Beyer, Anna Cornelia - Inequality and Violence A Re-Appraisal of Man, The State and Wa

Inequality and Violence
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A Re-appraisal of Man, the State and War
Anna Cornelia Beyer

University of Hull, UK
Anna Cornelia Beyer 2014

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recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
Anna Cornelia Beyer has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,
1988, to be identified as the author of this work.
Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:
Beyer, Cornelia.
Inequality and violence : a re-appraisal of Man, the state and war / by Anna
Cornelia Beyer.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4724-2352-8 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-1-4724-2353-5 (ebook) -ISBN 978-1-4724-2354-2 (epub) 1. Waltz, Kenneth N. (Kenneth Neal), 19242013. Man, the state and war. 2. International relations--Philosophy. 3. State, The.
4. War. I. Title.
JZ1316.B48 2014
327.101--dc23
2013041452
ISBN 9781472423528 (hbk)
ISBN 9781472423535 (ebk PDF)
ISBN 9781472423542 (ebk ePUB)
III
Printed in the United Kingdom by Henry Ling Limited,

at the Dorset Press, Dorchester, DT1 1HD
Contents
Acknowledgements
vii
Introduction
Man, the State and War Revisited
13
A Response to Man, the State and War
27
Human Nature and the Essence of Aggression
39
51
Inequality and War at the International Level
61
From Inequality to Global Governance
71
Global Governance
85
The Continuity of Power in Global Governance
10
Inequality and Good Governance in the Global War on Terrorism113
11
Good Global Governance
103
123
12 Conclusion
137
Bibliography
Index
145
157
Acknowledgements
This book would not have been written without the help of many. Kenneth Waltz
kindly invited me to his home in Bangor for interviews, and provided me with
an abundance of useful information, which is partly reflected in this book. His
wife, Helen, many of his colleagues and his students agreed to be interviewed on
Kens life and career, as well as his thinking; some of the interviews are presented
in this book. Justin Rosenberg, Campbell Craig and Adam Humphreys worked
with me through the preliminary stages, and I am grateful for their useful ideas
and input. Ken Booth gave helpful advice and provided me with an opportunity
to present earlier elements of this book at Aberystwyth. The book benefited much
from the feedback gained there. I subsequently met Kenneth Waltz at Aberystwyth
at the King of Thought conference as well as in New York on an invitation to the
International Studies Association Conference. The University of Leuven presented
me with opportunities for additional research for this book and the members of
staff and students who commented on the draft brought it forward. Likewise, I
benefited from the opportunity to present and discuss the main ideas for this book
at the University of St Andrews. I am also deeply grateful to the University of Hull
and the Department of Politics and International Studies and their support and
patience while completing this book. Athina Karatzogianni and Caroline Kennedy
read final versions of the manuscript. The staff at Ashgate were always very
helpful and supportive. Special thanks are due to my family, who enabled travels
to the US and stayed with me through the ups and downs of writing this book. It is
due to all of those above that this book was finally completed.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Introduction
What does one write about a persons life if this life was to a large extent
intellectual? Kenneth Waltz, born 1924, was one of the most prominent scientists
in the area of International Relations. He developed the theory of structural
Realism or Neorealism. This theory replaced classical Realism and broadened
its approach by a systemic variable. Obviously, for us as International Relations
(IR) scholars, his main achievements are the books Man, the State and War
(MSW), published in 1959, and Theory of International Politics, 1979. Both of
these books have quickly become important in the field, started a life of their
own, and prosper until this day. These books are the brainchildren of Kenneth
Waltz, and with them he fulfilled himself a lifes dream: to write a theory of
international relations. Most would agree he has achieved that goal with Theory
of International Politics. This book was and still is enormously influential as
one of the first scientific theories on International Relations, and one of the
most parsimonious and profound ones. The theory of structural Realism is
used, applied and respected to this day, more than 30 years after the book was
published. We have acquired more knowledge about international relations in the
past 30 years, with many further explanations and theories, but structural Realism
still remains one of the prominent approaches. However, the groundwork for it
has been laid with the earlier publication of MSW. This book already developed
the theoretical understandings of the conditions of international relations, in
particular the international system and the motives and constraints of actors
behaving within it. Waltz with this publication gave a broad overview and analysis
of the literature and knowledge in IR of this time, which served as the basis for
the latter development of his theory of international politics. MSW therefore will
be of interest here for us. It, too, has been majorly influential in the discipline and
is read widely today.
What is the history behind this great success story in political science? Kenneth
started his life as the son of a small, rather poor American family in Ann Arbor,
Michigan: the son of a pasteurizer and a housewife. His parents taught him the
value of hard work, and encouraged him to pursue his lifes dream. But it was
not easy for Kenneth to find out what he wanted to do. The dream rather found
him. As a schoolboy, Kenneth always experienced the benefits of his superior
intellectual capability in achieving outstanding results with nearly no effort. So, he
put his extra energy into work, to make up for the lack of resources that could not
be provided by his family. He was the guy on and off, as the Americans say,
having many jobs in this time, but never deciding what to do with his life. Acting
was an early fascination, but turned out to be more of a disappointment, because
quickly he learned that even if he could memorize the lines very well, he did not
excel in performing. When university education approached, he therefore faced a
major difficulty of decision. The professional instructors recommendation was
to study music, but Ken could only play the banjo. He finally started the study of
economics at Oberlin College, as he thought that one should pursue studies not
only for the sake of intellectual inspiration and pleasure, but again an influence
of his upbringing and background with respect to the work that can follow from
this. Initially not wanting to be a writer or teacher, as he lacked the experience and
believed not to like writing or teaching at the time, he also decided that he did not
want to be a lawyer, engineer or mathematician either. His choice of study would
later on deeply influence his thinking about international relations.
After being stationed in Manila in the Second World War, Ken returned to
the United States with the veterans bill, the GI bill. This allowed him to take up
studies in his favored city, New York, at Columbia University. In New York he
met his wife, Helen. They were instantly attracted to each other, and one thing led
to another, as Helen said: Ken was a free soul. We more or less agreed about lots
of things and he was interesting to talk to. Hes very faithful, lovable, but he can
be tough. Once he makes his mind up, its hard to change. He and his wife were
attracted by the study of political theory, and friends recommended that one can
have a wonderful life in academia, if there is enough money around.
And by this time I met my wife, and she suffered through this with me. You
know: What am I going to be? What I am going to do? And well, if Id do
English literature, I am not going to write a poem and I am not going to write
a novel, I am going be a critic. This, I think, is a perfectly honorable thing to
be. But just being a critic did not really inspire me. So, I thought: aha, political
philosophy. And in fact, my wife and I went back to Oberlin, we were on the
way to Ann Arbor to visit my parents, and we stopped in Oberlin and I talked to
two people who really inspired me: John Lewis and his wife, both of whom were
theorists. And I said: Well, I am thinking about becoming a college teacher in
political philosophy. And they both said: Well, its a wonderful life if you have
some money. College pay then was really pretty poor. So, we decided to do that.
My wife and I both did graduate work at Columbia together and both in political
theory. (Kenneth Waltz 2007, Bangor, interview with the author)
Also, the study of International Relations, which was supposed to become the field
of study he would be spending his life with, found him by accident. Due to a lucky
coincidence, his professor in IR changed, and demanded that he do IR proper, not
bits and pieces of it. For his final dissertation, therefore, he and his wife started
reading abundantly on International Relations, and here he figured out the idea for
his first book, which was to become his thesis: Man, the State and War. She was
sending excerpts and summaries of literature to Korea, where he was stationed
Introduction
while he prepared his thesis. By the time he wrote this first influential book of
his, he considered himself a political theorist, rather than an IR scholar. But with
MSW he was accepted into the discipline of IR and he would not be allowed to
leave anymore.
One thing that is very interesting and was more common of scholars of his
generation than now, but even then it wasnt completely common is his interest
in both political philosophy and European thinking, and very strong theory
grounded partly although not completely in economics. When you look at Man,
the State and War you see both these threads and others as well as knowledge
of the previous generation of thinkers he was criticizing. In social science you
find some people who lean more to political philosophy and find others who lean
more to rigorous theorizing especially in economics. Ken does both, which is
really, really striking. (Robert Jervis 2008, telephone interview with the author)
His wife was most fond of the book: I like Man, the State and War very much.
I liked working on that. And I liked the second book; I did a lot of work on that
in England while we were in London. After his entrance with fanfare into the
discipline of IR with this book, he excelled in an outstanding career. He went to
Swarthmore College, as an associate professor and worked there in International
Relations until 1966, when he left as a professor. The next station was Brandeis
University, where we stayed for five years. Within that time, he worked as a
research associate at Columbia University at the Institute of War and Peace
Studies, and as a Fellow in Political Theory and International Relations. Also,
he was a research associate at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard
University, a visiting scholar with the Department of Philosophy of the London
School of Economics and a Guggenheim Fellow. In 1971, he joined the University
of California, Berkeley. What followed were senior research associations with the
Department of War Studies, Kings College London, and later on with the Arnold
A. Saltzman Institute of War & Peace Studies, Columbia University. He held
fellowships with the Woodrow Wilson Center and the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, and visiting scholarships with Australian National University, Peking
University, Fudan University, US Air Force Academy, University of Bologna,
Nankai University and, again, the London School of Economics. He has served
as a Secretary of the American Political Science Association, President of the
International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association,
and has been a member of the board of editors of International Studies Quarterly,
Journal of Politics, World Politics, and the Journal of Chinese Political Science.
After MSW followed a second book, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics,
published 1967, which however never got as much attention and did never acquire
as much influence as the other ones. Thirty years later, his third book and the most
famous one, appeared: Theory of International Politics. With this, Ken achieved
his goal of writing a theory of international relations, an interest that had brought
him in contact with a lot of theory of science writings. The theory of structural
Realism gained influence in the International Relations world quite quickly:
The goal was to say some fundamentally important things about theory. I mean,
there is theory as theory and then theory applied to international politics. If
you are going to do theory, the first thing you have to do is to say is: What does
the word mean? Whats a concept? So, I spent a lot of time on that. And in fact it
does take a lot of time to figure out what a very slippery word like theory means.
And some philosophers of science tell me now that they are coming around
a view of theory thats somewhat like mine. (Kenneth Waltz 2007, Bangor,
interview with the author)
One thing I really liked about Waltzs theory was that it was parsimonious. It
was a nice simple theory about how the world worked. Its one of the reasons
its such a popular theory. Simple theories always prevail over complex theories.
He offered a theory that made a lot of sense. That was intuitively attractive,
intuitively plausible when you looked at the real world. (John Mearsheimer
2008, telephone interview with the author)
After that, the most important argument made by Waltz was about the spread of
nuclear weapons. Scott Sagan wrote an article The Perils of Proliferation and
asked Ken: I want to know whether I, in your judgment, represent your positions
accurately and any other comments you have will be very much appreciated. He
did not expect much response from him, but the next thing that happened was that
Ken called: Scott, I am teaching my seminar on the subject and why dont you
come up to Berkeley and you could give a guest lecture for my class and for the
broader community up here. They explained where they agreed and disagreed; the
article was published in the next year. Shortly thereafter W.W. Norton called and
asked if they would make it a book.
His arguments about nuclear weapons have personal experiences as a
background. His own life was saved by the atomic bombs in Japan at the end of the
Second World War, and he therefore started to believe in the utility of this weapon.
However, Waltz always opposed unnecessary wars, such as the Vietnam War and
also the Iraq War in 2003, unlike many other US scholars. Therefore, more recently,
he developed a severe criticism of the United States in current international affairs.
His honesty always made him speak out even uncomfortable truths. What I liked
most about him is he is very blunt and always willing to tell you exactly what he
thinks about a particular issue. He has superb and powerful views about how the
world works, and his judgment is, not always, but its usually correct. He is in
person much like he is in print (John Mearsheimer). In Steven Walts words: Ken
really prized independence. You can see that in his own work. His whole record of
scholarship was one of questioning conventional wisdom and not accepting what
was the familiar way of looking at things (2008, telephone interview with the
author). Also, as a mentor and teacher, Ken was highly successful.
Introduction
Ken is obviously one of the great realist thinkers. I found his point of view
consistent with how I already thought about world politics. It reinforced a lot of
ideas. I had various disagreements with him but they were at the level of details
rather than basic worldview. But Kens impact had several different parts to
it. First of all, he always encouraged students to be independent thinkers. There
are a lot of political science professors who try to impose their own ideas on
their students. They want to turn their students into little imitators of them. Ken
was not like that at all. He would give you a good argument; if he thought you
were wrong he would tell you. But he never tried to force his students to become
disciples or just write things that would confirm his work. (Steven Walt 2008,
telephone interview with the author)
Another recent student of his says:

I remember that he was very open-minded. In the United States there are a lot
of methodological and theoretical fights. Several universities are very divided
by this. During his seminar he actually presented all the different theoretical
orientations and apertures. He, of course, had his point of view that was very
clear, but he was very respectful of other theories and the other apertures. And
he always tried to teach them fairly and to show what were the strengths in
the different apertures. (Severine Autessere 2008, telephone interview with
the author)
What everyone seems to agree, even if it is always hard to risk a prognosis,

Kenneth Waltz will remain an important part of International Relations for many
decades to come.
Whats stunning is that some people say, Oh well, people have moved past what
Waltz says. Well, thats not true. Everyone still has to disagree with it. Everyone
still can benefit from thinking about what he did, not only in the book, but the
articles in a way that is really unusual. (Robert Jervis 2008, telephone interview
with the author)
Id say he is one of, if not the most influential writer in international relations
in the twentieth century. And to try and think of whom I would put above him
there are very few others and whether you agree or disagree with Ken Waltz you
ignore him at your peril. (Scott Sagan 2008, telephone interview with the author)
This book is the outcome of some years of work on Kenneth Waltzs writings.
Originally, it was intended to develop into his intellectual biography. For this
purpose, I met him personally and interviewed him on his life and works. His
contribution to the field of International Relations being so immense, however,
it seemed to be more appropriate to mainly focus on one single piece of his
works, namely his first major book, MSW. This monograph alone, I believe, gives
sufficient material to discuss and reflect on in this place. While the here presented
discussion will therefore centre around the arguments in MSW, it will also
continue this discussion and attempt to show both where the original ideas still
have importance for todays discourses and where the discipline of International
Relations has progressed in the last 50 years.
Kenneth Waltzs text is rich in references and ideas, and this book will engage
with those. It will revive the arguments promoted in MSW and reflect on them on
their own. All of these arguments, however, will also be discussed in relation to
the respective debates in contemporary scholarship. As Waltz did, the literature to
be engaged for this purpose will be oftentimes from the International Relations
scholarship. However, discourses in related relevant disciplines will also be
engaged with. For example, the discussion on human nature will draw heavily on
insights in philosophy, psychology, and biology.
Also, as Waltz did, this book will focus on the causes of war and preconditions
for peace, the main question concerning IR scholarship since its beginnings. It will
do so by starting its analysis on the lowest level, the first image the individual,
discussing human nature and its relevance for the emergence of conflict. It will
conclude with an analysis of these aspects to be found within the third level,
the international system. By repeating, sort of, Waltzs approach to the analysis
of causes of and cures for international war and violence, this book attempts to
also show where scholarship has progressed and to discover those areas where
research and scientific progress are still needed. Certainly, the quest for at least
theoretically solving the problem of human warfare has all but reached its final
goal. On the other hand, significant new developments in international affairs as
a reality as well as IR as a discipline have taken place since the publication of
the book.
One of these is the intensification, deepening and increasing institutionalization
of global cooperation mechanisms and structures, which are usually discussed
under the rubric of global governance. Particularly since the end of the Cold War,
now two decades ago, these structures and mechanisms have spread even further
to integrate the international world politically with the goal to enable collective
ordering and problem solving capability. Connected to this, and in part caused by
it, is the spread of liberalization, integration and democratization through policies
particularly pursued and promoted by the United States. What is usually referred
to as globalization on its own can be understood as both contributing to an
increased potential for international peace, as well as to new forms of conflicts and
violence. One of these negative outcomes we have arguably witnessed in the past
decade, with the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. While terrorism itself is
all but new, attacks from sub-state, clandestine groups originating in developing
countries targeting Western homelands is in this extent a recent development.
They have been responded to with the creation of even more global governance,
this time in the area of counterterrorism.
This book will therefore reflect also on these new challenges and the attempts
at addressing them. One of the arguments of this book will indeed be that Waltz
Introduction
underestimated the civilizing power which global governance structures and

mechanisms can have on states, and thereby reduce international warfare. Where
Waltz argues that the state is a practical even if far from perfect, if perfection
in this sense would be imaginable solution to the problem of inter-societal
violence, he stops short of allowing for a similar argument when looking at the
systemic level. It seems odd that he rejects ideas of global ordering structures
of supranational nature while accepting similar structures as valuable for the
national level.
The scholarship concerned with just this puzzle the question of global
governance, and how it is to be theorized, to be created, improved, and what the
potentials and pitfalls of it are has progressed significantly in the past decades.
The mainstream approach on global governance, if such exists, still rejects the idea
of a fully formed world state, with some notable exceptions. However, discussing
global governance as a via media between international heterarchy and anarchy
on the one hand, and hierarchical institutionalization of supranational authority
on the other, recent scholarship on global governance does indeed challenge the
arguments presented in MSW.
Secondly, the causes of violence and war are so manifold that an array of
diverse disciplines is interested in them. Psychology, anthropology, biology and
political science, amongst others, have concerned themselves with the quest for
finding these causes and origins of violence. The resulting answers are as diverse as
the perspectives studying this question. However, some common themes emerge.
This book will in particular look at inequality as a cause for violence. Inequality
is here understood in the broad sense. It usually refers to income inequality, but
can also encompass differences in standing or reputation, and attribution of social
role, for example. Furthermore, inequality is not the sole but an important cause
of violence.
Therefore, this book will address inequality. Inequality is back on the political
table as a topic, since the advent of the financial crisis, which brought capitalism
under renewed scrutiny, and the emergence of the Occupy movement. Inequality
might become the new obsession, as an evil to be countered and a wrong to be
corrected, and rightly so. Not only do we know for many years now that with
the increased spread of capitalism and globalization around the world, inequality
within nations and inter-nationally is increasing. While absolute poverty might be
slightly reduced, relative deprivation is on the increase. The poor get relatively
worse off. This is the development the Occupy movement rebels against. But why
should we worry? Is inequality not an integral part of human society, ingrained in
its fabric since the first civilizations have been established?
Inequality is one of the factors that arguably cause violence in humans and on
the international level. For Waltz, it is mainly the potential in humans human
nature being both good and evil and the absence of a higher authority, which
allows for violence and war. However, contemporary scholarship for example
in the discipline of psychology indicates that human aggression, and therefore
violence, is most often a response to a negative stimulus. Men are evil when
something bad happens. And in fact, inequality has been empirically linked to
cause crime, violence and wars.
Apart from making an argument about global authority in form of global
governance here, this book will therefore discuss the topic of inequality as one of
the more prominent causes of violence and war. And it will in conclusion argue
that we have to construct even better global governance, good global governance,
if we wish to further improve the conditions which for the past decades have
prevented major war on the global sphere.
Contents of the Book
While this chapter served as a general introduction to the book, the following
two chapters complete the introduction. Chapter 2 summarizes, to the best of my
abilities, the arguments found in MSW. This chapter is a mere representation of
Waltzs arguments, whereas the following chapter will build on these arguments.
It seemed reasonable to repeat the contents of MSW here, as particularly younger
readers might not be sufficiently familiar with them. The chapter presents the
discussion on the causes of violence and war and the possibilities of their prevention
at the three levels of analysis the individual, the state, and the international
system. While human nature at the individual level is found too complex, so Waltz,
to answer the quest for the origins of war, the state, as an authority superimposed
above individuals and exercising the monopoly of force, serves for peace. But
states in themselves are at times the origin of violence, which raises the question
how states can be changed towards peaceful behaviour. Waltz argues, both the
liberal as well as the Marxist prescription dont hold. States, similar to humans,
simply are resistant to perfection. However, in analogy to the solution he found
for the first level of analysis, or image, the creation of an authority on the third,
the systemic, level while being logically convincing is unattainable in practice.
Waltz finds the persistence of anarchy in the international system the permissive
cause of war.
This chapter then connects logically to, and serves as the basis for, the
following chapter. Chapter 3 can be understood as the first presentation of the
arguments to be found in this book. However, it is not strictly a summary of these
arguments, and some points of the discussion found here such as the discussion
on free will and determinism and the discussion on the democratic peace will
not be found in the remaining chapters. In essence, this chapter attempts to argue
that, while the author still agrees with the analysis in MSW, there is ground for
both optimism and pessimism with regards to the possibilities of peace. This
conviction is based on a close reading of contemporary scholarship, which for
example gives reason to be more optimistic about human nature and violence.
Rather than a pessimistic view of an evil nature of man with aggressive drives
like instincts, recent literature in psychology points to the understanding that
humans respond to negative stimuli with aggression. One of these stimuli is
Introduction
inequality. Therefore, in a partial analogy to Waltz, we need the state to address

potential origins of violence, and we need what I term the good state. This
concept of the state encompasses more virtues, qualities and functions than
the monopoly of force alone. Secondly, this chapter argues that indeed global
authority is the logical answer to interstate war, but Waltzs pessimism can be
countered: while we do not find a fully formed world state in our times, global
institutions, arrangements and processes have developed into global governance,
and arguably together with elements of democratic peace, they serve to stabilize
the world and help prevent wars.
Chapter 4 then is the first chapter to develop these arguments in more detail.
The focus of this chapter is human nature, and after reviewing findings from
anthropology and sociobiology, it goes on to discuss results from research in
psychology. This presents us with some most interesting insights. In particular,
it supports the assumption that violence in man is most often reactive in nature,
happening as a response to negative stimuli. This doesnt render the range of
potential causes, or triggers, less wide and therefore complex. But again, oftentimes
they are related to issues of power: honor, standing, resources, and such.
Therefore, Chapter 5 will single out one of the most prominent of these issues
inequality and present the findings on how inequality is related to violence.
While the connection between inequality and crime can easily be made, there is
also a connection to violence on the individual level. More unequal societies show
more of this kind of violence. But not only for individual violence is inequality
important, it also has been found to be related to civil wars, terrorism, and most
prominently revolutions. The evidence for inequality as a major cause of violence
on the sub-state level is abundant. But how can it be explained? Behaviourists
have developed the frustration-aggression hypothesis. This hypothesis states that
frustration most often, though not always, leads to aggression. This then can be
combined with the status theory, which argues that an inequality in status links to
frustration and aggression. Aggression is found to be caused by unequal standing
which links it back to inequality.
Chapter 6 progresses to look at inequality and violence at the international
level. Waltz himself had claimed that international politics is mostly about
inequalities. But in what form do inequalities on the international level influence
the occurrence of war? One interpretation was hinted at with the previous
discussion on civil wars and revolutions. According to the Marxist interpretation,
inequalities are at the basis for rebellious violence against the oppressors. Galtung
builds on this thinking in his theory of revolutions. But also Realists have argued
that inequality can be linked to war. For Realists, however, the picture is much less
clear and the debate ongoing. While one school of thought argues that inequality
increases the chances of war, either as a war of challenge towards the status quo
originating from the lower-rank states, or as a war of oppression or intervention
from the higher ranking state, the other school of thought argues that it is equality
which is particularly conducive to wars, especially great power wars and power
transition wars. It will be argued here that both perspectives can be accommodated
10
when we consider that it is wars amongst equal powers that escalate most, the two
world wars serve as examples. However, the risk and frequency of war is greater,
even if its scale lower, in an unequal situation. In such an unequal situation, it is
particularly the higher-ranking state to start wars. Examples for such wars can be
found in the Cold War era as well as afterwards under US hegemony. However,
even in multipolarity, which present examples of equal systems, inequality is at
the root of conflict, as can be seen in the cases of the two world wars. If we
therefore assume inequality to present a fundamental risk for the occurrence of
war, both on the intra-state as well as on the international level, we have to include
this factor when thinking about potential solutions. We need to think about good
global governance that tackles inequality, poverty and underdevelopment.
But in how far does global governance exist at all? Is it, as Realists like Waltz
suggest, negligible, or has it evolved into a real phenomenon to be taken seriously?
Chapter 7 attempts to answer this question. It will start with a discussion on
globalization, and derive from this the arguments about the need for global
governance. Global governance is necessary for managing the externalities, which
are produced by globalization. Furthermore, this chapter will present arguments
for an increase in existing global governance actors, institutions and processes.
Chapter 8 then turns towards a critique of the current global governance
literature. This chapter is probably the most supportive of Waltz, as it argues
that global governance literature and global governance in reality are diverging
somewhat. In particular, it claims that the remaining primary role of the state
is often underestimated in the academic discourse about global governance.
Secondly, it argues that global governance literature neglects the role of power and
power differentials amongst states. Rather than being a heterarchic undertaking,
we can observe in global governance strong signs of a hegemonic constellation in
which one state dominates in many respects all others. Inequality, therefore, still
features strongly even in global governance.
Chapter 9 supports this argument by citing another example that calls for the
need to rethink and reform global governance: the international occurrence of
terrorism and the global efforts to counter it. In particular the former Global War on
Terrorism was centred heavily on military measures against populations struck by
poverty, and it has been shown that these in turn caused more terrorism rather than
reducing it. Furthermore, similar policies in the past contributed to the emergence
of terrorism against the West in the first place. The argument therefore made in
this chapter is a call for reform of the global governance of counterterrorism to
become better integrated with other areas of global governance and to focus its
efforts more on soft tools, such as foreign aid.
Chapter 10 finally addresses the question of good global governance, how it
can be theorized and what functions it needs to fulfil to overcome the detrimental
effects of anarchy and inequality. While, first, it is argued that global governance
even in its present form as an institutionalized multilevel system of order and
cooperation does reduce the risk of war on the international level significantly.
However, second, global governance needs to be reformed to increasingly
Introduction
11
address inequality in the international, national and global realms. Without global
governance effectively addressing inequality, the seeds for future war and violence
are sown.
As this book has argued in the previous chapters that inequality needs to be
addressed by global governance, the reader might be interested if what we find is
enough to tackle this challenge. The Conclusion therefore discusses the overall
need for global governance, as well as the need for its reform. Also, it presents
proposals for reform of global governance. This then will conclude the analysis
and I hope to have presented a compelling argument why we need to revise our
thinking about the causes of war and the ways for its prevention.
I do not claim that inequality is the only pressing problem or the only stimulus
for violence, maybe just the most prominent one. Other factors need to be taken
into account and to be researched and addressed, such as poverty per se, identity,
and culture and so forth. Wide efforts are already put to the task. Also, I hope to
have provided an argument why global authority in form of global governance
should be taken more seriously by Realists as a force for peace and stability in
the world. Much has changed in global politics, particularly since the end of the
Cold War. And while some of these changes are ground for pessimism, others give
much reason for hope.
Chapter 2

This chapter serves to re-introduce the arguments made in MSW. I have tried
to summarize them as best as I could, even though the argumentation is highly
complex and I ask the reader to forgive if some details of the argumentation might
have not been presented in their original complexity. This chapter will serve as the
background for the argumentation pursued in the following chapters.
The First Image: Human Nature
Waltz starts his discussion of the causes of war with the first image, the lowest
level, the individual: Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive
impulses, from stupidity (Waltz 1959: 16). If other causes of war were secondary,
just the need to understand human nature would arise in order to explain and
eradicate the occurrence of violence. He distinguishes optimists and pessimists
in philosophical terms and with regards to human nature, the latter being an
explanation for the causes of war.
For optimists, reality is essentially good and there is a possibility for harmony
in society. They cite the loving capability in man and claim the human being as
such can be educated for peace if just enough effort is put to the task.
Were half the power that fills the world with terror,
Were half the wealth bestowed on camps and courts,
Given to redeem the human mind from error,
There were no need for arsenals or forts. (Ibid.: 16)
Mans nature cannot be changed or his drives suppressed, but they can be
diverted (Ibid.: 18). Spinoza, for example, believes in the possibility of reason,
being a precondition for courage and high-mindedness. Even the survival instinct
does not necessarily lead to conflict in the optimists view, if reason is applied:
That is, he (man) will strive to preserve himself in accordance with the dictates of
reason, and he will strive to aid other men and unite them in friendship (Ibid.: 22).
This unselfish behaviour is not irrational, but, in opposition, is the outcome of
the realization that prosperity and self-preservation are best being achieved by
cooperation and a division of labour. Under purely rational conditions, man will
unite harmoniously even in anarchy into one single mind and one single body
and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all (Ibid.: 23). But Spinoza
concurs that rationality is an ideal demand, not necessarily an ever-present reality
14
in the decision making of humans. The human condition is one of conflict between
reason and passion, both ever present in man lead to an aberration in the world
from the ideal state: Men are led not by the precepts of pure reason but by their
passions. Men, led by passion, are drawn into conflict (Ibid.: 24).
For pessimists reality is flawed (Ibid.: 18), they see no chance for peace,
as scarcity and ego-dictated human wants, needs and greed create a struggle for
resources and balance of power under the condition of mistrust. The security
dilemma is the closest we get to peace. The struggle for power simply arises
because men want things, not because there is some evil in their desires (Ibid.: 34).
Furthermore, for St Augustine, Niebuhr and Morgenthau, the dualism between
reason and passion is not relevant, as the human being as such is defective; there
is a tendency in the human heart, a lust for power. With Niebuhr, even the
desire of man to widen his control over nature will enable some men to enslave
or destroy others (Ibid.: 21). The seat of evil is the self, and it can be defined in
terms of pride.
Both optimists as well as pessimists seem to believe that human nature
can be improved. However, for pessimists internal peace of a community is
always coercive (and) the external peace between communities is marred
by competitive strife (Ibid.: 25). Niebuhr believes that love, a forgiving love,
grounded in repentance, is the cure for passion and irrationality and violence.
Waltz, however dismisses human nature as the predominant or sole cause
of war for the reasons of its complexity: human nature is so complex that it
can justify every hypothesis we may entertain (Ibid.: 40) and to say that man
acts in ways contrary to his nature is prima facie absurd (Ibid.: 27). Still, world
history was made by man; so violence and war are natural elements of human
nature, even if this does not imply that man is inherently simply bad. Also,
Spinozas search for causes in psychology does not seem sufficient. This might
just sustain the assumption that man sometimes fights and sometimes does not.
Waltz therefore here brings in for the first time the second image. Durkheim,
he writes, was right in stating that causation in human affairs goes beyond the
single individual into its surroundings. Society makes man, the environment
determines the individual. This will lead in the following chapters to a discussion
in how far the state as the modern environment of the citizen does affect
human behaviour and decisions for war and peace: under different conditions
men behave differently. When not united, men must constantly be on guard one
against the other; when they live within a commonwealth they often enjoy at
least a modicum of peace and security (Ibid.: 32). Finally, for pessimists as well
as optimists, power is for states what survival is for individuals. Power seeking
may be a means or an end in itself, in the absence of a world state; however, it
cannot be overcome. The security dilemma, which arises out of this absence,
hence international anarchy, promotes the self-oriented behaviour of all states,
and therefore them seeking power in order to survive in the international realm.
Waltz then focuses on behaviouralism and the behaviouralists explanation
for the causes of war. His assumptions about the nature of man are usually
15
less rigid, his solutions less individualistic. where the pessimist gave up
on man, the social scientist attempts to turn his finding into a prescription for
social action (Ibid.: 43). However, Waltz generally discards the behaviouralist
explanation of war as nave. The confidence of behaviouralists extends so far as
to promote plans for world peace, seeing the world as a patient, rather than an
explanandum; world peace only fails to realize because statesmen do not listen to
them. According to some the patient can be cured by doctoring the individuals
who compose it, according to others by improving the social arrangements
presently producing the tensions that so often find their imperfect dissolution
in war (Ibid.: 45). Preventive psychiatry is thought to be able in the long run to
prevent world wars and aggressive impulses can be minimized and controlled.
Waltz dismisses the belief that one only needs to find the social conditions
everything from infant care, everybodys psyche, the variations of custom in
different tribes, and the relation between culture and society and individual
behaviour responsible for war for preventing it. A principal assumption is that
increased understanding between nations or peoples is a precondition for peace.
Also, social adjustment and thereby the reduction of frustration and insecurity
are thought to contribute to peace. Some focus on the education of the executive
in the state. For achieving improvement, increased knowledge about social
conditions is essential. A criticism here, an unresolved point, however, is that
most proposals for world peace rest on the assumption that it is possible to find
one common ideology, formula or model that fits all, which would or could violate
the valuable diversity in human affairs. Close cultural affinity has not slowed
the flow of blood, as is amply illustrated in the history of Western Europe. Nor
has increased knowledge always been a dependable road to more sympathetic
understanding. Quite the opposite (Ibid.: 49) and increased knowledge, while
it makes some people humble, makes others more arrogant (Ibid.: 50). In
conclusion, while Waltz supports the claim of the need for more tolerance; he
dismisses the idea that it necessarily derives out of more knowledge. Also, the
anthropologists idea to assemble all peaceful values and practices of all world
cultures and to educate people in these terms is problematic, he thinks. Problems
to be faced are the time required for change and the timing of the changes, as
well as where to start changing a single not to say several given society and
in which way? Waltz criticism of this literature comes in three points. First, he
agrees with Isaiah Berlin that we need a focus on causes rather than symptoms,
a causal approach to detect the problems themselves, in order to solve the
problem of war. But even then, he argues, we are only half down the road, as
knowing is not being and necessary changes would have to be realized. The easy
identification of knowledge and control results either in a roseate, but sterile,
optimism or in the blackest pessimism. Either way, what originally seemed like
the promise of the policy sciences quickly withers away (Ibid.: 60). Secondly,
he looks at the target for change, being the elites. The proposal here, he detects,
lies in mental health service for example a screening system and control and
education for those responsible in government. Since war begins in the minds of
16
men, he cites Borberg, it is in the minds of those men who are most influential
in decisions for or against war that the defences of peace must be constructed
(Ibid.: 63). Waltz questions how this shall be achieved tyrannicide? and how
to instruct decision makers: This is not only because much of the advice given
by one behavioural scientist is contradicted by other behavioural scientists, but
also because most of the advice given by one man, or as the consensus of one
group, is either hopelessly vague or downright impossible to follow (Ibid.: 65).
In summary: we can say that with a working-through-the-leaders approach, two
problems arise: What advice shall we give them, and how shall we ensure that
the leaders of all the important countries follow it? (Ibid.: 65). The second,
he thinks, is the more important question, which he pursues in the third point
of his discussion: social scientists need nations to cooperate in order for their
recommendations to take effect. If only men (or societies) were all well adjusted
and rational, then we would have peace (Ibid.: 66). But, he argues, these social
scientists lack in showing us the way to get to this state of perfection. Others
depend on the prior formation of a world government. Allport, for example,
is cited: when men are fully confident that international organizations can
eradicate war, they will then at last succeed in doing so (Ibid.: 68), which
in Waltzs terms is a tautology: when there is no war, there is no war. World
government, however, as the abolishment of anarchy as the precondition or the
state of war, is for many the psychological precondition for peace. For others,
again, it is the abolishment of the symptoms of aggressiveness. What we need to
create, Durbin and the likes would say, is a generation of men and women who
will defend their rights and yet willingly concede equal rights to others, who
will accept the judgement of third parties in the resolution of disputes, who will
neither bully nor eat humble pie, who will fight, but only in defence of law, who
are willing and friendly members of a positive and just society (Ibid.: 70). They
would approach that noble goal by attempting to remove the ultimate causes
of war in human character by a new type of emotional education (Ibid.: 71).
But then, Waltz asks, what is symptom and what is cause? And as he mentions
already here, and will argue for in the following chapters, rather the structure
that humans and nations are finding themselves inserted in is cause, than their
intrinsic desires. To manipulate political structure is consequently to attack the
basic cause of war (Ibid.: 72). For that, however, and here he agrees with
Marx, revolutionary change was necessary.
The Second Image: Internal Structure of the State
Waltz continues to look at the second image, the state. He compares the state with
a container for human interaction, in which it is malleable for good and bad. It
therefore depends in part on the internal structure of the state if we find war or
peace the result of interaction: The events to be explained are so many and so
varied that human nature cannot possibly be the single determinant (Ibid.: 81). He
17
dismisses the sole psychological approach looking just within the human being
as well as the sole sociological approach looking just at its surroundings as
explanatory for war and maintains: To understand war and peace political analysis
must be used to supplement and order the findings of psychology and sociology
(Ibid.: 81). Two possible ways to introduce political analysis are possible here: to
look at the interaction of states in the international realm, or to look at the internal
structure of states.
The first proposal for peace is made by Bodin and the likes, which argue that
unity either within or between states is a precondition for peace. Unity, however,
can best be achieved in opposition to another, an external enemy. Secondly,
defective states either despotic or democratic ones may be a cause for war.
In despotism, tensions arising out of the suppression of the people might lead
to war, in democracies quite the opposite, overarching demands deriving from
the responsibilities towards the people might make the leadership of a country
ineffective. Finally, geographic or economic deprivations might lead a state to
war: a nation may argue that it has not attained its natural frontiers, that such
frontiers are necessary to its security, that war to extend the state to its deserved
compass is justified or even necessary (Ibid.: 83). In conclusion, defective states
are a cause for war at the second level. If we, however, want to eradicate war
and improve states, what is to be done? What definition of the good state is
to serve as a standard? He mentions Marx here who defines the good state in
terms of the ownership of the means of production, Kant who defines it in terms
of abstract principles of right and Wilson who refers to self-determination and
modern democratic organization. From each of these proposals, a change in
the organization of states would also follow the abolishment of states under
socialism, the establishment of a code of law for all states, cooperation and
improved international understanding, collective security and disarmament, a
world confederation of states. For all of them, however, internal change in the
state is the sine qua non for international peace.
For criticizing the assumptions that are made here, Waltz turns to nineteenthcentury liberals in order to ask the question What makes it (the social-economic
system) run at all? What makes it run smoothly? (Ibid.: 86). The answer that
liberals from the nineteenth century gave was that individual initiative is the
motor of the system and competition in the free market is the regulator (Ibid.: 86).
Freedom as a principle for progress is both obvious in Smith and Mill. Smith
maintains: The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better
his condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private,
opulence is originally derived is frequently powerful enough to maintain a natural
progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of government and of the
greatest errors of administration (Ibid.: 86). Individuals are not only the source of
progress in society; they are also constantly improving themselves. Even without
restraints, which might in fact be counterproductive, human beings in society
constantly drive for perfection, as Bentham argues. Hence, a limited state is the
best form of state for the liberals of the nineteenth century, as even the vices of
18
man contribute, indeed are essential, to the progress of society (Ibid.: 88). But
as the greed of man not only makes him work hard, it also makes him steal and
cheat. Therefore, on the other hand, the minimum requirement of a government
must be that it punishes criminals, it exists to provide security to persons and
their property (Ibid.: 89). Natural inequalities, in this view, are the outcome of
increased interference by the state, not its lack. Interventions, even philanthropic
ones, are dismissed as distorting the rule of the free market and producing more
bad than good. The good state was believed to consist of equal units (men)
competing with each other, forgetting that land and property might result in power
over others and free and equal competition might turn into power competition
and the suppression of some by others. John Stuart Mill is one who recognizes
this difficulty and therefore recommends the intervention of the state. The state
may have to intervene in ways not originally contemplated; for example, in order
to prevent extreme economic inequalities from arising (Ibid.: 94), government
should be limited, but strong in its sphere. While remaining outside of the market
it must be able to prevent the inequalities of wealth that may distort or eliminate
it (Ibid.: 95).
Liberals also take a look at international relations. The states function is to be
concerned externally with power and defence, and internally with law and justice.
Liberals were optimistic about peace in the society within, and the relations
of states in anarchy with each other. War was thought to be under certain
conditions a necessity, for the same reasons that individuals must sometimes
have recourse to courts of law (Ibid.: 96). Liberals, furthermore, started to believe
in free trade and the natural harmony of interests between states, which derived
out of this abdicating war and conquest. Bright objected that it is not the interest
of the peoples that govern states affairs, but the interests of the ruling classes, and
these might gain from war: Though the interest of the people is in peace, their
governors make war (Ibid.: 101). The solution that is proposed by Paine is to
transform monarchical sovereignty into democracy; sovereignty must rest with
the nation. With this, he refers back to Kant and Bentham, who believed that the
popular will would be sufficient to prevent wars, if allowed to rule. However,
Waltz dismissed this perspective and remarks: Faith in public opinion or, more
generally, faith in the uniformly peaceful proclivities of democracies has proved
utopian (Ibid.: 102).
Improvements in states, so liberals believe, could reduce the passionate
behaviour in them and bring them towards more amicable and rational behaviour.
Perfection of the conflicting units was the way proposed towards peace. What
system between states should replace the current anarchy that they could not
agree upon. There should be a minimum of organization and no use of military
force except for self-defence. Waltz describes this as quite an anarchists view of
international relations, when Liberals believe that the popular will is sufficient to
make for peace, as acting as a court system. He argues, even in the state peace is
not achieved by courts but by the fact that their decisions can be enforced. Wilson
argues along those lines: States have to be democratic, national self-determination
19
being the produce of democracy, and self-determined, democratic states being by

definition peaceful. Even then, to make peace secure, these units do have to form a
community; peace must rest on force the organized force of mankind. This
would not be the force displayed in power politics but a community of power.
He discusses the difficulties in the praxis of liberalism. More important,
however, are the failures in theory:
Peace and war are the products, respectively, of good and bad states. Should
this be true, what can be done to change states from their present condition
to the condition prescribed? This question led to the first criticism of liberal
theories of international relations. A second criticism, equally fundamental, is
suggested by questioning the original proposition. Bad states may make war.
The truth of the statement can be established simply by labelling as bad any
state that does. But would the existence of numerous states of the type defined
as good mean peace? While the first criticism hinged on the practicability of the
prescription, the second is concerned with the sufficiency of the analysis that
leads to it. (Ibid.: 114)
Waltz concludes, the liberal prescription is impracticable (Ibid.: 120). Perfection

is as impossible to achieve for states as for men as like societies make the men
that live in them the system determines the actions of states. Therefore, the
abolishment of war requires a systemic transformation, rather than one at the first
or second image level. Peace with justice requires an organization with more and
more of the qualities of government, just as internal justice was found to require
an ever stronger and more active government (Ibid.: 120). Waltz also rejects
the socialist prescription and Marxist thought for offering a resolution for war,
by looking at the First World War. Both Marxists and revisionists believed that
capitalism was the main source for international conflict, socialism in one country
would either spread internationally or at least be a precondition for peace in and
with this country. Capitalist nations would always strive after surpluses, from the
attempt to market these surpluses an international fight for markets ensues; war
results from this struggle for markets (Ibid.: 145). Capitalism, therefore, leads
directly or indirectly to imperialism, as a precondition for war. Socialist states, on
the other hand, are economically self-contempt and do not need to pursue these
kinds of international entanglements. Still, there was an opposition in socialist
thought between Marxism proper and Hobsons thought. Whereas both of them
believed that socialism would overcome capitalism as a cause of war, Marxism
proper assumed that by the free socialist association of men also the state would
be overcome and men would live in an international socialist society. Hobson
believed that socialism would perfect the state similar to Wilsons ideas of selfdetermination and democracy internally and therefore transform the relations
between states internationally.
20

