1) Bito-Onon vs.

Fernandez
Facts: The petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President
for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano,
Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the
Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates
for the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for
the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was
proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting Quejano to file
a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which
was decided against him on August 25, 1997. Not satisfied with the decision of
the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April 26,
1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of
jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the
decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in
connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and
directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the Supplemental
Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on
August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of
decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires
act and is void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its
issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over
the Liga's internal organization. On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onon's
motion to dismiss. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not QUESTIONED PROVISION IN MEMORANDUM
CIRCULAR 97-193 WAS ISSUED BY THE DILG SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF
HIS AUTHORITY
Held: The court held that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar
as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with
the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful
constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that
in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with
the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the
GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA
which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the
National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an
exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control,
which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given
the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the
Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by
local government units of such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe
or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary
over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local
government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per
statutory
enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to
interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of
the local government. **take note of the meaning of power of supervision and
power of control.. The President's power of general supervision over local
government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution. The power of
supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower
officers perform their functions in accordance with law." This is distinguished
from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

DILG was appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the
affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall
have been duly elected and assumed office. It issued several orders including
nullifying the Liga elections in Caloocan. These acts of the DILG went beyond
the sphere of general supervision and constituted direct interference with the
political affairs, not only of the Liga, but more importantly of the barangay as an
institution. Clearly, what the DILG wielded was the power of control which even
the President does not have. Like the government units, the Liga ng mga
Barangay is not subject to the control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.
3) BAUTISTA vs. ARANETA February 22, 2000 (326 SCRA 234)
FACTS: Bautista claimed he is a tenant, but the owner of the land Araneta,
denies it. DARAB ruled that he is a tenant. This was reversed by the CA.
HELD: CA can reverse DARABs finding that he is a tenant.
The Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim that he is a tenant by virtue of
the factual finding of the DARAB considering that DARAB mainly relied on the
certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant of the
disputed landholding.
Certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person
is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. This Court is
not necessarily bound by these findings especially if they are mere conclusions
that are not supported by substantial evidence.
Note: Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship that can only be
created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder.
4) REPUBLIC vs. IMPERIAL
FACTS: On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of then Court
of First Instance of Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and further
subdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the subjects
of herein petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines filed a case with the trial court to judicially declare the Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein private respondents null and void on
the ground that the subject land, on which the OCT was based, has the features
of a foreshore land based on an investigation conducted by the DENR, Region
V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other hand contend that Director of Lands
found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT
408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."
Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita
Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest,
namely, Felix S. Imperial, Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S.
Imperial filed a motion to dismiss. They contended that the adjudication by the
cadastral court is binding against the whole world including the Republic since
the cadastral proceedings are in rem and the government itself through the
Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and was a direct and active
participant therein. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
an objection to the motion to dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the
trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the judgment rendered by
the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and the Courts resolution in the
petition to quiet title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered
by OCT No. 408 (500) was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit and for failure to file the appellants brief within the extended period
granted to petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.

2) DAVID VS. PAREDES (439 SCRA 130 Sept.27,2004)

Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the
affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay in giving remedy to alleged violations made
by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the conduct of their elections, issued 2
memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the
Liga.
Petitioner contends that DILGs appointment constitutes undue interference in
the internal affairs of the Liga, since the latter is not subject to DILG control and
supervision. Respondent judge contends that DILG exercises general
supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the different leagues based on sec.
1 of Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the supervisory
power of the DILG.
Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control
over the Liga ng mga Barangay.
RULING: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of
the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local government, which
exclude the power of control. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga,
the DILGs authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it
cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or
replace the same.

HELD: Yes. At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in
question are foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of
the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It
was defined as "that part (of the land) which is between high and low water and
left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a strip of land that
lies between the high and low water marks and, is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide."
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of
government, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands
Management Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved by
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle
behind this ruling is that the subject has been exhaustively weighed and
discussed and must therefore be given credit. This doctrine finds no application,
however, when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict
with that of, the DENR Secretary.
5) SAMSON vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
On April 21, 1993, petitioner Moises S. Samson, on behalf of unidentified
complainants, charged private respondents Dr. Leonito L. Catarroja and Norma

