and it is
becoming increasingly clear to both that they must cooperate with each other toward this
end. This cooperation has started in earnest, indicated by the fact that for the
first time, high-level discussions have taken place between Indian and U.S. officials specifically focused on
Afghanistan and the terrorist threat emanating from there. Held in Washington in
early September 1999, this meeting is seen as the harbinger of a more coordinated strategy
on the issue of counterterrorism. Such coordination has taken on greater urgency
because of the recent coup in Pakistan that has brought to power a military
establishment suspected of close links with the Taliban.
and Minatom are now operating in circumstances of great stress. Money is in short
supply, paychecks are irregular, living conditions unpleasant ... [D]isorder
within Russia and the resulting strains within the military could easily cause a lapse or a breakdown in the Russian military's guardianship
of nuclear weapons. 38 Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a
nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era
nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods,
including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given
one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had
obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists
will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material
is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon . 41 Although nuclear devices are
extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant.
42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the
Organizations such as the Russian military
United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built.
nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that
states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation
of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear
attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as
well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United
States and escalte to the use of nuclear weapons. 53
ImpactDemocracy
US/India ties key to effective democracy promotion
Ayoob, 00 Professor of International Relations @ Michigan State University
(Mohammed, India Matters, Washington Quarterly, Winter)
The military coup in Pakistan has also highlighted a major political affinity between India and the United States,
namely, a firm commitment to a democratic form of government. The swearing in of the new postelection government in New
Delhi on the day after the overthrow of civilian rule in Islamabad in October 1999 may have been a coincidence, but the two events
are likely to exhibit greater appreciation of the complexity of the Indian decisionmaking process based as it is on the need to create a
democratic consensus before major decisions are made. Political players in Washington are extremely familiar with this process. Furthermore,
the recent emphasis in U.S. rhetoric on creation of a "democratic community of states," itself based on a popularized version of the
putting have challenged this proposition, but their challenges have only served as empirical tests that have confirmed its robustness. For example, the academic Paul Gottfried and the columnist-turned-politician
Patrick J. Buchanan have both instanced democratic England's declaration of war against democratic Finland during World War II. (4) In fact, after much procrastination, England did accede to the pressure of its
Soviet ally to declare war against Finland which was allied with Germany. But the declaration was purely formal: no fighting ensued between England and Finland. Surely this is an exception that proves the rule. The
strongest exception I can think of is the war between the nascent state of Israel and the Arabs in 1948. Israel was an embryonic democracy and Lebanon, one of the Arab belligerents, was also democratic within the
confines of its peculiar confessional division of power. Lebanon, however, was a reluctant party to the fight. Within the councils of the Arab League, it opposed the war but went along with its larger confreres when
they opted to attack. Even so, Lebanon did little fighting and soon sued for peace. Thus, in the case of Lebanon against Israel, as in the case of England against Finland, democracies nominally went to war against
democracies when they were dragged into conflicts by authoritarian allies. The political scientist Bruce Russett offers a different challenge to the notion that democracies are more peaceful. "That democracies are in
general, in dealing with all kinds of states, more peaceful than are authoritarian or other nondemocratically constituted states . . . .is a much more controversial proposition than 'merely' that democracies are
peaceful in their dealings with each other, and one for which there is little systematic evidence," he says. (5) Russett cites his own and other statistical explorations which show that while democracies rarely fight
one another they often fight against others. The trouble with such studies, however, is that they rarely examine the question of who started or caused a war. To reduce the data to a form that is quantitatively
measurable, it is easier to determine whether a conflict has occurred between two states than whose fault it was. But the latter question is all important. Democracies may often go to war against dictatorships
because the dictators see them as prey or underestimate their resolve. Indeed, such examples abound. Germany might have behaved more cautiously in the summer of 1914 had it realized that England would fight
to vindicate Belgian neutrality and to support France. Later, Hitler was emboldened by his notorious contempt for the flabbiness of the democracies. North Korea almost surely discounted the likelihood of an
American military response to its invasion of the South after Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly defined America's defense perimeter to exclude the Korean peninsula (a declaration which merely confirmed
existing U.S. policy). In 1990, Saddam Hussein's decision to swallow Kuwait was probably encouraged by the inference he must have taken from the statements and actions of American officials that Washington
would offer no forceful resistance. Russett says that those who claim democracies are in general more peaceful "would have us believe that the United States was regularly on the defensive, rarely on the offensive,