The socialist analysis, of both Marx and the revisionists, points to capitalism
as the devil; but the socialism that would replace capitalism was for Marx the
end of capitalism and the end of states. For the revisionists the problem will
wither away not as states disappear but as the separate states become internally
more perfect. (Ibid.: 155)
Problems with socialism he discusses at the example of its formation in Russia

in the era of the First World War. A practical difficulty, for example, for Marxists
was the realization that the international unity of the proletariat seemed to be a
fiction; it was not to be realized. Instead, a strong nationalist view prevailed in
which each country and its peoples had a pressing interest in keeping the enemy
from crossing the frontiers and save its skin as best as it can (Ibid.: 133). The
behaviour of the workers in the First World War demonstrated that there was no
international proletariat, but only national socialist parties whose actions would be
determined by their own definitions of their particular interests (Ibid.: 135f). The
national socialist parties failed to truly act according to the assumed interests of the
proletariat. These interests, it was thought, would have kept the peace, yet the First
World War developed even in the face of the existence of various socialist parties
in Europe. Either, the worse options of two, these parties could not be equated
with the proletariat. Or, the second possibility was that the socialist leadership in
these countries just had failed in the interpretation of the true proletarian interest
(Ibid.: 137) and could not act accordingly. Maybe, both explanations held. It was,
furthermore, also possible that the proletariat was corruptible, which led to the
question: If the proletariat could so easily be seduced, how could they ever work
with the solidarity necessary to bring off the socialist revolution? (Ibid.: 138).
The Third Image: International Anarchy
With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them,
with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates
of its own reason or desire conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to
occur. To achieve a favourable outcome from such a conflict a state has to rely
on its own devices, the relative efficiency of which must be its constant concern.
(Ibid.: 157)
This argument for the permanent possibility of war due to the absence of a world
government can be traced back to Thucydides and John Adams. In anarchy there
is no authentic harmony (Ibid.: 160). In the absence of a world government all
states have to fend for themselves, the final means to achieve their goals is force.
Any state at any time might calculate that force will be the best way to achieve its
goals; so all other states need as well to be prepared for war. The requirements
for state action are, in this view, imposed by the circumstances in which all exist
(Ibid.: 160).
21
But apart from the nature of international affairs, there is also nurture as an
aspect. Such as in the first image, citizens could be perfected, statesmen as well,
states could be internally perfected, and that would lead also in the third image
to improvement. International disarmament and trade leading to peace are such a
possibility. To discuss the difficulties of this optimistic view, Waltz discusses the
works of Kant, Rousseau and others closer.
On the one hand, Spinoza looks at the failure of man as his imperfection, his
passion, and he claims that states are like men. The difference between them is
one of scale and necessity: whereas individuals need to combine and collaborate
in order to survive, states are not subject to that need. They can be self-sufficient.
Wars among states are then as inevitable as are defects in the nature of man
(Ibid.: 162). Kant as well here is cited. Human beings, according to him, are
members both of the world of sense as the world of understanding. If they were
totally wholly of the latter, they would always act according to universally valid,
self-imposed maxims. They would follow the categorical imperative (Ibid.: 163).
But humans dont, and so the civil state appears as a necessary constraint. The
state acts as a judge between them; he enforces and enables morality in men. States
in the world are like individuals in the state of nature. They are neither perfectly
good nor are they controlled by law (Ibid.: 163). War, therefore, and conflict will
occur. But Kant for fear of terrible despotism does not argue for a world state.
All states must so improve that they only act morally. They may therefore improve
enough to allow the rule of law among them, a rule that is not backed by force
but by voluntary submission and consensus. The power to enforce the law is
derived not from external sanction, but from internal perfection (Ibid.: 164).
Waltz, however, detects here an apparent inconsistency, and moves on to
Rousseau. Rousseau describes the Hobbesian state of nature as fiction. Men
before the establishment of society have not developed the vices of pride and
envy and whenever chance brings them together, consciousness of weakness and
impotency dissuades them from attacking one another (Ibid.: 165). Waltz takes
from Rousseau the argument, that it is principally impossible to know human
nature, to know the natural man before the social man. However, he concurs that
conflict arises only within society, which raises three questions: 1) Why, if the
original state of nature was one of relative peace and quiet, did man ever leave
it? 2) Why does conflict arise in social situations? 3) How is the control of conflict
related to its cause? (Ibid.: 166). The answer to the first question is, again, necessity.
When men became closer to each other, they had to integrate, the imperative
became cooperate or die. This in itself was problematic, as Rousseau illustrates
very well with the fable of the stag hunt. Cooperation often fails, because no one
can trust that the others wont cheat. Rousseau solves this by invoking god or
reason. If all was known and rationally calculable, the common good would
easily be achieved. If men were perfect, their perfection would be reflected in all
of their calculations and actions. Each could rely on the behaviour of others and
all decisions would be made on principles that would preserve a true harmony
of interests (Ibid.: 168). The problem to achieve this is not only passion, but
22
also individual rationality that might under uncertainty differ from collective
rationality, as the stag hunt fable illustrates. According to Waltz, this collective
rationality problem cannot easily be overcome.
Since the world cannot be defined in terms of perfection, the very real problem
of how to achieve an approximation to harmony in cooperative and competitive
activity is always with us and, lacking the possibility of perfection, it is a
problem that cannot be solved simply by changing men. (Ibid.: 170)
For Rousseau, Kant and Spinoza, this resembles the state of nature, in which
even agriculture is impossible because it would be absurd to take the trouble
of cultivating a field which might be stripped of its crop by the first comer
(Ibid.: 171). For overcoming the state of nature, for making production and
collaboration possible, some men unite, set up rules and organize ways of
enforcing them (Ibid.: 171). This results in material gains. In the formation of
the state, man abandons natural liberty and in return receives civil liberty and the
proprietorship of all he possesses. But what, then, is the state among states, at the
third level?
It is, so the mentioned thinkers all-alike, a state of nature, defined by the lack of
an authority above them. The end of the state is the preservation and prosperity of
its members; he is a unit complete with will and purpose. Ideally, not assuming
that the sovereign acts in opposition to the national will, a state will actualize
the general will in its decisions, so Rousseau. The unity of the state is achieved,
when there exist the conditions necessary for the actualization of the general will
(Ibid.: 174). The precondition for this is patriotism and equality, so Rousseau.
Waltz accepts the idea of the state as a unit and compares patriotism to modern
nationalism. The centripetal force of nationalism may itself explain why states
can be thought of as units (Ibid.: 177), so Waltz asserts.
The less good the state, by Rousseaus standards, in the ultimate case the
unity of the state is simply the naked power of the de facto sovereign. On the
other hand, the better the state, or, we can now add, the more nationalistic,
and in the ultimate case the agreement of the citizens with the governments
formulation of foreign policy is complete. In either case, the state appears to
other states as a unit. (Ibid.: 178)
Also, wartime experience makes the state integrate into a unit. But how, now, do
the units interact? Under anarchy, when everything is left to chance, prudence
is futile. Even only good states could not live in a peaceful world, says Rousseau
in opposition to Kant. The will of the state, which in its perfection is general for
each of the citizens, is only a particular will when considered in relation to the
rest of the world (Ibid.: 181). And, therefore, it might be wrong in relation to the
world. For solving this tension, states would have to be abolished; the absence
of an authority above states to prevent and adjunct conflicts inevitably arising
23
from particular wills means that war is inevitable (Ibid.: 182). If anarchy is the
problem, then there are only two possible solutions: 1) to impose an effective
control on the separate and imperfect states; 2) to remove states from the sphere
of the accidental, that is, to define the good state as so perfect that it will no longer
be particular (Ibid.: 182).
For making this point, he cites Europe and the frequent occurrence of war
in Europe because their union is formed and maintained by nothing better than
chance (Ibid.: 183). Europe, to Rousseau, is in precisely that stage before the
establishment of a European society. For international affairs, in conclusion, what
kind of structure is required? Rousseau rejects the idea of a voluntary association
of states. He maintains that a federal government is needed as shall unite their
individual members and place the one no less than the other under the authority of
the law (Ibid.: 185).
Waltz discusses this view by citing examples from economics, politics
and history. The first example he gives is on national tariffs and international
trade. Protectionism of one country in this sphere, he argues, leads to a spiral
of escalation in which all countries start to protect their economies, even if this
results in a general decline in economic welfare. Unilateral, rational actions, he
concludes, lead to the worse outcome collectively. This argument is close to what
later was described in the prisoners dilemma. It leads Waltz to state: Fighting is
exactly what we may do in the absence of an effective decision-making authority.
The authority, not the categorical imperative, is the important factor so far as
peace is concerned (Ibid.: 190). What is rational from a domestic point of view
is not rational internationally, and for overcoming this problem of scale, we need
international institutions. Individual wisdom may represent collective insanity,
but under the conditions described it is difficult to see what the individual can
do about it (Ibid.: 196) and in the absence of spontaneous or nearly unanimous
agreement, governmental action is required (Ibid.: 194).
The second example he cites is from politics, and here he mentions the
importance of relative gains under anarchy: in a condition of anarchy, however,
relative gain is more important than absolute gain (Ibid.: 198). This leads him to a
discussion of the idea of balance of power, being possibly an impossible thing like
perpetual motion a longstanding illusion, coming from Hume and Morgenthau.
He asks the question: Is the balance of power illusion or reality? Is it something
pursued by the vicious and stupid, rejected by the pure and wise? (Ibid.: 200).
And the answer he gives himself: it is a logic that is intimately connected with the
third image of international relations (Ibid.: 200). It is and must be the rationale
of states under anarchy to pursue the balance of power. As everybodys strategy
depends on everybody elses, all states are drawn into the balancing logic. He cites
game theory here to make that point, and the need to form coalitions to oppose an
enemy, the existence of zero-sum games which inspire even more competition,
and in which the problem is entirely one of distribution and not of production
(Ibid.: 202). Even if these games are ideal cases and we find in reality a more
24
mixed situation, they describe why cooperation is oftentimes rendered impossible

in favour of competition and balancing. In extremes, two possibilities are given:
1) It may become a simple problem in maximization: all the players may
cooperate to make the largest possible pie. In international politics, this
corresponds to the hypothetical case in which all states band together with
nature as their adversary. 2) All the players may be so intent on the question
of how the pie already in existence should be divided that they forget about
the possibility of increasing the amount each will have by working together to
make more of it. (Ibid.: 203)
The decisive factors for the games that are played internationally are the
objectives of the states. Common to the desires of all states is the wish for
survival (Ibid.: 203). This, then, determines a game in which all have to adapt to
each others strategy, and the most likely strategy is balance of power. Pursuing
a balance-of-power policy is still a matter of choice, but the alternatives are
those of probable suicide on the one hand and the active playing of the powerpolitics game on the other (Ibid.: 205). Of importance here is that in the
international realm, the use of force is possible. In international politics there
is no authority effectively able to prohibit the use of force (Ibid.: 205), there is
no monopoly of force such as within the state. This does not mean that states
all the time have to war. The clever player will be on watch for a chance to
increase his gains or cut his losses by cooperating with another (Ibid.: 204ff)
and institutions may moderate the extent and savagery of the competition for
power. States may cooperate as well as compete (Ibid.: 206). Still, survival
depends on the capability to defend oneself; hence the balance of power is
to be observed. This also, he argues, renders Kants discussion of morality in
foreign affairs irrelevant. Where survival is at stake, there is no room for such
considerations. The conclusion? Moral behaviour is one thing in a system that
provides predictable amounts and types of security; another thing where such
security is lacking (Ibid.: 207). Now, is the balance of power inevitable? It
depends, of course, on the actions of states. But the logic of the system under
anarchy, Waltz argues, strongly favours balance of power. Waltz goes on to
discuss the historical evidence for these claims and mentions here the possibility
of internal balancing when external balancing is not possible. Where adjustment
by international moves is less possible, internal development of industry and
armaments becomes more important. Balance of power, furthermore, is an
element of continuity in international relations, as the historical analysis shows.
In conclusion, Waltz, after having discussed the causes of war at the three
levels, argues that there is a constant possibility of war in the world due to the
structural condition of anarchy. He rejects liberal and socialist ideas for peace
as tautologies, but also does not accept the argument for a world government to
overcome anarchy.
25
Yet in the international as in the domestic sphere, if anarchy is the cause, the
obvious conclusion is that government is the cure; and this is true even though
the disease in the former case is not fatal. The problem, however, becomes a
practical one. The amount of force needed to hold a society together varies with
the heterogeneity of the elements composing it. (Ibid.: 228)
He discusses the need to see the causes of war on all levels in their interaction.
Whereas immediate causes of war, such as location, size, power, interest, type
of government, past history and tradition, are to be found in the first and second
images, the third image condition implies that wars occur because there is
nothing to prevent them. The international environment, therefore, becomes
the permissive cause of war. International anarchy is one explanation for
war, but not alone. Men, also, are ambitious, vindictive and rapacious. The
logical conclusion, if men cannot be perfected, as well as states cannot be, is
the abolishment of a world of sovereign states. The obvious conclusion of the
third image analysis is that world government is the remedy for world war. But:
The remedy, though it may be unassailable in logic, is unattainable in practice
(Ibid.: 238).
Chapter 3

Waltz in Man, the State and War wrote about the main questions that concern
IR as a discipline; questions about violence and war, why they arise, and how
and whether they could possibly be prevented, abolished or reduced. He had set
himself here a task of enormous proportions, and successfully accomplished it. It
is for this reason that scholars and students of International Relations read this
seminal book still to this day.
MSW discusses the causes of war at several levels, from the individual, to the
state, to the international system. The line of his argument about human nature as
a cause for war is in accord with todays scholarship: finding human nature too
complex to educate us about the preconditions for peace, he sees a solution for
conflict among humans in the state. That, on the other hand, does not solve the
issue of interstate wars, as states still exist within an international system marked
by anarchy. The fascinating fact here, for me, is that Waltz stops short of arguing
further, and in logical completion of his previous argument, that overcoming the
anarchy among states not only could but must be a solution to interstate warfare,
an argument which has been strongly promoted by the Institutionalist school and
thinking about global governance and world-stateism more recently.
The great contribution of Waltz and the relevance of his book for us even
today is the conceptual and analytical strength on the main issues that IR, and
social sciences, scholars are concerned with: questions of violence and war, and
the possibility of harmony and peace. His book provided a tour de force through
the then contemporary and classical discourses on war and violence, their causes,
their possibilities of prevention. An additional important and original contribution
of his book was his distinction of this literature into the three levels of analysis
the individual, the state and the international system. Even today this distinction
is commonly used in writings about war, and the causes of war and peace
(e.g. Levy 2010).
This chapter will both try to take up the distinction of the three levels, without
engaging in a further discussion about this distinction per se, and will discuss
more recent findings on the causes of war and violence and the ways to prevent
them. The main argument derived from this broad overview on the literature
of the causes of war and peace will be that while Waltzs account still offers
very important and fundamental insights into these questions, some aspects have
gained increased attention since then. The search, it seems, for thinking about
possibilities to create world peace, has made some considerable progress.
One of these issues will be discussed with relation to the level of the individual,
addressing human nature, and concerns the question of inequality. Inequality is
28
increasingly discussed as a major external cause for aggression and violence. This
will serve for making the argument that we do not only need to think about the state
as a solution for violence among humans, but about the good state. Furthermore,
the scholarship on democratic peace has made quite some significant advances.
It seems, the good state not only serves for preventing war and violence amongst
its citizens, but also serves for increased peace internationally. However, this
democratic peace has just recently been causally linked to the presence of strong
international institutions, which will lead us to the third aspect to tackle here, the
discussion of the preconditions for peace at the systems level. It will be argued
here that it is unfortunate indeed that Waltz considered the establishment of some
sort of world stateism an indisputable impossibility. Not only theoretically there
is ever more support for the idea that some form of global governance strongly
serves the interests of peace amongst nations, also empirically the presence of
ever more and ever stronger global institutions was shown to increase the chances
of international peace. This argument will be completed by a discussion on the
need to reflect more about the nature of good global governance providing for
more international equality and democracy in order to perfect the conditions for
prevention of war and violence at the global level.
The First Image
Waltz sees human nature, represented in each individual in essence but ever
changed in its specific expression, as the original cause of war. Human nature, he
claims, is so complex that it can sustain any hypothesis about war and violence. In
his first chapter, he discusses passion as a root of evil, and irrationality or rather,
emotions as opposed to reason as a cause for war. Wars result from selfishness,
from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity (Waltz 1959: 16). Both
optimists as well as pessimists seem to believe that human nature can be improved.
However, for pessimists internal peace of a community is always coercive
[and] the external peace between communities is marred by competitive strife
(Ibid.: 25).
The research on human nature has made impressive advances, particularly
with the focus on genetic origins of human behaviour. It has still not solved the
puzzle about the nature of human nature, though. One of the most popular recent
books on genetics, socio-biology and human nature Steven Pinkers The Blank
Slate (2002) still today confirms Waltzs interpretation: human beings have
always been and are somewhat inherently potentially violent. While dependent
on the individual and circumstances, this general potential for violence cannot
be explained by looking at certain selected criteria only. Some factors favour the
emergence of violence, and some individuals are more violent prone. However,
violence seems a persistent possibility and a potential for humans more generally.
In addition, some causal and some restraining factors can be found: such as
frustrated need fulfilment, experience of violence, or growing up in a violent-prone
29
surrounding, as far as gender; and for the reduction of these factors, coercion,
education, or psychosocial interventions.
In Waltzs discussion on the psychology of men there shows a deep
dissatisfaction with strong and reliable predictions for, and recommendations for
prevention of, violence. Looking at the literature in psychology today, there seems
to be an even wider array of possible explanations for violence present. They range
from the discussion of emotions citing here frustrations, negative feelings, and
the role of cognitive interpretations of these events to discussions about violent
personalities, including the role of learned experience, and finally the societal
impact of media and culture. The breadth of these potential factors and the lack
of specificity with which they are connected to violence, solely in a probabilistic
way, is unsatisfying. But a clear argumentation can be derived, so simple that
it seems odd to state it: Aggression results from negative stimuli. If something
bad happens to a person, the person will more likely become aggressive. Not
at all, however, is this a deterministic factor for violence. Individuals who have
developed more ways of dealing with frustrations, setbacks and negative emotions,
have much less propensity for engaging in violence in response to these stimuli.
Also, passive individuals, or people to whom the opportunities are just not given,
will engage less in violence (Berkowitz 1993: 32f). While this discussion does
nothing but to support Waltz that human emotions are a tricky aspect when trying
to deal with violent behaviour, it will become important in the following for the
discussion that even though we always theoretically can decide for violence
there are certain factors which promote violence and which can be controlled.
Before turning to this discussion, some additional thoughts shall be presented
here to support the interpretation in MSW that human nature independently of
events can be violent. One issue that needs to be addressed for thinking about
the relationship between humans and violence still seems to be the free will
problem. If humans possess free will, as one side of the argument has it, then this
positions the whole question about violence in another dimension then when we
would assume in a more determinist line that human behaviour can be explained
by individuals genetic setup, psychological processes etc. The determinist
tradition in general starts from the assumption that violence can be explained by
understanding its causes. The attention for the external meaning of violence, that
is, that of which it is a symptom, to which it refers, is a determinist account of
violence (Schinkel 2004). On the other hand, as Searle writes in his lectures on
free will, it is the assumption of the presence of a free will that provides the basis
for rationality in humans:
Human rationality presupposes free will. The reason is that rationality must
be able to make a difference. There must be a difference between rational and
irrational behavior, but this is only possible if there is a space in which rationality
can operate. The presupposition, in short, of rationality is that not all of our
actions have antecedent conditions that are causally sufficient to determine the
action. (Searle 2004: 10)
30
While rationality in Waltz had been discussed as a possible precondition of peace,

the assumption of free will implied in the possibility of rationality does present
a fundamental problem. Free will would include the permanent possibility to
decide for violence for any reason imaginable. For example, Schinkel uses the
formalist perspective to describe the possibility of autotelic violence, a violence
that is its own goal, in which means and end are melted together, violence for
violences sake, because it can give pleasure (Schinkel 2004: 19). Obviously, this
perspective radically opposes the determinist perspective of detectable external
or internal causes of violence, which can be addressed to prevent it, and thereby
reduces the possibilities for thinking about reduction of violence by political,
economic, social, psychological, or even medical interventions. If humans seek
violence for mere pleasure, as a goal in itself without further reasons, then
changing human environments is rendered a futile undertaking. Still, autotelic
violence might be open to interventions of certain psychological kinds. But even
then, the presence of free will would enable individuals to choose to not positively
respond to the influences of these interventions. Therefore, the assumption of free
will, while being the basis for the assumption of rationality, can also serve as
the basis for the argument that violence cannot be controlled in absolute by any
means. The assumption of freedom of decision in essence always presupposes the
possibility for decisions for violence. Also, violence cannot at all be understood
as always irrational, and therefore as excluding itself from the possible choice of a
free willed individual. Under conditions of scarcity, violence might become a very
rational means of ensuring survival, as Waltz already mentioned in his discussion
on Realism. Rational considerations about self-interest versus the common good
are always dependent on the value put on the individual versus the community,
or the community versus the larger species. The difficulty here is the question:
rationality for whom or rationality in whose interest? And finally, even if purely
rational considerations could lead us towards finding a rational requirement for
general non-violence, these would involve calculations of such complexity (or
a different culture altogether, cf. Dalai Lama 1998) that it would be impossible
for the average human to conclude on them. Rationality per se, even if perfected,
would therefore not necessarily lead to peace. Therefore, as long as we assume and
allow free will to exist, any human and social situation can be conceptualized as
a potential cause or motivation for violence. Per definitionem, free will can imply
constructing reasons for violence from anything. Violence occurrence just because
humans want to engage in violence, per se would concur with Waltzs discussion
of passion as the root of evil. However, while the distinction between emotions
and rationality is generally not clearly defined, there are more rational reasons to
engage in war and fighting. The solution here then nonetheless would comply with
Waltzs proposal: a state monopoly of violence setup to prohibit and control the
use of it.
It continues to be an unsolved problem in philosophy, however, to answer
the question if such a thing as free will does exist. The genetic revolution is
just the current major branch of thought challenging the assumption of free will.
31
Genetic research, for example, is thought to have impacted the discussion in

criminal law. Jones asserts that recent discoveries in the field of genetics have
called this theoretical assumption of individual, voluntary choice into question
(Jones 2003: 1031). Much of the related research is having a tendency to promote
a determinist understanding of human nature and therefore for our perspective on
violence. While not affecting our understanding that violence might be natural for
humans, this research rather promotes the understanding that it is predetermined
from our genetic heritage. Similarly, the neuro-sciences seek to explain aggression
in humans from the composition of the elements and processes found in the
living brain. Both fields of study focus on biology as the causative agent in
human aggression, and could therefore be used to contend the assumption of
free will, as discussed above, but not the assumption of humans being inherently
potentially violent.
So far, we have discussed the perspective that violence springs from human
nature as an internally eternally present potentiality. Free will enables violence as
a possible choice, biology explains its potential. However, much of the literature
on the causes of violence understands it as not being rooted in human nature
intrinsically, but being learned, or being effected by external conditions. While
learned violence often refers back to abusive familial relationships and early
childhood experiences, environmental factors commonly discussed include a
culture and history of violence, poverty, and a lack of education and employment,
and inequality. Waltz dismisses the belief that one only needs to find the social
conditions responsible for war everything from infant care, everybodys psyche,
the variation of custom in different tribes, and the relation between culture and
society and individual behaviour (Waltz 1959: 47) in order to prevent it. This
is interesting, as he will continue to argue that the external presence or absence
of a higher authority the state presents us with the only viable solution to
violence among humans. While focusing solely on anarchy as a permissive cause
for violence here, he tends to underestimate some equally important aspects of
social causes for aggression.
The scholarship concerned with external aspects and social factors causing
human violence, and possibilities to reduce its occurrence, is still as vibrant as
it possibly was in Waltz times, and it seems necessary to discuss some of the
more prominent findings. A number of factors seem to increase the occurrence of
violence and could be manipulated to reduce it.
One of these factors is poverty, and related to this inequality and relative
deprivation. Pinker supports the argument that among the external factors
causing violence inequality, not poverty per se, seems to be the strongest
candidate. Conspicuous economic inequality is a good predictor for violence
(better than poverty itself), presumably because men deprived of legitimate means
of acquiring status compete for status on the streets instead (Pinker 2002: 329).
Wilkinson and Pickett provided an important empirical account, based on
decades long work with public health data, showing a clear positive correlation
between income inequality and homicide rates (Ibid.: 135). The importance of
32
inequality as a cause for violence was demonstrated not only in a comparison of

several countries, but also amongst the US states (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010).
Inequality, which was since the 1970s debated under the term structural
violence, has been brought forward again in recent attempts to explain the
occurrence of international terrorism (Beyer 2008). A common explanation for
inequality resulting in violence is that inequality reduces the possibility of certain
physical and psychological need fulfilments (self-maintenance, protection,
appreciation, status, self-development; Jacoby 2008: 105) and thereby results
in frustration, which spurs aggression. The frustration-aggression hypothesis
is much older than that and has been implemented, for example, to explain
Why Men Rebel (Gurr 1971a). It is based on the premise that persons might
feel that they are deprived of some desired state or thing, in comparison with
some standard, or with the real or imagined condition of other people (cited in
Jacoby 2008: 104). Deprivation as the cause of aggression was already in Marx
understood as immiseration as the motor for collective action and had been
promoted by Tocqueville as explaining the French revolution with his theory
of rising expectations (Ibid.: 104). Deprivation is linked to violence in what
is supposed to resemble a frustration-aggression mechanism. If goal-directed
behaviour is obstructed, frustration results and this always leads to aggression
(Ibid.: 105). The Marxist tradition states that economic needs, once frustrated,
contribute strongly to the outbreak of violent action (Ibid.: 105).
With a focus on war, not just violence, the hypothesis of poverty and inequality
contributing to civil wars also is strongly supported (Dixon 2009; Nafziger and
Auvinen 2003; Collier et al. 2009). While it is generally known that poorer
countries exhibit a much higher tendency towards civil wars (Collier et al. 2003)
and intra-national fighting decreases until it cedes with a certain economic and
developmental level. Also intra-national inequality has been shown to contribute to
fighting amongst parties within a given country (Ostby 2004; Cederman, Weidman
and Gleditsch 2010). While this aspect of the deprivation approach has been
critically engaged in a grievance versus greed debate, citing opportunity as the
main cause statistically to be found for conflict, this has recently been refuted by a
number of writers who claim that, while opportunities need to be present for civil
wars to erupt, the economic needs are still at the root of it (Collier et al. 2009). In
Theory of International Politics (TIP), Waltz will state that international politics
is mostly about inequalities (Waltz 1979: 94), but he does not discuss this aspect
as a contributor for human violence in his discussion on human nature.
Let me conclude the discussion on human nature as a cause for war and the
resulting possibilities for its prevention with some thoughts about the state. If
human beings by nature are potentially violent, and some circumstances provoke
this violence to erupt, what could be preconditions needed for the general
prevention of violence?
Waltz strongly favours the state as the primary solution to the problem of
violence among humans. There is a widely-held unspoken agreement in political
science mainstream on the beneficiality of the state. Several approaches, such as
33
original communism, world government, small size approach, to a certain degree

libertarianism, and anarchism, however challenge this perspective (Ross 2000).
Some of these approaches recommend small scale, non-hierarchical groups as
entities in which society should be organized. Others, such as libertarianism,
promote a minimalist state, which would still contain the monopoly of
violence and could carry out its defensive and protective functions. Indeed,
some anthropologists have argued that small-scale egalitarian band societies
are the most peaceful societies we can find amongst the global population
(Cashman 1993: 30ff; Donnelly 2012). On the other hand, a re-evolutionary step
with the abolishment of the state and the reestablishment of small-scale societies
would hinder the effective addressing of many day-to-day issues. Humans would
have to fundamentally change their economy, their social systems would collapse,
and their transport and communication ways could not be maintained. All of these,
even if not directly state-owned or -managed, depend in one way or other on the
state, either, because it supports it, or, because it regulates it. The abolishment of
the state would reduce us to a state similar of nature, in which even agriculture
is impossible because it would be absurd to take the trouble of cultivating a field
which might be stripped of its crop by the first comer. For overcoming the state
of nature, for making production and collaboration possible, some men unite, set
up rules and organize ways of enforcing them (Waltz 1959: 171). The state
still seems to be the most effective organization, which humans have developed in
their evolution to address issues of security and efficiency.
But there are further dimensions of higher authority and social organization
to consider than the proposed monopoly of force in a minimalist state. A good
society controls the expression of human nature by both increasing the incentives
for positive, harmonious and peaceful behaviour, and by reducing the causes for
decisions for violence. However, only part of these mechanisms are addressed
when Waltz saw the best way for establishing peace amongst humans in the
Hobbesian tradition by establishing a protective and sanctioning authority with
the state. In this understanding, the coercive aspect, or the increase of costs for the
individual implied in violent acts, is predominantly focused on. This perspective
focuses mainly on the power of the state to control violence by taking over the
monopoly of force and by enforcing this monopoly with state power, such as
the police. However, this excludes other possibilities of how the cost-benefit
calculations of humans can be changed towards peace and against violence.
Multiple additional factors are present in the state and constantly working to
regulate in-group human behaviour, such as families, small scale social groupings
and constellations of all sorts, religious and educative establishments, sports clubs
and what not. The need for the state is rather explained by the fact that only it can
serve to direct and support these basic social activities from the family to the
national level and to give it a common regulatory framework. The state is the
container for society, and society provides the cultural context for the individual
to engage in positive relationships with other fellow members of the same society.
And it is the integrative aspects in society, which are active in shaping harmonious
34
human behaviour. Sub-state communities and families, for example, provide the
individual with the fulfilment of the need to belong, and provide the surrounding
in which it is socialized and educated. A state, which provides opportunities to
participate, will inspire less frustration in its population than an authoritarian
state with few democratic participation rights. An economically strong state with
less inequality will experience less internal strife and crime and violence more
generally. And finally, a society, which culturally favours non-violence, might
expose its population to less violent media content and other daily stimuli. In
conclusion, a state has many more functions in which it influences and at least
potentially prevents violence than merely the monopoly of force. While the
connection between state health or state strength and the reduction of internal
violence seems to be widely supported with a clear correlation between state failure
and internal strife (Holsti 1996), this does not only imply the importance of an
effective state in terms of internal policing and the maintenance of the monopoly
of physical force, but also it refers to state legitimacy and the provision of public
services (cf. Fund for Peace, undated).
As the above discussion implied, we do not only have to think about the state
as a solution for violence, but about the good state. Good governance had been
fashionable as a concept for peace and development in the academic discussion
in the 1990s, and it centred, mainly with a focus on violence-struck developing
countries, on the claim that good governance should be implemented in order to
promote more peaceful states. The United Nations in their discussion on good
governance specifically cites participation, equity and inclusiveness amongst
the criteria. Good states, in conclusion, need to account for far more than just the
monopoly of force. The quality of the state is a good predictor for the reduction of
internal violence (Dixon 2009).
The Second Image
While the state, as argued in the first part of this chapter, presents a partial solution
to violence among individuals, it in itself presents the tool for violence between
societies. States provide over the most important structural prerequisites for
engaging in war: a coercive hierarchy and leadership and an economic surplus to
support a non-productive military organisation (Cashman 1993: 31). It is states,
which wage wars amongst each other. We therefore have to look at the state to
understand the preconditions and possibilities of peace on the second level. If
violence is regulated by establishing several higher authorities and creating an
international society of states, how then can war amongst states be averted?
Waltz compares the state with a container for human interaction, in which it
is malleable for good and bad. It therefore depends in part on the internal structure
of the state if we find war or peace the result of interaction. However, Waltz does
not follow the liberal recommendation that the state had to be perfected internally.
Waltz concludes that perfection is as impossible to achieve for states as for men.
35
In the past decade, the discussion on the democratic peace theorem was at
its height. The central argument promoted by followers of this theorem centres
around the assumption that democratic states behave much more peacefully
amongst each other than any other combination of states. This argument, which
looks at dyads of states, has been put to rigorous testing, and even though it
remains a difficult task to explain the findings, it seems that indeed democracies
rarely go to war with each other. The positive correlation between shared
democracy and peace has been found to be so strong that some even declared
the democratic peace to be closest to what IR can offer as an empirically
founded law-like relationship. Disturbingly, however, this does not imply that
democracies generally fight less. They do engage in wars, but particularly
with systems of other kinds. The challenge therefore remains to explain why
democracies seem to rarely fight each other and to understand if this finding is
dependent on context and circumstances, or could account indeed for a more
reliable finding (Gartzke 2010).
Critics of the democratic peace (cf. Barkawi and Laffey 2001) have argued that
the history of democracy is too short to be sure that the positive correlations found
are not co-incidental. Also, it has been argued that in the more recent history,
democracies have not only shared political systems, but were mostly combined in
alliances, or shared at least a certain culture, and the idea of belonging to the club
of the progressives, the most developed political systems. This shared culture, and
the centralization of democracies in the West for a long time, could potentially
account in part for the observed peace between democracies, but it would point
towards an alternative explanation for this observation. If we should attribute the
peace between democracies not to their shared political system, but to a common
identity and some form of loose alliance, then the explanation would be rather a
Realist or a Constructivist one, the democratic peace being an instance of in-group
formation, a community phenomenon (Weiffen 2009: 65).
If, however, we accept the law-like findings of democratic peace research
per se, there could be additional interesting explanations for the phenomenon.
One new development in the democratic peace literature is the argument that
shared participation in strong international institutions is the missing link
behind the findings on reduced war between democracies (Weiffen 2009). Also,
as indicated above, development is strongly linked to democracy and democratic
peace. It remains to be explored if absolute or relative development (i.e. wealth,
or inequality) contributes to democracy and peace, but the positive relation was
described as virtually equally law-like as the connection between peace and
democracy (Gartzke 2010: 64). However, development can always be understood
as relative wealth on a global scale. Hence, the connection between development
and democracy and peace could equally be framed negatively in terms of inequality
as connected to the presence of war and the absence of democracy in the less equal
states. It might not matter if we understand democracies to be peaceful because of
their political system, or states to be democracies because of their peaceful context.
For both interpretations the key criteria could be: successful states enjoy peace.
36
Success here would imply the absence of the negative effects of between-nation
inequality, and the inclusion in global state-like structures of order. Similarly to
individuals in the good state, states might benefit from absence of inequality and
the presence of positive authority.
The Third Image
I would like to continue the discussion on global governance in the discussion of
the third level. Waltz writes:
With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them,
with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of
its own reason or desire-conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur. To
achieve a favorable outcome from such a conflict a state has to rely on its own
devices, the relative efficiency of which must be its constant concern. (Waltz
1959: 157)
This argument for the permanent possibility of war due to the absence of an
international government can be traced back to Thucydides and John Adams. In
anarchy there is no authentic harmony. In the absence of a world government
or anarchy all states have to fend for themselves; the final means to achieve
their goals is force. Any state at any time might calculate that force will be the
best way to achieve its goals, so all other states need as well to be prepared
for war. The requirements for state action are, in this view, imposed by the
circumstances in which all exist (Ibid.: 160). Waltz, after having discussed the
causes of war at the three levels, argues that there is a constant possibility of war
in the world due to the structural condition of anarchy. He rejects liberal and
socialist ideas for peace as tautologies, but also surprisingly does not accept
the argument for a world government to overcome anarchy.
Since Waltz published this book, there have been fundamental challenges
towards this argument. The main challenge was posed by scholars from the
Institutionalist school who argued for the benefit of a minimalist world-state-ism
in the form of international institutions. Globalization, the process of increasing
interactions of financial, economic and social nature on a global level, led many
analysts not only to proclaim the increase of shared transnational political problems,
but also to announce a withering away, or at least a partial transformation, of
the state (Strange 1996). For both these developments, which are thought to be
irreversible, political coordination and integration on a higher supranational level
is thought to be the only possible solution. This political integration, however,
is not thought to take to form of a world state to be created in the medium term
future (even though some authors would predict this for the longer term future,
cf. Wendt 2003), but rather to resemble what is termed global governance.
Global governance describes the combination of international institutions and
37
organizations, international law, norms and agreements, and global cooperative