Sanchez, Chiefs of the Quezon City Health Sanitation and Food and Drugs
Divisions, respectively, with violation of paragraphs (b), (e) and (h) of Section 3
of RA 3019, essentially, as follows:
1. That respondent Leonito Catarroja caused the printing of health certificates
without serial numbers at his own expense and thereafter, he sold and parted
with the said blank and already signed health certificates at P20.00 each to corespondent Norma Sanchez and likewise to an unnamed employee of the
Business Permits and Licenses Office (BPLO), Office of the Mayor, Quezon
City, who then re-sold the same to fixers. In turn, the said fixers disposed of the
health certificates to applicants for P70.00 each without official receipts;
2. That on February 10, 1993, respondent Catarroja signed and issued twenty
(20) health certificates to employees of the Max restaurant even without the
required physical and medical examinations and immunizations, in
consideration of the amount of P400.00 which was paid by Pons Sepulveda for
and in behalf of said employees;
3. That likewise on the same date aforestated, respondent Catarroja issued
health certificate No. 15595-93 to one Alberto de Jesus without the required
physical and medical examination and immunization, after the latter had paid an
additional and unreceipted amount of P50.00 demanded by one of the staff in
the office of respondent Catarroja. However, the said health certificate is not
recorded in the official logbook of his office for duly issued health certificates.[3]
Section 3, paragraphs (b), (e) and (h) of RA 3019 provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The petition must be dismissed for lack of merit. The public respondent did not
act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed joint resolution
and order. Neither can it be compelled by mandamus to reverse its findings and
dispositions.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In other words, the power of
discretion is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.[7]
In this case, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent in dismissing OMB-0-93-0920 for lack of evidence to establish a
probable cause against private respondents.
Petitioners complaint was predicated on his assertion that the possession of
pre-printed and non-serialized health certificates by the applicants manifests
that they secured them after paying the fees without undergoing the usual
physical and medical examination and immunization.
Nonetheless, public respondent found that:
[T]he charge and allegations set forth in the complaint-affidavit taken in
juxtaposition with the controverting statements of answering respondents on
record, negate the adverse specifications embodied in the said complaintaffidavit to the effect that respondents Leonito Catarroja and Norma Sanchez
have violated the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law (R.A. 3019, as amended). As
has been above elucidated by their respective counter-statements, it appears
that the evidence on record failed to substantiate the alleged anomalies
perpetrated by the herein respondents. In the first place, complainant was not
able to present evidence disclosing the fact that there are other health
certificates which were printed personally by respondent Catarroja. Upon the
other hand, the Special Committee which investigated the alleged anomalies in
the Sanitation Division of the Quezon City Health Department, came up with the
findings that the health certificate issued to Alberto de Jesus alias Celerino dela
Cruz, was printed and issued officially by the Quezon City Health Department.
On this score, no rebutting evidence whatsoever, was submitted regarding the
pre-printed and un-serialized health certificates. Indeed, as put forth by the
respondents, complainant did not mind presenting the sworn statements of any
of the alleged complaining witnesses mentioned in his complaint-affidavit to
support the naked statements against the respondents.

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in
his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any
law from having any interest.
Private respondents counter-alleged that petitioner had neither the personality
to sue nor personal knowledge of the veracity of the complaint, which was mere
hearsay, not having been supported by any affidavit from the purportedly
affected, if not fictitious, health certificate applicants or sanitary inspectors. Also,
petitioner did not present any of his witnesses before the investigating
committee created by then Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay. Thus, private
respondents filed counter-charges against petitioner for libel, falsification and
perjury.[4]
On May 27, 1994, public respondent, through Graft Investigation Officer
Lamberto G. Sagum, issued a joint resolution dismissing the cases filed by both
parties:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no probable cause to justify
further inquiry into the instant charges and counter-charges embodied in the
above-entitled cases, let these cases be, as the same are, hereby
recommended, DISMISSED.

To this extent, we are hard put to see how the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law
have been violated by the respondents. For one thing, respondents did not
cause undue injury to the alleged complaining witnesses and much less, to the
alleged applicants. Neither, did respondents give any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their official
functions. At any rate, the Special Committee having been tasked to investigate
the denunciations of complainant Councilor Moises Samson which relate to the
same factual issues as in the instant case, found no sufficient evidence to
warrant further investigation against respondent Leonito Catarroja. In the same
manner, the said Committee also failed to uncover any iota of evidence against
respondent Norma Sanchez. (See: the Committee Report, pp. 313-343,
Records).
All of the above, taken together are more than sufficient to disprove the
assertions that anomalies were perpetrated in the Sanitation Division of the
Quezon City Health Department bearing on the issuances of health certificates.
There can, therefore, be no other conclusion other than the charge and its
specifications are devoid of legal and factual justifications and that for all intents
and purposes, the instant case is a mere product of an unfounded suspicion of
complainant herein.[8]
In its August 26, 1994 order, public respondent also squarely and thoroughly
passed upon the issues raised in petitioners motion for partial reconsideration:

SO RESOLVED.[5]
Mr. Raul R. Arnau and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr.
reviewed and later on endorsed the aforesaid joint resolution to Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, who approved it on June 22, 1994.
The public respondent, in its August 26, 1994 order, approved by Overall
Deputy Ombudsman Villa on September 9, 1994,[6] denied petitioners motion
for partial reconsideration of the joint resolution with respect to the dismissal of
OMB-0-93-0920.
Hence, this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent for dismissing OMB-0-93-0920, a supposedly prima facie graft case
against private respondents.

[T]he factual and legal issues raised therein had been already amply passed
upon, dealt with and considered painstakingly to the extent that the Resolution
merited the unqualified approval of the Honorable Overall Deputy Ombudsman.
To consider them again on the basis of the same representations and
rationalization after they had been shown to be untenable, would perforce,
result in the same conclusion and recommendation.
As it were, the essence of the ground remains the same. However, just to set
forever at rest the actual and legal issues re-raised in this motion, we shall
nevertheless, take them up once again.
Re the alleged printing of other health certificates by respondent Catarroja, let it
be said pointedly in this case, that from the testimonies of the employees of the
Quezon City Health Department and other offices including complainants
witness, Alberto de Jesus, the Special Committee which investigated the

anomalies supposedly perpetrated by some personnel in the Sanitation Division

failed to uncover evidence or documents that tended to show or prove that
there are other health certificates which had been printed personally by
respondent Catarroja. In fact, per logbook, the health certificate issued to
Alberto de Jesus alias Celerino dela Cruz was printed and issued officially by
the Quezon City Health Department. Further, the said committee during the
course of its investigation had found that the Administrative Division procures
sufficient health forms needed by the said Department including health
certificates and that there was no evidence presented or turned up which
showed that there are fake or unauthorized health certificates (See pp. 138139, Records).
As regards the assertion of complainant that twenty (20) unserialized health
certificates bear the signatures of respondent Catarroja and hence, it would
stand to show that respondent Catarroja did its printing personally as the said
samples are more than enough to establish the fact of printing.

Furthermore, the calibration of evidence to asses whether a prima facie graft

case exists against private respondents is a question of fact. The Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only
questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.[11]
Finally, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a]
that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken,
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station, or [b] that such court,
officer, board or person has unlawfully excluded the petitioner from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.[12] Mandamus will lie to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty requiring the exercise of judgment,[13] as
in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

On this score, suffice it to state that the investigating Committee also noted that
from the testimony of witness Mrs. Montojo it is disclosed that she encountered
applicants who were already holders of health certificates. However, the same
witness expressed her doubts as to the authenticity of the signature of
respondent Catarroja. Moreover, respondent Catarroja puts it correctly when he
contended that complainant did not witness the transaction between the fixers
and the applicants who allegedly bought health certificates without allegedly
having undergone the usual physical and medical examinations and
immunization and so, he is not a competent witness to testify on the authenticity
of the said health certificates as he was not privy to the alleged illegal
transaction.
Likewise, respondent Catarroja asseverated that complainant failed to present
competent witness before the said special Committee which conducted the factfinding investigation. Neither, did he present the sworn statements of any of the
alleged complaining witnesses mentioned in his complaint-affidavit to
substantiate the bare statements against the respondents.[9]
For private respondents to be held criminally liable under paragraph (b) of
Section 3 of RA 3019, they must have requested or received, directly or
indirectly, any gift or benefit for themselves or for another public officer who has
to intervene in any contract or transaction with the government. Under
paragraph (e), they must have given unwarranted benefits with evident bad
faith, gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality. Under paragraph (h),
they must have had a financial interest, directly or indirectly, in any transaction
in which they took part in their official function or in any transaction in which
they were prohibited by the Constitution or any law from having any interest
therein.
Yet, petitioner failed to present any proof that there was probable cause to hold
private respondents liable under any of the aforestated provisions. Sufficient
proof of guilt of the private respondents should have been adduced by
petitioner so that when the case is eventually tried, the trial court may not be
compelled, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. If the Ombudsman, using
professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such
finding, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the courts will
be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings by the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it. In much the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they
will have to review the exercise of discretion by fiscals or prosecuting attorneys
each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
by a private complainant.[10]
The Constitution and RA 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) endowed the
Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial
powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order
to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Section 13(1),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

6) TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondent.