during the Cold War." But that is not quite right: the word "regularly" distorts the issue. A victim can sometimes turn the tables on an aggressor, but that does not make the victim equally bellicose. None would
dispute that Napoleon was responsible for the Napoleonic wars or Hitler for World War II in Europe, but after a time their victims seized the offensive. So in the Cold War, the United States may have initiated some
skirmishes (although in fact it rarely did), but the struggle as a whole was driven one-sidedly. The Soviet policy was "class warfare"; the American policy was "containment." The so-called revisionist historians argued
that America bore an equal or larger share of responsibility for the conflict. But Mikhail Gorbachev made nonsense of their theories when, in the name of glasnost and perestroika, he turned the Soviet Union away
from its historic course. The Cold War ended almost instantly--as he no doubt knew it would. "We would have been able to avoid many . . . difficulties if the democratic process had developed normally in our
country," he wrote. (7) To render judgment about the relative peacefulness of states or systems, we must ask not only who started a war but why. In particular we should consider what in Catholic Just War doctrine is
called "right intention," which means roughly: what did they hope to get out of it? In the few cases in recent times in which wars were initiated by democracies, there were often motives other than aggrandizement,
for example, when America invaded Grenada. To be sure, Washington was impelled by self-interest more than altruism, primarily its concern for the well-being of American nationals and its desire to remove a chip,
however tiny, from the Soviet game board. But America had no designs upon Grenada, and the invaders were greeted with joy by the Grenadan citizenry. After organizing an election, America pulled out. In other
cases, democracies have turned to war in the face of provocation, such as Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out an enemy sworn to its destruction or Turkey's invasion of Cyprus to rebuff a power-grab by
Greek nationalists. In contrast, the wars launched by dictators, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, North Korea's of South Korea, the Soviet Union's of Hungary and Afghanistan, often have aimed at conquest or
subjugation. The big exception to this rule is colonialism. The European powers conquered most of Africa and Asia, and continued to hold their prizes as Europe democratized. No doubt many of the instances of
democracies at war that enter into the statistical calculations of researchers like Russett stem from the colonial era. But colonialism was a legacy of Europe's pre-democratic times, and it was abandoned after World
War II. Since then, I know of no case where a democracy has initiated warfare without significant provocation or for reasons of sheer aggrandizement, but there are several cases where dictators have done so. One
interesting piece of Russett's research should help to point him away from his doubts that democracies are more peaceful in general. He aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward each other.
Immanuel Kant was the first to observe, or rather to forecast, the pacific inclination of democracies. He reasoned that "citizens . . . will have a great hesitation in . . . . calling down on themselves all the miseries of
war." (8) But this valid insight is incomplete. There is a deeper explanation. Democracy is not just a mechanism; it entails a spirit of compromise and self-restraint. At bottom, democracy is the willingness to resolve
civil disputes without recourse to violence. Nations that embrace this ethos in the conduct of their domestic affairs are naturally more predisposed to embrace it in their dealings with other nations. Russett aimed to
explain why democracies are more peaceful toward one another. To do this, he constructed two models. One hypothesized that the cause lay in the mechanics of democratic decision-making (the
"structural/institutional model"), the other that it lay in the democratic ethos (the "cultural/normative model"). His statistical assessments led him to conclude that: "almost always the cultural/normative model
shows a consistent effect on conflict occurrence and war. The structural/institutional model sometimes provides a significant relationship but often does not." (9) If it is the ethos that makes democratic states more
peaceful toward each other, would not that ethos also make them more peaceful in general? Russett implies that the answer is no, because to his mind a critical element in the peaceful behavior of democracies
toward other democracies is their anticipation of a conciliatory attitude by their counterpart. But this is too pat. The attitude of live-and-let-live cannot be turned on and off like a spigot. The citizens and officials of
democracies recognize that other states, however governed, have legitimate interests, and they are disposed to try to accommodate those interests except when the other party's behavior seems threatening or
outrageous. A different kind of challenge to the thesis that democracies are more peaceful has been posed by the political scientists Edward G. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. They claim statistical support for the
proposition that while fully fledged democracies may be pacific, Ain th[e] transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less." (10) However, like others, they measure
a state's likelihood of becoming involved in a war but do not report attempting to determine the cause or fault. Moreover, they acknowledge that their research revealed not only an increased likelihood for a state to
become involved in a war when it was growing more democratic, but an almost equal increase for states growing less democratic. This raises the possibility that the effects they were observing were caused simply
by political change per se, rather than by democratization. Finally, they implicitly acknowledge that the relationship of democratization and peacefulness may change over historical periods. There is no reason to
suppose that any such relationship is governed by an immutable law. Since their empirical base reaches back to 1811, any effect they report, even if accurately interpreted, may not hold in the contemporary world.