interaction at and between actors on all three levels on a voluntary basis to order
their common affairs (Woodward 2011). Not only is global governance thought
to provide with effective global problem solving capability for the community of
states, also it encourages stable expectations of peaceful change in state actors,
which increases the trust needed to overcome anarchys security dilemma.
Furthermore, we can observe with globalization a partial blurring of the divides
between the first and the third analytical level. What has been described as the
emergence of new actors in international politics (such as non-governmental
organizations, transnational companies, and transnational terrorism, for example)
indicates an increased contact between the first and the third level, the individual
and the international system. The influences are present in both ways: individuals
are having more potential impact on the global level, an example being here
transnational terrorism, and international politics affects individuals around
the globe to a larger degree, an effect which was described in the literature on
globalization. If, however, we imply from here that the second level as the primary
container for human interaction is indeed losing part of its primary relevance, then
the question would arise if it is not logical and necessary to expect an increased
importance, and creation, of global political arrangements to counterbalance this
lack of authority over the individual. Crucially, global governance as a mediumstep towards overcoming and managing anarchy is not only practical and possible;
it is happening, and evolving fast.
Of course, global governance does not reach as far as world-stateism, even
if normative calls for such have been made. The European Union, with its
supranational form sui generis, usually serves as a model for global governance
on the regional level: states cede certain parts of their sovereignty and pool it to
enable them towards collective action. While not resembling a state, the European
Union could be an example how states even on a wider than regional basis could
integrate for the benefit of shared peace and prosperity. Even if this would imply
an evolutionary long-term future perspective, and not a present reality, the global
governance literature strongly suggests further integration on a global level to
be possible.
These arguments have been promoted at least since Rosenaus Governance
without Government (1992) and the United Nations report Our Global
Neighborhood (1995). Their main support stems from the evidence of increased
global and transnational interaction, which should result in a logical political
response. While the regarding literature is still developing, and needs further
development, the question inspired by the discussion on the first level is: What
is good global governance? Can we imagine global governance, which, in
opposition to and correcting the influences of globalization, reduces inequality
within and between nations? If inequality and good governance are key for peace
among individuals as well as states, the challenge for global governance theorists
is to conceptualize good global governance. As Waltz contended, a world polity
(even if not a state per se) needs to be rejected on normative grounds if it turns
38
into dictatorship or exploitation. The need therefore, is to inquire further into the
conditions for shaping global governance towards a better, a more humane, a more
equal system. This will affect, and be effected by, individuals and states alike.
Conclusion
Re-reading MSW presents us with a fundamental account on the causes of
war at the three levels of analysis and how in conjunction they do explain the
occurrence of international warfare. In the times since its publication, however,
there have been fundamental developments with regard to all three levels. When
addressing human nature, inequality seems to be an underexplored issue in Waltz
for thinking about aggression and violence. For preventing violence amongst
individuals, not only the establishment of state authority seems warranted, but the
establishment and maintenance of good governance. Similarly, the advancing
scholarship on democratic peace claims that both development and welfare and
international institutions are good predictors for peace amongst nations. Finally,
there has been much progress in the thinking about international institutions and
global governance as a force for peace on the global level. Also, the increase
in globalization and the concurrent evolution and thickening of international
institutionalism need to be taken into account when thinking about global
conflicts today. It seems reasonable to assume that the possibilities of higher
authority to overcome at least some of the effects of anarchy are not at all as
remote today as they might have been in the past. The existing level of global
institutionalism seems strong enough to connect many if not most states in
todays world in relations of mutual exchange and trust-building interactions. We
might therefore respond to Waltz that anarchy can be overcome and the solution
is not impracticable. However, in line with the discussions on the previous levels,
global governance per se might not be sufficient; we need to think about good
global governance, which ensures integration under some form of minimalist
common authority and the reduction of inequality as a precondition of war at all
three levels.
Chapter 4
Human Nature and the

Essence of Aggression
This chapter will provide more evidence for the arguments laid out above. In
particular, it will start with an analysis of human nature, an analysis of the causes
of war at the first image, the first level of analysis. Is violence necessarily human?
Is violence really ingrained in human nature, and how so? Waltzs perspective
firmly upholds the positive confirmative answer to this question. His pessimism
on the nature of human nature is in congruence with other Realists. Humans,
according to this view, are inherently bad and prone to engage in violence for
various reasons. The drives towards violence are inherent in human nature and
therefore war and violence have to be expected and are difficult to prevent.
But let us revisit this claim critically. For taking a deeper look at this question,
it is necessary to go beyond the traditional realm of political theory and to inquire
into disciplines that have the investigation of human nature at their heart. We shall
look into the disciplines of psychology, anthropology, sociology, and biology,
all of which have dealt with the question of violence in man and why it occurs.
The general findings of all these disciplines suggest the obvious: that violence is
inherently a human potential, but also that it is rather the exception than the norm.
In addition, general risk factors, or causes, of violence can be found, factors
that contribute to or lead more often to violence than others. Examples of such
factors are varied, and reach from early childhood experiences, to neurological
deficiencies, to a culture in which violence is dominantly advertised in the media.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the common themes, which develop
with regards to these causes of violence and try to relate these findings back to
the discussion in MSW. It will be shown that violence, even though inherently
human, does not need to occur under all circumstances but is usually triggered
by preceding causative factors. While these factors are varied, this will enable in
the following chapters the discussion on potentials to control these factors for the
prevention of violence.
Sociobiology
Sociobiology is a fairly young discipline, which originated in 1975 with
E.O. Wilsons monograph Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. The book had the
goal to apply evolutionary ideas based on Darwins theories to social behaviour.
Sociobiology therefore tries to explain human behaviour as based on biological
40
mechanisms, such as the drive to ensure reproduction. Competition for the best
mates is understood a central element in the evolution of man, shaping our relation
to violence and contributing to forms of violence such as infanticide, intermale
conflict, and male jealousy. Sociobiologists therefore draw comparisons between
the animal world and the human world, such as these:
It is the last item mates that accounts for most aggression in mammals. And
it is males that are most noted for this aggression. As we mentioned earlier,
females have so much at stake in any act of copulation so many months
gestation, the increased energy requirement, susceptibility to attack, the dangers
of birth, the responsibility of lactation that it serves their fitness to be picky
when looking for a partner. If females are picky, males must be show-offs: The
male must demonstrate that he has the qualities that serve the females fitness, in
order to serve his own fitness. (Boeree 1998)
Wilson himself had referred to warfare in terms of the spreading of genes:

If any social predatory animal attains a certain level of intelligence, as the
early hominids, being large primates, were especially predisposed to, one band
would have the capacity to consciously ponder the significance of adjacent
social groups and to deal with them in an intelligent, organized fashion. A
band might then dispose of a neighboring band, appropriate its territory, and
increase its own genetic representation in the metapopulation, retaining the
tribal memory of this successful episode, repeating it, increasing the geographic
range of its occurrence, and quickly spreading its influence still further in the
metapopulation. (Wilson 1975: 573)
More aggressive tribes, if successful, would show evolutionary fitness and would
pass on their genes to the next generations. This would favour these genes in the
long term, and even if counterbalanced by altruistic genes, which were selected
through the mechanisms within the tribes, the aggressive genes would survive and
would be present in generations later on. Pinker, a follower of Wilson, argues in
The Blank Slate that the predisposition to violence is something entirely natural,
as we have inherited it with our genes. Evidence of a natural heritage of violence
are to be found in our biological outset, such as for example, in the larger size,
strength, and upper-body mass of men, which indicates a history of male-tomale competition (2002: 316). Pinker rejects the interpretation that all violence is
learned or produced by cultural influences and conditions.
Anthropology
Anthropologists have long maintained that man is essentially a peaceful animal,
and that war is an invention and depended on cultural evolution. This interpretation
41
is based on the study of authentic tribes unaffected from Western civilization who
exhibit relatively few or no violent tendencies and did not go to war. Montagu
suggests that everything points to the non-violence of the greater part of mans
early existence and to the contribution made by the increasing development of
cooperative activities (Cashman 2000: 28). Early man depended on cooperation
within the group, as any intragroup violence would have endangered the survival
of the group. Also, intergroup violence is thought to have been rare. Leaky argues
that only the agricultural revolution brought about changes in the organization of
human society, which allowed for the development of warfare and violence:
as soon as people commit themselves to agricultural food production as against
nomadic food gathering they commit themselves to defending the land they
farm. To run away in the face of hostility is to face certain loss: a years labour
may be invested in the fields, and that cannot be given up easily. As well
as land that requires defending, agriculturalists tend to acquire property, both
personal and communal, that needs to be guarded. (cited in ibid.: 29)
As Cashman further maintains, peaceful societies have not only existed in the
distant past, but many such societies have survived into more recent times
(Ibid.: 30). Mostly, these are hunter-gatherer societies. They are marked by an
absence of wars, war involvement or civil wars, as well as the absence of a military
organization and the (relative) absence of violent crime. Many of these societies
can be classified as egalitarian band societies:
[they] generally lack patterns of ranking and stratification, place no restrictions
on the number of people capable of exercising power or occupying positions of
prestige, and have economies where exchange is based on generalized reciprocity.
[They] are small, face-to-face communities, a major factor contributing to their
open and egalitarian decision-making process. (Ibid.: 30)
It has, however, been argued that even in the distant past these peaceful societies
were the exception rather than the norm. As Ember and Ember write: A systematic
survey shows that, in contrast to the peaceful !Kung San of the 1950s and 1960s, 64
per cent of the foraging societies in the ethnographic record had combat between
communities or larger entities at least once every two years (1997: 2). Among the
societies they studied, war was absent or rare in 27.6 per cent of the cases, while it
was almost constant in 38.06 per cent of the cases. From the societies that had not
been pacified by intervention of the civilized modern societies, very few societies
(8.89 per cent) had rare or no war and most societies are found at the highest scale
score (warfare almost constant) (Ember and Ember 1997: 5). In support of this
finding, Pinker had argued recently that human evolution had made man more
peaceful and less violent:
42
Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been
getting kinder and gentler. Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to
indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission
statement of government, genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture
and mutilation as routine punishment, the death penalty for misdemeanors and
differences of opinion, assassination as the mechanism of political succession,
rape as the spoils of war, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the
major form of conflict resolution all were unexceptionable features of life for
most of human history. But, today, they are rare to nonexistent in the West, far
less common elsewhere than they used to be, concealed when they do occur, and
widely condemned when they are brought to light. (Pinker 2007)
The explanations for this evolutionary change remain somewhat vague, and
debatable with view to the two world wars in the not too distant past. However,
the argument, which is certainly valid and which we can draw from both of these
perspectives is that the environment, the stage of and form of development of
society, probably influences humans and makes them either more peaceful or more
prone to warring.
Psychology
The most interesting branch of study, and the one which probably put most effort
into the analysis of violence as aggression, is the discipline of psychology. Four
main aspects are dealt with in contemporary psychology regarding the causes of
violence: emotions, cognition, personalities, and learning. Cognition and learning
are processes that shape decisions for violence either short- or long-term. They are
interrelated, and again related to personalities, as learning in children influences
the behaviour and hence the personality of adults. All of them however are not
to be understood without the role of emotions, which play the most prominent
part in the explanation of aggression. For example, personalities who are prone
to instrumentalist violence, or goal-directed violence, have been shown to act
aggressively to control the behaviour of others, to restore justice, and to assert
and protect positive identities (Krahe 2001: 42). These goals are intrinsically
connected to emotional cues.
In opposition to the political scientists belief in the rational actor, emotions
are powerful things and strongly motivate human behaviour. We constantly use
our emotions to judge the value of our actions and the value of the processes and
objects in our surrounding for our benefit and wellbeing. In case we identify these
values as positive, we feel good, and that again determines our rational behaviour
differently than if we identify these values as negative. In fact, without emotions
rationality is not possible. Individuals in whom the emotional centres in the brain
have been destroyed due to accident or surgery are not able thereafter to make
simple day-to-day decisions. Their rationality is lacking the judge who determines
43
the end to any calculation of costs and benefits by introducing an estimate of

personal value. Their ultimately rational calculations run into ever more complex
calculations, adding more and more detail, without being able to stop and arrive
at a conclusion. Damasio analyzed several cases of brain-damaged individuals
to argue that rationality and the mind cannot be separated from the body and
emotions (1994). He introduced the somatic marker hypothesis, which claims that
through learning we attribute emotional states to certain external objects or events.
Encountering these objects or events triggers emotional cues, which in turn help
us make decisions on how to relate to and interact with these objects or events. On
the one hand, emotions guide our rational thinking and enable decision-making.
On the other hand, strong emotions influence our rationality towards aberrations
from objectivity. Our perceptions become distorted, our calculations biased
(Pham 2007). Depressed individuals supposedly perceive reality in the most
realistic way; all others perceive reality in a biased way, influenced by emotions.
Our emotions also shape our preference for actions: individuals who experience
fear are less likely to engage in risk seeking than individuals who experience
states of intense anger. Overall, it can be said that emotions strongly influence our
decisions and our behaviour, even our rationality.
Psychologists further argue that negative emotions are a prime motivator for
engaging in violence. In opposition to the popular myth that hardship betters
a person, it seems to rather only embitter a person and lead to hostility and
aggression. A rapidly growing body of evidence indicates that unpleasant events
are far more likely to make people hostile and aggressive than to make them kind
and virtuous (Berkowitz 1993: 49). Aggression based on negative emotions is
termed irritable aggression or annoyance-motivated aggression in psychology.
The mechanism is best illustrated by animal studies. In these studies animals
in a small chamber were exposed to negative stimuli. They frequently began to
fight, without any additional cue inciting their aggression. This leads Berkowitz
to the conclusion that open aggression under such circumstances seems to be an
inborn reaction to the physical distress, since it occurs fairly regularly, doesnt
require any prior learning, and persists even in the absence of obvious rewards
(Ibid.: 49). Negative stimuli, such as electric shocks, intense noise or others, lead
to the perception of pain. The experience of pain leads to the activation of the
fight or flight mechanism. If a fight response is chosen rather than flight, this
leads to open aggression against nearby targets, even if these are not responsible
for the inflicted pain. The fight response is more often chosen if an escape from
the situation is difficult or impossible. However, even if the negative stimulation
is terminated, aggression might persist, as if the negative stimulation had given
the animal an appetite for aggression. Aggression in case of negative stimuli is
not only negatively reinforced, meaning with the aim to end the painful event.
While this is usually the goal of aggression under pain, the latter can also lead
to aggression without the direct goal or effect of pain reduction. This is called
positively reinforced aggression and has been observed in rats: rats fought with
a peer when put under painful shocks, but their fighting did not end the shocks.
44
These animals would later be highly aggressive in response to further shocks, even
though they had not learned that their fighting would end their pain. Similarly
to animals, humans react to unpleasant stimuli with higher levels of aggression.
Berkowitz describes an experiment in which individuals could punish or reward
others while either being exposed to unpleasant events or to pleasant ones. The
individuals who were exposed to unpleasant events were much more likely to
punish their counterparts (Ibid.: 54f).
Negative stimuli can include many different factors. Some of the tested
factors include the exposure to cigarette smoke, exposure to disgusting scenes,
psychological stress and others. One frequently mentioned negative stimulus that
raises aggression in humans is heat. Hot weather has been shown to increase levels
of crime and violence. Under pain or stress, humans like animals do not seem
only to lash out at the perceived source of the negative state, but also at innocent
bystanders. In short, if we feel bad, we are more likely to act aggressively towards
others. As Berkowitz explains: virtually any kind of negative affect, any type of
unpleasant feeling, is the basic spur to emotional aggression. The negative affect
doesnt have to be intense, but the stronger the felt displeasure, the stronger will
be the resulting instigation to aggression (Ibid.: 56).
A particular focus in psychology is put on the psychological aspects of the
mentally ill. The literature focusing on the connection between mental health and
violence discusses certain correlations between mental illness and violence. For
example, a debate is waged if chronic schizophrenics engage in more instances of
violence than the general population. However, even if this should be confirmed,
it would not necessarily contribute much to the overall statistics of violence in
society, as the occurrence of this particular mental illness is low with a rate of
one per cent of the population affected only and therefore the overall numbers of
violent acts committed by schizophrenic people remain small. Nonetheless, looking
at mental illness as a cause for violence is interesting for another reason, as it
could educate us further about the possible reasons for violence. In schizophrenia,
typical symptoms that contribute to the occurrence of violence are voice hearing
and delusions. The mechanisms behind these are not yet completely understood,
but it is thought that disturbed signalling processes in the patients brain produce
hallucinations and internal voices similar maybe to the mythological voices of
god which has been heard by prophets which oftentimes also due to the disturbed
brain chemistry produce a negative content. Furthermore, the mechanisms of the
brain might even produce delusions of persecution and paranoia, so that the patient
might be in a subjective world where for him or her it makes perfect sense to engage
in violence. What now possibly makes mentally ill people more violent and can
we learn something from them about the causes of human violence? Interesting
observations have been made about the role of hallucinations and delusions a
central aspect of this illness in schizophrenic people in relation to violence:
Patients in the violent group were significantly more likely to experience
negative emotions, tone and content related to their voices Patients in the
45
violent group were more likely to hold persecutory delusional beliefs than
those in the non-violent group, Patients in the violent group were also more
likely to report that the delusion made them feel angry, while those in the nonviolent group were more likely to report that the delusion made them feel elated.
(Cheung et al. 1997)
This confirms the interpretation derived at previously that negative mental states
make a person more violent. We are nasty when we feel bad.
There is even more support for this hypothesis: Impulsive violence has
been explained with a lack of the brains ability to regulate emotion in certain
individuals who had a history of, or were predisposed to violence. A study
focused on impulsive violence found reduced activity in certain brain areas that
were responsible for the control of negative emotions, and normal or heightened
activity in others who could produce negative emotions. Negative emotions are
a reaction to stressors in life. Depending on the individual predisposition and
probably choice, they lead to various reactions, such as depression or the feeling
of being stressed. It seems that the reaction to stressors and negative emotions
is key: depression or repression, the latter leading to violence more regularly.
Emotions have obviously an important role to play in the origin of violence.
But what kind of emotions are key? John Braithwaite, a criminologist, links the
emotion of shame to violence. His argument is that shame, while also being
the emotion potentially most protective against violence, is also the emotion
causing violence. For explaining the difference in causation, he distinguishes in
acknowledged and unacknowledged shame:
To show disapproval threatens the social bond. The disapproved actor may
experience shame. If she acknowledges this shame, respects the others reasons
for expressing the disapproval, and the other reciprocates this respect so that
they enter a dialogue about the problem, shame will have been a cause of
constructive conflict. And constructive conflict can actually strengthen bonds
between individuals. When the shame evoked by disapproval is repressed
rather than confronted, however, people get angry. Actor A gets angry at B for
disapproving of her instead of examining the (correct or incorrect) reasons for
the disapproval. (Braithwaite 2001: xi)
Braithwaite proposes that all human violence is caused in this way. Shame, when
unacknowledged, results in aggression and violence.
Scheff and Retzinger (2001) support this interpretation with an example. They
explain Hitlers rise in Germany and the support he received from the German
peoples in terms of a match of his personality and a popular desire present at the
time. Hitler represented in particular the possibility to overcome the collective
unacknowledged shame and alienation that was present in Germany in the 1930s.
While alienation resulted from rapid industrialization, shame was caused by the
Treaty of Versailles and in particular the war guilt clause of the treaty, which
46
assigned total guilt for the First World War to Germany. Also, a high level of
reparations payments, connected to the assumption of Germans guilt for the war,
was interpreted as humiliating and destructive. This all resulted in deep feelings
of shame in the German population at the time, and Hitler presented ideas to
overcome in particular these feelings of alienation and shame. His concept of the
Volksgemeinschaft, based on blood and race, created some sort of imagined
community, which overcame the former separations and therefore helped to
diminish alienation. But more importantly, his whole ideology he presented in
Mein Kampf was based on the idea to overcome shame and to establish pride. In
an analysis of excerpts, Scheff and Retzinger show the recurrent obsession with
shame, humiliation, respect and pride.
There is ground for pride in our people only if we no longer need to be ashamed
of any class. But a people, half of which is wretched and careworn, or even
depraved, offers so sorry a picture that no one should feel any pride in it. Only
when a nation is healthy in all its members, in body and soul, can every mans
joy in belonging to it rightfully be magnified to that high sentiment which we
designate as national pride. And this highest pride will only be felt by the man
who knows the greatness of his nation. (Scheff and Retzinger 2001: 154)
Scheff and Retzinger show that the sequence unacknowledged shame, followed
by rage, followed by aggression does apply in Hitlers writings:
How could every single one of these points have been burned into the brain and
emotion of this people, until finally in sixty million heads, in men and women, a
common sense of shame and a common hatred would have become a singly fiery
sea of flame, from whose heat a will as hard as steel would have risen and a cry
burst forth: Give us arms again! (Ibid.: 156)
Furthermore, Hitler referred to the Treaty of Versailles as the Treaty of Shame

and to the Weimar republic as fourteen years of shame and opprobrium.
Research on Hitlers personality shows clear signs of severe mental illness,
which are oftentimes related to his early childhood experiences of separation from
the mother and a tyrannical, abusive father. Hitler showed signs of delusions,
phobias, sadism, sexual aberrations, and utter isolation. For example, Hitler was
unable to have normal relationships with a woman and most of the women with
whom Hitler had relationships either attempted or completed suicide. Slight
provocations urged intense outburst of anger, which his stepbrother describes such:
He was imperious and quick to anger from childhood onward and would not
listen to anyone. My stepmother always took his part. He would get the craziest
notions and get away with it. If he didnt have his way, he got very angry.
[He] had no friends, took to no one and could be very heartless. He could fly into
a rage over any triviality. (Ibid.: 151)
47
The underlying cause for his chronic shame was the abuse from his father, from
which the mother, while smothering him, did not protect him. While suffering
abuse and humiliation, he at the same time had to have respect for him, which
Braithwaite describes as a basic context for repression. This might have contributed
to his pathological personality: when shame is evoked but goes unacknowledged,
it generates intense symptoms of mental illness and/or violence toward self or
others (Ibid.: 151). Scheff and Retzinger diagnose strong feelings of inadequacy
and inferiority. At the same time, Hitler showed arrogance, boldness, and
extreme self-confidence. The explanation is given with a theory of compensation.
Unacknowledged shame is compensated for with anger and scapegoating:
Shame theory suggests that protracted and destructive anger is always generated
by unacknowledged shame. Normal anger, when it is not intermixed with shame,
is usually brief, moderate, and constructive, serving to call notice to adjustments
that are needed in a relationship. Long chains of alternating shame and anger,
however, are experienced as blind rage, hatred, or resentment if the shame
component is completely repressed. In this case, the expression of anger serves
as a disguise for the hidden shame, projecting onto the outside world the feelings
of shame that are unacknowledged within. According to Lewis, many would
rather turn the world upside down than turn themselves inside out. This idea
exactly captures the psychology of Hitlers lifelong story of intense rage states
and his projection of his inner conflict onto scapegoats. (Ibid.: 153)
Lindemann (2010) also analyzed the role of recognition and shame as a cause for
war. He argues that the homo symbolicus needs recognition to preserve a positive
self-image for both emotional and instrumental reasons as [a] good reputation
ensures authority and procures material resources (Lindemann 2010: 1f). For
him, recognition is also important for emotional reasons, for avoiding shame and
humiliation. Recognition is so important for the political man as he is preoccupied
with his self-image. Lindemann further argues that the need for recognition is
based on elementary psychological needs, such as respect (a social status), social
self-esteem the need to have a distinct and developed identity and selfconfidence (affection) (Ibid.: 24). These needs have been found to represent
almost universal motivations for human behavior by philosophers, psychologists,
as well as specialists on international conflicts. Lack of recognition is linked
back to social shame: a negative image of oneself can paralyse the individual by
condemning them to social shame (Ibid.: 25).
Lindemann also takes the example of Hitlers Germany to illustrate the role of
recognition at a case study. The strategies and conquests of Hitler corresponded
more to a logic of searching for recognition rather than economic or political
gain, he writes (Ibid.: 65). Shame was the result of non-recognition, leading to
the will to struggle for recognition: The Treaty of Versailles had taken a punitive
approach towards Germany, making it morally responsible and solely guilty of the
war with Article 231, the war guilt clause. The German delegation had not even
48
been invited to participate in the treaty negotiations. Furthermore, Germany had

lost Eastern territories, the Rhines left bank had been occupied by French troops,
the army was reduced to a size of a hundred thousand men, Germany had been
prohibited an air force, tanks, and heavy artillery, and had to pay heavy reparations
(Ibid.: 68). Max Weber argued: A nation can always forgive having to endure
material prejudices, but never an attack against her honour, especially when its
done in the way of a predicator who wants to be right at all costs (Ibid.: p. 68). The
treaty was seen as utter humiliation.
Similarly to Germany, the Soviet Union was excluded from the order of
Versailles. The United States and other Western countries intervened actively in
the civil war on behalf of the Whites against the Bolsheviks. The Soviet Union
with the Treaty of Rapallo and a non-aggression pact in 1926 recognized Germany.
The durable exclusion of the Soviet Union from the international order
encouraged the rise of a closed identity, as well as the complex of encirclement
The Bolshevik authorities drew the conclusion of unavoidable hostility with
Western capitalism. British and Nazi plutocrats were seen as being the same
thing and the Nazis were seen as the last rampart against a capitalist world in
distress. (Ibid.: 70)
It is argued that non-recognition of both Germany and the Soviet Union

contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War and recognition could have
avoided it. Similarly, Lindemann provides evidence for the role of recognition
at the examples of the Congress of Vienna, the Cold War, and as an alternative
explanation for the democratic peace between Western nations 19451991.
In classical psychology, Freud established an explanation for violence with
his dual instinct theory. He maintained that human beings were driven by two
intrinsic forces, the constructive life instinct, eros, and the destructive death
instinct, thanatos. While empirical studies found little support for this theory, it
nonetheless inspired the frustration-aggression hypothesis, which gained quite
some prominence in the discourse on the psychology of violence. Frustrations
are related to negative stimuli in so far as they refer to a situation in which
an expected desired outcome is prevented and the individual deprived of an
expected reward. Dollard et al. in Frustration and Aggression (1939) argue that
Aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Ibid.: 1). This is specified
further as the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the
existence of frustration and the existence of frustration always leads to some
form of aggression (Ibid.: 1). The authors themselves later on found at least the
latter of these statements to be too general and replaced it with the following
statement: Frustration produces investigations to a number of different types
of response, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression (Miller
et al. 1941). It is important to keep in mind here the definition of frustration
applied. Frustration was understood to be an interference with the occurrence
of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in the behavioural sequence
49
(Dollard et al. 1939: 7). This means, expectations that had been developed
needed to be disappointed for frustration to occur. Simple deprivation would not
necessarily result in frustration. Poor people, for example, would not necessarily
be frustrated if they would not expect a betterment of their life. The higher
the frustration, so the theory, the higher the level of aggression resulting from
it. Several studies later confirmed this relationship (Berkowitz 1993). Berkowitz
refined the frustration-aggression theory by inserting the notion of anger. This
was supposed to explain why frustration leads in some cases to violence and
not in others. Frustrations that were perceived to be of illegitimate nature result
in higher levels of anger than frustrations that were accidental or legitimate.
Unpleasant events would create negative affects, which in turn would activate
the primitive associational reaction of the fight or flight mechanism. The
fight tendency would be supported by aggression-related thoughts, memories,
and so forth and would result in anger and potentially aggression. The flight
tendency would be supported by escape-related thoughts and memories. Both
emotional states would be further refined by cognitive processing that comprises
an evaluation of the initial situation, of the potential outcomes, and of social
norms related to the situation (cf. Krahe 2001: 36f). The frustration-aggression
hypothesis has also been applied to competitive situations and repeatedly evidence
has been produced that supports the interpretation of competition giving rise to
aggression and hostility. Also, the frustration-aggression hypothesis has made its
way also into the discipline of political science.
Ted Robert Gurr applied the frustration-aggression theory to explain political
violence in Why Men Rebel (1971). He proposed the term relative deprivation,
understood to represent a difference between what a person had and what a
person ought to have. In Gurrs words, relative deprivation is defined as actors
perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value
capabilities (Gurr 1971a: 24). Relative deprivation is the source for tension or
frustration; it results in political discontent. The greater the discontent, the greater
the likelihood of political violence. Widespread discontent provides a general
impetus to collective violence. (Gurr 1971a: 13) The likelihood of political
violence is further determined by mens beliefs about the sources of deprivation,
and about the normative and utilitarian justifiability of violence against these
sources and the causing agents. Furthermore, the potential for political violence is
affected by societal factors, such as cultural sanctions for aggression, the degree
of success of past political violence, the presence of justifications for violence in
the popular discourse, the legitimacy of the political system and the responses it
makes to relative deprivation.
Conclusion
It seems from this discussion, that the purely Realist understanding of the causes
of violence and human nature is somewhat incomplete or under-complex. Rather
50
than the drive for power being sufficient to explain the origins of violence, it is
the aversion of negative stimuli; it is the fight against threats or loss. It is usually
negative events affecting the person to feel negative emotions frustration,
shame, anger have been discussed here which precede aggression and violence.
Emotions are a mediator between a negative event or situation and violence.
Human aggression therefore is usually not purely instrumental, which the
Realist discussion on the causes of violence and human nature suggests. If the
search for power is at the root of human aggression, then we would need to
understand aggression in a purely rationalist way. However, one explanation
can connect the interpretation of emotions at the root of violence and the more
rationalist interpretation of power-seeking. This is the aspect of status seeking or
dominance seeking in reference groups. As was discussed in the above, humans
like animals compete for status in groups, as higher status brings them more
benefits. Lower status is related to deprivation and increased aggression with
the goal to remedy the deprivation and the shame, which is accompanying the
lower status.
Lower status is perceived as threatening the self-image of the individual
in question. This threatened self-image needs to be defended or corrected, and
particularly individuals with an inflated self-image are prone to aggression in order
to establish a consistency with their internal self-image and what they perceive
others to see in themselves. The aspect of status-seeking in reference groups will
be dealt with in the following chapter.
Chapter 5

Global unemployment remains at record highs, with widening income inequality
adding to social strains. We could see rising social and political instability within
nations even war.
IMF chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn
As we have discussed in the previous chapter, human nature is not simply per se
a causative factor for violence. For violence to occur, usually some precipitating,
motivating factors, found in the environment of men, are needed. This chapter
will make the argument that inequality is one of these factors. Inequality,
particularly for those who are disadvantaged by being unequal, serves as a cause
for frustration and aggression. Therefore, violence is more common generally in
more unequal societies.
This chapter will look at theories and evidence that connect inequality to
violence at the second level of analysis, the state. While inequality is positively
connected to the occurrence of violent crime in societies, it is also linked to
revolutions and civil wars and terrorism.
Inequality and Violent Crime
While it is a common ideation that amongst the poor we find higher levels of
violence and crime, the reasons and mechanisms for a higher prevalence of crime
and violence in the disadvantaged strata of society are not yet fully explained.
Also, it remains still uncertain if poverty per se or inequality or relative as
opposed to absolute poverty within a society contributes more to the incidence
of violent crime.
Braithwaite reviewed 51 studies of the relationship between social class and
officially recorded juvenile crime. Lower class was here defined as referring to
individuals relatively low in wealth and power. Out of the reviewed studies,
only nine did not find that lower-class juveniles were more criminal, while the
remaining 42 studies found that lower-class juveniles were more criminal. An
additional 34 studies focused on the relationship between social class and officially
recorded adult crime. All of those studies found that lower-class adults were more
criminal. Finally, all nine studies on the relationship between social class of the
area where a person was living and officially recorded adult crime confirmed that
lower-class area adults were more criminal (Braithwaite 1979: 2532). Braithwaite
concludes that it has been demonstrated with a degree of consistency which
[sic] is unusual in social science that individuals either living in lower-class areas
52
or coming from lower classes show higher crime rates than their counterparts from
middle or higher classes (Ibid.: 32). Braithwaite also reviewed the evidence of
this relationship between lower class and higher crime being explainable in terms
of class bias, meaning that lower-class crime is either more often reported or
more often prosecuted. He came to the conclusion, though, that the unanimous
finding, from all courts and all police departments, that lower-class people have
higher rates for those types of crime handled by the police, cannot be totally
explained away as a manifestation of class bias (Ibid.: 46). However, if white
collar crime is put into the equation, the outcome changes: Lower-class adults do
not engage in more law-violating behaviour than middle-class adults. They just
engage in different forms of crime, oftentimes involving higher levels of violence.
When integrating his findings, he comes to the conclusion that inequality in
wealth and power, rather than lower class and lower material standing and power
per se, are connected to crime: Too little power and wealth creates problems of
living, and this produces crime of one type: too much power corrupts, and this
produces crime of another type (Ibid.: 200). Inequality, he argues, can explain
a considerable amount of middle-class and lower-class delinquency: A system,
which has economic failure, built into it fosters crime not only among those
who have objectively failed. There are also the pathological consequences of
anticipation of failure, fear of failure, and failure to achieve the success aspired
to or expected (Ibid.: 203). Support for this hypothesis is found in those studies,
which rather than using an unemployment or poverty index are using a global
index of income dispersion such as the Gini coefficient. These studies show a
fairly uniform support for a positive association between inequality and crime
(Ibid.: 211).
But not only for crime can the connection be drawn to inequality, also for
violence per se. Richard Wilkinson argues in an important article: The most well
established environmental determinant of levels of violence is the scale of income
differences between rich and poor. More unequal societies tend to be more violent
(Wilkinson 2004: 2). Generally, societies that are marked by high inequality have
poorer social relationships than more equal societies. These societies show less
trust among people, and people are less likely to be involved in community life.
Also, these societies are not as rich in social capital, and hostility levels are higher,
as well as rates of discrimination against minorities and against women. Wilkinson
attempts to explain the higher occurrence of violence in unequal societies with
frustrations of feelings of pride.
Where there is greater inequality, more people will be deprived of the jobs,
incomes, housing and cars, which are the markers of status. Vulnerable to the
humiliation of relative poverty, they will be particularly sensitive to feeling
disrespected and looked down on and unwilling to ignore incidents, which
appear to involve a loss of face. (Ibid.: 15)
53
He argues that the feeling of shame, and disrespect, are amongst the most prevalent
causes of intra-societal violence. For supporting his explanation, he cites James
Gilligan, a long-term prison psychiatrist, who commented on his 25 years of
experience in interviewing inmates: I have yet to see a serious act of violence
that was not provoked by the experience of feeling shamed and humiliated,
disrespected and ridiculed, and that did not represent the attempt to prevent or
undo this loss of face no matter how severe the punishment (Ibid.: 14).
Wilkinson, together with Kate Pickett, later published The Spirit Level: Why
Equality is Better for Everyone (2010). In this study, they establish a number of
criteria to measure the quality of intra-societal relations: Level of trust; mental
illness (including drug and alcohol addiction); life expectancy and infant
mortality; obesity; childrens educational performance; teenage births; homicides;
imprisonment rates; social mobility. Among the studied countries we find, in
increasing order of inequality, Japan, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Belgium, Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, France, Canada, Switzerland,
Ireland, Greece, Italy, Israel, New Zealand, Australia, UK, Portugal, USA, and
Singapore. Comparing the scores of their established social and health data for
these countries, they show strong positive correlations between increased social
and health problems, including violent crime, and increased inequality in societies.
Also Wilkinson and Pickett base their explanation on social status. With increasing
inequality, anxiety levels rise and fears about being accepted as a successful and
valuable member of society. Self-esteem is affected by being at the lower end in
an unequal society.
P.J. Henry confirms this hypothesis with an argument on cultures of honour
and violence. He maintains that certain cultures are marked by higher inequality
in areas such as social class, income, education, race, ethnicity, or age. These
inequalities represent status disparities for the individuals affected. For those,
who belong to the lower status groups, their sense of social worth is negatively
affected. This threat to their worth must be managed or compensated for in some
fashion, including the vigilant defense of their existing sense of worth. Of most
relevance here, this vigilant defense of the self is linked to a greater likelihood
for members of lower status groups to be violent against those who threaten that
worth (Henry 2009: 451). The original culture of honour research postulated that
in certain areas, particularly in regions of the United States, cultures of herding
existed in which insults oftentimes resulted in violence. The original hypothesis
said that herding cultures are coinciding with cultures of honour, as herding
cultures showed a higher need for self-protection:
we believe that herding societies have cultures of honor for reasons having to do
with the economic precariousness of herdsmen. Herdsmen constantly face the
possibility of the loss of their entire wealth through loss of their herds. Thus, a
stance of aggressiveness and willingness to kill or commit mayhem is useful in
announcing their determination to protect their animals at all costs. (Ibid.: 452)
54
This hypothesis could never be empirically substantiated. However, ensuing

literatures suggested that herding cultures may coincide with larger status
disparities: Not all herders are poor, and indeed some individual herders can
accumulate considerable wealth and power, but herding lifestyles nevertheless
may lead to large status disparities in a society (Ibid.: 452). Furthermore, low
status and vigilance toward self-protection are well established in the literature:
Research in the stigma literature shows that those who are members of lower
status groups are vigilant to varying degrees about threats to the self that may
come because of their low status. lower status individuals are particularly
invested in defending themselves against threats to the self compared with
higher status individuals. (Ibid.: 453)
This vigilance in self-protection is explained by the fact that lower-status

individuals are ascribed a lower psychological worth. This psychological worth,
and not the economic worth, is to be protected by the regarding individuals:
the compensation strategies used by members of low-status groups are used in
the service of psychological self-protection, not as a means of gaining higher
status, higher income, more resources, etc. (Ibid.: 453). Furthermore, research
on the psychology of violence suggests that people with a defensive or unstable
self-esteem may be especially prone to violence. Threats to self, exclusion, and
disrespect have been cited as causing violence in individuals with low, unstable,
or artificially inflated self-esteem. Taken together, many forms of violence can
be understood as serving the goal psychological self-protection. The low-status
compensation theory describes the link further:
members of low-status groups, often over the course of a lifetime, receive
messages from their society that they have lower social worth. These messages
are threatening to their self-concept. To manage such threats, members of lowstatus groups may resort to any number of compensation strategies, one of which
involves the vigilant protection of the psychological self. Threats to the self,
in the form of insults, disrespect, dishonor, etc., will be more likely to be dealt
with violently among members of low-status groups compared with their higher
status counterparts, who will have a more secure sense of social value and worth
and will therefore have less reason to resort to such self-protective strategies.
(Ibid.: 454)
Inequality and Revolutions1

The literature on explanations for the causes of civil conflicts concentrates on two
different aspects. One strand of the literature focuses on relative deprivation and
1Parts of the following will be republished in Beyer, forthcoming.
55
grievances as an explanation for civil conflict and revolt. The other strand of the
literature focuses on the decisions of each person to participate in political conflicts
and revolts. The latter takes expected utility calculations into account, which
balance the potential costs and benefits of such action. Benefits of participation in
revolt may come in form of an expected reduction of inequality and injustice. Costs
of participation in revolt may be induced by the governments decision to react to
revolts by engaging military and police forces (MacCulloch 2005: 95). MacCulloch
analyzed the preferences of individuals to participate in revolutionary action:
Controlling for the characteristics of people and countries, greater income
inequality has marked and statistically robust effects on increasing the chance
that an individual will support revolt. An increase in income inequality
is found to have a positive impact on the probability that an individual has a
revolutionary preference. A 1-standard-deviation change of the Gini coefficient
explains up to 38 percent of the standard deviation in the proportion of people
having a preference for revolt. Since a higher level of real income is found to
have a significant negative effect on revolutionary tastes, the results imply that
either going for growth or implementing policies that reduce inequality can
help buy nations out of revolt. (Ibid.: 94 and 114)
The theorizing behind the relationship between inequality and revolutions is

dating back to thinkers such as Tocqueville and Marx. Analysing the French
Revolution, Tocqueville maintained that a rise in living conditions did provide
the ground for revolutions: It is a singular fact that this steadily increasing
prosperity, far from tranquilizing the population, everywhere promoted a spirit of
unrest (Tocqueville 1971: 95). And: Revolutions are not always brought about
by a gradual decline from bad to worse. Nations that have endured patiently and
almost unconsciously the most overwhelming oppression often burst into rebellion
against the yoke the moment it begins to grow lighter (Davies 1971: 135).
Marx, on the other hand, explained revolutions with a decline in living
conditions, which the exploited working class experienced. The exploiting class,
the bourgeoisie, had itself come dominant due to power struggles and a series of
revolutions: We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product
of a long course of development, a series of revolutions in the modes of production
and exchange (Marx and Engels 1971: 101). Like the bourgeoisie struggled for
power of the course of history, it is now the oppressed, exploited and alienated
working class, which struggles to overcome the ruling grip of the dominant class.
The working class revolts against the working conditions, against the whole
organization of production, which is the cause of its suffering. It is, in opposition
to Tocqueville, however in particular in crisis situations, which the bourgeois
mode of production regularly produces, which give rise to revolts: For many a
decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt
It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put the
56
existence of the entire bourgeois society on trial, each time more threateningly
(Ibid.: 103).
It was, finally, Davies who accommodated the two contradicting views. He
reads Marx in a different way, arguing that it is not only progressive degradation,
but also improvements in the working class conditions that can give rise to
revolutions. Also, he argues that both Tocqueville and Marx can be synthesized
into a compelling explanation of revolutions. For him, it is the rising expectations
of the oppressed classes that are explanatory for civil strife. Expectations rise
when economic conditions improve. However, this is not yet enough to account
for revolutionary action. If, then, there is a return to worse conditions, the rise
in living and working conditions is halted and reversed, the expectations of the
working classes will not necessarily quickly adjust to this change and frustrations
will lead to revolt: The crucial factor is a vague or specific fear that ground gained
over a long period of time will be quickly lost (Davies 1971: 137).
Gurr developed his before mentioned theory of rebellions in the late 1960s.
He applied psychological principles to explain the causes of rebellions. For him,
it was relative deprivation, defined as actors perceptions of discrepancy between
their value expectations (the goods and conditions of life to which they believe
they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those
goods and conditions that they think they are able to get) (Gurr 1971b: 294),
which was explaining revolt. Even if additional factors had to be present, which
would structurally facilitate strife, the root cause of rebellion was to be found
in this psychological mismatch between the expected and desired, and the given.
These theories were put to empirical test by Feierabend and Feierabend,
who confirmed the role frustrations play in the explanation of revolutions: The
main finding is that the higher the level of systemic frustration, as measured
by the indices selected, the greater the political instability (Feierabend and
Feierabend 1971: 240). It is the developed societies that experience stability, and
if gratifications are less than [the] threshold values, the more they fail to meet
these levels, the greater the likelihood of political instability (Ibid.: 240). The
relation to inequality is made clear when Feierabend and Feierabend introduce the
role that modernity and the comparison effect between nations plays in this drama:
Want formation reaches an early maximum with exposure to modernity, after
which further awareness of the modern world can no longer increase desire for
modernity. Under these conditions, the modernity index is also in fact a frustration
index, indicating the extent to which these measured economic satisfactions are
present within a society which may be presumed to have already been exposed
to modernity. (Ibid.: 241)
Frustration and relative deprivation account for the explanation of revolts. In

addition, it is the pace of change in the modernization process, which determines
the willingness of the people to revolt: countries experiencing a highly erratic
instability pattern are those also undergoing a rapid rate of change (Ibid.: 243).
57
Inequality and Civil Wars

Kofi Annan summarized the connection between inequality and civil war:
Most of the worlds twenty poorest countries have experienced significant
violent conflict in the past decades. [But] poverty by itself does not cause
war. Nor is inequality in itself a sufficient explanation for conflict. simple
inequality between rich and poor is not enough to cause violent conflict. What
is highly explosive is horizontal inequality: when power and resources are
unequally distributed between groups that are also differentiated in other ways
for instance by race, religion, or language. So-called ethnic conflicts occur
between groups which [sic] are distinct in one or more of these ways, when
one of them feels it is being discriminated against, or another enjoys privileges
which it fears to lose. (Annan 1999)
Civil wars are defined as wars involving parts or the whole of the population
within one state fighting among each other. They represent the majority of wars
in the present times, since the end of the Cold War, and do occur predominantly
in countries of the developing world. Oftentimes, civil wars are fought between
different ethnic groups within a country. However, ethnicity alone does not explain
civil wars, as many developing countries exhibit peaceful ethnic pluralism. As
Ostby argues, we have to look for additional factors to understand the increasing
presence of civil wars (2003). The factors that need to be present are well-defined
collective grievances and inequalities that coincide with ethnic cleavages.
Ostby believes that an important factor that differentiates the violent from the
peaceful multiethnic societies is the existence of severe, systematic inequalities
between ethnic groups (2003: 2). She refers to such inequalities between groups
as horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequalities are in opposition to vertical
inequalities, which refer to the ranking of individuals against each other within
a country or globally. Vertical inequalities within a country are not thought to
be related to an increased risk of internal armed conflicts. Ostby explains: Even
though an individual may feel frustrated if he is disadvantaged e.g. economically
or politically compared to other individuals in society, he will not start a rebellion
on his own (2003: 2). Furthermore, a problem with many studies on inequality
and conflict is the focus on economic inequality solely. However, additional factors
that need to be taken into account are political, social and health inequalities.
She concludes: The rather robust evidence for a positive relationship between
horizontal inequalities and domestic armed conflict , in fact suggests that recent
studies of the inequalityconflict nexus are wrong in concluding that inequality
is unrelated to conflict! (Ostby 2003: 113).
58
Inequality and Political Violence: Terrorism2

Regarding the economic causes of terrorism the scientific community is divided.
For some, economic causes are accepted. Others argue that terrorists most often
come from well-established families and thus poverty or inequality cannot count
as a cause.
An international expert group that dealt with causes of terrorism in 2005 came
to the conclusion that it is never one factor alone that leads to terrorism. So for
example, poverty alone is not a cause. Yet combined with rapid modernization and
structural inequalities there is a risk for terrorism: We believe that poverty is
not a cause of terrorism but that rapid modernization and structural inequalities,
both national and international, and the culture of resentment and alienation they
often breed, are risk factors for terrorism (International Summit on Democracy,
Terrorism and Security 2005). Here, a direct connection between economic and
psychological factors is established. Rapid economic change often is perceived
as a threat and leads to support for movements that focus on traditional identities
(Bjorgo 2003: 4).
While the connection between underdevelopment and civil war has been
clearly established, making a similar connection between terrorism and
underdevelopment is more difficult. Part of the problem results from the structure
of transnational terrorist groups because they operate across borders around the
world. However, some successful attempts at showing a positive correlation
between poverty in countries of origin and the emergence of terrorism from these
countries have been made. Koseli, for example, showed a positive correlation
between poverty and terrorism in the case of Turkey. The number of people
living under the poverty line in each province, the lower education service per
capita compared to other provinces, and the percentage of young population in
each province were found to be related to the number of terrorist incidents in the
provinces of Turkey (Koseli 2006: 157). This study confirms the interpretation
that economic factors, here poverty, are at the root of terrorist incidents. On the
other hand, it rejects the interpretation that inequalities on the local level can be
used as an estimate for this link: GDP per capita, income inequalities in provinces,
public investment per capita, distribution of health services, health disparities,
population of provinces, unemployment and education attainment did not explain
the number of terrorist incidents in provinces of Turkey for the data that this study
examined (Koseli 2006: 159). Poverty, in turn, can be linked to the feeling of
injustice, which is a causal factor in terrorism. Perceived, remediable injustice has
been described as a basic motivation for terrorism, connected to psychological
processes of dissatisfaction, frustration and attribution of responsibility for the
injustice (Borum 2004: 248).
International terrorism is particularly rampant in the Middle East, followed
by South Asia and Western Europe. Pamuk (2006) describes the economic side of
2Parts of the following have been published in Beyer 2008a.
59
the picture for the Middle East: the growth rate of per capita income is strongly
negative since the 1970s by comparison with the Western world. The relative
position of the Middle East vis--vis the Western world has developed in this
direction: whereas the general national income in the nineteenth century made up
for 49 per cent of the general national income of the West, it is nowadays at 20 per
cent. These developments do contribute to frustration. Also, Halliday describes
the Middle Eastern economic debacle: [T]he Middle East was scoring very
poorly on the other most visible index of international economic performance, its
ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI): the Arab world and Iran were
almost entirely outside of the flow capital to developing countries that marked
the 1990s (Halliday 2005: 265) One calculation resulted in income figures for the
population of the Middle East and North Africa, in the early 1990s, of little more
than a tenth of that of the European Community per capita. Disregarding Israel
in this calculation, as well as the oil-rich GCC countries, the figures even fell.
On index after index, the region was not just behind but falling further behind
not only Europe but also significant parts of the developing world (Ibid.: 265).
Particularly the Palestinian territories suffer under economic backwardness, but
also Yemen and other countries.
Kitschelt comes to the conclusion that deprivation for example by nonparticipation in globalization and thus the exclusion from its positive benefits can
lead to political mobilization and in the extreme to violence. For such suffering
to motivate mobilization, political ideologues must articulate interests and a broad
cultural interpretation that explains to potential activists how deprivations have
come about and how to overcome them (Kitschelt 2004: 159). The Middle East and
the African continent, as one of the main areas of origin of international terrorism,
are very much predestined for this kind of violence as they are economically
among the worst performing economic regions. There is thus no question that the
intensity of socio-economic deprivation felt throughout much of the Middle East
has become great (Kitschelt 2004: 163). Relative deprivation clearly contributes
to political violences. This is especially to be expected for those societies which
are very young and which are not able to provide their young population with
perspectives for work and life chances. These societies are more endangered to
seduction by extremist ideologies. Particularly factors such as loss, deprivation
and alienation are causes for participation in terrorist groups.
Conclusion
Inequality, on the national level, does explain to a strong degree the level of
criminal and political violence. While the psychological factors behind this
mechanism have been explored before, this chapter attempted to gather and present
the empirical evidence linking inequality to violence on the national level. What
has been discussed as a feeling of shame and resulting anger at the root of violence
in the preceding chapter is here presented as frustration as the psychological factor
60
causing upheaval and revolt. Frustration in particular is connected to relative

deprivation, which in turn is connected to inequality.
While, in particular for terrorism, other aspects such as political oppression,
military interventions resulting in occupation, and exploitation, modernization and
cultural clashes are cited as explanatory factors, inequality plays a strong role also
in the explanation for political violence. This, for example, becomes clear when
one reads Osama bin Ladens declaration of war:
It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered from
aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist Crusaders
alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims blood became the
cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies. (PBS 1996)
It is connected to violence in a consistent way, through various theoretical and

empirical studies and for various expressions of violence. It has to be remembered
here that poverty, which was discussed in this chapter as connected to terrorism,
does equal inequality in, for example, the comparison with other states on the
international level. Therefore, transational terrorism from the Middle East could
well be inspired by inequality on the international level.
The political aspect of a struggle against inequality can be explained indeed as
a struggle for power, however with the aim to gain control over living conditions
and a rise in self-esteem. The psychological principles behind this general revolt
against inequality has not sufficiently been studied or understood, but it is rooted
in alienation and shame, as the previous chapter discussed, and it is experienced as
frustration which gives rise to aggression. For political violence to occur, usually
the formation of a collective is needed, as well as other conditions that have
to be present to enable the group or part of the populations to adopt ideologies
and strategies for their struggle. These conditions have not been discussed here
further, it shall suffice to point out that the most frequent application of force
from top down, from the authorities towards their populations, will be in cases
of individual violence, instability or popular strife in form of policing or military
suppression of revolt. This theme will recur in the following chapter, where we
will discuss the conditions and causes of violence on the international level, where
it usually presents as interstate or transnational warfare. Again, inequality will be
of prominent concern when looking at war at the international plane, and we will
find that inequality accounts for the majority of wars, even if not necessarily for
the worst ones, in the international arena.
Chapter 6

The last chapters have argued that inequality is a prominent cause of violence
for humans as it is a cause for frustration, leading to aggression. Inequality is
empirically strongly related to violent crime, and for the prevention of individual
violence, the reduction of inequality is important. Also, evidence has been
presented that inequality is a cause of civil wars, revolts, and terrorism. This
chapter will look at the international level and present evidence that similarly
inequality is connected to interstate wars.
Inequality and the Balance of Power
Waltz in Theory of International Politics discusses balance of power and
inequality as the core of his argument about the causes of stability among nations
and war. For him, equality among the major powers in the system leads to a higher
level of stability as the powers can hold each other in check and the outcomes of
aggression are less certain. The most stable system, according to his theory, is a
bipolar system of more or less equally powerful poles. This system resembles the
Cold War system, which was present while the theory was being developed. Waltz
introduces inequality the following way:
inequality is what much of politics is about. The study of politics, theories
about politics, and the practice of politics have always turned upon inequalities,
whether among interest groups, among religious and ethnic communities,
among classes, or among nations. Internally, inequality is an important part of
the political story, though far from being the whole of it. Internal politics is also
the realm of authority and law, of established institutions, of socially settled
and accepted ways of doing things. Internationally, inequality is more nearly
the whole of the political story. Differences of national strength and power
and of national capability and competence are what the study and practice of
international politics are almost entirely about. This is so not only because
international politics lacks the effective laws and the competent institutions
found within nations but also because inequalities across nations are greater
than inequalities within them (Waltz 1979: p. 142f)
While Waltzs Neorealism does therefore address inequality in the international

system, it does not discuss inequality in general terms to much extent. Inequality
between the major, middle and small powers is not sufficiently debated as a cause
62
of warfare. However, Waltz admits that the imbalance in the international system
smaller powers and stronger powers composing it might be a danger for the smaller
and the stronger powers alike. An imbalance of power, by feeding the ambition of
some states to extend their control, may tempt them to dangerously adventurous
activity. Safety for all states, one may conclude, depends on the maintenance of a
balance among them (Ibid.: 132). If states were roughly equal, this would provide
them with the ability to defend themselves against potential aggressors. Also,
equality would be a morally preferable condition. All states would be enabled to
maintain their integrity. While Waltz identifies a number of positive aspects of
equality, he maintains that equality is not realizable in the international arena and
that it never existed. Also, he argues, equality is associated with instability. Here,
he draws a domestic analogy: Where individualism is extreme, where society is
atomistic, and where secondary organizations are lacking, governments tend either
to break down into anarchy or become highly centralized and despotic (Ibid.: 132).
He concludes: The inequality of states, though it provides no guarantee, at least
makes peace and stability possible (Ibid.: 132).
Hegemony and the Causes of War
Hegemony has been discussed as a possible cause of war from two angles: First,
is has been argued that hegemony contributes to increased risk of war as the
imbalance in the international system leads to the weaker states trying to challenge
the dominant state. Hegemony would therefore in the long run lead to power
transition between the old and a new, emergent, hegemon, and war is most likely
at this point of transition of power between the two states (Organski 1958).
On the other hand, it has been proposed that hegemonies are very stable systems
as it is difficult for weaker states to challenge the hegemon due to the immense
power differential (Gilpin 1981). The answer lies in looking at the periods of
hegemony: hegemons experience periods of growth, of stability and decline.
Within the hegemonic growth cycle, conflict is least likely when the hegemon
is at its pinnacle of power. It gets more likely when the hegemon declines and
other powers start to challenge the declining hegemon, just as the hegemon had
to successfully challenge the previous hegemon in its growth phase to achieve its
dominant status in the system.
Gilpin presented his hegemonic governance theory in which he argued for
hegemonic wars and particularly wars of power transition. In periods of decline
of the hegemon, the hegemon is challenged by rising powers, and the hegemon
attempts to defend its position by engaging these challenging powers in warfare:
In these situations, the disequilibrium in the system becomes increasingly
acute as the declining power attempts to transform the system in ways that will
advance its interests. As a consequence of this persisting disequilibrium, the
international system is beset by tensions, uncertainties, and crises. Throughout
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history the primary means of resolving the equilibrium between the structure of
the international system and the redistribution of power has been war, more
particularly, what we shall call a hegemonic war. (Gilpin 1981, p. 197)
Empirical support for the hypothesis that an inverse relationship between

hegemonic power and the frequency of war exists has been produced by Spiezio.
He arrives at the conclusion: An empirical analysis of the relationship between
British hegemony and the frequency of international conflict indicates that
hegemonic power does exert a consistent effect on the outbreak of war involving
major powers. Indeed, the results generally support Gilpins contention that
systemic instability is inversely related to the magnitude of a hegemons relative
military and economic capabilities (Spiezo 1990: p. 178).
Status Disequilibrium Theory
Johan Galtung suggested that rank discrepant states are more likely to participate
in wars than rank equal states. Galtung differentiates in low status (underdog) and
high status (topdog) states. Stratification in a system always occurs, stratification
to him is a universal phenomenon (Galtung 1964: p. 96). The behaviour of
states is dependent on their position in the system. While he qualifies at another
place the term aggression, he argues that the high ranking states are aggressive in
suppressing the low ranking states: The complete topdog has already obtained
what the system has to offer in terms of rewards, but this by itself will not prevent
much from wanting more. Colonial wars and slavery were typical examples of
aggression from the top (Ibid.: p. 97f). On the other hand, very low-ranking
states may be dissatisfied, but they lack the resources for initiating aggression and
system change: the underdog is deprived of the resources that make revolutions
possible: ideas, visions, acquaintances, weapons, social experience, empathy,
courage necessary to imagine oneself as a ruler, etc. (Ibid.: p. 98). It is the middle
powers that challenge the topdogs and account for most wars. Galtung is inspired
by theories of revolutions, particularly Davies theory. He argues rank discrepant
states are most likely to engage in aggression in order to change their status in the
system, particularly when other avenues for change have already unsuccessfully
been tried and when there is a culture or experience of violence present.
Aggression is most likely to arise in social positions in rank-disequilibrium. In
a system of individuals it may take the form of crime, in a system of groups
the form of revolutions, and in a system of nations the form of war. But these
extreme forms of aggression are unlikely to occur unless 1) other means of
equilibration towards a complete topdog configuration have been tried, and 2)
the culture has some practice in violent aggression. (Ibid.: p. 99)
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Rank discrepant states are middle powers. They score high in some measurements
of power, and low in others. They could, for example, be economically strong
but militarily weak (TU), compared to one state below them that is economically
and militarily weak (UU) and one state above them that is economically and
militarily strong (TT). For an explanation of his theory, Galtung cites sociological
approaches. The rank discrepant middle power will use as its reference group the
higher powers, even if his reference group could just as well be the lower powers.
Therefore, the middle power finds itself in constant deprivation, comparing itself
with the highest powers in the system, which leads to frustration as the motivation
for aggression in order to change its position. Galtung does not argue that this
situation will always lead to violence; the theory just presupposes that higher
levels of discrepancy are connected to a higher probability of war.
There is some empirical support for his theory. East investigated the
association between status discrepancy and presence of war in the time
period 1948 and 1964 internationally. For this time period, he found most support
for the status discrepancy war hypothesis. The relationship was stronger if data
were lagged two years behind. Michael Wallace researched on a different time
period, 1920 to 1964, and also produced a moderately clear association between
the level of status discrepancy in the international system and battle fatalities
(Cashman 2000: 231). Again, the relationship was stronger when a time-lag of 15
years was introduced.
Cashman interprets these findings:
The point is that status discrepancy theory seems more appropriate for just these
sorts of situations where a state outside the major power subsystem achieves
economic and military strength without attaining the political and diplomatic
status that usually accompanies it, and then engages in aggression, the result of
which is to bring her just that status that she seeks! Status discrepancy theory
would seem to be most applicable, in other words, to those nations on the
political periphery of the system who desire entrance to the club. (Ibid.: 232)
Inequality and War1

Overall, inequality has been discussed for long as a cause of war at the international
level or a way of prevention of violence. While the balance-of-power approach
argued that a certain equality serves stability amongst states, the preponderance
perspective has argued the opposite: that dominance of one or several states over
others serves stability and therefore the prevention of war. The empirical evidence
on both perspectives in inconclusive, but both perspectives marshal impressive
support for their hypotheses.
1Parts of the following will be republished in Beyer, forthcoming.
65
Interstate violence has been explained by the struggle for power. Power in
the international realm, like for the individual, represents the potential to control
the states access to resources to fulfil the states needs and thereby ensure its
survival. While the balance of power theory has promoted the understanding that
some form of rough equality at least among the major powers ensures stability
and therefore the relative absence of violence internationally, preponderance
theorists have argued that under such conditions war is in fact more likely and
dominance of one or more states over others promotes higher levels of peace.
We have to keep in mind that neither of the two perspectives is exclusive in their
descriptions of the international constellations they favour. For example, Waltz
as a proponent of balance of power theory argued for a bipolar system as being
most stable. However, a bipolar system does implicitly imply dominance of two
superpowers over all others, a constellation which was observed in the period of
the Cold War. In opposition to this, preponderance theorists were much in favour
of a unipolar constellation and argued that war was most likely when the second
in rank nation would catch up and overtake the leading power. However, even in
a unipolar constellation, the majority of secondary major states might be roughly
equal in power.
It is argued here, in an attempt to accommodate both sides of the debate, that
both equality and inequality at the international level can contribute to warfare.
While inequality is oftentimes at the root of the conflict, equality contributes to its
escalation. Hence, in a quite unequal international system, such as under hegemony,
the risk and frequency of warfare is higher, but the exchanges will remain more
limited, simply because the differences in power usually predetermine the winning
side. In a more equal system, if war occurs, it will escalate more. However, as
deterrence theorists have argued, warfare in such systems at least between the
equal powers is less likely. On the other hand, as even equal systems such as
the Cold War system, contain significant hierarchies, minor warfare between the
dominant powers and their subordinates is frequent. Likewise, in unipolar systems,
hegemonic wars are common, even if major wars are scarce due to the lack of
relevant competitors with the hegemon. Therefore, inequality in the international
system makes warfare more likely. The highest forms of escalation, world wars,
are to be found amongst equal powers, however. But even these can be connected
to inequality in their origins, as has been partly shown in the previous chapters.
Jack Levy argued that unipolar systems, systems with the highest level of
hierarchy, are most prone to international warfare: General wars, have occurred
most frequently during unipolar periods and never during bipolar periods
Bipolarity and multipolarity have been equally stable in terms of the relative
number of the years at peace, whereas unipolar systems have been more often
characterized by war. However, it seems that multipolarity, with a higher level of
equality among the states, while less war prone generally, experiences wars of the
greatest magnitude: In terms of the frequency of war, multipolarity has tended to
be slightly more stable or less war-prone. In terms of the extent, duration and
magnitude of war, it appears that multipolar periods have been more stable while
66
the wars that do occur during those periods tend to be more serious. Multipolar
systems exhibit wars of the greatest severity, intensity and concentration,
particularly at the great power level. Bipolar systems show less severe wars.
However, for unipolar systems wars also are of long and large magnitude, but not
as severe as for multipolar systems (1985: 50). He confirms the impression that the
several perspectives on the war-proneness of diverse systems can be combined.
Bipolar systems, as Waltz argues, are the most stable. Bipolar systems are usually
exhibiting a high level of equality between the two poles. Multipolar systems,
hence systems which also show a relatively high level of equality among the great
powers, are showing the most serious effects in terms of warfare. However, under
unipolarity, the most unequal international constellation, warfare is most common.
Edward Mansfield confirms this interpretation in Power, Trade and War
(1994): the magnitude of war underway tends to increase as systemic capability
concentration declines (Mansfield 1994: 79). Concentration refers to the
inequality in the system. Hence, a more equal system is showing more severe
warfare than a more unequal international system. However, the picture is different
for the frequency of warfare: all interstate wars have begun more frequently
during hegemonic periods than during periods in which no hegemon existed.
Moreover, the quantitative effect of Hegemony on the incidence of interstate war
is considerable (Ibid.: 93).
In combination this means that, while hegemonies are most war-prone for all
sorts of constellations (major powers and non-major powers involved), multipolar
systems also exhibit a certain war-proneness. I will be explained in the following
chapter how war proneness under multipolarity also is connected to inequality
in its originas. Bipolar systems, also here, are found to be most stable, which
however could be due to a probably limited number of cases. However, this logic
is overlaid by the logic of concentration, which denotes the inequality between the
larger powers or all powers in the system, similar to the Gini coefficient on the
national level: an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between the concentration
of capabilities and the frequency of wars involving major powers (Ibid.: 87).
The highest frequency of war is to be found present with a concentration level
of about .275 or .260, depending on which source of analysis is referred to. The
level of concentration over the time period that Mansfield takes into consideration
(18251964) has varied from .202 to .417. This would indicate that not the highest
level of concentration (or inequality) but relatively low levels of inequality are
linked to a higher frequency of war.
However, this interpretation is challenged by a more recent publication by
Scott Bennett and Allan Stam: We find that high concentrations of economic
and military capabilities in the international system appear to be associated
with a much higher incidence of all types of dispute and war (2004: 148). They
specify this finding: we estimate war to be three to six times (73 to 396 percent)
more likely when the concentration of military and economic capabilities is one
standard deviation above the mean compared to one standard deviation below
(Ibid.: 148). Bennett and Stam do not support the balance of power hypothesis on
67
the dyadic level, but argue that between politically relevant states a situation of
preponderance (dominance of one state over the other) is most supportive to peace
and increased equality makes the relationship between the state more prone to
war (Ibid.: 124). However, for the international system the situation changes, and
increased inequality is more conducive to war. This negative effect of systemic
concentration and inequality as conducive to war is the strongest of all measured
risk factors, stronger than balance of forces, or other factors such as dyadic
power transition.
Explanation
While inequality therefore seems an important contributing, if not causal factor,
for violence and aggression, it is hard to say in which direction inequality works:
sometimes, as when we look at violent crime, the worse off are utilizing violence
to target the better off. Other times, such as in the international system under
unipolarity, the powerful frequently use violence to control the weak. Sometimes
even, as in the case of many revolutions, both sides use violence repeatedly and
equally against each other.
We have found that aggression is more frequent under inequality. This raises
two further questions:
Do the powerful or the weak aggress more often in inequality?
Different phenomena seem to indicate various mechanisms. On the one hand,
events such as revolutions, terrorism and crime seem to indicate that the weak are
more prone to violence under inequality with the purpose of challenging the status
quo. On the other hand, wars under unipolarity would indicate that the powerful
are more prone to violence under inequality with the intent to control the weak.
Violence from the powerful towards the weak is common; also, violence amongst
the weak, or the more powerful against the less powerful. Violence from the weak
against the strong is relatively rare (i.e. terrorism or revolutions).
Why do the powerful aggress? Because they can. But why do they want
to? They will want to preserve their interests and the status quo. Violence under
inequality is more frequent, because there is less power to control it and it is harder
to control it. Under equality, counterpower is easily achieved, either directly or
by allying with others. Under inequality, allying up is more difficult. Inequality
in the system can however exist in combination with an equalizing alliance
structure, such as the bipolar system in the Cold War. The less capable the system
of producing a balancer or balancing coalition towards the dominant power, the
more likely conflict.
In terms of the psychological principles underlying violence on the international
stage, similar processes are described as we found on the individual level.
Richard Ned Lebow starts from a spirit-based paradigm, which implies that
people, individuals and collectives, seek self-esteem. Self-esteem is dependent on
respect and recognition from others.
68

Self-esteem is a sense of self-worth that makes people feel good about
themselves, happier about life and more confident in their ability to confront
its challenges. It is achieved by gaining respect from those whose opinions
matter. Self-esteem requires some sense of self but also recognition that self
requires society because self-esteem is impossible in the absence of commonly
shared values and accepted procedures for demonstrating excellence. (Lebow
2010: p. 66)
Self-esteem is related to a subjective sense of honour and standing, and thereby

relates to status, as discussed in the chapter on inequality and human nature. Selfesteem is closely connected to honour (time), a status for the Greeks that describes
the outward recognition we gain from others in response to our excellence (Ibid.:
p. 69). It also relates to the emotion of shame, as shame is the opposite of selfesteem. It arises out of judgments that others make about oneself. Both shame and
self-esteem are stipulatively social. Similarly to Henrys cultures of honour,
Lebow describes worlds of honour, which are highly competitive because
standing, even more than wealth, is a relational concept.
The quest for honour generates a proliferation of statuses or ranks. These
orderings can keep conflict in check when they are known and respected, and
effectively define the relative status of actors. They intensify conflict when they
are ambiguous or incapable of establishing precedence. This is most likely to
happen when there are multiple ways (ascribed and achieved) of gaining honour
and office. (Ibid.: p. 71)
Lebow in an analysis of 94 wars finds 107 motives. Of these 94 wars, standing

was implicated in 62, or overall 58 per cent. Lebow argues that standing is far
and away the leading motive (Lebow 2010: 171). Also, this finding holds true
for all the centuries represented in the dataset, which covers the timespan 1648
to 2008. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, wars of standing were found
particularly within the European system. Kings and princes fought wars for
gloire. Rulers frequently sought to achieve gloire through military victories
and conquest (Ibid.: p. 172). In the eighteenth century, wars of succession were
fought which were often simply just about honour. Leading states sometimes
went to war in succession crises simply because their honour was involved (Ibid.:
p. 172). Honour and standing, furthermore, took precedence oftentimes over the
national interest. Louis XIV rejected the Dutch Republics desperate peace offers
following his initial campaign, although he had achieved his stated goals. Out of
hubris and an insatiable search for gloire, he insisted on complete conquest of the
Republic (Ibid.: p. 172). Honour and opportunity drove wars in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. For the nineteenth century, Lebow finds that search
for standing became a national concern, even in countries like Germany and
Austria (Ibid.: p. 174). With nationalism, the concept of national honour became
more prominent, also as traditional honour codes that had guided interpersonal
69
relationships declined in importance. Lebow sees in this development one of the

principal causes of the First World War. In particular, imperialism was fuelled
preceding the First World War by the upper-middle class who sought to buttress
their self-esteem variously through the success of their nation (Ibid.: p. 175).
When we turn to the crisis leading up to World War I, it is evident that the
Austrian war hawks responsible for the ultimatum to Serbia acted less from fear
for their countrys security and more from a desire to uphold its honor and their
own. The Emperor was not at all optimistic about the prospects of victory but did
not doubt that drawing the sword was the only honourable course of action.
French support for Russia reflected strategic calculations, but also concern for
honour. In Britain, the cabinet was divided, and prime minister Herbert Asquith
was able to muster a majority for war only by appealing to the need to honor.
(Ibid.: p. 176)
Also, for the Second World War, standing accounts for the origins, according
to Lebow. The Germans were particularly insulted by the war guilt clause,
and resented the allies and the Treaty of Versailles. It was less the reparations,
the loss of territory and the restrictions on Germany military that spurred this
resentment, but rather the articles that required Germany to accept responsibility
for the war and to hand over the Kaiser and other individuals for trial as war
criminals (Lebow 2010: 176). Lebow argues that standing also was involved
in the decision of the United States to invade Iraq in 2003. The events of 9/11
provided the political cover for a long-planned invasion, as the result of a conflict
that had nothing to do with terrorism and much to do with anger and standing
(Lebow 2010: 179). It is often rising and dominant powers that initiate wars: There
were 119 initiators of 94 wars Dominant powers account for 24 initiations and
rising powers for 27. Together, they are responsible for 47 out of 94 wars (there
were co-initiators of 4 wars), or initiated 49 wars (52 per cent), less than half of
which were against a dominant or another great power (Lebow 2010: 112). It is
less the great, but not dominant, powers that initiate wars: In effect, dominant and
rising powers, which account for only 33 per cent of state-years, were collectively
responsible for slightly less than half (46 per cent) of all wars. By contrast, great
powers initiated 38 per cent of wars but represent almost half (48 per cent) of
state-years (Lebow 2010: 113).
Michael David Wallace also argues that status inconsistency is related to
war. States grow and decline in power over time, and in particular states that
have experienced growth might not be attributed the appropriate level of status
internationally. He finds that such an inconsistency leads to the highest number of
conflicts with a time lag of approximately 15 years:
the causal sequence appeared to run as follows: status mobility acted to produce
status inconsistency, which in turn acted to increase the magnitude and severity
of war. when industrial capability was used, a quite different pattern was
70

discovered; differential change in capability predicted directly to the amount
of war, and combined with differential change in attributed status, predicted to
status inconsistency as well. (Wallace 1973: 90)
It seems that status, relative standing and honour play similar important roles on
the international level, as they play for individual and group violence. Hence, again
a connection can be drawn between the psychological mechanisms in response to
inequality, and violence.
Chapter 7

Theory of International Politics, Neorealism and Inequality
The previous discussions have focused on Man, the State and War and the Realism
that was ingrained in this piece of work. This chapter will take on some additional
focus on later Realist works, such as the structural Realism developed in Theory
of International Politics and its followers and will then lead into the discussion on
global integration under common institutions.
Kenneth Waltz with Theory of International Politics (TIP) wanted to contribute
a proper theory to the study of International Relations, which has become so
prominent that the following will be widely known. He had the intention to deliver a
natural science-like theory to the discipline. In its core, the theory is a Realist theory.
It uses all the assumptions that we have already encountered in the discussion on
Realism: States are the main actors. Realists are aware that other actors are present
in the international system, such as international organizations, like the United
Nations, or sub-state entities, such as non-governmental organizations like Oxfam
or Greenpeace, or terrorist groups. However, they believe that these entities are
not as important for the conduct of international politics, as states are. States, for
Realists, are the most important actors. Also, for Waltz, states are like units. This
means, they all have to fulfil similar functions. We can imagine this similarly to
firms or households. All households basically have to fulfil similar functions, even
if they differ in details. But certain aspects must be fulfilled in every household,
so that it can function. They are essentially, principally alike. Third, what counts
when looking at states and how they can be differentiated, is their power. Power in
Waltz is calculated in terms of capabilities. He here regards all aspects as important
which are of material nature, such as geography, military endowment, economic
strength, size of the population and so forth. Also, he mentions political stability.
Interestingly, though, in most research done by his followers, the main criteria
used for calculating states powers are military endowment and economic strength.
The fourth aspect: states, like for Hobbes individuals, live in a system of
anarchy. As discussed before, anarchy refers to the absence of a supranational
authority which could organize the relations between states, which could sanction
aberrant behaviour and which could take care that the relations between states
remain harmonious and peaceful. There is no supranational authority present, no
world government in essence, which can ensure peace between nations. This is
the new feature which Waltz brings into the study of Realism, that he looks at
the international system, which he describes as anarchic, and that he argues that
the anarchy of the international system is the force or the condition which
72
makes states behave the way they do. In the absence of a world government, war is
always possible. It is always a possibility that one state defects from cooperation,
or attacks another state for its own gain. Therefore, states essentially live in fear of
each other. And they have to protect themselves. States live in a self-help system.
They have to take care of their own survival. Survival, for Waltz, is the main interest
that states pursue. It is not the absolute interest in gaining power, but the mere
realization of the continuing functioning and presence of the state. Waltz therefore
is a defensive Realist. Later on, Mearsheimer, who was his student, contributed
to the debate by arguing in a similar vein like Macchiavelli that states would
pursue absolute power to feel protected. This is called offensive Realism. States
would strive for as much power as possible, in order to be secure. If a state could
acquire as much power as possible, it could achieve potentially hegemonic status,
and the more powerful a state was, the less it was under threat from other states. But
let us return to Waltz. How does he argue about the functioning of the international
system, in which alike states care for their position in terms of power and have to
accept anarchy as their contextual condition. The answer here is balance of power.
Balance of power describes the idea that states would create intentionally or not
intentionally some sort of equilibrium. They would always try to balance each
other out. For example, if there were a state growing in power, other states would
try to increase their own power in order to provide checks against this state and in
order to secure themselves against this state. They would act defensively, though
they would not generally try to achieve as much power as possible, but they would
try to gain so much power that they would not feel threatened by the other state. As
all states pursue this strategy, the system would create repeatedly an equilibrium.
This would not imply, though, that all states would be essentially equal in power,
even if this could be an ideal situation. It would rather mean that states would
create some sort of equilibrium, some equilibrium in which the stronger states
faced checks against themselves from other major states.
The powerful states would be termed poles; we can imagine a bipolar system,
a system with two poles of power, or a multipolar system, a system with many
poles of power. There would also be the possibility of a unipolar system, a system
with one hegemon in the world without any considerable counterpower. This
constellation has been discussed if it applies to the current configuration of world
politics, with the United States the hegemonic power. However, in TIP, Waltz does
not discuss unipolarity.
Finally, we have to mention balancing and bandwagoning. These are the two
strategies, which states pursue for the sake of ensuring their survival and gaining
power. If another particularly an enemy state gained too much in power, the
first state has several options. First, it can balance the challenger state. This could
be achieved by internal measures, such as an increase in military spending and
armament. Alternatively, the state also has the option to join other states and
ally with them in order to gain collective power. This would be termed external
balancing. Finally, there is the option of bandwagoning. Each state also has the
option to ally with the stronger state in order to gain from an alliance with the
73
strong state. The main expected gain from this would be protection against others.
This is what Europe did with regard to the United States in the Cold War era. They
bandwagoned with the US to be under its protective umbrella, as they would not
see any chance to otherwise protect themselves against the other superpower, the
Soviet Union.
What now can we learn from TIP for our discussion on global governance and
inequality? The first point to make it that Waltz acknowledges global governance;
he sees it in existence, but he thinks it unimportant. He does not believe that
international institutions help much to preserve the peace.
Secondly, he argues in a comparison between bipolarity and multipolarity that
bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones. This is in accord with what
we found before. Multipolar systems seem to bring forth more wars, and heavier
ones, than bipolar systems. While it is not clear if sufficient cases of bipolar systems
have been observed in the past to really judge their peacefulness in quantitative
terms, nonetheless, the stability of bipolar systems seems to be a more or less
established fact in the literature for now. Also later, Mearsheimer (2001) will argue
that bipolar systems will present a more stable situation than multipolar systems,
particularly what he calls unbalanced multipolarities, meaning multipolar
systems with one aspiring hegemon.
This description poses a logical problem for us. If we seem to know that
unipolar systems, which are the most unequal, present us with the highest risk
of war in terms of frequency, and if we assume that war risk is distributed in a
continuum along the lines of inequality, with decreasing inequality in the system
allowing for less wars, then we would logically assume that bipolar systems are
less stable than multipolar ones. This argument has been made historically, but
as I argued the evidence seems to point in the direction that indeed, as Waltz and
Mearsheimer argued, bipolarity is more stable. We would assume that multipolarity
is the most stable, but it seems, while it is more stable than unipolarity, it brings
forth more wars than bipolarity and the wars are of severe nature. There seems to
be no consistent continuum along the lines of inequality with regards to polarity
and war risk. What we have to take into account, though, is that multipolarities
are rarely fully equal. And even if all the poles were equal, it would be easy in
multipolarity to form winning coalitions by allying with other poles. Therefore,
maybe bipolarity provides us with more stable situations of equality in the system
than multipolarity does.
On the other hand, we have to consider that even under bipolarity there are
wars. In the Cold War, for example, we witnessed a number of proxy wars, always
involving minor powers with oftentimes the involvement of the superpowers.
Therefore, inequality in the system of bipolarity contributes to warfare again. This
points us to the role of inequality as contributing to war again.
Mearsheimer provided in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) an
analysis of the causes of war. He argued, along the lines of Waltz, that bipolar
systems are most stable, and multipolar systems are less stable. Least stable,
though, were multipolar systems that had one emerging hegemon within them,
74
one unbalanced state. And this again points towards the assumption that inequality
contributes to war. He did not discuss the system of unipolarity, though, but his
thinking indicates that this would be the least stable system, as indeed the empirical
evidence shows.
Another puzzle we have to consider here is the inconsistencies in Bennett and
Stams (2004) findings. If unequal systems are more war prone, why does he find a
higher war-proneness in equal dyads? This could only be interpreted to mean that
more wars do indeed happen under the condition of hegemony and unipolarity.
However, it is more wars among the lower ranking, equal states, rather than wars
involving the hegemon. This seems counterintuitive, though, as in the period of
US hegemony we observed repeated interventions of the US in other countries.
Likewise, in the Cold War, proxy wars with the involvement of the superpowers
were a common feature. Nonetheless, the finding that even these wars are more
frequent under hegemony would indicate that systemic inequality contributes to
war, a feature which I tried to show is argued by both Waltz and Mearsheimer.
I want to explore the argument deeper so that even if we find multipolarities,
which is a condition intuitively connected to more equality among the major
powers, we find inequality connected to war.
We need to look to more recent theories on Neorealism to understand how
inequalities and additional factors lead multipolarities to war. In the following, I
will refer to Randall Schweller, who published an article called Tripolarity and
the Second World War (1993), which was followed by a book. Schweller argues
in the line of Realism when thinking about the Second World War, and he was
interested to explain the Second World War in Realist terms. However, he does
not necessarily apply Waltzian Neorealism solely, but also is inspired by Carrs
Twenty Years Crisis (1939), in which Carr already had referred to Germany as an
unsatisfied power. However, Schweller combines a systemic analysis la Waltz
with Carrs concepts of status quo and unsatisfied powers to come to an analysis
how the Second World War came about.
First, some definitions: Revisionist powers, or unsatisfied powers, for him
are states which seek to increase their resources. Status quo powers, or satisfied
powers, only seek to keep their resources. Resources for him are counted in
military power potential.
Schweller makes this argument by arguing that
1. If all the powers in a tripolar system would be status quo powers, the system
would be very stable as no major power would challenge the distribution of
power. Peace could be expected in such a system.
2. If out of three powers only one power were a revisionist power, the
international system would be relatively stable but could face conflict. In
case the unsatisfied power would engage in conflictual behaviour, which is
likely as it wants to increase its resources, the other two powers would join
together against the unsatisfied power and balance it out. They would keep
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the revisionist power in check. The system, therefore, would be conflictprone but relatively stable.
3. Now, if we have the situation, which was according to Schweller present
before the Second World War, that two out of three major powers are
revisionist powers, and only one is a status quo power, the international
system becomes incredibly unstable. The two revisionist powers will try
to increase their resources, they could do that by intervening other, minor,
powers. And there would be not enough counterpower to prevent them
from doing so.
This is the international system that Schweller observes with regards to the time
preceding the Second World War.
He then goes on to establish that the international system at the time was
dominated by the USSR, the US and Germany. These were the major powers in
the international system in 1938, followed by the UK, Japan, France and Italy.
In essence, his argument is that the tripolar system before the Second World
War was instable as two of the major three powers were unsatisfied states. The
majority, hence, of the powers, which dominated internationally wanted to
challenge the power distribution in the international system. Among the major
three powers, the revisionist powers were the USSR and Germany. Only the United
States was a status quo power. And even if we include the other powers, the middle
powers, half of them were revisionist, namely Japan and Italy. Hence, overall in
the international system among the major powers there were more unsatisfied,
revisionist states, than status quo powers. This already indicates that there will be
a lot of risk of conflict in this system, with the possibility of war.
We have two aggressive, hungry, revisionist powers, and one satisfied power,
which wants to maintain the status quo. As the one status quo power is not
powerful enough to keep the other two in check it was not really a global
hegemon then this is a recipe for trouble.
The distribution of power between the three poles in the system before the
Second World War is fairly equal, according to Schweller. The critical factor
is the foreign policy orientation of the three states as revisionist or status quo.
Obviously, the revisionist orientation, in particular with Germany, can be related
back to inequality. As discussed in the previous chapters, inequality after the Treaty
of Versailles, due to reparations and restrictions, and increasing with the Great
Depression, led to the emergence of Hitler and a re-strengthening of Germany in
military terms in the first place. So again, there is a connection between inequality
and war, even though it is delayed. Also, Russia had been devastated by the
First World War and the civil war after the Bolshevik revolution. The economic
situation in Russia had been dire, and only later could Russia re-strengthen its
role. Again, this points towards inequality as an explanatory factor for later
revisionism, hence war proneness. As East and Wallace (in Cashman 2000)
explain, the war proneness is a delayed factor, coming only into effect after a restrengthening of both the military and the economy. Similarly, preceding the First
76
World War, Germany was presented with an unequal situation. While growing in
power, it was a late comer to the game of colonialism and seeked to catch up in
power with the surrounding European great powers. Hence, inequality, we could
argue, lies even at the root of conflicts in systems of multipolarity, which are per
se thought to be relatively equal.
Neorealism through a Constructivist Lens and the
Idea of Security Communities1
If inequality according to Waltzian Neorealism does contribute to warfare, what
are the solutions that have been found by his followers to this problem? Realist
ideas have been combined with Constructivist and Institutionalist ones to show
how security communities can form as a way to overcome the problems inherent
in anarchy. And again, here, we find indications that global governance might be
the best solution for preventing wars among states, and particularly major states.
When Deutsch 1957 presented his work Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area (1957) he submitted a quite idealistic concept to pit against the then
dominating Realism within the debates on international relations theories (even if
still applying realist core assumptions). His aim was to show a way to avoid war
avoid war by sketching a roadmap out of a purist realist paradigm. The argument
was, states could leave the security trap of anarchy simply by integration.
The idea is simple: To end the ongoing game of mutual mistrust within the
anarchic international system, states had to transform the system of anarchy by
building mutually binding norms for peaceful ways of competition. Self-interested
actors would not give up their interests, but socialize themselves, respectively each
other, to non-violent mode of conduct. He distinguished between pluralistic and
amalgamated security communities. The first concept relates to the mutual selfrestrictive binding of states by constructing some kind of common institutions,
the second concept signifies even deeper integration, standing in analogy to a state
of states.
The terms of conduct would be transformed from autonomous self-defence to
competing interests bound by the norm of observing non-violence. But how could
this transformation of the international system be achieved? Deutsch offers two
answers: One approach aimed at a pluralistic security community and starts with
intensification of communication and cooperation. By that, states would initiate
a dynamic process of social learning and begin to form a set of shared norms.
The second step demands that states had to submit to some kind of supranational
body that would bind all of them and thus provide predictability necessary for
the dependable expectation of peaceful change. The amalgamated community in
1The following has been published before in Beyer 2005 and is reproduced with
kind permission of Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations.
77
analogy to the nation state confers decision-making power from the multilateral to
the supranational level.
Both approaches realized would transform an international structure that
bars the units from peace and security. The notion of dependable expectations
of peaceful change refers to the expectation of peace between states elites and
their peoples for the present and the future even in the face of power shifts or
systemic changes. Only mutual reliance on this expectation can provide individual
fall-back on precautionary violence.
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in their 1998 joint publication on
security communities criticized the Deutschean concept to the effect, that it was
fuzzy and badly defined. His behaviouralist approach could quite well capture
transnational movements i.e. interactions which would point out to increasing
interdependence between states. That again would for one indicate interstate
convergence and, secondly, growing stimulus for further integration, inherent in
processual and systemic change. But, by deploying a sheer materialistic approach
Deutsch could not, simply by methodological constrains, explain the growing
sense of cohesion stemming from the development of a collectively shared
identity and community as cognitive and psychological phenomenon. Thus, the
indicators for community which according to Adler and Barnett is defined by
common identity, shared values and norms and mutual responsibility (Adler and
Barnett 1998: 40) are barely named nor measured by a behaviouralist approach.
Adler and Barnett were trying, by applying constructivism, a new way to the
same target. They aim at explaining the development of security communities as
a phenomenon of socialization, a path dependent constructive process. In order to
conceptualize Deutschs outline of security community enlarged by constructivist
assumptions, they develop a multi-fold model of the integration process. It is meant
to cover material change like interstate political coordinative interaction as well as
social change, like the formation of a common identity. That is to say, the model
embraces processual as well as structural change. Both spheres are understood
as being essential for community building: Community is defined by three
characteristics. First, shared identities, values and meanings. Secondly,
many-sided and direct relations; Thirdly, communities exhibit a certain kind of
reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest (Ibid.: 31). I will put
most emphasis on this first model because it describes in detail the mechanisms by
which states are able to transform the system of international anarchy. Within the
context of Adlers argumentation it ranks as the first step on the path to integration.
As the model describes three phases (Ibid.: 48) of the integrative process
it is able to picture dynamic change. Each phase named ascendant, nascent
and mature leads to a new level of integration. These sequential levels are
distinguished by means of certain indicatory sets. Additionally, to better capture
the process of integration, the singled out indicators are filed within three tiers.
The distinction is made according to their place within the process of change,
if they are to be localized where change is started, taking place, or showing its
effects. The first tier is that of precipitating conditions, which is to say the push
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or pull factors fostering integration. As examples of push-factors, one can think

of developments in technology, economics etc. that empower human capabilities,
shared exposure to internal threats and, finally, changes in the international
surroundings that produce external common threats. The second kind refers to
situations where security coordination is rather one further voluntary step in the
name of progress, e.g. reinterpretations of social realities that motivate social
change, like the idea of capitalizing on international division of labor or the idea of
a shared future deriving in regions with a high degree of homogeneity in cultural,
political or ideological terms. Deep homogeneity and the idea a shared future may
be derived from on a common, more integrated, past. Thus, this may be seen as
a non-pure case in terms of the model where the states are considered alienated
foregoing to security integration. It is not clear where else an idea of a shared
future should stem from. In any case, the whole model is aimed at explaining
just this. (This second category of precipitating factors may be considered very
cautiously in order not to tap into a tautological trap. I would prefer at least not to
put cognitive change at the beginning of a process which is to explain cognitive
change. It seems sensible to confine to push-factors, understood as any kind of
crises as precipitating factor within this phase.)
Within the second tier the conducive factors of social action and interaction,
driving the process of integration, are described. It encompasses the processual
elements of transactions and organization building and social learning. Further,
it points to where and how international structure is changed in order to adapt to
the ongoing process. Structural change is reflected in distribution, availability and
content of power and knowledge. This in turn is pushing the process of integration
further on. Both of them processual and structural factors are positive
reciprocal, i.e. mutually re-enforcing and regenerative.
The third tier finally implies the psychological changes, effects of the learning
process fostered by integration. They themselves are necessary conditions for
dependable expectations of peaceful change. Here, the elements of trust and
collective identity are to be found.
Summarized, tier one presents the material and normative incentives for
change in international relations, tier two shows where action possibly takes place
in the name of change and points out to the targets for transformative action, and
tier three shows the desired social outcomes of the process.
The tiers are ordered by sequence, the former always causal for the next one.
The three tiers should not be confused with the three phases noted above. Whereas
the factors presented within the three tiers are constitutive for progress, the process
as a whole is split up in the three sequences (phases). Thus, one ordering principle
in fact overlays the other. In theory they can be arranged vertically to each other in
order to create a more presentable model.
As Adler and Barnett analyze and describe the three tiers for every phase of the
integration process, this will be shortly repeated in the following.
At the nascent phase of integration, states find themselves settled in a formally
anarchic environment, where all the assumptions of Realism hold on. For the
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first tier, there have to be some precipitating elements to promote reorientation.

According to the model, these triggering factors induce a shift of orientation at the
state level towards each other and towards policy coordination with the promise of
mutual advantage e.g. through lower transaction costs. As push-factor one could
practically think of global threats like demographic growth or environmental
risks that need coordination in order to retain security or shifts in distribution
of power. This point is only mentioned here, but much more fully elaborated
on in the latter work of Emanuel Adler (2001). Mentioned as pull-factors are
developments in technical terms facilitating transaction or new interpretations of
social reality, e.g. by enhanced possibility in communications and newly available
knowledge, even the idea of a shared future. Within the second tier the integration
process starts at the at the foreign policy level. It takes place through diplomatic
consultations, face-to-face contacts and possibly so called search missions, which
are employed to evaluate the possibility of cooperative action. The next challenge
is posed as getting from the multiple bilateral consultations to truly multilateral
ones. Here, the problem of first action is crucial. The task is to overcome the
problem of collective action associated with interdependent choice, inherent in the
paradigm of Realism with its logic of mutual mistrust (Adler and Barnett 1998: 50).
Considered that not much common definition on possible or desired benefits from
cooperation has been established yet, the fear of being cheated upon is always
lurking around. There has to be at least one actor who is willing to bear in terms
of security and take the first step in the integrative direction. That may be the most
powerful and motivated one within the existing system, according to Deutsch: the
larger, stronger, more advanced units were found to form the cores of strength
around which the in most cases the integrative process developed (Ibid.: 39). His
role is complex: he may facilitate further deliberative action by making sure that
he is able to sanction violations of the process. For a while, this actor is likely to
become respectively stay core of strength, by providing leadership and care for
stability (Ibid.: 52).
Additionally, he may put the incentives for cooperation on an open agenda,
provide secure space where it can be discussed and its viability be explored. In
short, he is the one to bring the possibility of coordinated change and coordination
into the open by in its name creating a common forum, kind of midwife.
To stay in accordance with the intended outcome of the integrational path,
the whole must lead to the development of interstate organizations, which is
synonymous to the democratization of multilateral intergovernmental interaction.
The creation of international organizations in itself is a common act of states,
virtually an act of community. Community can be even said to find its first
materialization in shared institutions. Their practical purpose is to host and record
the deliberative process, and probably a little later then, to store the outcomes
sets of agreement, norms and in this manner settle the achieved approachment.
Beyond, the function of these organizations is to control and watch over
compliance. In order to provide backing on the further track, they may be even
given the power to sanction.
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Finally there is even something happening within the third tier yet, where the
effects of integration are measured in terms of trust and identity. Left to mention
that the discursive process is leading to a common working out of shared features
(interests and ideas) and dissociating ones. As fundamental for the nurturing of
the integrational process, common ideas of material progress and security have
to be found and common goals set. Here again one or another leading state may
be having its role in providing positive images for common development, being
point of reference for orientation. The second, the ascendant stage, witnesses the
transformation of anarchy. States and societies have already developed multiple
forms of social interaction. As the transformative process has begun, the structural
context wherein the interactions are embedded has to be changed accordingly.
The second phase builds on the first one. At the first tier now the formerly
established organizations themselves are to be found. They take up advocacy
for further integration. As well, ideas of material progress and security that were
defined as common, are now increasingly understood as common goods, in the
sense of being guaranteed by and found within the cooperation among members.
This can be seen as an indication for a fundamental cognitive shift (Ibid.: 53).
Looking at the second tier, an intensification of interactions at all levels, like
the intergovernmental, the economic sphere and the private one can be detected.
Indeed, these interactions are attended by advocation for further integration at
all levels, governments, security and other intergovernmental organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, epistemic communities, social movements, and
even by imaginative individuals. Transnational networks become increasingly
dense, the emergence of new shared social institutions and organizations very
likely. A characteristic interaction mode of diffuse reciprocity evolves. That means,
all members of the community participate in many-sided and indiscreet exchanges.
The members conduct the pursuit of self-interest within communities differently:
Although actors will come to identify with each other and derive many of their
interests and beliefs from the social fabric of the group, they also will continue to
harbour distinct interests, interests can generate competitive behaviour can and
competition lead to conflict. communities have diffuse reciprocity; and
the actors interests are interchangeable with those of the group. Therefore, while
states within a security community are likely to exhibit rivalry they no longer
fear the use of violence as a means of statecraft. It is based on the assumption
that the community binds its members and guarantees fair conduct, i.e. directly
(through sanctions) and to ever-higher degree indirectly (by promising benefits
for commitment).
The key indicator for increasing integration is found within the realm of hard
security. Hard security denotes the military complex in differentiation to soft
security, which refers to non-violent problem solving and coordination means
and strategies.
Military decisions are getting reflexive, which leads to mutually dependent
disarmament. States do begin to coordinate their intelligences. Here as well
bureaucratic structures do change, given that a parallel but separate process of
81
integration within the military realm has created them. Their monitoring function
will loose importance with respect to the ongoing deepening of cooperation. The
third tier at this phase displays the development of shared ideas, homogeneous
cognitive structures and common perceptions of social realities.
Multilevel multisided interaction feeds social learning processes. By actively
compromising on purposes and intentions (within the deliberative fora as well
in all kind of interaction) cognitive structures are subject to change. Cognitive
structures are understood as the set of ideas, the applied whole of images of the
world which are serving as interpretations with the aim to describe and explain
reality. Within the process of cognitive change, actors mutually get to know their
interpretations of economics, politics and society, will try to adapt and to come
closer. Deriving from now common knowledge is the formation of shared ideas.
This is preceding cognitive homogenization, which will be the final cause and base
for trust, it also over time accumulates into a collective identity. Since common
normative standards (especially in terms of peaceful conflict resolution) may
be deployed which will be obliged in action and referred to within the national
debates. The existence of collective identity shows up in language when the use of
we referring to the community gets common (Ibid.: 56).
The final phase brings about the mature state: Here, the possibility for a
common institutionalized governance system is given. Indicators for a mature
security community are to be found at the processual and the structural level.
Firstly, multilateralism up to a informal common governance is taking place,
deploying a high probability of consensus, the probability of conflict escalation is
low and differentiation between inside and outside regarding the security is made
prior to the inner differentiation.
This must not be directly observable as consensus is to be found for each topic
concerning shared underlying assumptions. It does not eliminate arguments within
the governing process. Inner borders are getting soft (in contrast to militarily
fortified), changes are to be found within the military planning (e.g. there should be
no worst case scenarios for internal conflicts anymore) and a common definition of
threat exists, which is (in military terms) now attributed to the non-members, the
external surrounding. Self-identification frequently has a corresponding other,
that represents the threat to the community.
Adler and Barnett furthermore distinguish between loosely and tightly coupled
security communities, the latter defined by a higher level of military integration,
maybe the pooling of resources. As well, policy integration coordinated law and
shared practices of public policies and the free movement of populations are
indicators. Policy coordination against internal threat is mentioned here, it is as
well possibly constitutive for community formation.
Concerning hard security respecting military decision-making power and
legitimacy after integration, some kind of collectivism is uttered: The institutional
context for exercise of power changes; the right to use force shifts from the units
to the collectivity of sovereign states and becomes legitimate only against external
threats or against members that defect from the core norms of community. It
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seems notable that nothing is said about the decision-making body or procedures
attributed to collectivity of sovereign states. Does it imply unanimity between
heads of member governments? If so, disunity must be discriminated from cases
of defection and clarified under which circumstances they would be specified
as such.
Last, the third tier features are said essential for the dependable expectation
of peaceful change: trust is established and a collective identity formed. Trust
means belief in the cooperative conduct of all member states. It has developed
from the notion of assured or probable obligation over time. Now, the reliance on
it is independent of institutional backing, instead more likely to rest on common
knowledge of peaceful means of conflict resolution. Collective identity formation
means the positive identification with each other and the pursuit of a common
way of life, which relies on the shared interpretations of economy, politics and
society. Adler and Barnett here speak of not only prosecution, but propagation.
Still it is not made clear why a common practices or beliefs should have to be
disposed to be an ingredient of the community.
Conclusion
As was meant to be shown in the second part of this chapter, the notion of
trust lies at the bottom of the argument within its first theorizing about security
community construction: inherently defined as an intuitive, affective commitment
and direction towards each other, some kind of magic glue binding to the logic
of idealism. Trust emanates under certain circumstantial conditions from the
integrative process at the individual level, gives proof of structural change and
serves as foundation pillar (preventing a backlash) for a lasting transformation of
the system towards a body of collective identity. So, it is critical in transforming
the individual state relying on self-interested action into an altruistic member
of community. As far as the observation holds true, it is synonymous with the
change of interest and consequentially of identity.
It is notable that learning processes are to be found within the causes producing
trust. So, for the further tracking of integration, it maybe well-advised to take an
ideational approach and the content of cognition into consideration. Knowledge
indeed is understood as constitutive part of the international structure, and so are
cognitive structures, that is shared sets of meanings and understandings: In other
words, part of what constitutes and constrains state action is the knowledge that
represents categories of practical action and legitimate activity. A hint is given
when Adler and Barnett refer to the security community as a cognitive region
(Ibid.: 33), even if the cognitive within a cognitive region was not yet defined
further than that.
Trust is supported and achieved, amongst other things, with the creation of
international institutions. While in Adlers concepts the focus on institutions as
a bearer of integration is clear, it will be supported even more in the following
83
chapters how institutions and global governance can contribute to peace in the
international arena. In particular Institutionalists, who base their arguments on
shared assumptions with Neorealists, have argued that institutions provide for the
development of shared expectations of peaceful change. The following chapters
will focus therefore more on global governance and what its proponents argue
about its capacity to prevent war.
Chapter 8
Global Governance
While I have discussed the topic of inequality as a cause for violence and war in
the latter chapters, I will now turn to the question of management. In this chapter,
I will present the arguments for the necessity of global governance, as well as
attempt to show in how far it has developed and strengthened, and what elements
it presently consists of.
Globalization as Cause for Global Governance
Globalization means the worldwide transcendence of societies and markets,
caused especially by the growing importance of the international financial markets,
world trade and the more intensive international orientation of multinational
enterprises, as well as the mobility of the individual. This is facilitated by new
telecommunication technology as well as by financial innovations and new modes
of transport. In the words of Anthony Giddens, The intensification of worldwide
relations, through which far distant locations get interconnected, results in the
fact that these locations are marked by processes that take place many thousand
kilometers away (translation by the author, compare Giddens 1997: 45).
Globalization implies more than the older concept of interdependence. Whereas
the term interdependence describes the results and processes of mutual
influence and vulnerability (in short, mutually effective relations) between states,
globalization means the increasing thickening of these mutually effective relations
and the spread of these to all spheres of living. Interdependence describes the
mutual dependence of states, which generally rests on trade and has effects on
sovereignty, whereas globalization describes a process. In this process, over time,
a globally integrated sphere of interaction develops (Zrn 2005: 122), former
borders dissolve or get increasingly porous and permeable, first for economic
actors, facilitated by politics. As a result, the difference between the relations within
and without which is still foundational for the concept of interdependence
dissolves (Ibid.: 122). Fully realized globalization would be termed globalism,
a situation that so far cannot be found in the world. A specific characteristic of
globalization is its intrusion in society. Increase in exchange relations has been
proven empirically: for example, in 1950, there were 74,000, 551,000 and 599,000
immigrants to Canada, Germany and Japan. At the beginning of the 1990s, this
number had tripled for Canada, doubled for Germany and Japan (Beisheim,
Dreher and Walter 1999: 110f). Regarding the trade in goods, this development
is even more obvious. The volume of exports of Canada, Germany, Japan and
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the USA in 1950 accounted for 3, 2, 1, and 10 billion US dollars. In 1995, it

amounted to 190, 512, 429 and 577 billion US dollars (Ibid.: 267). Cross-border
transactions through trade take place foremost between the three big trading blocs
of the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN. The main exports flow into the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries and the 10 leading
countries of the developing world (more than 91 per cent in the 1980s). This holds
true also for foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as for communication flows
(Zrn 2005: 123). Due to this geographic concentration of the processes that are
described by globalization, Zrn and other authors use the term denationalization
instead. They speak of full denationalization when there is no decrease in the
thickness of interaction at the borders of one country. Complete denationalization
until the 1990s is, however, the exception.
Kudrle differentiates between market globalization, communication
globalization, and direct globalization. Communication globalization is
globalization by and of the communication circuits and the accelerated exchange
in information and data and has diverse effects; it preceded the other forms
of globalization. Technical progress in transport systems and especially
in communications led to the simplification and acceleration of trade and
investment. This led to a functional integration between internationally dispersed
activities (Kudrle 1999: 3). However, it is not clear if we can already speak of an
international division of labour, as there is such in many multinational enterprises
but not yet between participating nation states. The organic link between
multinational enterprises, the speed, extent, and precision of financial information
mark the financial markets. They cause dramatic processes of change regarding
the quality as well as quantity of international communication. These enormous
changes not only result from technological progress (like satellite communication
and the internet) but also from a speedy decrease in the cost of services caused by
these technologies. By this process, communication globalization enabled market
globalization and facilitated direct globalization (Ibid.: 4). Market globalization
is marked by intensified trade, liberalization, and mobility of capital. These lead
to an increase in competition and to a race to the bottom in the concerned states.
So, the mobility of firms does cause unemployment and economic disparities
increase, at least in the industrialized countries. At the same time, the target
states experience the effects of increasing economic disparities and increasing
inequality, even if some parts of the labour force might profit. Labour migration
due to different life chances are the result. Direct globalization describes these
and other effects of communication and market globalization. The economic effect
is that states are exposed to accelerated and intensified competition (Ibid.: 5). The
cultural effect describes changes in lifestyles of peoples due to the possibilities
of information across borders. This can refer to entertainment, changed consumer
habits, as well as information habits themselves. Cultural products are becoming
global, as can be seen by the example of the movie industry. The comparison
effect describes that due to improved information, for example about political
and social circumstances in other states, the populations of politically backward
Global Governance
87
states start to demand reforms; they are inspired to do so because of the existing
information possibilities. Kudrle here cites the example of democratization
movements around the world and argues that civic freedoms are increasingly
globally demanded, especially by the concerned populations. As it enables these
developments, new transnational telecommunication technology poses a threat to
a number of states (Ibid.: 8).
From this description of globalization, three lines of argumentation for the
necessity of government beyond the state follow. First, there is the argument of
inherent necessity; second, the argument of retreat of the state; and finally, the
development of new actors as an argument.
Inherent Necessity
Direct globalization describes the externalities of the two other forms of
globalization. For example environmental degradation and climate change, but
also psychological externalities count here. These can be problems in the sphere
of human rights or workers rights. Direct globalization is causing the necessity of
global cooperation, which is the basis for global governance. Externalities are of
a transnational or interconnected nature and are only to be solved and addressed
by international cooperation. Some of the international problems created by
transnational interaction radically differ from those that developed due to the
communication revolution and market mobility. In response to the latter, states
can react with protectionism. They can decide on how far they will open up for
flows of information, goods and services, labour and capital. Yet, in the case of
true global externalities, control by one state is not possible any more. Polluted
rain cannot be controlled unilaterally, nor can the global climate (Ibid.: 15).
The necessity of cooperation in order to work on these externalities introduces
the problem of enforcement. Political actions have to be taken, and they have to be
taken by the majority, or at least by a large number of states. Thus, we find here the
need for coordination and cooperation, an argument that globalization must directly
lead to global governance. Keohane supports this argument when he argues that it
must be the imperative of the institutions of global governance to concentrate on
the negative externalities of decentralized action (2002: 248). In addition, Hewson
and Sinclair speak of the necessity of global governance and refer this back to
the externalities of development, environment, human rights, migration, trade
in drugs, and refugees (1999: 14). The results of economic globalization, thus,
demand increased efforts at global cooperation. Zrn, instead of externalities,
refers to transnational production (as distinguished from transnational exchange)
of goods and risks as a target of global governance. With global governance,
therefore, phenomena as different as the Internet, global inequality, and security
questions from war to organized crime, global climate change and the financial
markets have to to be addressed.
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Withdrawal of the State

A debate is waged around the decline of the state, some arguing for its reality
(for example, Strange 1996), while others oppose this claim (Sorenson and
Srensen 2004). Ann Florini argues that the necessity for global governance is
caused by the externality of the withdrawal of the state. In many spheres, states
cede accountability for government, which they have gained in the twentieth
century (Florini 2003: 64). The withdrawal of the state has to be complemented
by new forms of cooperation and politics; otherwise we will face a vacuum of
regulation. Thus, the many forms of failure of stateness are generating a demand
for global forms of government (Held and McGrew 2002: 50).
Global governance is marked by the fact that governance is partly transferred
from the traditional actors to new actors. Civil society as a collective is one of
these new actors. Societal groups in a process of so-called Vergesellschaftung
(socialization) are increasingly participating in governance beyond the state or
even take over this task (Zrn 2005: 128). So, the representation of interests in
regulation gets more pluralistic, more than just national interests are represented
on the international level. In addition, regulatory capacity is ceded from states
to international institutions. Global governance can thus be understood as
governance with government (as regulation by cooperation of governments), as
well as transnational governance or governance without government (regulation
by integration of non-state actors). Governance with government is characterized
by international regimes and intergovernmental networks, as well as the
establishment and existence of international organizations (IOs). Governance
without government is carried out, for example, by transnational organizations
like Amnesty International or Greenpeace and/or epistemic communities. These
establish their own institutions (transnational regimes) and thus undermine
states sovereignty (Zrn 2005: 135).
Kahler and Lake refer to the definition of the Commission on Global
Governance. Global governance is understood as being the sum of the many
ways in which individuals and public and private institutions bring order to their
common problems. It has a processive character and is directed at the exchange of
interests and cooperation (Kahler and Lake 2003: 7). Thus, it provides a framework
for collectively important activities on the global level and provides orientation
(Ibid.: 7). Kahler and Lake introduce the term authority. Authority refers to
a relationship wherein one actor intends another actor to do something and the
other actor voluntarily follows this intention. Governance is understood as a set
of relationships characterized by authority, but not as government. Beyond the
state, transnational companies (TNCs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and other actors can have authority. Kahler and Lake therefore describe the shift
of governance at the global level away from the state, which is undermined due
to the process of globalization, towards supranational forms of governance but
also towards cooperation with private actors (public-private forms of governance).
Kahler and Lake further find a development away from the club model (such as
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the G7) towards the international governmental organization model. They further
observe an increase in private forms of governance (2003a: 1314).
Increase in Other Actors
As already indicated above, a number of different new actors have entered the
scene since the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War. When
talking about new actors here, we are referring to actors that are different from
states (supranational or subnational actors) or that act beyond the borders of the
state (transnational actors). One example is the establishment of a regional union,
the European Communities, which later developed into the European Union (EU).
After that, other cooperation projects in different parts of the world followed. Also,
international organizations (IOs) have proliferated and increased in number as well
as power (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). There was also a sharp increase in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The first NGOs have been in existence since
the nineteenth century, but in the 1950s there were not more than 1,000 NGOs in
the world. For 2001, Anheier estimated the number of only international NGOs
(INGOs, that is NGOs that are present in at least three nations) at 40,000 (Anheier
et al. 2001). In addition, transnational companies and transnational terrorist groups,
as well as criminal organizations, are new actors that shape events on the world
scale today. Some of these actors do participate in global governance, for example,
NGOs and regional organizations, but also transnational corporations (TNCs);
others usually are regarded as externalities that have to be regulated and controlled
in the framework of global governance (terrorism, criminal organizations, and
again TNCs). To summarize, these developments lead to the necessity of global
governance in order to deal with these new actors and their effects. The emergence
of new actors poses both a challenge and an opportunity for global governance. On
the one hand, these new actors policies have to be regulated. On the other, some of
them may participate in or even form the basis of global governance.
Definition of Global Governance
Rittberger and Zangl define global governance thus: States, international
organizations participate at different levels and in different constellations in the
complex process of creation and implementation of international rules with global
claim of validity (Rittberger and Zangl 2003: 245). The following sections intend
to put more flesh on this definition and describe what these actors are and how
they engage in global governance.
Actors of global governance comprise the following: states; international
organizations; NGOs; and TNCs. Institutions, or systems of rule that are generated
by actors of global governance, are represented by international law, international
norms, and international regimes. Forms of conduct or modes of interaction
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in global governance are including: intergovernmental/multilateral policies;

and publicprivate cooperation and private forms of governance; as well as
unilateralism/hegemonic governance. Beyond these, the following merit mention,
but wont be discussed to more extent in the following: world conferences, ad hoc
arrangements, and global policy networks, and of course individual citizens. All
of these elements, which in their composition create global governance, have been
strengthened in the past decades.
States as Actors in Global Governance
The beginning of the system of international states dates back to the year 1648
when the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War. Articles 64, 65
and 67 established a number of core principles of a new system of states: territorial
sovereignty, the right of the state to choose its own religion and to decide its
own policies, and the prohibition for supranational authorities like the church to
intervene in state affairs. The treaty marked the end of the rule of religion in Europe
and allowed the rise of secular states. The territorial principle made the states
legally equal, thus they became sovereign participants in the international system.
Sovereignty thus became the core concept of the states system. This principle
was laid down in the Charter of the United Nations 300 years later (UN, United
Nations, undated). In the following period, the state became an ever more
prominent actor in international relations. With increasing globalization after the
end of the Cold War the state seems under pressure as new actors and issues arise
and states arguably lose authority. However, even given these changes, challenges
and new actors in global governance, the nation state remains the most important
actor on the international scene. It is still the first instrument of national and global
politics: The nation state [is] the most important actor on the stage of global
politics, but it is not the only important actor (Nye and Donahue 2000a: 12). It
is now supplemented by a variety of new actors, such as TNCs, IOs, and NGOs.
The result of the interaction between the three categories of actors is not the
obsolescence of the nation state, but its transformation (Sorensen and Srensen 2004).
In contemporary IR theories, states are oftentimes still the most important actors.
To understand the role of the state in global governance, we have to look at its
agential power: Hobson distinguishes between the domestic agential power of the
state and its international agential power (2000: 4ff). Domestic agential power is
understood as being the institutional state autonomy, thus connoting the ability of
the state to make domestic or foreign policy as well as shape the domestic realm,
free of domestic social-structural requirements or the interests of non-state actors
(Ibid.). Most of this domestic agential power is attributed to the state by Realism.
Liberal approaches like Marxism and constructivism as well as postmodernist
approaches are much more cautious in attributing much domestic agential power to
the state (Hobson 2000: 5). Furthermore, international agential power refers to the
ability of the state to make foreign policy and shape the international realm free
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of international structural requirements or the interests of international non-state

actors high agential power refers to the ability of the state to mitigate the logic
of inter-state competition and thereby create a cooperative and peaceful world
(Hobson 2000: 7). Yet, this international agential power is not the same as the state
power or capability attributed to the state by Neorealism. It does not so much refer
to the power to change the structure of the international system (i.e. distribution of
capabilities) as to transform the rules of the game in order to create the possibility
of cooperation. Most of this agential power is attributed to states by Liberalism.
Classical liberalism stipulates that as states conform to individuals social needs
within domestic society, so they are able to create a peaceful world. State-centric
liberalism (e.g. neo-liberal institutionalism) stipulates that states have sufficiently
high agency to reshape the international system and to solve the collective action
problem (Hobson 2000: 7). States, for example, are able to transform international
anarchy by establishing international institutions and regimes. Hobson comes to
define international agential power of the state as:
the ability of the state-society complex and the state as a unit-force entity
(whether it is imbued with high or low domestic agential power/autonomy, or
is fragmented or centralized, or is imagined or real) to determine or shape
the international realm free of international structural constraints; and at the
extreme, to buck or mitigate international structural constraints and the logic of
international competition. (Ibid.: 7)
With this definition, the state remains the most important actor, but, differently
from realist approaches, it can also be the most important actor in the creation of
supranational integration, hence global governance.
International Organizations
IOs are not only actors in global governance, they are important institutions in this
framework as well. IGOs are instrumental in forming stable habits of cooperation
through regular meetings, information gathering and analysis, and dispute
settlement as well as operational activities (Karns and Mingst 2004: 7f). Beyond
the world conferences, it is the IOs that present the fora wherein cooperation is
institutionalized. Here, binding treaties are agreed upon and international law is
created. Here also, the creation of soft law takes place. In 2003/4, the Yearbook
of International Organizations (Union of International Associations 2004)
counted 238 of IOs. The most important IOs in global governance generally
are the UN with its large number of sub-organizations, as well as the Bretton
Woods organizations.
IOs can have the role of an instrument, an arena, or can be actors in their
own right. They are instruments when they are being used by their member
states or others for the pursuit of interests. They represent an arena, as they form
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a platform for conferences and congresses where states can gather information
about the intentions and policies of other states and exchange views with them.
They are also definable as social entities that can act towards their environments.
They are internally characterized by norms that states agree upon and rules that
behaviour of states is based on. These norms and rules imply roles for the states
and their representatives in recurrent situations. This leads to the development of
mutually stable expectations of peaceful change. Externally, IOs are characterized
as being actors regarding those states and their representatives (Rittberger and
Zangl 2003: 27).
The quality of actorness of IOs is shown particularly in the case that there is
a hierarchical relationship between the member states and the other organs of the
organization and if these other organs can further act relatively autonomously.
The defining criterion is that one organ of the organization can act as a third party
towards its member states without just reacting to their influence.
International organizations transform inputs (support or demands) into outputs
(regulative, distributive, or redistributive policies). They thus can be understood
as social subsystems; they present a network of organs and procedures that the
production of collective decisions is based upon. The relation between the extent
of interactions within, compared to a relatively lesser extent of interaction towards
the outside, does differentiate the organization from its environment. So, IOs
can be understood as social subsystems that function as political subsystems in
international affairs. They also respond to external demands (as they are relatively
open towards their environment) and are based on support from external actors.
Inputs are demands as well as support, provided by the representatives of the
member states governments, but also provided by their administrative staff in the
organizations themselves or by organized interests or the public at large. Even
individuals (for example, experts that take over a policy-informing position) can
become actors in this regard. Most often, the input comes from the member states
of an organization. Inputs here can be membership fees, information, or even
personnel. Most often, this kind of support is not free of interests and is coupled
with demands. For example, a representative of a government can directly address
the organization with a certain idea or demand in exchange for some support to the
organization (Rittberger and Zangl 2003: 108ff). Member states and the staff of
the organization can also contribute to the output of the organization. Civil society
actors as well as experts are generally more active in the input sphere (even if
increasingly IOs give NGOs the role of supporting their policy implementation,
thus output).
As mentioned before, possible outputs are regulative, distributive, and
redistributive policies. The effectiveness of these policies depends on the level
of their implementation. Distributive and regulative policies are generally more
effective than redistributive policies. Thus, IOs have more influence in the
distributive and regulative spheres, and thus more authority. The influence and,
thus, authority of IOs can also be measured regarding their sphere of influence.
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Regional or membership-specific organizations exist that generally have most

influence on the states they comprise.
Finally, informational and operative functions are also fulfilled by IOs.
IGOs serve many diverse functions, including collecting information and
monitoring trends (United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP), delivering
services and aid (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR),
providing forums for intergovernmental bargaining and settling disputes
(International Court of Justice and World Trade Organization, WTO). (Karns
and Mingst 2004: 7)
NGOs as Examples of Civil Society Actors