The instant controversy arose from the verified letter-complaint1 dated July 24,
1995 filed by Teresita Fabian, petitioner, with the Office of the Ombudsman,
charging Nestor Agustin, herein respondent, with grave misconduct, disgraceful
and immoral acts, and oppression.
Petitioner alleged therein that she was the major stockholder and president of
PROMAT Construction and Development Corporation (PROMAT) engaged in
construction business. In 1986, PROMAT participated in the various biddings
for the construction of government projects within the First Metro Manila
Engineering District (FMED) of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH). Respondent is the incumbent District Engineer of the FMED.
Petitioner further averred that "respondent became a persistent suitor" and
refused to deal with PROMATs liaison officer, insisting that she personally
attend to her companys projects with FMED, otherwise, her papers "would get
stuck in his office." Respondent relentlessly pursued her and one time invited
her to a snack at the Philippine Plaza Hotel. After finishing her drink, she felt
dizzy. Taking advantage of her "semi-conscious state," he brought her to a
motel and raped her. That was the beginning of a hateful relationship. Her
attempts to extricate herself proved futile since he constantly warned her that
PROMAT would no longer do business with FMED unless the relationship
continues. Whenever she tried to avoid him, he would go to her house in the
middle of the night and create a scene by blowing the horn of his car, pounding
at the gate, shouting on top of his voice and pelting her windows with stones.
As a result of these disturbances, she suffered nervous breakdown and was
eventually operated for breast cancer on October 1994.
On May 22, 1995, one Winnie Gutierrez and respondents elder brother,
Honorato Agustin, persuaded petitioner to meet respondent as he would
apologize to her for his misdeeds. She agreed and met respondent at Lasap
Restaurant, Tomas Morato Street, in Quezon City. After sometime, his two
companions went out of the restaurant. Not wanting to be alone with
respondent, she attempted to leave. But respondent suddenly embraced her
and fondled her breast area, saying, "Tingnan nga kung talagang tinanggal na
ang suso mo." Out of extreme outrage and embarrassment, she lost
consciousness and had to be brought to the nearest hospital.
In his counter-affidavit, treated as his comment on the complaint, respondent
vehemently denied petitioners allegations, claiming that he accepted her
various invitations in order to discuss the projects of PROMAT. Through his
assistance as Chief of Office of FMED, PROMAT was awarded various public
work projects valued at millions of pesos. Whenever PROMAT committed
violations of its contracts with FMED, petitioner would persuade him to mediate
so that her companys interest would not be prejudiced and he was able to
settle its problems. On account of his cordial, warm and intimate relationship
with petitioner, she reaped "windfall profits from her transactions with
respondents office." He never had an "affair" with her since he is a happily
married man. On the Lasap Restaurant incident, he explained that he accepted
her invitation out of pity knowing that she was undergoing chemotherapy. When
she expressed her desire to get a multi-million peso project from his office, he
could not give a favorable assurance. Thus, she got angry, raised her voice and
threatened to have him removed from his job. He surmised that she filed the
instant case to harass and intimidate him to submit to her unlawful demands.

Section 15(1), RA 6770 states:

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. xxx
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.

On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigation Officer Eduardo Benitez issued a