They note that "in [some] recent cases, in contrast to some of our historical results, the rule seems to be: go fully democratic, or don't go at all." But according to Freedom House, some 62.5 percent of extant
governments were chosen in legitimate elections. (12) (This is a much larger proportion than are adjudged by Freedom House to be "free states," a more demanding criterion, and it includes many weakly
democratic states.) Of the remaining 37.5 percent, a large number are experiencing some degree of democratization or heavy pressure in that direction. So the choice "don't go at all" (11) is rarely realistic in the
contemporary world. These statistics also contain the answer to those who doubt the second proposition behind Fukuyama's forecast, namely, that the world is growing more democratic. Skeptics have drawn upon
Samuel Huntington's fine book, TheThird Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Huntington says that the democratization trend that began in the mid-1970s in Portugal, Greece and Spain is the third
such episode. The first "wave" of democratization began with the American revolution and lasted through the aftermath of World War I, coming to an end in the interwar years when much of Europe regressed back
to fascist or military dictatorship. The second wave, in this telling, followed World War II when wholesale decolonization gave rise to a raft of new democracies. Most of these, notably in Africa, collapsed into
dictatorship by the 1960s, bringing the second wave to its end. Those who follow Huntington's argument may take the failure of democracy in several of the former Soviet republics and some other instances of
backsliding since 1989 to signal the end of the third wave. Such an impression, however, would be misleading. One unsatisfying thing about Huntington's "waves" is their unevenness. The first lasted about 150
years, the second about 20. How long should we expect the third to endure? If it is like the second, it will ebb any day now, but if it is like the first, it will run until the around the year 2125. And by then--who
knows?--perhaps mankind will have incinerated itself, moved to another planet, or even devised a better political system. Further, Huntington's metaphor implies a lack of overall progress or direction. Waves rise
and fall. But each of the reverses that followed Huntington's two waves was brief, and each new wave raised the number of democracies higher than before. Huntington does, however, present a statistic that seems
to weigh heavily against any unidirectional interpretation of democratic progress. The proportion of states that were democratic in 1990 (45%), he says, was identical to the proportion in 1922. (13) But there are two
answers to this. In 1922 there were only 64 states; in 1990 there were 165. But the number of peoples had not grown appreciably. The difference was that in 1922 most peoples lived in colonies, and they were not
counted as states. The 64 states of that time were mostly the advanced countries. Of those, two thirds had become democratic by 1990, which was a significant gain. The additional 101 states counted in 1990 were
mostly former colonies. Only a minority, albeit a substantial one, were democratic in 1990, but since virtually none of those were democratic in 1922, that was also a significant gain. In short, there was progress all
around, but this was obscured by asking what percentage of states were democratic. Asking the question this way means that a people who were subjected to a domestic dictator counted as a non-democracy, but a
people who were subjected to a foreign dictator did not count at all. Moreover, while the criteria for judging a state democratic vary, the statistic that 45 percent of states were democratic in 1990 corresponds with
Freedom House's count of "democratic" polities (as opposed to its smaller count of "free" countries, a more demanding criterion). But by this same count, Freedom House now says that the proportion of
zero. In 1776, the birth of the United States of America brought the total up to one. Since then, democracy has spread at an accelerating pace,
Aff
We do think that there is a lot more that can and should be done to address
issues of trafficking and child labour, she said.
In all of our interactions, we raise issues particularly if we have specific
instances or cases of concern to seek Indian responses and actions, she
added.
India has 12-14 million slaves. There are 27 million slaves in the world. How
does a country like this has 12-14 million slave in the year 2016? How does
that happen? Senator Bob Corker Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations
Committee asked.
Responding to a question on denying visa to members of USCIRF, Biswal said
the Administration has tried to impress the Indian government to provide
them with visas.
She also noted that the successive Indian governments have denied the visa.
strategic stability in South Asia unless China and its cooperation with Pakistan
is brought into the equation and Indias strategic needs vis a vis China are
recognised. Until the India-US nuclear deal, the US has viewed the nuclear
equation in the sub-continent as a purely India-Pakistan affair. Even before
India and Pakistan became overtly nuclear the US pressed for strategic
stability with a view to curbing Indias nuclear program, in the belief that this
would deprive Pakistan of the argument that it must match Indias nuclear
capabilities to ensure its security.
