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US Role Adriatic 1918-21
US Role Adriatic 1918-21
'
very quickly brought them into open conflict with the Italians,
who had preponderant influence in drafting and carrying out the
provisions. Initially, Italy was reluctant to allow the Allies
and the Americans to participate, considering its own occupation
of the Dalmatian coast as a guarantee that it would obtain what
had been promised it by the Treaty of London of 1915.
.
Italy prepared itself for the new situation. Its naval and
army units were dispatched to the eastern Adriatic immediately,
and its
government refused
to demobilize.
The Italians
entrenched themselves in these territories and imposed harsh
measures against Yugoslav committees and organizations for self
government which had been established during the last months of
the Austro-Hungarian administration.
Those who opposed the
Italian presence were deported or jailed.
Yugoslavs from
Austria-Hungary
were
considered
enemies and were treated
accordingly.
UNITED STATES NAVY
The differences between the Italian and American occupations
were evident from the beginning.
Even before the armistice,
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, instructed Admiral
Benson that "due to possible Adriatic developments and our desire
to show sympathy with Slavonic government being formed in the
late Austro-Hungarian Empire, consider it desirable to send flag
officer immediately into the Adriatic."1 Admiral William W. H.
Bullard was detailed to proceed there on the USS Birmingham.
After the .Austro-Hungarian fleet
had
surrendered
to the
representatives of the Yugoslav Committee in Pola, Admiral
William Sims, commander of the US Naval Forces in European
Waters, instructed Bullard not to attack these ships but to see
that they proceed to Corfu under white flags.
Memorandum #63,
prepared by the Planning Section on November 3, 1918 pointed out
that the mission of the United States was to encourage "the early
establishment of stable government in Yugoslavia friendly to
ourselves. u It warned that the greatest threat to this goal were
Italy's ambitions in the Adriatic and its jealousy of any
interference there by the Allies and the United States, an
Associate power.
It was necessary, then, to reach an agreement
between the Allies, the United States, and Italy in order to
prevent frictions. uYugoslavia should include all territories in
which the Slav population preponderates, including adjacent
islands so populated." The memorandum urged that the naval bases
along the Adriatic be occupied by Allied forces, or preferably
the United States, until a stable government friendly to the
United States could be established.
This was desirable because
the Yugoslavs trusted the United States and were suspicious of
Italy. It was recommended that American observers be sent into
Yugoslavia as soon as possible to inform the US government of
local conditions.2 These recommendations were not acceptable to
the Italians, since they threatened the basis.of their policies.
2
..
intemperate language
and open hostility to the provincial
government. Niblack told Benson that Rombo's behavior would
cause bitterness
and hostility
between the Yugoslavs and
Italians, and demanded that Rombo be relieved of his duties on
the committee.10 R9mbo rejected the majority report submitted to
the committee and insisted that the committee approve an Allied
occupation of the US zone.
Niblack and other admirals opposed
this, believing that the Yugoslav troops were stationed in the
zone in accordance with the terms of the armistice. Rombo argued
that the terms were not being carried out, and that the
provincial government was under the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav
government.
These two views were irreconcilable, and the
minority report Signed by Rombo, as well as the majority report,
were sent to Paris.
On March 26, the day of the committee's departure for Kotor,
Rear Admiral Andrews arrived at Split and replaced Niblack as the
commanding officer of the US forces in the Adriatic. The meeting
in Kotor began on March 27, and went smoothly. The Allied
officers, Admiral Delzons, Commodore Bianchini, aqd General
Thaon, reported on the situation in Kotor. Rombo was restrained,
although several questions stirred up bad feelings.
These
included the problems of the war materials from the former
Austro-Hungarian army and navy, ammunition, prerogatives of the
local authorities, and the recruitment of the local populace for
military service.
The conclusions of
the committee were
virtually unanimous, and with this meeting its functions came to .
an end.
'
The US Navy was charged with the administration of a part of
the Adriatic coast, central Dalmatia with Split as its center.
The terms of the armistice allowed the United
States to
administer the zone with the assistance of the provincial
government and the Yugoslav army units . All steps and proposals
of the local authorities were approved by the American admiral,
who in certain cases ordered Yugoslav army units to be withdrawn.
The combination 'of cooperation and control made it possible for
peace and order to be preserved in the US zone.
Aware of the
Italians' treatment of the population in the Italian zone and
confronted with their interference in the British and French
zones, the local population was cooperative. The destiny of
Split might have been similar to that of Fiume if the Italians
were allowed to carry out their plans. The provincial government
looked for ways to eliminate all frictions emerging from the.
presence of the Yugoslav troops in the US zone. It was not
always easy, as the government in Belgrade was impatient to have
its authority recognized in the zone, a request which the US
admirals denied.