In Europe and the United States, the first peace movements came into existence
in the nineteenth century. These peace movements participated in peace
conferences in The Hague. In 1900, there were 425 of them worldwide. They
are the precursors of the current NGOs. Instead of the term NGO, there are
many other descriptions for civil society organizations. A common definition
is rendered difficult, even if some authors attempted to. For example, Khagram
et al. define NGOs as private, voluntary, non-profit groups whose primary
aim is to influence publicly some form of social change (Khagram, Riker and
Sikkink 2002: 6). However, according to Khagram et al., guerrillas and terrorists
could be NGOs, even if they are generally excluded. I will use the following
definition: NGOs are voluntary, non-state, non-profit, non-violent organizations
with the main aim of publicly inspiring social or political change and without
aiming at governmental power. Some NGOs do use violence, yet only to the
extent that may be described as civil disobedience, not to the extent that terrorist
groups do. In addition, social movements and epistemic communities are elements
of civil society, for example, as a number of other groups. Social movements and
epistemic communities are not NGOs as long as they do not form an organization.
Roth (2001: 39) sees in NGOs the potentially most beneficial new actors in
international politics, as they are comparatively independent from the state and the
market and can bring in perspectives from civil society into the political process.
Ideally, they even can correct state and market failures. NGOs are thought capable
of dealing with ignored or marginalized interests and issues. According to Weiss
and Gordenker, NGOs have a positive impact on global governance: in their wide
variety they bring expertise, commitment, and grassroots perceptions that should
be mobilized in the interests of better governance (1996: 19).
NGOs are often judged very positively in literature in respect of their
importance for global governance, and for some they even represent the
fifth pillar of democracy. They were found to play an important role as
independent co-operation partners for international organizations (Kreiser and
Lachmann 2003: 23). Also, NGOs serve undeserved or neglected populations to
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expand the freedom of or to empower people and to engage in advocacy for social
change as vanguards for the just society (Ibid.: 19). Nelson writes with regard
to the development sector:
NGOs are often touted as a solution to many of the problems that bedevil
official development aid. Networks of voluntary associations are seen
as a valuable resource for building strong civil societies and accountable
government. They [NGOs] are hailed for their proximity to remote
communities and to the poor their efficiency and the low cost of operations
their promotion of sustainable development and their potential role as
organizing and representative bodies in civil societies. (Nelson 1995: 36)
TNCs
TNCs are defined as those enterprises that act transnationally and are represented
in at least three states. The numbers of TNCs have increased exponentially since
the 1990s. In 1996, UNCTAD counted 39,000 TNCs with about 270,000 subbranches abroad. TNCs are accountable for about a third of the world trade
internally and another third with other companies. They are the decisive actors of
the economictechnological structural change and the spread of new organizational
concepts (Bonsignore 2003: 44). The vast majority (circa 50 per cent) come from
the United States, UK, Japan, France and Germany. In addition, investments by
these companies mainly take place in these countries, whereas in the 1990s also
single neighbouring countries could attract this kind of money. Regarding their
financial power, many TNCs are said to have surpassed states. General Motors and
WalMart have bigger returns than the general social product of Brazil, Canada or
Spain. In many cases, they exert pressure on the nation states that are competing
for investments in order to make them lower their restrictions. Thus, TNCs are
important actors with regard to deregulation. By intensive lobbying of their interest
groups and economic pressure on national economies they can exert influence on
the decisions of governments and supranational economic institutions. For this
purpose, TNCs accumulate their interests like NGOs in networks. Examples of
such forms of organization are the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the US Council for International
Business (USCIB), and the World Economic Forum (WBCSD) (Ibid.: 46). In some
cases, TNCs have been allowed into political positions. For example, in the United
States, a large number of representatives of TNCs are present in the subcommittees
of the Department of Commerce and can thus exert direct influence.
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International Law
International law since the 1960s also has experienced enormous quantitative
growth (Karns and Mingst 2004: 5). The statute of the International Court of
Justice recognizes five sources of international law: treaties and conventions,
customary law, the writings of law scholars, and general principles of law. The
strongest elements of growth have been international treaties. In the past 50 years
alone there have been about 4,000 new multilateral treaties, to a large extent with
reference to economic issues. For the praxis of global governance, a problem
of international law is that it only refers to states, which, however, are not the
only relevant actors in global governance. Currently (with the exception of
the EU) multilateral agreements cannot be directly used to bind individuals or
multinational enterprises. Nor are NGOs and paramilitary forces bound by this
law (Ibid.: 6). But international law does bind states and the resulting norms
can and should be implemented from them vis--vis non-state actors. Further
problems of international law are the insufficient mechanisms of coercion and
the remaining sovereignty of states, which leaves much room for freedom on the
question of whether to agree to these treaties or not. The Charter of the UN and the
treaties of the EU have sanctioning mechanisms, but in many cases compliance
with international law cannot be achieved by applying these sanctions.
International Norms
Risse (Risse, Jetschke and Schmitz 2002) define norms as collective expectations
regarding an appropriate conduct on the basis of a given identity. Norms are, thus,
interpersonally shared and stable expectations of behaviour of others. They are
part of the social structure in which the actors are embedded. Whereas norms
in the Rational Choice approach are seen as an intervening variable regarding
the cost-benefit calculations of actors, Constructivism assumes that individuals
are embedded in their social world and social structures and reproduce and
change these structures constantly by their interactions. Social norms do not only
constitute rules, at the same time they constitute the actors that they bind. They
do so by influencing the social identity and the definition of interests in the actors
(Ibid.). Thus, norms socialize actors: in the process of implementation, actors
internalize modes of thinking and behaviour that stem from their environment and
make them their own. As a result, norms bind the actions of the actors. We find
these norms at the international level also, where they fulfil the same function,
only the actors (mostly states) being different. The most well known of these
norms is that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other entities. Many
international conventions represent non-binding norms or standards for states,
sometimes referred to as soft law (cf. Abbott and Snidal 2000). Examples here
are some human and workers rights, the common law of the seas and the polar
regions. In many spheres, like the protection of the environment or the agreements
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for biodiversity, norms are established first. This also happens under special
pressure from NGOs and the influence of epistemic communities. These norms are
complied with and implemented. In the ideal case, in an evolutionary process, hard
law develops from soft law with the signing of international treaties and binding
agreements in the concerned policy field.
Regimes
Regimes are understood as central institutions, but not as actors of global
governance. They are composed of principles, norms, rules, and procedures
that order and guide the interaction between states. Principles can be described
as shared assumptions about reality, about causes and causal relations and right
behaviour. Norms are standards of behaviour that do express in rights and
duties. Rules are special obligations or interdictions for behaviour. Procedures of
decision-making are ordering the establishment and implementation of collective
behaviour by common rules. The existence of the four factors structures the
expectation of the actors in the concerned spheres of issue (Krasner 1983: 2).
Regimes can be further described as arrangements that are based on norms. They
depend on the assertiveness of these norms. Regimes can subsume formal treaties
but are more than that (de Nevers 1999: 5). Regimes facilitate the distribution of
costs. Governments tend to produce a common good only in the case that others
produce this good as well. It is harder for states to evade compliance with their
duties if other states particularly great powers can point to specific written
rules and procedures. Regimes establish those standards. In addition, regimes
provide information to governments. Information exchange is essential for
collective and effective problem solving. Examples here are the fight against
diseases and against pollution of the environment. Further, international regimes
make policies of governments more predictable and reliable. Regimes also
provide information indirectly: for example, when they provide the opportunity
to members of governments to gain insights into the processes that are important
for political results by means of negotiation and personal contact (Keohane and
Nye 2001: 291). Finally, by fulfilling the named functions, regimes can prevent the
interests particularly of the greater powers coming into conflict with each other.
Intergovernmentalism and Multilateralism
Multilateralism is the central mode of interaction within global governance
and it is becoming more important over other forms of interaction. Ruggie
writes about multilateralism: At its core, multilateralism refers to coordinating
relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles
(1992: 568). Multilateralism is further distinguished from bilateralism, which is
highly discriminatory. The example of the New Plan of Hjalmar Schacht (a highly
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bilateral trade arrangement between Nazi Germany and mostly East Central
European countries) is in opposition to the multilateralism of GATT that extends
any bilateral agreement to all other parties. Further, collective security systems are
examples of multilateralism:
None has ever existed in pure form, but in principle the scheme is quite simple.
It rests on the premise that peace is indivisible, so that a war against one state
is, ipso facto, considered a war against all. The community of states therefore is
obliged to respond to threatened or actual aggression, first by diplomatic means,
then through economic sanctions, and finally by the collective use of force if
necessary. Facing the prospect of such a community-wide response, any rational
potential aggressor would be deterred and would desist. (Ibid.: 569)
The difference between traditional alliances and security systems is that the
latter are encompassing. They can be compared to a horizontal network of
alliances, linking each state with each other state in responsibility. Generally,
multilateralism can be found in institutions: multilateralism depicts a generic
institutional form in international relations (Ibid.: 569). Multilateralism is an
institutional form that coordinates relations among a number of states (at least
three). It is based on generalized principles of conduct; discrimination is excluded
or rendered impossible.
Private Governance, PPPs, and Global Policy Networks
Private law in many cases is established in situations where the state is not active.
Example of forms of such private law are international standards of accounting,
and private standards in the industrial sphere established by the International
Standards Organization, as well as the regulation of the internet. Private actors
are increasingly subcontracted by states in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in
order to use their services for governmental functions. PPPs are a well-known
instrument in national politics. For example, corporatist arrangements are a form
of PPPs (Brzel and Risse 2004: 1). In IR, private actors have only recently come
into focus as partners of the state in the sphere of global governance.
To the extent that non-state actors were taken into consideration at all, they
appeared either as actors shaping state interests through domestic politics or
as transnational actors (from Multi-National Corporations to International NonGovernmental Organizations [INGOs]) lobbying international negotiations and/
or international organizations. (Ibid.: 1)
PPPs count as efficient and legitimate means of cooperation between the state and
the private sector in order to solve problems beyond the traditional sphere of the
state. Forms of PPPs according to Brzel and Risse are shown in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1
Forms of PPPs
Rule setting
Rule implementation Service provision
Co-optation
Human rights regimes UN human rights

system
UN development
agencies
Delegation
International
Standards
Organization (ISO)
International Labour
Organization (ILO)
Humanitarian and
development aid
sectors
UNAIDS
Co-regulation
Self-regulation
in the shadow
of hierarchy
Safe harbor
agreement
Executive outcomes
Various emission
trading schemes of
climate change regime
Global Compact
Rating agencies
Source: Brzel und Risse (2002: 6). Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
University of Toronto Press 2005
Co-optation is the most common form of PPPs, but also the weakest one.
Co-optation means that private actors are represented as members in delegations
for rule-setting and implementation as it is often practiced in human rights and
environmental politics. Delegation to private actors is also increasingly practiced
in international politics. Most often, this is to be observed in the sphere of technical
standard setting, for example by the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO). Tasks of the state are assigned here to private actors. Private expertise is
expected to secure the efficiency and acceptance of the result. Co-regulation refers
to common decision-making when private actors have at least a veto position.
This can be observed in the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the
World Commission on Dams. Yet, co-regulation is only rarely used by state actors.
Private self-regulation is inspired by the threat of legislative regulations: When
the WTO had decided a code of ethical and scientific standards, the International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association voluntarily adopted
a Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices to avoid further regulation of
marketing practices (Ibid.: 9). Private self-regulation can also evolve out of the
lack of norms and rules.
According to Dingwerth, forms of PPPs, which he describes as global policy
networks, are issue-specific, idealistically trisectoral (meaning that they encompass
the state, and the economic and civil society actors) networks in the members
search for a common solution to a transnational problem (Dingwerth 2003: 1).
Particularly well known are global policy networks through the works of Reinecke
and Deng (2000), who understand them as a contribution to increased efficiency
and legitimacy of global governance. Policy networks can place issues that would
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otherwise be ignored on the international agenda and they are also capable of
inspiring rule setting (Dingwerth 2003: 8).
Unilateralism
Unilateralism is essentially based on dominant power, at which I will have a look
first. Power is a phenomenon that we encounter on a regular basis in international
relations. Yet, power is not always recognized as such. It depends on how it is
exerted, what it is based on, to what its external appearance is. In the discipline
of IR, we distinguish between hard and soft power. Much has been written about
hard power, mostly applying the concept implicitly rather than explicitly (but
cf. Keohane and Nye 1998; and Everts 2004). Classical theories of IR mainly
deal with its acquisition, application, and effects. Hard power is primarily
based on military means, with coercion being exerted by its application or mere
threat. Military intervention with the aim of regime change is an example of
application of hard power. By soft power (Nye 1999) we understand economic,
cultural, and diplomatic means and their application. It can be debated as to how
far these can be applied in a hard manner, for example, by economic sanctions.
Economic sanctions against a country can have disastrous effects, as we have seen
in the 1990s in Iraq. In such cases, we speak of hard power. Generally, there is
yet another characteristic to distinguish between hard and soft power: its effect.
If we speak about the power to realize ones own aims and interests against the
will of another state (Weber 1947: 152), then we speak of hard power. The other
state then complies or cooperates out of necessity, in order to evade or diminish
negative consequences. In the case of soft power, the other is convinced that it just
wants the same as what we want. It is following (complying with) power in its
own interest, without fearing negative consequences if it does not, but probably
with an ideal or material gain in sight if it does. The difference is gradual, there
being many degrees of power between coercion and persuasion. By means of both
strategies, applying hard as well as soft power, the cost-benefit calculation of the
other state is changed in a way that its behaviour changes as well. This change in
behaviour is central to the definition of power change of behaviour in the interest
of the powerful. Hannah Arendt (1969) has described this difference between hard
and soft power very compellingly. According to Arendt, we distinguish between
power and violence or force. Power is always based on the support of others, thus,
can never be obtained independently from others. It equals the principle all for
one or soft power. Violence or force is necessary only in the case that no power
is in existence. Its necessity is caused by the lack of power. Only when I cannot
persuade others to follow me voluntarily do I have to employ force.
Unilateralism describes the application of policies based on power that
do not regard other states as equal actors (cf. Bhagwati 1990). The action
of unilateralism as opposed to bilateralism or multilateralism takes self-
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interest before the interests of others (in multilateralism interests being mutually
negotiated). Malone and Khong define unilateralism as:
a tendency to opt out of a multilateral framework (whether existing or proposed)
or to act alone in addressing a particular global or regional challenge rather
than choosing to participate in collective action. States opt out because
they do not wish to subject themselves to the generalized principles of conduct
being negotiated or enforced, or they may find such principles inimical to their
national interest. (Malone and Khong 2003: 3)
This behaviour (in Realism) is traditionally ascribed to great powers: History

affords little support for the assertion the great powers like to make that they are
more restrained and responsible than minor powers. It suggests, rather, that they
wish to monopolize the right to create international conflict (Halloway 2000).
Halloway goes on to state that the minor powers generally were more capable
than the great powers of pursuing consistently what might be regarded as the
universal interest of upholding international law and order (Ibid.). Thus, logically,
unilateralism is highly facilitated and increasingly used by unipolarity and unipolar
powers. The United States are particularly commonly unilateralist in its behaviour.
Although the United States develops their policies partly in response to global
events, the U.S. foreign policy community tends to give short shrift to the ideas
and opinions of international observers. Foreign attitudes are often overlooked,
ignored, or dismissed rather than being integrated . (Malone and Khong 2003)
Some American scholars tried to define American unilateralism (which they

proposed and/or diagnosed as the dominating principle after 9/11) as an alternative
to isolationism, but without the bad effects of over-engagement and selfcentredness; it was supposed to mean:
determination to self-consciously and confidently deploy American power in
pursuit of those global ends. Note: global ends. There is a form of unilateralism
that is devoted only to narrow American self-interest and it has a name too.
It is called isolationism. Critics of the new unilateralism often confuse it with
isolationism, because both are quite prepared to unashamedly exercise American
power. The new unilateralism defines American interests far beyond narrow
self-defense. In particular, it identifies two other major interests, both global:
extending the peace by maintaining democracy and preserving the peace by
acting as balancer of last resort. (Krauthammer 2002/3)
However, at least as often, American unilateralism is criticized as hampering the

effectiveness of global governance or cooperation in general (e.g. Maynes 1999;
Kellner 2002). Halloway (2000) concluded a study on unilateral voting behaviour
in the UN with the following findings: U.S. negative, or rejectionist, voting
Global Governance
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increased as a proportion of total votes from 1968 to 1993 and U.S. behavior in
the General Assembly can be characterized as nonmultilateralist not only in the
large sense (not accommodating to the majority) but also in the minilateralist sense
(not voting with its closest NATO allies) (Halloway 2000).
Chapter 9
The Continuity of Power in

Global Governance
Global governance as a concept has developed into a major focus of theorizing
in IR. Mainly concerned with the question how globalization and its effects can
be, and are being, managed on an international level, scholarship has produced so
far an impressive amount of literature on global governance. While this literature
in itself is highly diverse, it focuses essentially on ordering structures which are
created between states and on a supranational level to enable just these states, as
well as other actors, to coordinate their common affairs and address joint problems.
Bruehl and Rittberger (2001) in an attempt to categorize the literature on global
governance have described three strands of thought on the phenomenon: world
state-ism, governance without government, and hegemonic governance. First, we
find the literature on world state-ism. This literature argues that global problems can
only be solved under the condition of abolition of anarchy, hence the creation of a
world state. This is arguably the most radically normative branch of the scholarship
on global governance, and the least developed one. Criticisms abound, particularly
on the fact that a world state in our times remains a hypothetical construct and
the challenges before its creation are immense (e.g. Nye and Donahue 2000). On
the other hand, the second concept on global governance governance without
government represents the mainstream of theorizing on global governance
(e.g. Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Supporters argue that cooperation among states
and other actors is possible, expectable, and in fact observable, due to the mere
pressure of collective problems. Rational considerations will (and do) lead nations
to collaborate on a supranational level in order to address global externalities,
so the argument. And sub-state, private actors, such as NGOs and TNCs, will
be involved in these common policy processes to improve the decision-making
processes and to facilitate the implementation of solutions. Furthermore, this
branch of theorizing on global governance oftentimes assumes that states are
losing power in international affairs. This is due both to the active withdrawal
of the state, ceding functions to private actors, as well as due to the emergence
and fast growth in numbers of non-state actors who claim political power and
participatory as well as representative rights. Governance also is becoming more
networked, integrating many actors (not only states) into transnational connections
and collaboration agreements with each other. And finally, this branch argues (or
maybe rather implicitly assumes), global governance is heterarchic. Due to the
waning power of the state, power differentials between states (but also between
other actors) are not problematized intensively in this literature; in fact they
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are ignored. The vast majority on publications since Rosenau and Czempiel on
global governance fall into this strand of theorizing, which is affiliated with the
Institutionalist and Liberal school of thought. This chapter will attempt to criticize
this particular mainstream branch of thought on global governance as also being
too normative in its perspectives. It will be arguing instead that the third category
of global governance concepts presented by Bruehl and Rittberger has more
important insights to offer than is commonly acknowledged: governance under
the hegemonic umbrella. The latter perspective is in fact an under-researched and
-theorized one. It implies that the role of the state is still strong in international
affairs, and that the international distribution of power proposed by Realism as
the main factor causal for various behaviours of states in international affairs still
explains international processes. It finally combines these assumptions to argue
that global governance is essentially a product of the policies of the internationally
leading and most powerful state, the hegemon.
This chapter will proceed in two steps. First, the mainstream conceptions on
global governance will be discussed in an attempt to show commonalities, such
as the implicit assumption of heterarchy and the neglect of discussions on power
distribution within the international system. Second, it will be argued that global
governance in its current worldly expression does show observable features and
structures that can be understood by combining the Institutionalist perspective on
global governance with a more realist-inspired worldview. States still do play an
important role in global governance; they remain the most important actors. Also,
the distribution of capabilities in the international system still shows remarkable
effects, even within a global configuration of shared governance arrangements.
And finally, states are still constrained in their actions on an international level by
these two factors, influencing their decisions to participate and comply with global
governance or to abstain. This latter part of this chapter will support these claims
by presenting some findings from a former study on the causes of participation in
global governance.
Global Governance: Heterarchy without States
The mainstream literature on global governance shows some common features
that are explicitly or implicitly present in the large bulk of the writings on the
phenomenon. As mentioned before, the largest part of the writings on global
governance are in the tradition of Rosenau and Czempiels governance without
government (1992). Citing a small number of examples will serve here to support
the claim that this literature prejudices in favour of the decline of the state and the
emergence of networked, heterarchic architectures. This perspective is oftentimes
found to be highly normatively laden; nonetheless it serves many theorists of
global governance as a quasi-empirical description of the globalized world we
live in.
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Khagram, for example, proposes six models of global governance: 1)

multilateralism; 2) grassroots globalism; 3) multiple regionalisms; 4) world
statism; 5) networked governance; 6) institutional hierarchy (2006). While these
are discussed as possible future architectures of global governance, it is clear that
a strong focus is put on non-state architectures and heterarchic models of global
governance. Five out of six models are presenting architectures in which the
nation states have a smaller role to play than it would be imagined, for example,
by Realist accounts (grassroots globalism, multiple regionalism, world statism,
networked governance, institutional hierarchy), only one of the models addresses
the idea that nation states in the future still might remain the most important
actors and create some sort of global governance among them (multilateralism).
Khagram also gives the reason for this focus, a reason which is explicitly or
implicitly used in much of the global governance literature: he wants to show
images which are normatively desirable for at least some identifiable social
actors. Like Khagram, much of the literature on global governance follows this
approach, which is due to the inherent normative trajectory of thinking about
global governance. Following this line of argumentation, he envisages even for
multilateralism a greater equalisation of interstate authority (Khagram 2006: 98),
which is to follow from democratization of international organizations, resulting
in greater quantity and quality of transparency, participation and accountability.
With this, he also shows clearly another element present in most of the global
governance literature: the focus on heterarchic arrangements. Nonetheless,
multilateralism is his only model in which states remain the central actors in
global governance: This greater equalisation of authority relations could
occur with or without a prior, concomitant, or consequential equalisation
of interstate power relations. Note well that in this image, other actors and
levels of governance besides central states do exist, but the latter remain the
overwhelmingly predominant constituents and agents of global governance
(Khagram 2006: 99). All other models reject this notion of states being the most
important actors in global governance. For example, in multiple cooperative
regionalism the predominant locus of authority would not be central states but
rather various regional collectivities of political units (Khagram 2006: 99).
The networked governance model gives states a certain amount of power with
the trans-governmental model (primarily state governmental and bureaucratic
actors, although not just from central states), while the multi-stakeholder model
diminishes the role of the state to give more power to substate actors (state
and nonstate actors from various sectors). The institutional heterarchy model
finally envisions a powerful role for a large number of diverse actors, such as
communities, religions, interest associations, epistemic communities, companies,
states, interstate organizations, and social movements, and regions, transnational
or global networks of various kinds. Khagram goes on to argue that indeed the
events of 9/11 while showing in itself a strong evidence for transnationalism
and sub-statism spurred a conscious re-strengthening of interstate relations,
with the United States focusing their Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) on
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states, and haven states in particular. However, the main argument he promotes
in the article is showing a strong skepticism towards the remaining power of the
state world: Why should we expect that current or future global governance
architectures are, will be, or should be organized around a partly mythical,
potentially idiosyncratic nation-state and sovereign-state system model?
(Khagram 2006: 110). And: At the very least, it must be expected that the world
will likely remain or become more trans-nationalized for the foreseeable future
(Khamgram 2006: 110). And he finishes his argument with restating the desirable
future importance of transnationalism and heterarchy: one of the key analytic
principles that form the foundation of these [future] institutional arrangements
is the recognition and internationalization of the transnational nature of world
affairs and dynamics and a key normative principle [is the] equalization of
power relations (Khagram 2006: 112).
Niekerk also argues along these lines, while taking a more cautious perspective:
the role which social organizations, rather than governments, can perform in
resolving collective action problems that are currently at the top of global political
and economic agendas are increasingly being recognised (2010: 38). And
while he concedes a still important role to states, he argues that their power is
being diminished:
[While] states still remain among the main players on the global stage,
governments are indeed no longer the only main players [and] the growth in
IGOs is a critical contributory factor to an increasing trend towards shared
governance, which means that the sovereignty and autonomy of national
governments is ever more locked into a multi-layered system of governance.
(Niekerk 2010: 41)
For him, the state is increasingly sandwiched between powers above and below,
its power is shared and bartered among many other public and private agencies
or centers of authority above, below and alongside the state (Niekerk 2010: 41).
But, in line with the majority of writings on global governance, not only does he
see a diminished role for the state; also he argues that hierarchies between states
are ceding their importance for international politics: Consequently, globalization
does prefigure a historic power shift from national governments to evolving
systems of regional and global economic governance. the contemporary world
order might best be described as a heterarchy (Niekerk 2010: 43).
Walters states that research on governance is skeptical about the conceptual
centrality and validity of the state. The age of governance monopolized by
the state is passing, and political authority is becoming more polycentric and
multileveled. Governance research and theorizing focuses more on processes
than institutions, therefore including a broader picture on political authority than
just focusing on the state. Old governance describes a world in which economy,
society, and even the state itself are governed from fixed centers of authority in a
top-down fashion. New governance pertains to a novel form of society in which
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the traditional goals of governments can no longer be accomplished by the

centre acting alone (Walters 2004: 29). This leads governance theorists to believe
in a transnationally integrated, fastly changing international society, marked by
networks, coordination and heterarchy, in which the state assumes a new role.
Held sums these ideas up when he writes: the idea of global politics challenges
the traditional distinctions between the domestic and the international, the
territorial and the non-territorial, and the inside and the outside, as embedded
in conventional conceptions of the political (Held and McGrew 2002: 6).
Overall, this part tried to show by using a couple of examples of writings on
global governance that this line of theorizing is usually strongly prejudiced with
regards to the role of the state and the international distribution of power. This
bias not only is present in the more normative accounts on global governance,
but also can be found in the more empirically oriented accounts, such as the one
of Niekerk.
Bringing Back Power: The Realist Perspective
This chapter attempts to suggest that a more realist inspired perspective on global
governance can be relevant. In particular, such a perspective would highlight
the continuing importance of states, the influence of dominant power, and the
constraints stemming from the international system in which regulation is still
exercised and happening within a partially anarchic setting, constraining states
decisions for cooperation and participation and compliance in global governance.
In Neorealism, states are the main actors of importance for international
affairs. States are essentially alike, but they differ in power, provide over
different capabilities. Anarchy is the structural condition, the overarching
principle according to which states are organized. Anarchy implies the
lack of a supranational authority that similarly to the state on the national
level could organize, sanction and control the states behaviour. However,
theoretically, anarchy is only one possible configuration of the international
system, even according to Waltz. Hierarchy is to be found at the other end
of the continuum. Yet this possibility is in the current world not realized:
global governance does, so Waltz, not present us with a hierarchical structure,
hierarchy instead would imply the presence of a legitimate and competent
government (Waltz 1979: 114). Global governance is acknowledged by Waltz
as international politics [which] is flecked with particles of government and
alloyed with elements of community supranational organizations whether
universal or regional, alliances, multinational corporations, networks of trade,
what not (Waltz 1979: 114).
While Waltz therefore acknowledges the presence of global governance, he
argues that states are still the most important actors, and their power differentials
as well as the systemic configuration of anarchy account for states behaviour.
States act under calculations of costs and benefits with regards to their survival and
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security and for these calculations consider the powers of other states. Security is
not maintained by a supranational authority, such as the United Nations, but by a
constant interplay between the states behaving self-interestedly. In a certain way,
this perspective resembles the hidden hand of Smiths free market theory. All
states will fare best if each behaves according to the demands of the international
system. He claims that balance of power mechanisms can on the one hand be
accountable for stability, such as in the Cold War, but on the other hand can
contribute to international warfare, such as under the condition of multipolarity.
When Waltz wrote TIP in 1979, international organizations such as the United
Nations and the Bretton Woods organizations already were in existence and
powerful, even though the Cold War much more so than any factor today prevented
an efficient and powerful working of particularly the United Nations. The power of
global governance institutions and arrangements since the end of the Cold War and
with the advent of globalization has arguably increased, as the former chapter tried
to show. Nonetheless, traditional international structures still present considerable
determinants for international relations and states behaviours.
The Importance of States and Internationalism
As Walters in the above mentioned article argues, the neglect of governance
theorists of the state, and the argument that with governance we observe a new
phenomenon in which the state and its functions are transformed, needs to be
taken with caution. He questions if there is real proof for asserting that the state
is changing, compared to former eras, indicating a lack of comparative historical
studies (Walters 2004: 38ff).
Previous research by the author (Beyer 2010) also indicated that states
remain the main actors of global governance, particularly when security issues
are the focus of politics. At the example of a specific policy field, the analysis
of participation in the GWOT, it showed that in both analyzed regions, the EU
and ASEAN, cooperative relations were found to be strongly concentrated on a
bilateral level. While the security dimension of this policy field itself might explain
the missing inclusion of, or focus on, sub-state actors such as private companies or
NGOs, the focus on the bilateral level instead of the regional or supranational level
here seems interesting. It could have been assumed that global counterterrorism
cooperation would have been materialized very strongly on the regional and the
interregional and global levels for reasons of efficiency, as pooling policy making
powers in global governance arrangements is usually thought to improve the
problem solving capacities of state (Commission on Global Governance 1995).
However, counterterrorism collaboration here appears to have manifested on the
traditional international level instead. Furthermore, it was found in an analysis of
the counterterrorism policies of both regions internally that a dominance of the state
could be established. Counterterrorism policy formulation and implementation
was mainly found to be a responsibility of the state. The regional organizations
109
mostly served as a communication channel with the UN, as well as by setting

certain broad frameworks and issuing conventions. For both regions it was found
that the centredness of counterterrorism policies on the state level posed in fact a
problem for intra-regional coordination.
The study tackled the question of actorness of regional organizations, such
as the EU and ASEAN, more generally and in the case of counterterrorism
specifically. It was established here that both regions can only be termed collective
actors, in the case of ASEAN even only in emergence. They cannot compete in
terms of strength of actorness with the common state in dimensions such as unified
international presence, common internal strategies and policies, and coherence
internally and externally generally (for a full discussion see Beyer 2010, ch. 3).
This perception of new international actors as still weak actors is confirmed by
the fact that international organizations, such as the UN, is dealing primarily with
states in their promotion of counterterrorism efforts. Generally, the high politics
of international cooperation in international institutions is comprised still of states
as members of these organizations. Even the EU, as the most developed regional
organization internationally only has an observer status at the United Nations and
is the only non-state member to several agreements and conventions (European
Union @ United Nations, undated). Comparisons with other (non-political)
international institutions, such as the International Paralympics Committee show
that regions as members with equal weight to states are a theoretical possibility
for global institutions (Official Website of the Paralympic Movement, undated).
Arguably, if the decline of the state was an advanced reality, other actors would
increasingly be present and be included in international institutions, from
regional organizations to NGOs. I have argued at another place that the extent to
which NGOs are integrated in international institutions is still underdeveloped.
Sometimes, they achieve passive observer status, are being consulted, or subcontracted (Beyer 2007).
Hierarchy and the Importance of Power
Second, when looking at the international system in our times, it would be
unreasonable to dismiss the important role that power and its distribution between
states still plays. It is, of course, debatable if we live in a truly unipolar system
still, or if we already have moved towards a multipolar system with China and
the EU (for example) challenging the United States as the hegemon. It is usually
accepted, however, that the United States still represents the strongest power in
international affairs of today and exercises a hegemonic function. Both, the power
distribution in the current international system, and its configuration as a partially
global hegemonic system, I argue, have an impact on global governance and
state behaviour.
Global governance much more than being a heterarchic undertaking should
therefore be understood as hegemonic governance to account for these
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inequalities in power. Hegemonic governance would take note of the factual

configurations of the international system and integrate therefore a more realist
inspired worldview with a perspective on global governance. While the term
would not stand for a description of global governance solely controlled by the
hegemon, it would nonetheless argue that the hegemon, as well as probably other
major (Western) powers, has/have an uneven share of power to influence and
shape other states policies. The here-mentioned study (Beyer 2010) indicated,
and this was in fact one of the most important findings, that dominance and power
exercise of the hegemon were the main causes for participation in this specific
form of global governance.
While absolute power differentials in themselves are arguably a reason
for states to collaborate with the hegemon as a form of bandwagoning, states
collaborated with the hegemon for several additional reasons. One interesting
outcome of the study was that while the argument that hegemony contributes
to participation in global governance held for both of the two studied cases, the
specific characteristics of hegemony at work in both cases differed. For both
analyzed regions, ASEAN and the EU, it seemed to be features of the international
system and their specific relationship with the hegemonic state in that system that
compelled them to engage in their own form of counterterrorism. Both regions
showed a high level of support for US hegemony, and this was mentioned
as one particular, even if not the strongest, reason for participation in the
GWOT. The strongest reasons for both regions differed. For the European Union,
it was the shared ideology and discourse that apparently caused participation in
counterterrorism. It was the common understanding of international terrorism
representing the major threat to peace and stability in the present world, and an
understanding of being in the same boat with the United States. Here, identity
issues and ideology featured strongly as reasons for participation. While this does
not directly account for power distribution in the international system according
to a Realist understanding being causal for states actions and constraining
their behaviour, it nonetheless can be explained in a Gramscian understanding
of hegemony being based on shared ideologies and understandings of the world.
For ASEAN, the most important causal factor for participation in the GWOT was
found to be an asymmetric interdependence relationship with the United States.
It was repeatedly stated that considerations about foreign direct investment, and
a general acceptance of the United States as a legitimately leading authority,
contributed strongly to participation in the GWOT. Also, in some instances pressure
was exercised to inspire participation. For both cases, hegemonic power exercise
seemed to strongly contribute to participation, even if in different ways: either, in
the form of making use of discursive and ideological power, as in the case of the
EU, or, in the form of making use of economic and material power, as in the case
of ASEAN. In addition, hegemonic leadership and power exercise was found to
be present in global governance more widely. Several authors present arguments
for the dominance of United States agenda setting powers in many international
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organizations, specifically the UN, economic organizations, and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO; Foot et al. 2003; Beyer 2010: 16877).
Regulation under Partial Anarchy
The here-discussed study indicated that other states and hierarchies between
states still strongly determine the behaviour of states on the international
stage. The results suggested that international institutions (this study inquired
about the United Nations only) have probably only equal or even less impact
on the international conduct of states than dominant other states (in this case
the hegemonic United States). For an illustration of this finding, some results
from interviews with scholars and practitioners in the EU and ASEAN on the
perspective of the member states of the organizations on both the US and the UN
shall be presented. In the interviews, it was asked if either one or both of them
were seen as legitimate leaders in the global efforts against terrorism.
Generally, the US and the UN were seen as legitimate actors. With regard to
the US, it depends on which government you ask. Generally, the Europeans
were not much in favour of the GWOT but the US were generally seen as the
real target of new terrorism, so they were accepted as a legitimate leader in
global counterterrorism efforts. One interviewee, however, stated that the US
had lost authority due to the Iraq war and the missing legitimation thereof. For
interviewees from the EU, the UN has a higher legitimacy than the US. According
to another interviewee, both the US and the UN were seen as legitimate
actors in global counterterrorism. The UN in particular is the reference point
concerning legitimacy, and cooperation with it serves to raise the legitimacy of
the EU. However, the US was also seen as a legitimate actor; even if there were
practical and political differences, and it is seen as a much stronger leader. The
UN, on the other hand, is seen as legitimate but not as very powerful.
In case of ASEAN, one interviewee stated that we have to make the distinction
between public opinion and the decision makers. The elite still want the US to
be present in the region and have very good security relations with it. When it
comes to managing the nation, they can see common interests with the US. It has
tremendous resources: it can provide training, and also the economic relations are
of importance. In addition, there is a commonality of interests. Even the military
presence of the US in the region is not seen as a threat. Mahathir for instance
was always very critical of the US primarily because this is what public opinion
wanted to hear. But at the same time Malaysia had extremely close military ties
with the US and Malaysia wanted the US to be part of the region. However, the
legitimacy question after the 2003 intervention of Iraq was a huge one and it
was true that the US had lost a large part of its legitimacy in the Muslim states
of South-East Asia as a result. The war in Iraq in particular had cost a lot of
political good will in SEA. Nonetheless, the US is seen as a security guarantee
for the region, one would not easily give up the presence of the US. I think those
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capitals would be wary of seeing the US disengaging from the region. The UN
featured less prominently. It has a good image, it is generally seen as a legitimate
actor, but not as a very effective one: The UN is seen as a legitimate big player.
You still need the UN as a legitimate interlocutor, mediator, where nation states
cannot play that role, even if it is failing in certain areas. We would like the UN to
be more effective.
All this indicates that it is only partially international institutions of global
governance, which shape and determine global affairs, and participation in
the GWOT was found to be more likely explained by the role and influence
of the US. Dominant states, we could conclude, seem to still matter most in
international relations.
Conclusion
This chapter tried to challenge the mainstream literature on global governance
as underestimating the still dominant role of the nation state and the remaining
importance of the international distribution of power. It did so by showing a
preference in global governance theorizing for heterarchy and what has been
described as the decline of the state. While the GWOT arguably represents a
new form of global governance, and while its analysis supports the impression
that the state and the international distribution of power still are important
factors that need to be taken into account when analysing international affairs, it
surely might not represent a case from which it would be sensible to generalize.
It might however be possible that the findings from this particular case are
similarly applicable to other areas of global governance. Global governance,
in the case of counterterrorism, still is in a high politics field and therefore
naturally the states will attempt to retain their sovereign powers in this field
more so than in other areas of global governance. However, this case is a useful
case to show that we should not overestimate the diminished role of the state or
a state withdrawal, nor can we state that international hierarchies between states
are becoming redundant.
Chapter 10
Inequality and Good Governance in the

Global War on Terrorism
Bringing the former two strands of argumentation together, this chapter will
present a case study on the effects of inequality in terms of poverty and the
possibilities to remedy violence resulting from it. In particular, this chapter
will look at poverty as a cause of terrorism and foreign aid as a potential tool
to counter this form of violence. Poverty as a cause of terrorism is contended.
However, evidence for a link can be accumulated.
Introduction
The last decade has been marked by a political obsession with creating and
implementing measures to counter terrorism. Particularly the United States
created a large set of policies aimed at countering political violence directed
against them from outside or inside their own country established institutions
nationally or internationally to enable international cooperation in and global
management of these policies, and promoted the pursuit of counterterrorism as
a priority on the international level. By now, nearly globally states have been
integrated into regimes promoting counterterrorism measures of wide range. This
chapter will look at the most important positive and negative outcomes of these
policies and argue that we need to utilize the positive gains from the GWOT to
spread cooperation, stability and welfare.
This chapter is divided into three main parts. First, it is going to describe in
which ways global counterterrorism efforts have created global governance in a
new policy field. It will argue that herein lies the main advantage and the most
important positive outcome of the GWOT. Second, the chapter will criticize
the strong focus in counterterrorism on military approaches and intelligence,
which, while useful in pursuing terrorists, do not add much to the resolution of
the underlying problems contributing to the emergence of terrorism. In a third
step, it will be argued that we have to utilize the positive achievements from
the GWOT for increasing stability, peace and prosperity on a global level. The
mechanisms, networks and procedures, which have been created with the purpose
to counter terrorism, need to be utilized to spread global governance in further
areas and strengthen it in existing ones. This chapter will conclude by arguing
that the Western world needs to refocus its collective efforts away from the state
of security towards the conditions of security. It needs to focus on soft policy
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matters to reduce the conditions that allow for the emergence of political violence
in order to pursue an effective long-term strategy against terrorism. Of particular
interest for countering terrorism are policies of foreign aid, rightly used. These can
address the underlying grievances and thereby reduce motives for joining terrorist
groups and reduce terrorist activity in the long term.
The Emerging Global Governance of Counterterrorism
Global governance is the creation of globally cooperative networks spanning
many levels and including a diverse array of actors with the goal to collectively
address global problems. It is supported by the creation of international regimes,
and institutionalized in international organizations and international law. Global
governance is understood as the most powerful tool to address in particular the
externalities of globalization. These problems need transnational, integrated
responses to be effectively an efficiently addressed. National policies are
virtually helpless against them. Many authors have argued that globalization
while bringing about a vast array of positive changes also produces negative
externalities, which similarly to the processes of globalization itself are of
transnational nature. Many of these externalities, or unintended side-effects
of globalization are presenting political problems that call for solutions. The
solutions, however, can only be found on the supranational level, in global
cooperation, due to their transnational nature and their connectedness to other
global processes. Transnational terrorism can be understood as such an externality
of globalization, if one accepts the explanation that globalization and related
processes contributed to the emergence of this specific form of political violence.
Al Qaeda in its declarations of war particularly referred to Western foreign policies
as an essential element of globalization for explaining their motives of struggle.
As this new threat is presenting itself as a clandestine, transnational network,
with potentially global reach and connections and cells in many countries around
the globe, the policies to counter this threat need to be globally integrated. As
Cordesman writes:
We cannot deal with international terrorism unless we do cooperate. Terrorist
groups have shown that they can easily move across national lines. They have
shown that they can find sanctuaries in the nation that is the weakest link, and
exploit the differences between nations and cultures as weapons. No country
can seal its own borders or rely on self-defence, and participate in todays
global economy. No nation can fight terrorism throughout the world on its own.
National defense and response capabilities are critical to counterterrorism but
they cannot be enough. (Cordesman 2006: 2)
The need to counter terrorism emerged in the present intensity only a decade
ago, with the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the realization
Inequality and Good Governance in the Global War on Terrorism
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that groups such as Al Qaeda targeted Western countries, abroad as well as their
homelands. To that date, there had not been many policies in existence in most
places, not nationally or internationally. While some countries, such as the UK and
Germany, profited from their experiences in the 1980s, and others, such as Spain
and France, had some current internal terrorism to counter even before that date,
many states realized that their policies to counter an emerging transnational threat
of large-scale terrorist attacks were insufficient. Of course, the main driving force
behind the creation of new counterterrorism policies and cooperation was the
United States, the main target of Al Qaeda. They started to lobby for the creation
of not only international collaboration, but also the strengthening of measures in
counterterrorism on national levels.
In fact, the United States created a dominant discourse, similar to the
previous discourse on globalization, to promote global cooperation in the field
of counterterrorism. One of the elements of this discourse was the assertion
that political violence in the form of sub-state terrorism presented the major
security threat for societies in current times, and that countering this threat should
therefore be given priority. In many places, this discourse was adopted. But this
discourse only served as the background for much wider-ranging policies of
counterterrorism promotion. International bodies were created, supposed to focus
on the monitoring of counterterrorism cooperation (for example the CounterTerrorism Implementation Task Force of the United Nations); the US supplied
many countries with aid in military matters with the goal to strengthen their
capacity to counter terrorism nationally; they organized a global strategy and
common policies to counter the financing of terrorist organizations, for which
they established the Financial Action Task Force; and they collaborated intensely
on a bilateral level with many states to promote their increased engagement and
cooperation in counterterrorism matters. This list could be continued. Therefore,
the GWOT has brought about political arrangements of cooperation that can be
described as global governance. Elements of global governance have developed
in an area where little cooperation on a global level, and in many cases even few
policies on the national level, existed before. In particular, the United States helped
to create networks of cooperation in this new policy field on a nearly global level.
In response, the majority of states internationally in the past 10 years have started
to create and implement their own counterterrorism policies. Even Cuba now has
legal measures against terrorism in place. Also, many states participated even if
to varying degrees in global counterterrorism cooperation.
Cordesman (2010) rejects the interpretation that true cooperation in the field
of counterterrorism has developed. In his view, this assumption is based on a
number of myths. For example, for full cooperation to happen on a global level,
resources in all countries would need to be sufficient to engage in counterterrorism
policies; all countries would need to share the interpretation that violent political
dissent needs to be countered, and all countries would need to act based on this
interpretation towards state sponsors of terrorism as well as non-state actors; all
countries would need to be willing to freely share intelligence, and to keep it
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secure at the same time; and finally, all countries would need to share a common
definition of terrorism and common values with regards to what constitutes
terrorism (Cordesman 2010: 6). While, according to this perspective, cooperation
in the field of counterterrorism still leaves much to desire, the same can be said
of all other areas of global governance, and according to Cordesmans definition
no area of global governance would be marked by true international cooperation.
I will therefore here not apply this strict definition, but rely on an argument
made elsewhere:
Global counterterrorism cooperation encompasses more than certain rules
of behavior over a particular issue. For one, counterterrorism cooperation is
reflected in a large number of areas such as financial control, border control,
immigration regulation, intelligence cooperation, traditional security policies
and so forth. Furthermore, it encompasses more than rules and regulations,
plans and energies affecting cooperation. (Beyer 2010: 136f)
This distinguishes cooperation in counterterrorism from regimes, being wider

and broader in nature, and makes the mechanisms, structures and policies of
counterterrorism cooperation resemble rather an emerging form of more complex
global governance.
The Mistaken Focus on Military Means in Global Counterterrorism1
The Global War on Terrorism, since its beginning, has focused more on military
and intelligence measures to counter the threat than applying softer means towards
this goal. By March 2011, Congress had approved a total of $1.283 trillion:
for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy
costs, and veterans health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11
attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter
terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security
at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). (Belasco 2011: summary)
Of this, $1,414.8 billion were assigned to the two military operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq. In 2007, the spending for the military efforts amounted to $170.9 billion,
in 2008 to $185.7 billion and in 2009 to $155.1 billion. Other estimates even figured
the costs for the Iraq war alone at above $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008).
Compared to that, overall the United States in 2007 spent $18,901 million on
foreign aid to developing countries; in 2008 the sum amounted to $23,860 million.
In 2009, the United States spent $25,174 million on foreign aid. In 2009, the Near
East and South Asia together received $11,778 million in grants and credits; Africa
1Parts of this chapter have been published in Beyer 2012.
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received $6,022 million. In 2008, the total foreign assistance from the United
States towards North Africa and the Middle East amounted to $13,956 million,
of which $8,382 million comprised military assistance (US Census Bureau 2011).
Therefore, the military aspects have received more attention in the context of
foreign policy generally, and in counterterrorism policy specifically.
It has been argued that the military centred approach against terrorism has
had several problematic effects. The most prominent among them obviously is
the legitimacy crisis, which the United States created with its highly disputed
intervention in Iraq. According to international law so the widespread concern
being an illegal act of aggression, this intervention has set precedents of unilateral
attack which could and with the case of Russia potentially already has erode
the general will to comply with the international standard of non-aggression lest
it be authorized by the UN Security Council. The implications of this for future
international relations should not be underestimated. If international law is not
upheld by the strongest power in the world, who will protect it and comply with
it? Secondly, particularly the Iraq intervention has brought the hegemon, the United
States, into discredit with the international community as well as the peoples of
the world. While the approval rates for the US have shot up to previous levels
under Obama, foreign policies such as these mentioned could serve to decrease
the legitimacy and consensus that the US hegemony is based on. This could affect
global stability as well as the international capacity to cooperate and to create
trust among nations. Most importantly, military strategies to counter terrorism
serve short-term goals, but aid little to guarantee long-term success in the struggle
against political violence. The argument that military interventions increase
the motivational basis as a precondition to engage in terrorism against the
perceived occupational power has been theoretically and empirically substantiated
(Beyer 2008a; Pape 2010). But not only do interventions increase hatred against
the West, also per se they help little to address other underlying conditions
which contribute to the emergence of terrorism.
Issues, such as rampant unemployment, substandard education, poor social
services and healthcare, and a general lack of development with at least the chance
to future prosperity need to be addressed to tackle what has been described as lying
at the root of the problem of this form of political violence. The recent uprisings in
the Middle East are just one outcome of a serious development crisis in the region.
While apparently yet there is no connection to be drawn between the revolts and
groups such as Al Qaeda, the situation could change if the West does not help
ensure improvements in this area. Poverty, inequality, etc., are all regarded as
some of the preconditions for terrorism to occur, and while the leading figures
of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda might be affluent, the foot soldiers often
are from the impoverished, unemployed strata. Young people, particularly male,
without reasonable expectations for their lives are more vulnerable to be recruited
by terrorist groups (Koseli 2006). Political oppression and lack of democracy,
freedom and participation are also important aspects contributing to the emergence
of terrorism. However, while rhetorically important in the past, the spread of these
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goods is not necessarily aided by military interventions at least not on their own.
Political change, while desirable, is not necessarily achieved by interventions.
Democracy has to be built from below, engaging peoples power. As the recent
events in the Middle East illustrate, peoples are ready for change in many places.
Supporting their struggles is a reasonable strategy. The states of the Arab Spring
hopefully will turn out as a more successful example of democratization, than,
for example, Afghanistan. However, supporting these developments with military
power alone will not be enough to secure stabilization and democracy in the longterm in these cases. Additional supporting policies are necessary to engage these
new democracies and aid them on their way to stabilization. Otherwise, the shortterm euphoria of victory and change might be overshadowed soon by following
years with increased occurrence of violence. For stabilization, though, integration
of these states, and for enabling widespread support, we need the mechanisms of
global governance.
Global Governance as a Tool to Counter Terrorism
As argued above, global governance has been established on a far-ranging scale
in the area of counterterrorism in the recent decade. While the precise scope of
cooperation is hard to estimate, it surely spans all continents, most countries
and a wide array of measures. Cooperation mechanisms have been established,
positive relations formed, with many countries on a global scale. Institutions
nationally, regionally, and again globally have been erected. International hard
and soft law has been created. All this serves as a basis for utilizing these new
governance structures to insert new policies, more positively directed at creating
stability, democracy and prosperity. The existing structures can be used to spread
cooperation in the sphere of the economy, environmental protection, and social
issues. In parts, this has already happened as a natural effect of counterterrorism, for
example with intensive aid to Iraq and Afghanistan for development in the social
sphere, or as a spillover from these efforts. While therefore the mentioned positive
aspects are already present to some degree, much more could be achieved if the
global governance structures of counterterrorism cooperation would be integrated
with cooperation in other fields of mutual concern. And again, in many areas this
is happening. Southeast Asia, for example, is engaged in positive relations both
in the security realm as well as economically with the United States. These serve
as the background and basis for successful counterterrorism cooperation. Europe
is engaged with the United States bilaterally and the effectiveness of cooperation
in many policy areas has increased due to cooperation in the sphere of countering
terrorism. For Afghanistan and Iraq, development aid is already a central second
pillar in the fight against terrorism and does strongly accompany the military
efforts in these states.
The global governance of counterterrorism must continue to get better
integrated into general global governance approaches and must be well balanced
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with other, non-military forms of cooperation. Global cooperation from the United
States should refocus on global development matters. It is of utmost interest to the
policy community to find more effective and efficient ways of countering terrorism.
However, as argued above, these new methods need to focus less on military and
intelligence approaches and instead increasingly include soft measures which
serve rather long-term goals and aim at preventing future terrorism by tackling
what has been described as the root causes of political violence.
Economic Causes of Terrorism
For making the argument that a revised counterterrorism policy is needed,
we need to investigate the motivations for terrorism again. An effective
counterterrorism policy should address these motivations, or root causes of
terrorism and thereby reduce its renewed occurrence. While the connection
between underdevelopment and civil war is clearly established, a similar
connection between terrorism and underdevelopment is harder to make. Part
of the problem results from the mere structure of particularly transnational
terrorist groups, who, by their very nature, are spanning potentially the whole
globe and acting across borders. On the other hand, some successful attempts
at showing a positive relation between poverty and inequality in countries of
origin and the emergence of terrorism from these countries have been made.
Bueno de Mesquita (2008: 2) has presented the recent findings with regards
to selected causes of terrorism. One of the most discussed potential reasons
for terrorism to occur is poverty or underdevelopment. As Mesquita finds, the
results with regard to the relation between poverty and terrorism are mixed, but
indicative. On the one hand, Krueger and Laitin found that wealthy countries
are more likely to suffer terrorist attacks and that economic performance is not
a statistically significant predictor of which countries terrorists emerge from
(Krueger and Laitin 2008). The lack of the latter could be explained by the known
problem of under reporting of terrorist incidents from less developed states.
Also, richer states being more often the target of terrorism seems indicative that
wealth has something to do with it. Abadie (2006) finds no statistically significant
relationship between per capita GDP and terrorism risk. On the other hand,
several authors have found a statistically significant negative correlation between
measures of economic performance and the level of terrorist violence (Blomberg
et al. 2004; Drakos and Gofas 2006). Koseli, for example, showed a correlation
between poverty and terrorism for Turkey (Koseli 2006). Also, Li and Schaub
(2004) found that economic development in a country reduces terrorism in that
country. Finally, it is known that failed states and less democratic states breed more
terrorism and serve as safe havens for transnational groups, and a link between
these states and underdevelopment can be made (Rice 2006). Relative deprivation
as a cause for terrorism has also been positively discussed, as has being exclusion
from globalization (Ziemke 2006). Kaarthikeyan (2005) gives an example of
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inequality contributing to terrorism at the case of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.
Morrison (2012) cites inequality as a contributing factor for the rebellion of the
Naxalites in India.
Another approach focuses on the economic situation of terrorists themselves.
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2003) find that terrorist operatives
from Hezbollah and Hamas are neither poor nor poorly educated. Usually, they
are well educated and come from relatively well-off backgrounds. Therefore, so
the argument, improving the economic conditions in a country would not have any
impact on reducing the emergence of terrorism. This argument has been refuted
repeatedly. For example, it has been argued that terrorist groups apply strategies of
recruitment similar to any business organization: they try to primarily select those
individuals from the pool of interessees that are best qualified, best educated and
these are of course not to be found among the poorest. Finally, terrorist groups need
not be comprised of the poorest people themselves in order to make a connection
between underdevelopment and this form of violence. It would suffice if these
groups adopt the plight of their fellow countrymen, for example, as a motivation
to engage in political struggle.
Foreign Aid as a Tool against Terrorism
While early on the main focus in the Global War on Terrorism was on the military
and intelligence, foreign aid as a tool has also been used to counter terrorism. Even
under US president George W. Bush, in fact, foreign aid to developing countries
increased. Recipients have been particularly Afghanistan and Iraq, where schools
and hospitals have been built, infrastructure established, and so forth. Foreign aid
as a tool to counter terrorism is, however, contended. The main argument utilized
against the use of foreign aid for this purpose is the claim that most members
of terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, do not belong to the poorer strata
of their respective societies. As there is indication, however, that poverty does
contribute to the emergence of terrorism, even if probably not alone, foreign aid
and other strategies for development as tools to counter this threat should be taken
more seriously.
Several studies have researched the potential contribution of foreign aid for
the reduction of terrorism. Interestingly, two studies confirm strongly the positive
important role of foreign aid for the reduction of terrorism. However, they
also caution: Foreign aid, if it is used by illiberal regimes in order to suppress
political violence by restricting political freedoms and by generally repressing the
population does in fact not help to decrease the emergence of terrorism. Foreign
aid is thought to have the most positive effect against terrorism in the country
of origin:
[We find] the effectiveness of foreign aid to reduce the number of terrorist
attacks originating from the recipient country. In the host country, the impact
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of foreign aid may be different as counter-terrorism measures also influence

the number of imported attacks. This finding suggests foreign aid must
be not too intrusive in the policy of the recipient government. Foreign military
interventions are also counter-productive and they seem to be a strong attraction
factor for terrorists. A strong presence of foreign actors in the recipient country
or foreign influence might in fact be counter-productive. (Azam and Thelen
2010: 35)
This not only confirms the positive impact of foreign aid on terrorism, but also
provides evidence against the utility of military means in the struggle against
sub-state violence. Furthermore, oppressive approaches in the pursuit of
counterterrorism have been found to be counterproductive:
The evidence suggests that repressive counterterrorism measures may not
be the optimal way to fight terrorism. Government crackdowns and harsh
repressive measures funded by foreign aid can create a societal backlash and
lead to more support for terrorist groups and thereby increase the supply of
terrorist attacks. (Savun and Hays 2011: 25)
All this gives indication that a more soft policy-oriented approach against
transnational terrorism might be useful.
A New Global Governance of Counterterrorism
Have the policies of global counterterrorism pursued in the last decade brought
more harm than good? The obsession with integrating the world into a global
struggle against political violence from below the state has brought very mixed
results for the peace and stability 10 years after the attacks of 9/11. On the one
hand, the states of the world have been integrated into what was termed here global
governance of counterterrorism. On a global level, nearly all states participate in
some form or other in counterterrorism activities. I have shown the mechanisms of
this new form of global governance that rests on the common belief that terrorism
is a major threat to our societies, but also on very rational considerations of
external gains from cooperation in this field (Beyer 2010). A very positive result
of this cooperation is the possibility to use the existing networks and cooperation
mechanisms in this field to enable spill over of global governance processes into
other areas. As the widening of globally collective ordering activities is desired
and very much needed for the solution of manifold global issues, this is certainly
a very positive outcome. The collective efforts to create cooperation in the field of
counterterrorism now need to be deepened and broadened, to create collaboration
in the wider security dimension. The United States should utilize existing channels
to help bring about more cooperation even in higher security spheres. With potential
conflicts expected to arise from a rising China and the growing strength of its
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potential allies, such as India and Russia, deepened networks of global governance
in the security sphere in whatever form surpassing the existing mechanisms of
the United Nations could bring immense benefits for future peace. However,
special care has to be given to concerns about human rights and civil liberties.
In many states even in the West, concerns have been uttered about human rights
abuses and infringements on civil liberties. The Western world compromises its
democratic standards and achievements of the past if it allows a watering down of
its standards. The UN, as a central institution promoting counterterrorism, as well
as the United States, need to develop clear guidelines how security measures can
be married to human rights protection and democratic principles. Not only does
the West need to defend its values and principles, though, also, it needs to refocus
its efforts away from being centred on the military and intelligence towards an
even stronger inclusion of softer and more cooperative means. Several studies
have argued that political violence against the West is at least partially inspired
by a history of interventions in the Middle East (cf. Beyer 2008). If the West
continues to use the sword against peoples, states and regions, it will create more
terrorism in the long term. The application of hard policies against terrorism might
be effective in the short term by binding the resources of terrorist groups and by
decimating their numbers it does not allow for an effective long term strategy
with the aim to reduce the motives for people to join such groups. Therefore,
the policies pursued by Western countries should increasingly include measures
of support for developing countries in the critical regions and beyond. The West
needs to help bring about increases in employment rates, improved education,
better social services and health care. Only by spreading wealth to the Middle
East and other suffering areas we will be able to drain the potential support basis
for current or future terrorism long term. The recent uprisings in the Middle East
are one result of the increasing difficulties the peoples of this region face. While
the revolts and demonstrations speak all but for support for Al Qaeda, these
hardships if not addressed with the help of the West might serve as a breeding
ground for political violence in the future. The positive achievements from the
Global War on Terrorism therefore should be utilized to bring states globally
together to work towards the goals not only of security, but also of stability and
prosperity. Mechanisms, networks and procedures have been widely established.
They should be used to deepen cooperation also in other political spheres, such as
development, employment, and so forth. Only then we can count on future longterm success against terrorism.
Chapter 11

This chapter will re-state the power of global governance to serve for stability
and peace and the prevention of war, mainly by transforming the logic inherent in
Realisms anarchy. It will then go on to argue that we need to reform the existing
processes and institutions of global governance to make it even more effective
against the risk of war, and also that global governance needs to increasingly
address inequalities for the same purpose and how this can be done.
Cooperation under Anarchy
Waltz argues that the international system continues to be marked by anarchy.
While the presence of anarchy in the international system has remained fairly
consensual in IR, the definition and description of anarchy has undergone some
significant challenges.
Alexander Wendt (1992) distinguishes between separate forms or
developmental stages of anarchy: Hobbesean anarchy, Lockean anarchy,
and Kantian anarchy. These realizations of anarchy are distinguishable not by
the absence or presence of a superior power (in all these anarchies this is by
definition missing), but by the interpretations of the states about the implications
of its absence.
In Hobbesean anarchy, self-help is the norm, the classical realist security
dilemma applies and cooperation is not to be expected. In Lockean anarchy,
cooperation becomes more frequent and states fear less. In Kantian anarchy, states
finally define each other as friends, they do not assume any threat from each other
anymore, and they share a common understanding of identity or we-ness.
In Hobbesean anarchy,1 states are in a state of nature. They have to fear each
other, as there is no superior power to protect them. It was thought that only under
the condition of hegemony could the general fear of death by war be overcome
(anarchy, self-help, and power-balancing, Ness 2002). But then again the
hegemon might itself decide to play the predator and it is by no means bound
to the protection of one of the most important public goods, which is security.
Therefore, the only given route to survival is armament and preparation for war.
Cooperation might lead to vulnerability, so is avoided. There is general mistrust
1Please note that the following descriptions of anarchies do not adhere absolutely
to Wendts conceptualizations, but are inspired by them and reformulate them from the
perception of the author.
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between the members of this anarchic society. In Lockean anarchy, states have
transformed the essential fear of each other into mutual respect. Rationality and
common problems persuade the states to cooperate for the sake of the public good.
Cooperation is frequent, yet armament and war are still in existence as a last resort.
However, the military card is not generally played; in case in the repeated games of
interaction the other chooses to cheat, the decision might be in favour of sanctions.
In Kantian anarchy, finally, the states have accepted each others as friends and
are aware of their mutual dependence. Cooperation is the norm, accompanied by
close communication to keep society alive and to increase the conviction that
cheating is futile and wrong. Strong social ties bind the members of this anarchy
together and lead to the expectation of peaceful interaction.
So what distinguishes these anarchies? The essence of the difference is to
be found in the interpretations of the states of the nature of the other in their
particular forms of anarchy. Generally, the other can be interpreted as many things,
such as hostile, friendly, competitive, untrustworthy, weak or strong, aggressive or
patient, threatening or promising.
It is the perception that counts (cf. Bar-Tal 2001: 603f). It depends on how A
interprets the other (B), if A sees him as hostile, threatening and aggressive, or
otherwise. In which ways A interprets the other is just to a certain extent a function
of his (Bs) behaviour. It is also a function of As experience with others in general.
If A has had many others indeed threatening or even attacking him, A might be
more fearful towards any other, even if this other is behaving in a friendly manner.2
Also, As behaviour will cause Bs interpretation to be more or less fearful or
fearless, depending on the aggression shown and Bs conditioning and perception.
In response to As interpretation, A will choose a certain way of reacting, or
signalling. But it is not necessarily the case that As signalling will respond in
kind to the others (Bs). If A interprets the other as threatening, whatever his
real intentions are, A might choose either to deter him, and, therefore, engage
in aggressive behaviour on his side, or A might choose to back off and play the
friendly card, in order not to anger him (B) further or even to appease him. This is
dependent on As level of fear (cf. Berkowitz 1989).
Here is where realism comes in again. Therefore, mutually friendly behaviour
can be an outcome of asymmetric power constellations. Nevertheless, it can also
be an outcome of symmetric power constellations. In the case that A is as powerful
as the other; there is no general need to fear the other, hence to be aggressive. Even
if As level of fear is not generally too high, A might not decide to act aggressively
towards B. It can even be assumed that after we have left the most intense zone of
fear, the less fear A has, the more willing to cooperate A will be. Aggression mostly
happens in a medium state of fear: not too much fear to act at all, but enough fear
to calculate that the other is a threat (and maybe thereby to misinterpret him).
Fearless actors, finally, can cooperate more easily. They, by definition, would not
2Cognitive sciences have the term learned fear for this kind of conditioning, based
on the observations of Pavlov (1927).
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fear to be threatened or cheated. Therefore, the most likely stage for aggression is
a state of medium and calculable fear (cf. Baron and Bell 1976).3
Which systemic constellations then will manifest higher and lower levels
of fear?
This depends 1) on the capacity for aggression and 2) on the use of this
potential for aggression. If aggression is not used, fear will remain low.
Aggression can be used by the part that owns the capabilities. In this case fear
will be high. In the traditional symmetric constellation, we find both-sided fear
on a limited scale as well as both-sided potential to aggress on a limited scale.
In an asymmetric constellation we find one-sided fear present in the weaker part,
and one-sided potential to aggress present in the stronger part. This would lead
to the conclusion that equality in the system would increase aggression. Inserting
nuclear weapons into the picture changes the calculation, however, and mutually
assured destruction between the major states in the system rendered the Cold
War a system of high levels of fear. While with the end of the Cold War, the
inherent fear in the system was abolished, the underlying brute facts remain.
Instead of near perfect nuclear balance, it is therefore military dominance, which
creates a situation of medium and calculable fear between the leading states
and its challengers, such as in constellations between the US and China, Iran
and North Korea. Unipolarity, hence inequality on the systemic level, therefore
presents a fundamental risk factor for aggression on the international level. In a
hierarchical setting, i.e. global governance, including control mechanisms, we find
the following: the systemic constellation transforms the rationale of fear as global
governance is about integration, not about distinction and separation of us and
other, it is about inclusion under common institutions and shared norms and laws.
It transforms anarchy, thereby mitigating the security dilemma, similar to the logic
of power within the nation state, and to be understood as a way of transforming
asymmetric international relations into more symmetric relations in a formal, but
not necessarily material, sense due to the presence of equalizing institutions and
rights and responsibilities. If global governance would in addition also address the
material inequalities in the system, the security dilemma could be further reduced
and thereby the risk of international conflict.
Conditions of Peace under Anarchy
Let us review some other arguments about the possibility of reduction of the risk
of war under anarchy.
Institutionalist and security community theorists argue that elements of
integration and hierarchy without the abolition of anarchy, hence without the
creation of world government, can control the risk of international violence.
3The most aggressive behaviour should therefore occur when the person experiences
moderate levels of stress (cited in Tedeschi and Felson 1994: 55).
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For institutionalists, it is the creation of common institutions comprised of

informal rules and norms, formal laws, and material organizations which creates
dependable expectations of peaceful change. These institutions create trust
among their member state by monitoring and sanctioning their behaviour and by
providing a forum for interaction, dialogue and exchange. These functions reduce
the uncertainty of interaction, and thereby reduce risks of conflict escalation.
Security community theorists argue very similarly, but for them it is less the
common institutions that count, but rather the imagined community of states that
comes with integration. A common identity, when developed, a sense of we-ness,
allows for a reorientation of the national interest towards the common good and
a reduction of fear and mistrust among states. The Security Community approach
is heavily influenced by Constructivist arguments. Constructivists, like Wendt,
argue that no external configuration of (international) society determines our
(states) behaviour, but that we can decide on which assumptions to interact with
the world. States, like people, are free agents who create the societal world in a
mutual process of action response reaction (Wendt 1992).
Liberals generally argue that conflict is less likely than cooperation, and
that good democratic states that are integrated and interdependent will find it
irrational to fight. First, the nature of the state principally predicts its preferences
for foreign policy action, and allows for the logic of the democratic peace. Second,
interdependent states will rationally decide against conflict and cooperation as the
costs of conflict are seen higher than the gains of it in an interdependent relationship.
Those Realists who look at hegemony as a potential to reduce the risk of
international warfare would argue that the hegemon serves as an international
police force and provides via his surmounting power the global common good
of stability. As I have argued elsewhere (Beyer 2010), the current constellation
of global governance is one very much influenced by hegemonic power, which
I describe with the term hegemonic global governance. This implies that global
governance and its outcomes in large part are controlled by, but also backed up
by, the power of the hegemon. It does not imply total control of global governance
by the hegemon, though. Hegemonic governance is to be understood rather as
leadership than as informal government in the sense of a new world order.
All of the above elements are covered by global governance. Global
governance in its current configuration, I argue, responds to all the above
mentioned preconditions for peace. It is integrated, interdependent, hegemonic,
institutionalized, and rationality-enhancing.
Global Governance Serves Peace
Global governance is a force for peace. This can be best illustrated at the example
of the European Union, which some see as a greenhouse or model for global
governance. The European Union, like the League of Nations in the period
between the two world wars and the United Nations after the Second World War,
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has been created to increase the chances of peace among the traditionally warfaring countries of Europe. For this purpose, common institutions have been
created, and societies and markets have been integrated. Since its inception, the
EU has brought peace to Europe and most would think it unthinkable that war
in Europe might reoccur. On the international level, the United Nations system
with its affiliated organizations serves similar functions. Integration of markets is
increasingly provided by the processes of globalization. And it is argued that both
in their combination have helped to maintain peace at the international level.
Institutionalists maintain that institutions serve for peace as they help establish
common expectations of peaceful behaviour, create trust, socialize the states
into peaceful cooperation, monitor the behaviour of states, and are even able to
punish non-compliance. Institutionalist theories deal with the question of war and
peace. They argue that institutions push states away from war and help foster
stability. Liberal institutionalism attempts to explain cooperation in economic
and environmental terms between states. It argues that cooperation is much more
likely than Realists would concede, and that the main problem for cooperation is
cheating, which is addressed by institutions.
The liberal scholars usually have a benign attitude towards international
institutions and cooperation among states. Institutions, according to them, play
the main mediating role and act as the principal means to achieve and maintain
cooperation between states. Mutual interests of states minimize differences,
pave the avenues for cooperation. States become willing to cooperate once
institutions (sets of rules and practices that prescribe roles, constrain activity and
shape the expectations of actors) are seen as beneficial. States are rational actors,
they maximize absolute gains through cooperation and are less concerned about
relative gains made by other states. (Nuruzzaman undated 3)
With the increase in institutions, the thickening of multilateral processes, and

the strengthening of global governance, the chances of peace on a global level
are increased. Since the end of the Cold War, after which global governance
has experienced an unprecedented boost, international warfare has declined
dramatically. While some argue this has been caused by the global spread of
democratization; others see its origin in increased integration under common
institutions. Democratic peace has been hailed as the most profound force for
peace we have discovered so far (the theory maintains that democracies rarely,
if ever, wage wars against each other). With the spread of democracy, therefore,
the amount of international warfare is reduced. The explanations for this effect
vary. Some see the more open and transparent political systems of democracies
as responsible, others the increased power of the masses, still others their better
integration in economic terms. Trade has been argued to reduce warfare amongst
countries. Common institutions play a strong role in this. For one, they promoted
the spread of democracy and help to maintain it. On the other hand, it has been
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found that common membership in these institutions is a factor that explains the
phenomenon of democratic peace (Weiffen 2009).
The most powerful example of such an institution is the United Nations.
Created after two world wars with the goal to prevent further violence amongst
states, the main interest of the UN is the preservation of peace. The UN Charter
establishes clear guidelines for the use of force in international affairs. Force
is only to be used as a defensive action after the UN Security Council has
established a breach of or a threat to peace and sanctioned force. Usually, it is
then used collectively against the aggressor. While the United Nations system
in the past 60 years has worked more successfully than the previous League
of Nations, it still has shortcomings. So, for example, it could not prevent the
interventions of the superpowers in minor states in the era of the Cold War. At
this time, the UN suffered from the antagonizing conflict between the US and
the USSR, which rendered the UN Security Council ineffective. After the Cold
War, the United States as the remaining superpower has at time circumvented
the ruling of the UN Security Council, the 2003 Iraq intervention being the most
prominent example.
Needed Reform of Global Governance
Global governance increasingly faces a legitimacy problem. This is in part caused
by its contribution to growing inequality at the national and international level.
Global governance has contributed to inequality via the promotion of capitalist
practices. This doesnt render the idea of global governance itself futile. Rather,
it urges for reforms of current institutions and practices of global governance.
In particular, global governance needs to be democratized. This demand is
directed both at the Security Council as well as at the other institutions of global
governance. Democratization would bring with it increased equality, transparency
and participation. For example, while the current UN system grants all its
members formal equality in terms of sovereign rights, it does not do so within
the Security Council in which the five veto powers dominate all other countries.
An expansion of the Security Council and the possibility of rotation are thought
about. Furthermore, there are calls for strengthening the General Assembly. Also,
the economic institutions of global governance need to be democratized.
Overall, the goals for reform would be:
global democracy, i.e. further spread of democratization;
democratization of global governance institutions and mechanisms;
making global governance more accountable for the poor, i.e. reduction of
global inequality.
These goals shall be discussed in the following.
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Global Democracy
So far, democratic institutions have spread throughout the world in at least four
democratic waves (Aksu and Camilleri 2002: 56). The first wave created the
modern representative governments of Britain, France, and the United States. The
second wave spread through advanced industrialized countries in the nineteenth
century. The third wave appeared in the European colonies of Asia, Africa and
Latin America. The fourth wave finally captured for example those states that were
set free from Communist rule after the end of the Cold War, and it is arguably
still ongoing. The spread of democracy will bring with it growth, stability and
increased integration in global governance. Democracies have been shown to be
economically stronger, less stricken with internal violence, and more actively
participating in global governance. The spread of democracy therefore would
present the grounds for strengthened and improved global governance.
Democratization of Global Governance
Global governance structures themselves need to be reformed. The power
imbalances within the UN and affiliated organizations need to be reduced, as
discussed above.
One of the before-mentioned problems in global governance is the remaining
unequal distribution of power between the states that comprise it. The United
States as the unipolar power is capable of exercising dominant power within the
institutions of global governance.
At the one hand, this can have beneficial effects and the United States
have produced public goods with establishing many international institutions.
On the other hand, this allows for the United States to insert their interests
disproportionally into the processes of global governance and achieve outcomes
that are not necessarily in the global common interest but the national interest of
the United States. In particular, the economic institutions, WTO, Worldbank and
IMF, have been criticized for promoting solely US-style capitalist policies with
devastating results in many of the affected countries.
While the United States could take over a leading role in shaping a more
beneficial global governance, much is dependent on political will. In absence of
such a political will, a more equal global governance system could be beneficial.
The danger is that more equality among states in global governance could
contribute to even less effectiveness of the global institutions. This argument has
been brought forward in particular by the United States, who are keen to preserve
their interests in the current world order.
Global governance can only be reformed if a consensus emerges among
its participants. States, civil society and corporate members need to deliberate
proposals for reform and agree on their realization. The United States could fulfil a
leadership function here and inspire debate and even create incentives for reform.
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In addition, the United Nations institutions need to be reformed. The first step
would be a revitalization of the General Assembly. This should be accompanied
by a Peoples Assembly and a Consultative Assembly. The Peoples Assembly
would grant the peoples of the world some representation in the UN. The Security
Council needs to be reformed. Permanent membership and the power of veto
have, if anything tended to obstruct the path to collective security (Aksu and
Camilleri 2002: 260). In particular, the veto of the five permanent members
needs to be phased out. Increasingly, majority voting could be introduced instead.
Permanent membership could be retained, but would be put under a periodic
review to reflect the changing distribution of power. Also, permanent membership
might be extended to Germany, Japan, India and possibly Brazil. The rotating
membership should be expanded from 15 to between 23 and 25, depending on
the number of permanent members. Also, this reformed Security Council would
need to adopt a more strategic approach to the maintenance of security. For this
purpose, member states should establish a biennial summit meeting to review
recent trends, set out the broad parameters of the emerging security agenda, and
map out future strategies (Ibid., 260).
Global Governance and Reduced Inequality
The development of inequality over the past decades is a contentious issue. Political
activists and many scholars alike claim that inequality has risen fundamentally,
both in absolute terms as well as on the national levels. Globalization has brought
with it an increase in national and international inequality.
A UN report claims:
Poverty is everywhere. Gaps between the poorest and the richest people and
countries have continued to widen. In 1960, the 20% of the worlds people in the
richest countries had 30 times the income of the poorest 20%. In 1977, 74 times
as much. This continues the trend of nearly two centuries. Some have predicted
convergence, but the past decade has shown increasing concentration of income
among people, corporations and countries. (Sala-i-Martin undated 1)
This effect is oftentimes attributed to the processes of globalization and capitalism.

On the other hand, others argue that both international and intra-national
inequalities declined in the recent decades. They argue that:
1. the world overall is becoming richer, and also the number of poor people is
declining and the middle class is growing;
2. the one-dollar-a-day poverty rate fell from 20 per cent in 1970 to 5 per cent
in 1998; the two-dollar rate fell from 44 per cent to 8 per cent in the same
time period;
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3. while the dramatic increase in income inequality is nowhere to be

seen, they find a slight increase in intra-country inequality over the last
thirty years;
4. the largest inequality factor is inter-country inequality, which however has
been reduced substantially.
This is the well known argument that globalization lifts all boats. However,
it lifts the yachts higher and lets the small boats sink. While the poor become
better off absolutely, relatively speaking they fall further behind. Inter-country
inequality, as another example, has been largely reduced due to the growth in
China and India. If this factor is calculated out, inter-country inequality is still
stark if not increasing.
Global governance needs to be reformed in order to tackle global inequalities.
While the reduction of poverty has been a central interest of global governance
actors for a long time, the reduction of inequality has not been formulated into a
central policy goal, mainly due to the pressure from the US.
The Millennium Development Goals presented a milestone in the fight against
global poverty but have been criticized for being not sufficiently implemented.
Further reforms are necessary, and proposals include forms of taxation
and redistribution.
The most dangerous development adversely affecting the distribution of
wealth globally is the laissez faire financial system. In 1978, Nobel laureate James
Tobin proposed an international currency transaction tax, going back to the ideas
of Keynes (Aksu and Camilleri 2002: 140). While at the time not much attention
was put on this proposal, some NGOs lobbied for the introduction of the Tobin
tax and recent financial crises have brought the idea to the forefront again. The
Tobin tax recommends a taxation of between 0.1 per cent and 0.25 per cent on
all foreign-currency transactions. Although the percentage might seem quite
small , its impact on currency speculation was likely to be significant, while
any disincentive to long-term investment was expected to be minimal (Aksu and
Camilleri 2002: 141).
Some of the advantages of such a tax include:
Efficacy in discouraging short-term speculative flows; its potential in terms
of revenue creation; an increase in the autonomy of national authorities in
formulating monetary and macro-economic policy, its contribution to the
generation of foreign-exchange reserves , its facilitation of the monitoring
of international financial flows , and its innovative economic incentives
compared to a command and control approach to regulating capital flows.
(Aksu and Camilleri 2002: 141)
Several countries have already developed and implemented similar taxes, such as
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy,
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Japan, Singapore, and Sweden, who apply such taxes on the sale of stocks and
bonds (Aksu and Camilleri 2002: 142). Again, much is dependent on political will.
Taxation of wealth and redistributional policies are among the best tools in
the fight against inequality on the national and global level. Countries such as
Brazil have successfully countered their rising inequality with similar measures.
While it would be essential that countries adopt these policies individually, on
the international level policy change is both possible and necessary too. If the
Tobin tax, for example, would become international legal standard, this would
have beneficial effects for taming the global financial markets. In terms of
redistributional policies, goals for increased foreign aid towards poorer countries
already exist, but most states do not fully comply with the targets.
Inequalities on the global level of course do not encompass solely inequalities
measured in terms of income or material factors. Other forms of inequalities
are to be found in the area of gender, race, age, disability, religion, and so forth.
These inequalities are of no less importance than the inequalities in economic
terms, and most often they coincide. Anti-discriminatory policies are promoted
by the institutions of global governance, and many countries have shown some
improvements. But as of yet, the goals are by far not yet reached, not even in the
advanced Western countries. Reducing these inequalities would help to reduce
conflicts and violence as well. For example, it has been shown that countries with
higher levels of gender equality are less likely to engage in intrastate conflicts
(Melander 2005).
Adopting a Marxist-style political system, on the other hand, would not
necessarily reduce inequalities. One of the few studies on small communist
countries found that they exhibited relatively high levels of inequality
(Michal 1973). Also, China, even if a hybrid capitalist-communist system,
experiences growing levels of inequality. The political systems so far most
successful in tackling inequality are market-oriented democracies with a strong
social-democratic leaning (e.g. Muller 1988).
Finally, the reduction of inequality requires a rethinking of the common
ideologies guiding international economic affairs. The Washington Consensus
dominated in this area for the last two decades. Williamson originally coined the
phrase in 1990 to refer to the lowest common denominator of policy advice being
addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as
of 1989. These policies were: Fiscal discipline, a redirection of public expenditure
priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to
improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary education,
and infrastructure, tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base),
interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization,
liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation
(to abolish barriers to entry and exit), secure property rights. Dani Rodrik argues
that there now exists an augmented Washington Consensus, which in addition
to the items listed above, adds corporate governance, anti-corruption, flexible
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labor markets, WTO agreements, financial codes and standards, prudent capitalaccount opening, non-intermediate exchange rate regimes, independent central
banks/inflation targeting, social safety nets, targeted poverty reduction (Centre for
International Development 2003).
The Importance of Progressive Leadership4
Global governance in its current configuration is marked by high levels of
hegemony, as discussed before. Therefore, much will depend on the willingness
to change foreign policy by the United States elites. Reforms are possible if the
leading state supports and promotes them. America in our age is still and this is
rarely disputed counted as the hegemon in international affairs. This description
is derived from its overarching power resources in different dimensions, such
as the economy, the military, science and so forth. A hegemon furthermore is
characterized by exerting his power over others in this case other nations of the
world. This power, however, has to be implemented wisely, in order to achieve
beneficial results, and to promote the overall good. The hegemon therefore has to
act responsibly in using its powers.
There is an old Christian prayer which describes the essence of responsibility:
God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change
the things I can, and wisdom to know the difference.
The first part of this prayer essentially implies understanding ones own
strength. It asks for the possibility and implies the need to use ones powers
wisely. With regards to the United States, this implies that they have to find a
balance between their own and others wellbeing. For this purpose, they need to
understand their own and others needs and find a middle way that benefits both
of them. Progress is holistic, and if the United States wants to progress further on
the route to world peace and development and integration, they will need to take
others with them. Progress is not possible unilaterally, at least not in the long term
and not very far, as the game theoretic assumptions of stag hunt and the structural
Realist assumption of balancing tell us. In case that the United States disregard
the wishes and needs of others, they will not make as much progress as they wish
for themselves and they will anger others and mobilize them against them in
the future. The practical recommendation therefore here would be to engage its
friends and to cooperate with and support other nations, which are still on the way
of development. To find the right balance is of course critical in this respect, how
this can be achieved needs international deliberation. Many recommendations are
already in existence.
Secondly, even the United States cannot do everything. The United States
knows that and has experienced it very painfully in the aftermath of the Iraq war.
4The following has been published in a previous version as Beyer 2008b and is
reproduced with permission of Friedenspolitischer Ratschlag.
134
Overusing its powers is not a solution for problems but bears further problems in
itself. The United States cannot do much against everybody else. Sometimes, a
strong state might be the leader and progress even if the rest of the world is still
relatively undecided. However, this possibility is very critical and again as seen
in the case of Iraq, it can bring serious problems (not only with regards to politics
and global public opinion) if it is not used wisely. In essence, this second point
is a call for complying with the tools (and strengthening them further) of global
democracy. The United Nations could be a formidable force for peace, if they
had the full support of the United States. Democracy is never easy, and it should
not mean the tyranny of the majority. But international decisions that affect many
other states (and under the condition of globalization most international decisions
affect a lot of states and peoples) need to be carried out ideally by consensus. This
will be the largest task for the coming decades if we wish for a more peaceful
world to lead the world to work more closely together with these international
democratic fora and to learn international democratic ways to live together as
states in a globalized world. Also, what we need to learn in this respect is to take
responsibility for peoples within states in civil conflicts. We will have to decide
how to protect them without doing more harm than good.
Thirdly, for all this to be able to work, the United States needs to understand
that there is a high level of need for stability, reliability and rules. Those institutions
and rules that we have in particular the United Nations and the accompanying
international law are the source of a certain stability of expectation in the
world. They of course can and should be reformed, but only after international
consultation, ideally with a broad consensus, as well as gradually.
Finally, we have progressed with our knowledge and experience to such a
degree that we can assume that non-violent ways of solving conflicts must be the
preferred route of taking any action. Principally, and this tells us the theory of tit for
tat, any non-cooperation should only be applied as a reaction to non-cooperation.
This is not only an idealistic demand, it is also the most effective strategy. Also,
violence (which is never an ideal option) should only be applied in real defensive
measures, when violence was experienced by us or others. Offensive measures
will most often result in counter-violence and therefore bear conflicts that are
becoming often more costly as the benefit promised in the first place. The principal
differentiation is that power should be used with or for others, not against them.
Whenever power is used against others, this can be termed violence and violence
against innocents is still a crime under international law. With the new debate
on human rights, therefore, wars are increasingly difficult to wage as innocents
are often under attack. A possible solution would be to strengthen international
peacekeeping forces and to solve conflicts by intermediation and the insertion of
emergency forces, if more good than harm can be achieved. Also, conflicts with
pariah states such as Iran, for example, cannot be easily solved by war (remember
the example of Iraq) but can ideally be solved by integrating these states. As Waltz
argues, these states are not suicidal, they do not want war. They want something,
135
maybe more prosperity, maybe more say in international affairs or regionally. We

have to help them attain what they want at least partly as long as it is possible
to combine it with our wishes, in order to get to peace.
Chapter 12
Conclusion
This book was set out to reflect on Man, the State and War and to investigate
where its contribution is to be found for today, or, where we might have progressed
in the field of International Relations since then. A re-reading of Waltz is clearly
indicated for any serious student of IR. It still today has a lot to offer to educate us
about the causes of war and conflict, the conditions of violence amongst humans
on the large scale. Nonetheless, since Waltz published his book in 1959, a lot has
changed in the world and in scholarship.
For one, international politics has experienced a major transformation with
the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a truly globalized world. While the
United States in particular spread their influence across the globe and promoted
integration, liberalization and capitalism, other nations partook in this process
and together they created what is nowadays termed global governance: systems
of rule and regulation, coordination and management, integration at the political
and policy level on a transnational, global scale, across borders and across levels
of analysis. As the pinnacle of global governance, the United Nations have been
strengthened as the longstanding conflict between the Soviet Union and the
United States, which paralyzed the United Nations and rendered it dysfunctional
throughout the Cold War, was no more. This newfound importance of the main
global institution cannot be underestimated with regard to its significance. On the
other hand, with globalization also came the spread of capitalism, and with this
the spread of a system, which favours inequality and produces increasing gaps
between the rich and the poor. Worldwide, in the past decades, this gap between
the rich and the poor has been growing, and nationally as well as internationally
inequalities have been sharpened. Just recently these developments are receiving
increased attention and the connection is drawn between these processes and the
topic of security.
This book attempted to reflect on MSW from a contemporary perspective.
Important contributions have been made to the discussion on the causes of
violence since Waltz published his book. The argument of this book started with
a discussion on human nature in connection to violence. The question, if humans
are inherently good or bad, still is a legitimate question. However, the responses
we find today differ somewhat from previous attempts. While before, Freudian
ideology had convinced us that human nature contains the element of evil, with
drives like instincts propelling us to violence. When we look at the findings of
scholarship in the discipline of psychology today, we hear a somewhat different
canon. Violence, it is argued, mostly occurs in response to negative stimuli.
Negative events make people feel bad, and this in turn leads to frustration, leads
138
to aggression, leads to violence. One of these negative stimuli is connection to

the issue of human standing, indeed of power, of capability. Inequality has been
found to occur all through the literature on violence from crime to civil wars
as a prominent causal factor. Inequality, it was argued here, is causally linked
to violence, and it might be one of the main causes for violence overall. This
inequality does not need to be represented in terms of income differentials only; it
can also be manifested as an inequality in standing or prestige, affecting feelings
of honour or pride. Most often, however, these two are linked. As we saw in the
discussion on international inequality and the causes of war, both factors in their
combination for some scholars explain wars occurrence. If inequality can be seen
as lying at the root of violence and war, we need to reflect on our responses to such
evil. If the monopoly of violence with the institution of the state had featured so
prominently in Waltzs discussion, we might be challenged to complete the picture:
rather than merely the state, we need the good state, a state that addresses the
internal causes of violence, such as inequality, and guarantees the reduction and
prevention of these causes. Similarly, on the international level, we need good
global governance, a global governance that addresses inequalities and thereby
promotes the absence of violence.
Global governance means the collective attempts of states to order global
affairs, to engage in policing the globalized world. As a concept, global governance
does not feature strongly in MSW. Waltz does accept that something like a world
government is theoretically a logical solution to interstate war. But he argues that
this possibility is neither realized nor desirable.
The closest Realists get to global governance is by assuming with Gilpin
that a global hegemon takes over organizing international affairs. This hegemon
would replace sort of the world state and would act as a leader of nations.
This hegemon currently is in existence with the United States. The United States
promotes policies, and engages in ordering activities of all sorts, and it can
positively reward and negatively sanction other states.
Another approach to global governance is the concept of a world state.
Obviously, this is a theoretical and normative concept. Even the United Nations or
the United States are not strong enough powers and have not sufficient influence
on other states to speak of a world state in our times. Nonetheless the world state
as an idea has received a lot of attention. For example, Alexander Wendt argued
that we will have a world state in about 200 years. Some authors, such as Otfried
Hoeffe (1999), have even provided detailed descriptions on how such a world
state would have to be conceptualized in order to function properly. Other authors
from the UK, David Held for example, would not go as far as this and argue
instead for a world Constitutionalism, in which global citizens would become
truly cosmopolitan and a global convent would be in place to organize and order
global affairs (1995). This would, however, not resemble a world state such as
thought about by Hoeffe, but rather resembles a reformulated idea similar to the
United Nations system, but broader.
Conclusion
139
Global Governance, though, as the term is usually used, implies governance

without government. The proponents of this concept assume that due to
globalization and the new problems emerging by the new interconnectedness and
interdependence of societies, new ordering mechanisms have to be found. For
those authors, usually the state is still the dominant actor in global governance,
even if other actors, such as transnational corporations and non-governmental
organizations, now accompany it. These new organizations for them are an
element of civil society and usually these authors argue that civil society has to
be integrated more into the processes of already existing global governance. For
example, this would mean that non-governmental organizations such as Oxfam
or Greenpeace and others would have a say in what the United Nations does,
they would have to have some participation rights in certain meetings and forums
of international organizations and therefore make their voice heard and influence
policy making. This goes back to the general assumption in this literature that
global governance is a voluntary process of cooperation with the aim of policy
making which includes actors on diverse levels, from the local to the global.
Globalization was a main argument for the development of some sort of
globally integrated politics, even if most scholars still rejected the idea of a fullblown world state.
What changes here, I believe, is that with globalization the relationship
between the levels and the strong empirical distinction between the first, second
and third level are dissolved and transformed. In particular, globalization can be
understood as creating a direct connection, a relation of influence, between the
third and the first level, and vice versa. Suddenly, the international level is directly
influenced by and influences the individual. That can happen, for example, in the
form of the West promoting globalization directly influencing with the policies of
globalization peoples living in developing countries. That can also be seen when
terrorists or economic entrepreneurs through transnational companies having
a strong influence on global politics by changing the games that states play in
the economic realm. Generally, it can be said that within the sphere of strong
globalization (globalization is not having the same effects all over the globe) the
state is partly reduced in its control over activities of the individuals that comprise
it, and individuals have in turn partly stronger influence on what is happening in
the world of states. This has been described in the literature in terms of withdrawal
of the state and emergence of new actors on the global level.
If we assume this transformation in the relation between the analytical levels,
and a more direct connection between the first and the third level, this could
already make for an argument that world governance is becoming more likely
as well as more necessary to provide for order. Similarly to the processes and
needs formerly described as being present within the state, where the state has the
monopoly of force to secure stability and peace for the peoples, a world governing
agency collective or more centralized could and should develop to regulate a
more globalizing world.
140
And in a way, I argue, we can observe this happening. The United States in
these processes oftentimes take over the leading role, but they are also oftentimes
pushed by other states towards more global integration in cases where it declines
to lead. The unipolar position of the United States after the end of the Cold War
had not been foreseen by Realism. However, even in the period of the Cold War,
the US created most international organizations, and promoted thereby a form of
initial global governance. Since the end of the Cold War, it also acted as a form
of global policing force, and finally with the Global War on Terrorism directly
orchestrated the development of global policies in the struggle to suppress and
counter individualist (small group) opposition to the world order created by the
Western states. The Global War on Terrorism at another place has been described
as a form of hegemonic governance with which the US created global governance
within only a few years in a totally new area of global politics. If we understand this
as some form of leadership within an integrationist process, we can assume that
we might indeed be moving slowly on the path towards more global governance.
This global governance system while of course not necessarily similar to a world
state similar to the nation state might be collectivist (comprising all or many
nation states) and hierarchical (giving the Western states, and the United States in
particular, a leading role). It might well be sort of an evolutionary process towards
some form of global governing system.
Political authority over the centuries and millennia of human existence has been
organized at ever-higher levels due to efficiency considerations (unknown 2008).
Starting with the tribe, then the village, the city state, the kingdom, then empires
to states, humans have shifted their governing functions over time to ever higher
levels and integrated in ever larger entities generally. While in the current phase of
history we are living majorly in a state of states, supranational entities are already
strongly evolving (with international institutions, the European Union, and many
similar regional organizations) and it can be argued indeed that over time we might
end up with global political integration following logically a global integration in
the low politics sphere.
If we assume the United States or another hegemon, if the US should be
replaced by, for example, China in the future leading the world into global
governance, I believe the main challenge to be the question of inequality.
Inequality has been shown repeatedly to be a strong contributor to violence, on
the individual and on the inter-state level. With the processes of globalization,
which are promoted by the United States in order to spread their ideas of liberal
governance and free trade, sadly increasing inequality between and within nations
is spread too. This, in my view, accounts for one of the reasons why the United
States has to struggle with transnational terrorism against the West. It is caused
by the experience of increasing inequality between the populations of the Middle
East and the populations of the Western world. Also, within societies, increasing
inequalities might contribute to increased violence. And it can be argued that
potentially increasing inequalities between states might also lead to further
violence on an interstate level.
Conclusion
141
Waltz had argued that the state presents the best possible option of solving
the problem of violence between individuals. The monopoly of force endowed
the state with the potential to suppress and punish violence amongst its citizens,
even if this was never totally successful. Here, it has been argued that not only
do we need to think about the state as a tool to end violence, in terms of its
monopoly of force, but also we need to think of the good state. Good governance
had been fashionable in the debates of the 1990s. And it presents the tools to
start understanding what a good state would look like, a state that goes beyond
suppression of aggression by actively encouraging positive, peaceful interaction.
Good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus
oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable
and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized,
the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most
vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the
present and future needs of society. (UN ESCAP 2012)
For global governance, we face two challenges. First, it has been discussed in
the preceding chapters that global governance still bears the marks of a Realist
system. States and hierarchies are still present and dominant in the world marked
by processes, mechanisms and institutions of global governance, and hinder
its most effective functioning. While hierarchies in the world, with a unipolar,
leading United States at the centre of global power, are in part positive for global
governance, they also bring disadvantages. The positives are obvious. Due to
its leading position, the United States was able to create and maintain the most
essential institutions in global governance. Many of the international organizations,
which present the backbone of global governance today, are in essence a creation
of the hegemon, such as the United Nations and the Bretton Wood institutions.
In an ideal world, global governance would resemble what we have discussed
as good governance at the global level. It would be heterarchical, democratic,
transparent, and would address successfully and efficiently global inequalities.
While it is indeed strange the good governance concept itself has not yet been
applied to global governance, the discussion on reforming global governance,
particularly its institutions, is vibrant.
Good governance is grounded on certain predicates, which are, that: citizens
and their governments do enter into a compact in which the citizens of any
polity expect returns from their rulers for the enormous power vested in the
government. They expect the government to respond to their material and nonmaterial needs through a systematic process of accountability, transparency and
checks and balances. The expectations are that this compact will significantly
lead to poverty reduction. In a way, good governance is an imperative for
development. (UNECA 2001)
142
James Orbinski, a globally recognized humanitarian practitioner and advocate,

as well as one of the worlds leading scholars and scientists in global health,
recently has called for good global governance. In his understanding, good
global governance refers to equity: People in similar situations should be treated
similarly. it requires that no distinction exists on grounds such as race, gender,
ethnicity, religion or economic status (CIGI 2011). Walden Bello, for the EnqueteKommission Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft, wrote a report on good global
governance as viewed from the South. Criticising the IMF and World Bank, he
calls for their democratization, as well as deglobalization and a pluralizing of
global governance. Deglobalization is:
About drawing most of our financial resources for development from
within rather than becoming dependent on foreign investment and foreign
financial markets; about carrying out the long-postponed measures of income
redistribution and land redistribution to create a vibrant internal market
that would be the anchor of the economy; about deemphasizing growth and
maximizing equity in order to radically reduce environmental disequilibrium;
about not leaving strategic economic decisions to the market but making them
subject to democratic choice; about subjecting the private sector and the state
to constant monitoring by civil society; about creating a new production and
exchange complex that includes community cooperatives, private enterprises,
and state enterprises, and excludes TNCs; about enshrining the principle of
subsidiarity in economic life by encouraging production of goods to take place
at the community and national level if it can be done so at reasonable cost in
order to preserve community. (Bello 2001: 39)
Global governance needs to be decentralized and de-coupled from the hegemonic

power and dominance within. It needs to be democratized and pluralized. Global
governance in its hegemonic form has been criticized widely as contributing
to inequality, poverty, inequity and the resulting conflicts, including violence.
Caroline Thomas calls for a reform of global governance with the goal of reducing
inequality, promoting development and human security. The steps to be taken are:

Public regulation of corporations;

A mandatory code of global conduct;
Fair and ethical trade;
Publicly regulated finance;
An international speculation tax (Thomas 2000: ch. 7).
Furthermore, she calls for a democratization of global governance. Albert Berry

described additional steps to create global governance that would best lower world
poverty and inequality. The solution is to be found in 1) improving the processes
of technological change and transfer; 2) reformed practices of trade, foreign aid
and capital flows; 3) reduced sins of commission, referring to crisis-fostering
Conclusion
143
practices of exploitation and resource extraction; and 4) a more organized and

integrated approach to migration (Berry 2010: 62f). In addition, the institutions of
global governance would need to be reformed, including the UN Security Council.
The General Assembly would need to be strengthened and a Peoples Assembly
contemplated. An Economic and Social Security Council has long been called for,
and would need to be created (Camilleri 2002: ch. 15).
I want to conclude with a remark that was published in 2000 by Thomas
G. Weiss, who reflected on good governance and global governance and stressed
the importance of a strengthening of international institutions for the improvement
and efficiency of global ordering capability:
There is no such actor for the planet [a world sovereign]. Although the glass is
clearly less full than we would like, Mark Zacher reminds us that the modest
order in todays international economic system results from international
efforts: In short, without these and other regimes and public goods generated
by the UN system, it would truly be a jungle out there. At the same time,
the conceptual and operational challenges of global governance are formidable.
(Weiss 2000: 808)
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Interviews
Severine Autessere, 2008, telephone interview.
Robert Jervis, 2008, telephone interview.
John Mearsheimer, 2008, telephone interview.
Scott Sagan, 2008, telephone interview.
Steven Walt, 2008, telephone interview.
Kenneth Waltz, Bangor and New York, 2007 and 2008.
Helen Waltz, Bangor and New York, 2007 and 2008.
Index
actions 42
actor 45, 49, 71, 889, 9095, 124
rational 42
Adler, Emanuel 7782
aggression 8, 15, 289, 312, 3950, 634,
1245
aggressive genes 40
annoyance motivated 43
emotional 44
impulsive 45
instrumental 50
irritable 43
learned 31
negatively reinforced 43
positively reinforced 43
stimuli for 8, 9, 29
aid
foreign 10, 114, 12021
alienation 456, 5860, 78
alliance 35, 97
analysis, levels of 6, 8, 27, 378, 139
first image 136, 19, 25, 2834, 37
second image 14, 1620, 25, 347
third image 2025, 368
anarchy 10, 14, 16, 18, 20, 225, 27, 31,
368, 712, 767, 80, 91, 1236
anger 43, 457, 49
animal studies 43
anthropology 9, 15, 33, 4042
armament 24
Autessere, Severine 5
authority 8, 11, 223, 31, 334, 368, 47,
71, 88, 92, 141
balance of power 9, 14, 234, 612, 65,
72, 108
balancing 24, 72
band societies 33
Barnett, Michael 7782
behaviourism 9, 146, 77
biology 67, 31, 3940

brain 424
capitalism 7, 19, 48
class 513
working 556
coercion 14, 289, 29, 334, 95, 99
Communism 33
community 4, 14, 19, 30, 41, 52, 77, 7982
imagined 46
security 7682, 126
of states 37
companies, transnational 37, 94
competition 49, 86, 91
for mates 40
for power 18, 24
Constructivism 35, 7682, 90, 95
cooperation 10, 13, 1617, 21, 24, 37, 41,
72, 76, 7982, 878, 91, 11416,
1235
costbenefit calculations 43, 55, 95, 99
counterterrorism 10
crime 8, 34, 41, 44, 514, 63, 67
culture 11, 15, 22, 29, 31, 345, 3940,
589, 78, 86
of honor 53, 68
of violence 63
decision-making 423
democracy 1719, 35, 9, 100, 129
democratic peace 8, 28, 35, 38, 48
democratization 79, 87, 12930
spread of 6
deprivation 32, 50, 59, 64
relative 7, 31, 49, 54, 56
determinism 8, 2931
development 32, 35, 58, 93
dilemma
prisoners 23
security 14, 37
158
dominance 69
seeking 50
economy 23, 33, 556, 589, 78, 8082
education 1516, 29, 31, 334, 53, 58
emotions 29, 425
emotional cues 423
emotional states 49
negative emotions 434, 50
employment 31, 59
equality 22, 62, 657, 90
systemic 910
escalation 65
Europe 20, 23, 58, 68, 73, 90, 93, 97
European Union 37, 10812
expectations 95
of peaceful change 37, 768, 82, 92
rising 32, 56
fear 43, 523, 72
fight or flight mechanism 43, 49
Freud, Sigmund 48
frustration 9, 15, 289, 32, 34, 42, 56,
5860, 64
frustrationaggression hypothesis 9,
32, 489
gains
relative 23
Galtung, Johan 9, 634
game theory 234
gender 29
genetics 2832
Germany 45, 47, 53, 689, 746, 85, 94,
97, 114
global governance 611, 278, 367, 73,
85101, 10312, 11416, 11819,
1212, 13843
actors in 10, 9094, 1047
definition of 8990
good global governance 8, 10, 28,
378, 12335, 1413
institutions of 10, 23
processes in 10
reform of 1011
globalization 67, 10, 368, 59, 857, 90,
139
externalities of 10, 36, 87, 114
good
the common 21, 30, 96
governance
global 611, 278, 367, 73, 85101,
10312, 11416, 11819, 1212,
13843
actors in 10, 9094, 1049
good global governance 8, 10, 28,
378, 12335, 1413
institutions of 10, 23
processes in 10
reform of 1011
good 34, 378
hegemonic 62, 90, 103
private 979
without government 37, 88
Gurr, Ted Robert 32, 49, 56
health 31, 58
mental 15, 29, 446, 53
hegemony 62, 656, 724, 117, 138
heterarchy 1037
Hitler, Adolf 45
honor 9, 48, 54, 68, 70
humiliation 458, 523
identity 11, 35, 42, 58, 778, 8082
imperialism 69
inequality 711, 18, 27, 312, 358, 5170,
734, 867, 11920, 13033
horizontal 57
insecurity 15
instinct
death 48
life 48
survival 13
Institutionalism 27, 36, 7682, 1257
institutions 234, 28, 356, 38, 73, 76, 79,
82, 88, 91, 967, 1258
integration 6, 21, 367, 7682
interaction 378, 778, 80, 85, 90, 96
interdependence 85
irrationality 13
Jervis, Robert 3, 5
Kant, Immanuel 1718, 212, 24
Index
law 18, 2021, 23, 36, 81
criminal 31
international 37, 89, 91, 95, 100
private 97
leadership 1335
learning 42
Liberalism 8, 179, 24, 36, 91
love 14
Man, the State and War 13, 58, 1325,
27, 29, 34, 38, 137
market 1819
free 18
Marx, Karl 1617, 32, 556
Marxism 89, 1920, 32, 90
Mearsheimer, John 4, 734
Middle East, the 5860, 118
military
force 18, 24, 36, 55, 60, 99, 11618
organization 41
Morgenthau, Hans 14, 23
multilateralism 96
multipolarity 10
nature
human 69, 1316, 278, 313, 3950
and nurture 21
state of 212, 33
needs
economic 32
need fulfillment 32, 34
norms 37, 767, 92, 96
international 956
social 49
nuclear weapons 4
organizations
international 37, 71, 7880, 89, 913
non-governmental 37, 71, 80, 889,
927
pain 43
participation 34, 59
passion 14, 18, 21, 28, 30
personality 29, 42
pathological 47
philosophy 6, 30
159
Pinker, Steven 28, 31, 412

polarity 61
bipolarity 656, 723
multipolarity 656, 724
unipolarity 657, 72, 74
police 33, 52
poverty 7, 11, 312, 49, 512, 578, 60,
11920
power 910, 14, 18, 54, 61, 65, 7172, 78,
99, 10312
concentration 667
differentials in 10, 62
hard and soft 99
lust for 14, 50
seeking 50
prestige 41
pride 14, 21, 46, 52
psychological interventions 30
preponderance 9, 65, 67
psychology 69, 14, 16, 429, 56, 58, 78
rank 910, 413, 57, 68, 74
discrepancy 634
rationality 13, 18, 2123, 2930, 423
irrationality 1314, 30, 43
rational actor 42
Realism 9, 30, 35, 39, 4950, 789, 90,
100, 1078
classical 1
defensive 72
offensive 724
structural 1, 613, 716, 107
recognition 478, 678
regimes 88, 91, 96
reparations 45, 69
resources 47, 54, 57, 63, 656, 745, 81
revolution 9, 16, 20, 546, 63, 67
French 32
risk
risk seeking 43
Rosenau, James 37
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 213, 1034
Sagan, Scott 5
security 33, 80
collective 17, 97
insecurity 15
160
shame 457, 50, 523, 60, 68

social 47
unacknowledged 457
signalling 44
Smith, Adam 17
socialization 77
socialism 17, 1920, 24, 36
society 7, 139, 21, 23, 25, 334, 41, 85
band societies 33, 41
civil 93
of states 34
sociobiology 9, 28, 3940
sovereignty 37, 90
Soviet Union 48, 73, 75
Spinoza, Baruch 1314, 212
stability 6162, 65, 71, 73, 79
standing 6770
state, the 8, 10, 1520, 22, 27, 312, 38,
1089, 141
abolishment of the 33
as actor 9091
the good state 9, 1719, 22, 28, 34, 36
internal structure of 1720, 34
limited 1718
minimalist 33
monopoly of force 89, 24, 30, 334
transformation of 36, 90
as unit 22, 91
unsatisfied 745
withdrawal of 889
status 31, 50, 53, 6870
disequilibrium theory 634
lower 50, 534
quo powers 745
seeking 50
theory of 9
stimuli, negative 8, 9, 29, 434, 50
survival 1314, 24, 30, 41, 65, 72
system
the international 8, 27, 37, 6172, 76
transformation of the 19
terrorism 6, 9, 10, 32, 37, 589, 67, 71, 89,
93, 11422
trade 23
trust 21, 523, 76, 7882
Theory of International Politics 1, 61,

713, 108
Tocqueville, Alexis de 32, 556
unilateralism 99101
United Nations 34, 71, 90, 95, 1089, 122
United States 6, 32, 48, 53, 723, 75, 86,
934, 100, 11112, 114, 140
hegemony 10, 72, 117
Versailles, Treaty of 457, 69
violence 69, 29, 34, 93, 99
autotelic 30
inequality as a cause of 278, 32
instrumentalist 42
non-violence 30
origins of 89, 11, 2931, 33, 39, 41
political 49, 589
prevention of 27, 29, 32, 39
structural 32
Walt, Stephen 45
Waltz, Helen 2
Waltz, Kenneth
life of 15
Man, the State and War 13, 58,
1325, 27, 29, 34, 38, 137
Theory of International Politics 1, 61,
713, 108
war
causes of 8, 1325, 28, 41, 57, 6170
civil war 9, 32, 57
Cold War 1011, 48, 57, 61, 65, 723,
8990, 108, 140
First World War 1920, 45, 69, 756
frequency of 656
Global War on Terrorism 10, 105, 108,
11322
great power wars 9
guilt clause 45, 47
international 6, 9
magnitude of 66
power transition wars 9, 62
prevention of 8, 11, 27, 32
risk of 10, 73
Second World War 48, 69, 745, 89
world war 10, 15, 25, 42, 65
Index
Wendt, Alexander 1236
will
free 8, 2931
free will problem 29
general 22
particular 23
world
federation 23
government 16, 20, 24, 33, 36, 712
of honour 68
peace 1325
state 7, 9, 14, 21, 27, 138
minimalist 36
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Inequality and Violence

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Inequality and Violence

A Re-appraisal of Man, the State and War

Anna Cornelia Beyer

Anna Cornelia Beyer 2014

Printed in the United Kingdom by Henry Ling Limited,

Man, the State and War Revisited

A Response to Man, the State and War

Human Nature and the Essence of Aggression

Inequality and Violence

Inequality and War at the International Level

From Inequality to Global Governance

The Continuity of Power in Global Governance

Inequality and Good Governance in the Global War on Terrorism113

Good Global Governance

This page has been left blank intentionally

This page has been left blank intentionally

Inequality and Violence

Inequality and Violence

Another recent student of his says:

What everyone seems to agree, even if it is always hard to risk a prognosis,

Inequality and Violence

underestimated the civilizing power which global governance structures and

Inequality and Violence

inequality. Therefore, in a partial analogy to Waltz, we need the state to address

Inequality and Violence

This page has been left blank intentionally

Man, the State and War Revisited

Inequality and Violence

Man, the State and War Revisited

Inequality and Violence

Man, the State and War Revisited

Inequality and Violence

Man, the State and War Revisited

being the produce of democracy, and self-determined, democratic states being by

Waltz concludes, the liberal prescription is impracticable (Ibid.: 120). Perfection

Inequality and Violence

Problems with socialism he discusses at the example of its formation in Russia

Man, the State and War Revisited

Inequality and Violence

Man, the State and War Revisited

Inequality and Violence

mixed situation, they describe why cooperation is oftentimes rendered impossible

Man, the State and War Revisited

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A Response to Man, the State and War

Inequality and Violence

A Response to Man, the State and War

Inequality and Violence

While rationality in Waltz had been discussed as a possible precondition of peace,

A Response to Man, the State and War

Genetic research, for example, is thought to have impacted the discussion in

Inequality and Violence

inequality as a cause for violence was demonstrated not only in a comparison of

A Response to Man, the State and War

original communism, world government, small size approach, to a certain degree

Inequality and Violence

A Response to Man, the State and War

Inequality and Violence

A Response to Man, the State and War

organizations, international law, norms and agreements, and global cooperative

Inequality and Violence

Man, the State and War Revisited

A Response to Man, the State and War

Human Nature and the Essence of Aggression

Inequality and Violence

Inequality and War at the International Level

From Inequality to Global Governance

The Continuity of Power in Global Governance

Inequality and Good Governance in the Global War on Terrorism113

Good Global Governance