Tanada v Tuvera

Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure
of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by
Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when
it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the
necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in
the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability
and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must
be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first
that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the
clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did
not have to be made in the official gazette.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.
Held:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the laws.
PESIGAN vs. ANGELES, G.R. No. L-64279, April 30, 1984
FACTS:
Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in
April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health
certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial
veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners
were negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private
respondents, Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda.
The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos
from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25
farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private
respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.
HELD:
Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as
already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in
article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations
which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
Pesigan v. Angeles Digest
GR L-64279
Civil law, when Laws take effect

Facts: Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao dealers transported on April 2. 1982,
twenty-six (26) carabaos & a calf from Camarines Norte with Batangas as its destination. They
were provided with health certificates from the provincial veterinarian and three (3) other
permits attesting that the cattle was not part of lose, stolen or questionable animals.
Despite this, the said cattle was confiscated by respondents Zenarosa and Miranda, who were
respectively the police station commander and provincial veterianarian of Basud, Camarines
Norte. The confiscation was on the basis of said EO 626-A which was dated October 25,
1980 but was published in theOfficial Gazette on June 14, 1982.
Executive Order 626-A provides, "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The
carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject
to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos".
The Pesigans filed an action for replevin against herein respondents for the recovery of the
subject cattle but this could not be executed by the sheriff. Subsequently, the judge dismissed
the case for lack of cause of action. Hence, the petitioners filed an appeal to the Supreme Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for
the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of cattle transported from one
province to another, can be enforced even before its actual publication in the Official
Gazette of June 14, 1982
HELD: NO
The Supreme Court held that EO 626-A is a penal regulation published more than two months
after the confiscation of the cattle or in June 14, 1982. Hence, it became effective only fifteen
days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. It should therefore not be enforced
against the petitioners.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the
said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People v Que Po). Justice and fairness
dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette
before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
Note: The word "laws" in Article 2 of the NCC also includes circulars and regulations which
prescribe penalties.
MECANO vs.COA
MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ
MECANO vs.COA
G.R. No. 103982
December 11, 1992
FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he
incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the
COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his expenses
on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC, the pertinent
provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty.
When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or
municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual
physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any
period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months,
and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance,
necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the
case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx

In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line
of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary
hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding petitioners
illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of
Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioners claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioners claim to Director Lim,
having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the effect that the RAC
being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of
then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code did not
operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the
particular Section 699 of the latter.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecanos claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable
consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioners claim to the COA Chairman, recommending
payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied petitioners claim on the ground that
Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for
the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the
Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the
Employees Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred
after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to Director
Lim with the advice that petitioner elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC
HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due
course to petitioners claim for benefits
NO
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a
matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a
repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions
thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing
clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an
express repeal; all others are implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it
was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on
the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book
VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause?
It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or
acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing
provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that
substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under the
category of an implied repeal.
There are two categories of repeal by implication.
Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the
later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
2.
If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover
the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code
which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law,
the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699,
and still others.

According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent
to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and
procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government
structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of
the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because
the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been
restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are
not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.
NOTES:
1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the
Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. The COA anchored
this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code
which incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles and rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of
1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier
statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute
may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest
indication of legislative purpose to repeal.
2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar the recovery
of benefits under the Employees Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The
second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees Compensation and
State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides
that the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are
administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.
People of the Philippines vs Judge Donato & Rodolfo Salas
Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion
Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged together
with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the
WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to hear each partys side. It was later agreed upon by
both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody
for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the
stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on,
Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge
Donato did not bother hearing the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is
estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or
habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.
HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the
issuance of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody
and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His waiver to
such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.
Lichauco v. Apostol (Case Digest)
Lichauco v. Apostol, G.R. No. L-19628 (44 PHIL 138), December 4, 1922
Facts:

Petitioner, a corporation duly organized under the Phil. laws, engaged for several years in the
business of importing carabao and other draft animals, and was desirous of importing, from
Pnom-Pehn, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However,
respondent Director of Agriculture refused to admit said cattle except upon condition that drafts
be immunized. Petitioner however contends that the respondent has no authority over the
matter, invoking section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052. On the
other hand, relying upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code, Admin. Order No. 21 of the
Bureau of Agriculture, and Dept. Order No. 6 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, respondent maintained its decision. Hence, the issue.
Issue: Whether or not section 1770 (and other similar acts) has been repealed by implication by
Act 3052 and hence cannot be applied with the case at bar?
Held and Reasoning: No. The Court ruled that the contention of the petitioner is untenable for
the reason that the invoked section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature while
1770 is a particular one. Section 1770 is therefore not inconsistent with section 1762 and instead
be considered a special qualification of the latter provision. Moreover, the court emphasized
that specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon a same
subject unless it clearly appears that the provision of the two laws are so repugnant..xxxThe
special act and the general law must stand together, the one as the law of the particular subject
and the other as the general law of the land. Therefore, Section 1770 of the Administrative Code
remains in effect and serves as a supplementary provision to section 1762, as amended.

Albino Co vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 100776. October 28, 1993)
31MAY
ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
Ponente: NARVASA
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company
against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in petitioners conviction of
the crime charged on the basis that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation, Ministry of Justice Circular
No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22) was subsequently
reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the
Regional Trial Court but the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check will
no longer be considered as a valid defense be retroactively applied.
HELD:
NO. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal prosecution against
accused-petitioner was dismissed.
RATIO:
It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Courts
decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a check issued
merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22
should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons

situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall
within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine,
must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling
reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its
clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.