The tenacity of such US thinking surfaced during discussions on the Next
Steps in the Strategic Partnership when the US tried to introduce the
concept of strategic stability to offset Pakistani concerns about US tilting in
favor of India on strategic matters. Why after the nuclear compromise
inherent in the India-US nuclear deal the US continues to stress strategic
stability in South Asia and wants all sides to continuously act with maximum
restraint and work jointly toward strengthening strategic stability in South
Asia, is difficult to understand. So is the reference to the importance of
regional balance and stability in South Asia which unreasonably equates
India with Pakistan, including in the sphere of their security interests.
Even if we ignored the reference to strategic stability in 2013, we have less
reason to ignore it today. India and the US have in 2015 greatly widened the
scope of their geopolitical engagement by releasing a US-India Joint Strategic
Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region and upgrading the
trilateral India-US-Japan relationship relationship in a certain strategic
perspective. In this context it makes little sense for the US to still talk of
strategic balancing India and Pakistan. This merely sends confusing signals
about the depth of Indias strategic commitment to India.
Likewise, in January 2015, on the occasion of Obamas January 2015 visit, the
US-India Delhi Declaration of Friendship was issued, which proclaimed a
higher level of trust and coordination between the two countries.
Furthermore, in the joint statement issued then, Obama and Modi committed
to undertake efforts to make the U.S.-India partnership a defining
counterterrorism relationship for the 21st Century by deepening collaboration
to combat the full spectrum of terrorist threats. It called for eliminating
terrorist safe havens and infrastructure, disrupting terrorist networks and
their financing, and stopping cross-border movement of terrorists, besides
asking Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist
attack in Mumbai to justice. In September 2015, as part of the inaugural
India-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a U.S.-India Joint Declaration on
Combating Terrorism was issued with expansive provisions.
Relations Inevitable
Relations inevitable and Chinas irrelevantthe US is
committed to Indian growth and cooperation
Nye, 15 University Professor at Harvard University and a member of the
World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on the Future of Government
(Joseph S., 8/11. Whats the future of US-India relations?
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/whats-the-future-of-us-indiarelations/)
It would be a mistake to cast the prospects for an improved US-India
relationship solely in terms of Chinas rising power. Indian economic success
is an American interest on its own. So is the open approach taken by India
and Brazil on issues such as governance of the Internet, at a time when
Russia and China are seeking more authoritarian control.
No one should expect an Indian-American alliance any time soon, given
historical Indian public opinion. But one can predict a relationship in the
coming years that will be both sui generis and stronger.
suggest that these attitudes should be revised. India and Pakistan are now engaged in a competition for
escalation dominance, one that is deeply rooted in enduring structural factors, such as Islamabads
attempt to preserve one of the only coercive strategies available to it as the weaker side, as well as New
Delhis efforts to exploit its advantages as the stronger actor. Specifically, Indias pursuit of a limited
conventional warfare capability to deter or retaliate against Pakistan, along with Pakistans pursuit of
limited nuclear options to deter or retaliate against India, is increasing the likelihood of a conflict between
countervalue targeting, therefore, New Delhi might find that it cannot rely on its army to retaliate against
Pakistan (and thus to deter Islamabad from supporting proxies) without major changes to its own nuclear
doctrine and force structure.
the efforts of the ruling government of both the nations. They play an eminent role to ignite antagonistic
feelings against each other to suffice their agendas such as winning public support and to divert the
attention of the masses from real issues especially economic turbulences. Hence, they have been both the
between India and Pakistan, its imperative for the stability and prosperity of both the regions that
opportunities for mutual cooperation be pursued further. Simultaneous conflict over territory, national
identity and power position in region, makes Indo-Pak rivalry an enduring one. (Paul, 2005). Therefore, it
might result in a yawning hiatus between rhetoric and reality.
Despite persistent tensions, recurring crises, and one minor war, South Asia has
arguably been less volatile than many observers anticipated when India and Pakistan
became nuclear-armed powers. Consistent with the logic of the stability-instability
that it's manageable is the best reason to try to tackle it rather than abandon all hope like a steerage class
passenger in the bowels of the Titanic.
