Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Property Cases Easements
Property Cases Easements
Calimoso vs Roullo
1.
The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway;
2.
There is payment of proper indemnity;
Facts:
In his Complaint4 for Easement of Right of Way, the respondent mainly
alleged: that he is the owner of Lot 1462-C-1 5 situated in Brgy. Sambag,
Jaro, Iloilo City; that his lot is isolated by several surrounding estates owned
by petitioners that he needs a right-of-way in order to have access to a
public road; and that the shortest and most convenient access to the nearest
public road, passes through the petioners lot. The petitioners objected to the
establishment of the easement because it would cause substantial damage to
the two (2) houses already standing on their property. Due to the
respondent's allegedly malicious and groundless suit, the petitioners claimed
entitlement to damages. RTC granted the respondent's complaint and
ordered the petitioners to provide the respondent an easement of right-ofway (42sqm) and ordered the respondent to pay the petitioners proper
indemnity in the amount of Php1,500.00 per square meter of the portion of
the lot subject of the easement. CA affirmed in toto the RTC's decision and
held that all the requisites for the establishment of a legal or compulsory
easement of right-of-way were present in the respondent's case. The
petitioners moved to reconsider the CA's decision arguing that, while the
establishment of the easement through their lot provided for the shortest
route, the adjudged right-of-way would cause severe damage on their
property (damage to the nipa hut and bedroom of the concrete house) but
was denied.
Issues:
1. W/N the respondent has met all the requisites for the establishment
of a legal easement of right-of-way
Held:
No. To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites
should be met:
3.
The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; and
4.
The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners' lot
would cause the destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners'
property.10 Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public
road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out,
and that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage,
albeit longer, is available. Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the
easement of right-of-way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement
where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the
least damage would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and
least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have held in the past
that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance
criterion.
Additional Information:
The immovable in whose favor the easement is established is called the
dominant estate, and the property subject to the easement is called the
servient estate.8 Here, the respondent's lot is the dominant estate and the
petitioners' lot is the servient estate
Three options were then available to the respondent for the demanded rightof-way: the first option is to traverse directly through the petitioners'
property, which route has an approximate distance of fourteen (14) meters
from the respondent's lot to the Fajardo Subdivision Road; the second
option is to pass through two vacant lots (Lots 1461-B-l and 1461-B-2)
located on the southwest of the respondent's lot, which route has an
approximate distance of forty-three (43) meters to another public highway,
the Diversion Road; and the third option is to construct a concrete bridge
over Sipac Creek and ask for a right-of-way on the property of a certain Mr.
Basa in order to reach the Fajardo Subdivision Road
B.
&
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court - said court concluded that petitioners
and Liza are entitled to an easement of right-of-way
It observed that petitioners and Liza's allegation in their Complaint that they
were in possession of the subject property for more than 50 years was not
denied by respondent in its Answer. Thus, the same is deemed to have been
impliedly admitted by the latter. It then ratiocinated that based on Article
1137 of the Civil Code, petitioners and Liza are considered owners of the
subject property through extraordinary prescription. Having real right over
the same, therefore, they are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
under
Article
649redof
the
Civil
Code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals - concluded that petitioners and Liza have
no right to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent.
On appeal, respondent argued mat petitioners and Liza were neither able to
prove that they were owners nor that they have any real right over the
subject property intended to be the dominant estate. Hence, they are not
entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way. At any rate, they likewise
failed to establish that the only route available from their property to Col.
Guido
Street
is
through
respondent's
subdivision.
CA held that the evidence adduced by petitioners and Liza failed to
sufficiently establish their asserted ownership and possession of the subject
property. Moreover, it held that contrary to the RTC's observation,
respondent in fact denied in its Answer the allegation of petitioners and Liza
that they have been in possession of subject property for more than 50
years.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
from respondent.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners are NOT entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
from respondent.
Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be
demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of
a
real
right
may
cultivate
or
use
the
same.
OFFICE, Petitioner,
Caruff, respondent, and the bank. It further alleged that the continued use of
the subject property by respondent and the condominium owners without its
consent was an encroachment upon its rights as absolute owner and for
which it should be properly compensated.
The RTC rendered a Decision declaring the existence of an easement
over the portion of the land occupied at present [by the] powerhouse and
sump pumps nos. 1 and 2 only, of Legaspi Towers 300, in favor of Legaspi
Towers 300, Incorporated.
Aggrieved, APT sought recourse before the CA. The petitioner,
Privatization and Management Office (PMO) substituted APT in its appeal.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the construction of a generator set and 2 sump
pumps constitutes as easement of the property.
HELD: NO. An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on
anothers property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner
of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do
something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person."
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the
dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two sources of easements: by law or by the will of the owners.
Article 619 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
In the present case, neither type of easement was constituted over the
subject property.
In its allegations, respondent claims that Caruff constituted a voluntary
easement when it constructed the generating set and sump pumps over the
disputed portion of the subject property for its benefit. However, it should
be noted that when the appurtenances were constructed on the subject
property, the lands where the condominium was being erected and the
subject property where the generating set and sump pumps were constructed
belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article 613 of the Civil Code does not apply,
According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration
for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be
unproductive.
In a decision dated April 21, 1966, the trial court held that the plaintiff had
no right to pass through the defendant's land to draw water from the
Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law,
controversies between persons claiming a right to water from a stream are
within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and his decision on
the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty
days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public
Works Secretary collaterally.
ISSUE: The principal issue involved in this case falls under the subject
of servitude of waters which are governed by Article 648 of the new
Civil Code and the suppletory laws mentioned in the cases of Lunod vs.
Meneses 11 Phil. 128) and Osmena vs. Camara (C.A. 380 62773) which
are the irrigation law and the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
specifically Article 122 thereof.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation
purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by
a third person.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is set aside, and a new one is entered
ordering the appellee to grant the appellant continued and unimpeded use of
the irrigation ditch traversing his land in order to obtain water from the
Pampanga River to irrigate appellant's land. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the court a quo for the reception of evidence on the appellant's
claim for damages.
SO ORDERED.
RULING:
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer
of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's
property.
The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was part of a land
owned by the Tuasons which was sold to Philippine Building Corporation
by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Paragraph three (3) of the deed
provides that ". . .the boundary line between the property herein sold and
the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters
wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the
VENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the
VENDORS." The land was later sold to Ateneo de Manila University with
the consent of the Tuasons. The Tuasons later developed its 7.5 meter
share of the Mangyan road, while Ateneo erected an adobe wall on the
entire length of the boundary of its property parallel to the 15-meter wide
roadway which was later removed due to an amicable settlement. Ateneo
sold 16 hectares of its property along Mangyan road to Solid Homes, Inc.
and the deed of sale provided among others that the vendor passes unto the
vendee the privileges of such right-of-way. Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc.
developed the Loyola Grand Villas. La Vista, a residential village developed
by the Tuasons, prohibited the agents and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc.
and residents of Loyola from traversing the Mangyan Road. Solid
Homes Inc. then instituted an action, and prayed that LA VISTA be
enjoined from preventing and obstructing the use and passage of LOYOLA
residents through Mangyan Road. The trial court issued a preliminary
injunction in favor of Solid Homes, Inc. which was nullified and set aside
by the Appellate Court. In a petition for review on certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court, Solid Homes, Inc. assailed the nullification and setting
aside of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered a
decision on the merits affirming and recognizing the easement of right-ofway
along
Mangyan
Road
in
favor of Solid
Homes, Inc. LA VISTA appealed
to
the Court of Appeals,
which
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the easement is a voluntary one
Held:
Yes.
of-way was created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your favor";
(e) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO
property in 1976, acknowledged the existence of the contractual right ofway as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de
Manila University and La Vista Homeowners' Association would be
extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property and would thus
become the owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and,
(f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice, received by this Court on 26 March 1997, acknowledged that "'onehalf of the whole length of (Mangyan Road) belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc.
The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo in equal
portions". These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned
had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan
Road and, like any other contract, the same could be extinguished only by
mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to
LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say the least. The
opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or
compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The
fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property
right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
Continuous non apparent easements
BICOL
AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCERS
COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI) vs. OBIAS, et al.
Facts:
The Bicol Sugar Development Corporation
(BISUDECO) was established at Himaao, Pili,
Camarines Sur. In the same year, BISUDECO
Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem
9
Issue:
ISSUE:
the
RULING: Yes.
The existence of the irrigation canal on
Respondents land for the passage of water from
the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to
and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to
the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the
vendee of the land to continue using it as
provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code (Doctrine
of Apparent Sign):
FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino
Florete, Sr. is the present owner of the land adjoining
the Iloilo River up to the adjacent lot where the L.
Borres Elem. School is located. There existed a main
canal from the Iloilo River which passes through the
Marsal property and thru a canal that traverses the
school property going towards Lot 2344. Marsal & Co.
closed the dike entrance and later on demolished the
portions of the main dike connecting the main canal to
the canal running thru the school grounds. This closure
caused flooding in the premises of the school and its
vicinity because the canal serves as outlet of rain or
flood water that empties into the river. This prompted
the school and barangay officials to complain to higher
authorities about the closure of the canal. When
Florete was about to bury a pipe in lieu of an open
canal, he was prevented from doing so by the district
supervisor, Javellana, thus he instituted a complaint for
recovery of damages for allegedly denying his access
to the use of the canal to his property. The RTC ruled in
favor of Javellana thus Florete appealed to the IAC
which reversed the decision thus the case at bar.
Javellana vs IAC
RULING:
YES. A positive easement of water-rightof-way was constituted on the property of Florete as
the servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary
School and the nearby lands as dominant estates since
it has been in continuous use for no less than 15 years
HELD: YES.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: When the
plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part
of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to
VALDEZ V. TABISULA
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez
purchased via a January 11, 1993 Deed of
Absolute
Sale from respondent-spouses Francisco
Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a 200 square
meter (sq.m.)
portion (the subject property) of a 380 sq. m.
parcel of land located in San Fernando, La Union.
The deed
stated that the petitioners shall be provided a 2
1/2
meters wide road right-of-way on the
western
side
sale.
FACTS:
Woodridge is the usufructuary of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-363902 in the name
of spouses Ernesto T. Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas. Its
co-petitioner, Miguela Jimenez-Javier, is the registered
owner of the adjacent lot under TCT No. T-330688.
On the other hand, ARB is the owner and developer of
Soldiers Hills Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, which is
composed of four phases. Phase I of the subdivision was
already accessible from the Marcos Alvarez Avenue. To
provide the same accessibility to the residents of Phase II of
the subdivision, ARB constructed the disputed road to link
the two phases.
As found by the appellate court, petitioners' properties sit
right in the middle of several estates: Phase I of Soldiers
Hills Subdivision in the north, a creek in the east and Green
Valley Subdivision the farther east, a road within Soldiers
Hills Subdivision IV which leads to the Marcos Alvarez
Avenue in the west and Phase III of Soldiers Hills Subdivision
in the south.
Initially, petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as
indemnity for the use of the road. Adamant, ARB refused the
offer and fenced the perimeter of the road fronting the
properties of petitioners. By doing so, ARB effectively cut off
petitioners' access to and from the public highway.
After failing to settle the matter amicably, petitioners jointly
filed a complaint in the RTC of Imus, Cavite to enjoin ARB
from depriving them of the use of the disputed subdivision
road and to seek a compulsory right of way after payment of
proper indemnity.
RULING:
1)NO
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is obliged to pay the full value of the property
taken or easement fee only;
RULING:
YES. Petitioner is obliged to pay the full value of the property taken.
vs.
and
Issue:
W/N Appellate Court erred in skirting the issue on the
genuineness and/or binding effect of the forged
alterations and insertions on the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition; and in holding that a legal easement of right-ofway automatically attaches to Lot "F" adjudicated to
Humiliano, as the servient estate
Held:
CA did not entirely disregard the matter of the questioned
alterations and insertions. It summarized the conflicting
evidence thereon observing that "unrebutted was the
testimony of Mrs. Casafranca that her father Humiliano
Rodriguez favored the maintaining of a right-of-way. If
Humiliano himself favored the right-of-way, petitioners, as
his successors-in-interest, should be held bound by it.
Respondent Court added that the Notary Public, Atty.
Bernardo Solotan, who authenticated the document, also
declared that the initials of Humiliano and Ines R. de
Pages were authentic, and that the insertions were made
at the instance of Humiliano.
In point of fact, a road right of way providing access to
the public road from "Lot G" existed long before the
execution of the extrajudicial partition even during the
lifetime of Quirino Rodriguez. The Deed of Partition
merely sought to legalize and give stability to the access
road already existing. As a matter of law, considering that
"Lot G " has no access to the public road, the easement
is explicitly provided for in Article 652 of the Civil Code 7 ,
its width being determined by the needs of the servient
estate pursuant to Article 651 8 of the same law. The
annotations did not "create" a right-of-way, contrary to the