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Peacocke, Mirror of The World
Peacocke, Mirror of The World
discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282413045
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1 author:
Jose Luis Bermudez
Texas A&M University
98 PUBLICATIONS 697 CITATIONS
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tree,
for
example,
what
I
see
is
that
i
am
approaching*
a
tree*
(where
the
stars
indicate
nonconceptual
perceptual
content
constituents
that
would,
in
a
normal
concept-user,
rationalize
applying
the
concepts
approach
and
tree).
As
a
concept-user
I
might,
but
need
not,
form
the
corresponding
judgment
I
am
approaching
a
tree.
Peacocke
maintains,
though,
that
a
non-human
animal
might
have
a
perception
with
exactly
the
same
nonconceptual
content,
even
in
the
complete
absence
of
conceptual
abilities.
This
would
be
what
he
terms
Degree-1
self-representation,
as
opposed
to
fully
conceptual
self-representation
(Degree-2)
and
the
complete
absence
of
self-representation
(Degree-0).
Peacocke
gives
an
account
of
how
nonconceptual
first
person
contents
are
integrated
with
each
other
in
terms
of
what
he
terms
self-files,
exploiting
the
concept
of
an
object-file
that
originated
in
the
cognitive
science
of
perception.
An
object-file
is
a
postulated
subpersonal
mechanism
that
stores
and
updates
mental
representations
that
apply
to
the
same
thing.
A
self-file
is
the
file
that
each
subject
has
for
subject-referring
representations
(or
rather
for
the
subpersonal
precursors
of
those
representations).
Unlike
ordinary
object
files
self-files
do
not
require
any
kind
of
indexing
or
tracking
of
an
object
over
time,
since
none
of
the
representations
in
the
self-file
depend
upon
any
process
of
identification
(because
they
are
intrinsically
subject-referring,
as
described
earlier).
What
makes
I
and
i
both
first
personal
representations
is
that
contents
involving
them
are
intrinsically
subject-referring,
where
a
mental
event
is
intrinsically
self-referring
just
if
its
content
refers
to
its
subject
as
a
function
of
the
type
of
content
it
involves.
So,
perceiving
myself
in
a
mirror
is
not
intrinsically
subject-referring
because
perceptual
states
need
not
myself
approaching
a
tree
or
hear
someone
coming
closer
to
my
left.
It
is
very
unclear
to
me,
however,
how
perceptual
content
can
have
components
that
refer,
in
the
way
that
linguistic
expressions
or
mental
concepts
do.
When
I
see
myself
approaching
a
tree
what
I
see
is
the
aiming
point
of
the
tree
(of
course),
together
with
visual
kinesthetic
information
about
my
trajectory
derived
from
optic
flow
and
other
sources.
My
body
may
feature
in
the
perception,
or
may
not
depending
on
lighting,
perspective,
and
so
forth.
But
my
body
is
certainly
not
a
referring
expression
and
nor
is
there
anything
else
in
the
content
of
perception
that
could
be
a
candidate
for
having
a
reference
rule.
Theorists
who,
like
Peacocke,
see
the
content
of
perception
as
nonconceptual
typically
think
of
it
as
analog
rather
than
digital.
Certainly
the
machinery
of
scenario
content
that
Peacocke
developed
in
A
Study
of
Concepts
(1992)
fits
that
description.
But
surely
a
minimal
requirement
for
perceptual
content
to
have
a
component
that
refers
is
that
it
be
digital,
rather
than
analog.
In
A
Study
of
Concepts
Peacocke
postulated
a
level
of
content
that
he
termed
protopropositional,
but
without
giving
much
elucidation.
I
would
imagine
that
the
nonconceptual
first
person
i
is
located
at
the
protopropositional
level.
But
an
important
challenge
in
developing
Peacockes
position
is
to
flesh
this
account
out,
so
that
we
know
exactly
how
the
self
is
represented
and
referred
to
in
perception
and
other
nonconceptual
first
person
states.
Peacocke
seems
to
assume
that
(in
this
area)
representation
involves
reference,
but
that
assumption
requires
further
defense
and
discussion.
The
discussion
up
to
now
has
focused
on
relatively
simple
instances
of
self-consciousness
associated
with
mental
and
physical
self-ascriptions.
One
of
the
most
interesting
features
of
the
book
is
Peacockes
discussion
in
Chapters
VIII
through
X
of
the
three
richer
forms
of
self-
consciousness
that
he
terms
perspectival
self-consciousness,
reflective
self-consciousness,
and
interpersonal
self-consciousness.
Perspectival
self-consciousness
is
the
ability
to
take
a
third
person
perspective
on
oneself.
Reflective
self-
consciousness
is
de
se
awareness
of
being
in
a
de
se
state
(and
hence
allows
subjects
to
state
and
assess
their
reasons
for
being
in
particular
states).
Interpersonal
self-consciousness
is
my
de
se
awareness
that
another
person
is
representing
me
as
a
self-representing
subject
(a
subject
of
de
se
states).
Peacocke
has
many
interesting
things
to
say
about
these
types
of
self-consciousness
and
their
interrelations.
Many
theorists
(myself
included)
have
thought
that
self-consciousness
and
other-consciousness
are
interdependent.
Peacocke
rejects
this
view.
Perspectival
self-
consciousness
can
be
enjoyed
without
a
conception
of
other
minds
(because
third
person
perspectives
on
oneself
can
be
completely
non-psychological).
In
fact,
Peacocke
also
argues
that
interpersonal
self-consciousness
need
not
require
perspectival
self-consciousness
because
I
can
attribute
psychological
concepts
to
you
without
taking
a
third
person
perspective
on
myself.
Peacocke
also
suggests
that
reflective
self-consciousness
may
also
independent
of
both
perspectival
and
interpersonal
self-consciousness,
thus
completing
a
triple
dissociation
between
higher-level
forms
of
self-consciousness.
Sadl;y
there
is
no
room
for
further
discussion,
or
for
comments
on
Peacockes
interesting
engagement
with
Descartes,
Kant,
and
Sartre,
among
other
figures.
As
should
be
clear,
this
is
a
very
rich
and
rewarding
book
required
reading
for
anyone
interested
in
the
metaphysics
and
epistemology
of
the
self.