Resolution2 finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct and irregular or
immoral acts and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits under the law, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this office finds substantial
evidence and so finds respondent guilty of grave misconduct under Section 36
of PD 807 and for acts which are contrary to law or regulations or otherwise
irregular or immoral under Section 19, RA 6770, Rule III, Section 1 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and hereby orders his dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law."
In holding that respondent is guilty of such administrative offenses, Graft
Investigation Officer Benitez made the following findings:
"As District Engineer, respondent exercised functional and administrative
supervision over the district office (Sec. 23, Administrative Code of 1987). The
District Office undertakes the planning, design, construction and work
supervision function of the Department for infrastructures in the district.
"Respondent did not deny complainants statement that practically all matters
that have a bearing on the project from inception to completion required his
approval; although he pointed out that he was not the sole signatory to
documents relevant to the projects.
"During the tenure of respondent as District Engineer of FMED, Promat was
awarded by that office several public works projects listed in Annex "A" of
complainants Supplemental Affidavit. According to respondent, the listing was
incomplete. In his words, This list, is however, incomplete, because there are
still other contracts involving millions of pesos which complainant obtained from
the DPWH with the assistance of respondent. (Memorandum for Respondent,
p. 8)1a\^/phi1.net
"Respondent admitted that he is a married man. Complainant was married but
her marriage was annulled in 1992.
"While respondent denied courting complainant and said that it was the latter
who initiated their meetings through her personal invitations, one of his letters
to the complainant reads in part to prove the contrary:
It was in July, 1986 your beauty was stunning. Your looks excelled among all
contractors and non-contractors in the FMED.
My relationship then with my wife was not any better. You captured my heart. I
courted you. (Annex "A", Complainants Reply Affidavit dated Oct. 2, 1995).
"In another letter to the complainant, the respondent described his relationship
with complainant as emotional, spiritual and sexual." In the same letter he
admitted that they lived and shared the nights together.
"Respondent admitted authorship of these two letters when the xerox copies of
which were compared with the originals in the possession of the complainant,
and in fact made use of them to deny that he threatened or otherwise harassed
the complainant.
"Relevant to that relationship between complainant and respondent, the latter
said that as Chief of Office, he assisted complainant in getting multi-million peso
contract from his office and that on the occasions where Promat committed
violations of the public works contract, he mediated so that the interest of
complainants company would not be prejudiced. Respondent also said that on
account of his relationship with complainant, she was able to reap windfall
profits from her transactions with respondents office. (Memorandum For
Respondent, p. 17)
"ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
"In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent states thus:
"1. That I vehemently DENY the allegations of Ms. Fabian in her sworn
statement against me."
"xxx xxx xxx
"2. In due time I got acquainted with the complainant and through my
assistance she was able to secure various projects from our office valued at
millions of pesos;
"3. While I assisted the complainant in getting the multi-million pesos public
works contracts from our office, as chief of office I always see to it that
complainants transactions met the required standards imposed on these
projects bearing in mind the protection of the government and public interest
above anything else; neither have I compromised these strict standards of my
office to place the complainant at a great advantage over her rival private
contractors;
"xxx xxx xxx
"4. On certain occasions, however, complainants construction company
committed violations in their awarded projects, hence, our office called
memorandum, copies of two (2) of these memoranda are hereto attached as
ANNEXES "1" AND "1-a";

"5. Complainant would then see me personally about these matters and
persuade me to mediate so that her companys interest will not be prejudiced; I
tried to help the best of my ability and somehow I was able to settle these
problems to her satisfaction and that of my office;
"Relevantly, in his Memorandum, respondent flaunts the benefits that
complainant supposedly gained, thus:
"Complainant frequently sought Respondents assistance to secure business
transactions with his office. She succeeded; Respondent had unselfishly lent
the necessary assistance to enable Complainant secure contracts from the
FMED which covered millions of pesos. Complainant enumerated some of said
projects in her Supplemental Affidavit. She continued to court the favor of
Respondent to further her business interests when he was designated District
Engineer of the Rizal Engineering District, Kapitolyo, Pasig. (at pp. 3-4)
"The letter (by respondent to complainant) clearly shows the cordial warm and
intimate relationship between Respondent and Complainant . . . that it was on
account of said pleasant relationship that she was able to profit from multimillion-peso public works contracts from DPWH office as shown in the list of
projects she submitted to this Honorable Office. This list, however, is incomplete
because there still are other contracts involving millions of pesos which
Complainant obtained from the DPWH with the assistance of Respondent. (at
p. 8)
"Respondent further speaks of complainant "reaping a windfall profits" and
"financial gains" she had been showered on account of her multi-million pesos
transactions which she obtained with the help of Respondent. (at p. 17)
"On complainants supposed motive for filing this case, respondent theorized in
his Memorandum that she wanted to "continue" to reap significant financial
benefits out of public works projects under respondents office; and that she
was angered when he ensured that she follow the requisite standards and
procedure. (at p. 18) Respondent thus implies that in the previous contracts
awarded to complainants company the requisite standards and procedures
were not ensured and applied and thereby she reaped windfall
profits."1a\^/phi1.net
On February 27, 1996, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved3 with
modification the said Resolution (reviewed by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo
Aportadera) in the sense that respondent was found guilty only of misconduct
and that the penalty was reduced from dismissal from office to suspension
without pay for one (1) year.
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. In his Order
dated June 19, 1996, Graft Investigation Officer Benitez denied respondents
motion and reiterated his assailed Order. Graft Investigation Officer Rafaelito H.
Imperial and Legal Officer Andrew F. Ammuyutan likewise recommended that
respondent be found guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him the
penalty of dismissal from the service.
Before the parties motions for reconsideration were resolved, Atty. Amador
Casino, a "classmate and close associate" of Ombudsman Desierto, entered
his appearance as counsel for the respondent. Forthwith, Ombudsman Desierto
inhibited himself and designated then Deputy Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero to
resolve the motions.
On June 18, 1997, Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero issued a Joint Order,4
dismissing the administrative complaint, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the subject Motion for
Reconsideration of the respondent is hereby GRANTED and the subject Motion
for Modification (Reconsideration) of the complainant is hereby DENIED; and
accordingly, the instant administrative case against the respondent is hereby
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
"SO ORDERED."
In dismissing the case, Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero held:
1. That respondent raped and harassed complainant is "highly doubtful"
because she reported the incident to the NBI only on December 15, 1993, or
after more than seven (7) years;
2. On the Lasap Restaurant incident, complainant stated in her sworn
statement taken before the PNP Criminal Investigation Service Command that
respondent embraced her and fondled her chest area. However, in her sworn
statement dated June 23, 1995, she claimed that he held her at different
delicate parts of her body and kissed her. Moreover, the eyewitnesses did not
identify respondent as the person who molested her;
3. As to respondents improper behavior in complainants residence, it appears
that she failed to report the disturbances to the security personnel of the village;