The Americans built a
small naval
base, established
telegraphic communications with Paris, and maintained naval units
in Split to preserve order.
In early April, Andrews threatened
did not have instructions from his command and stated that "the
American troops are being used to promote rather than curb
Italian activities and our Army representative has not definite
instructions....
Army
officers are
dominated
by the
Italians. "27 Two days later, Secretary of War Newton Baker
ordered General Pershing to withdraw the American troops from
Italy and put them under his command.
This opened the question
of what to do with the American troops under Italian command. It
took some time for the Department of War to act on it.
The relationship between the Americans and Italians in Fiume
was cleared up following Colonel Everson's testimony to the
Committee of Admirals in Fiume in late December 1918. Everson
argued that the Italians had ignored the American presence, only
keeping in touch with the American command when it was convenient
for them and not consulting it about the joint actions in the
city and port.
The committee concluded that the occupation of
Fiume was not in the Allied spirit, and proposed changes. The
Italian admiral was against these changes, which included the
withdrawal of the Italian troops from Fiume and an increased
presence of the Yugoslav troops, as well as pulling the US
battalion out of the Italian army_ Given these circumstances, it
was natural that many representatives of the US Navy and Army and
the Peace Commission believed that the withdrawal of the American
troops would be a good step to take. The Italian Supreme Command
opposed it, and the Italian diplomacy tried to block this
initiative.
On November 28, 1918, Baker instructed General Pershing to
bring the US troops in Italy under his command,28 and to arrange
with Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander,
for the American regiment to be returned to France. But nothing
came of this. President Wilson was persuaded that the withdrawal
of the regiment would "create a bad impression in Italy," and
that keeping it there lay in the interest of Allied cooperation,
giving rise to fears that it would involve the United States in
Balkan politics. It was only a minor diplomatic victory for
Italy, but one that proved to be a prelude to new disputes.
While Washington was deciding what to do, General Bliss was
involved in discussio~s with the military committee, which was
considering the French solution to the worsening situation along
the Adriatic coast.
The French proposed that
an Allied
commission be formed to decide which troops should occupy certain
places and who would command them. This was unacceptable to the
Americans who did not want to dispatch fresh units there, and the
proposal was withdrawn.29
President Wilson's arrival in France made the resolution of
the problem possible.
On December 18, 1918 Bliss discussed it
with the President, telling him that he believed the' withdrawal
of the regiment at that moment was unfeasible, since it was
12
".
not to pass such laws in the future, suspecting that the Belgrade
government had imposed it on the provincial government.SO The
old Austro-Hungarian tax law was put back into use.
In April 1919, a confrontation between the United states and
Italy seemed imminent.
The naval authorities assisted the Food
Administration in carrying out its duties, in an attempt to keep
peace in Dalmatia and elsewhere. Andrews asked that the Italian
authorities distribute food in the American zone under the
supervision of Lieutenant Alfred Shaw, the Food Administration's
representative, to make sure that the food was sold at fair
prices- or handed out to those who could not pay. Andrews
believed that the distribution of food through a single source
would produce uniform results.
Admiral Rombo refused to accept
this proposal and brought it to the Committee of Admirals,
insisting that it had been done by an order of the Italian
government.
Andrews informed the group
that the Italian
distribution encouraged disturbances and weakened the provincial
government. It was being used "more and more as propaganda by
being freely given where it will cause trouble." And: "What the
Italians' send in is unnecessary and a waste, and it originally
comes from the States."
He believed that if the Italian
distribution stopped, the chances of trouble when peace was
announced would be reduced, and he asked that no Italian food be
sent to the American zone.S1 A clash was unavoidable since the
Italian government
did not want. to act jointly with the
Americans.
The clash came on April 19, when after much hesitation
President Wilson made up his mind, and in a letter to Norman
Davis, he
asked the
Treasury Department
to stop making
arrangements for
a iSO-mil lion-dollar loan to the Italian
government "until the air clears, if it does."S2
But this was
not all.
Several days later, Wilson warned Henry Robinson, the
representative of the US Shipping Board, regarding shipments of
coal to Italy that "obviously this is not the time to further
Italian industrial interests at the expense
of feeding a
distracted world."S3 Both measures c~e too late.
Hoover's proposal was accepted, though with some delay. The
Americans wanted to avoid upheavals in that part. of Europe, and
President Wilson believed that food was an important element in
achieving this goal.S4
D' ANNUNZIO AT FlUME (RIJEKA)
Both the population and soldiers felt strongly about Fiume, and
20
case Italy
should retain Fiume, Andrews believed, "it is'
practically certain that the Yugoslavs will attack them with the
intention of taking it away from them."S8
..
di Revel.70
Another incident which showed that Admiral Millo could not
control the Italian zone and was thus forced to tolerate the
rebels occurred when D'Annunzio's forces landed in Zadar on
November 22.