Start with the economy. The Stern Review, led by the distinguished British economist Nicholas Stern, is the
in terms of
income, greenhouse gasses are a threat to global growth, but hardly an
immediate or catastrophic one. Take the impact of climate change on the developing world.
most comprehensive look to date at the economics of climate change. It suggests that,
The most depressing forecast in terms of developing country growth in Stern's paper is the "AT: scenario" -one of a series of economic and greenhouse gas emissions forecasts created for the U.N.'s
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It's a model that predicts slow global growth and
for the most pessimistic simulation of the economic impact of climate change suggested by the Stern
report, and people in those countries are still markedly
for Afghanistan, a little more than six times as rich for Ethiopia.
change by pricing carbon and investing in alternate energy sources is a slam dunk. But for all the likelihood
that the world will be a poorer, denuded place than it would be if we responded rapidly to reduce
And what about the impact on global health? Suggestions that malaria has already spread as a result of
climate change and that malaria deaths will expand dramatically as a result of warming in the future don't
fit the evidence of declining deaths and reduced malarial spread over the last century. The authors of a
recent study published in the journal Nature conclude that the forecasted future effects of rising
temperatures on malaria "are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the changes observed since
about 1900 and about two orders of magnitude smaller than those that can be achieved by the effective
scale-up of key control measures." In other words, climate change is and will likely remain a small factor in
the toll of malaria deaths into the foreseeable future.
22,000 deaths each year. Most of the vectors for such diseases -- mosquitoes, biting flies, and so on -- do
poorly in frost. So if the weather stays warmer, these diseases are likely to spread. At the same time,
there are existing tools to prevent or treat most tropical diseases, and Zimmerman
and Gollin suggest "rather modest improvements in protection efficacy could
compensate for the consequences of climate change." We can deal with this one.
It's the same with agriculture.
agricultural yields by as much as 30 percent. Compare that with the 90 percent increase in rice yields in
Indonesia between 1970 and 2006, for example.
while climate change will make extreme weather events and natural
disasters like flooding and hurricanes more common, the negative effect on global
quality of life will be reduced if economies continue to grow. That's because, as
Matthew Kahn from Tufts University has shown, the safest place to suffer a natural disaster
is in a rich country. The more money that people and governments have, the more they can both
Again,
afford and enforce building codes, land use regulations, and public infrastructure like flood defenses that
lower death tolls.
dealing
with climate change will take immediate and radical retooling of the global economy. It won't. It is
affordable, practical, and wouldn't take a revolution. Giving out the message that the
Let's also not forget how human psychology works. Too many environmentalists suggest that
only path to sustainability will require medieval standards of living only puts everyone else off. And once
you've convinced yourself the world is on an inevitable course to disaster if some corner of the U.S.
Midwest is fracked once more or India builds another three coal-fueled power plants, the only logical thing
to do when the fracking or the building occurs is to sit back, put your Toms shoes on the couch, and drink
micro-brewed herbal tea until civilization collapses. Climate change isn't like that -- or at the very least,
isn't like that yet.
if you're really just looking for a reason to strap on the "end of the world is
nigh" placards and go for a walk, you can find better excuses -- like, say, the
threat of global thermonuclear war or a rogue asteroid. The fight to curb
greenhouse gas emissions is one for the hard-nosed optimist.
So,
that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars.
Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and
economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on
a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that
their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that
problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be
While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as
outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my
view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn
without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad
times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war
thinkable
solved by war?
But
we're being told by Sen. Dianne Feinstein and Rep. Mike Rogers, the heads of the
Senate and House Intelligence committees, that the terrorist threat is back and worse than
now
it was a few years ago. In particular, they point to the growing jihadi role in places like Syria and to selfcongratulatory statements from al Qaeda leaders like Ayman al-Zawahiri. The implication, as this New York
Times story makes clear, is that the United States needs to get more directly involved in defeating this
ever-expanding set of terrorist copycats.
I understand that terrorist groups like al Qaeda do operate in secret (to the extent that they can), and that
riskaverse politicians prefer to err on the side of caution . If you issue lots of scary warnings
gauging the actual level of the threat they pose is not an exact science. And I recognize that
and nothing happens, you can take credit for having been prudent. But if you tell people the danger isn't
that great and then an attack takes place, you sound nave, credulous, and insufficiently devoted to
national security. So when in doubt, politicians are inclined to oversell the danger.
Still, it really is important to get this right: Just how serious is the threat, some 12 years after the 9/11
In terms of the direct harm to Americans in the United States, the danger
appears to be quite modest. So why are Feinstein and Rogers so animated by this latest set of
attacks?
developments? And doesn't Boston's defiant and resolute reaction to the city's marathon bombing in April
suggest that the American population isn't nearly as querulous as politicians fear: If you explain to them
that there is no such thing as 100 percent security, they don't go all wobbly. Instead, they display precisely
the sort of calm resolution that causes terrorist campaigns to fail.
It is even more important to figure out how best to respond. If Islamic extremists using terrorist methods
are trying to gain power in various countries, does it make sense for the United States to insert itself in
these conflicts and inevitably invite their attention? Or is the country better off remaining aloof or just
backing local authorities (if it can find any who seem reasonably competent)?