The Battle of Hattin Revisited BENJAMIN Z. KEDAR The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Just fifteen words of his multi-volume Geschichte der Kriegskunst did Hans Delbrtick, the eminent military historian, devote to the Battle of Hiattin, giving the opinion that it yields nothing of importance forthe history of warfare.‘ This may well be the case, But a battle’s contribution to the art of war is not necessarily commensurate with its political significance and, stil. lessso, with the fascination it holds for posterity, Hattin, a climax in the history of crusade and dhad, is replete with high drama: Saladin’s caleulated thrust at Tiberias, liciting King Guy's seesaw reactions at Saforie; the weacy Franks encircled on the arid plateau ducing the night that preceded the final battle; the Hight of the thitst-stricken Frankish foot soldiers to the Horns of Hattin overlooking the inaccessible waters of Lake Tiberias; the last Frankish cavalry charges almost reaching Saladin, tugging at his beatd in agitation; the encounter between the triumphant Saladin and the captuced Frankish leaders, withthe vietor kiting his archenemy with his own hand, Small wonder that historians turn their attention to this batile time and again. During the las twenty-five years n0 Tess than three major reconstructions have been put forward. In 1964, Joshua Prawer published his "La batalle de Hattin,” which contributed inter alia to the understanding of the Lower Galilee road system at the time of the battle. In 1966, Peter Herde ‘came out with his “Die Kampfe bei den Homern von Hittin und der Untergana, des. Krouzrittesheeres @. und 4, Juli 1187), Eine historisch-topograpbische Studie,” the most detailed account of the events offered to date, based on painstaking scrutiny of the sources and the battlefield. In 1982, Mateolm C. Lyons and D.E.P. Jackson dedicated 2 chapter of their book on Saledin to Haiti, usilizing for the first time an account of the battle waitten after the capture of Acre on 10 July 1187. The present attempt is a by-product of the Second SSCLE Conference, 1 Hans Delbrck, Geshicte der Krisgskunst im Rekaen der pllscen Geschich, vl. Dar Muelater Belin, 1907), . 42 2 Praver's article was published in Zone! Exploration Journal 14 (1964, 1604179; for & ghty eapanded English version see his Crusader Dsiaions (Oxford, 1960), pb-A84 AUe lores ale appested in Romische Quartet far chritche Altermmskende died Kchengeacicre 64 (1966), 1-50, The eacorstruction by Tyom and Jackson eppesre ir isi Salix The Poltes ofthe Holy War (Cambridge, 1962), ch 16.C.P, Mite ang Nee Lyons have etd and tangled Saladin’ tern he present volume, pp. 216-22. jal view of Moons of Hatta from east (photo by Moshe Milner) ‘Seeking an appropriate site for the session scheduled to take place at the Horns ‘of Hattin, I went over the terrain with Eliot Brau, the archaeologist, who made ime aware of Zvi Gal's survey of the ancient walls slong the circumference of the hhorns and Gal’s excavations of an isolated medieval structure on the summit of the southern horn; this led to the identification (or rather reidentifiation) ot that structure with the Dome of Vietory that Saladin had erected on the horns following the battle, Later, the Lower Galllee Regional Council asked me tb provide a brief description of the battle, which was to be placed on a signpost at the horns on the occasion of the SSCLE conference. Attempting to condense the story into a signpost text of some 200 words I became acutely aware ofthe fimits ‘of scholarly consensus on the issue; but [also came upon some new, ot hitherto ‘unutilized, facts. First, I gained knowledge of the considerable progress archaeologists have made in recent years with regard to the ancient road network in Lower Gilile, and especially ofthe discovery in 1983—just south of Khirbat Maskana and about 1.8 kilometers northwest of Labiya /Lubie—of the intersection of two Roman roads. Israel Roll of Tel Aviv University, who was the first to realize the importance of this discovery, was kind enough to put at my disposal the evidence (much of which remains unpublished) that he has {gathered about the roads of the region; the roads marked on Figure 1 are largely ‘based on his information.* Second, Tlearned that discharge measurements of the 4. For survey of Roms roads in Lower Galle ste 260 Vig‘ Teper and Yava Sar,PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF THE CRUSADES AND THE LATIN EAST. JERUSALEM AND HAIFA 2-6 JULY 1987 Edited by B.Z. Kedar (s Seo wax save BP sea, woronariow society JERUSALEM A&B vaiorum + London192 ENIAMIN 2. KEDAR. springs in the region, some of which go back to the 1920s, may shed some light fon the events of 3 July 1187. Visits to the ruins of Kafr Sabt and Kh. ‘Maskana—under the guidance of Yossi Buchman and Naphtali Madar of the [Allon Tabor Field School—also proved helpful, Finally, leame to realize that a ‘description of the battle which ‘Abd Allah b. Alymad al-MugaddasT wrote on 13 _Djumaida 11 $83/20 August 1187, and sent to Baghdad, aad which Aba Shama Tater included in his Kitab al-rawdatayn* should be ascribed to the prolific and influential Haabalt jurisconsult Muwaflag al-Din “Abd Allah b. Almad b, ‘Muhammad b. Qudima al-Hanbalfal-Muqaddasi (hereafter al-Muqaddast). His {father was the Hanbalt preacher Almad b. Muhammad b. Qudama who lived under Frankish rule in Djamma°s, a village southwest of Nablus, fled in 1156%0 damascus and initiated the exodus of his relatives and discipfes to that city. Al- ‘Mugaddast, born in 1146 in Djamma'a, was ten years old at the time of that ‘exodus; he studied in Damascus and Baghdad, and took part—together with his much older brother AbG “Umar and his cousin “Abd al-Ghani—in Saladin’s expeditions against the Franks, including that of 11872 The battle account by this learned refugece from the Frankish Kingdom stands out fois sobriety and factual detail when compared with the florid effusions of the other Muslim ‘eyewitness, “Imad al-Din, and should be ranked high among the sources on the beatle. By 1187, experience must have taught Saladin that nothing short of clear-cut showdown would give him victory over the Franks. In November 