They soon withdrew, but their landing created a
stir, prompting Andrews to reconsider the position of the US Navy
in the Adriatic.
He believed that D'Anpunzio's action made
future compromises less likely and his role of peacemaker
questionable. He thought that D'Annunzio might decide to take
Split, which would make the US position untenable: "The people
of Yugoslavia have come to look on the US as their champions in
their desires and efforts to uniee into a self governing nation,
and they believe that the US will not stand by and see their
territory invaded by the usurping Italians without making some
effort to assist the Yugoslavs."
Obviously, Andrews was
concerned with the image of the United States and of President
Wilson, and worried about the situation they might face in case
of Italian actions in the neighborhood of Split. If this were to
happen and the Allies.refused to act jOintly, Andrews proposed,
the United States should withdraw. 71
General Bliss came to a
similar conclusion. After analyzing the attitudes of France and
Great Britain and the US Navy's situation in the Adriatic, he
argued that keeping a small force would only bring trouble.
He
recommended that unless the situation changed, the United States
should withdraw its naval forces immediately.72
Admiral Knapp
had a different point of view. While recognizing the difficult
position of the US naval detachment in the Adriatic, he believed
that it should not be withdrawn because of its "value as a moral
factor, and the possibility that its presence may contribute to
avert an outbreak of war between Serbo-Croat-Slovene state and
Italy." Knapp also advised that an effort be made to secure
British and French support for the US naval force. If they
denied it, however, he was willing to consider a withdrawal. The
final decision was in Lansing's hands.
Andrews was instructed
not to attempt to prevent an attack from the sea within the
American zone, but to resist any attempt to seize the Austro
Hungarian vessels in American custody.
This was the only
possible solution.73
Thus, the US Navy remained in the Adriatic
for almost two more years and smoothed over many more disputes.
The Fiume raid lost its initial significance, and the United
states turned its attention to its own zone and naval forces in
.Split.
CONCLUSIONS
From its very beginning as an independent state, Yugoslavia
was faced with Italian opposition.
With Dalmatia, Fiume, and
Kotor in dispute between the two countries, the United States
,became involved in the region since it supported Yugoslavia,
which was unable to protect itself. The conflict on the Adriatic
had an echo in Europe and the United States.
After having been
forgotten during the world war, the region suddenly took center
24
OJ.
ENDNOTES
1. Daniels to Benson, Washington, November 2~ 1918, Naval
Records, box 683. Navy Branch, National Archives, Washington, DC.
2. Memorandum # 63, "Proposed decisions in
the event of
revolution in Austria-Hungary from a naval point of view," Naval
Records, box 5.71.
25
'.
3. Benson to Bullard,
records, box 683.
Paris,
November
and
9,
1918, Naval
in Henry
8. Benson to Bullard,
Naval Records, Box 683.
Paris,
December
March
21
Benson, Venice,
...
Nelson, Kotor,
cable, November
30.
27
8, 1918, secret,
Hoover.
of Frank
1918, cables,
Fiume,
January
and
6,
1919, Naval
40. Crosby to Polk, Paris, January 13, 1919, FRUS PPC, Vol. II,
pp. 566-67; Parker to Bullard, January 19, 1919; Niblack to
Benson, January 24 and 25, 1919, Naval Records, boxes 682 and
685; Benson to Bullard and Niblack, Paris, January 23 and 30,
1919, Benson Papers, box 31.
41. Diaries of
Vance McCormick,.
February 1, 1919., House
collection, Yale University; Polk diary, January 9, 1919, Polk
Papers; Polk to Commission, Washington, January 20, 1919, Wilson
Papers, series VIII-A, box 12.
42.
Memo:
the
commissioners,
March
7,
1919,
Harrison
48. Minutes of the meeting of March 21, 1919, Naval Records, box
682.
49. capt. Train
box 684.
50. Andrews to Benson, Split, April 16, 17, 19, 24, 1919, Benson
Papers, boxes 31 and 32.
28
'.
...
52. Wilson to Davis, Paris, April 19, 1919, Norman Davis Papers,
MBS Division, Library of Congress.
53. Herbert Hoover, The
1963, p. 104.
Ordeal
of
Woodrow
Wilson,
New York:
September
National
12, 1919,
Archives,
Fiume,
September
16,
1919,
Naval
29
'.
Bliss to
Polk, Paris,
30
Comments by
H. James Burgwyn
Professor
Zivojinovic
has
exhaustively described the
attitudes and outlook of American naval and army units assigned
to the
disputed areas in the Adriatic between Italy and
Yugoslavia. The troops were there, we are told, "to restrain the
excessive territorial ambitions of another ally, Italy, a member
of the victorious coalition. R An underlying thesis of the paper
is that President Wilson was persuaded to pursue a policy
grounded on justice and equity in the "Adriatic by US military men
attached to the occupation forces who kept him fully apprised of
Italy's ill-treatment of the local Yugoslav population and
discourteous behavior toward Allied military representatives
trying manfully to uphold law and order along the Dalmatian
coast.