4. Although it is improper for a married man to court another woman, "this Office
is by no means prepared to hold that such act by itself constitutes the
administrative offense of immorality."
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review5 pursuant to
Section 27 of RA 6770,6 docketed as G.R. No. 129742. In its Decision dated
September 16, 1998, this Court declared invalid Section 27 of RA 6770,
together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or
issuance implementing the aforesaid act insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court. This Court ruled that henceforth, appeals from the decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. Consequently, this Court referred and
transferred petitioners petition for review to the Court of Appeals for final
disposition, with said petition to be considered pro hac vice as a petition for
review under Rule 43.
On June 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals, rendered a Decision,7 the dispositive
portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Order of respondent Deputy
Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero dated June 18, 1997 granting private
respondent Nestor V. Agustins Motion for Reconsideration and denying
petitioner Teresita Fabians Motion for Modification (Reconsideration) is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the order of respondent Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto dated February 26, 1996 suspending private respondent Agustin
from the service for one (1) year is REINSTATED.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration. On
May 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision8 reinstating
the Joint Order of Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero dismissing the complaint
against respondent for insufficiency of evidence.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated as follows:
"We find merit in the private respondents motion for reconsideration, for the
following reasons:
"FIRST, it is obvious from a reading of the Supreme Courts landmark decision
dated September 16, 1998 in G.R. No. 129742 that the Hon. Supreme Court
did not declare the entire nullity of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 nor of
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman) or any other law or issuance implementing the
aforesaid Act, but only INSOFAR AS THEY PROVIDE FOR APPEALS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASES FROM THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN TO THE SUPREME COURT. Such being the case, the rest of
the aforesaid provisions still subsists.
"SECOND, the fifth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 explicitly provides:
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing
the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
months salary shall be final and unappealable.
"The foregoing provision is reiterated in Section 7 of Administrative Order No.
07, to wit:
Sec. 7. Finality of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge,
and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases,
the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt
thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for
certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.
"THIRD, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, under which this case
had been referred to this Court pro hac vice provides in Section 10 thereof that
the findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by
substantial evidence, shall be binding on this Court.
"In the instant case, a close scrutiny of the evidence of the parties indicates that
the factual findings of Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero is supported by substantial
evidence. As found by Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero, the allegation of rape
does not deserve any credence, considering that the petitioner made a report
thereon more than seven (7) years after the alleged incident. In the meantime,
she continued to have personal and business dealings with private respondent.
"Anent the alleged molestation at the Lasap Restaurant, the affidavits submitted
by the petitioner to support her alleged molestation do not even name or