1177, bis deep but largely unopposed thrust into the southern coastal plain of Palestine had tended in resounding defeat at Montgisard; in July 1182 his advance into the Jordan Valley and Lower Galilee had come to a standstill with the inconclusive battle near Forbelet in August 1182 his feet and army had failed to take the crucially important ‘ity of Beirut by a well-coordinated susprice attack; in October 1183, with the rival armies encamped near copious springs in the ‘astern Jezreel Valley, he had not been able 10 provoke the Franks into battle; and his deep raid into central Palestine in September 1184 had not perceptibly ‘weakened them. Saladin’s moves ia June 1187 Jeave no doubt that this time he was resolved to force a full-scate, decisive battle. evish Setlements tv Galle and Their Hideaway Systems (op, 198%), pp. 128139 in Hebeen)- 4 RHIC Hor, 4286-287. The eter wae sent “from Azcalon”—Le. from the Mostim army that nas besieging that tow, Arcalon surrendered on § September L187 5 On the Hanball exodus oe Emmanvel Sivan, "Refuge syepasilens au temps es CCroisades" Revue des des istomigaes 35 (96D, 135-147 anc Joseph Dror “Hanbals fot the Nablgs Region in he Elventh and Twelfth Centuries" sian and afrcon Sees ‘2 (i988), 32.112 For information on Mwatfag2-bie and ts work see Hen Tags, Te prc ecott dfn Qudima (Eta. 1980), pp vallisand Dry, “Hanbal,” p10, TW should be noted that AbO Shims refers aso to Ton Shadd without mensoning his Iga (honorific te) Baba ali: RHC Hr 4:280- CE. Dominique Sovrde, "Deux ‘docurpente elas fa communanié hantalite de Damas,” Besa denades erences 25 (oom, 12183,i springs in fon the ev ‘Maskana~ Alloa Tab description Djumida Tater inch infivential Muhamras father was under Fra: damascus ‘Mugaddas exodus; he much olde expedition this learne factual de exewitness battle By 1187,€ showdown but largely ended in t Jordan Va ‘atte neat crucially i October 1 eastern Je: tnd his de weakened was resolv eit Hebrew 4 RHCH 5 On she Croisaa ‘ofthe ® 2.098 Lepres shox! agab wom. BATTLE OF HATTIN REVISITED 193 ‘On 18 RabF II $83/27 June 1187, a Saturday, Saladin reached al-Uabuw. na, at the southern end of Lake Tiberias, and set up camp near the village of Sinnabra, the ste ofa ruined Umayyad castle. On Tuesday, 21 Rab 11/30 ine, he moved northwestward co the village of Katt Sab, leaving his heavy baggage in al-Ughuwana, The fist date is derived from the account of “Imad 1-Di tg second is given by Baha’ al-Din, who also mentions the encampment ny Sinnabra; the place name Kafr Sabt and the detail chat Saladin moved to village without his heavy baggage are supplied by al-Mugaddast* Kafr Sabi—a village that belonged to the abbey of Mount Tabor, and th place of origin of one of its turcopoles?—lies near the eastern edge ofa sizable plateau, just to the south of the main road that, at least from Late Bronze times ‘onward, linked Acre with the Jordan Valley and Transjotdan (se fig. 1S Southeast of Kafr Sabt, this road rans along Wad! Fidjds, which provides the ‘most gradual descent to the Jordan in the region. Climbing the oad from the Jordan, itis at Kaft Sabt that one gets one's first view ofthe plateau as well as oF Mount’ Tabor, the mountains northeast of Nazareth, Mount Tur‘, and the Horns of Hatin. The terrain west and northwest of Kafe Sab is easy to traverse, ‘with the main road running toward Acre through broad valleys or plains. About 2 kilometers east of Kafr Sabt, a road—possibly a Roman one—branches off the main Acte-Transjordan road and leads northeastward to Tiberias. Saladin most probably advanced to Kafr Sabt by the road ascending along Wedt Figgjs in any case, it could have served him for a speedy retreat to the Jordan Valley. At Kafr Sab, Saladin bad an ample supply of water: the large springs in Wadi Fididjés, the waters of which wete carried in antiquity to Tiberias by quesduet, were easily accessible;? water could also be hauled from the Jordan; fand there is 2 small perennial spring just northeast of the village. Ry occupying Kafr Sabt, Saladin controiled one of the ronds leading from the Frankish camp 6 “mid al-Din a-tfabtes, Congute dela Syieet dee Palestine par Slit cD. Cae de Lanchorg(Letéen,I488),p- 2, French rns. Hen Mast (Pai, 1972) p22 Bab SLD ia RHC HOr 3:93 aed ia ABU Shima, RHC HO. 4282; a-Magadcast in Aba Shima, RHC HOr. #286, On the siz of the encampment sec LA. Maye, “A Sinnabia." Ertefrael L(Jersalem, 1981, 169-190 (in Hebrew). 1 For’ the sources mentioning the’ case Capharseth see, Gastey Beser, “Die Keeuxahrergcbiete Akko und Galiaen," ZDPY 81 (194448), 218, The wreoyok Peis de Cafarset (or Capbarst) is mentioned in 1163 and 1180: Delavile, Carulare, 2905, So. 1 Aspe Sanialo,“Topographicel Researches in Guee"Suena of he Palestine Oriental Soctery 9 (1929, 30-96 an 10 (1997), %; Bartenay ‘Oded, “Dacb al-iewarnel —An AAncitt Route,” Erot-rae! 1 Uaruslem, 1971), 181-187 (in Hebren) 4 Ser Zaman S, Winogradav, "The Ancient Aqueduct of Tiberias,” 19 D. ‘Amit, Y Firsehisd, and. Pattie, eos, The Aqueduets of anclent Paes: Colectd Bsioys (Gerussem, 1988), pp. 123-152 (in Hebrew), Discharge measurement ofthe springs 0 \anarFijdse are saiabe for some dates ron 1928 onvard, For instance, the sharge Irensursé Sh 16 July 1946 amounted to 0.081 see hati, 20,600 ers per hour, Patestine, Department of Land Selerent and Water Comission, Inigaton Sere, Worer Meaurements 1945/48 Qersaiem, 1947), p. 162. would ike to thaak Mr, Yigal Cohen, of Ramat Ha-Shordn, for bis help wih meters hydrological.194 DENIAMIN 2, KEDAR at SafTuriya /Saforie to Tiberias and could easly strike at either destination.0 ‘The stretch of the more northerly Roman road to Tiberias which extends from the village of Tur'én via Kh. Maskana to Libiva / Lubieis not visible from Kafr Sab; but Saladin probably sent a part of his huge army to Libiya/Lubie, just 4 kilometers of easy ascent northwest of Kafr Sabt, to gain thereby direct control of that road too." Saladin, so relates al-Mugaddast, stayed at Kafr Sab: for two days—that is, until 29 RabI IT/2,July. The well-informed, anonymous author ofthe Libellus de ‘expugnatione Terrae Sanctae reports that the Muslim troops roamed throughout the region, from Tiberias to Bethsan and Nazateth, seting everything on fire; they also ascended Mount Tabor and desecrated the sanctuary at its summit." Saladin himself rods westward to the Springs of Saforie to lure the Franks into battle but, predictably, failed; s in the Jezree] Valley in '183, the Franks refused to budge. In a letter written about three months later, Saladin claims that he ‘went on to search “in the plain of Labiya™—that is, near the Horns of Hattin— for a suitable battlefield that could accomodate both ermies."» Then, on ‘Thursday, 23 Rabi 11/2 July, Saladin desconded on Tiberias and laid siege to it, ‘evidently hoping to induce the Pranks to leave the Springs of Saforie and cbme to the rescue of Galile’s eapital. One may surmise that siege equipment from al Ughuwine was brought up the western shore of Lake Tiberias. Saladin's men soon breached the wall and occupied the town, and the lady of Tiberias, beleaguered in the citadel on the lake's shore, sent a messenger to Safarie to call for help. King Guy, who must have remembered thatthe adoption of a defensive stance under similar circurmstanees in October 1183 lad caused his ousting from office, and who might have needed some large-scale acticn to justify the hiring of ‘mercenaries with money that Henry II of Engla finally made up his mind to march to Tiberias.“ 1 is reasonable to assume that the Franks, with theit destination some 30 Keilometers away, left Saforie early in the moming of 3 July, but the precise hour ‘must remain conjectural, Also unclear isthe route of thefiest part of their march to Tiberias. The layout of the ancient roads inthe vicinity of Saforie has not yet bad deposited in Jerusalem, 10 Lyons and Jackson, Salah, p. 256, 1 Sines “imi al-Din sepors that bofore ch asuult on Tibenine the Muslin passed the ight oa the plain of Lubiya (Ina al-Din, Conga, cd Larter, p. IOS, French tras Mass, p. 83, German tran, n lrg Keacmer, Dir Stars de KonigretchsJoralom [5837 187 ander Dersetng des “nd ad Do al Kis ah! (Wiesbaden, 1952}, > 14), snd since Tho Shaddad writes that Saladin camped on # mountain west of Tbetse (RHC Hor. 3:99, Heras coped that on 30 une Saladin moved from sl-Uchane Mia Kafr Sotto’ Labiva: Horde (pote 2 above}, p13. The explicit statement by Mugaddast shoud nonever be prefered 12 RHC Hor. 4286; De exugnarione Torree Sancta lielic,e6, 5, Stevenion, RS 66 (London, 1875) p. 219, 13 “Imsd spi, Conpte, 6. Londber, p10, tana, Mes. 95, tans, Kraemer, pI 14. For seconsvuctons of Guy's reasoning se R.C. Sma) "Tre Prticaments of Guy of LLasgnan, 1183-97" n Ovremer, pp 19-176: Bans Rayer, “Henry of England dnd the Holy Land" dngtsh Historica! Revew 97 (1982), 721.79, Grove Rega. Saladin ‘andthe Pll ef Jervaiem (London, 1987), pp. O-it& BATTLE OF HATUIN REVISITED 195 been conclusively established. The main Roman road from Tiberias westward hhas been traced {o a spot about 3 kilometers northeast of Saforie. Near this spot, the inner width of the road amounts to 10.40 meters; the overall width of the road, including curbstones, to 13.20 meters; and the width of the embankment to 15.80 meters. No other road of Roman Palestine is known to have been that wide. A milestone found at this spot indicates a distance of 2 miles to Diocacsarea (ie.. Zipp5:1/ Saffariya /Seforie) and we may therefore assume that there existed also a road between that milestone and Safore, In addition, remains have been found of an ancient —possibly Roman—road that by-passed Saforie from the northovest, and of another road that ascended through billy {ground from Saforie east-southeast to Mashhad (see fg. 1). No ancient remains have been spotted along the alternative route from the Springs of Saforie to Mashhad suggested by Prawer, which first follows the dry bed of Wad Malik/Nahal ZipporT and then ascends northeastward to Mashhad." In {general, one should not overemphasize the importance of roads for Frankish or Muslim field armies, for as R.C. COtto') Smal had judiciously remarked, these armies “were not dependent upon supplies brought up by wheeled vehicles from 1 base, and so were not limited to the use of certain roads," Indeed, the report of the Old French continuations of William of Tyre that the serjeants of the Frankish army captured, tortured and burat an, old Saracen woman at the distance of 2 lives from Nazareth apparently supports the view that the Franks id take the more difficult route from the Springs of Saforie to Mashhad, for Mashhad js situated about 2 leagues northeast of Nazareth.” However, the dlstances noted by medieval chronicles are all too often rough approximations, s0 the 2 leagues must not be taken at face value. It is at least as plausible to assume that the Hanks, with a fong march before them, gave preference to the much easier and only fractionslly longer route that led from the Springs of Saforie northward to the wide Roman road, and then eastward along it In any case, Muslim scouts observed the Frankish advance. Saladin, then directing the Siege of the citadel of Tiberias, was notified and immediately moved westward; we do not know whether via Kafe Sabt or Labiya. His men began to harass the Franks. In the letter first utilized by Lyons and Jackson, Soladin relates that at noon the Franks "took one ofthe waters by marching to it ‘and turning aside” but, contrary to their best interests, “left the water and set 13. raver, Craader Ietintions, p49 16 RC. Sia, Crasaing Warfare (1097-1193) (Cambridge, 1956), p. 208. 17 Cont Hp, 47: Erets,p. 58. Emoul, p 163, does aot mention te distance. A ene (deage) equals 2,222 meters: Albert Grenier, Manel Cereholgie gllovonane, Larchéoldgie du sol: Les routes (Pars, 1938), pp. 95-95. The Old French pasage lieussed by Fraser, Crasader Instintons, p. #9, note 23, who also mentions thet Raymond of Tripoli argued that berween Sore ard Tierias there ony he wail pring of Creston (Emout,p, [5]. However, this spriag is only about one Flometer Closer to Masnad than tothe Roman rosd. indeed the Franks chose to travers the broken ground te Mashhad, onemay speculate thet they id ot tere ten nortan to Kair Kanna but continued nonh-norteast along a zoute dotted by sevra) sll Springs, Cesson being one ef chee (Yosh Buchnas' suggestion}196 BeRIAMIN 2, KEDAR ut towards Tiberias.” Lyons and Jackson assuene thatthe spring in question was that of Tur‘én.!* This is indeed plausible, as that spring les fess than 3 ‘kilometers north of the road presumably taken by the Franks; infact, Prawer, ‘writing before Saladin’s etter heeame known, saw ft to explain why the Franks had passed so close co the spring of Tur‘in without taking advantage of its waters.* How should we best interpret King Guy's decision to leave the spring ‘and continue the march eastward—a decision that Saladin considered a blatant mistake? Lyons and Jackson believe that Guy's advance eastward was a mere probe; if the Muslims were to attack from their main camp near Kafr Sabt. the Franks would be able to pin dhem against the north-souh ridge situated east of the village of Tur‘an; ifthe Muslims were to stay at Kafr abt, and thee postion ‘would appear to be unassailable, the Franks could return tothe spring of Turan and neutralize Saladin’s threat to the citadel of Tiberias by repeated thrusts in the ditection of the main Muslim camp. The probe was tactially sound, but it failed because Guy was not aware of the vasiness of the Muslim forces, Numerical superiority allowed Saladin to hold the ridge as well as send his two wings to the spring of Tur'dn, seize it, and prevent the Franks from retreating to it, According to Lyons and Jackson, it was this move that won Saladin the battle ‘This is an ingenious reconstruction, based almost enttely on an assessment of the terrain and the opportunities it offered the opposing armies. A simpler solution is suggested by discharge measurements of the springs of Saforie Hatin, and Turn in recent times. OF course, it woulld >e rash to assume that spring yields in Galilee remained constant between the twelfth century and the Present, but there are reasons to suppose that the relative importance of the varioue springs did not change markedly. Thus the Springs of Seforie, at which the Frankish army assembled on several occasions, are the mast abounding in Lower Galiles: one of them, “Eyn Zipport/“Ayn al-Qastal, yielded no less than 108,000 liters per hour on 7 August 1949, and 86,400 lites per hous on 13 July 1980. The two springs at the village of Hatin, “ou ila eve de fonteines a grant planté" according to the Eracles, and which the Pranks presumably attempted 10 reach ava later stage of their advance on Tiberias, also supply a considerable ‘quantity of water: on 4 July 1949, it amounted to 33,840 liters per hour, ancl on 20 July 1950, to 17,280 titers per hour.” The discharge of other springs in the 18 Lyoas and Tuckson, Solin, p. 259. Forte 19 Prawst, Crigaer Ison, . 493, Another posi ist: Saudis eer refers to the springs of Hatin; bu the account in the later dace not isin with the dse=ption of the steuple fr those springs given in one ofthe Old French eaaimanionvet Millon ok ‘Tyre 0 be dco bal 20 Lyons and Jackson, Sela, pp 29-261. The author de not pai, though why Guy id not leave behing ors t guard the spring: ef, Hannes Moving, "Salacne Fok des Heligen Keege,” Der flay 6 (1984) 385 21 Ineel, Ministry of Agnculture, Water Depastnent, Hydkologcl Senice,Huhologt Yeerook of het, 1947/48 I940/50 (Stusales. 1950), pp. #8 (Ayn sLGputaly SE x see the wie by Melville an Lyons in a ee ey BATTLE OF ATERU REVISITED 197 tegion is far more limited. Thus Mary's Fountain in Nazareth yielded about 4,000 liters per hour i the spring of 1918, and just one-fourth of that toward the {end of the dry season # Yield data for most other springs are not available, since their meager discharges have not been deemed important enough to warrant ‘measurement. This is true of the spring of Cresson, deseribed by Raytiond of ‘Tripoli as “une petite fontaine,” and of ‘Ayn Turan (or ‘Ayn al-Balad), situated in the mountains about 1.5 kilometers northwest ofthe village of Tur'an, On 12 July 1989, Shimon Mishgal of the Tiberias Bureau of the Israe) Hydrological Service kindly agreed to measure for me the discharge of ‘Aya ‘Tur'an, on which no earlier daca were available, The disshagge amounted to 180 ters per hour, a mere fraction ofthat of the springs of Saforie or Hatin.” One ‘may surmise, therefore, that the spring above Tur'an, while able to quell the thirst ofa number of Franks on 3 July 1187, was insufficient to sustain an army numbering many thousands of men and horses. Whatever King Guy's bhinders, the move from Turan was hardly one of them. ‘The bulk of the Frankish army appears to have managed to advance only about 3 or 4 kilometers east of Tur‘én. The leter utilized by Lyons and Jackson ‘elates that Saladin sent his nephew Tagf al-Din, as well as Muzaffar 2l-D¥, to seize “the water” (presumably Turan); and al-Mugaddasi writes that Tag! al Din commanded the Mastim right wing, Muzaffar al-Din the left, and Saladin, hhimself the center, Tt seems reasonable to assume, then—as do Lyons and Jackson—that the two wings made their way to “the water” around the Frankish army. It follows that from this point the Franks were virally surrounded. Indeed, this is what al-MugaddasT explicitly states, adding that the Muslim center was behind the Franks, The Zibellur de expugnatione Terrace Sanctae relates that the Templars in the tear came under a crushing Turkish attack. These fast two pitoes of information tie into indicate thet the Templars in the Frankish rear had to bear the brunt of the attacking Muslim center under Saladin. The clash of Muslim center and Frankish rear suggests that the Muslims Were charging from the high ground in the south against the Franks, who wece (Aya Haun), 577 (Ayn Nabi Shu'ays) Of the mensuremeate available, I chose thore tones to 3 Sythe ovgina data are im mace. For the Guottion see Facer p82 22 Paul Range, facet, Das Land der Bibel, 42 (Leipnig, 1923p. 13, De Range, wc serving inthe German army during World Wr I, uneartaed a sing in the Westen pst ff the town thet yeldea S00 fers per hour 25. See Sophia Schmorak and ML. Goldchmich, "Springs," in dios of ral eran and Amsterdata, 1070), Shet 5.2 (ydrology 24 Erol, p15 25. The discharge of “Aya al.Nabr Shu'yb does nat appear to have changed! much besween [949 and 1988: both on 2 September 199, and on 12 Deoombe 1988 amounted fo 1800 ers per hour. For the is atu ste Hyareogicel Yours (ote 21 above). 5; for the fovond 1 am indebied agin to Mi Mise 25 Foe Saladins ener se pp. 216-20 below; al-Mugaddasn Abd SDIma, RNCHOr 4286: Tyons and Inetsan, Safin ote 2 ove, pe 2 2B ablMugaddas,p. 287 (1 would lke to thank my colleague Ftan Kohlber for having lane for me'the meaning of this 28d other Arabic pastages) Libths (eat 13 above) pe 222203,198 ENIAMIN 2. KEDAR advancing eastward along the valley of Tur'tm —‘Iméd a-Din indeed reports that, before the atiack, the Muslims saw the Franks froma above ™—and that by the time the Muslim center launched its attack, the Frankist van and center were already cast of the area where the clash was to take place According to the Libellis, che van under Raymond of Tripoli advanced close to the steep descent to Lake Tiberias. Raymond urged the king to go ahead swiftly so that the army might fight its way to the water. The king promised to do so but, because of the Turkish pressure on the Frankish cear, suddenly ‘changed his mind and gave orders to encamp on the spot. Raymond considered this decision a fatal mistake: a vigorous push to the lake could have saved the army, encampment on the arid plateau mad its defeat inevitable, On the other hhand, one version ofthe Old French continuation of William of Tyre relates that it was Raymond who believed it to be impossible to each Tiberias on that day ‘and therefore advised the king to tur left, descend o the village of Habatin (i... ‘Hatgmn) and its springs, and continue to Tiberias on the fellowing day. But the turn to the left brought the Franks into disarray, and the Turks succeeded in seizing the springs ahead of them.» Other Old French versions claim that in view of the Turkish pressure, Raymond advised the king to set up camp on the plateau.2 All Old French versions brand Raymond's advice a mauvait conse, land report that men who had participated in the campaign were of the opinion that if the Franks had gone on the attack at this junetere they could have Gefeated the Truks, Thus both the Libellus and the Old French versions beliove that the Eranks should have pressed on to Tiberias; they differ in that the Libeitus holds the king guilty of aborting the attack whereas the Old French versions lay the blame on Raymond. Perhaps neither of these two ald rivals acca resolutely enough atthe erica moment and mutual reeriminations began immediately thereafter. ‘The Old French version which reports that the Franks led in their attempt to reach the springs of Haytin goes on to relate that they stopped on the suenmit of a mountain called Camehatin (ie, the Horns of Hatt), that Raymond advised setting up camp there, and that the king accepted his advies. This account —which contrasts starkly with all reliable descriptions of the battle that took place the following day— ought to be dismissed. The Libel on the other hhand relates that the Frankish advance on 3 Jaly came to ahaltata casa called 28 Idd a}-Din, Congute, od. Landbere,p. 106, trans Mass p. Sse also ed. Landtere dd. tran Mare, p25, 29 Libetus, p. 223 Faces, pp. 62463. The scoovn inthis version af the Bcle is partly ovraboiaied by the one cscovered by Jean Whar i Wat Ro. at 88, whic states That “eadom die nost gasers for'ue wiqae; aguam preoecupatam ab fost perdidenan™ Sean Richard, "An Ascount of the atte Of Tattin Referring to the Frankish Mercenris in Orkental Moslem Stats." Specut 27 (0952), 17% for @ Aifexent worcing see Rober "Auxerre, Croricon ec 0. Holder-Epger (1882), MGHSS 26:240. eo alsa “add ab Din, Compute, a. Laver, p25 trans. Mast, . 2. 30, Brecles, MS.C, pp l-6l; Emvoul, pv 167168; Cont WF p53 SE a a a a a I SET, BATILE OF HATTIN REVISITED 198 Marescalcia;* and it stands to reason that the Franks spent the night of 3 July at this place, since in an act drawn up only a few weeks fater the remaining Jeaders of the Frankish Kingdom mentioned that the defeat of 4 July took place supra manescaleiam Tyberiadis.2® Prawer argued convincingly that Maresealcia /Manescaleia should be ideati- fied with Talmudic Mashkena and Arabic Maskana.* In modern times, Maskana has been a ruin. But the Ottoman cadastral register of 1555-56 lists it as 8 village, and that of 159697 discloses that it was then inhabited by 47 families; accordingly, it was similar in size to Turan but much smaller than nearby Labiya, which numbered 182 families * There are grounds therefore for ieving that the reference ofthe Libellus to Marescalcia as a casale, or village, is accurate, and that the place was indeed inbsbited in 1187. Prawer assumed that Marescaleia was situated on 2 secondary road leading northeastward to the village of Hattin. However, inthe early 1980s, a stretch ofthe main Roman road in the region, linking Acre with Tiberias, was (e}discovered north ofthe modern highway, just 300 meters south of Khirbat Maskana, The stretch is visible ia several aerial photographs —as in that taken on 4 March 1961 (fig. 2). The main Roman road intersects with a local north-south road of the same period (eee arrow D on fig, 2); atthe crossroads, the inner width of the main road amounts to 5.80 meters, the overall width inclusive of eurbstones to 6.60 meters, and the width of the embankment to 10.30 moters, East ofthe erossroads, the main road contains many basalt plates fitted together (fig. 3). West of the crossroads, between the main road and Khirbat Maskana, is a pool—Birkat Maskana— originally a crater. About 40 by 40 meters in extent, i is surrounded by large basalt stones, with traces of a water inlet at the northeastern corner (se figs, 2 and 4). A Roman milestone, now Ia the museom of Kibbutz Deganya Beth, wes found close to it? 31 Braces, p. 6% Lies, p. 28, 32 Cisse imperaie Sani” An 2 (Rome, 1938), Dee. 7p. 87 RRH 65 33. Prawer, CasederIntatons, pm, 489-90, 34 Fordaskana inthe register of 1955-S6ece H. Rhode, “The Geography ofthe Sintenih- {Century Sancak of Safad." Arckiwoy Ostomanteun 10 (1985), 198, Rhode doce not provide deus on population. According tothe reper of 1586-97 there were 4 Nea of Frais (pus ope unmacred man) in Maskana, cia Tura, 29 Kafe Sab, 182(ph 32 ‘yomeried mea) in Lidiya, 86 (piss 24) in Hatin, and 366 (pat 3) in Safir: Well Dieter Hatteroth and Kamal Abdallah, Hitorcl Geography of Puleuine, Tomson aed Southern Syrian the Late 1h Cenary (Cxtangen, 1977), pp. 187 (Libya), 186 (Gettorya, Kale Sabt, Turn), 189 (Maveara), 190 (fst), Caress speaks of Meschind vill, re &t noming:” Franeseus Quacesmius, Buco Terce Sentae, 2 (Aaiwerp. 163), p. 856u 38 The most detciledeseption of Brkat Maskana ie that by Gustaf Dalman in his “Iahresberiche des Instus fr das Arbelsjabe 1913/14." Paldtinajarbuch. des DewichenEvongtinchon Instinas fir _alterumsutstnichaft det heigen Landes te Jertalert 10 (194), 41. Tam indobied to Lral Rol forte dat on Ue Roman roads ‘sho Teper ad Shubr,Jeick Setiements (note 3 above), pp. 19-130, fd, Coticeaplomatico delle Repabbiea dt Genova, Reet believes thatthe act dates rom de ed of ulyFg. 2, Al pot of Roman rd esr Khibat Masha 4 Mareh 1861 ure Israel, S. 49, photo 0407) Fe ee AC: Roman road; B-C: modem roed; Ds intersection of two Roman roads; M: Kh Maskana oe It follows that during the night of 3 July the Franks were encamped on o near the Roman road to Tiberias. Birkat Maskana was probably already it existence—Gustaf Dalman assumed that it originated inan “uralte Zeit" —but is it reasonable to assume that it contained water that late in the year? Two guidebooks, compiled at a time when travelers and troopers depended on information about water almost as much asin the Middle Ages, suggest that itis Baedeker’s guidebook of 1912 refers to “the ruins and water-basin of Birket “Meskena” and the Handbook on Northern Palestine and Southern Syria, printed in Cairo in April 1918 by General Allenby’s intelligence officers in preparation for the British drive oa Nazareth and Damascus, says: ‘Bicket Meskench, large rain-water pool is passed tor. it generally contains water, which is used only for BATTLE OF HAYTIN REVISITED 201 Fig. 3. Main Romsn rotd enst of erosconds (photo by author) animals." Aerial photographs indicate that the pool was full of water on 26 Jannary 1945, and nearly so on 4 March 1961 (see fig. 2), but that on 13 Jaly 1963 it was dry.” So it was when visited on 8 June 1989 (see fig. 4). Yet it is possible that when Maskana was still inhabited, the pool was carefully maintained and contained some water even at the beginning of July. The same goes for the six large, rock-hewn cisterns On the northern, northwestern, and southern slopes of Kip. Maskana. Infact, “Imad al-Din (and Ibn al-Athie) relate that the Pranks emptied the reservoirs of the vicinity." Whatever water they found there certainly did not suffice, for most sources stress the thirst endured that night by the Franks. But, given the constraint of having to set up camp on the platesu, the choice of Maskana appears more sensible than hitherto supposed? 36 Karl Buedeke, Poles and Syria (Lie, 1912p, 280 Mando on Merten ‘leet tery Ste enon con a, 5 pel 1 a, Psa etek atone ane oft Hee Rene fede Seach afte Roman roi wl peered fx or he nde rs EO. 21 Maestne Survey, Sip 1, poo 1385 Soney offal Seip, polo? {ith ae Sic who 203 (83) Te pholowapte re hep the Ata Feterets Un of he Hstew Unies Deparment of ography. woud eto ‘Rn Be Dov Gun wets snr vig epee ped hoa ther photershe a ny Sposa an fr hagas perm fo oro the 16 34 Ta apta in Abe Shima, RHC Hos. 4.267; tn aba i» RC Hoe 1688. 3 Te Held Wort rcs 1 abot) pA eins sng wear BPELsee ako stark Fig. 4 Birkat Maskana from southeast (photo by aut thoz) et Daring the sight, the Mosins tightoed their enrtient Sead Samp somes tha ben a Lib, about Zul sma of Natlony uke the Franks, the Muslims had at their disposal all tke water they ne ed auld on camels fom the ke, arg quamien of anon nee ont mong the archers in preparation for the expected battle.” Be On the morning of 4Jly/25 Rab Ta Sanday, the Franks resumed thei tvarch, What was thir objective? Did they hed novia ying rece spins of Ua, they had done the day bore econ soe Od Foch versions, oil they march estan tothe tke The Mase ral Migaddast, Ind a-Dit, and Tbn a Athir state ence the Franks headed or he lake abd tha alin datetnined see from doing so, whereas the Latin sources interpreted as oan advance 6 refecring to an advance {he springs may also be understood as indicating & march tothe lake True, sats ed mPa ao Alon Tabor Te ot ive not soa of te spac ease at Mate ofthe ee : rt once ater Labhre Gibid., p. 293), re siidniaserec ia Aenea, 1 Eee Sas ces Reiley entts, ai Moqadinst re Se mn BEC HOr 4267 ied al-Din, Core, ed, Landberg,p. 7 frank. Masse , 96, tens. Kraemer, 17; ton al Ahr RG Hoe La Seay eos Be ea ae barns oF HATTON nsvisrteD 203 the distance from Maskana to the springs is less than half that tothe fake, and in view of the thirst of men and horses this difference might have rendered an advance to the springs more attractive. But as noted earlier, an Old French ‘version relates that the Muslims seized the springs on the preceding day; and it that was so, it stands to reason that they continued to occupy the springs and their approaches, Even if we choose to discard this testimony, itis plausible 0 assume that Saladin would have countered any Frankish move toward the springs by occupying the approaches from the direction of the plateau and by posting a force atthe springs themselves, To reach the springs, the Franks would first have had to overcome the Muslims guarding she approaches, then tide down the slope unprotected by their foot soldiers—who would not have been able to keep pace with them—aned finally overwhelm the Muslim archers massed around the springs. Most of these hazards might have been reduced by taking the slightly longer route to the springs that lead from Kh. Maskena northward fand then skirts Nimrin from the northwest; but iis clear from the sources that the Franks did not choose this route, The march to the lake, on the other hand, ‘would have denied the Muslims knowledge of the Franks" precise target, asthe ‘waterfront could be reached at several points. Besides, the march might have afforded the Franks an opportunity to launch a full-scale charge against the ‘main body of the Muslim army, a charge of the kind that had given them victory fon previous occasions. On batance, therefore, the explicit statements of the Muslim writers—two of them eyewitnesses—should be given credence. ‘Three Old French versions relate that, in the morning, the Muslims drew backward, refraining from battle until the heat became oppressive. Tt is therefore ‘plausible to assume that Saladin decided to position his men somewhat west of the main Palestinan watershed, which runs, in the area in 4guestion, from the heights of Nimrin to Hill 311 (today the site of Kibbutz Lavi) and then to Litbiya (se fig, 1), By holding this line Saladin would have blocked the road to Tiberias, covered the approaches to the springs of Hittin, and compelled the Franks to fight with the Muslims occupying the high ground, Accordingly, the Franks would have been able ro advance some two kilometers cast, and uphill, of Maskana, with Muslim archers presumably attempting 10 slow them down, The problem with this reconstruction is tha, in order to reach the Horas of Hajtin, the main body of the Frankish army must have crossed the watershed at some point, ic., dislodged the Muslims from their purported position—and none of our sources indicates that the Franks scored such an initial success. ‘Naim (or Nem) seer tothe village of Nin, the sentence Nol! noe mean that the ing Inarched one league noe 7 Nimrin; rather that ke marched te a pore about one Tenge ‘from Nin &legie ie 2 klomeers—souheas of Nira begs us to the plateau fowthnest of the Mores of Hain: Herd, p32, note 172, 43. Erol, p. 168; Facts, pp. 62. 64 ‘4 nosld ike to thank Me, Shabae Sbapira for having pointed out to me the possible portance of de watershed andthe ole dominating tne inte area, In the ftare, We iimend to apply bis “dominating lines method” to the inal stage of the bat208 NENIAMIN 2, KEDAR. "believe i is impossible to establish the exact sequence of events during the ensuing battle, Two Latin sources—the letter to Archumbaid as well asthe less Feliable letter of the Genoese consuls~insist that the atile begen with # Templar attack that foiled disastrously because the other contingents did not support it. I accepted at face value, this would indcate that. Frankish coordination was inadequate from the start. However, the author ofthe Libel "mentions a similar event much later in the battle. He relates that while the king and the bishops pleaded with the foot soldiers to descend feom the mnountain te Which they had fled (ie,, the Homs of Hatin), the Templars, Hospitalles, and {arcopoles came under unbearable pressure and appealed fr te king's support. ‘The king, however, seeing that the knights stood no chance against the Turkish, arrows without the foot soldiers’ help, ordered the pitching of tents." The similarity between the aecounts argues against the possibilty that they refer to ‘wo distinct events; the difference between them rendets questionable the asserifon that the battle began with a Templar attack, As forthe battle’ end, few Historians have been able to withstand the temptation to wind up thei reconstruction with Ibn al-Athi’s dramatic description of two suacessive Frankish downhill charges repulsed by two successive Muslim counterattacks that drove the Franks back up to the Horns of Hatfin, the second counterdrive culminating in the overthrow of King Guy's tent, which marked the Frankish rout, Ton al-Athir relies on the eyewitness account of Saladin’s son al-A¥al. But 4 more mature eyewitness, ‘Imad al-Din, relates that after their cavalry charges bad been repulsed, the Franks dismounted and continued to ight on foot, When the Muslims captured the True Cross, the Franks knew that they were beaten, the king was captured somewhat later. So much for the hattie’s beginning and end, Reganding the rest, there is considerable agreement as to the main events—the scrub fire started by the Muslims, the escape of Raymond of Tripoli, the ascent 1a thehorns~—-but not ex to their sequence or cause. Hence the striking divergencrs among modern attempts at reconstruction. I have chosen to call attention to the renae of variance in descriptions of the episodes, and some of their implications, rather than to constrain them into one out of several plausible nacratives Most sources relate that the Muslims started a heath fire, which added to the haclships of the thirsty and weary Franks. The Libellas states chat the fite was started during the night of 3 July; one Otd French version hasit thatthe fie was started, on Saladin’s orders, during the morning of 4 July; the letter of the Genoese consuls mentions the fire occurring after the failure of the Frankish ‘attacks “Imad al-Din places it after the escape of Raymond of Tripoli: and the ‘$8 Se te ltier 1 Archumbald refereed to in noe 42 above, p. 2. Theletter ofthe Genoese consuls fas beon published twice: Gena rgis Howl iceund ed W, Sratbae (London, 1867), 2:11-13 ane Karl amps, "in ungadruchermigendsabene Been, ber die Solacht bei Hatin,” Neues Archiv 22 (881), 276280, Lieto ome 48 Ibo al-Athir fn RHC Hr. 1:685-686; “mtd al-Din in Abd Shen, RHE HOe 770, 274, See also Saatin’s Iter, pp. 216-220 below BATTLE OF HATTIN REVISITED 20s ct fies around the Frankish army letter of Archumbaldleclates that the Turks st fires around the F when it atempted to eneamp near the horns. 18 of course possibie thatthe Muslims set the scrub on fre on more than one occasion. Tt was certainly & simple and effective means of harassment, Johana Ludwig Burckhardt, the Wel known traveler who passed near the horns on 23 June 1812, help to impart is cfficaey was several es reprimaned by my Bide, or not taking proper cae ofthe ghd tobacco that fall rom my pipes THe whole ofthe mountain tekly covered th dey grasy sich realy take fie, andthe aightes rea oF ‘foal gprensthe eofigrnon fot over the country, te great ra ofthe Soe i of san Eaeet The Arabs wha inba etal ot Jordan vara UEth oy person wh skeowa ove bee even the fnooen cause of ing he vance regardng the sae at which Raymond's spe tok lace I or Tmted ut compounded by he ussion af mote. Toe autor ote Leas thane thet the men round Raymond dg to escape ae they Ma been eat ef rom the mai fore undet The ing. The Old Preach ern onthe ter Nand ate that Raymond went onthe atch on he ingore sd that he Shoe opened ranks and et hi though" Ae for the msc oth oth thor the Eien eccses the or sles of having made teal ne bate on th approtch af he Scene On the er Ha, both he ert fArchunbald and an Ol French vr aris to Raymond ie ais tat the ene ay should encmp maroon the Roc, whl the Musi Sues teprt the sacha aking pe toward the nd a he bal according fo the kur fo Atchumbal, Raymond ehrecterd the Noms a cavelum."*" Whether ognaing Wah Rayinond ovo a pt harstrtatin, Gals arclacloge suey has eee aa both Hons re Sree by aon Age wal a thatthe Suter, somewhat ihe ora Surounded ls by «Exe Bronze a npesive semuns ae veo hin day: tr Iota, Dama spoke of a “yclopean val” onthe soe Born, of 48 J.L- Burckhardt, Travels in Syria and the Holy Land (Loodon, 1822}, B oe ae ‘eq. Landberg, p. 24, trans, Maseé, p. 26, Tbn sl-aghir, in RHC HOr. 1:685, See alo Joyal 18 (1982), 215,218 in Hebrew),206, BERIAMIN 2, DAR Which a considerable part was 2.30 meters wide and 2 meteze high,® and its plausibie to assume that in 1187 the remains were still mere imposing. Thus, Under the difficult circumstances ofthe final batl, the ascent to the horns made considerable military sense: the anciewt walls provided some protection {rom ‘Muslim arrows and allowed the Frankish archers to shoot at their enemies as if from the ramparts of a castle. Itis likely that the Frankish knights regrouped in he large crater between the horns. The two downhill cavalry charges were mast probably launched westward, through the only convertient exit from the crater. Ton al-Atht’s account leaves no doubt that both cavalry charges were aimed ‘at the point where Saladin himself was.* Back in 1952, Jean Richard drew attention to the similarity between these charges and the stratagem that a knight named John suggested to King Guy at the beginning of the battle, According to ‘an account preserved in Vat. Reg. lat, 598 and in the cironicle of Robert Auxerre, this knight—who had frequently fought in Mus.im armies and was ‘well versed in their mode of warfare—advised the king to attack with all his strength the compact body of Muslims around Saladin's banner, because once it ‘was routed, the other contingents could be easily overcome. The similarity between this advice and the charges described by Ibn al-Athiris indeed striking, Richard wrote that the plan proposed by the knight Joha almost gave vietory to ‘the Franks * Perhaps; in fact, Ibn al-Athir writes that the Frenkish charges well- nigh succeeded in removing the Muslims from their positions.** At any rate, there is ample grounds for believing that arduous fighting cantinued long after Raymond's escape. The Frankish sources giving 2 different impression reflect ‘accounts by participants who fled with Raymond or with Balian of Thelin; the ‘Muslim sources, which stress thatthe battle raged on until Saladin’s men finally succeeded in ascending the horns, should be preferred. Al-Mugaddast saw fit wo spell out the identity of the captors of King Guy and Renaud de Castillon: the first, be relates, was captured by Dirbas the Kurd, the second by a servant (glnuam) of the amir Ibrahim al-Mibrinf. He does not ‘mention the seizure of the True Cross at al, “md al-Din, who does not give the captors’ names, exhibits a better understanding of his enemies’ sensibilities when tne dwells at length on the importance of the Cross for Frankish morale and coneindes that ifs capture weighed with the Franks more than that ofthe king, ‘About fen years earlier, on 25 November 117, the Franks hed decisively routed Saladin in the Battle of Montgisard; it was the day of Sain! Catherine, and to commemorate their victory, the Franks had established the church of Sainte Katerine de Mongisart.%* Now, after his own great victory, it was Saladin's turn ‘53. Dalman, “ahesberiche™ (note 35 shovel. 9. 42 54 RHC Mor, 1:685686, 88 Rienaré, “Account,” pp. 169-171, 175; Robert d'Auaeere, Chroncon, p. 2 56 Ton aleAthr, RHC HO. |:654 57 _WT 21, 2. p 92% Las pelernages por olor on Ihealom, in inéaires@sérsalem et ctesripions de la Tere Sante reiges on fragals ae NP. TP NIIP ces, 8. eaTTLe of Mary REveHTED 207 fo memorialize. The same Old French version which relates that upon the Christian defeat Saladin "rend graces a Nostre Seignor [sie/] del honor que i voit fait,” tells also that he ordered the building of a makomerie on the summit of the mountain on which King Guy had been captured. The geographer sl-Dimasbgi (d. 1327) preserved the name of the structure, Having ‘mentioned that the Franks were defeated at the Horns of Hatin, he adds that Seladin built there a dome “which is called guébar almnasr™ (the Dome of Victory). It did not remain intact for long. The German pilgsim Thietmar, who arrived in Acre in 1277, tells with glee thatthe temple Saladin had erected “to his ‘g0ds” after the victory, is now desolate. The very nature of the edifice came to be forgotten: Quaresmius, in the early seventeenth century, caw on the suzamit ruins believed to be those of a church.® The remains were correctly identified by Dalman in 1914,° and Gal excavated them in 1976 and 1981, But the few layers of stone, cleared of thistle a few days before the cight-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Hattin, are barely distinguishable by the untrained eye, Almost like the victory it once commemorated, the dome can be conjured up only by a feat of imagination Mian and G, Raynaud Gees, 1652, p95 Lt de fon doin. 2679 RAC Us Tl The sulk Dawes veoy nd chore war nancy sung ty {GhnesChemont Cannas Reel areaoe ovis Te, p90 ine thet tnt aioe, 58, Brats, p66. MS.G. Tod. 6; a0 Ero, p. 172 3 Burts, 9.6 & Camara te Chomrt-Dn Abou Aah Mohanmede-Diniche A. More {he retro 860, 921 Eng raton in Gay Le Sang Pre Nason 4 Deterptonlf Sys an te Hol Lent om 4D 8010 300 Londo, 1, “i in wan Pe cmp, i exci Chana ve fa en ana 3 ic ers cape Ui a meio camp nena qadam Salads pro hab sherri au empl era goo agen hie le hones Sine et deoatn; nc rman on ox slid sp ram pera, Graves Teen Mogi! Thelma’ perertnreet. TEM. Laie (ae 1857, p08. 62 "Sort Ie sor summit seine inate creda ete on Beclsia ad heroram Dacona Canadienne” Quare Eheda oe 3 or)». 4 Baiman, Saher ne 5 she) efeitos Dimael Tea