It was not Wilson, Lansing, House, and others who
conceived and conducted American policy in the Adriatic, but
Benson, Bullard, Niblack, Andrews, and Sims, all military men.
While that novel thesis
the predominant influence of the
American military on Wilson's Adriatic policy -- might reasonably
be questioned, it is doubtless true that the Italian Adriatic
Command turned out to be Italy's worst ambassador to the American
delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.
In the unbroken litany recounted here of Uncle Sam's
disinterestedness and
goodwill in
rendering the Yugoslavs
justice, only the American battalions stationed in Fiume are
found to be wanting in their task of holding the Italians at bay.
Blame for this, according to Zivojinovic, rests squarely with
Colonel House who, hoodwinked by the Italians, deprived the Army
of an active role in political happenings in the area.
But this
was an aberration.
On the whole, as the author pOints out, the
Americans, in a job well done, sincerely believed that Italian
selfishness and greed were impeding their efforts to secure peace
and rehabilitation in southeastern Europe.
If Zivojinovic has
still to explain the incongruities and dangers in the American
disposition to moralize on questions traditionally dealt with
according. to the dictates of realpolitik, he has irrefutably
documented Italian misbehavior and aggressiveness toward the
Yugoslav. population
residing
in their zones of military
occupation. It would not have caught the Americans by surprise
had they known what we now know that the Italian Command in
December 1918 had issued orders for its units to sow discontent
against the fledgling Yugoslav state wherever and in whatever
manner possible, especially in Fiume and Dalmatia.
31
-.
ENDNOTES
British Foreign Office
1.
190878, 19 November 1918.
(hereafter
cited
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
as
Fa) 371/3137/
8.
H. James Burgwyn, "Sonnino a la diplomazia italiana del
tempo di guerra nei Balcani nel 1915," Storia contemporanea, XVI,
n. 1 (February 1985): pp. 113-37; and "Italy's Balkan Policy
1915-1917. Albania, Greece and the Epirus Question," storia
delle relazioni internazionali, 11 (1986/1): pp. 3-61.
9.
Paul C. Helmreich, "Italy and the Anglo-French Repudiation
of the 1917 St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement," The Journal of
Modern History On-Demand Supplement.
Abstracts printed in Vol.
48, No.2, June 1976: p. 139.
10. Quoted in Hugh and Christopher seton-watson, The Making of a
New Europe (Seattle:
University of Washington Prass, 1981), p.
268.
11.
Seton-watson, p. 268.
12.
13.
Seton-watson, p. 319.
14.
17.
18.
19.
Ii.
(hereafter cited as
~.
38
Comments by
them.
Another area that merits exploration in the contex~ of the
author's objectives is the role of US financial power. The paper
implies that the possibility of loans for postwar reconstruction
tempered Italian territorial ambitions in the Balkans. Dollar
diplomacy became the primary tool of American foreign policy in
the 1920s. Giangiacomo Migone2 has illustrated the important
role US bank loans played in Mussolini's ultimate political and
social stabilization of postwar Italy as well as in tempering
Fascist foreign policy.
This essay suggests that the Italian
leaders of 1919-21 were equally susceptible to this type of
-diplomatic leverage.
We need more information on US plans and
demarches and on the Italian response.
While the description of Italian motivation is one-sided,
the author
is even
more abstemious in treating Yugoslav
objectives and the efforts the leaders of that newly created
kingdom made to influence US policy and to support US officials
in the Adriatic.
Relative political and military weakness
produces serious diplomatic activity. We need to know more about
the cooperation (and conflicts) between the two states at the
regional level in order to assess the effectiveness of American
policies.
In summation, I would suggest that the author has provided
us with much useful new material on US actions in the Adriatic in
the immediate aftermath of World War I. He now needs to give his
essay more focus and to remove its polemical thrust by rooting it
in a broader perspective of national objectives.
By doing this,
he can make a significant contribution to our understanding of
the dynamics of US foreign policy and its practical effects in
the Adriatic region.
ENDNOTES
1.
Among a large number of important works, Piero Melograni,
Storia Politica della grande guerra (Bari, 1972), B. Tobia, nIl
partito Socialista Italiano e la politica di Woodrow Wilson,n
Storia Contemporanea 6: June 1974, pp. 275-306; Michael Ledeen,
The First
Duce (Baltimore,
1977), R. Webster, Industrial
Imperialism in Italy (california, 1975); R. Bosworth, Italy: The
Least of the Great Powers (Cambridge, 1979); and the still useful
R. Albrecht Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (New
York, 1938).'
2.