identify the private respondent. No other evidence was submitted to support

such charge, considering that the parties agreed not to submit testimonial
evidence, and relied only on their respective documentary evidence. It is a
basic rule of evidence that a party has the burden of proof to establish his claim
or defense. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to effectively discharge such
burden." (Emphasis ours)
Simply stated, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Amended Decision, held that
since petitioner failed to prove her charges by substantial evidence, her
complaint must be dismissed. Pursuant to Section 27 of RA 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), the Joint Order of Deputy
Ombudsman Guerrero dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence is,
therefore, final and unappealable.
From the above Amended Decision, petitioner now appeals to this Court,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Guerrero Joint Order.
She contends that she was able to prove her charges by substantial evidence.
For his part, respondent maintains that the petition raises only questions of fact
which are not proper for review by this Court.
While we agree with respondent that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari, however, there are recognized exceptions to
this rule, among which, is when there is a conflict between the factual findings
of the trial court and that of the appellate court.9 In such case, this Court is
bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in
the proceedings below.
Here, it is undisputed that the discord in the factual findings existed not only at
the Ombudsman level, but even at the Appellate Court. First, it must be recalled
that: (1) In his Resolution of January 31, 1996, Graft Investigation Officer
Eduardo Benitez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct as well as
irregular or immoral acts and recommended his dismissal from the service, with
forfeiture of all benefits under the law; (2) Graft Investigator and Legal Officer
Andrew Ammuyutan made similar finding and recommendation; (3) Then
Ombudsman Desierto, approved the said finding and recommendation with
modification in the sense that the offense is only misconduct and that the
penalty is suspension from office for one (1) year without pay; (4) Eventually,
Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. Second, the Court of Appeals, in its original Decision, reinstated
Ombudsman Desiertos Order dated February 26, 1996 finding respondent
guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the
service for one (1) year without pay. Later, the Court of Appeals rendered an
Amended Decision, this time, affirming the Guerrero Joint Order dismissing the
administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Such conflict in the factual findings compels this Court to deviate from the
general rule and review the evidence obtaining in this case.
On the charge of grave misconduct, respondent himself, in his counter-affidavit
admitted that through his assistance, petitioner was awarded numerous public
work projects valued at millions of pesos and that she reaped "windfall profits
from her transactions with respondents office." He also admitted that he
mediated whenever petitioner violated her companys contracts with his office.
With respect to the charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct, petitioner
submitted two letters given to her by respondent. One letter partly reads:
"It was in July, 1986, your beauty was stunning. Your looks excelled among all
contractors and non-contractors in the FMED.
"My relationship then with my wife was not any better. You captured my heart. I
courted you." In the other letter, respondent depicted his relationship with
petitioner as "emotional, spiritual and sexual." Moreover, he admitted that they
"lived and shared the nights together."
On her version of what transpired at the Lasap Restaurant, petitioner submitted
the affidavits of its employees, namely: Renante Tapis, Benny Cabural and
Jaime Coquia. They stated that while petitioner was having dinner with
respondent and two other male companions, one of the men (referring to
respondent as confirmed by petitioner in her sworn statement), suddenly
embraced her and tried to kiss her and touch her private parts. She lost
consciousness while going out of the restaurant.
To prove the charge of oppression, petitioner presented to the Investigator the
affidavit of Arsenia Lima, the liaison officer of PROMAT, stating that respondent
required petitioner to personally attend to PROMATs papers pending in his
office. Petitioner also submitted the affidavits of Maribel Pulin, a "mayordoma"
at her residence, and Antonio Almacen, a security guard at La Vista where she
resides. Both confirmed that on several occasions, respondent would cause
disturbance in petitioners neighborhood and forcibly enter her house. In his
affidavit, Abelardo Pamintuan, petitioners former husband, affirmed that he was
intimidated by respondents men from visiting her house. Lastly, Jomel
Simbulan, petitioners hairdresser, stated in his affidavit that while she was

confined in the hospital for breast cancer operation, respondent arrived and
threatened her with a gun.

Restaurant incident is weak in light of the positive declaration of petitioner and

those of the employees who witnessed the same.

As mentioned earlier, respondent, in his counter-affidavit, merely denied

petitioners charges, except the one concerning the Lasap Restaurant incident.
To substantiate his version of the same incident, he submitted the affidavits of
his brother Honorato Agustin who was with him at the restaurant and those of
Rolando Martinez and Arthur Diaz, Agents of the Criminal Investigation
Command, who were supposedly present in the restaurant at that time.

We thus find respondent guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral

acts and oppression.1a\^/phi1.net Indeed, by his conduct, respondent violated
the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in the public
service.13 Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.14 Public
servants must bear in mind this constitutional mandate at all times to guide
them in their actions during their entire tenure in the government service. In
Rios vs. Sandiganbayan,15 this Court emphasized:

After carefully reviewing all the evidence obtaining in this case, we find the
positive declarations of petitioner and her witnesses in their sworn statements
more credible than those of respondent. In administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence is required to hold respondent liable for the charges
against him. Here, we are convinced that petitioners charges are supported by
substantial evidence jurisprudentially defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.10 We
quote with approval the following findings and observations of Graft
Investigation Officer Benitez, sustained by the Court of Appeals in its original
Decision, thus:
"The complainants evidence and respondents admissions stand for the
requisite substantial evidence which in an unprejudiced mind reasonably
supports a conclusion that indeed the administrative offenses, subject of the
complaint had been committed. The uncontroverted facts show that respondent
courted complainant and established intimate relationship with her. On account
of that affair, or at least in the course thereof, her firm was awarded a number of
contracts by the office of which respondent was the head. From these contracts
even the respondent averted that she derived windfall profits. Times were,
through complainants persuasion, respondent interceded for complainants firm
whenever it was involved in contract violations. This alone constitutes grave
misconduct in office.
"Respondents flaunted generosity was at the expense of the
public.1awphi1.nt He compromised, if not sacrificed public interest, in those
periods of indiscretion.
"Here we have the inglorious spectacle of a married public works official
carrying an illicit affair with a lady contractor and in the course thereof,
showering her with windfall profits out of public works projects.
"This kind of misconduct in office amounts to a betrayal of public trust and we
have to be true to the purpose of administrative disciplinary proceedings which
is to weed out the undesirables and secure the faithful and efficient
performance of official functions."
By his actuations, respondent has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed
in him by virtue of his office. He made a mockery of his government position
and seriously compromised its integrity when he used his influence, being the
District Engineer of FMED, in assisting petitioner obtain various public work
projects worth millions of pesos and enabling her to reap "windfall profits" from
his office.
Serious misconduct in office is such misconduct which affects the performance
of his duties as a public officer and not only his character as a private
individual.11 It is settled that misconduct, warranting removal from office of an
officer, must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of
official duties.12
Equally, if not more damning and despicable, is the fact that respondent, being
a married man and handling a highly responsible position in the government
service, is engaged in an illicit affair with petitioner. He described in one of his
letters to her that their relationship is "emotional, spiritual and sexual" and that
they "lived and shared the nights together." Such moral depravity cannot be
countenanced and should not remain unpunished. A public office is a public
trust, which demands of those in its service the highest degree of morality.
Having an affair with someone who is financially interested in the transactions
being acted upon by his office, of which he is the head, is not only outrageous
to the standards of decency and morality, but unmistakably prejudicial to the
public service. Moreover, his uncouth and atrocious conduct at the Lasap
Restaurant, witnessed by its workers, is manifestly disgraceful which should be
condemned and accordingly sanctioned. Likewise, the charge of oppression
has been sufficiently established by petitioner. There is truth in her allegation
that respondent, on several occasions, forcibly entered her house and caused
disturbances in her village.
It bears emphasis that respondent admitted that because of his position,
petitioner was awarded various government projects worth millions and that he
had illicit relationship with her. His negative assertion relative to the Lasap

"The good of the service and the degree of morality which every official and
employee in the public service must observe, if respect and confidence are to
be maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the law, demand that
no untoward conduct on his part, affecting morality, integrity and efficiency while
holding office should be left without proper and commensurate sanction, all
attendant circumstances taken into account."
Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
of 1999, grave misconduct is classified as a grave offense, the prescribed
penalty of which is dismissal from the service.16 Disgraceful and immoral acts
as well as oppression, are also grave offenses, both punishable by suspension
for 6 months and 1 day to 1 year.17 Under the same Rule,18 if the respondent
is found guilty of two or more charges, the penalty to be imposed should be that
corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered
aggravating circumstances. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it forfeiture
of retirement benefits and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service.19
7) MATUGUINA vs. CA
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging
businesses under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was
established in 1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the
majority stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be
transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLEs petition, Davao Enterprises
Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao)
alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCORs
timber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged
and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE
appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources. During pendency,
Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto
Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and
Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the
ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3 worth of timbers. The Minister
then issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for
prohibition before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has
ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the execution of the writ.
DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI
averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued
a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister
has been made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same
was issued patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation
of MIWPIs constitutional rights under the due process clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPIs right to due process has been violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that
no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same
manner an execution can be issued only against a party and not against one
who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for the issuance of the
Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without giving
MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR
for the issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that
MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter requesting for
the Execution of the Ministers decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made
liable upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretarys expedient
conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the
basis merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without
hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution,
MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any
participation in the encroachment in DAVENCORs timber concession. This
action of the Minister disregards the most basic tenets of due process and
elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in
administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make
conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned.