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Christoph Horn, Dieter Schonecker, Corinna Mieth Groundwork For The Metaphysics of Morals
Christoph Horn, Dieter Schonecker, Corinna Mieth Groundwork For The Metaphysics of Morals
Metaphysics of Morals
Edited by
Christoph Horn
Dieter Schnecker
Walter de Gruyter
Contents
Christoph Horn and Dieter Schnecker
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
vii
Notes on Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ix
Groundwork, Preface
Nico Scarano (Tbingen)
Necessity and Apriority in Kants Moral Philosophy: An Interpretation of the Groundworks Preface (GMS, 387392) . . . . .
Groundwork I
Allen Wood (Stanford)
The Good Without Limitation (GMS I, 393394). . . . . . . . . . . .
25
45
72
93
Groundwork II
Marcus Willaschek (Frankfurt a. M.)
Practical Reason. A commentary on Kants Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS II, 412417) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
121
139
vi
Contents
158
200
Groundwork III
Klaus Steigleder (Bochum)
The Analytic Relationship of Freedom and Morality
(GMS III, 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
225
247
285
301
325
General Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
337
Preface
Kants Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals is one of the most
influential texts in the entire history of moral philosophy. It offers the
first and presumably the most attractive account in Kants writings of
an ethics which can be called Kantian in the sense in which we are
accustomed to understand this classification. In earlier stages of his
development, Kant sympathized with variations of a Leibniz-Wolffian
perfectionism or with a Hutcheson-Humean moral sense-philosophy.
In the Groundwork, however, Kant develops his own characteristic position. He now emphasizes that an adequate form of moral philosophy
has to be pure, i. e. both free from all empirical elements of interest,
self-love, and natural feelings as well as free from rational concepts of
perfection. More generally speaking, ethics must not be grounded on
anthropology, since morality is a demand, as Kant contends, which is
addressed towards all rational beings as rational beings. According to
Kant, ethics has to be spelled out on the basis of a moral law that is
valid for all finite rational beings. He believes that only from this point
of view can moral motivation and moral obligation be formulated in
an appropriate way. It is the Groundwork in which Kant develops and
discusses his doctrine of the categorical imperative and where he attempts to give a deduction for the universal validity of the moral law.
Published in 1785, the Groundwork presents a type of moral philosophy that has continously inspired and provoked its readers ever since.
At first sight, Kants Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
seems to be a clearly structured, well argued, and easily accessible
text; not without reason it has often been used to introduce beginners to Kants moral philosophy. On close reading, however, the text
really turns out to be most difficult and somewhat underdetermined.
The Groundwork is a highly condensed treatise containing many of
the topics and ideas Kant treated in his university lectures and his
notes since the 1760s. Thus, interpreters face many hard questions,
e. g.: Kant begins with the doctrine of the goodness of the good will;
however, he never says what a good will actually is, rather, he just
describes what it is not so what is it? Why does he introduce tele-
viii
Preface
Notes on Contributors
Marcia Baron is Rudy Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University
(Bloomington, Indiana). She is the author of Kantian Ethics Almost
without Apology (1995), and with Philip Pettit and Michael Slote,
Three Methods of Ethics (1997), as well as articles on a variety of
topics in ethics and philosophy of law, including friendship and impartiality, patriotism, justifications and excuses, sexual consent, and
manipulativeness.
Christoph Horn is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bonn.
He works on various aspects of ancient philosophy (Plato, Aristotle,
Plotinus, Augustine) as well as modern moral philosophy. Publications: Plotin ber Sein, Zahl und Einheit (1995), Augustinus (1995),
Antike Lebenskunst (1998), Politische Philosophie (2003), Grundlegende Gter (forthcoming). He edited the following volumes: Augustinus, De civitate dei (1997), (with Ch. Rapp) Wrterbuch der antiken
Philosophie (2002), (with N. Scarano) Philosophie der Gerechtigkeit.
Texte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (2002).
Samuel Kerstein is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland, College Park. He is the author of Kants Search for
the Supreme Principle of Morality (2002) and is working on a reconstruction and defense of Kants Formula of Humanity.
Harald Khl is Lecturer at the University of Saarbrcken. He was
Guest Professor of Philosophy at the Humboldt University (Berlin). His most important publications are: Kants Gesinnungsethik
(1990), Abschied vom Unbedingten. ber den heterogenen Charakter moralischer Forderungen (2006). Papers on practical philosophy
(Kant, Schopenhauer, Williams, Rorty), theory of knowledge and
semantics.
Bernd Ludwig is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Gttingen. His main research areas are the philosophy of I. Kant, moral
philosophy and the theory of Natural Law in the early modern period.
He is editor of Kants Metaphysics of Morals. Most important publica-
Notes on Contributors
tions: Kants Rechtslehre (22005), Die Wiederentdeckung des Epikureischen Naturrechts [on Th. Hobbes] (1998).
Corinna Mieth (MA 1999 and PhD 2002 at the University of Tbingen) teaches ethics and political philosophy at the University of
Bonn. Her research interests are focussed on duties of assistance, on
the foundation of human rights, especially social rights, on the political philosophy of John Rawls and theories of global justice. She is coauthor of a commented edition of Kants Groundwork with Christoph
Horn and Nico Scarano.
Marcel Quarfood is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Sdertrn
University College, Huddinge, Sweden. He translated Kants Prolegomena into Swedish, and published Transcendental Idealism and
the Organism. Essays on Kant (2004), as well as articles on Kant and
on the philosophy of biology.
Jacob Rosenthal graduated with a Diploma in Mathematics from
the University of Wrzburg. Afterwards he studied philosophy at the
University of Konstanz and received a PhD in 2002 with a dissertation on objective interpretations of probability (published as Wahrscheinlichkeiten als Tendenzen (2004)). Currently he teaches ethics
and philosophy of science at the University of Bonn. His research interests lie in the fields of epistemology, general philosophy of science,
theory of action and moral philosophy.
Nico Scarano is Assistant Professor at the University of Tbingen.
He works on metaethics, moral philosophy and political philosophy.
His dissertation Moralische berzeugungen. Grundlinien einer antirealistischen Theorie der Moral has been published in 2001. He edited
the following books: (with Ch. Horn) Philosophie der Gerechtigkeit.
Texte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (2002), Modelle politischer
Philosophie (2003) and Ernst Tugendhats Ethik. Einwnde und Erwiderungen (2006).
Dieter Schnecker is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Siegen. His main research areas are Kants ethics, metaethics,
medical ethics, hermeneutics, epistemology. Publications: (with Gregor Damschen) Selbst philosophieren (2006), (in cooperation with
Stefanie Buchenau and Desmond Hogan) Kants Begriff transzendentaler und praktischer Freiheit. Eine entwicklungsgeschichtliche
Studie (2005),(with Allen W. Wood) Immanuel Kant: Grundlegung
zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein einfhrender Kommentar (22004),
Notes on Contributors
xi
xii
Notes on Contributors
Allen W. Wood is Ward W. and Priscilla B Woods Professor at Stanford University. He has also taught at Cornell University and Yale
University, and has held visiting appointments at the University of
Michigan, University of California at San Diego, and Oxford University. He is author of nine books, most recently Kant (2005) and
is general editor (with Paul Guyer) of the Cambridge Edition of the
Writings of Immanuel Kant, as part of which Guyer and Wood collaborated on a new translation of the Critique of Pure Reason. Wood
has also translated Kants Groundwork (2002).
Groundwork
Preface
Nico Scarano
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for a pure moral philosophy. It will become evident that Kants argument is comprehensible if the decisive concept necessity is understood
as a modal operator in the sense of modern logic. The modal status,
necessity, allows moral principles to guide our counterfactual, practical reflections. This aspect of logical form can be clearly distinguished
from epistemological connotations, on the one hand, and the prescriptive or imperative character of normative propositions, on the other.
1. What is a Metaphysics of Morals? (GMS, 387,1388,14)
Kant does not introduce the Preface of the Groundwork with a characterization of the works content; rather he attempts first of all to define
the place of a metaphysics of morals within philosophy. For this task,
he makes use of three criteria. Kant first differentiates philosophical
theories by whether they are formal or material. Formal philosophy, according to Kant, is equated with logic. It possesses no specific
object; rather it concerns itself, without distinction among objects,
with the universal rules of thinking in general (GMS, 387,10 f.). In
contrast, every material philosophy has to do with determinate objects and the laws to which they are subjected (GMS, 387,12 f.).
This formulation already offers an indication of the second criterion. Kant subdivides material theories, in turn, into two classes. Kant
distinguishes them by with reference to the laws to which the objects
that the theories deal are subjected. He seems to assume that there
are exactly two kinds of laws. And, correspondingly, he differentiates
between two types of material philosophy: on the one hand, physics, or doctrine of nature, or, alternatively, natural wisdom; and,
on the other hand, ethics, or doctrine of morals, or, alternatively,
moral wisdom. It is a matter of the laws of nature, in the one case,
and of the laws of freedom, in the other, that each theory is respectively concerned (GMS, 387,14 f.). What can Kant mean by this? The
expression laws of nature seems to be relatively unproblematic. But
what is to be understood by the expression laws of freedom?
From Kants elucidation one can infer a more exact interpretation.
Laws of nature are therefore laws in accordance with which everything happens, while the laws of freedom are those in accordance
with which everything ought to happen (GMS, 387,25388,1).2 Obviously, one can draw the parallel here to the modern terminologi2
See also the parallel passage in the Critique of Pure Reason, A 802/B 831.
Thus Tugendhat (1993, 99 f.), for example, doubts whether the use of the term necessity in Kants theoretical philosophy and in his practical writings can be understood in a unified manner.
For the concept of law in Kants ethics see also Klotz (2001). The concept of necessity as a modal quality that stands at the center of this essay is mentioned by him
without, however, further explication (58).
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follows that these laws also must be valid for other rational beings.
And, in a further step, Kant concludes the apriority of moral philosophy from this necessity. The decisive term for Kants argumentation,
necessity, especially requires interpretation. In order to obtain more
exact concepts of interpretation, I would like to examine more closely
in the following section the logical structure of ethical principles.
2.1. The Logical Structure of Ethical Principles
At the center of every ethics are normative statements. Ethics of principle, like Kants, presuppose that there are ethical principles that
can be formulated with the aid of normative or evaluative statements,
which have a high degree of generality and therefore allow the moral
judgment of a plurality of cases. Such principles have the goal of guiding our moral judgments and therewith our actions. They formulate
criteria by which we can morally judge objects, for example actions or
institutions.
Ethical principles can have different logical strengths. They offer
either a necessary or a sufficient or a both necessary and sufficient criterion for determining when an object receives a corresponding moral
predicate. The categorical imperative, as defined by Kant, or, more
precisely, the founding law of the categorical imperative, appears to
be a quite demanding principle, one which prescribes both a necessary
and a sufficient condition for morality. Kant compares this principle
with a compass in the hand by which one knows [his] way around
very well in all the cases that come before [him], how to distinguish
what is good, what is evil, what conforms to duty or is contrary to
duty (GMS, 404,13).
Normative propositions in which principles with such a logical
rigor come to expression exhibit, by means of a first approach, the
following logical form:
(P1) For all objects x:
if, and only if, x satisfies the criterion C, does x have the moral
quality M.
Such propositions contain criteria for determining when an object receives a certain moral predicate or when it is denied it. In P1 it is a
matter of the conditions for the assignation of the moral predicate M.
According to the all-quantified biconditional, every object that satisfies the condition C simultaneously receives the moral predicate, and
vice versa. General propositions that exhibit such a form consequently
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I assume that we are dealing here with an excellent case of the law
of freedom of which Kant speaks in the Preface. However, which as5
I interpret the categorical imperative as a test not only for the legality but also for the
morality of an action. Such an interpretation is not uncontested in the contemporary
literature on Kant (s., for example, Khl, 1990, 66 f. and Wood in this volume); it
does not, however, play a decisive role in my further reflections. The term morality in (P2) would, accordingly, simply have to be replaced by the term legality.
pect of the logical form refers to the necessity of the law is not, as yet,
explicitly worked out.
2.2 The Modal Status of an Ethical Principle
Ethical principles have the task of guiding our moral judgments. A more
exact analysis of their logical features takes into account that with their
help we judge not only factually existing objects but also objects which
we merely imagine or whose existence is possible but not actual.
Let us assume in a particular situation that we have two alternatives
of action at our disposal. We must decide between action A and action
B. If we choose A, B will never exist; if we choose B, A will likewise
never exist. If we wish to judge both options of action from a moral
point of view, we can do so with recourse to our ethical principles. In
that case, we test whether the criteria formulated in the principles will
be satisfied or not satisfied. The criteria must be applicable both to
factually existing objects as well as to merely possibly existing ones in
order to guide our valuation. Both the actual action A and the merely
possible action B fall within the range of objects covered by the principles. This condition has consequences for their modal status.
In order to express modal relations, one can make use of the possible-worlds terminology common in semantics. In case we decide for A
and successfully translate this decision into action, then A is an object
of the actual world, and B is solely an object of a possible world. We
judge both objects with recourse to the same principles. That means,
however, that these principles express something not only about the
actual world but also about other, possible worlds. Since these principles indicate a strength beyond that of contingency, it appears that
they exhibit the modal status of necessity.
In the preliminary formulations (P1) through (P3), this logical
quality has yet to be expressed. In (P1') the modal status of necessity,
therefore, is explicitly taken up into the formulation:
(P1') Necessarily, for all objects x:
if, and only if, x satisfies the criterion C, does x have the moral
quality M.
Applied to Kantian ethics, this thought results in the following formulation of Kants fundamental principle:
(P2') Necessarily, for all actions x:
if, and only if, x satisfies the criterion CI, does x satisfy the demand
of morality.
10
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The fact that ethical principles carry in themselves the modal status
of necessity provides an important methodical starting point for the
construction of ethical theories. Thus, the execution of the commonly
performed counterfactual thought experiments in ethics is only possible under the condition that the principles of valuation support such
an operation. Contingent principles are not in a position to do that.
Kant makes methodical use of this logical quality of moral principles
particularly in those places where he speaks of other rational beings (e. g. GMS, 389, 401, 408, 412, 415). The central passage in the
Preface of the Groundwork in which he argues for the necessity of a
pure moral philosophy also belongs to this methodical usage. It does
not matter in these passages whether there actually are other such beings as, for example, the inhabitants of other planets or also God. For
the Kantian argumentation it is sufficient that such beings could exist, that their existence is thinkable. The corresponding passages must
be understood as methodically executed thought experiments, which
make use of the particular modal status of ethical principles.
Now it becomes clear why the laws of freedom have a comparable modal status to the laws of nature. Laws of nature support
counterfactual arguments, too. In order to achieve this, they also must
have a modal status which is higher than simple contingency. The connections formulated in them are also valid in all natural law governed,
possible worlds, and in this respect, they exhibit the modal status of
necessity. The difference between laws of nature and laws of freedom
appears to consist primarily in the fact that the laws of nature are concerned with all-quantified, descriptive biconditionals, while the laws
of freedom are concerned with all-quantified, normative biconditionals, each receiving the modal status of necessity.6
6
Actually, the type of necessity spoken of here has to be further specified. Is it a matter of logical, conceptual, nomological, or metaphysical possible worlds? In
Scarano (2001, chapter 3.2), I argued that our moral principles have a comparable
status to the metaphysical necessity introduced by Saul Kripke (1980). To Kant
has to be ascribed the view that it is herewith a matter of conceptual necessity.
I see an indication of this interpretation in the method he applies in the fi rst and
second sections. He presupposes that the content or the formula of the categorical
imperative can be found solely through the means of the conceptual analysis of our
11
12
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13
idea of moral laws. How can the individual steps of this very dense
argumentation be distinguished from each other and ordered?
According to Kant, the starting point, a reflection on our moral
concepts, leads immediately to the first intermediate thesis, that (1)
a moral law has to carry absolute necessity with it (GMS, 389,13).
If this necessity is very narrowly interpreted, that is, in the sense of
the previously worked out modal status of an ethical principle, then
two peculiarities of the total argumentation will become more understandable. First of all, it will become clear that in the passage of the
text an argumentative progression takes place from the given-ness of a
modal quality to the proof of an epistemological quality distinguished
from it. And secondly, an argument not implausible even from a contemporary viewpoint comes to light for the intermediate thesis (1).
For, as shown above, it is the task of an ethical principle to guide our
valuations even in the case of counterfactual considerations. If this is
correct, then an analysis of our concept of morality can help bring to
light the modal status that is responsible for the capacity of meeting
this task. The argumentative progression from the point of departure
to thesis (1), therefore, appears well-motivated. Through the analysis
of our concept of morality we find that moral laws also apply to counterfactual situations, that they consequently exhibit the modal status
of necessity.
Kant distinguishes at this point between moral laws and moral duties. From a moral law (the ground of an obligation: GMS, 389,12)
arises a moral duty (obligation) to which our actions have to conform. As an example of an obligation, Kant names the command
You ought not to lie (GMS, 389,13 f.). It is interesting to observe
that Kant ascribes the decisive absolute necessity not to the duty,
but rather to the law that is foundational to the duty. This, too, serves
as an indication that the term necessity is to be understood as a modal
expression and not in the sense of normativity or prescriptivity.
Otherwise Kant would speak of the necessity of an action instead of
the necessity of the law foundational for obligation.
The point of departure, absolute necessity, may be read therefore as a modal status of moral principles. How, then, are the other intermediate steps to be understood? The basis in the text is extremely
narrow. One possibility of outlining the continued line of argumentation is as follows:
In the next step, Kant seems to refer to a counterfactual thought
experiment. Among the counterfactual situations to which duties are
attributed are those in which not humans but other imaginable ration-
14
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15
a foundational part that proceeds purely a priori, that is, without reference to anything empirical. In Kants words, all moral philosophy
rests entirely on its pure part, and when applied to the human being it
borrows not the least bit from knowledge about him (anthropology)
(GMS, 389,2629).
This is one of the possible approaches for a systematic reconstruction of the central argument in the Preface. Unfortunately, Kant offers very few suggestions of how he can assume that the thesis that
there has to be a pure moral philosophy is self-evident. Consequently,
much interpretation is required. And much of the interpretive work
revolves around which systematic concept of necessity is implemented
in the interpretation. The interpretation presented here bases itself
upon a purely modal-logical concept of necessity, which entails neither an epistemological meaning nor an equivalence of normativity
or prescriptivity. If one chooses other systematic basic concepts, the
structure of argumentation also has to be interpreted in other ways. 8
2.5. The Practical Use of a Pure Moral Philosophy
(GMS, 389,36390,18)
Although the aim of the argumentation appears to be complete, Kant,
in the ensuing paragraph, suggests another form of reasoning for the
necessity of a pure moral philosophy. This second argument, however, takes a completely different direction. Kants original question
concerning the necessity of a moral philosophy is not free of ambiguity. For him, it was at first a matter of a necessity that referred to cognition (speculation: GMS, 389,37) as its goal. It could be summarized
as follows: If one wants to obtain knowledge of moral principles, then
a pure moral philosophy is an indispensable means.
In Kants second argument, a pure moral philosophy is indispensably necessary (GMS, 389,36) not only for the correct cognition but
8
16
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also for the correct action. It could be said, If one wants to act correctly, then one needs a pure moral philosophy. Kant argues for this
thesis: because morals themselves remain subject to all sorts of corruption as long as that guiding thread and supreme norm of their correct judgment is lacking (GMS, 390,2 f.). The implication contained
in this argument seems, at first sight, quite strong, but it is not clear
whether Kant actually advocates it so strongly. Do we really need a
philosophical moral theory in order to act correctly? Are we compelled to rely on a kind of philosophical expertise when dealing with
moral questions?
Such an implication seems hardly congruent with the rest of Kants
remarks. There remains nonetheless the possibility of a weaker interpretation. In this context, the expression moral philosophy does
not entail only the explicit theory, whose formulation the scientific
discipline of philosophy has as one of its tasks. Rather every human
or rational being possesses a moral philosophy if she has the capacity to act from principle (for the sake of: GMS, 390,5). Accordingly,
every being capable of action carries at least implicitly a moral philosophy in itself.
Therefore, fleshed-out scientific theories can help us make explicit
the implicit philosophical knowledge that is present in every person
and therewith isolate the a priori part from the empirical part. Such
an explicit knowledge can serve as a reliable guiding thread for action. According to Kant, one can speak of a purity of morals (GMS,
390,17) only if the normative principles with which we ground our actions are pure and contain no empirical elements.
Thus, the scientific discipline of philosophy has a supporting but
not a constitutive function for the morality of our conduct. A metaphysics of morals, as an explicitly fleshed-out philosophical theory,
can, however, offer a supporting contribution in making the idea of
a pure practical reason, which, according to Kant, lies in each of us,
effective in concreto (GMS, 389,35).
2.6. A Methodological New Beginning (GMS, 390,19391,15)
Kant asserts that the process of working out such a metaphysics of
morals is an entirely new field [] to be entered on (GMS, 390,22 f.).
He therewith contrasts the type of theory he introduces with all other
approaches that had been previously worked out in the history of philosophy. Kant is not humble in his claims. Not only does he claim that
the philosophy before him had not found the right moral theory. It is
17
his opinion that all previous approaches were on the wrong track from
their very starting points.
For an interpretation of this passage in the text, the fact that moral
principles, according to Kant, can serve not only as criterion for judgment but also as genuine grounds of action is significant. For Kant,
actions are truly moral solely if not only the principles of valuation
but also the particular grounds of action for the acting persons are
free of all empirical content. Moral principles must be our grounds
of action. Kant intimates therewith one of his central theses that he
will more thoroughly develop in the course of the Groundwork. Kant
accuses Christian Wolff and with him the entire moral philosophical
tradition of not clearly recognizing this. In their moral-philosophies,
they did not investigate the idea and principles of a possible pure
will but began their investigations with the actions and conditions
of human volition in general, which (and this is where Kant sees the
methodological mistake) are for the most part drawn from psychology (GMS, 390,3437). According to Kant, exclusively a metaphysics
of morals, free from all empirical content and based on the analysis
of a pure will, is an appropriate foundation for the working out of a
normative theory of morality.
3. The Method and the Relation of the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS, 391,16392)
At this point, Kant departs from his general reflections on a theory to
be provided someday (GMS, 391,16) and dedicates himself to the
work that follows. His remarks are extremely terse and without a total
interpretation of the Groundwork almost impossible to comprehend.
In particular, his comments on the method he uses are hardly understandable for a reader who is not already familiar with the work.
He assigns three transitions to the three sections of the work although it is unclear whether the sections also contain the starting
points and termini named in the title or whether they ultimately
have only the transitions themselves as topics. Kants mention of an
initially analytically and subsequently synthetically proceeding
is also unclear and disputed among interpreters (GMS, 392,1922). A
possible interpretation consists in directly connecting the expressions
analytically and synthetically to the word method. This would
mean that Kant refers here to the two different methods of instruction (Lehrarten) mentioned in the Prolegomena, which appeared
18
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See, for example, Brandt (1988, 171174), Bittner (1989, 29 f.), Freudiger (1993, 61
70), Schnecker (1996, 1997) and Milz (1998).
19
(a) The first problem arises from the fact that Kant thinks two types
of a groundwork for a pure moral philosophy are possible: on the one
hand, a critique of pure practical reason, and on the other hand, the
present work. Although he claims there is really no other foundation
than a critique (GMS, 391,17 f.), he believes that one can do without
such a critique and lists three reasons for this (see GMS, 391,20392,2).
It remains nevertheless unclear how the relation of the Groundwork to
the intimated critique of practical of reason is to be defined.
(b) Equally unclear is the precise relation of the Groundwork to
the envisioned metaphysics of morals. Is the groundwork of a theory itself to be considered a part of this theory or is what Kant calls
the preliminary work of laying the ground (GMS, 391,37) a part
separate from the actual metaphysics? Undoubtedly, the parts of the
theory developed in the Groundwork raise the claim of being independent of empirical knowledge and therefore belong to a pure moral
philosophy. Thus, at least parts of the Groundwork have to be identical with parts of a metaphysics of morals.
(c) Making matters more difficult in the identification of the relation between the Groundwork, a metaphysics of morals, and the mentioned critique of pure practical reason is the fact that Kant later
published monographs with these or slightly modified titles. In any
case, it may not simply be assumed that the later produced works actually deal with the types of theories mentioned in the Preface to the
Groundwork.
How can the relations of these types of theory to each other be
more precisely defined? Is Kants expression metaphysics of morals
a unified concept or are there different meanings combined here in
opaque ways?
An approach toward the resolution of these difficulties offers
perhaps a more precise interpretation of what Kant understands by
a metaphysics of morals. In the opening passages of the Preface,
Kant had defined the metaphysics of morals with the help of three
criteria:10 fi rst of all, it is a theory that is not purely formal but refers
to particular objects. It refers, secondly, to objects insofar as these are
under laws of freedom. And thirdly, it is perfectly free of empirical
content. Therefore, a metaphysics of morals is a pure moral philosophy. One question, however, remains unanswered. What actually is
a moral philosophy? Or articulated more precisely: what is the ontological status of such a theory?
10
20
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21
Other works
Bittner, Rdiger (1989): Das Unternehmen einer Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Zur Vorrede der Grundlegung, in: Otfried Hffe (ed.):
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein kooperativer Kommentar,
Frankfurt/M., 1330.
Brandt, Reinhard (1988): Der Zirkel im dritten Abschnitt von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in: Hariolf Oberer/Gerhard Seel (ed.):
Kant. Analysen Probleme Kritik, Wrzburg, 169191.
Freudiger, Jrg (1993): Kants Begrndung der praktischen Philosophie. Systematische Stellung, Methode und Argumentationsstruktur der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Bern/Stuttgart/Wien.
Klotz, Christian (2001): Gesetzesbegriffe in Kants Ethik, in: Volker Gerhardt/Rolf-Peter Horstmann/Ralph Schumacher (ed.): Kant und die Berliner Aufklrung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Berlin/
New York, Vol. 3, 5562.
Khl, Harald (1990): Kants Gesinnungsethik, Berlin/New York.
Kripke, Saul A. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Oxford.
Milz, Bernhard (1998): Zur Analytizitt und Synthetizitt der Grundlegung, in: Kant-Studien 89, 188204.
Nida-Rmelin, Julian (1994): Begrndung in der Ethik, in: Nida-Rmelin:
Ethische Essays, Frankfurt/M. 2002, 3247.
Scarano, Nico (2001): Moralische berzeugungen. Grundlinien einer antirealistischen Theorie der Moral, Paderborn.
Schnecker, Dieter (1996): Zur Analytizitt der Grundlegung, in: KantStudien 87, 348354.
Schnecker, Dieter (1997): Die Methode der Grundlegung und der bergang von der gemeinen sittlichen zur philosophischen Vernunfterkenntnis, in: Hariolf Oberer (ed.): Kant. Analysen Probleme Kritik. Vol.
III, Wrzburg, 8198.
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Schnecker, Dieter / Wood, Allen W. (22004): Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein einfhrender Kommentar, Paderborn u. a.
Timmermann, Jens (2004): Kommentar, in: Timmermann (ed.): Immanuel
Kant: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Gttingen, 84152.
Tugendhat, Ernst (1993): Vorlesungen ber Ethik, Frankfurt/M.
Groundwork
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will be at odds not only with what people have usually thought Kant is
saying but also with what I freely admit it is probably easiest to think
he is saying. My argument, however, will be that the common and
easy way of reading the text leads us into serious difficulties. It cannot
make good sense of what Kant is talking about or of what he is saying,
and it attributes to him a set of claims that are simply not there in the
Groundwork sometimes because Kant does not accept them, and
sometimes because they are claims about topics that Kant does not
intend to address at all in this passage. I ask only that the reader try
on the reading I will suggest, and see for herself or himself whether
my reading is not in the end more satisfactory than what seems at first
to be the easy and obvious reading.
This paper is going to focus chiefly on the claim made for the good
will in the opening sentence of the First Section: There is nothing it
is possible to think of anywhere in the world, or indeed anything at
all outside it, that can be held to be good without limitation, excepting
only a good will (GMS, 393). Further, the paper will focus less on
what Kant means by a good will than on what he means in claiming
that such a will is good without limitation. I want to distinguish this
claim both from other claims Kant makes about the goodness of the
good will in the opening pages of the Groundwork, and from some
claims that he is often thought to have made but is not making. And
finally, I want to try to say something about how the unlimited goodness of the good will is supposed to function in the overall argument
of the Groundwork.
Kant brings out the distinctiveness of the good will by comparing its
goodness with that of other goods, which he divides into two main categories: gifts of nature, which he further subdivides into talents of the
mind and qualities of temperament, and gifts of fortune, among
which he distinguishes the three main objects of human passions and
competitiveness (power, honor and wealth), and also two more general
and encompassing goods: health and that entire well-being and contentment with ones condition, under the name of happiness. Kant
thinks the unlimited goodness of the good will makes it different from
any of these other goods. And he tries to persuade us of the unlimited
goodness of the good will both by comparing it with these other goods
and by considering how we regard both the good will and the bad will
in the context of complexes made up of good or bad volition and some
of these other goods (or of the bad things opposed to them).
Yet if we are to understand the claim that the good will is good
without limitation, we must see clearly that it is a claim neither about
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its worth in comparison to other goods nor a claim about the relative
goodness of various complexes in which a good or a bad will might
figure. Something might be good without limitation even if it were a
rather minor good as compared with others, and something might also
be good without limitation even if many of the complexes in which it
figured were less good than complexes involving a bad will. Thus Ross
(1954, 10) is mistaken when he says that Kants claim here entails that
the good will must never unite with anything else to produce a bad
whole. The claim that the good will is good without limitation is rather a claim about the constancy and unchangeability of the degree of
goodness possessed by the good will itself (specifically, its immunity
to having its goodness diminished) when it is combined with anything
else, and the uniqueness of the good will in this respect when compared to any other good whatever.
Kant asserts, and expects his readers to agree, that for every other
kind of thing that is in general good, the goodness of its particular
instances varies with the circumstances in which those instances are
found, and the way they are combined with other things, especially
with a will that is not good. Thus talents of the mind, such as understanding, wit and the power of judgment, or qualities of temperament,
such as courage, resoluteness and persistence in an intention, although
they are without doubt in some respects good and to be wished for
[] can also become extremely evil and harmful, if the will that is to
make use of these gifts of nature, and whose peculiar constitution is
therefore called character, is not good (GMS, 393). Even happiness is
good, Kant claims, only when it is enjoyed by a person having a good
will, since such a will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of the worthiness to be happy (GMS, 393).
In contrast to all other goods, however, every instance of the good
will is good, and equally good, under all conditions, in all combinations, and whatever its effects or consequences. The good will is good
not through what it effects or accomplishes, not through its efficacy
for attaining any intended end, but only through its willing, i. e. good
in itself (GMS, 394). Even if through the peculiar disfavor of fate,
or through the meager endowment of a stepmotherly nature, this will
were entirely lacking in the resources to carry out its aim, if with its
greatest effort nothing of it were accomplished, and only the good will
were left over (to be sure, not a mere wish, but as the summoning up
of all the means insofar as they are in our control): then it would shine
like a jewel for itself, as something that has its full worth in itself
(GMS, 394). The good will of course aims at good results, and with
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good fortune, achieves them. But they form no part of its own worth,
and do not add the least bit to it. It would be only the setting, as it
were, to make it easier to handle in common traffic, or to draw the attention of those who are still not sufficiently connoisseurs, but not to
recommend it to connoisseurs and determine its worth (GMS, 394).
Kants claim that the good will is good without limitation good
thus amounts to what we might call the nondiminishability thesis:
The goodness of the good will is not diminished by any circumstance
in which it is found, by any of its effects, or by any combination with
other things, however good or bad, in which it may be involved. Kant
also holds a parallel nonincreasability thesis to the effect that the
goodness of the good will cannot be increased by any of its circumstances or effects or by any combination with other goods. Kant sometimes states the claim that the good will is good without limitation by
saying that it is absolutely good (GMS, 394; 402). I think he means
this in the sense of absolute that he explicates in the Critique of
Pure Reason when he says that we apply a predicate to something absolutely when we mean either that the predicate applies to the thing
in itself or internally (apart from any relation the thing may have
to other things) or else when it applies to the thing in all respects or
in every relation (KrV A324 f./B380 f.). The good will is absolutely
good, in this sense, because its goodness does not vary with its relation
to any other thing, and is therefore possessed entirely in itself or apart
from any relation that the good will may stand to other goods.
There is another thesis that Kant asserts in the same paragraph
that obviously has some close relation to these two theses. This is what
we can call the unconditionality thesis: The good will is unconditionally good, or equally good under any and all conditions, whereas
all other goods are good only conditionally. Gifts of nature are good
when used by a good will but bad when used by a bad will for its ends.
Gifts of fortune are bad when they lead (as through arrogance) to
a bad will, or when they are enjoyed by a being that lacks the good
will which is the indispensable condition for the worthiness to enjoy
them. I think we may view the nondiminishability and nonincreasability theses as consequences of the unconditionality thesis, in the
following way: If we consider all possible instances of some kind of
thing, then that kind of thing is good without limitation only if all
of these possible instances are good. If some of them are bad, then
this limits the goodness of that kind of thing. Since the goodness of
all good things except a good will is conditioned, those instances of
other kinds of things in which the condition is not fulfilled are not
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posite of what B aims at is realized, and this is a very good result, perhaps exactly the result that A, with the good will, would have willed to
come about. Which complex, considered as a whole, should we value
more: As good will, with its bad results, or Bs bad will, with its good
results? Nothing in the nonincreasability thesis, or the nondiminishability thesis, implies any answer to this question.
In other words, the nondiminishability and nonincreasability theses are theses are only about the goodness of the good will as a possible kind of good, and also theses only about the good will itself. There
is no reason to suppose that Kant would deny that the complex of a
good will plus the good results at which it aims is a better whole than
the combination of the same good will with bad results that might
come about despite the good wills fruitless attempts to prevent them.
Nor do the the nondiminishability and nonincreasability theses themselves make any claims about the goodness of the good will in relation
to the goodness of other goods. Something whose goodness can be
neither increased nor diminished might be a relatively minor good,
not nearly as good as many of the things whose goodness is increased
or diminished by their circumstances, or effects or by their combination with other things.
As a matter of fact, however, Kant does hold that the good will is
also a greater good than any of the goods that are subject to being increased or diminished: considered for itself, without comparison, it is
to be estimated far higher than anything that could be brought about
by it in favor of any inclination, or indeed, if you prefer, of the sum
of all inclinations (GMS, 394). And this seems also to be something
that Kant sometimes intends to say when he claims that the good will
is absolutely good. Here, however, the claim that the good will is
absolutely good does not mean that its goodness is independent of its
relations to other things, but rather makes the quite distinct claim that
it is a greater good, in comparison to other things, than anything else.
This distinct claim, which we may call the higher worth thesis, does
entail that when a person with a good will achieves the happiness of
which she has made herself worthy, then it is the good will and not the
happiness that is the greater good.
The higher worth thesis may also imply though this seems to me
less certain that in our example of A and B above, that the complex
of As good will and its unfortunate bad results is to be preferred to
the complex of Bs bad will and its fortunate but unintended good
results. This remains uncertain because it might be that the goodness
of the unintended good results in the case of B, or the badness of the
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adopts. The good will, therefore, is the will that adopts good maxims,
namely, those that accord with objective laws of reason. The bad will
is the will that adopts maxims contrary to these laws.
We can now characterize the difference between those who think
the good will, at least in the case of human beings, belongs only to
subjects who act from duty, and those (such as myself) who think that
the good will, even for human beings, includes some subjects who do
not act from duty. The question is: Does the ground or incentive from
which the subject adopts its maxims also belong to those maxims as
part of their content? If the answer to this question is yes, then it would
not be possible for two subjects to adopt or to act on the same maxim
from different incentives, since the difference in incentives would all
by itself make the maxims different. For example, it would not be possible for two merchants to adopt the same maxim: Deal honestly with
all your customers, whether experienced or inexperienced (GMS,
397), one of them from prudence (concern for his reputation) and the
other from duty. Nor would it be possible for the same merchant to act
on this same maxim at one time from prudence (say, when he realizes
he is being watched as he deals with an inexperienced customer) and
another time from duty (when he realizes he can get away with cheating the customer, but constrains himself to deal honestly from respect
for the moral law). For if the incentive itself is part of the maxim,
then the merchant who deals honestly from prudence has a different
maxim from the merchant who deals honestly from duty, and only the
latter truly has a good will. On this view, those who act externally in
the same way as the person with a good will do not really have a good
will unless they act from duty. If they are honest, or beneficent, but
are so only from prudence or inclination, then their maxim and their
will is not good.
In contrast, someone who thinks that the incentive need not be
part of the maxim can say that both merchants act according to the
same maxim, which, moreover, since it is in conformity with duty (i. e.
is what duty would command), counts as a good maxim, the maxim
making for a good will. On this view, the merchant who adopts this
dutiful maxim from prudence has a good will as well as the merchant
who adopts the same maxim from duty, and if the same merchant follows this dutiful maxim sometimes from prudence and sometimes
from duty, he has a good will whichever incentive moves him at the
moment. (Of course, a merchant who acts from prudence and whose
real maxim is not to deal honestly, but only to deal honestly when
he wont get caught cheating, does not have the same maxim as the
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person does not have a good will. It is true that Kant has sometimes
been charged with holding such absurdities as these, but they are not
a necessary or even a natural way of reading what he says.1
Within the First Section itself, the argument appeals (as Kant says
it will) not to claims about the good will, but to claims about acting
from duty. 2 Specifically, Kant argues for the first formula of the prin1
Many think that for Kant it is possible to act from duty even when one has an inclination to do the act which is strong enough that no self-constraint is required. To
sustain such a reading of the text, however, one is forced to do either of two things:
On the one hand, one might attribute to Kant a highly mechanistic conception of
action and motivation, according to which, when one has two different incentives to
perform the same action, there must be a fact of the matter about which incentive
caused the action, much as, if a light bulb were hooked up to two different wires,
there would have to be a fact of the matter about which wire it was that delivered the
current to the lighted bulb. Or, on the other hand, one would have to interpret claims
in such cases about ones real motive as claims not about that particular action at
all, but rather about ones character or volitional dispositions, the structure of ones
volitional priorities in general to act from duty is to give duty general priority over
inclination in making ones decisions. But neither of these options is the least bit
attractive. The first requires us to ascribe to Kant, on the basis of no explicit textual
support whatever, a highly implausible and unappealing theory of action. The second transforms what he evidently intends to be a claim about the moral worth of this
action into a general claim about the agent, or about what the agent would do under
counterfactual circumstances. (Would the agent still act in a dutiful way if the cooperating inclination were removed?) But it also does not seem that there need be
any corresponding general truth about the agents character, or about what the agent
would do, for this action to have moral worth in the case Kant is imagining -- where
the agent must constrain himself through respect for the law if the dutiful action is
to be performed at all. In fact, we might think that an action would have more moral
worth in such a case if it were performed against the agents general dispositions,
and in conflict with his (generally bad) character. For that would give the agents
act of self-constraint an even more heroic quality. The more one reflects on the inconveniences and implausibilities we are required to digest in order to maintain the
usual interpretation of Kant here, the more attractive becomes the idea that in this
passage, all Kant means by acting from duty is acting with self-constraint through
respect for law something that need not, and therefore could not, occur in any case
where there were a co-operating inclination that made self-constraint unnecessary
(hence impossible).
Another temptation to think that a will can, in the sense relevant here, act from duty
even when it need not constrain itself to do so is drawn from Kants claim that only
the action done from duty has moral worth. It might seem to follow from this that
a dutiful action requiring no self-constraint (due to co-operating inclinations, such
as sympathy) is morally worthless. Kant has sometimes been accused of holding
such views, but it is easy to see how we could avoid that reading. For it is easy enough
to avoid it even while understanding acting from duty as acting with self-constraint out of respect for the law once we realize that an action which lacks moral
worth in the sense Kant means here need not be a morally worthless act, or an act
of no value to morality. Obviously, an act that conforms to duty, especially when
done with a good will (that is, from a maxim that conforms to duty) would have some
kind of value to morality (and deserve praise and encouragement as Kant says it
does), even if it is not done from duty. Notice that when speaking of moral worth in
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who come away from the Groundwork with the impression that his
opening claim about the goodness of the good will is fundamental to
his entire ethical theory are profoundly mistaken.
Kant sometimes speaks (though only here in the Second Section,
never in the First Section) not merely of the good will but of the
absolutely good will. That will is absolutely good which cannot
be evil, hence whose maxim, if it is made into a universal law, can
never conflict with itself (GMS, 437; cf. 426, 439, 444, 447). This is
not merely a repetition of the claim that the good will is absolutely
good (either in the sense that it is good unconditionally, regardless of
any of its relations to other things, or in the sense that it has a higher
worth than any other possible good thing). Rather, it identifies a special case of the good will, where not only does its maxim conform to
the moral law, but where the principle of this will is itself conformity
to moral laws. 3 This makes sense, however, only after we have identified the moral law, and can therefore specify the will whose goodness
is absolute in the sense that it conforms to that law. It must not be
thought that all along Kant had this absolutely good will in mind,
and that it was only of it that he said that it is good without limitation.
Rather, any will that adopts a good maxim, in whatever respect and
from whatever incentive, is, to that extent, a good will, and good without limitation.4
3
In the Preface, Kant says: For as to what is to be morally good, it is not enough that
it conform to the moral law, but it also must happen for the sake of the law (GMS,
390). This is usually read as saying the same as that an action has moral worth only
when it is done from duty. But it does not say the same thing. For a holy will (to which
the very concept of duty, and of acting from duty, could not apply) presumably also
conforms itself to the moral law and acts for the sake of the law. It is better to understand Kant to be saying here that properly moral good is to be found in a will which
performs dutiful actions on principle, rather than (as he puts it here) contingently
and precariously from co-operating inclinations. In other words, we come closer to
a worth that is properly moral when we are dealing with an absolutely good will, a
will whose basic principle is to conform its actions to the moral law, than a good will
which is merely acting on some principle or other that conforms to the law. Kant no
doubt would deny that it would be possible for a finite and imperfect human will to
do this always without sometimes having to act from duty (with self-constraint). But
in a person whose temperament has been well cultivated to dispose it to morality,
it seems that it might be possible to act quite often for the sake of the law without
having to constrain oneself through respect for the law. So I do not think that what
Kant is talking about here in the Preface precludes the possibility that a good will,
possessing a good that is properly moral, especially if it should be an absolutely good
will, might often act not only in conformity with the moral law, but also for the sake
of the law, without having to act from duty.
A will that acts on the principle that all its maxims should conform to the moral
law is, I think, what Kant means by a will that acts for the sake of the law. But, as
has been pointed out in the previous note, this is a will that need not act from duty
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It may help here to realize that a will (as practical reason or the
capacity to act on principles) is an abstraction. A good will is not the
same as a good person. Every (finite, imperfect) persons will is always
in some respects good and in some respects bad, assuming that all of
us adopts some good maxims and some bad ones. So a bad person
may (sometimes, in some respects) have a good will, and a good person may (sometimes, in some respects) have a bad will. For example,
the merchant who, out of prudence and with a self-serving aim, adopts
the maxim of dealing honestly with his customers, still has a good will
as far as that maxim is concerned. But if his maxims are generally
self-serving, then on the whole he would doubtless be a bad man, and
would even have (on the whole) a bad will. We must not think that
because he is a bad man on the whole, his will regarding this maxim is
a bad will, as long as his maxim does indeed conform to morality.
Moreover, a merchant who also had the maxim (or meta-maxim)
of adopting maxims in conformity with the moral law for the sake
of the law (GMS, 390) would have on the whole a better will than
this merchant, who adopts the dutiful maxim from prudential considerations. Even this latter merchant, however, would still not be acting
from duty in cases where prudential considerations gave him sufficient
grounds for following the maxim of honesty, since no self-constraint
would be needed in those cases to get him to follow the maxim of
honest dealing. Thus we should not confuse acting from duty with
acting for the sake of the law. Nor should we think that anyone who
is honest, or beneficent on principle (as distinct from being honest out
of prudence or beneficent out of sympathetic inclination) is thereby
acting from duty. Such thoughts, which are admittedly all too easy to
entertain, misconstrue what Kant means by acting from duty and
contribute to many common confusions about what he is saying in the
opening pages of the First Section of the Groundwork.
A good will must also be distinguished from a persons good character or virtue, which is the strength of the persons character in act(this is especially obvious in the case of a holy will, but might be true in the case of a
finite human will wherever its conformity on principle to the moral law comes about
without the need for self-constraint through respect for the law). If that is right, then
an absolutely good will might exemplify the properly (truly, genuinely, authentically,
pre-eminently) moral good, yet without acting from duty. In the First Section, however, Kant never considered the case of the absolutely good will, so he took no position on this. All the cases he considered had to do with the conformity of particular
actions to particular duties or dutiful maxims. In those cases, it was only through
exhibiting self-constraint through respect for the law (acting from duty) that the
properly moral good could be exemplified.
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ing on good maxims (MdST, 408 f.). Good character implies a certain
good will, which is why Kant speaks of the two together in Section
One of the Groundwork (GMS, 393; 398); but as he makes explicit
elsewhere, a good will can co-exist with lack of virtue, when a person
adopts good principles, but is too fragile or weak of character to carry
them out reliably (RGV, 29; GMS, 407 f.). Goodness of will might also
be combined with a serious lack of wisdom or judgment, so that the
actions performed may even be contrary to the good principles that
make the will good. In both these ways, a person with a good will can
be a person who often does what is morally wrong. When it forms
part of a syndrome of moral weakness or bad moral judgment, the
good will (the adoption of good principles) might be thought to lose
some of its goodness, and to be itself less good than it would be when
found in a person of greater virtue and moral wisdom. The more we
reflect on this point, the more reason we might find to doubt that Kant
is even correct in regarding the good will as good without limitation.
But even if we do doubt the unlimited goodness of the will on these
grounds, that doubt need not call into question the fundamental values on which Kantian ethics rests: the autonomy of reason, the universal self-legislation of the rational will, the dignity of rational nature as
an end in itself.
The fact that goodness of will is an abstraction that all of us
doubtless have a good will in some respects and a bad will in others
may account for the fact that in the early pages of the Groundwork
Kant chooses to narrow his focus from the good will to the special
case of acting from duty. For every instance of acting from duty displays a good will, even though the converse of this does not hold, and
acting from duty also displays a good will under adverse or trying circumstances (under certain subjective limitations and hindrances,
as Kant puts it) so that in acting from duty the good will shows itself
with a kind of special heroism not present in many cases of the good
will (the adverse circumstances elevate it by contrast and let it shine
forth all the more brightly.) For the same reason, Kant prefers the
person who acts from duty to the one who is dutiful from prudence
or inclination only in the sense that the person who acts from duty is
due greater esteem, not in the sense that we should prefer to be like
him in the sense of being in his (adverse and unfortunate) situation.
All too many readers of the Groundwork probably because they do
not distinguish the question Who is most morally admirable? from
the question Whom would I most want to be like? have badly misread what Kant is saying here, as though he thought we should prefer
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our actions for any actual or possible ends given independently of the
imperative itself. More precisely, however, a categorical imperative rationally directs us not so much to do certain things, as to adopt and
act on certain principles (maxims), which may in turn include or entail
the performance of certain actions, or the setting of certain ends. The
basic effect of a categorical imperative, therefore, is to declare certain
maxims of action binding on us irrespective of their relation to any
independently given ends, or therefore, of their relation to any consequences (good or bad) of acting on them.
The will, as we have seen above, is for Kant the rational faculty of
practical principles. That is, it is the faculty through which a rational being gives itself such principles, whether subjective principles (maxims)
or objective principles (laws). A will is good when its maxims accord
with the laws it gives itself. For a holy will, such as the divine will, there
are only objective principles, or else, what would come to the same
thing, its subjective principles or maxims are necessarily identical to
the objective principles it rationally legislates to itself. (This is why no
rational commands or imperatives apply to such a will.) For a finite and
imperfect will, however, goodness of will consists in the contingent and
voluntary accord between its maxims and its laws. In other words, as
we have already seen, what makes a good will good are its principles,
or, in the case of a finite and imperfect will, its maxims.
Now there are two possible ways in which maxims, hence wills,
might be considered good. They might be good (at least in part) because of the consequences of acting on them, hence good relative to
certain independently given ends. Or they might be good simply in
themselves, irrespective of any such consequences or their conduciveness to any independently given ends. In the former case, the goodness of the good will itself would necessarily be increased if its consequences were good, and diminished if its consequences were bad
(relative to those ends).
According to Kants unconditionality thesis, however, and the nondiminishability and nonincreasability theses that follow from it, the
goodness of the good will is unaffected by its consequences, whether
these be good or bad. Therefore, the maxims constituting the goodness of a will are not good only relative to certain consequences or independently given ends, but must be regarded as good in themselves,
irrespective of their consequences or the effect of these consequences
for any independently given ends. That means that the principle that
specifies which maxims are good must not do so by reference to any
independently given ends, but only by regarding certain maxims as
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Other works
W. D. Ross, Kants Ethical Theory: A commentary on the Grundlegung zur
Metaphysik der Sitten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954),
Christoph Horn
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As an interpreter of section (a), one has to make sense of the fact that
Kant, as I already mentioned, surprisingly hopes to support his view on
good will by such an unclear argument anyway. Concerning the crucial
section (b), some important questions one would like to ask Kant may
be these: What precise type of teleology is it that he has in mind? How
can Kant hope to defend his idea of good will by a kind of doctrine
which must be, in his own eyes, obscure and illegitimate? Why does he
introduce such serious and far-reaching claims in such a superficial and
provisionary way? How would Kant legitimize what we called the principle of suitability? Apparently, he does nothing at all here to make it
plausible. Further questions are: Is it really convincing to say that the
natural dispositions of each animal are indications of the goal or end
towards which it is directed? What may be a typical example for such
a natural goal? Who or what constituted this goal? Do there exist biological species for the sake of this end? Are men determined by nature
to follow these alleged ends? Or is it rather a sort of natural inclination
which humans feel with regard to such ends? Hence, are we capable of
choosing to act contrary to nature, and is Kant demanding us not to
do so, but to follow our true nature? If that were the case, we would
have to accuse him of committing a naturalistic fallacy. Next, we have
to raise the question of which natural dispositions of biological species
may be regarded, from a teleological point of view, as relevant or telling. What does count here as important? Would it be persuasive to ask
why men possess a cecum? It is a well-known problem of Aristotelian
teleology that in describing biological species, e. g. humans, it takes
into consideration no more than few selected features, called proper
features (idia) and leaves out all the others.2
Apparently, there are more or less dysfunctional features or dispositions to be found in biological species. But given this fact, couldnt
it also be true that human reason has been generated by nature without any goal, namely as being produced at random or as a feature
which has been useful under former environmental conditions which
nowadays no longer persist? To put the same point in a slightly different way: Why should one consider humans as a biological species
having this or that set of natural characteristics? Wouldnt it be more
attractive to separate the biological and cultural features of humanity,
and to put practical reason primarily on the second side? As a consequence of this, doesnt it seem more persuasive to assume that human goals always exist in a culture-dependent context and that all are,
2
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rightly indicate that Kant is in a sort of dilemma: Kant himself permits that reason can be appropriately used as an instrument to support our needs and interests, but at the same time, he suggests it to be
a non-instrumental power which exercises a profound moral influence
on human will. 3
Concerning section (d), there are some further questions to be
added. The most important one may be: why should the influence of
practical reason generate the good will which has been characterized,
some pages before, as the only good without restriction? What kind of
impact does Kant have in mind when he claims that practical reason
is able to produce a good will? One of the difficulties which this claim
raises is how a good will can be said to be a goal anyway. Is it the kind
of object someones actions can be directed to in the same sense as it
is the case with happiness? Can it serve as a goal in the way in which
the majority of ancient and medieval philosophers meant happiness
to be a goal, namely as a final end? Suppose that this is what Kant
wants to tell us. How can, then, our natural dispositions indicate such
a moral end? If it were correct to say that a naturalistic argument is
not appropriate to challenge morals, why should it be suitable to support a moral point of view? A further question of some importance is
why Kant takes into consideration only these two possible fi nal ends,
as if such an alternative was exhaustive, and why he takes them to be,
at least in this sense, mutually exclusive. We find no explicit justification for these claims in our text.
The list of problems seems so overwhelming that there remains little hope to making sense of our passage. A simple strategy to acquit
Kant on all these points is, now, to suppose that he did not ground
his teleological considerations on his own philosophical position, but
reacted on the convictions of some unnamed adversaries. By this line
of interpretation, it would be superfluous to ascribe to him such a
strange position. At least prima facie, it looks promising to claim that
Kant simply argues on the basis of a view adopted in this context and
for the sake of argument. At the beginning of our text, Kant seems to
say that he is merely testing the idea of a good will in the light of teleological assumptions: Hence we will put this idea [i. e. that of a good
will] to the test from this point of view [i. e. teleological thinking]
(GMS, 395,13). Taken this way, what we have in our text would be an
argument ad personam, not Kants own position. And in fact, if one
compares our text with some passages to be found in his handwritten
3
51
This and other interesting accounts of the sources and implicit presuppositions of
our passage are provided by Forschner (1988 and 1989).
Cf. Ak. 8.19,234: Nature does nothing in vein and is not sumptuous in using the
means towards its ends (Die Natur tut nmlich nichts berflssig und ist im Gebrauche der Mittel zu ihren Zwecken nicht verschwenderisch).
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the same way as the generation of the moral attitude does. Leaving
the differences between our two texts aside, it is remarkable that the
text quoted from the Idea confirms that Kant considers nature to be a
kind of quasi-divine power developing a rational plan for all biological species and providing them even if in an extremely parsimonious
way the means necessary for their survival and their happiness.
Before we come to the question of Kants overall view of teleology,
I would like to re-examine the problem of the possible adversaries of
our passage in the GMS. As I already mentioned, one crucial problem
of our text consists in the fact that it doesnt really contribute to the
analytical line of argument which leads, in GMS I, from common rational moral cognition, centered around the concept of a good will, to
the philosophical moral cognition, focused on the idea of a categorical imperative. Now, one of the possible explanations for Kants introduction of teleology could be that he thought of certain adversaries
which he wanted to refute in this very context. Who may be the philosophers that Kant perhaps had in mind? What makes this question
difficult to answer is that these adversaries have to defend two different claims which do not fit very well together. The first is that nature
does nothing in vain, since it is a divine order, and that our natural
dispositions are indicators of our natural goal. The second is that man
is determined by nature to strive for happiness which seems to be understood in a hedonistic and instinct-guided way. Whereas the former
seems typical for intellectualist conceptions of teleology such as that
of Aristotle and the Stoics, the latter belongs to the tradition of Epicurean philosophy. But as is well known, the former is not hedonistic,
and the latter is strictly a-teleological. Therefore Forschners solution
which I already mentioned regains, at least temporarily, a certain attractivity. It may seem as if Kant had in mind the Neo-Epicurean bon
sauvage-philosophers Helvtius, LaMettrie, and Mandeville.
There is, however, a major obstacle for Forschners identification
of Kants adversaries. When Kant characterizes the kind of happiness which they have in mind he makes use of the terms preservation (Erhaltung) and welfare (Wohlergehen, GMS, 395,89). If
these authors were hedonists, Kant should have spoken of pleasure
or lust. Preservation and welfare are not subjective mental states, but
clearly objective goods. The absence of a hedonistic and subjective
vocabulary and the occurrence of the key word preservation makes
it highly plausible that the actual Kantian adversaries are the Stoics. The ancient Stoics described self-preservation (sustasis heautou,
conservatio sui) as one of the provisional primary goods of nature,
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9
10
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55
For our purpose it is interesting that the whole autobiographical passage in the Phaedo seems to be devoted to the introduction of a new
and revolutionary way of explaining the natural world: by teleological explanation.11 Apparently, there is little distance between this Socratic teleological thought and the principle of suitability which Kant
formulates as follows (GMS, 395,47):
In the natural predispositions of an organized being, i. e., a being arranged
purposively for life, we assume as a principle that no instrument is to be
encountered in it for any end except that which is the most suitable to and
appropriate for it.
Nevertheless, we find one major difference between the principle developed in the Phaedo and the Kantian formula: Kant restricts his
principle to living organisms. These are said to have instruments
which are organized in the best way possible. There is no such restriction in Platos writings and his Socrates does not confine the principle
11
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57
One should not mistake this last distinction for that which exists
between extrinsic and intrinsic forms of teleology: An entity or event
can be said to be a passive or insensitive part of a teleological process
since it may not dispose of any inner perspective or internal dimension (regardless whether it is a means or an end of the process), or it
can be described as having an inner principle of striving or aiming
at a goal. Darwinism explains teleological elements of nature in the
first way: e. g. a skeleton of an extinct species may help a palaeontologist to decide if the animals under consideration lived in terrestrial or
aquatic habitats; the teeth may provide evidence of whether these animals were carnivores or herbivores. The Darwinist background conviction is that animals are highly suited to meet the challenges of their
specific environments; but of course, adaptation is nothing but a result of arbitrary mutation and selection under competitive conditions.
Aristotelianism traditionally assumes that natural entities, especially
animals, follow internal impulses connected with their essence which
stimulate them to go for their natural goals, whereas Darwinism even
interprets inner impulses as consequences of an adaptation to the outer environment.
Nearby this dichotomy lies another one of no less importance: One
may discern cases of intentional teleology, when we attribute to an
entity a mental, conscious, or even rational anticipation of its goal,
from cases of non-intentional or functional teleology. Instead of intentional teleology, one could also speak of personal teleology. But
perhaps it would make more sense to reserve this distinction for the
dichotomy between a teleological structure designed by a personal,
intelligent demiurge or creator (as in Platos Timaeus) and an impersonal cause of purposiveness in nature. Of course, this last distinction
is that between theological and a-theological forms of teleology. An
additional distinction of high importance for Kant is that between an
objective and a subjective concept of purposiveness: Kant calls a teleological relation objective if it has an object as its end or target. It
does not play any role if the object under consideration is generated or
if it is only modified or affected by the effect directed on it. Accordingly, he characterizes a teleological structure as subjective if there
is no orientation towards an object but only an effect on the subject
which feels the purposiveness of its organization. This is the case in
aesthetic experience where the spectator of art or nature is, following
Kant, confronted with the well-organized structure of his cognitive
abilities. And a final Kantian dichotomy is that between formal and
material (or real) purposiveness. We are confronted with a formal sort
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59
of texts of his critical period. With regard to the first, Kant feels it necessary to deal with natural teleology since, with regard to nature, the
common spectator (not only the pre-modern one) gets the impression
that everything is well-ordered and wisely coordinated: every natural
species possesses its ecological niche, i. e. its separate habitat, its food
and shelter, its ways to defend itself or to get itself to safety, its way of reproduction and of raising its descendants; even if one species is instrumentalizing the other for survival, no one seems to definitively destroy
the other. Also humans are provided by nature with all the capacities,
skills, and means which are indispensable for their lives. But even more
impressive is the inner structure of an organism: as we already saw,
Kant describes it as a structure of reciprocity and interrelatedness. It is
a whole organized under one concept where the parts are interdependent towards each other as being both and simultaneously means and
ends, causes and effects. Do all these observations provide evidence
for a highly organized universe? No, for Kant, the teleology of nature
isnt something objective and real. But does that mean that it must be
traced back to the ways in which we see and interpret nature? Does it
reflect a merely subjective way of explanation following our way of understanding human behavior? Kant claims that teleology in nature lies
beyond the dichotomy of objectivism and subjectivism. He considers
organisms as purposes and thinks that man as the end for the sake of
which universe has been designed without neglecting that organic life
and humans are natural species among other natural species, endowed
with some extraordinary abilities, but lacking of many others.
It is even harder to answer the second question: Are we justified in
assuming purposiveness in human history? Are most of the historical
events and processes contingent ones, or do we find convincing examples for what one might call meaning in history, i. e. for comprehensive structures and ordering principles? Is there some sort of divine
providence at stake in history, or at least certain lines of development
and progress? The spectator may come to deeply different conclusions:
She may get the skeptical impression first formulated by Thucydides
that, since human nature is constant and changeless, historical disasters and successes, catastrophes and achievements will always follow
the same rules. Or she will share the enlightenment idea of a moral
progress or cultural development, at least in the centuries of which
we have historical knowledge. Undoubtedly, for Kant, there is some
evidence for a progress towards a human progress in society, economics, national and transnational politics etc. He thinks that nature is
organized in a way that forces humans to develop their talents and
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Cf. KpV, 59: nihil appetimus nisi sub ratione boni, nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione
mali. See on this point Herman (1993) ch. 9.
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15
Cf. GMS,415,28416,1: There is one end, however, that one can presuppose as
actual for all rational beings [] and thus one aim that they can not merely can
have, but of which one can safely presuppose that without exception they do have t
in accordance with a natural necessity, and that is the aim at happiness. The hypothetical imperative that represents the practical necessity of the action as a means
to furthering happiness is assertoric. One may expound it as necessary not merely
to an uncertain, merely possible aim, but to an aim that one can presuppose safely
and a priori with every human being, because it belongs to its essence.
Cf. Moralphilosophie Collins: Ak. 27/1. 344.
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be vindicated on the basis of practical teleology. Already in his writing On the Use (1788), Kant expresses this line of thought. Teleology taken in its practical meaning, i. e. morality, is forced, according
to this essay, to realize its purposes. Hence it is not allowed to neglect
that the necessary preconditions for this realization must be fulfilled.
These preconditions contain both the final causes (Endursachen) and
the supreme cause of the world (oberste Weltursache). Transcendental
Idealism therefore is able to guarantee the possibility of morals in the
natural world.16 As Kant says in the third Critique, man is the singular
being in the world which is forced to obey the moral law in following
its ends; hence, it must attribute freedom to itself and considers this
freedom even as its highest purpose; and, therefore, is a purpose-initself and represents the highest end of all nature:
Now we have in the world only a single sort of beings whose causality is
teleological, i. e. aimed at ends and yet at the same time so constituted
that the law in accordance with which they have to determine ends is
represented by themselves as unconditioned and independent of natural
conditions but yet as necessary in itself. The being of this sort is the human being, though considered as noumenon: the only natural being in
which we can nevertheless cognize, on the basis of its own constitution, a
supersensible faculty (freedom) and even the law of the causality together
with the object that it can set for itself as the highest end (the highest god
in the world).
Now of the human being (and thus of every rational being in the world),
as a moral being, it cannot be further asked why (quem in finem) it exists. His existence contains the highest end in itself, to which, as far as he
is capable, he can subject the whole of nature, or against which at least
he need not hold himself to be subjected by any influence from nature.
Now if things in the world, as dependent beings as far as their existence
is concerned, need a supreme cause acting in accordance with ends, then
the human being is the final end of creation; for without him the chain of
ends subordinated to one another would not be completely grounded; and
only in the human being, although in him only as a subject of morality, is
uncoditional legislation with regard to ends to be found, which therefore
16
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makes him alone capable of being a final end, to which the whole of nature is teleologically subordinated. (KU, 435,15436,2).
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III
Towards the end of our teleological passage, Kant makes this claim
about the relationship of good will and happiness (GMS, 396,2430):
This will may therefore not be the single or entire good, but it must be the
highest good, and the condition for all the rest, even for every demand
for happiness, in which case it can be divided with the wisdom of nature,
when one perceives that the culture of reason, which is required for the
former, limits in many ways the attainment of the second aim, which is
always conditioned, namely of happiness, at least in this life [].
We are familiar with the doctrine of the highest good developed here
in nuce from the more detailed version of the Critique of Practical
Reason (KpV, 10814): The summum bonum for human beings must
be conceived as a combination of morality and happiness in the sense
that morality is the end for the sake of which one should act, whereas
happiness is the reward that God distributes in the afterlife according
to someones worthiness to be happy. According to this view, it would
be morally inappropriate if one acted for the sake of his own happiness, but it would disappoint our natural inclinations if we couldnt
fulfill our desire for happiness. By combining morality as the end and
happiness as the reward and by setting happiness under the condition
of morality Kant escapes from the dilemma that either the demands
of moral law or our natural desires are missed. The first mistake is,
according to Kants account in the second Critique, that of Epicureanism, the second that of Stoicism. In our passage of the Groundwork,
we encounter of the first short drafts of this doctrine. It presupposes
far-reaching assumptions concerning the understanding of happiness,
and it entails a harsh criticism of eudaemonism in moral philosophy.
As we see from Kants remarks on happiness in the Groundwork, he
is fully conscious of these consequences.
In his pre-critical period, Kant himself defended a sort of eudaemonism which has been founded on a perfectionist account of human
life. We find this account e. g. in his General History of Nature and
Theory of Heaven (1755) where Kant claims that human happiness
consists in the future community with the infinite being; at that
point of his development, he believed that human nature is directed
towards its perfection. Nature thus prepares man for a perfect existence with God.17 A second stage of his thought on happiness might
17
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Other works
Ferrari, Jean (1979): Les sources franaises de la philosophie de Kant. Paris.
Forschner, Maximilian (1988): Moralitt und Glckseligkeit in Kants Reflexionen, in: Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung 42, 351370.
Forschner, Maximilian (1989): Guter Wille und Ha der Vernunft, in: O.
Hffe (ed.), Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein kooperativer
Kommentar, Frankfurt a. M., 4565.
Frank, Manfred and Zanetti, Vronique (1996): Immanuel Kant. Schriften
zur sthetik und Naturphilosophie, Frankfurt a. M.
Gallop, David (1975): Plato, Phaedo. Translated wit Notes, Oxford.
Guyer, Paul (2000): Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, Cambridge/New
York.
Guyer, Paul (2002): Ends of Reason and Ends of Nature: The Place of Teleology in Kants Ethics, in: The Journal of Value Inquiry 36, 161186.
Herman, Barbara (1993): The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge/
Mass.
Himmelmann, Beatrix (2003): Kants Begriff des Glcks, Berlin/New York.
Irwin, Terence H. (1996): Kants Criticism of Eudaemonism, in: S. Engstrom/J. Whiting, (edd.), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Cambridge, 63101.
Johnson, Monte Ransome (2005): Aristotle on Teleology, Cambridge.
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996): Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge/
New York.
Langthaler, Rudolf (1991): Kants Ethik als System der Zwecke. Perspektiven einer modifizierten Idee der moralischen Teleologie und Ethikotheologie, Berlin/New York.
Marc-Wogau, Konrad (21938): Vier Studien zu Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft.
Uppsala.
McFarland, J. D. (1970): Kants Concept of Teleology, Edinburgh.
McLaughlin, Peter (1990): Kants Critique of Teleology in Biological Explanation: Antinomy and Teleology, Lewiston.
Reich, Klaus (1935): Kant und die Ethik der Griechen, Tbingen.
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Schnecker, Dieter / Wood, Allen (2002): Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein einfhrender Kommentar, Paderborn u. a.
Shell, Susan Meld (2003): Kants True Economy of Human Nature, in:
B. Jacobs/P. Kain (edd.), Essays on Kants Anthropology, Cambridge,
194229.
Weidemann, Hermann (2001): Kants Kritik am Eudmonismus und die Platonische Ethik, in: Kant-Studien 92, 1937.
Marcia Baron
Thanks to Vann McGee for raising this question in conversation with me around
1977, when we were graduate students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
The thought is that actions done from admirable feeling are morally worthier, or at
least as morally worthy, as actions done from duty. Among the many people who
have so remarked are Annas (1984); Blum (1980); Oakley (1992); Sidgwick (1981,
223); Stocker (1976).
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My focus in this section will be (3), though (2) will enter into the discussion because the asymmetry contributes to the challenge of figuring out what it is that is much harder to notice. I shall assume that
Kant meant the comparison to be as he stated it, and so will preserve
5
75
the asymmetry.6 An answer to (1) will emerge in the course of the discussion, and evidence thought to support an alternative answer will be
assessed in Sects. 3 and 4.
Kant says it is much harder to notice this difference when the
agent has an immediate inclination to the action in question than
when the agent is getrieben by another inclination to perform the
action. This difference refers to his assertion that it is easy to distinguish whether the action in conformity with duty is done from duty
or from a self-seeking aim. 7 [Da lsst sich leicht unterscheiden, ob
die pflichtmssige Handlung aus Pflicht oder aus selbstschtiger Absicht geschehen sei.]
Let me first spell out an interpretation that I think incorrect, though
it is a natural reading (particularly if the sentences are read as isolated
sentences). According to this reading, Kant is saying that it is easy to
discern, for any action in conformity with duty and done from selfinterest, that it indeed was done from a self-serving purpose rather
than from duty; and it is harder to discern this if the action is one to
which the agent has an inclination. On this reading, what is harder (or
easier) to discern is the agents real motive. When Kant says that it is
harder to notice this difference, he means that whereas it is easy to
tell, if an action is done from self-interest, that it really is done from
self-interest rather than from duty, it is much harder to determine, if
an action is one to which the agent has an inclination, whether it is
done from duty.
This reading is implausible for at least three reasons. First, it is in
some tension with Kants discussion at the start of Section II (GMS,
407), where he emphasizes the impossibility of knowing for certain
our true motives. Second, even setting aside GMS, 407, it would be
uncharitable (and implausible) to attribute to Kant so silly a view
as that it is easy to detect that someone is acting from self-interest.
6
One reason for my assumption is that he clearly is marking the distinction between
aus Neigung and mit Neigung at GMS, 400, where he writes, Only that which is
connected with my will merely as a ground, never as an effect, only what does not
serve my inclination but outweighs it, or at least wholly excludes it from the reckoning in a choice, hence only the mere law for itself, can be an object of respect and
hence a command (italics added). The part I italicized allows for the possibility of
an inclination (though not necessarily a supporting inclination) being present yet
not influencing the decision.
It is troubling that Kant seems by this to be treating all actions done from immediate inclination as actions with a self-seeking aim. I will not here enter the debate on
whether Kant is a psychological hedonist with respect to all actions not done from
duty. For discussion of that question, see Reath (1989), Herman (2001), and Kerstein
(2002).
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I will not keep repeating immediate; the idea is simply that one has an inclination
to do the action in question, and immediate serves to contrast that with acting
from self-interest (or as Kant has it, a mediate inclination). Note too that my clumsy
wording is due, at least in part, to my efforts to preserve the asymmetry noted above.
Otherwise I would write acting from duty is easier to differentiate from acting from
self-interest than from acting from immediate inclination.
77
the headings of acting from duty and acting from inclination: doing it
because it merits it or because one should do it roughly, doing it from
duty and doing it because it is enjoyable, or because one feels like it.
What is clearly ruled out by doing it for its own sake is doing it from
some ulterior motive.
It makes sense, then, to claim, as Kant does, that acting from duty
is more sharply distinguished from acting from self-interest than from
acting from inclination.
Because acting from duty is readily conflated with acting from inclination, Kant needs to set things straight, explaining the difference
between acting from duty and acting from inclination. It is important
that his readers be clear on this difference, since otherwise they will
not understand what an unconditionally good will is (thinking perhaps
that it is something like benevolence), and are likely to get on entirely
the wrong track in thinking about what sort of principle guides such
a will. Without a firm understanding of the difference between acting
from duty and acting from inclination, they might think that a good
will could be determined by a heteronomous principle.9
My interpretation of GMS, 397, thus provides an answer to the
question of why Kant devotes so much more attention to actions done
from inclination than to actions done from self-interest. There is, he
thinks, very little tendency to confuse the idea of acting from self-interest with that of acting from duty, whereas acting from inclination
and acting from duty are less clearly distinct in his readers minds.
A different interpretation needs to be addressed. On this alternative interpretation, Kant is again saying that we, in effect, err, but in a
way that is significantly different from the way I suggested above. The
error, according to this alternative interpretation, is that of failing to
realize that doing X from duty is incompatible with being at the same
time inclined to do X. Kant is, on this reading, at pains to emphasize
the incompatibility between doing X from duty and being inclined
to do X. This reading is important to address at length, because it
has been the source of much antipathy to Kants ethics. Since actions
done from duty (and only actions done from duty) have moral worth,
having an inclination to do X, on this reading, prevents an action from
having moral worth. And that seems troubling. Why should the fact
that one has an inclination to do X preclude ones doing X from having moral worth?
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On my interpretation, Kants reason for attending so closely to actions to which the agent lacks any inclination (mediate or immediate) is
to bring home the difference between acting from duty and acting from
inclination, a difference less apparent than that between acting from
duty and acting from self-interest and a difference vital for understanding the idea of an unconditionally good will and why there is nothing except the universal lawfulness of the action in general that can
serve the will as its principle (GMS, 402). But as it is easy to suppose
that Kant instead is aiming to convince us that an action cannot count
as done from duty if one is also inclined so to act, I will devote the next
section to assessing evidence thought to support that reading.
3. Does Kant hold that an action to which one has an immediate inclination is thereby precluded from counting as done from duty (and
thus from having moral worth)?
Before we address this, a clarification is in order. The question
should not be confused with the following: Does Kant hold that an
action done from inclination cannot at the same time be done from
duty? I. e., does the fact that an action is done from inclination preclude
its also being done from duty? I believe the answer to this question is
Yes, but that the answer to the former question (that posed in the
previous paragraph) is No. One can act from duty mit Neigung but
cannot act aus Pflicht und Neigung.10 Some resist this distinction between (a) acting from duty, where one also has an inclination to do the
action in question, and (b) acting from both duty and inclination. They
claim that to have an inclination is by definition to be moved, at least
a little, to act accordingly. That being the case, they argue, one cannot
be inclined to do X, and then do X, without doing X at least partly from
the inclination. But the definitional claim is not one to which Kant
would, or should, accede. It presupposes a different (and less robust)
view of agency than he holds. His picture is not a mechanistic one of in10
As I explain in Baron (1995, Ch. 5), and more recently in Overdetermined Actions and Imperfect Duties (forthcoming), I do not consider this to be an embarrassment for Kant and his defenders. I think it is correct to say that one in fact
cannot do X simultaneously from duty and inclination, if by doing X from duty
we mean doing it because it is morally required. I also note in Overdetermined
Actions Allen Woods suggestion (primarily by e-mail and in conversation, but
briefly indicated in Wood (1999, 44) that acting from duty should be understood
more broadly, to include not only doing X because it is morally required but any
action that is the result of self-constraint through moral considerations. Thus understood, acting from duty and inclination might indeed be possible. I do not believe, however, that this conception of self-constraint is Kants, for reasons I briefly
indicate in that essay.
79
Of course it would be very hard to know that one has not acted from that inclination, but that is a different matter. (And clearly the fact that I cannot tell whether
I have acted from a motive I have when I do X is no reason to conclude that I must
have done so.)
For more on the distinction between acting mit Neigung and acting aus Neigung,
see my Freedom, Frailty, and Impurity (1993), a discussion of some issues in Allison, Kants Theory of Freedom (1990). Allison replies in the same issue, and his
article is reprinted in Allison (1996). See also Baron (1995, 151 f.). For a sustained
argument that it makes no sense to suppose that one can act mit Neigung without acting aus Neigung (an argument that I will not be able to address here), see
Latham (1994).
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tion done from duty excludes inclination, and that it is consistent with
the agent being inclined so to act. (It is also compatible with the view
that an action can be done from both duty and inclination, though in
fact I do not think that Kant holds that to be possible.)12
Let me expand on why Kants choice of examples does not show
that he believes that an action from duty excludes inclination.13 Consider how he sets up his examples. He speaks first of people so sympathetically attuned that, even without any other motive of vanity or
utility to self, they take an inner gratification in spreading joy around
them, and can take delight in the contentment of others insofar as it is
their own work. In such a case, he asserts, the action [] has no
true moral worth for its maxim lacks moral content (GMS, 398). He
then asks us to imagine that the mind of that same friend of humanity
were clouded over with his own grief, extinguishing all his sympathetic
participation in the fate of others, thus emphasizing that the motives
available to him earlier are now no longer available to him. We are
asked to suppose that now, where no inclination any longer stimulates
him to it, he tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the
action without any inclination, solely from duty; only then does it for
the first time have its authentic moral worth (GMS, 398). The example brings to the fore that unless he acts from duty, his action lacks
moral worth, no matter how beneficial the action and how amiable the
12
13
GMS, 400, provides strong evidence that Kant does not believe that to be possible: An action from duty is supposed entirely to abstract from [absondern] the
influence of inclination. The evidence is strong but not quite decisive. It is a little
unclear what absondern means here, and for that reason the evidence is not decisive, but it is difficult to imagine anything absondern might mean that would not
entail that Kant believes an action cannot be done from both duty and inclination.
Some additional evidence comes just before GMS, 402: Nothing other than the
representation of the law in itself, which obviously occurs only in the rational being
insofar as it, and not the hoped-for effect, is the determining ground of the will,
therefore constitutes that so pre-eminent good which we call moral. The relevance
of this passage is apparent if we assume that that so pre-eminent good which we
call moral is equivalent to moral worth, and bear in mind that an action has moral
worth if and only if it is done from duty (GMS, 398). Additional evidence comes
from recognizing what it is to act from duty for Kant, and more generally, what
the relation is between incentives and action on Kants view of agency. Since the
incentive does not operate as a mechanical force, and instead as a reason, to say
that someone acts from both duty and from x is to say that duty alone is not the sole
reason for which he acts. But some explanation is needed here as to why it is not the
sole reason, and I can think of no explanation that avoids attributing to the agent an
insufficient regard for the fact that the action in question is ones duty. Acting from
duty is incompatible with acting from desire, since it involves regarding duty as a
less than decisive consideration. I explain this more fully in Baron (1995, Ch. 5) and
in Baron (forthcoming). See also Allison (1990, Ch. 6).
This paragraph and the following two paragraphs overlap with Baron (1995, 148 f.).
81
inclination. (It also is designed to remove any doubt that we have this
incentive the motive of duty and that it can be effective even in the
absence of any cooperating inclination.)
Dissenters those claiming that Kant holds that one cannot act from
duty mit Neigung charge that for the first time, in the sentence just
quoted, makes it plain that Kant is saying that the mans action lacks
moral worth unless he has no inclination to it. The only way around it,
they claim, is to take the liberty of inserting into the proposition the
qualification that it is the first time we can know that an action has
moral worth (Baker, 1986, 460).14 But as Barbara Herman points out,
it matters that Kant is not speaking at the end of his example (at GMS,
398, 513) of a different person from the one described earlier in the
example. He is not comparing two people, one who acts from inclination, and another who lacks inclination and acts from duty. He is saying
of someone who formerly acted on others behalf from inclination and
not from duty that only now, when the inclination to act on their behalf
is not available, does his action of aiding them have moral worth. Herman explains: Of him it is [] said: only when the inclination to help
others is not available does his helping action have moral worth. For of
him it was true that when he had the inclination he did not act from the
motive of duty (Herman, 1993, 1819). Kants use of first does not
signify that only when one acts without inclination does the persons
action have moral worth. He is saying of someone who, when he acts
with inclination, does not act from duty, that only when he lacks the inclination to help others does his action of helping have moral worth, for
only then does he act from duty. So the critics are wrong to claim that
if we are to reject the if inclinations, no moral worth interpretation,
we have to insert the qualification that only now can we know that an
action has moral worth.
But what about the end of GMS, 398, where Kant writes, if nature
had put little sympathy at all in the heart of this or that person, []
nevertheless would he not find a source within himself to give himself a far higher worth than that which a good-natured temperament
might have? This looks bad for those of us who hope to avoid the if
inclinations, no moral worth interpretation. For is not Kant saying
here that those who lack sympathy are able to give themselves a far
higher worth than are those whom nature has endowed with plenty of sympathy? The idea, apparently, is that only the person lacking sympathy, or a heartfelt inclination to help others, can act from
14
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Marcia Baron
16
I am modifying Schillers suggestion only slightly. It went like this (Schiller, 1981,
221):
Scruples of Conscience
I like to serve my friends, but unfortunately I do it with inclination
And so often I am bothered by the thought that I am not virtuous.
Decision
There is no other way but this! You must seek to despise them,
And do with repugnance what duty bids you.
I am using, with very slight alteration, Allen Woods translation of the passage. See
Wood (1999, 28). For a discussion of Schillers differences with Kant on duty and
inclination, see Reiner (1983).
One might argue that Kants view is that one is always capable of doing ones duty,
not that one is always capable of acting from duty. I will not try to address that possibility here.
83
and hindrances inclinations that conflict with duty make the good
will more evident. It should come as no surprise, then, that in each of
Kants examples, the agents inclinations hinder rather than help the
agent to act as morality requires. That they do should not be taken to
entail that inclinations, and affect in general, are always or typically,
in Kants view, moral hindrances.17
Kants discussion and commendation in Kritik der praktischen
Vernunft of a method of isolation further buttress this explanation
of his inclusion, in each example, of subjective hindrances to doing
ones duty. He likens the philosopher who arranges an experiment to
distinguish the moral (pure) determining ground from the empirical,
to the chemist (KpV, 92). Later in the same work he writes that the purity of the moral principle [] can be clearly shown only by removing
from the incentive of the action everything which people might count
as a part of happiness (KpV, 156, substituting people for men).
4. The arguments presented thus far undermine support for the claim
that Kant holds that an action cannot be done from duty (and thus cannot have moral worth) if the agent is inclined so to act. Can we do better
than that? Is there evidence that Kant in fact does hold that an action
can be done from duty even when the agent is inclined so to act? I believe that GMS 397 provides very strong evidence, though not as decisive as I used to take it to be. After saying that it is easy to distinguish
whether the action in conformity with duty is done from duty or from
a self-seeking aim in the case of an action to which the agent has no
immediate inclination but is driven to it [] through another inclination, Kant says that it is much harder to notice this difference where
the action is in conformity with duty and the subject yet has besides this
an immediate inclination to it. I reasoned that if absence of inclination
were necessary for the action to qualify as an action done from duty,
it would not be difficult at all to know whether an action to which the
agent had an inclination was done from duty. It would be clear that it
was not done from duty. Since Kant is quite explicit in saying that it is
not clear, it cannot be the case that absence of inclination to X is necessary for X to qualify as an action done from duty.18
17
18
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Marcia Baron
19
ing from Duty for Allen Woods edition of Groundwork, I registered some doubt
(Baron, 2002, n. 4).
Additional evidence can be found in the Tugendlehre. Since Kant emphasizes in
that work the importance of cultivating various sentiments, it would be odd if he
held that if we have sentiments that support doing what is in fact our duty sentiments that would incline one to so act we cannot act from duty.
85
It seems clear that a merely permissible action could not qualify.20 One
cannot from duty alone perform a merely permissible action; one can
do X from duty only if it is ones duty, and an action that is merely permissible is not required, hence not ones duty. Someone might retort,
What if it is the only permissible action in those circumstances?
Then it would not be merely permissible. I used merely to indicate
that it is not, in addition to being permissible, morally required or
even recommended. Another possible retort: What if what one does
is merely permissible, but there are only a few permissible actions
open to one under the circumstances? Does one not act from duty in
performing this action, since one has made a point of refraining from
doing something impermissible, and has done so from duty? Here
it seems the correct thing to say is that what one does from duty is
refrain from performing the impermissible action. One does not act
from duty in opting for this particular permissible action.
What, then, about (2)? It is tempting to say this: an act of helping
another is not ones duty, either. It is not a duty to help here and now,
or to practice violin here and now or, indeed, ever. I could take up a
different musical instrument, or develop my talents in entirely different ways, learning a new foreign language or improving my rusty German, rereading great novels I have not read in thirty years, jogging
daily, taking an astronomy course, and so on. If permissible actions
20
Unless, perhaps, one mistakenly thought it was morally required; but I will not
consider that possibility here.
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Marcia Baron
cannot be done from duty, the same would seem to be true of individual acts of helping others or of developing ones talents.
Such actions are of an interesting ilk. Each such action is of a type
which, in very general terms, is required, but the action itself is not itself required.21 I am not morally required to help at every opportunity
nor to develop my talents as much or as often as possible much less
to do so with respect to every talent I either have or might, with effort,
come to have. The acts described in (2) are not strictly required, but
are not merely permissible, either. They fall under principles of imperfect duty. Kant so categorizes them in Grundlegung, and though he
does not explain the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties
until later, in Metaphysik der Sitten, it is clear from the Grundlegung
that then (as well as later), he viewed actions such as helping another
not to be, as isolated actions, strictly required. We are required to
help others, and to develop our talents, but how much (and how) cannot be specified.22 Framed differently: the maxims of helping others,
and of perfecting ourselves, are obligatory, and we cannot have those
maxims without adopting some more specific maxims that instantiate
the very general ones; but we have considerable latitude as to which
particular specific maxims we adopt.
As they are not strictly required, it is hard to understand how they
could possibly qualify as actions done from duty. Yet we know from
GMS, 398, that Kant does think it possible to help others from duty.
The best explanation is that acts of helping another count, for Kant,
as acts done from duty insofar as the agent adopts from duty a maxim
of helping others. The subsidiary maxims the maxims instantiating
that maxim are also adopted from duty, and thus helping S, if one
does so not for the pleasure of helping, or because one loves to be
with S, but because it is morally incumbent on us to help one another,
counts as an action from duty.
Another way to explain it is as follows: acts of helping another are
not, severally, morally required, but because they are of a type that
is morally required, one can help others from duty. (The same holds
for arranging to have violin lessons, practicing violin, etc.) In this way
they are quite unlike merely permissible actions, and fairly similar to
21
22
I am ignoring here what I believe are exceptions (though Kant does not say that
they are): aiding where the need is grave and the aid needed is easy for the agent to
provide. See Baron (forthcoming).
This is clear both from his remarks at GMS, 421, and in the fact that the Categorical
Imperative applies differently to imperfect duties than to perfect duties. For further
discussion, see Baron (1995), Baron (forthcoming), Hill (1971), and Hill (2002).
87
at least some perfect duties. I have a duty not to lie to others, but just
how I fulfill this is, to some degree, up to me. Just as my duty to help
others may be discharged in many ways, my duty not to lie to others
can be discharged in a number of ways. Admittedly it is not exactly
the same; there is less latitude in the latter than in the former; but the
difference is not as huge as is sometimes supposed.23 I might discharge
the duty not to lie by telling the truth (though this avenue may not
be open to me if, say, it entails divulging anothers secret), by deftly
changing the subject, or saying something outrageous at just the right
time so as to distract or disarm my interlocutor, or more straightforwardly by indicating that I do not want to discuss that topic (though
if the timing is not quite right, this may amount to giving the answer
away, something I may be obliged not to do).
But are they really so unlike merely permissible actions? The situation seems fairly similar to the case where there are, in a particular
situation, only a few permissible actions; it is my duty to opt for one of
those in order to avoid doing what is impermissible. The difference
is this: the maxims of the merely permissible actions are not instantiations of a general maxim which is itself obligatory (except at a very
abstract level: do not do what is impermissible). They have in common
only that they are not impermissible. Unlike acts of helping others, or
of developing ones talents, they are not attached to an obligatory end.
6. Reflection on these sorts of cases leads to the thought that perhaps there is something askew in asking whether an individual action
is done from duty or not. Although Kant does indeed use the word
Handlung, which suggests individual actions, acting from duty is really a matter of acting a certain way, not performing this action from
this motive. It concerns conduct over time, conduct guided by certain
maxims. Likewise, moral worth seems to reside not primarily in individual actions, but in conduct and more specifically, in the maxims,
or principles, by which one conducts ones life.
That moral worth does not reside primarily in individual actions is
evident in Kants second proposition: an action from duty has its
moral worth not in the aim that is supposed to be attained by it, but
23
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Marcia Baron
89
90
Marcia Baron
it is clear that the actions really are done from duty, Kant builds into
the case that the agent is not inclined to so act.
Actions done from duty differ from actions that otherwise resemble
them in that the maxims of the former have moral content. Exactly what
this means is not spelled out very fully in Grundlegung, and readers interested in this question would do well to read Part I of Religion.24 But it
is clear that what differentiates them is not that actions from inclination
spring from one sort of motive, and actions from duty spring from another;25 rather, the idea is that only actions from duty are guided by a commitment to doing whatever morality requires.26 Just as understanding, wit,
the power of judgment, and like talents of the mind, though good and
to be wished for can also become evil if the will that is to make use
of [them ] is not good (GMS, 393) likewise, inclinations such as fellowfeeling need to be guided by a commitment to doing what is right. 27
Literature
Kants writings
Kants writings will be cited according to the pagination of Kants gesammelte
Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: deGruyter, 1902).
GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA, IV
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (2002), Wood, Allen W.
(ed., trans.), New Haven, Yale University Press.
KpV
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AA, V
The Critique of Practical Reason (1956; 3rd ed.1993), Beck, Lewis
White (ed., trans.), New York, Macmillan Publishing Co.
MdST Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Metaphysische Anfangsgrnde der Tugendlehre , AA,VI
The Metaphysics of Morals, Part II (1996) in Gregor, Mary J. (ed.,
trans.): Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
RGV Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, AA,VI
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1998) in Wood, Allen / di Giovanni, George (eds., trans.): Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
24
25
26
27
91
Other Works
Allison, Henry E. (1990): Kants Theory of Freedom, New York, Cambridge
University Press.
Allison, Henry E. (1996): Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kants Theoretical and Practical Philosophy, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Allison, Henry E. (2001): Ethics, Evil, and Anthropology in Kant: Remarks
on Allen Woods Kants Ethical Thought, Ethics 111, 594613.
Annas, Julia (1984): Personal Love and Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest, Philosophy and Literature 8, 1531, reprinted in Badhwar, Neera Kapur (ed.)
(1993): Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, Ithaca, Cornell University
Press.
Baker, Judith (1986): Do Ones Motives Have to Be Pure? in Grandy, Richard / Warner, Richard (eds.): Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, London, Oxford University Press.
Baron, Marcia (1993): Freedom, Frailty, and Impurity, Inquiry 36, 431
441.
Baron, Marcia (1995): Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Baron, Marcia (2002): Acting from Duty, in Wood, Allen W. (ed.): Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, New Haven, Yale University Press, 92
110, published (2004) in German as Handeln aus Pflicht, in Ameriks, Karl
/ Sturma, Dieter (eds.): Kants Ethik, Paderborn, Mentis Verlag, 8097.
Baron, Marcia (forthcoming): Overdetermined Actions, Imperfect Duties,
and Moral Worth, in Klemme, Heiner F. / Khn, Manfred / Schnecker,
Dieter (eds.): Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag.
Blum, Lawrence (1980): Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Denis, Lara (2000): Kants Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy, Kantian Review 4, 4873.
Guyer, Paul (1993): Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Henson, Richard G. (1979): What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth
and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action, Philosophical Review 88,
3954.
Herman, Barbara (1993): The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Herman, Barbara (2001): Rethinking Kants Hedonism, in Byrne, Alex /
Stalnaker, Robert / Wedgwood, Ralph (eds.): Fact and Value: Essays on
Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson, Cambridge, MA, MIT
Press.
Hill, Thomas E., Jr. (1971): Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation,
Kant-Studien 62, 5576, reprinted in Hill (1992): Dignity and Practical
Reason in Kants Moral Theory, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Hill, Thomas E., Jr. (2002): Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Kerstein, Samuel J. (2002): Kants Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
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Korsgaard, Christine M. (1989): Kants Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Foundations I, The Monist 72, 311340, reprinted in Korsgaard
(1996): Creating the Kingdom of Ends, New York, Cambridge University
Press.
Latham, Noa (1994): Causally Irrelevant Reasons and Action Solely from
the Motive of Duty, Journal of Philosophy 94, 599618.
Oakley, Justin (1992): Morality and the Emotions, New York, Routledge.
Reath, Andrews (1989): Hedonism, Heteronomy, and Kants Principle of
Happiness, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70, 4272.
Reiner, Hans (1983): Duty and Inclination: The Fundamentals of Morality
Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller, Santos,
Mark (trans), The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Schiller, Friedrich (1981): Xenien in Trunz, Erich (ed.): Goethes Werke,
vol. 1, Munich, Beck, 208234.
Sherman, Nancy (1990): The Place of Emotion in Kantian Morality, in
Flanagan, Owen / Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (eds.): Identity, Character,
and Morality, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 149170.
Sidgwick, Henry (1981): The Methods of Ethics, Indianapolis, Hackett.
Stocker, Michael (1976): The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,
Journal of Philosophy 68, 453466.
Wood, Allen W. (1999): Kants Ethical Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Wood, Allen W. (2003): The Good Will, Philosophical Topics, 457484.
Harald Khl
What is here at issue is the basic formulation of Kants moral law (or his Categorical
Imperative) that can be found (with small variations) in GMS (402, 421) and in KpV,
7. One could also call it the Universal Law-Formulation of the Categorical Imperative. I will not take into account the End-in-itself-, the Autonomy-, and the Kingdom
of Ends-formulations of the Imperative.
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Harald Khl
In connection with my critique of Allison, in part V of this paper, I discuss the corresponding argument in the KpV.
95
If practical laws are to be laws, they must, as Kant puts it, be valid for the will
of every rational creature (KpV, 19). A practical law that I cognize as such must
qualify for a giving of universal law: this is an identical proposition and therefore
self-evident. (KpV, 27)
Even hapiness is a contingent aim in this sense, since particular conceptions of it
cannot be made universally binding.
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Harald Khl
Strictly speaking, a morally qualified maxim cannot become a moral law. Maxims
express general intentions of individual persons, while laws (at least for beings like
us) are normative, i. e. are rules. So, strictly speaking one must say that the moral
qualification of being universalizable that a maxim may possess is a good reason to
formulate a corresponding norm (law). Kant himself invites the reading just criticized when he writes: Now I want only to know whether a maxim could also hold
as a universal practical law. (KpV, 27) But he also expressly writes: maxims are
indeed principles but not imperatives. (KpV, 20) Charitable readers orient themselves at the best formulations that an author has found for his claims. See also
the corresponding interpretation of Bruce Aune (1979), 23 f.: Kant characterizes
practical laws in a way implying that they could not be [] maxims. But it would,
acccording to Aune, be okay to say: if a given maxim is universally valid, a corresponding, fully general, lawlike statement is also valid (my emphasis). Such a
statement is, in other words, a candidate for the relevant law.
97
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Harald Khl
The positive descriptions that Kant gives in the GMS about the character of categorical imperatives are often overlooked. A categorically demanded action is necessary of itself and good in itself (414); good through the form and the principle
(416) of the action itself. Its form is the form, which consists in universality (436)
that is demanded by the principle of Kantian ethics. See H. Khl (2001), part IV.
See also Khl (2004), 128, as well as Khl (2006), Chapter 5.
99
[L]aws must be categorical: otherwise they are not laws. Cf. KpV, 20. this
rule is a law because it is a categorical imperative. Cf. KpV, 21.
With the lawgiving of reason the rule must be objectively and universally valid.
Cf. KpV, 20 f.
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Harald Khl
101
the good will and its attributes. This is unsurprising, since the Achtungs-Thesis (400) belongs to the three sentences about acting out
of duty, through which Kant wants to further develop his idea of a
good will (397).
This thesis is Kants third sentence: Duty is the necessity of an
action from respect for law. (400)10 In the following sentence where
he takes up earlier presented determinations, he claims regarding an
action from duty that in its case there is left for the will nothing that
could determine it except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and so the maxim of complying with such
a law (400 f.). Because of the explicative and so this sounds like the
anticipated conclusion of Kants following proof:
(1) But what kind of law can that be, the representation of which must
determine the will, even without regard for the effect expected from it,
in order for the will to be called good absolutely and without limitation?
(2.1) Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that could arise for it
from obeying some law, (2.2) nothing is left but the conformity of actions
as such with universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle,
(2.3) that is, I ought to act except in such a way that I could also will that
my maxim should become a universal law. (3.) Here mere conformity to
law as such, without having it as its basis some law determined for certain
actions, is what serves the will as its principle (402; first emphasis and
inserted numbers mine.)
Sentence (1) poses the initial question (what kind of law can that
be) and makes clear from the beginning that Kant wants to perform
a proof via an analysis of the genuine moral motive. First, Kants talk
about the representation of the law which must determine the will
(my emphasis) is clearly about a motive. Second, because that representation is a representation of the moral law, Kant can only be
referring to the moral motive to act for the sake of the law (see 390),
or in the case of human beings, out of duty. This is the motive that
must be present for a will to be called good (401).11 Kants initial
question is thus: what is the content of moral law itself, if the motive
to act according to it is the motive to act for the sake of the law? In
10
11
Here, for the first time in GMS I, Kant mentions the (moral) law. In the Preface
to the GMS, Kant already mentions (moral) laws (plural; in 387 f.) and soon thereafter for the first time the moral law (390; my emphasis).
With his talk of the representation (of the law) that must determine the will in
moral action, Kant takes up again his previous discussion about the representation
of the law (401). There already he claimed that this representation insofar as it is
the determing ground of the will, can constitute the preeminent good of the will we
call moral (ibid.).
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Harald Khl
other words, what is implied, for the wording of the moral law, by this
description of the moral motive?
Ad (2.1): The moral motive to act for the sake of the law refers
ultimately to the moral law. Thus it cannot consist in the impulse to
achieve something beyond obeying the law (no regard is present
for an effect expected (see (1)). But then (2.2) the moral motive to
act for the sake of the law can only refer to the law-character of the
law, and be the motive for generating actions with this character. Acting this way is consequently demanded by the moral law. (2.3)
This last step in the proof takes place by a shift in perspectives. If
out of the perspective of the moral motive to act for the sake of the
law this motive can only refer to the law-property : then seen
from the perspective of the searched-for law-formulation a law that
demands the exercise of so motivated actions accordingly can only
contain the precept: Carry out actions with property (or act according to maxims with this property).
The conformity of actions with universal law, in (2.2), and the
mere conformity to law, in (3), is that which I earlier referred to as
lawlikeness (Gesetzmigkeit2):
The moral law consists in the command to carry out actions that
are capable of being laws (or whose underlying maxim can be transformed into a law). A good action (with moral worth) is one done for
the sake of the law: that is (solely12) because it is capable of being a
law. I can here leave the question unanswered whether for Kant it is
part of the content of the moral law that actions that occur because of
their lawlikeness must be done from that motive.13
What differentiates the proofs that Kant presents in 402 and 421 f.
to determine the content of the moral law? The first proof, an examination from the perspective of the moral motive, seems to me to
rely on the crucial move (not explicit in Kants text) of assuming that
the moral motive must ultimately refer to the law. Thus, it cannot be
for the sake of profits that may result from following the law. Consequently, it can only aim at that which defines the law qua law: that is
the expectation associated with it of being universally valid.
In the proof 421 f., I see the crucial move as the transition from
lawfulness1 (Gesetzmigkeit1) to lawfulness2 = lawlikeness (Gesetz12
13
103
15
It occurs insofar as the thought that the searched-for law contains the notion that
it should be followed, that is, the prescribed actions should be in accord with the
law.
See for the following: Aune (1979), 28 ff.
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Harald Khl
Out of this Aune develops supposedly Kants formula of the practical respectively moral law:
L: Conform your actions to universal law. (29)
Though Aune claims that Kants text allows one to believe he thinks
L and C1 are the same basic principle (ibid.), he takes this belief to
be highly implausible: because it seems to him obvious and he thinks
it must have been so for Kant as well that L and C1 differ in an important regard:
(S2) C1 is useful in a way that L is not. (S3) As I have formulated it, L is
a higher-order principle telling us how to conform to certain lower-order
laws. (S4) But if we do not know what these lower-order laws are we shall
not fi nd L a very useful principle. (S5) C1 does not seem to possess this
limitation. (S6) Even if I do not know what principles are properly considered universal laws, I know they are practical principles that, being
universal, are binding on all rational beings. (S7) Knowing just this much,
I could no doubt decide whether I could will that the maxims of many
possible actions should be (or become) such laws. (S8) C1 would thus
have practical value for me even though I had no idea how to comply with
L. (30; (S1)-(S8): my numbering.)
105
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Harald Khl
proof at 402, first wanted to discover the formulation of the moral law
(out of which concrete laws could be derived), he had, on his way to
that formulation, to avoid talk of such laws. On my reading there is no
mention of them.
If Aune were correct in attributing L to Kant, he would also be
correct in his assertion that C1 is more likely to be the searched-for
fundamental moral principle than L. But since L is not held by Kant
at all, Aunes question regarding the relationship between L and C1
does not even arise. Of course, there can be no gap between two one
of which doesnt exist. Kants proof in 402 may be faulty, but for this
gap he cannot be held responsible.
I want to move from my last point of contention with Aune to my
criticisms of both Woods and Allisons interpretations. Aune had
formulated that Kants good and duitiful will does not conform
to a practical law because and the only rational basis for conforming to it (see (S1)), and also that L is a higher-order principle telling us how to conform to certain lower order laws (see (S3),
my emphasis). Through this conformity-talk a misplaced notion has
been imported into Kants Text on 402 (and took place in the history of this passages interpretation): what I have termed lawfulness1
(Gesetzmigkeit1). In this sense one acts lawful if ones own action
corresponds with a/the law, i. e. one does what one is commanded to
do. As I have tried to show in part IV of my paper, this notion of Gesetzmigkeit1 is not present in 402 (in contrast to the proof in 420 f.).
Rather, the conformity of actions as such with universal law, which
alone must serve the will as its principle and the mere conformity
with the law as such that should be present in morally motivated action serving the will as its principle (present in 402) is captured by
what I have called lawlikeness. This means the capacity of an action
or a maxim to serve as the epistemic basis for a norm that can be
thought to be universally valid.
The presentation of proof 402 that Allen Wood gives in his book
on Kants Ethical Thought (KET)16 is too brief to be considered a
serious effort at comprehending the argument. His critique is just as
brief. Wood obviously thinks the errors in Kants proof are so evident
that it is unnecessary to explicate them. Kants reflections are based
on fallacious reasoning (or at least it is an argument with a large gap
remaining to be filled) (KET: 48). Wood sees the same gap in the
proof that Aune saw between his L and C1.
16
107
How comes Wood to believe that one can obtain the notion that maxims should conform to moral laws (plural) from Kants argument in
420 f.? In Kants argument only the law is under consideration:
(1.) when I think of a categorical imperative I know at once what it
contains. For, since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the maxim be in conformity with that law, (2.2) while the law
contains no condition to which it would be limited, (2.3) nothing is left
with which the maxim of action is to conform but the universality of a law
as such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative properly represents as necessary. (My emphasis.)
Wood cannot have generated his interpretation out of Kants formulation of the Categorical Imperative, according to which one should
only act following according to maxims that one can simultaneously
desire to become a universal law (my emphasis). Even though the
idea of a plurality of laws is implicit here it would be incoherent to
speak of a maxim conforming to a law that the maxim eventually is
fi rst becoming17 .
(3.) There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this:
act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the
same time will that it become a universal law. (420 f. my emphasis; original text italicizes the entire Categorical Imperative.)
17
On the problem of Kants claim that a maxim can become a universal law, cf. my
footnote 5.
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Harald Khl
109
According to Allison, Wood wanted to show the impossibility of deriving a viable moral principle from the mere concept of universal
practical law (143). The way in which Allison relates the misreadings
of Aune and Wood is remarkable in at least one point. To make this
clear, I will introduce a distinction that Wood used in HET:
Wood distinguished the universality of applicability and the
universality of concern as two desirable properties of practical
laws (HET: 135 f.; my emphasis; see also 165 f.). [T]hat laws should
have universality of applicability means [e]verybody should be
equally subject to them. (HET: 165; my emphasis.) The universality of concern that we desire of good laws rests on the assumption
that everyones following those laws will result in a system of collective behaviour that is rational and generally beneficial (ibid.). Allison
recapitulates Woods distinction (which Wood uses as an objection
against Kant), noting that Kants mistake consisted in failing to distinguish between these two meanings of universality in his proofs to
determine the content of the Categorical Imperative.
Now the astonishing point I alluded to above is Allisons claim that
Woods universality of applicability (Everybody should be equally
subject to them = the laws) is equivalent to Aunes L, which the reader will recall is the formulation of the moral law that Kant supposedly
holds: conform your actions to universal law. Aune elaborated this
claim as follows in his (S3): L is a higher-order principle telling us
how to conform to certain lower-order laws. Rather, Woods universality of applicability roughly corresponds to what I have called the
legal character of a practical principle (in part II of this paper). Out
of the connotations of the notion law one can deduce, as I claimed
there, that a moral law is a precept encompassing a broad circle of
creatures.
19
110
Harald Khl
In my opinion, the prospects of Woods criticism are not encouraging if his universality of applicability means the same as Aunes L.
This is because, as I argued above, Kant not at all held L. Thus if Allisons equation would be correct, Wood lacks something to set against
his universality of concern.
Regardless of whether or not Kants proofs to determine the content of his Categorical Imperative are correct, I find Woods distinction between universality of applicability (as he understands it) and
a universality of concern very helpful. But is it, as he understands
it, a useful critical tool against Kant? What Wood characterizes as
concern in his phrase universality of concern sometimes is called
by him collective benefit or collective rationality. He then uses
this terminology to claim that collective benefit [] is not identical
with Kants FUL test [that is the basic formulation of the Categorical
Imperative], which says that it must be possible to will without contradiction that the law will be universally followed (HET: 165 my
emphasis). Because Kants conception of the law contains [only] universality of applicability, it does not contain anything like collective
benefit (ibid. my insertion). True. But what looks to be a factual
argument for the relative emptiness of content, or unfruitfulness, or
the morally indeterminate character of Kants formulation of the law
itself, Wood transforms into a criticism of Kants derivation of this
formulation (without good reason, as Id argue): We cannot infer (as
Kant does) that a principle with universality of applicability is eo ipso
a principle with collective rationality. Such an inference is invalid.
(HET: 166; my emphasis.) Im unable to understand how Kant could
have made this mistake in his derivation of the Categorical Imperative
if he (according to Wood) should have been satisfied with a principle
that merely possessed universality of applicability.
Before I return to Allison on a different point, Id like to summarize the hitherto given critique of all three of Kants critics. They
have allowed themselves to be mislead by the ambiguity of the term
Gesetzmigkeit (and related ways of speaking). Gesetzmigkeit1
is the conformity (of an action or a maxim) to a (or the) Moral Law,
while Gesetzmigkeit2 means the legislative form of a maxim.
Kants critics failed to clarify this ambiguity, consequently taking crucial places in Kants argument to mean Gesetzmigkeit1, when Kant
was actually working with the notion of Gesetzmigkeit2. Thus they
were able to import the idea of a plurality of laws into Kants derivation of the Categorical Imperative, a plurality to which maxims needed
to conform. Kant was subsequently criticized for this idea. In fact, it is
111
unintelligible where these laws could have originated. Such laws can
only be generated by the application of the Categorical Imperative to
maxims. But this Imperative can only be used after its formulation
has been derived. The aforementioned laws cannot appear during the
derivation.
The gap in the derivation of the moral law that Kants critics believe
they have found in GMS 402 and 420 f. cannot be found in the corresponding proof in the KpV ( 17). This, at least, is Allisons claim.
According to him, in the KpV the gap has successfully been bridged
by means of the introduction of transcendental freedom (144). Of
course, Kant would have done himself, by introducing transcendental freedom at that place, a disservice. Who, except staunch Kantians,
would still believe in the existence of a freedom which implies independence from causal determination by everything empirical? (151)
Even Allison knows that if Kants so-called metaphysical deduction
(L. W. Beck) of the moral law rests on a thick conception of transcendentally free agency, that is for better or worse (154; my emphasis).
If that is what grounds moral law! I take the assumption to be questionable that Kant used transcendental freedom as a premise in his
proof in the KpV. I read this proof as follows: Kant goes from the thesis of 4 to his conclusion in 7. 5/6, where transcendental freedom
is introduced, is an interlude:
In the Theorem of 4, Kant moves from the assumption [i]f all
material of a law, , is abstracted from it, nothing remains except the
mere form of a universal legislation to the conclusion: a rational
being must suppose that their mere form [= the form of maxims],
through which they are fitted for giving universal laws, is alone that
which makes them a practical law. (KprV, 27; my insertion.) This form
is prescribed for maxims in the Fundamental law of pure practical
reason ( 7) by the demand One ought to act a certain way (KpV,
30; my emphasis). The transition from 4 to 7 would be the transition that was, concerning the corresponding GMS-passages, criticized
by Aune, Wood and Allision an objection I challenged.
So, on my view, what function does the interlude in 5 and 6 have?
For Kant a will to wich only the legislative form of the maxim can
serve as a law is a free will: free in the transcendental sense (KpV
29, 5). Granted that a will is free [which I read as: if we can assume
that ] then we can manage Problem II, which is to find the law
which alone is competent to determine it necessarily. Because the
lawgiving form, insofar as it is contained in the maxim, is therefore
the only thing that can constitute a determining ground of the [free]
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Harald Khl
will (KpV 29, 6 my insertions). Kant here only adds to his claims
in 4 that the will in question is a free will. But it is not obvious to me,
as it is to Allison, that this is an additional premise in the argument to
the formulation of the law in 7.
In the Remark to 6 Kant seems to ask if we may presuppose
the freedom of the will to arrive at a formulation of the moral law. If
I am reading him correctly, his answer is no. The answer is no, because the correct organization of our concepts implies that morality first reveals the concept of freedom to us (KpV, 30; my emphasis).
Kants morality, i. e. the concept of morality, I understand to be the
searched-for formula of the moral law, that consequently cannot be
deduced from the notion of transcendental freedom. Looking back
on 5 this paragraph can be taken to mean: if one could begin with
the notion of transcendental freedom, then one would know what the
searched-for practical law was. However, as 6 makes clear: that is an
illegitimate move.
I am uncertain on this point. The transition from 4 over 5/ 6
to 7 is confusing. I find the Remark to 6 even more confusing. If
we could assume that my confusion has an objective correlate, I would
diagnose Kants argument as follows:
In the Remark to 6, Kant is introducing considerations that do
not belong in the flow of arguments to ascertain the formulation of
the moral law. Rather, they belong to Kants attempt to answer the
question how the demand expressed by this law may be grounded.
That this project of GMS III cant be successfully carried out, is the
thesis in the KpV.20
Thus freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply
each other we read in the Remark to 6 of the KpV. Allison is surely right in identifying this as the Reciprocity Thesis (151 his term)
that Kant already formulated in GMS III and according to which a
free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same (GMS,
447). Freedom and morality are reciprocal concepts for one single
concept (GMS, 450). But that is precisely the point: this thesis belongs in the context of an attempt to ground the moral law. That this
context is not present in the KpV was obviously of no consequent for
Allison.
In the GMS Kant still believed he can presuppose freedom for his
argument:
20
113
Now, in the KpV, Kant no longer believes this is legitimate. My impression is that Kant was here so bent on correcting his position of the
GMS that he inserted the subject of the (now believed to be impossible) deduction of the moral law in an argument that was concerned
with something else: not to ground the Categorical Imperative (the
demand it expresses) but to first of all discover its formulation.
In his search for an understanding of Kants Search for the Supreme
Principle of Morality (so the title of his illuminating book21), Samuel J. Kerstein unfolds what he calls a new, criterial reading (12) of
Kants derivation of the moral law. His critique of the gap-theorists
(Aune, Wood, Allison) is preceeded by the following reconstruction
concerning both of the Kantian proofs in GMS I and II:
First, Kant develops criteria that any viable candidate for the supreme
principle of morality must fulfil. [] Second, Kant tries to establish that no
possible rival to the Formula of Universal Law fulfils all of these criteria.
Finally, Kant attempts to demonstrate that the Formula of Universal Law
remains as a viable candidate for a principle that fulfils all of them. With
these three steps, Kant strives to prove that if there is a supreme principle
of morality, then it is this formula (12, cf. Kersteins Summary: 93).
The criteria developed by Kerstein in step one constitute (cf. 12) what
he calls Kants basic concept of the requirements that have to be
fulfilled by a supreme moral principle: It would be practical, absolutely necessary, binding on all rational agents, and would serve as a
supreme norm for the moral evaluation of action (1). The first three
of these criteria are in accordance with my own claim, concerning
Kants proof in Groundwork II, that the moral law contains the highest categorical prescription for action, which is simultaneously universal (in part III of this paper).
Concerning Kants derivation in GMS I, Kerstein contends (as I
did above in part IV): Kant holds his discussions of the good will, [of
acting from] duty, and moral worth to be essential for his proof, adding that he (and Kant) believe this discussion to be necessary for the
development of criteria for the supreme principle of morality (86; my
emphasis and insertion). Considering Kants proof in Groundwork II
21
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Harald Khl
Kerstein finds it elliptical (93). Surprisingly, he introduces an additional criterion as a constituent of the derivation: The derivation is
not complete unless all imperatives of duty can be derived from the
imperative Kant proposes as the only viable candidate for the supreme
principle of morality (87; cf. 88). Compared with this interpretation,
my own reconstruction in part III has been more text-immanent. Further analysis of the differences between Kersteins and my analysis
of Kants attempts to derive the correct formulation of the moral law
would be beyond the scope of this paper.
VI. Critical Considerations
Let us assume for the sake of the argument that I have succeeded in
parts IIIV of my paper to plausibly reconstruct Kants arguments to
determine the content of the Categorical Imperative into a conclusive argument. Then why does Kant fail to persuade us? Which of his
premises are problematic?
1. Surely Kants notions of the moral law and moral laws are alien to us. For his predecessors22 and contemporaries this was different.
Kants talk of such law(s) becomes problematic when he exploits the
connotations of these expressions for certain philosophical purposes.
So, for example, the argument that he presents in the Preface to the
GMS for the benefit of a non-empirical understanding of ethics (GMS,
389) trades on his rhetoric about law. Because only the talk of a law
makes it seem compulsory, that it carr[ies] with it absolute necessity
does not hold only for human beings [but also] for other rational beings (ibid. my insertion). By comparison, Kants mention of a command (e. g. thou shall not lie, ibid.) does not so clearly express an
(unconditioned) necessity to act in accord with it (my emphasis).
2. Kants presumption of the scope of validity for a moral law is
questionable as well. I would like to admit that the connotations of the
expression law, and the description of the law as the highest moral
principle, imply that this precept is valid for an encompassing circle of
creatures (see II.3). But whether this circle consists out of all rational
creatures is doubtful. It is even problematic that this law does not
hold for humans only but for all humans (ibid.). At most, it could
apply to all rational or competent in an xy-way or born with capaci22
The natural law theorists thought only a morality built around a specific concept
of law and obligation would be serviceable. Cf. Schneewind (1998, 518).
115
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Harald Khl
28
29
117
Literature
Kants writings
Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (= GMS; engl.: Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Morals) is cited according to the Akademie-Ausgabe
and its pagination, volume IV (page numbers inserted into the text without
abbreviation refer to the GMS). The Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (= KpV;
engl.: Critique of Practical Reason) is cited according to volume V of the
Akademie-Ausgabe and its pagination.
English translations are taken from The Cambridge Edition of the Works
of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (New York, 1996: Cambridge University Press).
Other works
Allison, Henry E. (1996): On a presumed gap in the derivation of the categorical imperative, in: Idealism and Freedom, Cambridge, 143154.
Aune, Bruce (1979): Kants Theory of Morals, Princeton.
Khl, Harald (1990): Kants Gesinnungsethik, Berlin/New York.
Khl, Harald (2001): Moral und Klugheit. Rortys Kritik an einer kantischen
Unterscheidung, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift fr Philosophie 49, 1941.
Khl, H. (2004), Kants Grundlegung: neu ediert, kommentiert, interpretiert in: Philosophische Rundschau 51.
Khl, H. (2006), Abschied vom Unbedingten. ber den heterogenen Charakter moralischer Forderungen, Freiburg i. Br.
Larmore, Charles (1987): Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge.
Paton, Henry. J. (1971): The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kants Moral
Philosophy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Patzig, Gnther (21983): Ein Pldoyer fr utilitaristische Grundstze in der
Ethik, in: Patzig: Ethik ohne Metaphysik, Gttingen, 127147.
Quine, Willard V. O. (1953): Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in: Quine, From
a logical point of view, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2046.
Schneewind, Jerome B. (1970): Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles, in:
G. A. Vesey (Ed.), Knowledge and Necessity, London / New York.
Schneewind, Jerome B. (1998): The Invention of Autonomy, Cambridge.
Schnecker, Dieter / Wood, Allen W. (22004): Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein einfhrender Kommentar, Paderborn.
Siep, L. (2004), Konkrete Ethik, Frankfurt a. M.
Tugendhat, Ernst (1993): Vorlesungen ber Ethik, Frankfurt a. M.
Wood, Allen. W. (1990): Hegels Ethical Thought, Cambridge.
Wood, Allen W. (1999): Kants Ethical Thought, Cambridge.
Groundwork
II
Marcus Willaschek
Practical Reason
A commentary on Kants Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals (GMS, 412417)1
1. Introduction
On pages 412417 of the GMS, Kant introduces his conception of the
will as practical reason and the closely related distinction between
hypothetical and categorical imperatives in a rather concise manner.
In the following, I will address the much discussed definition of the
will (4: 412), the concepts of both the holy will (4: 412 und 414) and the
imperative (4: 413414), as well as the differences among the different
kinds of imperatives (4: 414417), while explaining Kants central concepts and theses. Prior to this, however, I will present a short overview
of Kants general line of argument.
2. Overview
Practical reason is the ability to act rationally that is, the ability of a
person to rationally coordinate her goals and ends and to orient her actions according to these rationally set ends. Kant identifies this ability
with the will, or with the ability of a rational being (more precisely, a
being possessing reason) to be the cause of its conduct through its own
representations (mental states). In other words, having a will means
being able to act in accordance with ones own rational representations.
Within the concept of practical reason, Kant distinguishes pure
from empirically qualified practical reason a distinction that he first
1
For their valuable advice and criticism, I would like to thank Alexander Bagattini,
Steffi Schadow, Dieter Schnecker as well as the participants of the preparatory
conference in Bonn.
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Marcus Willaschek
makes explicit in the KpV, and that is already anticipated (and implicitly presupposed) in the GMS (cf. 4: 389, where Kant speaks of a
practical pure reason as well as of the question of how pure reason can be practical, 4: 458; cf. 461). God and the angels (if they exist) possess exclusively pure practical reason; their decisions are in no
way influenced by subjective factors, and particularly not by sensible
(sinnliche) inclinations, but solely by objective, and specifically moral,
rational grounds. Each of their wills is a holy will, which necessarily
and exclusively seeks the moral good.
Humans, on the other hand (as the only rational beings of whose
existence we have knowledge), are influenced by their naturally and
socially conditioned wishes and inclinations in many ways. Their wills
are, therefore, not holy, for when it accommodates their interests they
can decide to act immorally. Their practical reason is therefore empirically qualified: as instrumental rationality, it serves to satisfy empirically-given inclinations in the most effective way possible. If, on
the other hand, as Kant supposes, moral principles hold without exception and necessarily for all beings who possess reason, thus also
for humans, then it must be rational for every rational being to follow
these principles, independent of its respective inclinations or wishes.
Accordingly, humans must not only have empirically qualified reason,
but also pure practical reason; that is, they must be able to orient their
action according to moral principles when this would not further, or
would even contradict, their own interests.
The human will is thus distinguished from a holy will in two ways:
first, our decisions do not necessarily accord with that which would be
rational to do, and second, rational for us does not only mean morally good, but also useful for the satisfaction of subjective inclinations.
The first difference leads to the concept of an imperative, the second to
the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives.
Imperatives are propositions in which what is good and reasonable
to do is expressed in the form of a command. Such commands are not
directed at a being with a holy will that necessarily does what is rational, but rather at beings such as humans, who can act rationally but who
do not necessarily do so (i. e., those for whom both rational and irrational actions are possible in any given situation). Most people are thus
capable of doing something because they have recognized it as rational
(e. g. taking care of their health or paying their taxes), but this rational
insight does not necessarily motivate them to a corresponding course
of action, because their inclinations (e. g. towards indolence) or their
self-interest may oppose it. The principles of rational action, therefore,
Practical Reason
123
The following translations of passages from Kants works are based on the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1992-).
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Marcus Willaschek
mermann 2003, 9), and even if one takes the context into account
the passage remains ambiguous. Kant begins with this observation:
(1)
The will is thus a capacity (i. e., an ability) of a rational being to act
in a specific way, namely in accordance with the representation of
laws. But what does it mean to act in accordance with the representation of laws? Which laws are meant here? It is exactly with regard
to this question that interpretations diverge.
In order to understand Kant correctly here, it will be helpful to
review the connections among the concepts life, faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermgen), and will (cf. with regard to this and what follows
Willaschek 1992, 8290). Life, as Kant writes in the KpV, is the
faculty of a being to act in accordance with the laws of the faculty of
desire. The faculty of desire is the faculty of this being to be, through
its representations, the cause of the actuality of the objects of these
representations (5: 9; cf. already in 2: 327 as well as 4: 544). As is
briefly stated in the MdS, The capacity of a being to act in accordance with its representations is called life (6: 211). Here, to act has
the broad meaning of the Latin agere: it means the same as to bring
about or to cause (cf. Gerhardt 1986). Kant understands life as the
purposeful spontaneous activity (Selbstttigkeit) of an organism (or
in the case of a living God, cf. 3:421, the activity of a non-material
entity) in accordance with the Aristotelian-Leibnizian concept of entelechia. This spontaneous activity, however, is conceived (at least in
the case of physical beings) in a distinctively modern way as a lawful
and purely causal association. A living being also works according
to laws: it has a representation of what it desires and this representation motivates it to act in a way that leads to the realization of the
Practical Reason
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Marcus Willaschek
the repetition of the words according to (nach) creates difficulties, for it would then be both the representation of laws and the laws
(principles) themselves according to which rational beings act. This
difficulty is resolved, however, if one considers what it means for Kant
that a rational living being acts according to a principle: it has a representation of the principle in question, which motivates it to realize
the represented object (the principle). Someone who acts according to
the representation of a law (a principle), ipso facto acts according to
the law (principle) itself. Sentence (2) should then be understood in
the following way:
(2') Only rational beings can orient their behavior according to the representation of the laws of rational action, and thus act according to
these laws or principles themselves.
One can also say this more concisely: only rational beings have the
ability to act rationally, in both the instrumental and moral sense.
Kant calls this ability for rational action and effort the will. The human will, as one can also say with Kant, is a rational faculty of desire
in accordance with concepts (6: 213); the representations through
which we become cause of the actuality of represented objects are
not (only) of an intuitive and sensible kind, but are (also) conceptual.
Kant calls a concept that is at the same time the cause of the object
represented through the concept an end (5: 180).
While the definition of the will as the rational faculty of desire
corresponds with the philosophical tradition, and especially with the
vocabulary of the Leibnizian-Wolfian school of philosophy (cf. e. g.
Baumgarten, Metaphysica 690), in the sentence that follows Kant
chooses an at least terminological path of his own:
(3) Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the
will is nothing other than practical reason.
Practical Reason
127
ciples) (20: 201). However, that means only that one cannot have a
will without also having reason (cf. 4: 427: The will is thought as a
capacity to determine itself to action in conformity with the representations of certain laws. And such a capacity can be found only in rational beings.) This does not mean, however, that the will is nothing
other than practical reason. For this, rather, two claims would have
to hold, claims that Kant implicitly presupposes: first, that the will (as
the capacity to act according to the representation of laws of reason)
is nothing other than the capacity of the derivation of actions from
laws, and second, that for this capacity, practical reason is not only
necessary (Kant: is required), but also sufficient.
The talk of a derivation of actions refers to Aristotles practical
syllogism in which a general major premise (Everything sweet must
be tasted) and a minor premise (This is sweet) are followed directly by the execution of the rationally commanded action (cf. EN 1147a
25 ff.). Kant also assumes that practical reason does not only consist
in deriving propositions or opinions about actions but also the actions
themselves: practical reason is the ability to orient ones behavior according to the laws of reason. That is, it is not only the ability to recognize what is rational (the so-called principium diiudicationis), but
to also do it (principium executionis). However, Kants conception
differs from the Aristotelian view in one important respect: practical reason does not produce the derived actions directly (i. e., simply through insight into their rationality), but indirectly, via a feeling.
This feeling, however, which in the case of action according to moral
laws Kant terms respect for law (cf. 4: 400, 440) or moral feeling
(4: 460), is itself of rational origin, for it arises through insight into the
rationality of moral laws (cf. 4: 460, 5: 76). In Kants view practical
reason delivers both objective reasons and the subjective incentives
of rational action and is thus nothing other than the will or the ability
to act rationally.
This identification of practical reason and the will raises a problem, however, when Kant directly afterwards (and in many other passages) speaks of reason determining the will (more or less effectively). How can this be if the two are identical? The answer lies in
the ambiguity of the expressions will and practical reason (cf. on
this and the following Willaschek 1992, 4853). In the GMS, as we
have already seen, Kant defines will and practical reason as the
ability to act rationally. What is at issue there, however, is a complex
ability. It includes on the one hand the ability to bring the totality of
ones wishes and convictions into a rational order (which guarantees
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Marcus Willaschek
consistency and completeness). Kant calls this ability reason and, insofar as it concerns primarily wishes, ends, and grounds for action,
practical reason or will: The will is therefore the faculty of desire
considered not so much in relation to action (as choice (Willkr) is),
but rather in relation to the determining ground of this choice of action. The will itself actually has no determining ground, but insofar as
it can determine choice it is instead practical reason itself (6: 213, my
emphasis). In this passage from MdS Kant does not understand will
and practical reason as he does in GMS in the broader sense, as the
ability to act rationally, but rather in the narrower sense, as the ability to produce rational determining grounds for action. On the other
hand, practical reason in the broad sense also includes the ability to
actually act according to these rational grounds of action. This ability
is what Kant calls free choice (freie Willkr). Choice is the capacity
to act according to ones own representations, which are connected
with pleasure and displeasure (Lust and Unlust) (6: 413); choice is free
insofar as pleasure and displeasure do not determine behavior but
rather serve as a basis for the rational establishing of ends (cf. KrV A
802/ B 830 and, with a slight change of emphasis, 6: 413).
Practical reason or will in the broader sense as the ability to act
rationally includes, first, practical reason or the will in the narrower
sense (that is, the ability to bring ones wishes and ends into a consistent scheme of grounds for action) and, second, free choice (that
is, the ability to do what is rationally desired). The will, choice, and
practical reason are therefore not distinct causal instances or subject-like homunculi, but instead aspects of the complex ability to act
rationally. When Kant speaks of the fact that reason determines the
will or choice, he means that practical reason in the narrower sense
(the capacity to set rational ends) provides the determining grounds
for the will in the broader sense (the ability to act rationally) or free
choice (the ability to act rationally). That reason determines the will
thus means depending on emphasis either that one actually does
what is rationally desired, or that what one does is actually rational.
When Kant, however, equates reason and the will, then he means either (in the broader sense) the ability to act rationally or (in the narrower sense) the ability to establish ends rationally. Although Kants
use of words is confusing and not always uniform, his conception of
the will as practical reason is in fact uniform and thoroughly comprehensible.
A further meaning of the term will in Kant has not yet been
mentioned: namely, according to Kant the will is not only the ability
Practical Reason
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Marcus Willaschek
does this concept of a perfectly good will relate to that of the good
will that is the topic of the beginning of the fi rst section?
(1) A holy will, in contrast to a human will, is a capacity to choose
only that which reason independently of inclination recognizes as
good; such a being can be determined only through the representation of the good. These formulations suggest that a being can only
have a holy will if its will is not affected by inclinations, but instead acts exclusively according to the objective principles of reason.
This becomes clear, too, through comparison with the human will
for which, in contrast to the holy will, reason alone does not adequately determine the will and thus which is also subject to subjective conditions (certain incentives) (4: 412). Thus the holy will would
be subject to no subjective conditions, such that reason alone would
determine it sufficiently. Similarly, Kant writes in the KpV that the
moral law has for humans the character of an imperative, because
in them, as rational beings, one can presuppose a pure will but, as
beings affected by needs and sensible motives, not a holy will, that is,
a will that would be incapable of maxims conflicting with the moral
law (5: 32). In this passage as well it sounds as if a being with a holy
will may not be affected by needs and sensible motives, because
it is this state of being affected that prevents humans from attaining
this holy will.
Such a view would be awkward, however, since a being without
inclinations would be incapable of action. Rational principles alone
are not sufficient to establish how one should act in a certain situation. With regard to the principle of instrumental action (He who
wills the end, also rationally wills the necessary means to that end)
this is obvious: it presupposes that one already has ends; what these
ends are does not only depend on rational considerations, but also on
that to which one has an inclination. Even moral principles, and
above all the categorical imperative, are by themselves not sufficient
to be taken to show a certain action to be rationally commanded. After all, one is supposed to test, using the categorical imperative, if the
maxim by which one intends to act could be a universal law. Maxims,
however, are subjective rules of action, which reason determines according to the conditions of the subject (more often his ignorance
or also his inclinations) (4: 421; my emphasis). A being that has no
inclinations (and is also not subject to any other subjective conditions) has also, therefore, no maxims, and thus nothing to which
it could apply the categorical imperative. Thus, even a being with a
Practical Reason
131
holy will needs inclinations (or other not purely rational subjective
conditions) in order to be able to act rationally.
Now in the passage cited above, Kant does not explicitly exclude
the possibility that a being with a holy will could have inclinations,
but instead says only that inclinations may have no influence on its
will. As we have just seen, however, even this is problematic: a capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination
recognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good, is not enough to
decide on concrete actions and would therefore not be a will. Kants
characterization of the holy will as completely independent of inclinations is thus too strong. However, what is important for Kant in the
concept of the holy will is not its independence from inclinations, but
its necessary correspondence with the laws of reason and of the good:
The will whose maxims necessarily harmonize with the laws of autonomy is a holy, absolutely good will (4: 439). And for this necessary correspondence, in contrast to what Kants formulations suggest,
a complete independence from inclinations is not necessary. A being
whose will is capable of being affected by inclinations, but whose inclinations necessarily (because of its intrinsic constitution) correspond
to the laws of reason, would have maxims, but would not be capable
of any maxims conflicting with the moral law (5: 32) and would thus
have a holy will.
In fact, many passages speak for the thesis that Kant was of the
opinion that a holy will could well be affected by inclinations as
long as these necessarily corresponded with the laws of reason. Kant
writes in the MdS that in the case of a holy (superhuman) being
no hindering impulses would impede the law of its will (6: 405).
And in lecture notes it is stated, holiness is the absolute or unlimited moral perfection of the will. A holy being must not be affected
by the least inclination against morality (29: 1075). The addition
against morality obviously only makes sense if it is at least conceivable that a holy being is at all affected by inclinations. Kant continues: It must be impossible for him to want anything that would
be contrary to the moral laws. Understood thusly, no being aside
from God is holy; as every creature always has some needs, and if it
wants to satisfy them, then inclinations as well, which do not in each
case correspond with morality (29: 1075). The holiness of a will
thus consists in its necessary correspondence with the laws of reason
and morality. This does not exclude the possibility that a being with
a holy will is affected by inclinations, but only the possibility that
it is affected by inclinations that could motivate it to do something
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Practical Reason
133
duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law (4:
400). The individual actions do not then accidentally correspond with
the moral law; rather, they do so necessarily.
When Kant returns to the good will at the end of the second part of
the GMS, it is exactly this necessity of correspondence with the moral
law that he emphasizes: We can now end where we set out from at
the beginning namely, with the concept of an unconditionally good
will. That will is absolutely good which cannot be evil, hence whose
maxim, if made into a universal law, can never conflict with itself. This
principle is, accordingly, also its supreme law: act always on that maxim whose universality as a law you can at the same time will (4: 437;
my emphasis). A will is thus good if it cannot be evil, and therefore
cannot be evil because it has made correspondence with the moral law
into the supreme law or, as Kant says in another passage, into the
supreme condition of all maxims (5: 31; cf. 6: 36).
If this interpretation of the concept of the good will is legitimate,
then the question of the distinction between the good and the holy
will becomes all the more urgent, since for the holy will Kant also
emphasizes the necessity of correspondence with the moral law, and
he equates the holy will with the completely good will (4: 414) and
the absolutely good will (4: 439). Nevertheless, there is in fact a
distinction between a good human will and a holy will: in contrast
to God, even humans with the best wills feel inclinations whose satisfaction is possibly incompatible with the moral law. These inclinations constitute a temptation to action adverse to duty, and must
therefore be suppressed or overcome. This danger of moral corruption that is an irrevocable part of the human condition is what Kant
in the Religionsschrift calls radical evil (6: 32 ff.): even the best human is radically evil (that is, evil at the root), since he can feel morally adverse inclinations (such as indolence, envy, selfishness, etc.),
which, if they do not prevent him from following the moral law, at
least make it more difficult. As we have already seen, however, in the
case of a holy will all impulses are from the outset and necessarily in
harmony with the demands of morality so that there is no temptation
that would have to be overcome: in the case of a holy (superhuman)
being [] no hindering impulses would impede the law of its will,
and it would thus gladly do everything in conformity with the law
(6: 405).
A good will is thus one that does what is morally required not
simply accidentally, but out of firm resolution and lasting principle; a
good will is holy if it does not have to overcome any inner resistance
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Marcus Willaschek
(in the form of inclinations) to do so, but rather does the good, under
any conceivable circumstances, gladly. (To what extent holiness of
the will can be demanded of humans, as Kant claims in the KpV and
the MdS, is an additional problem that cannot be treated here; cf. on
this Allison 1990, ch. 9).
5. The concept of the imperative and the division of the imperatives
(4: 413417)
The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it necessitates
a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of that command is called an imperative (4: 413). According to this definition,
an imperative is the linguistic expression (formula) of a command
of reason, which itself is the representation of an objective principle or law that necessitates the will. (Kant does not always hold
himself to this usage, though, and often uses the terms imperative,
command, law, and objective principle synonymously). All imperatives, as Kant continues, are expressed by an oughtor, more
precisely, can be expressed by an ought, since Act in such a way
that the maxim of your action could be a universal law is an imperative in Kants sense, even though it is not expressed by an ought. It,
however, could easily be reformulated accordingly (You ought to act
in such a way, so that the maxim of your action ).
The necessitation of the will that is expressed in the imperative
is that specific rational form of normative motivation which consists
in the awareness that one ought to do what is rational to do. Kant
does not try to ground the connection between reason and normativity further: he presupposes here that a being that is endowed with
reason but not always rational ought to be rational (cf. Kants discussion of the usefulness of reason at the beginning of GMS I; 4: 395/6).
He does, however, explicate the normative and evaluative dimension
of reason a bit later by highlighting the connection between ought
and good: imperatives say that to do or to refrain from something
would be good []. Practical good, however [in contrast to the pleasurable; M. W.], is that which determines the will by means of representations of reason, hence not by subjective but objective causes,
that is, from grounds that are valid for every rational being as such
(4: 413; cf. 414). According to Kant, every imperative implies a value
judgment, but one that is rationally justifiable and thus claims to hold
for all rational beings. (Here we are reminded of the famous thesis of
Practical Reason
135
the KpV concerning the priority of the moral law over the concept of
the good; cf. 5: 5771.)
Imperatives, however, do not hold for all rational beings, because,
as we have already seen, a holy will is not subject to any normative
necessitation: the ought is out of place here, for Kant, because
volition is already of itself necessarily in accord with the law (4:
414). Kant is famous for the thesis that ought implies can: someone who ought to do A, also can do A (cf. 5: 30). In contrast, his
claim here is: ought implies being able to do otherwise. Someone
who ought to do A, can also not do A. (It does, for example, seem as
senseless to command someone to be identical with himself, as it is
to command him to not be identical with himself; he cannot stop doing the first, and he cannot do the second. In both cases the ought
is out of place.)
Kants view can be summarized by saying that imperatives are
rational directives (or directives of reason). Their normative binding
force is based on the fact that it is rational to follow them. Their prescriptive character is based on the fact that they are directed toward
beings that can act rationally, but do not necessarily always do so.
Kant continues: All imperatives command either hypothetically or
categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving something else that one wants (or
that it is at least possible for one to want). The categorical imperative would be one that represented an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end (4:414). On the basis
of the analytic relationship between ought and good, Kant can
express the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives in the following way as well: Now, if the action would be good
merely as a means to something else, the imperative is hypothetical;
if the action is represented as in itself good [], then it is categorical
(4:414).
The distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives
thus has an impact on the question of why it is good and rational to act
in the way commanded by the imperative. This distinction does not
necessarily show in the linguistic form of the imperative: Invest your
money cautiously! is, viewed linguistically, a categorical sentence but
a hypothetical imperative, for a cautious investment is obviously good
merely as a means and is not sought after for its own sake. If you
owe money, you ought to pay it back is linguistically a conditional
sentence but nevertheless a categorical imperative, because it represents an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to
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Practical Reason
137
beings. They do not concern the material of the action (thus do not
depend on which ends one is pursuing), but concern rather the form
and the principle from which it [the action] itself follows (4: 416). The
form of the action is, as has already been shown in the first section
of the GMS, the conformity to law as such, which serves the will as
its principle (4: 402). In this manner, Kant arrives at the categorical
imperative in the singular (never to act except in such a way that
I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law, 4:
402; cf. 421). According to Kant, out of this universal categorical imperative, as their principle, all imperatives of duty, i. e., all particular categorical imperatives such as the prohibition on lying, stealing,
etc., are derived (cf. 4: 402). What unites these distinct categorical
imperatives is the fact that one ought to act in the prescribed way not
for an actual or possible purpose, but simply because the action is
good in itself. To prove that there actually are such actions (and
thus also the categorical imperative that commands them) is the aim
of the third section of the GMS.
Literature
Kants writings
Kants writings will be cited according to the pagination of Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: deGruyter, 1902) (abbreviated
as AA). The Critique of Pure Reason will be cited according to the A/B
pagination from the first and second editions. All textual references are to
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press, 1992).
GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA, IV
KdU Kritik der Urteilskraft, AA, V
KpV
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AA, V
KrV
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA III, IV
MAN Metaphysische Anfangsgrnde der Naturwissenschaft, AA, IV
MdSR Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre, AA, VI
MdST Metaphysik der Sitten, Tugendlehre, AA,VI
RGV Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, AA, VI
TG
Trume eines Geistersehers, AA, II
Other works
Allison, Henry E. (1990): Kants Theory of Freedom, Cambridge.
Beck, Lewis White (1974): Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Ein
Kommentar, Mnchen.
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Bernd Ludwig
This kind of insertion is, for instance, used when trying to take into account the
peculiarities of the addressee, like: If you want to play the piano well, YOU have to
practice (in opposition to your advanced brother).
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Unlike angels and saints, human beings are not reasonable beings but
only capable of reason. Their willing is not necessarily determined
by reason but can also be stimulated by inclinations. This is where
the necessitation, or ought, comes from on part of the reason. You
should do X! or just Do X! is thus the natural form of the imperative
which speaks to the one of whom it is expected that her or his will is
not determined
from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are
valid for every rational being as such. (GMS, 413)
Any given imperative can be examined not only with respect to the
content, but also with respect to the conditions under which it is actually commanding: If certain conditions would not apply anymore,
would the necessitation, the ought, vanish and hence the imperative
as such turn invalid or void? These conditions may either be changed
by the addressee of the ought, or not. In the second section of the
Groundwork, Kant is only interested in the former kind of conditions.
Consequently, he distinguishes imperatives as follows:
141
As one can see from the lecture notes of Collins and Mrongovius,
Kant had already given lectures in this spirit some years earlier. Here
one can find formulations like this:
The imperatives of skill command only hypothetically [] The imperatives of prudence command not only given a problematic condition but
given an assertoric one. (AA XXVII, 246, compare 1399 f.)
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Hence, applied to practical rules, the terms categorical and hypothetical do generally not refer to a possible (judgment-)form of an
imperative, but to the mode of the determination of will only. For this
reason, grammatically the two terms are no adjectives which belong
to imperative, but they determine the verb command attributively.2
There are neither hypothetical imperatives nor categorical imperatives sensu stricto, 3 but only hypothetically- or categoricallycommanding statements respectively, which, in so far as they command, are imperatives (or are called so) and which all have the same
form: Do X!. Hypothetical and categorical are not placeholders
in an imaginary Kantian table of the imperatives4, but just name
the relevant relation in a judgment about the practical character of
a statement given as a practical one. Strictly speaking, hypothetical
and categorical are terms that belong to the meta-theory of imperatives. They dont classify imperatives, but they appear in judgements
2
Also KpV, 31: represented a priori as a categorical proposition, KpV, 32, and
MdST, 404: commands categorically, similar GE, 282 and 416. In German, the
terms kategorisch and hypothetisch stand for adjectives and adverbs both.
That is to say, the semantic relations fundamentally differ here from the ones in the
case of hypothetical judgments: There it is not the character of the judgment which
is contingent, but solely the asserting of (one of) the singular judgments. Hence, hypothetical judgments are always judgments, but hypothetical imperatives sensu
stricto were only imperatives if the antecedent were true.
In analogy to the Table of Judgements (in KrV, B95) M. Moritz f. i. misses disjunctive imperatives (s. 9 ff.).
143
6
7
The hypothetical judgment is not made of one judgment and one imperative but of
two judgments (KrV, B98).
See Patzig (1973, 209 f.).
The inventor of this example, Hare (1971), shows the trouble one gets into, if one
sticks to this misguided (and not Kantian) analysis. A simple reduction ad absurdum shows that any expression of the form EO(M) wont work as a formal version of Who wants the end, ought to want the necessary means, with E standing
for Person p wants the end , M for Person p wants the means and O( ) for
something like It has to be the case that . We only have to apply contraposition twice: let ~m~e stand for the proposition [underlying EO(M)] that the
means is necessary for the end in question. Since ~m~e is equivalent to ~~e
~~m, ~MO(~E) as well has to be the expression of an imperative (by the very
same reason as for which EO(M) is one). But ~MO(~E) is equivalent to
~O(~E)M again and this latter is unquestionably nonsense: nobody wants the
means in all cases where there is no obligation/necessity to abandon the end. Since
the only non-trivial step in the argument above is the transition from ~m~e to
EO(M), this must be inadequate.
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non datur). However, then there only came off an infinite regress of
hypothetical conditions but never a necessitation, not to mention that
it remains entirely clouded what could be the content of the antecedent
of each single one of the hypothetical imperatives in question.
Therefore, according to the opening considerations and to Kants
proper definitions, a statement like: If you want to be happy, avoid pain!
is not an imperative at all,8 but simply a truth-apt judgment whichcontains
an imperative. At the most, it is a kind of advice which one usually uses
to argue for the relevance of the imperative-formula Avoid pain! And
further, it is not even a hypothetical judgement (that is, a conditional),
since it does not answer the question: Under which conditions shall I
avoid pain?, but rather: For what reasons shall I avoid pain?. Only if
one kept on asking after having received the answer (Because you want
to be happy.) and thus discovered being free of pain to be a necessary
condition of human happiness, eventually a hypothetical judgment came
into play: If you dont avoid pain, then you cannot be happy.
Although at first sight Kant himself speaks a bit loosely in this context and seems to equate hypothetical imperatives with counsels
(GMS, 416,19; but then 24 f.), one should be aware of the fact that
he gave a clear and consistent exposition of the basic concepts afore,
which make it possible for the reader to specify such stenographical
formulations and thus explicate them in a coherent and adequate manner. We will see that Kant isnt very particular about the terminology
in this respect when looking at the alleged analyticity of hypothetically-commanding imperatives. But first, the basic idea of the proof of
the possibility of hypothetical imperatives must be recapitulated.
III. The Possibility of hypothetical Imperatives
Lets start again with some elementary considerations independent of
Kants writings:
1. A man9 who wants to realise an end (E) which cannot be realised without any help on his part, is necessitated to do10 something
definite, viz. to apply the necessary means (M). This is completely
8
9
10
145
This passage claims three things:12 1. Who wants the end wants (in
so far as ) the means. 2. Statement (1) is analytic. 3. The imperative derives the concept of necessary action from the wanting the end.
According to Kant, these three statements contain the answer to his
question of how we can conceive the necessitation of the will which
the imperative expresses (GMS, 417). Furthermore, Kant stresses
that this question does in fact not need any exceptional discussion,
that the answer goes without saying to a certain degree. Obviously,
the fi rst statement is true if the second is. And the third should then
result with the aid of the first.
First, ad 2.: Analyticity of the means-end-formula
11
12
Who does not want to practice the piano and knows that it cannot be done without,
simply cannot do anything he himself could understand as expression of his will to
become a pianist, i. e. it is not clear what is meant by he wants to become a pianist
in this case.
For reasons of clarity, the three assertions are represented in an abridged way.
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However, this text dates from 1797. Therefore one has to be aware
of the fact that it already takes into consideration the distinction between Wille (sc. will) and Willkr (sc. choice), which Kant doesnt
draw yet in the Groundwork and which he only uses firmly after the
Religion from 1793. It is also mentioned in the introduction to the
Metaphysics of Morals:
The faculty of desire in accordance with concepts, insofar as the ground
determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called a
faculty to do or to refrain from doing as one pleases. Insofar as it is joined
with ones consciousness of the ability to bring about its object by ones
action it is called choice; if it is not joined with this consciousness its act
is called a wish. The faculty of desire whose inner determining ground,
hence even what pleases it, lies within the subjects reason is called the
will. (MdSR, 213)
This Willkr (choice) corresponds to Wille in the means-end-formula of the Groundwork. To answer the question of the analyticity of
this formula one has to be aware that Kants concept of Willkr (1785:
of Willen, GMS, 449) includes consciousness of the ability to bring
about its object (MdSR, 213). But under this presupposition the willing of the end almost naturally comprises the willing of every ground
of possibility of the action (GMS, 427) identified as necessary.13 For if
13
See also the quotation from GMS, 417, above: but if I know that it is only by this
process Surely, one feels already necessitated if one only believes. As expected,
147
14
Kant does nowhere in his argument assume that the relevant causal judgments are
true.
However, it is hard to judge singular cases: I cannot live that way usually just
means: I do not want to live that way, for the price is too high still, the bystanders
sometimes consent that one cannot live that way. But then it is all about what we
want to expect of each other and not about where the natural necessities begin.
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at something impossible, e. g., to make what has happened not have happened (O mihi praeteritos, etc.), or, when impatiently waiting, to make the
time until the wished-for disappear. (KdU, 177; my emphasis)
The necessitating character of the hypothetically-commanding imperatives, which goes beyond the insight that who wants the end also
wants the means, as long as the reason decisively determines his actions,
shows itself in two cases: 1. If the one, whose will is not (yet) determined
decisively by the reason in the relevant respect, is necessitated to find
the means (without he cannot realise the end), i. e. get his reason the
relevant influence. Or 2.: If the one, who already knows about the necessary means, feels necessitated to decide whether to do without the
realisation of the ends or to use the means. What he surely cannot do
(and hence, which he cannot be ordered to omit) is both to want the end
and at the same time not want the means already known to be necessary. Hence in this second case he is not necessitated to do something,
but only to make a decision: He is necessitated to give up his end
(GMS, 420), or to use the means in question. Though, who wants end
and means likewise is not necessitated at all, just like Kants saints: For
those only laws apply which are no imperatives (GMS, 414).
In this sense, a hypothetically-commanding imperative indeed
necessitates, regardless of the fact that everyone who wants the end
wants the means as well as long as the reason decisively determines
his willing. For, who wants the end and knows what the necessary
means is (sc. as long as ) is not necessitated to want the means, he
just wants it. Who does not want the means is not necessitated not to
want the end, he (as long as ) just does not want it. The necessitation only shows itself when incompatible wishes face each other. In
that case only one of them can become a will, and if that happens, the
other wish looses its force and reason has gained decisive influence.
Consequently, the ought, which is expressed by the hypothetical
imperative in view of the means in question, is always a hypothetical
149
willing at the same time. However, it is misleading to talk about rational willing as a paraphrase of Kants own formula: wills also (so
far as reason decides his conduct). Willing is exclusive to rational beings anyway, as Kant claims: the will is nothing but practical reason
(GMS, 412,26 ff.), and, hence, a non-rational willing is an absurdity
within the scope of Kants considerations. What Kant must have in
mind here is that without influence of reason one does not develop
any relation to a certain object or a certain behaviour whatsoever. If I
want the radio to play music but dont know that for making that possible I have to get up from my chair, I have no more will regarding my
sitting position than regarding the position of a stone on the backside
of the moon. Consequently, the parenthesis so far as reason decides
his conduct does not mean that we metaphorically speaking listen
to reason sometimes more and sometimes less, but to what degree it
speaks to us in particular cases. For after it has spoken to us, we dont
have the choice of being disobedient anymore: who knows that he cannot make the radio play without getting up, but still refuses to get up,
from now on simply lacks consciousness of the ability to bring about
its object (MdSR, 213), in short: the will for music, for he knows of
all remaining actions that they wont make the radio play. He isnt ordered or forbidden anything but he just realises what he cannot do.
If in the context given Kant inserts the clause as far as reason decides [mageblich beeinflut] he thus does not refer to the fact that
reason can prevail15 against the passions (as one has to imagine it in
the case of the categorical imperative) but he refers to our capacity
to deduct (GMS, 412,28 ff.) an action from a given rule. It might
happen even to Kants saints that they are influenced by reason insufficiently and thus dont develop a will concerning getting up from
the chair, even if they want to listen to the radio. But in this case (as
always with saints) it is not moral imperfection but mere epistemic
incompleteness (or stupidity, admittedly), which is mageblich at this
point. Maybe the unknowing saint does not want to get up. But he
must, if he wants to listen to the announcements of the Holy Father
on the radio. Being a saint, he e suppositione does not struggle with
irrational inclinations, but he is necessitated nevertheless to find out
the adequate rule that tells him what is required to realise his end.
Maybe Kant has not shown clearly enough the difference between
what against the necessitation works in cases of hypothetical and cat15
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egorical imperatives respectively.16 The necessitation in hypothetically-commanding imperatives is on his conditions no necessitation
reason exerts as an antagonist of the inclinations, but always a necessitation which one inclination by the help of reason exerts against another. The addressee of the imperative does not have to do anything
definite but rather to decide which of the (say, morally neutral) inclinations (or wishes) he wants to give in: to stay in the chair or to listen
to the radio. The hypothetical imperative makes clear to him that he
can only make his wish to stay in the chair a will at the price of letting
go his wish to listen to the radio.
Accordingly, Kant does not say: Who wants the end (and knows
about the necessary means) ought to17 want the means but plainly
wants the means (GMS, 417, lines 10 and 30). The determination of
the will by a hypothetical imperative does not consist in an order to
want18 only consistently. This would be futile because it would order
us to refrain from doing something we cannot do anyway. Rather, the
determination consists in the imperatives necessitating us to make
our wishes consistent when it comes to actions, i. e. to the willing, by
showing us what we wish, but cannot do and in the face of that knowledge cannot want, either. In short: You want, because you know that
you cannot do differently!. The necessitation is the repercussion of
wanting the means upon wanting the end.
It is different in the case of Kants categorical imperatives: you are
capable, because you know that you are obliged (see KpV, 30); but
the inversion does not hold that you are incapable, just because you
know that your action is prohibited human beings are no angels,
whose reason is practical without any hindrances, thus determines
the will, but they are always stimulated by their inclinations (GMS,
449; see also KpV, 82, and MdST, 383). In this respect the moral prescriptions which one can violate deliberately are principally different from hypothetical imperatives. Exactly because of this, according
to Kant, the latter are just Corollarien aus der Naturwissenschaft
16
17
18
This lack of clarity fi nds an echo in Kants ambiguous use of the word Gebot. In
the beginning he defi nes all imperatives as formulas of Gebote (GMS, 413), but
later (GMS, 416) he suggests that only categorical imperatives are such.
Or muss (must), as in Patzig (1973, 215). At best Who wishes the end, shall will
the means would render an understandable assertion. In Kant we mostly fi nd: I
ought to do something, because I want something (GMS, 441,11; 444, 4 and 11; the
only exception: GMS, 419,9).
Though Downie (1984, 486) consents to that, he tries to show that there is a moral
obligation of practical consistency alike to a liability behind hypothetical imperatives.
151
(KdU, 173; MdSR, 222; see also AA XX, 200), which might contain
a determination of will. As one can easily see now, they just necessitate us, when we know about the means to an end, to decide for the
means or against the end.19 Simply and solely categorical imperatives
necessitate us to decide for or against something definite, hence, to do
something definite.
IV. Hypothetical vs. Absolute Necessitation Achenwall
Still, the perhaps surprising discovery that hypotheticallynecessitating imperatives do not make particular actions necessary but rather
decisions is not just a modern interpretation of Kant, but can already
be found in Gottfried Achenwalls (whom Kant thought so highly of)
terminological fixing of an obviously ready-established usage:
Si determinatur alter ad unicum; coactio vocatur absoluta: si ad unum ex
quibusdam determinatis eligendum; dictur hypothetica. (Elementa Iuris
Naturae, 1750, 70)20
20
21
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Bernd Ludwig
153
Every now and then, the Kantian assertion that hypothetical imperatives were analytic practical propositions (GMS, 419) is described
as: hypothetical imperatives are analytic statements with the last
expression standing for Kants analytical judgements, e. g. the heading title of a chapter in H. J. Patons classic The Categorical Imperative
is Imperatives of skill are analytic propositions. Evidently, it is only a
very small step from here to a question like: Are hypothetical imperatives true in virtue of their logical form, are they even tautologies?22
This kind of question contains a false presupposition, which I want
to focus upon in the following. Kant himself does on no account say that
hypothetical imperatives are analytic judgements or statements. According to him, hypothetical imperatives are analytic, at the best, in the
figurative sense that one will fall back on an analytic principle if one
explains their being possible: Having shown the possibility of imperatives of skill with the help of the means-end-formula (GMS, 417,11 and
417,23), he writes that the imperatives of prudence were just as analytic (as those of skill) (GMS, 417,29). At this point, this can just mean that
their possibility can also be shown with the analytic formula in question
only,23 for more has not been mentioned (and is neither mentioned elsewhere in the Groundwork). In a later passage, again, it is said of an imperative of prudence that it is an analytic practical proposition (GMS,
419,4) and that it differs from an imperative of skill only in the specific
end (sc. happiness). This is an allusion to the mentioned figurative way
of talking, which becomes even clearer through the attributive position
of analytic: the reason that the statement is a practical one is a fact that
can be stated by an analytical judgement about the necessitation to the
application of a means, in case the will to the end is given.
Hence the assumption that Kant believed hypothetical imperatives
to be analytic statements in any sense or even analytic judgments (no
matter how dubious an allegation like that might be anyway24) does
not find any support by reference to the Groundwork (or in fact to
any other of his writings), since Kant nowhere says that hypothetical
imperatives themselves are analytic. In the three passages suggest22
23
24
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Bernd Ludwig
ing that Kant might want to assert something like that, he is only concerned with the very familiar claim of the analyticity of the principle
forming the basis of the explanation, why the use of the means is in
fact imperative for her or him who wills the end. Kant never claims
that the imperative itself is analytic.
These negative findings get confirmed further by Kants talk of the
synthetic-practical character of the categorical imperative. Even if Kant
uses the formula synthetical practical proposition sc. synthetischer
praktischer Satz (GMS, 444, instead of synthetic-practical proposition
sc. synthetisch-praktischer Satz) later and, in this case, does not use
synthetic grammatically as an attribute to practical but as a second
predicate to proposition (and of same rank as practical), this does not
indicate that Kant wants to express more than what he has already written
in the footnote to the formulation a priori synthetic practical proposition.
Here, he directly and negatively refers to the analytic means-end-formula by emphasising that in case of the categorical imperative
the willing of an action [is not deduced] by mere analysis from another
already presupposed (for we have not such a perfect will), but connects it
immediately with the conception of the will of a rational being, as something not contained in it. (GMS, 420)
155
Here, Kant intermingles two statements: The imperative itself (sc. the
synthetic proposition which commands apodeictically sc. der synthetische Satz der apodiktisch gebietet, viz. Dont steal!) and the
judgment which says that the rule or law in question (i. e. this very
imperative) in fact is an imperative. If it mattered that the imperative itself were a synthetical statement (like the latter part of Kants
formulation might suggest at first sight), this would nevertheless be of
no importance to the point in question, for it would only show that it
is not possible to find out about the statements truth (but not about
its imperative mode) by analysing its concepts. As long as hypothetical is supposed to be the hypothetical from the First Critique and
Prolegomena, the statement to be analysed can only be a judgment,
and in this case, it is the judgement concerning the practical character
of the given imperative (just as the second half of the quote tells us,
compare also GMS, 420).
Quite as in the other cases the benevolent interpreter might either
assume that Kant falls back on a (deeply puzzling and, unfortunately,
nowhere recorded) thesis of the transmission of the well-known analytic-synthetic-differentiation from judgements to imperatives. Or he
might assume that Kant was not always as careful as necessary to be
taken at his word when distinguishing between the semantic levels.
If the second alternative is approved, we will maintain that it is not
the imperative itself which is analytic or synthetic, but the judgement
(which in this case is special, affirmative categorical and necessary
according to the table of judgements) stating the practical character
of statements addressed to someone who has specific ends.25 Some imperatives command hypothetically (for example: Practise the piano!
if she or he has the end of becoming a virtuoso) and some command
categorically (Keep your promise!). And some seeming imperatives
are in fact no imperatives at all: Keep control of the calories now!
is just no imperative at all for her or him who does not want to reduce
weight. In the first and in the last case we just have to explore what it
means to have or have not a particular end. In the second case, this is
25
Thus, those proposals of correction which claim against Kant that hypothetical imperatives were not analytical become obsolete, cf. e. g. Schnecker (1999, 96).
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Bernd Ludwig
just not enough, and the inquiry has to be postponed until the third
Section of the Groundwork.
Since this interpretation is compatible with all passages in the
Groundwork26 in which Kant makes use of the analytic/synthetic-distinction, it does not need any demanding theses about tacit reinterpretations of the concept of analyticity, a concept which was already
well-known from his other writings.
VI. The End
Who does not only wish but also acts, i. e. who wills anything in the
Kantian sense, is necessitated to obtain adequate insights, realise them
and, as a consequence of these insights, to decide between the options
which are identified as being incompatible. Kants theory of hypothetically necessitating imperatives which are analytically-practical statements (but neither hypothetical judgments nor analytic judgments) is
the subtle explication of this central but not very enigmatic fact. It is
no hidden theory of practical rationality and it does not presuppose
any idiosyncratic doctrines from transcendental philosophy. Hence,
if Kant himself says that the possibility of hypothetical imperatives
does not need any exceptional discussion, the aequitas hermeneutica
requires to refute any interpretation as inadequate which urges us to
suppose that there is anything to make out but an ingenious conceptual
frame for a picture rather familiar to his contemporaries. Whether or
not this conceptual frame is adequate has not been answered this way27
but it seems that smart alternatives are quite rare up to present.
Literature
Kants writings
Kants writings are cited according to the pagination of Kants gesammelte
Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: deGruyter, 1902) (abbreviated as
AA). The Critique of Pure Reason will be cited according to the A/B pagination from the first and second editions. All textual references are to The
26
27
Kant does not take up the distinction between analytical and synthetical imperatives later again.
See further Ludwig 1999.
157
Other works
Achenwall, Gottfried/Ptter, Johann Stephan (1750): Anfangsgrnde des
Naturrechts (Elementa Iuris Naturae). Frankfurt a. M. 1995.
Downie, R. S. (1984): The Hypothetical Imperative, in: Mind vol. 43, 481
490.
Hare, R. Melvin (1971): Wanting: Some Pitfalls, in: R. Blinkley et al. (eds.),
Agent, Action, and Reason, Oxford, 8197.
Moritz, Michael (1960): Kants Einteilung der Imperative, Lund.
Paton, Herbert James (1953): The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kants
Moral Philosophy, New York et.al.: Hutchinson.
Patzig, Gnther (1973): Die logischen Formen praktischer Stze in Kants
Ethik, in: G. Prauss (Hrsg.): Kant. Zur Deutung seiner Theorie von Erkennen und Handeln, Kln, 207222.
Schnecker, Dieter (1999): Kant: Grundlegung III. Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs, Freiburg i. Br./Mnchen.
Schnecker, Dieter/Wood, Allen W. (22004): Immanuel Kant Grundlegung
zur Metaphysik der Sitten: ein einfhrender Kommentar, Paderborn.
Schwaiger, Clemens (1999): Kategorische und andere Imperative: zur Entwicklung von Kants praktischer Philosophie bis 1785, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt.
Ludwig, Bernd (1999): Warum es keine hypothetischen Imperative gibt,
und warum Kants hypothetisch-gebietende Imperative keine analytischen
Stze sind, in: H. Klemme, B. Ludwig, et al. (eds.), Aufklrung und Interpretation, Wrzburg, 105124.
Mark Timmons
Kants rationale for this re-casting is elaborated in the Critique of Practical Reason,
chapter II, in a section entitled, On the Typic of Pure Practical Judgment.
Kant writes: I understand by canon the sum total of the a priori principles of the
correct use of certain cognitive faculties in general (KrV, A796/B824).
159
Even those sympathetic to Kants universalization tests will agree with Otfried
Hffe (2002, 144) that [Kants] manifold assurance that the universalization of
false promising runs into contradiction stands in peculiar contrast to the absence
of a precise demonstration of the point. And the same point holds with respect to
Kants use of the test in connection with other duties as well.
A point forcefully argued by Allen Wood (1999, 97110).
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Here are a few of relatively recent vintage: Korsgaard (1985), Herman (1993), Baron
(1997), Wood (1999, ch. 3), and Kerstein (2002, ch. 8). In the appendix below, I have
attempted to organize the various interpretations of how contradictions are supposed to be generated from an application of the CI.
161
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163
Rosss example might prompt the thought that the more detail the better, since in his example the description lying to a would-be murderer
is both the most detailed and intuitively correct maxim for moral assessment. But in many circumstances, there will be many details (e. g.,
ones age) which are not morally relevant and whose mention in ones
maxim will affect its universalizability and thus lead to intuitively mistaken moral verdicts. So, presumably, a solution to the problem of relevant descriptions would specify which features of ones choice situation
are morally relevant and thus ought to be included in a formulation of
ones maxim and, by implication, which features lack moral relevance
and ought not be included. We return to this issue in IV.
From step 1 to 2: raising ones maxim to universal law
Going from step 1 to step 2 is a matter of raising ones maxim to its
universalized counterpart, but there are questions about how this
is to be done. The dominant interpretation (reflected in the above
scheme) is that one imagines ones maxim raised to the status of a
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Pogge notes that in some places (e. g., GMS, 403) Kant poses the crucial universalizability question by asking whether one can consistently will that everyone may (as
opposed to will) act on her maxim; hence, the textual basis of the universal availability interpretation. In his 1954 book, Ross argued (in effect) that the universal
conformance to the false promising maxim featured in Kants example would not
destroy itself since if people acted always on this maxim every promise could be
relied upon to be broken, and this would in many (though not in all) cases serve as
well as if it could be relied upon to be kept (p. 30). Since he does think the universal
availability interpretation would, no doubt, lead to chaos, he too favors this latter interpretation. Allen Wood (1999, 80) claims that Kants presentations of FUL
and FLN in the Groundwork express the universal availability and universal conformity interpretations respectively. More recently, ONeill (1996, chs. 2 and 6) has
proposed what she calls a thin modal interpretation of the universalizability test in
terms of universal adoptability, though ONeill is less concerned about interpreting
Kant than she is about making use of a plausible understanding of this sort of test.
These labels were introduced by ONeill (Nell) in her 1975 book and have since
caught on in the secondary literature.
165
With regard to these questions, interpretations are more or less austere, where the most austere of them allow only (broadly speaking)
conceptual ancillary information, knowable a priori information
about the actions being tested or about rational agency to play a role
in generating contradictions.9 More opulent views permit the inclusion
of such empirical information as teleological laws or causal laws that
happen to govern (or in the case of teleological laws, may be taken as
if they govern) our world, including the implications of the operation
of such laws in a world like ours.
This issue about the kinds of information that may be used to generate contradictions affects how well the tests can generate intuitively
correct results for admittedly wrong actions. Compared to austere interpretations, more opulent interpretations allow empirical information to play a role and (arguably) make the tests more useful in generating moral verdicts about a wider range of issues bearing on human
conduct and thus more powerful as a decision procedure (about which
more will be said in the next section).
The issue concerning epistemic status affects the scope of those
agents for whom the moral verdicts reached by the procedure hold.
Given Kants repeated claim that moral laws must hold for all (finite)
rational agents (including, but not limited to human agents), there is
pressure to interpret the tests austerely so that minimal assumptions
about, e. g., rational agency, are involved in deriving moral verdicts.10
So there would appear to be a kind of trade-off here: the more austere
ones interpretation, the greater the scope of the moral conclusions
reached by the deliberative procedure, however, more opulent interpretations, though narrower in scope, allow for a greater range of implications about duties and obligations that pertain to human beings.
9
10
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12
13
In MdST, 393, Kant refers to inner actions, by which I take him to be referring to
such actions as consciously adopting ends and which is reflected in his discussion of
maxims of ends (adopting ends) and contrasted with maxims of (overt) action.
See, for instance, ONeill (1975) for an interpretation of Kants tests that restricts
deontic verdicts to ones about subjective rightness. See Timmons (1997) for a defense of the claim that Kants tests are not restricted to yielding verdicts about the
subjective rightness of actions.
See ONeill (1985). In one place, Kant himself suggests that appeal to universalizability can be used for deriving both deontic verdicts and verdicts about worth.
After presenting FUL in section I of the Groundwork and illustrating its use in
connection with making a lying promise, Kant remarks that with this compass in
hand, [common human reason] knows very well how to distinguish in every case
that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity with or contrary
to duty (GMS, 404).
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the moral verdicts in question are primarily about the rightness and
wrongness of actions.14
This concludes, then, a first pass over the main steps in the deliberative procedure associated with FLN and some of the main questions
that arise at each step. We now proceed to examine in more detail
the very idea of FLN as a decision procedure, which will lead us to
make contact with some of the recent (and not so recent) secondary
literature.
II. FLN as a Decision Procedure:
Core Assumptions and the Strong Model
Fundamental moral principles are often cast in the dual role of providing both a decision procedure for moral deliberation and a moral
criterion. As I am using the term, a moral principle represents a moral
criterion of right action when it purports to specify those fundamental morally relevant (nonmoral) features (one or more), possession of
which by an action, makes it morally right. According to classical hedonistic versions of act utilitarianism, for instance, the fact that a concrete action (open to an agent in some circumstance) would produce
as much net happiness as would any other available alternative action,
is what makes the action in question morally right; alternatives lacking this feature also lack the feature of moral rightness, and so (given
a standard understanding of deontic concepts) are morally wrong.
Understood in this way, the principle of utility represents a moral criterion of right action. It may also be understood as representing a
moral decision procedure, according to which in moral deliberation
we are to estimate the utilities associated with various alternative actions and decide accordingly. But it need not be taken as a decision
procedure, and some defenders of the utilitarian theory have argued
that it should not be understood in this manner.15 The point is that a
moral principle need not be cast in the dual role of decision procedure
and moral criterion; it may play one role without playing the other in
the overall economy of some moral theory.
14
15
Doing so still leaves open questions about, for example, whether the verdicts represent claims about the objective deontic status of actions or whether they only
represent verdicts about subjective rightness.
See, for example, Sidgwick (1907, book IV, ch. 1, 1), Bayles (1971), and Brink
(1989, ch. 8).
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17
169
mitted correct common sense moral verdicts about those actions. This
requirement, note, will be met if, for whatever reason, the principle,
together with relevant nonmoral information, yields correct moral verdicts in all actual and possible cases in which the test yields verdicts.18
3. Relevance
Not only must an adequate moral principle satisfy the coherence criterion, but it must do so for the right reason in the sense that as a decision procedure the moral principle either expresses or otherwise is
internally related to facts about actions in virtue of which they have
the deontic status they have. Assume that FLN is not a moral criterion
but that the humanity formulation is. Then, for FLN to satisfy the relevance condition, the fact that a maxim is not universalizable must be
somehow internally connected to the fact that the action in question
fails to properly respect humanity as an end in itself.19
To summarize: self-sufficiency articulates what is required for FLN
to play the role of a decision procedure; coherence represents perhaps
the most basic condition of adequacy of a decision procedure; and relevance serves to help explain why it is that a self-sufficient decision procedure does satisfy the coherence criterion. Giving up on some or all of
these seems tantamount to giving up on FLN as an adequate decision
procedure; they represent core assumptions. By contrast, the following
four additional theses each represent ways in which the core may be
strengthened thus making FLN a very potent decision procedure.
B. FLN: the strong model
4. Deontic power
There is textual evidence that Kant understood FLN as expressing
both a necessary and sufficient condition of moral rightness.20 If this
principle does have this kind of deontic power, then not only will it be
18
19
20
My formulation here is meant to capture a very weak coherence requirement according to which FLN never leads to deontic verdicts that conflict with common
sense moral convictions. Strictly speaking, this requirement will be met even in case
FLN simply fails to yield any deontic verdicts. In this case, the complaint would be
that FLN is useless because completely indeterminate.
Although I do not take this desideratum to be quite as central as are the other two
to the success of FLN as a decision procedure, it certainly represents an assumption
that one would expect it to satisfy if it indeed satisfies self-sufficiency and coherence. The importance of this desideratum is stressed by Herman (1989 and 1993).
See Pogge (1989, 189 f.) on this point who cites GMS, 421, and other passages as
evidence that it expresses a necessary condition and GMS, 403, as evidence that
Kant took it to express a sufficient condition as well.
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able to rule out actions and omissions that are morally wrong, but it
will be able to rule in actions and omissions as obligatory. This would
mean, further, that FLN would be powerful enough to generate negative duties and positive duties.
5. Act-level determinacy
According to this desideratum, FLN is powerful enough to yield conclusions about the deontic status of a wide range of reasonably specific
act tokens concrete doings (or omittings) that are or might be performed by a person at a time in a particular set of circumstances.
6. Classificatory accuracy
The classification at issue here is between importantly different types
of duty. Kant claims that his two tests are sufficient for accurately classifying morally required actions and omissions into the categories of
perfect and imperfect duty.
7. Maximum scope
The scope of a moral principle is a matter of the width or generality
of the class of agents to whom the principle is properly addressed. A
principle has wide scope vis--vis humans when it holds for all accountable human agents. A principle has maximum width of scope
if it holds for all finite accountable agents, human and non-human.
Certainly Kant thinks that the CI has maximum scope. The more
interesting and controversial thought is that derived mid-level moral
generalizations of the sort featured in the Tugendlehre system of duties (what I will call moral rules) also have maximum scope.
As I will proceed to explain further in the next section, these latter
four desiderata are not a package deal: one might accept some of them
and reject others (what I am calling a strong model comes in degrees
of strength). But let us pause before moving on in order to bring together the key ideas from this and the previous section.
We now have before us what I take to be the main interpretative
questions about Kants universalizability tests ( I) and in this section we have set out the various core assumptions implicated in taking FLN as a decision procedure as well as made note of various desiderata each of which represents one way of strengthening FLN as
a decision procedure. In the next section, I will briefly indicate why
many recent interpreters (some of them sympathetic to FLN as some
kind of adequate decision procedure) deny one or more of the strong
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theses. This will help us focus on how those who are sympathetic to
FLN as a decision procedure understand its deliberative power. But
then in IV and V, I want to get down to business and argue that:
(1) contrary to what some believe, the promise of FLN as a decision
procedure, whether strong or weak, cannot be saved (as perhaps some
think) by appeal to a theory of relevant descriptions, that therefore (2)
we ought to reject FLN as an adequate decision procedure. All this is
negative. But I then go on to argue, in a more positive vein, that (3) the
significance of universalizability in Kants ethics need not rest with
the CC and CW tests, rather (4) it is best understood as a metaethical constraint on moral reasons, and finally that (5) if we view Kants
Groundwork applications of FLN to maxims in the context of the
books overall strategy, then we should view Kants tests as representing ad hominem arguments addressed to morally conscientious agents
who are capable of experiencing moral demands but who are tempted
by considerations of self-interest to violate those demands.
III. Troubles for FLN as a Decision Procedure
In this section, then, I continue our investigation of FLN by first explaining the move away from strong interpretations by interpreters
who remain (somewhat) optimistic about this principle as a decision
procedure. However, I go on to explain why I think that a pessimistic
verdict about FLN is warranted; its importance within Kants ethics is
not primarily that of a decision procedure.
A. Chipping away at the strong model
Let us consider the grounds for rejecting each of the four strong theses, taking them up in reverse order.
7. Wide Scope
In the preface to the Groundwork, Kant famously claims that:
Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a ground
of obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the
command thou shalt not lie does not hold for human beings, as if other
rational beings did not have to heed it, and so with all other moral laws
properly so called; that, therefore the ground of obligation here must not
be sought in the nature of the human being or in the circumstances of the
world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in concepts of pure reason
(GMS, 389).
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22
Galvin (1991) and Swoyer (1983) defend the idea that only a priori ancillary assumptions are allowed in Kants tests, many others, including, Gram (1967), Potter (1975), Harrison (1957, 1958), ONeill (1985), Timmons (1984), Wood (1999),
interpret Kants tests as allowing empirical ancillary assumptions to play a role in
generating contradictions.
Here I am compressing two distinct levels: (1) the level where Kant appeals to very
general information about human beings in deriving the basic obligations that are
at the same time ends (self-perfection and happiness of others), and (2) the level of
more specific duties to oneself and duties to others that is elaborated in Parts I and
II of the Doctrine of Elements of Ethics in The Metaphysics of Morals.
173
24
For an overview of the empirical assumptions operative in Kants tests see Wood
(1999, ch. 3).
Among those who allow information about human beings qua human as a legitimate part of Kants derivation of duties disagree over the epistemic status of such
information. See Swoyer (1983), Pogge (1989), and Herman (1993).
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27
175
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Mark Timmons
Of course, this claim would have to be defended by examining the various interpretations of the CC and CW tests since what works as a counterexample to one
interpretation may be avoided by one of its rival interpretations; a project I cannot
undertake here. However, for recent, good overviews that substantiate my pessimism see Wood (1999, ch. 3) and Kerstein (2002, ch. 8).
177
position of being able to save an innocent persons life in order to protect that person from being harmed. Again, were we to have in hand a
principled account of morally relevant features, we would have a basis
for arguing that the second maxim is to be used in Kants tests since it
includes morally relevant information about ones circumstances and
purposes that the former lacks.
IV. Will a Theory of Relevance Save FLN?
I myself, from time to time, have optimistically suggested that alleged
counterexamples to FLN can be dealt with in this way.29 My current
skepticism is not due to the fact that Kants theory does not include
a principled account of moral relevance this is a quite absurd suggestion, anyway. Rather, as I will explain shortly, making use of Kant
theory of moral relevance undermines FLN as self-sufficient and it
cannot save Kants tests from all obvious counterexamples. Let us
explore this issue by first bringing into focus Kants theory of moral
relevance, and then proceed to examine how his theory might be of
use in his universality tests.
A. Kants solution to the problem of relevant descriptions
So here is the hypothesis under consideration. Were Kant to have a
principled account of moral relevance, then we could use it to determine which features of ones circumstances are morally relevant and
should be included in an expression of ones maxim for moral testing,
and we could also use it to determine which features are not morally
relevant and should not be included in a specification of ones maxim.
Now Kant does have a theory of moral relevance that is expressed
in humanity formulation of the CI and is elaborated in the Tugendlehre system of moral duties. Let me explain. 30 A moral theory (whether
of right conduct or value) is in the business of specifying those fundamental features or properties of actions, persons, and their circumstances in virtue of which an action or other item of evaluation has
the moral properties it has. 31 The fundamental moral principles featured in a moral theory that purport to pick out which features, most
29
30
31
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33
This is not the whole story, however. The principle of autonomy, for reasons that I
will explain below in section V, is also deeply implicated in Kants theory of moral
relevance.
Talk of bearing here is meant to include not only how our actions causally affect
the rational autonomy of persons, but also considerations about what various actions express about rational autonomy. For more on this, see Wood (1999, 141 f.;
147 f.) and Timmons (2002a).
179
and promoting those essential capacities and tendencies that are essential to the exercise of human rational autonomy.
How then do we get a theory of moral relevance from the enriched
conception of humanity? There are two points to be made. First,
think of the various Tugendlehre negative duties to oneself duties
to refrain from suicide, immoderate consumption of food and drink,
improper use of ones sexual organs as indicating general types of
action which, given basic anthropological facts about human nature,
necessarily interfere in some way with the maintenance of humanity in ourselves. Again, think of the various positive duties to oneself
duties to develop our (specifically human) powers of body, mind,
and spirit as types of activity the principled omission of which would
interfere with the maintenance and promotion of our humanity. Similar remarks apply to the various negative and positive duties to others.
So the first idea here is that the various duties of Kants Tugendlehre
system represent an anthropologically grounded specification (better:
an interpretation) of the (initially) thin notion of rational autonomy.
But what does all this have to do with the issue of relevant descriptions? This brings us to the second point. To consider an action as of a
certain type is, in effect, to consider it under some description or other.
For many such descriptions, because of their importance in moral and
social life, we have single terms that serve to pick out actions under a
description. To classify an action as a case of suicide is short for classifying it under a more cumbersome description. The same goes for
terms such as, gluttony, lying, avarice, servility, ingratitude,
malice, and envy that are featured in Kants system of duties.
I am suggesting, then, that the system of Tugendlehre duties represents the outline of a principled account of moral relevance. In cases
where some action of mine can be correctly classified as an instance
of one or more of the various actions mentioned in the system of duties, then this fact about it is morally relevant. Any other fact about an
action that is morally relevant in some context will be derivatively relevant in the sense that its relevance (in that context) can be explained
by appeal to one or more of the more basic relevant features that are
expressed in the system of duties.
B. Why the solution does not save FLN
Recall the three core assumptions associated with FLN as a decision
procedure: self-sufficiency, coherence, relevance. I will now proceed
to explain why Kants theory of moral relevance will not vindicate
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35
36
37
However, in section V I consider what I take to the philosophical and practical relevance of Kants universality tests.
ONeills 1975 solution to the problem of relevant descriptions was simply that
whatever information ones maxim (assuming that ones formulation of it is sincere)
does contain, is relevant for use of Kants tests. This means, in effect, that FLN does
contain a solution to the problem of relevance, contrary to Ross. See ONeill (1975,
13). One implication of this solution is that the tests are restricted to yielding only
judgments about the subjective rightness of actions. See ONeill (1975, 129).
This, incidentally, is to reverse the view, expressed by many interpreters, that because the concept of humanity (and the associated requirement of treating humanity as an end in itself) is excessively vague, in order to judge whether some action
would constitute a case of failing to treat someone as an end in themselves, one
must first use FLN to determine whether ones maxim is universalizable. See, for
example, Singer (1961, 235).
In the Tugendlehre, Kant only uses the universal law formulation of the CI in arguing for the duty of beneficence. See MdST, 393, 451, and 453.
181
182
M
Mark Timmons
In circumstances where: I am unemployed, I have (for health reasons) dim prospects for employment, I have a family to support, and
where I have been offered a job but about whose nature I have reservations (because of how the products of my labor might be used)
and, moreover a job which will go to a zealot if I do not take it, I will
take the job not only to provide for my family but out of gratitude to
the person who has arranged for me to get it.
This example (and many more can be provided) strongly suggest that
the CC test cannot help us reach conclusions about concrete cases
(in which we need deliberative help) when morally relevant detail is
specified in the maxims being tested.
What about the CW test? We have not said much about this test. But
from Kants Groundwork examples of letting ones (natural) talents
rust and refraining from helping others in need, the blue print for its
use is fairly clear. The maxims in these cases can be consistently conceived as laws of nature (they pass the CC test), but they cannot be con-
183
41
But see Glasgow (2003) for an intriguing attempt to explain how considerations of
temporality play a role in Kants universality tests and thus how it is that considerations of universalizability can be made to do work in deriving duties to oneself.
For a discussion of this matter, see Rawls (1989).
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2. Coherence
As I mentioned earlier, the coherence desideratum has been central in
evaluating the plausibility of Kants CC and CW tests. And I do think
that Kants theory of relevant descriptions does help to explain why
certain maxims particularly those that include intuitively morally
irrelevant information are not appropriate for moral testing. But,
unfortunately, Kants theory of moral relevance cannot save the tests
from all counterexamples, even from some of the well-known ones.
For instance, the maxim, I will buy toy trains but not sell them, cannot
be consistently universalized, but this maxim does not seem to include
morally irrelevant information about the action, nor does it seem to
omit morally relevant information about the agent, her act, or her circumstances. Here we have a false negative.
I think it is also clear that Kants tests yield false positives. With
false positives the problem seems to be that fairly specific maxims
pass the tests. In the above example featuring George, both M and
its contrary M* pass the tests. Now, of course, we could just conclude
that Georges taking the job and his turning it down are permissible
actions a case where the moral pros and cons are fairly evenly balanced. But notice that if it is the specificity of maxims that get them
through Kants tests (as seems to be the case on both the logical and
practical interpretations) then in the many cases like Georges in
which a number of competing moral considerations are relevant, both
the maxim and its contrary will pass Kants tests which implies that
the action in question and its omission are both morally permissible. I
do not believe it is plausible to suppose that in all such cases the correct moral verdict is that both the action and its omission are morally
permissible this amounts to massive moral indeterminacy.
So, I conclude that Kants theory of moral relevance, used as a constraint on formulating maxims, does not save Kants universality tests
from counterexamples and thus that the coherence desideratum perhaps the most important of the core assumptions is not satisfied.
C. Rejecting FLN as a moral decision procedure
We began with a very strong conception of a decision procedure and,
following the train of a long history of interpretation, have found
reason to conclude that (1) not only is FLN not a powerful decision
procedure, but (2) it is not self-sufficient, (3) it does not seem able to
play an adjudicative role in moral reasoning, and (4) even appealing
to a principled theory of morally relevant descriptions does not save
185
Alan Donagan (1977), for example, develops a systematic moral theory on the basis
of the humanity formulation.
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Mark Timmons
But universalizability is also used as a term to refer to metaethical theses about moral concepts. The most well-known of these is
the so-called logical principle of universalizability, which Sidgwick
expressed this way: If a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for
me is not right (or wrong) for someone else, it must be on ground
of some difference between the two cases, other than the fact that I
and he are different persons.43 This principle is supposed to express
a necessary truth that can be known a priori, and obviously its use in
moral reasoning to reach normative verdicts requires additional moral
premises. There is nothing particularly Kantian about this principle,
as evidenced by the fact that it plays a significant role in the utilitarian
moral theories of Sidgwick (1907), R. M. Hare (1963), and M. G. Singer (1961). So, if the significance of universalizability in Kants ethics
is entirely captured by the logical principle formulated by Sidgwick,
then, contrary to what many have thought, there is nothing particularly exciting or special about Kantian universalizability. But I do not
believe this is right either.
My proposal starts with the suggestion that we ought to distinguish between the philosophical significance of the idea of universal
law in the overall argumentative strategy of the Groundwork and its
practical significance as expressed in the universalizability tests. The
philosophical significance of the idea of universal law is that a proper
understanding of what such law in the realm of practical reasoning
is all about reveals to us an interconnected set of formal features
that moral reasons, qua moral, must have and which serves to distinguish them as a class from non-moral reasons and, in particular,
from prudential reasons for action. Thus, Kantian universalizability
is substantive in the sense explained above it has substantive implications about the content of moral reasons. The practical significance
of Kantian universalizability is that it can be used in moral deliberation as an ad hominem argumentative device to reveal a kind of
duplicity in choice and action and thus make manifest the distinctive
authority of moral reasons.
Before going on, let me admit that I am taking some liberties with
Kants texts. Kant himself does not explain the significance of the universal law formulations in quite the way I am proposing. However,
I believe that my interpretation of the philosophical significance of
these formulations meshes nicely with dominant themes in Kants
moral theory and that the practical significance I find (see below) in
43
187
these same formulations do a great deal of justice to what the universalizability test in Kants writings really does help reveal.
Let us now proceed to examine respectively the philosophical and
practical import of the universal law formulations of the CI.
A. Universality: it philosophical significance
Talk of the ground(s) of obligation can be usefully viewed as involving two related issues: an issue about the content of those features of
an action in virtue of which it is obligatory, and an issue about the
ultimate source of the kind of normativity that is characteristic of
moral obligation. The two issues are connected: to serve as a moral
reason, a consideration must have a kind of normative authority, indeed, for Kant, normative supremacy.44 Let us examine the matter
more closely.
I interpret the content question as having to do with a specification
of the kinds of considerations (their content) that represent moral reasons considerations about actions, agents, and their circumstances,
that are a basis for (ground) moral requirements. The content question, then, is: What kinds of contentful considerations qualify as
moral reasons? More precisely, if we assume that there is a single
underlying or fundamental consideration bearing on action in virtue
of which an action has the deontic status it has, then we can re-state
our question as: What sort of contentful consideration qualifies as a
fundamental right- and wrong-making feature?
To answer this question, we must specify some general constraints
that any kind of consideration must satisfy in order to count as a moral
reason, given our common sense notion of duty. My suggestion on
behalf of Kant is that the universal law formulations (in effect) encapsulate a set of formal requirements, based on the common notion
of moral obligation, which moral reasons, qua moral, must possess.
Doing so is a central part of Kants attempt in the Groundwork to
search for the supreme principle of morality understood as a moral criterion that picks out a fundamental morally relevant reasoning
providing consideration that grounds moral rightness.
Here, then is a list of three formal constraints on what can count as
a basic moral reason, implicated in the universalization formulations
of the CI.
44
See T. M. Scanlon (1998, ch. 4) for discussion of these two questions about moral
reasons.
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Appendix:
Sorting Out Interpretations of Kants Universalizability Tests49
There are two issues, partly (but not completely) orthogonal to one
another that figure in standard ways of classifying interpretations of
Kants CC test. 50 First, as mentioned above in section II, there is the
question of what sorts of ancillary information may legitimately play
a role in the CC test. Austere interpretations restrict such information
to necessary truths knowable a priori, while opulent interpretations
allow a posteriori claims to enter in. Second, there is the question of
the precise locus of the alleged contradiction that is revealed through
testing non-universalizable maxims. Here, so far as I can tell, there
are two main interpretative options. One of them attempts to locate
the contradiction either within the maxim qua universal law attempting to make sense of Kants claims that certain maxims, when
universalized are self-contradictory or within a system of nature
one of whose laws is the maxim qua universal law. Within this camp
we find a variety of different views on what ancillary information may
be used in generating such contradictions, and hence we find both austere and opulent versions of this species of interpretation. According
to another interpretive strain of thought, the contradiction is not in
the very conception of a law or a system of nature but rather involves
a contradiction among ones intentions involved in the process of raising ones maxim to universal law.
Here, then, is a brief overview of the various interpretations, including footnote references to each interpretations defenders.
A. Inconsistency in Law Interpretations of the CC test
1. Strict conceptual interpretation
On this interpretation the only auxiliary information allowed in the
test is represented by analytic truths that express the meanings of
those terms featured in the maxim. For example, some interpreters
have claimed that given the very concept of slavery, in order for this
practice to exist, there must be slaves and slave owners (who by definition cannot themselves be slaves). Thus, the very idea of a law according to which everyone holds slaves is itself logically inconceivable. In
49
50
Special thanks here to Josh Glasgow. Ive benefited from his unpublished handout
on the various interpretations of the CC test.
There is far less controversy, so far as I can tell over how the CW test is supposed to
work. But maybe this is owing to comparative lack of attention.
195
52
53
54
Cf. Galvin (1991). Similarly, Hffe (2002, 149) argues that experience is not required to know that a false promise harbors two conceptually internally and mutually incompatible aims.
Cf. Swoyer (1991) and perhaps Pogge (1989).
Cf. Paton (1953) and Beck (1960).
Cf. Harrison (1957); Dietrichson (1964); Timmons (1984); Rawls (1989); Herman
(1993).
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Mark Timmons
Cf. Ewing (1933); M. G. Singer (1961); Gram (1967); Potter (1975); ONeill (1975);
Korsgaard (1989). This paper was presented at the Beijing International Symposium on Kants Moral Philosophy in Contemporary Perspectives, May 2004, Peking
University, Beijing, China. It was also presented at Friedrich-Wilhelms Universitt,
July, 2004, Bonn, Germany at which the papers in this volume were presented and
discussed. I wish to thank audiences at both conferences for their valuable input. I
would especially like to thank Christoph Horn and Dieter Schnecker for organizing the Bonn conference and editing this volume. Special thanks to Corinna Mieth
for her kind help with conference arrangments. I am indebted to Josh Glasgow for
his comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.
197
Literature
Kants writings
Kants writings will be cited according to the pagination of Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: deGruyter, 1902) (abbreviated
as AA). The Critique of Pure Reason will be cited according to the A/B
pagination from the first and second editions. All textual references are to
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press, 1992).
GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA, IV
KpV
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AA, V
KrV
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA III, IV
MdSR Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre, AA, VI
MdST Metaphysik der Sitten, Tugendlehre, AA,VI
Other works
Aune, Bruce (1979): Kants Theory of Morals, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Baron, Marcia. W. / Pettit, Philip / Slote, Michael. (1997): Three Methods of
Ethics: A Debate, Oxford: Blackwell.
Bayles, Richard E. (1971): Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making
Characteristics or Decsion-Making Procedure? in: American Philosophical Quarterly, 8, 25765.
Beck, Lewis. W. (1960): A Commentary on Kants Critique of Practical Reason, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Brink, David O. (1989): Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Donagan, A. (1977): The Theory of Morality, Chicago: Chicago University
Press.
Ewing, Alfred C. (1933): The Paradoxes of Kants Ethics, in: Philosophy,
XXI, 4056.
Galvin, Richard (1991): Ethical Formalism: The Contradiction in Conception Test, in: History of Philosophy Quarterly, 8, 387408.
Glasgow, Joshua (2004): Expanding the Limits of Universalization: Kants
Duties and Kantian Moral Deliberation, in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33, 2347.
Hare, Richard M. (1963): Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Harrison, Jonathan (1957): Kants Examples of the First Formulation of the
CI, in: Philosophical Quarterly, 7, 5062.
Harrison, Jonathan (1958): The Categorical Imperative, in: Philosophical
Quarterly, 8, 36064.
Hegel, Georg F. W. (1821): Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Nisbet, H. B.
(trans.), (1991), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Herman, Barbara (1989): Murder and Mayhem, in: The Monist, 92, 411449.
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Herman, Barbara (1993): Moral Deliberation and the Derivation of Duties, in: Herman, B., The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hffe, Otfried (2002): The Prohibition against False Promising, in: Hffe,
O., Categorical Principles of Law, Migotti, M. (trans.), University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania University Press. (Originally published as Katogorische
Rechtsprinzipien, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990.)
Kerstein, Samuel J. (2002): Kants Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1985): Kants Formula of Universal Law, in:
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66, 2447. Reprinted in Korsgaard, C.
(1996): Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, and in Guyer, P. (ed.), (1998): Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
McNair, Ted (2000): Universal Necessity and Contradictions in Conception, in: Kant-Studien, 91, 2543.
Mill, John S. (1863): Utilitarianism. London.
Mulholland, Leslie (1978): Kant: On Willing Maxims to Become Universal
Law, in: Dialogue, 17, 92105.
Narveson, Jan (1985): The How and Why of Universalizability, in: Potter,
N./Timmons, M. (eds.): Morality and Universality: Essays on Ethical Universalizability, Dordrecht: Reidel.
ONeill (Nell), Onora (1975): Acting on Principle, New York: Columbia University Press.
ONeill, Onora (1985): Consistency in Action. in: Potter, N./Timmons, M.
(eds.): Morality and Universality: Essays on Ethical Universalizability,
Dordrecht: Reidel. Reprinted in: Guyer, P. (ed.), (1998): Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
ONeill, Onora (1996): Towards Justice and Virtue, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Paton, Henry J. (1953): The Moral Law, London: Hutchinson & Co.
Pogge, Thomas V. (1989): The Categorical Imperative, in Hffe, O, (ed.):
Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein Kooperativer Komentar,
Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann. Reprinted in Guyer, P. (ed.),
(1998): Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays,
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Potter, Nelson (1975): How to Apply the Categorical Imperative, in: Philosophia, 5, 395416.
Rawls, John (1989): Themes in Kants Moral Philosophy, in E. Frster (ed.):
Kants Transcendental Deductions, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Ross, Sir William D. (1954): Kants Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scanlon, Thomas M. (1998): What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sidgwick, Henry (1907): The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed, Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Publishing Co., 1981.
Singer, Marcus G. (1961): Generalization in Ethics, New York: Alfred A.
Knopf.
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201
Here I am following Thomas Hill, Jr. (1992, 3841). Allen Wood presents a slightly
different account of what Kant means by humanity (1999, 118 ff.).
As Allen Wood has pointed out to me, it is not obvious that Korsgaard attributes this
claim to Kant. But I take as some indication that she does her statement that in the
argument for the Formula of Humanity, as I understand it, Kant uses the premise
that when we act we take ourselves to be acting reasonably and so we suppose that
our end is, in his sense, objectively good (1996, 116). In any case, it is worth noting
that Korsgaards account of the regressive argument incorporates a robust notion of
an objectively good end. On her account, Kant tries to show that if an agent takes
himself to have objectively good ends, then he is committed to the unconditional
goodness of humanity. But in order for an end to be objectively good in Kants sense,
she claims, it must be the object of rational choice, provide reasons for action that
apply to every rational being (1996, 115) and be fully justified. All three criteria are
apparent in 1996, 114116.
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Samuel J. Kerstein
203
I am not convinced that this argument is successful. For detailed criticism of it, see
Kerstein (2002, 4754).
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Samuel J. Kerstein
ond step, Kant claims that this something is humanity. Kant appears to
pack his defense of this claim into the paragraph which begins: Now I
say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as
an end in itself (GMS, 428). For at this paragraphs end he concludes
that if there is a supreme practical principle for reason, then rational
beings are of absolute worth (unconditionally valuable).
On its face, the defense seems inadequate. It appears to amount to
an argument by elimination. Kant quickly dismisses three candidates
for unconditional goodness: objects of inclinations, inclinations themselves, and beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on
nature, (GMS, 428) such as animals. Then he embraces humanity as
alone suited to be an end in itself, that is, the unconditionally valuable
ground of a categorical imperative.
His dismissal of rival candidates for unconditional goodness seems
precipitate. For example, Kant says simply that all objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth; for if there were not inclinations and the needs based on them, their object would be without
worth (GMS, 428). But this statement requires defense that Kant
does not here seem to offer. For an opponent might reasonably object
that, regarding some such objects, Kant has things backwards: it is
not the case that they are valuable (just) because we desire them, but
rather the case that we desire them at least partly because they are (in
themselves) valuable.4
Even if the remarks Kant here makes did eliminate these candidates for absolute goodness, the question would arise as to whether he
is entitled to conclude that it is humanity he is looking for. After all,
might not Kant have overlooked some other candidate for absolute
goodness? What about the state of affairs of all rational agents being
happy? How does Kant dismiss this possibility? This candidate is not
itself an inclination. It need not be considered an object of an inclination. (We can easily envisage a world in which no one desires everyone
including his enemies to be happy.) And everyones happiness is
not obviously something the existence of which would rest on nature
rather than on our will.
Kants argument that only humanity could be the absolutely valuable thing needed if there is to be a categorical imperative (supreme
principle of morality) appears to suffer from serious shortcomings.
His arguments against the other candidates he considers seem far too
quick, and he does not explicitly consider at least one candidate that
4
For a defense of this sort of objection, see Gaut (1997, 176 f.).
205
That Wood attributes the fi rst two claims to Kant is manifest in the following passage: Thus Kants argument is based on the idea that to set an end is to attribute
objective goodness to it and that we can regard this goodness as originating only
in the fact that we have set those ends according to reason. The thought is . . . that
rational choice of ends is the act through which objective goodness enters the world
(1999, 129). See also (1999, 127 and 129 f.).
Wood makes clear that he attributes this claim to Kant when he states that Kant
does infer from the premise that rational nature is the source or ground of the objective goodness of all ends to the conclusion that rational nature itself is the underivative objective good, an end in itself (1999, 130). See also (1999, 127 and 129).
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Samuel J. Kerstein
Korsgaard (1996, 123) and Wood (1999, 131) each discuss this point.
Cf. Kerstein (2002, 4672).
Cf. MdST, 392.
207
11
Thomas Hill, Jr. argues (2002, 244274) that Kant does not embrace the view that
in setting an end an agent always commits himself to the ends objective goodness. I
focus more than does Hill on the issue of whether specific texts in the Groundwork
provide evidence that Kant adopts the view in question.
In this context Kant is using imperative as a success term; he is conceiving of
imperatives as valid.
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Samuel J. Kerstein
however, is that which determines the will by means of representations of reason, hence not from subjective causes, but objectively, i. e.,
from grounds that are valid for every rational being as such (GMS,
413). If we identify practical good with any end an agent sets, then
we seem to have evidence that Kant maintained the view in question.
For then Kant appears to be suggesting that what determines an agent
to pursue any end of his is a ground that is valid for every rational
being as such. And if what determines an agent to pursue any end of
his is a ground valid for every rational being as such, then it seems that
an agent is rationally compelled to view any end of his as valuable to
every rational being.
But it is questionable whether in the passage cited from GMS, 413,
Kant identifies practical good with any (and every) end an agent sets.
There is no straightforward indication that he does. He uses the term
end [Zweck] not once in the paragraph from which the passage is taken. Moreover, there is another interpretation of the passage available.
By practical good, I believe, Kant means something like objective
(practical) principles. In the two sentences preceding the passage,
Kant is describing imperatives, which are objective practical principles expressed with the help of an ought, since they are addressed
to agents, such as human beings, who might fail to act in accordance
with them. In the passage itself, Kant seems to be maintaining the following: if an agent does something at least partly on the grounds that
an imperative commands it, then the agent is acting from grounds that
are valid for every rational being as such. And that one maintains this
does not require him to embrace the quite distinct view that in setting an end, an agent must take it to be objectively good. Suppose, for
example, that Sally visits New York partly because the hypothetical
imperative If you want to visit the Empire State Building, then you
ought to travel to New York, commands this action. (I describe her as
acting partly from the imperative because a necessary ingredient of
her acting from it at all is that she have the desire to visit the Empire
State Building.12) Sally is acting from grounds that are valid for every
rational being as such. For assuming that the principle in quotations is
really an imperative, it is the expression of an objective principleone
valid for every rational being as such. The imperative is valid for us
(human beings) in that if any of us have the end of visiting the Empire
State Building, then, other things being equal, we ought to travel to
12
At GMS, 428, Kant calls relative ends, such as Sallys end to visit the Empire State
Building, grounds of hypothetical imperatives.
209
New York. Nothing here implies that in setting herself the end of visiting New York, Sally must embrace the view that the end is valuable
to all rational agents. The interpretation on the table of GMS, 413,
harmonizes well with what follows. In the very next sentence Kant
suggests that practical good is distinguished from the agreeable, as
that which has influence on the will only by means of sensation from
merely subjective causes, those which are valid only for the senses of
this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which is valid for
everyone (GMS, 413). An objective practical principle is, of course, a
a principle of reason, which is valid for everyone. It seems a stretch
to claim that in Groundwork, 412414, Kant endorses the view that in
setting an end, an agent must hold it to be objectively good.
Actually, near the beginning of the derivation of the Formula of
Humanity there is evidence that he does not endorse this view. Kant
says:
The ends that a rational being proposes as effects of its action at its discretion (material ends) are all only relative; for only their relation to a
particular kind of capacity of desire of the subject gives them their worth,
which therefore can provide no necessary principles valid universally for
all rational beings and hence valid for every volition, i. e., practical laws.
(GMS, 427 f.)
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Samuel J. Kerstein
14
Both Korsgaard (1996, 115) and Wood (1999, 128 f.) appeal to passages outside of
the Groundwork for support of their view that, according to Kant, if an agent sets
an end, he holds it to be objectively valuable. Both invoke, for example, Kants
discussion of goodness and well-being in The Critique of Practical Reason (KpV,
5861). For an interpretation of this discussion according to which Kant is not there
committing himself to the view in question, see Hill (2002, 262 ff.).
This contention challenges Korsgaard as well as Wood. See Korsgaard (1996, 122 f.).
211
The note indicated in the second sentence reads as follows: Here I put
forward this proposition as a postulate. The grounds for it will be found
in the last Section (GMS, 429). Kants claim that the human being
necessarily represents his own existence as an end in itself might be a
claim about human nature. Kant might be suggesting that it is natural
for human beings to think of themselves as superior to non-rational beings, including other animals.15 But perhaps Kant wants to leave it open
that non-human rational agents might not, as a rule, act against the
background of such a view. That would explain why Kant calls doing
so a subjective principle of acting. In any case, the plausibility of the
claim that human beings do indeed represent themselves as superior to
non-rational beings would not seem to depend on an argument regarding the ultimate source of value in the world.
But what are we then to make of the rest of the passage, in particular of Kants remark that every other rational being also represents
his existence in this way consequent on just the same rational ground
that also holds for me? This remark seems to me to contain two distinct claims. The first is that we, human rational agents, have a rational
ground, that is, are rationally compelled, to represent all rational agents
as unconditionally valuable. The second is that non-human rational
agents are also rationally compelled to view all rational agents as having such a value. But to this point in the Groundwork, Kant has proven
neither of these claims. By his own lights, he has shown merely that if
one assumes there to be a categorical imperative (supreme principle
of morality), then one must hold humanity to be an end in itself. He
has not shown (nor tried to show) that anyone who does not make this
assumption is rationally compelled to hold humanity to be an end in itself. In other words, Kant has not proven the validity of the categorical
imperative (Formula of Humanity). That is a task that he puts off until
Groundwork III. There he tries to show that all agents (rational beings
with a will), not merely human agents, must take themselves to be free
and thus to be bound by the moral law.16 It is therefore not at all surprising that, in a note, Kant calls the remark in question a postulate and
suggests that he will defend it in Groundwork III.
Our reflections thus far have not left us with a good impression
of Kants Groundwork derivation of the Formula of Humanity. He
seems to offer a very weak argument by elimination in defense of his
claim that the unconditionally good ground of a categorical impera15
16
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Samuel J. Kerstein
213
good will is as good as something that has such a will. The argument
unfolds as follows. Whatever constitutes the ground of a categorical
imperative must be compatible with the value we attribute to a good
will (i. e., unconditional and preeminent goodness). But let us suppose
that any of the rivals to humanity were the ground of a categorical
imperative. We would have to acknowledge that a good will would (in
some circumstances) be subordinated to the rival and that a good
will would thereby fail to have the value we attribute to it. We would
land in contradiction. Therefore, we have license to dismiss any of the
rivals as possible grounds for a categorical imperative. As is perhaps
already evident, the material that is to supplement Kants argument
by elimination is material Kant develops before his presents the argument. I will not appeal to any positions Kant develops after he does
sofor example his view that humanity has dignity, that is, unconditional and incomparable value.
Filling in the supplemented arguments details requires elaboration of the concept of a good will as well as of the notion of one things
being subordinated to another. The latter task is in a sense easier,
since Kant simply does not tell us precisely what this notion amounts
to. But I think it reasonable to assume that he would endorse the following claim: If x is subordinated to y, then x is less valuable than y
and we thereby have sufficient grounds to use x in whatever way is
necessary in order to maintain y. So for example, if plants are subordinated to rational beings, then they are less valuable than rational
beings, and we have sufficient reason to harvest the former in order to
preserve the latter.
Regarding a good will, it suffices for our purposes to take note of
two ways in which Kant seems to employ the notion as it applies to us,
agents who can indulge their inclinations and thereby act contrary to
the moral law. According to the first usage, a good will is a particular
sort of willing or, what for him amounts to the same thing, of acting.
Kant writes of the unqualified [uneingeschrnkten] worth of actions
(GMS, 411), presumably of actions done from duty, which he has previously stated to have unconditional and moral worth (GMS, 400).
Since, according to Kant, the good will is good without qualification
[ohne Einschrnkung], it appears that sometimes good will refers to
a certain kind of action, that is, action done from duty.19 According to
19
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Samuel J. Kerstein
a second usage of good will, it refers not to a particular kind of action an agent might perform but rather to a kind of character she might
have. An agent has a good will on this usage just in case she is committed to doing what duty requires, not just in this or that particular
action, but overall. Presumably if an agent has this commitment, then
she will sometimes act from duty. (For example, she will invoke duty
as her incentive to do what is morally required in cases in which she is
tempted by her inclinations to act contrary to what morality demands.)
Kant intimates that having a good will amounts to having a certain
kind of character in the first paragraph of Groundwork I. Right after
suggesting that a good will is good without qualification, he tells us that
certain qualities of temperament, for example, courage or resolution,
are undoubtedly good and desirable for many purposes, but they can
also be extremely evil and harmful if the will which is to make use of
these gifts of nature, and whose distinctive constitution is therefore
called character, is not good (GMS, 393).20 Sometimes Kant employs
what we might, following Karl Ameriks (1989, 5459), call the whole
character conception of a good will. I believe Kant to be employing
the whole character conception of a good will in the passage we are
discussing (GMS, 437). In any case, it is that conception of a good will
that might help him to bolster his argument by elimination.
Let us now return to our (GMS, 437based) supplement to Kants
argument by elimination. Suppose that beings the existence of which
rests not on our will but on nature, say, species of wild animals, were
the ground of a categorical imperative, namely one commanding us
never to eradicate currently existing species of such animals. We would
be committed to the view that such beings were not only unconditionally but also preeminently valuable. Otherwise, we might sometimes
lack sufficient grounds to abide by the principle not to eradicate them.
And if we might lack such grounds, we cannot take the principle to be
a categorical imperative.
We would presumably lack sufficient grounds to abide by the principle in question when doing so would conflict with maintaining some-
20
good will (engage in unconditionally good willing) just in case they act for the sake
of the law. Presumably such beings are capable of doing this. And Kant does not
seem averse to the idea that acting from duty is a species of acting for the sake of
the law.
Later Kant is discussing a man who is by temperament cold and indifferent to others, but who, from duty, acts beneficently. It is just then, says Kant, that the
worth of character comes out, which is moral and incomparably the highest (GMS,
398 f.). This passage suggests that good will refers not merely to a particular kind
of action, but to a kind of character that can be expressed in action.
215
thing that was also unconditionally valuable, but more valuable than a
wild animal species. That something might, for example, be a person.
Say that the only way to save someones life was to kill the last two remaining representatives of a bird species in order to make a medicine
for him. If we believe correctly that persons are more valuable than
species of wild animals, then, in these circumstances, we do not have
sufficient reason to act in accordance with a principle commanding us
never to eradicate the latter. It seems plausible to grant the possibility
that more than one kind of thing is unconditionally good as well as
that one unconditionally good thing is better than another. After all,
what basis do we have for denying it? Yet if we grant this possibility,
we find that preeminent as well as unconditional goodness is necessary to ground a categorical imperative.
Getting back to our example, if species of wild animals can serve
as the ground of a categorical imperative, then they must be unconditionally and preeminently good. Their being preeminently good implies that nothing that is not a species of wild animals is as good as
something that is. But if species of wild animals have this value, then
a good wills value is subordinate to their value. They are worth more
than it is, and so we have sufficient reason to abandon it in order to
preserve them. As Kant suggests it would at GMS, 437, this subordination of a good will to species of wild animals results in a contradiction. For we have been assuming that a good will is unconditionally
and preeminently good. But a good will cannot both be less valuable
than species of wild animals and, as the notion of preeminence implies here, more valuable than they are.
It would, I believe, be unproblematic to illustrate via an analogous
chain of reasoning how Kant might eliminate other candidates for the
ground of a categorical imperative, including inclinations and the objects of inclinations. Even a candidate Kant does not seem to consider
in his argument by elimination, namely everyones being happy, is vulnerable to this reasoning.
Suppose that everyones being happy were the ground of a categorical imperative, namely one commanding us to maximize the aggregate welfare. We would then be committed to the view that everyones
being happy was both unconditionally and preeminently valuable. If
it were merely unconditionally valuable, we might sometimes lack
sufficient grounds (i. e., rational justification and thus motivation) to
abide by the principle to maximize aggregate welfare. For example,
we might lack sufficient grounds for abiding by this principle when
doing so would prevent us from securing something more valuable
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Samuel J. Kerstein
217
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Samuel J. Kerstein
attributed to him by Korsgaard and Wood. For not only does Kant explicitly embrace the reasoning that bolsters the argument (namely at
GMS, 437), but this reasoning itself relies only on concepts that Kant
develops before the derivation is complete.
Of course, the supplemented argument from elimination and thus
the derivation as a whole is, at best, only as convincing as Kants view
that a good will is unconditionally and preeminently valuable. This
view is surely in need of defense.21
But let me conclude by considering a further challenge to the supplemented argument. If the reasoning in Part IV is sound, the argument avoids two pitfalls. It does not descend into self-contradiction;
for there is nothing inconsistent in maintaining as the argument does
that both humanity and a good will are unconditionally and preeminently good. Moreover, the argument does not imply that a good will
is subordinated to humanity. So it avoids thereby eliminating humanity as a possible ground for a categorical imperative.
However, a serious question remains: What justification does Kant
have for holding that it is beings with rational nature who constitute
the ground of a categorical imperative, rather than maintaining that
it is merely beings with a good will who do so? What, for example,
permits Kant to reject the view that it is not all of us, but rather only
those of us with a good will, who never ought to be treated merely as
means? Consider a principle that Kant does not discuss, namely what
I call the Formula of the Good Will: So act that you treat a good will,
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at
the same time as an end, never merely as a means. It makes sense to
stipulate that, according to this formula, having a good will necessarily involves having an overall commitment to doing what Kants Formula of Universal Law requires. For Kants derivation of the Formula
of Universal Law takes place well before the argument by elimination.
The supplemented argument by elimination seems to leave open the
possibility that a good will serves as a ground for the Formula of the
Good Will. So why must we say that it is humanity rather than a good
will that remains viable as a ground for a categorical imperative?22
21
22
But the supplemented argument does not depend on a further controversial view
Kant holds (GMS, 393), namely that only a good will is good without qualification.
In reply, one might focus attention on the fact that Kants derivation of the Formula of Humanity occurs after his derivation of the Formula of Universal Law. One
might then argue that Kant implicitly holds the following: whatever is to serve as the
ground of a categorical imperative must serve as the ground of a principle equivalent to the Formula of Universal Law, that is, a principle that requires or permits
just those actions that are required or permitted by the Formula of Universal Law.
219
23
24
25
26
But the good will would serve as the ground of a principle, namely the Formula of
the Good Will, that is not equivalent to the Formula of Universal Law. Therefore,
concludes the argument, the good will is not the ground of a categorical imperative.
Perhaps Kant would embrace this argument, but I do not find it philosophically
promising. Kant, of course, suggests that the Formula of Humanity is equivalent to
the Formula of Universal Law (GMS, 436). But I know of no substantive interpretation of the two principles according to which they turn out to be equivalent. So
I fear that this sort of argument would likely not only eliminate the good will as a
possible ground of a categorical imperative, but humanity as well.
See GMS, 407 f.
See RGV, 36 f.
See, for example, GMS, 404, and KpV, 36. This view seems to me to be unpersuasive, as I explain in Kerstein (2002, 119129).
At this point, it might be tempting to make the following argument. Even if we are
sure that Sue does not have a good will now, it is open to her to develop one in the
future. On the basis of this potential she has, the Formula of the Good Will would
forbid us from treating her merely as a means. But this argument misses the mark.
For the Formula of the Good Will does not forbid us from treating beings with the
potential for having a good will merely as means, but rather from treating beings
with a good will merely as means. And here we are assuming that we know Sue not
to have a good will.
220
Samuel J. Kerstein
27
28
See IV above.
I would like to thank the other contributors to this volume for very helpful discussion of this paper.
221
Literature
Kants writings
Kants writings will be cited according to the pagination of Kants gesammelte
Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: W. deGruyter, 1902-) (abbreviated as
AA). All English translations are based on The Cambridge Edition of the
Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Anth Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, AA VII
GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA, IV
KpV
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AA, V
MdST Metaphysik der Sitten, Tugendlehre, AA,VI
RGV Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, AA, VI
Other works
Ameriks, Karl (1989): Kant on the Good Will, in: Hffe, Otfried (Ed.):
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten; Ein kooperativer Kommentar,
Frankfurt a. M., 4565.
Gaut, Berys (1997): The Structure of Practical Reason, in: Cullity, Garrett/
Gaut, Berys (Ed.): Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford, 161188.
Hill, Thomas, Jr. (1992): Dignity and Practical Reason, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hill, Thomas, Jr. (2002): Human Welfare and Moral Worth, Oxford; Oxford
University Press.
Kerstein, Samuel J. (2002): Kants Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996): Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Wood, Allen W. (1999): Kants Ethical Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Groundwork
III
Klaus Steigleder
Translated from the German by Jo Ann Van Vliet, Ph. D., Tbingen, and checked by
Alexander Cotter (Stonehill College).
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Klaus Steigleder
tom (GMS, 407). It could even be the case that no unconditional ought
exists, and that actually all norms, which we generally address as moral
norms, are nothing other than norms of prudence. These would then
constitute not an unconditional ought but only a conditional ought.
In order to better comprehend the task of Groundwork III, i. e.
to demonstrate that morality is not a phantom but that we can and
must obey the moral principle, we should recall why we are capable of
formulating a nonarbitrary idea of an unconditional ought and what
this idea entails.
We are able to conceive the idea of an unconditional ought because
we are conscious of the reality of conditional demands, of conditional
norms of action. In Groundwork II Kant develops his theory of norms
governing action (Kant himself does not speak of norms of action but of
imperatives) as a theory of practical judgments from the perspective of
an acting subject. Conditional norms of action are so structured that, for
the agent, the practical necessity exists of pursuing an end or undertaking an action in order to pursue an end, if or because he or she has a certain actual end. Because I want to lose weight, it is necessary for me to
want to eat less chocolate candy or Because I want to avoid destitution
in old age, it is necessary for me to want to put money aside for retirement are two examples of such practical judgments.2 The intention to
do or achieve something necessitates the intention to do something else
which is a means of attaining the original end. In this context, wanting
means volition, the actual resoluteness, the real intention of pursuing an
end or undertaking an action in order to pursue an end.3 Since we do not
automatically want to do what it is necessary for us to want to do on the
basis of our actual ends (we would like to continue to enjoy chocolates
with abandon, although we want to lose weight, and we would prefer to
spend rather than to save money, even though we do want to avoid destitution in old age), the practical necessity of wanting to do something,
arising out of our actual ends, confronts us as a demand, a necessitation,
an ought. Kant differentiates two types of conditional norms of action,
namely, technical norms and prudential norms. Technical norms are dependent on ends that we can have; prudential norms, in contrast, are
dependent on an end that all those beings that are under the influence
of feelings of pleasure and displeasure inevitably have, to wit, the end of
ones personal well-being, or, as Kant says, ones own happiness.
2
227
Given the indeterminate nature of this end, we continually interpret and reinterpret it through more specific ends (e. g., living in a
marriage or a long-term relationship with another human being, starting a family, engaging in a fulfilling profession, achieving affluence).
Conditional norms of action have, thus, the structure that, due to an
end, a practical necessity determined by this end arises for the agent, a
necessity which appears as a demand, which becomes an ought.4 Ultimately, all conditional norms of action derive from the comprehensive
end of ones own happiness, since this underlies the choice of ends
on which conditional norms of action are dependent. The comprehensive end of personal happiness arises for us, however, through an
interaction between our sensibility and our reason: because we are
shaped by feelings of pleasure and displeasure, we wish to achieve
and sustain pleasant states of being (if possible), and to end and avoid
unpleasant states of being as well (if possible). With the assistance of
our reason we conceive the goal of a maximum of conveniences and a
minimum of inconveniences. 5
Being knowledgeable of conditional demands, we can attain a
conception of an unconditional moral ought by negating the essential
characteristics of a conditional ought. An unconditional ought must
be founded on an absolute practical necessity, i. e., the necessity of
wanting to do something, independent of a goal given to the practical faculty of reason or resulting from its interaction with unreasoned
elements or aspects. This leads to the concept of an unconditionally
necessary end. This must originate in the practical faculty of reason.
Since the concept of an unconditionally necessary end must be free
from all empirical elements stemming from our sensibility, it must
originate in a direct purposiveness of pure practical reason. Since the
criteria for this purposiveness of reason cannot be external to reason;
and since, correspondingly, the end, too, cannot be external to reason;
and since, finally, an unconditionally necessary end cannot be something that must be realized (rather, it must be thought of as something
that necessarily exists as an end) this very end must necessarily lie in
the faculty of pure practical reason. A being that possesses the faculty
of pure practical reason must understand himself or herself, on the
basis of this faculty, as an unconditionally necessary end and, accord4
For a more extensive discussion see Steigleder (2002, 2358, Chapter 2: Hypothetische Imperative).
Happiness is the satisfaction of all our inclinations (extensive, with regard to their
manifoldness, as well as intensive, with regard to degree, and also protensive, with
regard to duration) (KrV, B 834 /A 806).
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Klaus Steigleder
That is, from GMS, 412,26 and particularly from GMS, 420,24 on. In both explicit
references to pure practical reason following GMS, 412,26 (namely, GMS, 440,25 f.
and 445,1115) the task of a critique of pure practical reason is mentioned and it
is thereby referred to GMS III.
229
Kant develops this even further in the idea of a will which is giving
universal law and subject only to the law which it gives to itself, summarizing that the autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of
morality.
But that the above principle of autonomy is the sole principle of morals
can well be shown by mere analysis of the concepts of morality (GMS,
440,2830).
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Klaus Steigleder
which we must constitute for ourselves and which every other human
being capable of action must constitute for us. Neither can there be a
necessary end or an absolute worth for us nor could we take such an
absolute worth as such into account, should it exist.
Although, as Kant underscores, the content of the moral principle
can be ascertained by mere analysis of the concepts of morality,
that which is ascertained through this analysis has a different status
than the hypothetical imperatives, which, according to Kant, are analytic practical judgments. Kant calls hypothetical imperatives analytic
judgments (propositions), because in their case wanting to achieve an
end mandates wanting to pursue another end or an action as means.
Wanting to pursue another end or wanting to undertake an action is,
in a certain sense, inherently wanted in wanting to achieve the original end.8 Crucial for our discussion is the fact that the volition, upon
which the necessity of further volition depends, is empirically accessible. We are conscious of the fact that we have or can have ends which
hypothetical imperatives are dependent on.
This is why, according to Kant, it is not difficult to answer the question of the possibility of hypothetical imperatives, i. e., the question
of the origin of the necessitating power of hypothetical imperatives.
They are respectively dependent on our actual ends, the reality of
which is therefore unquestionable. This is completely different in the
case of the categorical imperative or the unconditional ought. Neither
is this dependent on something, the reality of which is established,
nor is it established from the beginning that there is such a thing as
an unconditional ought. An unconditional ought, as introduced in
Groundwork II, is, as indicated, a mere idea, and, correspondingly,
everything ascertained through its analysis possesses the same status:
it, too, is, at least for the moment, a mere idea. Thus, the question of
the possibility of an unconditional ought also has another significance
than the fundamental question concerning theoretical judgments in
the Critique of Pure Reason How are synthetic judgments possible?,
the reality of such synthetic judgments a priori in theoretical form being indisputable for Kant.
To establish that the moral principle is not only a thought-entity
but that it possesses validity for us is the task of the Third Section of
the Groundwork. Kant can also define this task as the proof of the
moral principle as a synthetic practical judgment a priori. What actually constitutes a synthetic practical judgment a priori?
8
231
According to Kant, three kinds of practical judgments are conceivable for us as finite beings capable of action:
1. Maxims. These have the two following basic forms: a) I want to
achieve end E through my action, and b) I wish to carry out action
A9 in order to achieve E. The reality of maxims is indisputable.
2. Hypothetical Imperatives. These take the following basic forms10:
a) I ought to do A, because I want to achieve E. b) I ought (to attempt) to achieve E2 because I want to achieve E1. That is, hypothetical
imperatives demand the adoption of certain maxims because the agent
has certain other maxims from which the necessity arises to adopt the
maxims being demanded. Since the reality of maxims is indisputable,
the reality of hypothetical imperatives is equally indisputable.
3. Categorical imperatives. Their basic form consists of the unconditional demand to do something or not to do something. Since
practical judgments are practical judgments precisely because they
express the volition of a subject capable of action, we can more fully
comprehend the categorical imperative as a practical judgment if we
realize that moral oughts articulate a practical necessity for an agent,
which materializes as a demand for him or her (a necessitation). The
unconditional ought of the categorical imperative thus derives from
the judgment that an unconditionally practical necessity exists for the
agent: in the absence of a presupposed maxim the acting subject must
necessarily want to do something. The truth of a corresponding synthetic practical judgment a priori presupposes for this reason that the
agent is capable of determining necessary ends and of complying with
necessary ends. Thus the truth of the synthetic practical judgment a
priori in question is contingent on our possession of the faculty of
pure practical reason, or of freedom in the strict sense.
Thus precisely this appears to be the task of the proof of the validity of the moral principle in Groundwork III: to demonstrate that we
have the faculty of pure practical reason, or of freedom in the strict
sense, that enables us to establish ends, or to account for necessary
ends completely independent of sensible impulses while acting. The
task of the critique of pure practical reason, which is to establish the
9
10
232
Klaus Steigleder
233
assume that the moral principle possesses validity for us. Consequently, the moral principle is not a mere thought-entity for us but must be
the authoritative guiding principle of our action.
This is the line of argumentation that Kant pursues in Groundwork
III. It is prefigured in the first part in Kants attempt to epitomize his
explication of the idea of an unconditional ought in Groundwork II,
his emphasis on the centrality of freedom for the evolving argumentation, and his acknowledgment of the difficult nature of the justification of the moral principle. Let us now turn to this first part in detail.
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Klaus Steigleder
Life is the faculty of a being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire.
The faculty of desire is a beings faculty to be by means of its representations the
cause of the reality of the objects of these representations. (KpV, 9,1922; original
emphasis); see also MdSR, 211,79: The faculty of a being to act in accordance
with its representations is called life (Original emphasis).
235
grounds of the causality of a being insofar as its existence is determinable in time and therefore under the necessitating conditions of past time,
which are thus, when the subject is to act, no longer within his control
and which may therefore bring with them [] natural necessity [] (KpV,
96,1937; the phrase causality determined in accordance with a natural
law is not italicized in the original).
Yet at the beginning of the first part of Groundwork III Kant immediately focuses on free choice, or the will, under the hypothesis that
this free choice possesses the faculty of freedom in the strict sense
(and freedom would be that property of such causality that it can be
efficient independently of alien causes determining it). If we think
of free choice as free in this sense, then we must not think of it as
pure practical reason, i. e., we must not equate free choice with pure
practical reason but must think of it as being endowed with the faculty of pure practical reason an insight which is significant for the
comprehension of the line of argumentation in Groundwork III in
general. If free choice were equatable with pure practical reason, a
being endowed with such a faculty would necessarily determine itself
to activity through pure practical reason (would necessarily do what is
morally good). This is clearly not the situation of finite living beings,
and, in any event, not our situation insofar as we possess the faculty
of pure practical reason, because otherwise the moral law would not
have to confront us as a demand, an imperative. If our capacity of
choice possesses the faculty of pure practical reason, then we are always capable of determining ourselves to activity independently of
alien [] determining causes.
If we thoroughly contemplate the implications of this negative determination of freedom in the strict sense, we realize that we have
also been directed toward a positive content. In certain respects this
repeats the establishment of an unconditional ought in Groundwork
II. This originally consisted in negating the essential properties of a
conditional ought. However, it proved to have given grounds for positive determinations.
The preceding defi nition of freedom is negative and therefore unfruitful
for insight into its essence; but there flows from it a positive concept of
freedom, which is so much the richer and more fruitful (GMS, 446,1315;
original emphasis).
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Klaus Steigleder
the cause of such effects must be inherent without this cause itself in
turn being comprehensible as the effect of a foreign, preceding, and
determining cause. Since the concept of causality is not an experiential concept and, consequently, is to be comprehended as entailing
a necessary relationship between cause and effect,12 we cannot conceive the relationship between an original (uncaused) cause and its
effect as a lawless relationship replacing the naturalistic progression
of cause and effect but rather as a lawful relationship of its own kind.
A different law supplants natural law, namely, the law of pure practical reason.
Since the concept of causality brings with it that of laws in accordance with
which, by something that we call a cause, something else, namely an effect,
must be posited, so freedom, although it is not a property of the will in accordance with natural laws, is not for that reason lawless but must instead
be a causality in accordance with immutable laws but of a special kind;
for otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. Natural necessity was a
heteronomy of efficient causes, since every effect was possible only in accordance with the law that something else determines the efficient cause to
causality; what, then can freedom of the will be other than autonomy, that
is, the wills property of being a law to itself? (GMS, 446,15447,2)
The will has the capability to establish ends and to actively pursue
ends independent of foreign determining influences. Given the fact
that such independent establishment and pursuit of ends do not appear out of nowhere, but are brought about by reason, they must also
be determined by the characteristics of reason, specifically, universality and necessity. Reason that establishes ends necessarily observes
the law, which it is to itself, is autonomy. This thought can be developed further with various accentuations. It can be stressed that reason, which establishes ends, can constitute an unconditionally necessary end and, correspondingly, an absolute worth for itself. Kant
himself sets a different accent:
But the proposition, the will is in all its actions a law to itself, indicates
only the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have
as object itself as a universal law. This, however, is precisely the formula
of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality; hence a free
will and a will under moral laws are one and the same (GMS, 447,27).
12
237
Before I briefly address the relationship between the various accentuations, it is crucial to realize that, as emphasized, the will is to be
conceived as free choice, which possesses the faculty of pure reason,
but which is not simply pure practical reason. Such a will always has
the possibility of obeying the law in determining its ends and actions,
the law which it is to itself on the basis of its faculty of pure practical
reason. But it is not simply reason that establishes its own reasonable
ends. Correspondingly, the will does not necessarily observe the law,
for it is not autonomy but only possesses the power of autonomy. It is
a law to itself and it is under the law, that is, subject to the law.
That Kant comprehends the will in Part 1 as free choice (endowed
with pure practical reason) and not as pure practical reason is evident,
for example, in his assumption that the will is capable of maxims, i. e.,
of subjective determinations. As subjective determinations of the will,
maxims can deviate from precisely those laws of pure practical reason
characterized by universality and necessity. Consequently, the moral
law takes the form of a categorical demand only to act according to
those maxims which correspond to the lawgiving of pure practical
reason. This lawgiving would not be a foreign demand but a demand
arising from our own faculty of reason. If, however, although we possess the faculty of pure practical reason, we were to act according to
maxims contravening the moral law, we could not attribute this to natural necessity, i. e., to alien determining influences. For then we would
allow ourselves to be determined by foreign influences, even though
we always have the possibility of not observing these influences. We
would then have to comprehend ourselves as being free in our action
and as being responsible for our action, although it would not be a realization of the law of our freedom. How this occurs or would occur is
totally unknown to us. Nonetheless, the distinctions and their related
determinations are significant.
If we, in the sense explained above, must attribute ourselves with a
free will, then we must presuppose that we ourselves and every other
being, which, like us, has a free will, constitute an unconditionally
necessary end and possess an absolute worth which is to be taken into
consideration in all action. This demand does not essentially differ
from the principle emphasized by Kant to act on no other maxim
than that which can also have as object itself as a universal law. There
are, of course, differences insofar as the various formulations of the
moral principle call for different procedures to examine or to determine the compatibility of a purpose or an intended action with the
moral principle. In passing, I would like to note that not all of the
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examination procedures are equally suited and that precisely the procedure favoured by Kant in Groundwork II is problematic.13 Here it
was only important to comprehend why Kant can assert hence a free
will and a will under moral laws are one and the same.
This conclusion ends the passage which I have designated as the
first segment of Part 1 in Groundwork III. Kant summarizes this once
again at the beginning of the second segment, i. e., at the beginning of
the third paragraph, as follows:
If, therefore, freedom of the will is presupposed, morality together with
its principle follows from it by mere analysis of its concept (GMS, 447,8
10).
It is important to note in general that the investigation which has the task of developing the fundamental characteristics of the content of the moral principle is not
the Groundwork, but The Metaphysics of Morals of 1797. There, Kant establishes
that the moral principle justifies a number of orderly sub-principles. Correspondingly, for Kant it is not at all the task to always directly judge our actions and maxims on the basis of the moral principle. See especially Steigleder (2002, 129274,
Teil B: Moralphilosophie als Rechts- und Tugendlehre).
239
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Klaus Steigleder
not a true parallel to the forms of intuition, time and space. For us,
freedom is something, the reality of which is neither ascertained nor
ascertainable.
Such synthetic propositions are possible only in this way: that the two cognitions are bound together by their connection with a third in which they
are both to be found. The positive concept of freedom provides this third
cognition, which cannot be, as in the case of physical causes, the nature
of the sensible world (in the concept of which the concepts of something
as cause in relation to something else as effect come together) (GMS,
447,1420).
Kant, thus, does not speak of freedom as the third cognition being
sought but rather purports that the positive concept of freedom provides or creates (schafft) this third cognition. This third cognition,
as Kant recapitulates with reference to his preceding reflections on
the positive concept of freedom, is to be distinguished from the causal
relationships constituting experienceable nature (and thus independent of a time structure). Of interest here is Kants assertion that the
concept of freedom provides or creates this third cognition. This is
initially quite surprising since his task seems to be the departure from
the level of mere ideas. In actuality, however, as addressed above,
Kants solution will consist in establishing that the idea of freedom
cannot be a mere idea for us but that we must necessarily consider
ourselves to be free in the sense of the positive concept of freedom.
According to Kant, it will also be crucial to show that we must necessarily comprehend ourselves as rational beings with wills, that we
cannot comprehend our sensible nature as our real nature, and that
we must attribute ourselves with the faculty of pure practical reason.
Consequently, Kant concludes the first section by maintaining:
What this third cognition is, to which freedom points us and of which we
have an idea a priori, cannot yet be shown here and now; nor can the deduction of the concept of freedom from pure practical reason, and with it
the possibility of a categorical imperative as well, as yet be made comprehensible, some further preparation is required (GMS, 447,2025).
241
242
Klaus Steigleder
Cf. also Schnecker (1999, 157): If a being acts freely, then it acts morally.
For an example see my own interpretation in Steigleder (2002).
See Schnecker (1999, 161 f.).
See also Schnecker (1999, 79, 154, and 157, for example).
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244
Klaus Steigleder
245
25
26
See, e. g., GMS, 331: Hence the will is not merely subject to the law but subject to
it in such a way that it must be viewed as also giving the law to itself [].
See GMS, 433 f.: A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when
he gives universal laws in it but is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it
as sovereign when, as lawgiving, he is not subject to the will of any other.
A rational being must always regard himself as lawgiving in a kingdom of ends
possible through freedom of the will, whether as a member or as sovereign. He cannot, however, hold the position of sovereign merely by the maxims of his will but
only in case he is [a] completely independent being and with unlimited resources
adequate to his will.
246
Klaus Steigleder
Literature
Kants writings
Kants writings will be cited according to the pagination of Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: deGruyter, 1902) (abbreviated
as AA). The Critique of Pure Reason will be cited according to the A/B
pagination from the first and second editions. All textual references are to
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press, 1992).
GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA, IV
Ent
ber eine Entdeckung AA, VIII
KpV
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AA, V
KrV
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA III, IV
Log
Logik-Jsche, AA IX
MdSR Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre, AA, VI
Other works
Schnecker, Dieter (1999): Kant: Grundlegung III. Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs, Freiburg i. Br.
Steigleder, Klaus (2002): Kants Moralphilosophie. Die Selbstbezglichkeit
reiner praktischer Vernunft, Stuttgart.
For a thorough discussion of the meaning of the question how a categorical imperative is possible see Schnecker (1999, ch. 2).
248
In part 1, Kant begins with the notion of a free will. He claims that
the concept of freedom is the key to the explanation of the autonomy
of the will (GMS, 446), that an autonomous will is nothing but a
will under the moral law (reciprocity thesis)2, and that this connection is an analytical one, i. e. morality follows analytically from the
concept of freedom (analyticity thesis). Kant first gives a negative
characterization of freedom: A free will is a will that is independent
of alien determining causes, and this means for Kant that the will is
not determined by natural causes according to the laws of nature. But
it must be determined somehow and according to some law, since the
concept of free will includes the notion of causality (because the free
will is supposed to cause actions) and this notion, in turn, carries with
it the concept of law. The activity of a free will, by which it causes
actions, must thus follow some law. This can only be a law the will
imposes on itself, for otherwise the will would be subject to an alien
law and not free. So the negative characterization of freedom of the
will, namely, absence of alien determining causes, leads by itself to a
second, positive characterization: A free will is an autonomous will,
a will that acts according to self-given laws. But, as Kant has shown
in Section II, the common principle of those laws or maxims is that
they can be willed as universal laws through themselves. This is what
the categorical imperative commands, which therefore captures the
very idea of autonomy at least as far as its content is concerned. In
its imperative form it applies only to imperfect wills, which do not by
themselves act in accordance with the stated principle. The categorical imperative is also the principle of morality, as Kant attempted to
show in his analysis of our common moral understanding. A free will
is an autonomous will, a will under self-given laws, and this in turn is a
will that acts according to the moral law. If, therefore, freedom of the
will is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows from it
by mere analysis of its concept. (GMS, 447)
But can freedom of the will be presupposed? This is the subject of
part 2 of Section III that we are going to discuss in this contribution.
Now, since Kant has argued that a free will is a will under the moral
law, the question naturally arises, if our will (or any rational will) is
free. If this question can be answered positively, Kant has shown that
we (or any rational being3) are subject to the moral law. Three argu2
3
249
I. Reconstruction
Step 1:
It is not enough that we ascribe freedom to our will on whatever ground,
if we do not have sufficient ground for attributing it also to all rational
beings. For, since morality serves as a law for us only as rational beings, it
must also hold for all rational beings; and since it must be derived solely
from the property of freedom, freedom must also be proved as a property
of all rational beings; and it is not enough to demonstrate it from certain
supposed experiences of human nature (though this is also absolutely impossible and it can be demonstrated only a priori), but it must be proved
as belonging to the activity of all beings whatever that are rational and
endowed with a will. (GMS, 447 f.)
There is one problem with part 1 of Section III that Kant has to solve
in part 2, namely he has not yet shown that we can indeed presuppose
freedom as a property of the will of all rational beings (and therefore
ascribe morality to ourselves as rational beings). At the end of part 1,
he states that he intends a deduction of the concept of freedom from
pure practical reason which requires further preparation (GMS,
447). So the idea is to show that we have to ascribe freedom to our will
insofar as we are rational. Why should we look for a proof of freedom
in practical reason? As a preliminary remark, Kant reminds us that
we cannot take an alleged proof of our freedom from particular experiences. That might of course be tempting: Dont we experience our
freedom directly? But that would merely be an a posteriori argument
for freedom, and moreover, it would at best be valid for human beings.
Since the task of the Groundwork is to develop a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be only empirical
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251
would bind a being that was actually free. Thus we can escape here from
the burden that weighs upon theory. (GMS, 448)
As in step 2, Kant starts with a claim and gives the justification afterwards. The claim reformulates the title of part 2: Freedom must be
presupposed as (not: is) a property of the will of all rational beings.
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Presupposed by whom? In the first place, freedom must be presupposed by the rational being itself who is acting, as we have already
seen, i. e. freedom must be presupposed from the first-person perspective. What Kant additionally seems to claim is that we (from the
perspective of the third person) must ascribe (necessarily lend) the
idea of freedom to any agent who has to view himself as free (acts
under the idea of freedom).
There are two possibilities of interpretation for this, a weak and
a strong one. The weak one says that this is not really an additional
claim. We simply discover that the agent has to consider himself to be
free and in this sense lend him the idea of freedom. The strong one
says that we have to consider him to be free. We have to introduce a
distinction here, because there is a certain ambiguity in terminology.
If we speak of a rational being we might merely think (weakly) of a
being that engages in practical deliberations. Any such being has to
consider itself to be free, as Kant subsequently shows, but of course
we dont have to view it so. We can ascribe its practical judgments to
mere impulses, while the being itself assumes at the same time that it
is acting according to reason. But, if we speak of a rational being, we
might also think (strongly) of a being endowed with a purely rational
or perfect will, and such a being would of course have to be considered
to be free by any spectator and not just by itself. The point is that we
cannot know if we are rational beings in this strong sense. But what
we know is that we are rational beings in the aforementioned weak
sense: We engage in practical reasoning and view our practical judgments as causing our actions. In doing so, we have to view ourselves as
being guided by reason and therefore as free. We do not have to think
that we are rational throughout (we know that we are not), but when
we deliberate what to do and come to a considered judgment, we have
to ascribe this judgment to reason and so hold ourselves to be free at
least in this respect.
Kant states that if we think of a rational being with a will, we have
to assume that it is provided with practical reason: a reason that has
causality with respect to its objects. In this assumption, Kant identifies the will of a rational being with practical reason: We thereby think
of a will as determining what is chosen or what is done in a reasonable
way. The latter is important, because Kant does not think of a will
here in the sense that it has a freedom to choose whatever it likes in
an indeterminate way. The formulation that the will has causality
with respect to its objects rather means that we have a reason for an
action, and that the action is really due to this reason, and not due
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256
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258
to actual performances. That is, for example: A being is free1 (at time
t), if (at time t) it is able to deliberate, judge, will and act according to
the laws of reason (no matter whether it actually does so or not), and
analogously for the other notions of freedom. To refer to abilities in
such a way may be appropriate concerning several kinds of freedom,
but not concerning freedom of the will, which is at stake here. With
freedom of the will, such a move would merely shift the issue one step
back. If a being is able or has the capacity to do something, it depends
(among other things perhaps) on its will whether it actually does so
or not. But we are dealing here precisely with the question how the
will of the being comes about, and what we have to assume about this
coming about in order to call it free. The five notions of freedom are
five different ideas what freedom of the will might consist in. It cannot
consist in a certain ability of the subject, because it depends on the
subjects will whether the subject makes use of its ability or not, and
therefore, as long as we talk about abilities or capacities, the will is out
of focus and all problems concerning its freedom remain open.
Let us add some remarks on terminology here. As we know from
other important notions in Kants oeuvre, he does not always use
terms in a stringent way. In the Groundwork, the notion of spontaneity plays no prominent role, it just shows up in GMS 452, when Kant
talks about the pure self-activity of reason. But he has the same
thing in mind, when he, in our passage, speaks of a reason that []
has causality with respect to its objects (GMS, 448). In Prolegomena, 53, he makes the distinction between causality interpreted as
natural necessity and causality as freedom, and introduces explicitly
freedom as spontaneity (Prol, 344). In the Critique of Pure Reason,
Kant speaks of transcendental freedom to describe the same thing
(e. g. KrV, A 445/B 473 ff., A 532/B 560 ff.). The ability of self-determination, that in Kants view implies that ones will is not determined by
sensual impulses, is called practical freedom there (KrV, A 534/B
562). These two aspects of practical freedom are what Kant calls positive freedom and negative freedom in GMS. In GMS III, 3 reason
(Vernunft) is described as pure self-activity (reine Selbstttigkeit) as opposed to understanding (Verstand) which is restricted
to the function to bring sensual representations under rules (GMS,
452). Reason shows a pure spontaneity as an ability to build ideas
independently of empirical and sensual influences. 5
259
This is what Dieter Henrich (1975, 64 f.) calls Vernunftfreiheit (freedom of reason) or Urteilsfreiheit (freedom of judgment). He distinguishes it from transzen-
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261
the title Kant has given to the passage can be misunderstood. That
freedom understood as rationality is (not only: must be presupposed
as) a property of a rational will, is true analytically, but whether we
are entitled to view our wills as rational is not so clear. We can doubt
that we have rational wills. What we cannot doubt is that we engage
in practical deliberation, and what Kant shows is that in doing so we
have to consider ourselves to be rational and therefore free1, at least
as far as an ongoing deliberation is concerned. It is this argument that
works only from the first-person perspective. I can say about your
judgments that they depend on non-rational natural impulses, but I
cannot say it about mine. If I say it about mine, they are no longer my
judgments. Therefore, every deliberating being has to consider itself
to be rational, at least with respect to its actual deliberation.
It was Lewis White Beck (1960, cf. 1975), more recently followed
by Christine Korsgaard (1996), who emphazised the difference between the perspective of the actor and that of the spectator. From the
(first person-) perspective of the actor who has to view himself as the
author of his actions and his foregoing deliberations, freedom must be
presupposed. Beck and Korsgaard also speak of the practical point
of view, refering to the doctrine of the two standpoints in GMS III,
3. Freedom is thus characterized as an idea that is a creation of practical reason not as a mere fantasy, but as a necessary assumption.
On the other hand, from the perspective of the spectator, we observe
events in the world that we can describe from the theoretical point
of view, according to the laws of nature. We do so without interpreting ourselves as involved and without interpreting the events as
results of our will. While it seems possible, although very unnatural,
to describe another actor as merely a part of nature, as if he were
not free, it is of crucial importance for Kants moral philosophy that
we are not only forced to interpret ourselves as free but also lend
the idea of freedom to all other rational beings. If we had no reason
to apply the idea of freedom to other beings, it would not be clear
why we should treat them as persons, as ends in themselves, and not
as mere means or things. Therefore it is no coincidence that the notion of autonomy at first appears in combination with the formula of
humanity in GMS II when Kant describes every rational being as
the subject of all ends and therefore as an end in itself (GMS,
431). From this there follows as Kant points out the third practical principle of the will, the so-called principle of autonomy, that
describes the will not only as subject to the law but subject to it in
such a way that it must be viewed as also giving the law to itself and
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just because of this as first subject to the law (of which it can regard
itself as the author). (GMS, 431) From there we are lead, according
to Kant, to the idea of a kingdom of ends that is a systematic union
of rational beings through common objective laws (GMS, 434) that
can be understood as common and objective because they abstract
from the personal differences of rational beings as well as from all
the content of their private ends (GMS, 433). But this means to interpret the others as free beings as well.
It seems that from the argument given in GMS III, 2 (that should
give a justification for the moral point of view developed in GMS II)
it follows that we have to consider ourselves to be free i. e. autonomous because we have to consider ourselves to be rational from the
first-person perspective. And we know that any other deliberating
being has to do so as well with respect to itself. But is this enough
to show that we have to interpret others as free i. e. autonomous beings as well and therefore as ends in themselves that are an object
of respect for all our maxims? This does not seem to be implied by
Kants argument in III, 2, and is at the very least in need of additional argumentation. The problem surfaces as early as Section II, when
Kant derives the formula of humanity (GMS, 429). There he writes:
The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in
itself. The human being necessarily represents his own existence in
this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. But
every other rational being also represents his existence in this way
consequent on just the same rational ground that also holds for me;
thus it is at the same time an objective principle [] from which the
categorical imperative in the form of the formula of humanity follows. But again, the question is, even if every rational being has to
regard itself as an end in itself, why does he have to regard the other
rational beings as ends in themselves, too? This is the same kind of
problem as we face in our passage. To be sure, if every rational being
has to view itself as autonomous, and if the principle of autonomy is
to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as object
itself as a universal law (GMS, 447), every rational being is bound to
will according to this principle. But it is not clear what this principle
implies with respect to other rational beings, whether it dictates a
specific attitude towards them. In other words, if we look at the categorical imperative: It is not clear whether the formula of universal
law indeed implies or is equivalent to the formula of humanity. This
is claimed by Kant, of course, but to get to this result he has to make
the problematic step just mentioned.
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3. Although Kants argument aims at practical deliberation and practical judgments, it is as valid for theoretical judgments. Kants primary
interests here are the rational will and rational actions, but what he
claims is in effect about judgments in general, be they practical or
theoretical. The core sentences of his argument are: Now, one cannot possibly think of a reason that would consciously receive direction from any other quarter with respect to its judgments, since the
subject would then attribute the determination of his judgment not to
his reason but to an impulse. Reason must regard itself as the author
of its principles independently of alien influences [] (GMS, 448).
These statements are about reason in general, not just about practical reason. This is quite obvious from the continuation: [] consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must
be regarded of itself as free (emphasis by us). So, Kant talks about
reason in general, and only afterwards applies his considerations to
the special case of practical reason. And this is very plausible. I can
no more say I judge this proposition to be true (probable, well-confirmed etc.), but this judgment is due to a non-rational impulse than
I can say I judge this course of action to be the right one, but only
due to a non-rational impulse. So, as Kants formulations as well as
systematic considerations show, his argument applies equally to any
kind of deliberation and judgment.7
In this context it should also be kept in mind that Kant emphasizes
the unity of reason in the Preface of GMS. There he says I require
that the critique of a pure practical reason, if it is to be carried through
completely, be able at the same time to present the unity of practical
with speculative reason in a common principle, since there can, in the
end, be only one and the same reason, which must be distinguished
merely in its application. (GMS, 391) For Onora ONeill, the mentioned common principle has to be the moral law, interpreted as the
supreme principle of all reason (ONeill, 1989, 52). She claims that
Kant argues not from reason to autonomy but from autonomy to reason. Only autonomous, self-disciplining beings can act on principles
that we have grounds to call principles of reason. [] Autonomy does
not presuppose but rather constitutes the principles of reason and their
authority. (ONeill, 1989, 57) Kant has never really carried out his
idea of the unity of theoretical and practical reason, and it is, of course,
hardly believable that all principles of reason should somehow spring
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from the bare idea of self-legislation.8 But this is only an aside. We will
discuss the problematic relation between autonomy and rationality in
another respect in the fifth comment. For now, we note that Kants argument applies to every activity of reasoning and judging.
In particular, it applies to instrumental reasoning. First of all, even a
perfect will would have to reason instrumentally if it aimed at the realization of an end. Now, what serves the will as the objective ground of
its self-determination is an end, and this, if it is given by reason alone,
must hold equally for all rational beings. What, on the other had, contains merely the ground of the possibility of an action the effect of which
is an end is called a means. (GMS, 447) As any action pursues an end
(as is emphasized repeatedly by Kant, e. g. RGV, 4; Ge, 279, note; KpV,
34), the process of practical reasoning can never do without instrumental, i. e. means-end-reasoning. In particular, this applies to a being that
acts from the motive of duty. If it wants to do its duty in a certain situation, it always has to obey hypothetical imperatives, too. Second, if
we consider an end that depends on a natural inclination, reason does
not tell us to pursue the end. But it does tell us that if we are to pursue
the end, we have to will the means. The validity of the hypothetical imperative expressed by the conditioned sentence does not depend on the
mentioned inclination or any other alien influence. After all, reason
in the form of the hypothetical imperative does neither command us
to take the means, nor to pursue the end. It commands us to take the
means provided that we (for whatever reason) are to pursue the end.
Any rational being can follow this reasoning and recognize its validity,
whether or not it actually approves of the end. This is how Kant puts it
in the Groundwork: Whoever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary
means to it that are within his power. (GMS, 417)
What makes this matter difficult is that insofar as the will depends
on a natural inclination, it is not free in the negative sense. For example, at the end of GMS II, in Heteronomy of the Will as the Source
of all Spurious Principles of Morality (GMS, 441), Kant says: If the
will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own giving of universal law [] heteronomy
always results. The will in that case does not give itself the law; instead the object, by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to
it. This relation, whether it rests upon inclination or upon representations of reason, lets only hypothetical imperatives become possible
8
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[] (GMS, 441) So, in how far is the will of a deliberating being free,
when it engages in instrumental reasoning in order to fulfill a natural
desire? Kant himself has changed his mind as to whether such a being
has freedom in the sense of spontaneity (transcendental freedom). In
the Critique of Pure Reason he opts for yes (KrV, A 547/B 575 f.), in
the Critique of Judgment for no.9 Concerning freedom as rationality, the situation is as explained above: Reason does neither command
us to take the means, nor to pursue the end, but it commands us to
take the means provided that we are to pursue the end. So, we have to
distinguish between the different notions of freedom here. Hypothetical imperatives carry with them an ought, and if one judges, according
to a hypothetical imperative, that one ought to do such-and-such, one
claims validity for this judgment, and consequently has to presuppose
that the judgment is made according to the laws of reason. So, Kants
argument de facto applies to these cases of reasoning, too, and establishes freedom as rationality. But we seem to have neither negative
freedom, nor freedom as autonomy, nor freedom as spontaneity in
these cases of instrumental reasoning, where reason serves a natural
inclination. What complicates the matter further is that it is not quite
clear how to describe the situation from the fi rst-person perspective.
Generelly, when one engages in practical deliberation to serve a certain desire, one reflectively endorses that desire, at least rudimentarily, and thereby implicitly claims freedom as autonomy (or, at least,
a certain sense of autonomy). From the third-person perspective it
is easy to view somebody who is deliberating what to do as unfree in
every possible sense, especially when we are Kantians and the person
thinks about how to satisfy a certain natural desire. But it is hardly
possible to do so with respect to ones own desires to view them as
alien influences on the will and nevertheless continue thinking about
how to satisfy them. To remember, it is the first-person perspective
that is relevant for Kants argument here.
It does not seem that definite solutions to these problems are to be
found in Kants writings, and we will not discuss the issue further here.
We merely note that the four different kinds of freedom involved here
(rationality, negative freedom, autonomy, and spontaneity) do not automatically coincide. The systematic reason for the fact that the hypothetical imperatives create difficulties is that with them, on closer inspection, the different kinds of freedom tend to fall apart. Since Kant
wants them to amount to one and the same thing, he himself is uncer9
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according to the laws of reason. If you seriously doubt that in your reasoning you follow the laws of reason, you no longer believe in its validity. It is not that you must be rational for this. It is simply not possible to
believe in a piece of reasoning and at the same time doubt its validity,
and it is simply not possible to make a certain judgment and at the same
time think it is unjustified. If one wants to be very cautious, one has to
construe the mentioned presupposition negatively. Of course, a rational (in the sense of deliberating) being may never have entertained the
thought that in deliberating it follows the laws of reason, so it need not
be his explicit opinion that it does. That it has to be its implicit opinion
at least, is very plausible, but it is not fully clear what implicit amounts
to. Perhaps our rational being never reflects on its reasoning. So, maybe
it need not believe positively (not even implicitly) that in deliberating it
follows the laws of reason. But at least this much is true, that it cannot
make any conflicting assumption, because that would amount to the
judgment that the reasoning is invalid and the judgment emerging from
it unjustified. And this much is true, that if a rational being reflects on
its reflecting, it has to admit that it is committed to the assumption that
in reasoning it follows the laws of reason.
So, we have to consider ourselves to be subject to the laws of reason, because otherwise we could not claim the validity of our reasoning and judging, which we inevitably do when we reason and judge.
Kants statement that every being that cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom in the indicated sense is just because of that
really free in a practical respect (GMS, 448) does mean no more than
that this being has to admit the validity of the laws of freedom (or reason) for itself. The phrase does not constitute an additional step in the
argument. If Kant had given an argument that we are free, this would
have meant that we are free theoretically, now he has given an argument to the effect that we have to consider ourselves to be free, and
this means that we are free in a practical sense, since concerning the
question which laws we have to accept as valid for us, everything is as
it would have been had we been given a theoretical proof for freedom.
The practical respect does not to refer to practical deliberations and
actions as opposed to theoretical deliberations and beliefs, but to the
kind of argument Kant has given for our freedom, an argument that is
as valid for theoretical reasoning as it is for practical deliberations.
4. We have seen that it is freedom1, freedom as rationality, that we
have to ascribe to ourselves according to Kants argument. In deliberating and judging, we have to suppose that we deliberate and judge ac-
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spective of the third person but not from your own perspective at that
moment. If you deliberate about what to do and arrive at a practical
judgment, it is only your judgment if you claim validity for it, and this
means that you think you have thereby found out what the reasonable thing to do is. We all know that we often act irrationally, and can
judge our own past deliberations and practical judgments thus, but
this means that they are no longer our judgments. We cannot take this
stance towards our present and actual judgments.
Freedom as indeterminism means that you can will and do one
thing, but also another thing, in an absolute or unconditioned sense.
You are neither determined nor predictable in your will and your action, and afterwards it is true that you could have willed and done otherwise. This is not the kind of freedom Kant is dealing with in our
passage. If you are free in the sense of rational autonomy, your will is
determined by the laws of reason and you think and act under their
direction and according to them. So if there is only one reasonable option, you will choose this one, you cannot will otherwise, and what you
will do is entirely predictable. In particular, if there is a choice between
a morally right and a morally wrong action, you will choose the former.
While freedom as indeterminism is not compatible with any determination whatsoever of the will, freedom in the sense of autonomy, on
the contrary, assumes that the will is determined: determined by the
laws of reason. These laws are self-given laws, to be sure, but the will is
nevertheless determined by them, and this excludes the performance
of any action but one, at least in situations with moral obligations.
Therefore, if we take Kants claim seriously that a lawless will would
be an absurdity (GMS, 446), there is no room for freedom as indeterminism. There are two possibilities: Either you will and act according
to the laws of nature (which is heteronomy), or according to the laws of
reason (which is autonomy), but in either case your will is determined
and your actions occur with necessity. There is no third or meta-position from which you could deliberate and choose whether to follow
your natural inclinations or your reason, because, if you really were
in such a meta-position, you would be able to choose against your inclinations, i. e. your will would be free in the negative sense, and then
it would, according to Kant, also be free in the positive sense, which
means that you would choose according to the laws of reason. The supposed third or meta-standpoint collapses.10 If you try to imagine it, you
realize that you in fact imagine the situation of autonomy. There is no
10
270
12
13
Die Freiheit der Willkr aber kann nicht durch das Vermgen der Wahl, fr oder
wider das Gesetz zu handeln (libertas indifferentiae), definiert werden, wie es wohl
einige versucht haben, obzwar die Willkr als Phnomen davon in der Erfahrung
hufige Beispiele gibt. (MdSR, 226)
dass die Freiheit nimmermehr darin gesetzt werden kann, dass das vernnftige
Subjekt auch eine wider seine (gesetzgebende) Vernunft streitende Wahl treffen
kann, wenn gleich die Erfahrung oft genug beweist, dass es geschieht (wovon wir
doch die Mglichkeit nicht begreifen knnen). (MdSR, 226)
As e. g. Beck (1960, 177, note 1) points out, it is very hard to find an adequate English translation for Willkr. There exist as many different proposals as translations of Kants works. That is why we follow Becks solution and keep the German
expression in the following. Mary Gregors translation is power of choice. In her
271
14
glossary (Gregor, 1996, 650), she refers to the latin difference between voluntas
(Wille) and arbitrium (Willkr). What is meant by Willkr is in our opinion most
adequately described by faculty of arbitrary choice, in order to emphasize the
aspect of arbitrariness.
Cf. Allison (1990, 225 f.); Beck (1960, 177 ff.); Wimmer (1980); Steigleder, (2002,
94 f., 109 ff.).
272
Die Freiheit der Willkr ist jene Unabhngigkeit ihrer Bestimmung durch sinnliche Antriebe; dies ist der negative Begriff derselben. Der positive ist: das Vermgen der reinen Vernunft, fr sich selbst praktisch zu sein. (MdSR, 213 f.)
273
274
275
276
277
But his brand of compatibilism requires the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal world, and he leaves no doubt that there is no
simpler or more down-to-earth solution to be had. He is an incompatibilist insofar as he is convinced that the reconciliation of the two perspectives an agent standing under the laws of nature, on the one hand,
and being free, on the other hand requires such extreme means. They
certainly are extreme: an action may be viewed as a natural event and is
as such fully determined by events arbitrarily in the far past, according
to the laws of nature. It could thus in principle have been predicted with
complete certainty at any particular time prior to its occurrence. The
very same event, however, viewed as an action, is spontaneously caused
by an agent who thereby starts a new causal chain, and this is supposed
to be no contradiction, because the latter is due to the agent as a thing in
itself and somehow takes place outside of space and time.
This is hardly credible first of all, the action, the decision to act,
and the foregoing deliberations of the agent that certainly somehow
influence his decision, occupy a certain stretch in time. Second, the
notion of causation presupposes that of time, so causal relations can
only exist within the (spatio-)temporal world, and not between the
noumenal and the phenomenal world. Third, if the action, viewed as a
natural event, is in fact determined by the laws of nature, it would take
place independently of what the noumenal self of the actor did. If by
freedom we mean noumenal causation and assert that we know no
noumena, then there is no justifiable way, in the study of phenomena,
to decide that it is permissible in application to some but not others of
them to use the concept of freedom. The uniformity of human actions
is, in principle, as great as that of the solar system; there is no reason to
regard statements about the freedom of the former as having any empirical consequences. If the possession of noumenal freedom makes a
difference to the uniformity of nature, then there is no uniformity; if
it does not, to call it freedom is a vain pretension. (Beck, 1960, 192)
Or, as it is described by Bennett, analyzing the compatibilism Kant
introduces in the Critique of Pure Reason: Kant wants the so-called
causality of freedom to be a power of originating a series of events (B
582). That requires that freedom leave its mark on the world of events,
making a difference to what occurs in that world, and that in turn implies that natural causality cannot entirely determine which events
occur. We repeatedly fi nd Kant trying to have it both ways: freedom
affects the world of events, and yet what happens in that world is just
what would have happened if there had been only natural causality.
(Bennett, 1974, 200)
278
279
280
valid can and will subsequently change. So, again, the freedom to
think that we have to claim for ourselves when we deliberate does
only amount to freedom as rationality, but does not imply negative
freedom or freedom as spontaneity.
The case of freedom4 (autonomy) is most difficult to judge. In a
weak sense, it is implied by Kants argument. In deliberating and judging, we not only have to assume that we follow whatever laws of reason
there are, but also approve of our being subject to them. We could not
wish to violate them while deliberating, because this would render our
conclusions unjustified. In this sense the laws of reason are self-given.
They need not be self-given in the sense of literally being chosen by
ourselves, but we can certainly think of them as self-given. Upon reflection we realize that if we had the choice we would (have to) impose
these laws on ourselves, or negatively, that we could not wish to get rid
of them. But this sense of autonomy does not imply freedom2 or freedom3. We can further clarify this weak meaning of autonomy if we
ask why the laws of nature are alien laws. Insofar as we are subject
to them, we have, of course, not actually chosen to be so. But as we
have seen, this may also be the case with the laws of reason. The crucial difference is that we are not bound to approve of our being subject
to the laws of nature. In deliberating, we need not identify with nature
and her laws, but we have to identify with reason and its laws. It is this
point that is successfully made by Kants argument.
One might agree with this and nevertheless object to the characterization of the laws of nature as alien. Insofar as we are deliberating beings, we have to identify with reason and its laws this we
can concede. But are we not also sensible beings? And insofar as we
are such beings, dont we have to view ourselves as part of nature and
identify with her laws? Doesnt Kant beg the question if he calls the
laws of nature alien and the laws of reason self-given? Why are we
entitled to prefer the view of ourselves as rational beings to the view of
ourselves as sensible beings? These questions point to the reason why
Kant has not reached his goal within the text passage under discussion,
even if his argument here were to be completely successful. They are
answered in the further parts of Section III by an appeal to the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal world, by attributing the
laws of nature to the former and the laws of reason to the latter, and
by claiming priority of the latter because the world of understanding
contains the ground of the world of sense (GMS, 453), and therefore,
what belongs to mere appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the constitution of the thing in itself (GMS, 461).
281
282
283
Other works
Allison, Henry E. (1990): Kants Theory of Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Allison, Henry E. (1993): Kants Preparatory Argument in Grundlegung
III, in: Hffe, Otfried (ed.): Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein
kooperativer Kommentar, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 314324.
Allison, Henry E. (2002): Morality and Freedom: Kants Reciprocity Thesis, in: Pasternack, Lawrence (ed.): Immanuel Kant Groundwork of
Metaphysics of Morals in Focus, London: Routledge, 182210.
Beck, Lewis White (1960): A Commentary on Kants Critique of Practical
Reason, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Beck, Lewis White (1975): The Actor and the Spectator, New Haven/London:
Yale University Press.
Bennett, Jonathan (1974): Kants Dialectic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eisler, Rudolf (1994): Kant-Lexikon. Nachschlagewerk zu Kants smtlichen
Schriften, Briefen und handschriftlichem Nachla, Hildesheim u. a.: Olms.
Henrich, Dieter (1975): Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes. ber die Grnde der Dunkelheit des letzten Abschnittes von Kants Grundlegung zur
Metaphysik der Sitten, in: Schwan, Alexander (ed.): Denken im Schatten
des Nihilismus. Festschrift fr Wilhelm Weischedel zum 70. Geburtstag,
Darmstadt, 55112.
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996): Morality as freedom, in: Korsgaard, Christine M.: Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 159187.
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1998): The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
ONeill, Onora (1989): Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung III, in:
ONeill, Onora: Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kants Practical Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5165.
Prauss, Gerold (1993): Fr sich selber praktische Vernunft, in: Hffe,
Otfried (ed.): Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein kooperativer
Kommentar, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 253263.
Schnecker, Dieter (1999): Kant: Grundlegung III. Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs, Freiburg i. Br./Mnchen: Alber.
Schnecker, Dieter / Wood, Allen (22004): Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein einfhrender Kommentar, Paderborn: Schningh
(UTB).
Schneewind, Jerome B. (1992): Autonomy, obligation, virtue, in: Guyer,
Paul (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 309341.
Steigleder, Klaus (2002): Kants Moralphilosophie. Die Selbstbezglichkeit
reiner praktischer Vernunft, Stuttgart: Metzler.
Sturma, Dieter (2004): Kants Ethik der Autonomie, in: Ameriks, Karl /
Sturma, Dieter (ed.): Kants Ethik, Paderborn: mentis, 160177.
Timmermann, Jens (2004): Kommentar, in: Jens Timmermann (ed.): Immanuel Kant. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 84158.
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287
moral law can obligate, and why we ought to detach ourselves from
all empirical interest (GMS, 450). The solution to the circle problem
should presumably also aid in answering this question.
The present essay will attempt to cast some light on the problems
of interpretation outlined above. It proceeds as follows: In part 1 the
structure of the circle is studied in order to determine what kind of
circle we are dealing with. Part 2 considers the circle problem in relation to Kants other concerns in GMS III, with the aim to see what
an escape from the circle is supposed to accomplish. Whether a circle actually has been committed in Kants argument is also discussed
here. Part 3 examines how transcendental idealism is introduced and
in what way it solves the circle problem. As might be expected, not
all difficulties will disappear. In particular, it will remain undecided
whether the assumption of a world of the understanding is a step that
abandons the practical point of view and attempts a theoretical proof,
thereby perhaps even transcending the boundaries of cognition.
This long sentence is made up of three parts. The first part describes
the circle as such. The second part (for, freedom and the wills own
lawgiving are both autonomy and hence reciprocal concepts) identifies
the principle on which the circular reasoning hinges, and at the same
time prepares for the third and final part of the sentence, in which the
circular reasoning is criticized. Thus, the circle as such is this reasoning, which I shall call the first circle passage: We take ourselves as
free in the order of efficient causes in order to think ourselves under
moral laws in the order of ends; and we afterwards think ourselves as
subject to these laws because we have ascribed to ourselves freedom
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The German reads: Wir nehmen uns in der Ordnung der wirkenden Ursachen als
frei an, um uns in der Ordnung der Zwecke unter sittlichen Gesetzen zu denken, und
wir denken uns nachher als diesen Gesetzen unterworfen, weil wir uns die Freiheit
des Willens beigelegt haben.
For a recent example of such an interpretation, see Kim (2002, 71). Schnecker
(1999, 349 f.) refers to several other instances. My treatment of this issue owes much
to Schnecker (1999).
T-h (1788, 271): wir scheinen also aus der Freiheit auf die Autonomie, und dann
wieder aus der Autonomie auf die Freiheit zu schliessen.
In the present context it does not matter that T-h construes the argument in terms of
autonomy rather than morality.
289
Perhaps clearer than in the corresponding part of the first circle passage, here it is stated that the idea of freedom is taken as a ground,
that is, a premise. The last part of the passage says that once freedom
is assumed, we can infer the moral law.8 It seems that here, like in the
first circle passage, we have a non-circular argument starting from the
assumption of freedom and having morality as its consequence.
Kant goes on to explain what kind of mistake we would have made
had we argued in the manner described in the circle passages. It was
suspected that we were unable to furnish any ground at all for the
moral law but could put it forward only as a petitio principii [Erbittung eines Prinzips] disposed souls would gladly grant us, but never
as a demonstrable proposition (GMS, 453).9 We would thus have put
7
The German reads: da wir nmlich vielleicht die Idee der Freiheit nur um des
sittlichen Gesetzes willen zum Grunde legten, um dieses nachher aus der Freiheit
wiederum zu schlieen.
The words in turn might be taken to indicate a reversal of argumentative order,
suggesting a genuine circle after all. Perhaps Allen Woods translation (Kant 2002)
of wiederum as once again gives a slightly different tone.
Alternatively, the translation could be unable to furnish any ground at all for our
inference. Compare Woods rendering (Kant 2002): we could not offer any ground
for the former. In its context the former (jenem) might refer to our inference
(unserem Schlusse). Here is the complete German sentence: Nun ist der Verdacht,
den wir oben rege machten, gehoben, als wre ein geheimer Zirkel in unserem
Schlusse aus der Freiheit auf die Autonomie und aus dieser aufs sittliche Gesetz
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forward a petitio principii. Though the term is often used for circular
arguments in general, petitio principii more specifically designates
an assumption made without other ground than that the assumption
can be used as premise for inferring a desired conclusion. A petitio understood in this way amounts to an ad hoc assumption. So, for instance,
if someone asks me why I think the Big Bang theory is false, and I offer
as reason that the universe is eternal, then in making this assumption
I put forward a petitio principii, unless either a case can be made for
the self-evidence of the assumption or independent grounds are given
for it. The ground I offer (the eternity of the universe) is a petitio, and
so my claim that the Big Bang theory is false can also be called a petitio. In this sense, the straightforward argument is a petitio principii. In
our inference from freedom to autonomy and from the latter to the
moral law (GMS, 453), the assumption of freedom has not been given
any ground, and it seems to be made only for the sake of inferring the
moral law, which therefore in its turn is groundless too.
Now, it may seem somewhat implausible that Kant should reach
this conclusion, considering that he has argued in GMS, 448, that a rational being must view its own judging as free. Is this not a justification
for assuming freedom (at least in the practical respect), so that the
premise is not simply put forward without ground? We will return to
this question in the next section; before that, an explanation is needed
for why Kant talks of a circle if he only means a petitio (in the sense
related to ad hoc).
Kants choice of word is not necessarily misleading. The Jsche
Logik (Log, 92, 135) distinguishes two kinds of fallacies in the same
short section, obviously seeing them as closely related. Whereas a circulus in probando builds the proposition to be proved into the premise
used for proving it, a petitio principii consists in accepting a premise
as immediately certain although it still requires a proof.10 As related
to circulus in probando, petitio principii is in a loose sense a kind of
10
enthalten, da wir nmlich vielleicht die Idee der Freiheit nur um des sittlichen
Gesetzes willen zum Grunde legten, um dieses nachher aus der Freiheit wiederum
zu schlieen, mithin von jenem gar keinen Grund angeben knnten, sondern es
nur als Erbittung eines Prinzips, das uns gutgesinnte Seelen wohl gerne einrumen
werden, welches wir aber niemals als einen erweislichen Satz aufstellen knnten
(GMS, 453; I have italicized the words under discussion). For a discussion of what
jenem refers to, see Schnecker (1999, 340). Anyway, even if jenem refers to the
moral law, so that the moral law is what is put forward as a petitio, this can be taken
as resulting from the groundlessness of the premise for inferring the moral law,
namely freedom (cf. Schnecker, 1999, 340 f.).
See also Kim (2002, 70) for references to Kants other lectures on logic treating
these two fallacies.
291
circle (eine Art von Zirkel), which is the phrase with which the circle
problem is introduced in GMS, 450.11 There is also another reason why
the argument might be called a circle. Kant thinks that if one were to
commit this fallacy, the motivation for doing so would be the desire
to reach the conclusion. The train of thought goes from wanting to
establish morality to finding a suitable premise from which to derive it.
We take ourselves as free [] in order to think ourselves under moral
laws (GMS, 450), and we took as a ground the idea of freedom only
for the sake of the moral law (GMS, 453). There are also formulations
in the previous discussion in the third subsection of GMS III which
can be read in this way, such as this one: in the idea of freedom [it
seems that] we have actually only presupposed the moral law, namely
the principle of the autonomy of the will itself (GMS, 449). So even
though the argument structure in the circle passages is that of a petitio,
in an informal, psychological sense, the train of thought is circular. 12
One cause for the prevalence of interpretations misconstruing the circle passages as having the form of circulus in probando arguments is
presumably that commentators have read this motivational movement
of thought into the logical structure described in these passages.
Another feature of Kants presentation of the problem that might
be taken to speak in favour of an interpretation in terms of circulus in
probando is the discussion in connection to the first circle passage of the
reciprocity of the concepts of freedom and the wills own lawgiving:
freedom and the wills own lawgiving are both autonomy and hence reciprocal concepts [Wechselbegriffe], and for this very reason one cannot be
used to explain the other or to furnish a ground for it but can at most be
11
12
Kim (2002, 70) considers the possibility that the circle in GMS III may take the
form of a petitio. But first he only discusses an argument in which morality is assumed without ground and used for deriving freedom, which is surprising since
he argues that the goal of the deduction in GMS III is to establish the principle of
morality. When Kim then (on p. 73) briefly treats the inverse argument, in which
freedom is assumed and morality inferred, his rejection of this interpretation (as
presented in Allison 1990, 221) seems to rely on taking the circle as a fallacy Kant
himself is to have committed. Moreover, because he construes the fi rst circle passage (GMS, 450) as a description of a strict circle (p. 71), he looks for a circulus in
probando even when he considers a petitio, so that his initial insight that the circle
might be a petitio is lost.
The circular train of thought could perhaps be presented quasi-formally in the following way (letting M represent morality and F freedom):
(1) M
(groundless assumption, psychologically based on conviction)
(2) FM (assumption on the basis of the reciprocity between these concepts)
(3) F
(groundless assumption, psychologically based on the wish to infer M)
(4) M
(conclusion from (2) and (3), but not from (1), as that would be unbearably trifling.)
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used only for the logical purpose of reducing apparently different representations of the same object to one single concept (as different fractions
of equal value are reduced to their lowest expression). (GMS, 450)
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Marcel Quarfood
human being which has a rather more difficult time when it comes to
acting morally. Obligation and duty are notions applicable only to the
latter. The concept of duty contains that of a good will though under
certain subjective limitations and hindrances (GMS, 397), whereas
for a being whose reason is practical without hindrance (GMS, 449)
or holy (GMS, 414; 439), the will and its maxims necessarily harmonize with the laws of autonomy (GMS, 439). From this we can see that
the concept of duty analytically contains good will as subconcept, as
well as hindrances, which we can identify with sensibility and the incentives it provides us with (cf. GMS, 449). According to Kants theory
of conceptual containment, the concept of gold contains the subconcepts metal and yellow, and if we detach from the concept metal
what we might call its limiting condition, the concept yellow, we can
no longer infer gold (as we could from the combination of metal
and yellow, if we assume for the sake of simplicity that these are the
only subconcepts of gold).16 Analogously, if we detach the limiting
condition of being subject to sensibility from the concept of a good
will, we cannot infer duty from the latter.17 Duty, as a composite concept, presupposes a synthesis connecting its subconcepts, good will
and sensible incentives.
In less formal terms, what the requirement for a synthesis amounts
to is that in order to explicate our subjection to duty (and thereby our
subjection to the categorical imperative), we need to connect the necessary lawfulness of pure practical reason to the fact that our will is
affected by sensibility (GMS, 449). To explicate how this synthetic
connection can be justified a priori is to give a deduction of the categorical imperative. So when Kant asks (immediately before introducing the suspicion of a hidden circle in the third subsection of GMS III)
from whence the moral law obligates (GMS, 450), he indicates that
up to this point the possibility of the categorical imperative has not
been addressed.18
An alternative way of explaining how the assumption of freedom
could possibly be a kind of petitio in spite of the argument in the
second subsection of GMS III to the effect that a rational being must
see itself as free would involve accepting this argument as valid in
principle even for the human case, already as it stands, without fur16
17
18
295
ther premises. On this view, the problem would rather concern how to
make use of the arguments conclusion: the straightforward argument
from freedom to morality appears to be irrelevant unless it can be
explained why morality presents itself as duty for the human being.
On this interpretation too, the third subsection of GMS III has to find
a way to unite rationality and subjection to sensibility in the same being, and unless this can be accomplished it is of no avail to possess an
abstract argument from freedom to morality. The conclusion of the
argument is too distant from human moral life to have any cogency,
despite its validity. If we are justified in considering ourselves free (at
least in the practical respect), morality follows in virtue of the analytical link between freedom and morality, but we do not yet see how
thus ascribing morality to ourselves can aid in understanding (or even
be consistent with) the phenomenon of obligation and the fact that
we are not necessarily acting morally. Unless this can be accommodated to the result of the straightforward argument, no progress can
be made in the deduction of the categorical imperative.
The alternative interpretation has both weaker and stronger points.
Its weakest aspect is perhaps that it represents the circle in terms
reminiscent of an antinomy rather than a petitio principii or even a
circulus in probando. There are to be sure points of contact between
the circle problem and the Antinomies of reason, but it would seem
that this is not all there is to the circle. I will not go further in evaluating this interpretation, but merely point out that it converges with the
previous one when it comes to what one should expect the solution to
the circle problem to accomplish. Such a solution must, on this view
as well as on the previous one, explain how both the validity of the
moral law and the capacity to adopt immoral maxims can apply to
human beings, that is, it must illuminate the possibility of obligation.
An important difference between the two views as concerns what the
solution to the circle problem should deliver is that on this view, there
is no need to find new evidence for justifying freedom. The argument
for a rational beings having to act under the idea of freedom provides
the evidence needed; we only have to find a way to accommodate this
result to the nature of our moral situation.
In light of the exposition up to this point, we should be able to answer the question as to who commits the circle fallacy. Is it Kant, or is
it perhaps some other philosopher? It ought to be fairly clear that Kant
has not committed the circle fallacy. Kant does not retract from his
arguments in the beginning of GMS III, he rather points out that they
are not sufficient for a deduction of moral obligation. Only a reading
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stressing the admission in the statement that it must be freely admitted that a kind of circle comes to light here (GMS, 450) but neglecting
other things said about the circle would have to attribute the fallacy
to Kant. He continues the sentence by pointing out that there merely
seems to be no way to escape the circle. And in GMS, 453, when he
claims to have solved the problem, it is the suspicion that a hidden
circle was contained in our inference from freedom to autonomy and
from the latter to the moral law that is said to have been removed. So,
apparently, there never was a circle, but a suspicion of a circle arose at
one point. Why did it arise? According to Kant the doctrine of the two
standpoints will remove the suspicion of a circle. Hence it must be the
absence of this doctrine that occasions the threat. But the doctrine,
central to transcendental idealism, could hardly be thought to be absent from Kants reflection. However, when the suspicion of a circle
arises, the doctrine of the two standpoints has not yet been put to work
in the Groundwork, and it could well be expected to be absent from the
reflection of the reader. Rather than attributing actual circular reasoning to Kant or some other thinker, we should see the circle as a possible mistake. The one who might commit it would be a possible reader.
Having followed Kants train of reasoning until the end of the second
subsection of GMS III, such a reader, not aware of transcendental idealism, would find it hard to advance without assuming freedom by petitio (or, on the alternative interpretation adumbrated above, without
getting stuck in the paradox of having proved morality and yet having
to face the proofs irrelevance to moral phenomenology).
The problem encountered by a reader lacking the possibility to appeal to transcendental idealism could also be formulated in terms of
the difference between on the one hand an analytic procedure following conceptual connections but lacking the resources to establish
that something falls under these concepts, and on the other hand a
synthetic a priori methodology capable of making explicit necessary
connections not merely reducible to analytical relations. The former
method would be useful for determining the genuine principle more
accurately, but it could not explain the principles validity or tackle
the issue of obligation (GMS, 449). Against this background, Reinhard Brandts suggestion that philosophers employing the analytical
methodology of the Wolffian tradition would be the ones committing
the fallacy of circularity gets a certain corroboration.19 From a Kan19
Brandt (1988, 186). For criticism of Brandt, see Allison (1990, 220), Schnecker
(1999, 353), and Kim (2002, 74 f.).
297
tian point of view, a thinker who draws such analytic connections, but
lacks the resources of critique by means of which synthetic a priori
claims can be justified, is a dogmatist par prfrence. The circle might
be said to represent the route the ideal typical Wolffian dogmatist (as
seen by the lights of Kant) would have to follow, even though no Wolffian actually reasoned along the lines of the circle.20
3. The two standpoints
Immediately upon introducing the circle in 450 Kant presents the way
out. It consists in attending to the difference between two standpoints
we can adopt with respect to ourselves. On the one hand we think of
ourselves by means of freedom as causes efficient a priori, on the
other hand, we conceive of ourselves in terms of our actions as effects
that we see before our eyes. The two standpoints are linked to the distinction between things in themselves and appearances. In these pages
(GMS, 450 f.), Kant describes an observation possible to make even
for the commonest [gemeinste] understanding (GMS, 450). But he
states that a reflective human being would come to the same conclusion (GMS, 451), and the whole discussion is conducted in the technical
language of transcendental philosophy, so it is endorsed also on this
level of reflection. Bringing the unsophisticated persons understanding into the discussion accords with the starting point of the Groundwork, namely that the content of morality is already implicitly assumed
in everyday moral thinking. The distinction is not just imported from
philosophical theory, but is corroborated in human experience (though,
as we will see, it does certainly not have its source in experience).
The drawing of a distinction between appearances and things in
themselves is traced back to an observation [Bemerkung] made even
by the commonest understanding in the form of an obscure discrimination of judgment [Urteilskraft] which it calls feeling (GMS, 451), to
the effect that representations over which we have no control present
things to us only with respect to how they affect us, that is, how they
appear, but not as to how they are in themselves. The passivity of the
reception of representations leads us to view them as appearances,
and thereby we are committed also to assuming that there is behind
appearances something else that is not appearance (GMS, 451).21 In
20
21
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thus noticing the difference between passively received representations and those produced by our own activity, we obtain a crude
[rohe] version of the distinction between the world of sense and the
world of understanding [Verstandeswelt] (GMS, 451). The world of
understanding is conceived of as the stable basis of the world of sense,
which latter may vary for different observers of the world [Weltbeschauern] in accordance with variations in sensibility (GMS, 451).
The above considerations do not concern only representations given from outside, but also what is given in inner sense. Therefore the
information we can obtain about ourselves consists only of appearances, and in this case too, we must necessarily assume something
else lying at their basis, an I in itself (GMS, 451). But with regard to
pure activity [reine Ttigkeit], which reaches consciousness immediately and not through affection of the senses, one must count oneself to the intellectual world [intellektuellen Welt] (GMS, 451). This
pure activity is identified as reason, a capacity which the human being
finds in himself and by means of which he distinguishes himself
from all other things (GMS, 452). Reason operates with ideas that
transcend sensibility. In making the distinction between the world of
sense and the world of understanding, reason marks out the limits
of the understanding, which, in contrast to reason, is restricted in its
activity in so far as its concepts only serve to bring sensible representations under rules (GMS, 452).
The spontaneity of reason allows the human being to think of himself as intelligence [Intelligenz] (GMS, 452), that is, as belonging
to the world of understanding.22 Therefore there are now two standpoints available from which to consider oneself: as belonging to the
world of sense, and as belonging to the intelligible world. This result
is used to remove the suspicion of there being a circle in our inference from freedom to autonomy and from the latter to the moral law
(GMS, 453). There is no circle (i. e., no petitio), because we now have
a ground for attributing freedom to ourselves, independently of our
wish to take ourselves as subject to morality. If we find reason in ourselves, then we have the premise needed for concluding that we are
practically free, and then we can use the analytic connection between
freedom and morality to establish the validity of the latter. The threat
of a circle being removed, the straightforward argument goes through.
On this reading, the recourse to the two-standpoints doctrine of transcendental idealism serves the function of providing independent evi22
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is that both before and after introducing the distinction between the
two points of view, Kant urges the reader not to look for a theoretical
proof of freedom. Early on in GMS III he states that he is not bound
to prove freedom in its theoretical respect, but only in a practical respect (GMS, 448n.). And at a later stage of his exposition, he says that
the concept of a world of understanding is [] only a standpoint that
reason sees itself constrained to take outside appearances in order to
think of itself as practical (GMS, 458).
Literature
Kants writings
Kants writings will be cited according to the pagination of Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: deGruyter, 1902) (abbreviated
as AA). All textual references are to The Cambridge Edition of the Works
of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press, 1992), except where otherwise noted. The German text of the Grundlegung will be quoted according to the edition by Bernd Kraft and Dieter Schnecker (Hamburg, Felix
Meiner Verlag, 1999). The Critique of Pure Reason will be cited according to
the A/B pagination from the first and second editions.
GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA, IV
KrV
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA III, IV
Log
Logik-Jsche, AA, IX
Prol
Prolegomena, AA IV
Kant, Immanuel (2002): Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, New
Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Other works
Allison, Henry E. (1990): Kants Theory of Freedom, New York, Cambridge
University Press.
Brandt, Reinhard (1988): Der Zirkel im dritten Abschnitt von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in: H. Oberer, Hariolf / G. Seel (Hrsg.),
169191.
Kim, Halla (2002): Has Kant Committed the Fallacy of Circularity in Foundations III?, in: Journal of Philosophical Research, 27, 6581.
Schnecker, Dieter (1999): Kant: Grundlegung III. Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs, Freiburg i. Br./Mnchen.
T-h (1788): Vierter Versuch ber die Kantsche Grundlegung zu einer Metaphysik der Sitten, in: Deutsches Museum, 13, 264293.
Dieter Schnecker
For a detailed analysis of Groundwork III, cf. Schnecker (1999); this article is
based upon that book. Here I will not address the secondary literature (I did so
extensively in Schnecker, 1999); as far as I can tell, little has been published since
that pays close attention to the text. However, I will make some brief comments on
Steigleders interpretation of what I call the thesis of analyticity. Many thanks to
Richard Capobianco and Alexander Cotter for checking my English.
Cf. Schnecker (2001); cf. also Damschen / Schnecker (2006).
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303
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perfectly rational beings always act morally. There are many passages
that prove this point (some of which can actually be found in GMS
III). A famous one in GMS II reads as follows:
If reason determines the will without exception [unausbleiblich], then the
actions of such a being, which are recognized as objectively necessary,
are also subjectively necessary, i. e. the will is a faculty of choosing only
that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes as practically
necessary, i. e., as good (GMS, 412,3035).
Since human beings dont have such a perfectly rational being, to them
the moral law is a categorical imperative or, as Kant puts it, a synthetic
proposition a priori. The categorical imperative is
a practical proposition that does not derive the volition of an action analytically
from any other volition already presupposed (for we have no such perfect will),
but is immediately connected with the concept of the will of a rational being,
as something not contained in it (GMS, 420,3235, Fn., m.e.).
305
duty. The counterpoint to freedom is not the absence or lack of freedom, but duty. Since morality without freedom is not thinkable for
Kant, freedom understood as a counterpoint to duty cannot be identical with the freedom presupposed by morality for beings that are both
sensuous and rational. Freedom as the counterpoint to duty must be
understood as the quality of a will that is completely rational and free.
However, a being that is obligated by duty must be free, too. Therefore, to think of oneself as obligated by duty implies to consider oneself as belonging to the world of sense, but it also means to consider
oneself at the same time (zugleich, GMS, 453,15) as belonging to the
world of understanding. 5 Hence the first part of the passage quoted
above (GMS, 453,1113) really is nothing but a reformulation of the
thesis of analyticity. The second part after the semi-colon, however,
makes clear why for sensuous-rational beings the moral law is an imperative and hence duty.6
The thesis of analyticity also shows up in the deduction found in
Sec. 4 which we will address in great detail later: As a mere member
of the world of understanding, all my actions would be perfectly in
accord with the principle of the autonomy of the pure will (GMS,
453,2527, m. e.). A bit later it says: And thus categorical imperatives
are possible through the fact that the idea of freedom makes me into a
member of an intelligible world, through which, if I were that alone, all
my actions would always be in accord with the autonomy of the will
(GMS, 454,69, m. e.). Again, at the end of the Sec. 4 Kant concludes:
The moral ought is thus his own necessary volition as a member of
5
6
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Dieter Schnecker
an intelligible world and is thought of by him as an ought only insofar as he at the same time considers himself as a member of the sensible world (GMS, 455,79, m. e.). And to quote yet another passage:
Under the presupposition of freedom of the will of an intelligence, its
autonomy, as the formal condition under which alone it can be determined, is a necessary consequence (GMS, 461,1417).
Kant describes an intelligence as a rational being that considers
itself solely as a member of the world of understanding. Thus, the will
in the context of the thesis of analyticity cannot simply be understood
as the will of a sensuous-rational being. It must be understood either
as the will of a perfectly rational being, whose free will always is a
good will; or, with an eye on human beings, it must be understood as
the will of a sensuous-rational being, whose will is both part of the
world of sense (Sinnenwelt) and of the world of understanding
(Verstandeswelt), whose will, however, as part of the latter world, is
the idea of reason, which would have full control over all subjective
motivations (GMS, 420,31, m. e.). It is exactly in this sense that in
the context of the deduction proper (Sec. 4), Kant writes that the categorical ought represents a synthetic proposition a priori by the fact
that my to will affected through sensible desires there is also added
the idea of precisely the same will, but one belonging to the world of
understanding, a pure will, practical for itself (GMS, 454,11, second
emphasis mine). In this perspective the human being, too, considers
his will as free, and such a free will always wills the good (all actions
would be perfectly in accord with the principle of the autonomy of the
pure will). This is the meaning of Kants thesis of analyticity.7
Thus Kant writes right after stating the thesis of analyticity:
Nonetheless, the latter is always a synthetic proposition: an absolutely
good will is that whose maxim can always contain itself considered as universal law, for through analysis of the concept of an absolutely good will
that quality of the maxim cannot be found. (GMS, 447,1014)
I cannot discuss here Kants repeated claim that the categorical imperative is a synthetic proposition; in any event, I would hold that, strictly speaking, it does not make
sense.
307
From early on this passage and especially the (formulation of the) concept of an
absolutely good will has tremendously contributed to the misunderstandings of the
thesis of analyticity (cf. the report on the secondary literature in Schnecker, 1999,
168171). For Kant does indeed avail himself of this concept of an absolutely good
will to refer to a perfectly rational (holy) will (cf. GMS, 439,2934). However, he
also refers to an imperfect will as absolutely good: That will is absolutely good
which cannot be evil, hence whose maxim, if it is made into a universal law, can never conflict with itself (GMS, 437,6). In this passage and context Kant clearly does
not talk about perfectly rational (holy) beings. He refers to the will as absolutely
good only insasmuch its (particular) maxim can be universalized; cf. GMS, 426,10;
437,24; 437,32; 444,28.
In Sec. 5 Kant provides a lengthy justification for his claim that the question of how
a categorical imperative is possible can only be answered partially: Thus the question, How is a categorical imperative possible? can be answered to this extent: :
(GMS, 461,7, m. e.); what cannot be answered is the question of how pure practical
reason indeed can be practical (cf. GMS 458,37; 459,34; 460,10; 461,25, 461,32).
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Dieter Schnecker
the world of sense in order to argue that the human being also must
understand himself as practically free. But then, it seems, Kant still
thinks that the answer to that crucial question is still not answered;
recall that Kant in Sec. 3 still asks from whence the moral law obligates (GMS, 450,16), a question that is not answered in Sec. 3 itself.
For now, I will leave it open what exactly it is that question is asking
for; as we will see later, Kant himself seems not to be entirely clear
about its meaning. In any event, what is needed is somehow the proof
that the CI is really valid, i. e. really binding on us. As long as this has
not been shown, morality could very well be a figment of the mind
(GMS, 407,17, 445,8); I will come back to this later.
2. The deduction of the categorical imperative
Sec. 4, then, raises our crucial question again and finally answers it.
This section is broken down into three paragraphs. In the first paragraph, Kant offers the argument proper. In the second paragraph,
Kant provides the final answer to the question of how categorical imperatives are possible (And thus categorical imperatives are possible
GMS, 454,6). Paragraph three comes back to common rational
moral cognition (something mentioned at the end of the preface); I
will not discuss it here.
2.1 Presuppositions of the deduction
Let me now quote the first four sentences of Sec. 4:
The rational being counts himself as intelligence in the world of understanding, and merely as an efficient cause belonging to this world does
it call its causality a will. From the other side, however, it is conscious of
itself also as a piece of the world of sense, in which its actions, as mere
appearances of that causality are encountered, but whose possibility from
the latter, with which we have no acquaintance, is something into which
we can have no insight, but rather in place of that we have to have insight
into those actions as determined through other appearances, namely desires and inclinations as belonging to the world of sense. As a mere member of the world of understanding, all my actions would be perfectly in accord with the principle of the autonomy of the pure will; as a mere piece of
the sensible world, they would have to be taken as entirely in accord with
the natural law of desires and inclinations, hence with the heteronomy of
nature. (The former would rest on the supreme principle of morality, the
second on that of happiness.) (GMS, 453, 17)
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These lines are basically a summary of what Kant has said about
freedom and morality in Sec. 13, and so they are also a summary of
his thesis of analyticity. Using Kants own words of paragraphs 912
(GMS, 452,7453,15), the gist of it is this: Now the human being actually finds in himself a faculty, and this faculty is reason as a faculty
of pure spontaneity (self-activity). On account of this, a rational being has to regard itself as an intelligence (thus not from the side of its
lower powers), as belonging not to the world of sense but to the world
of understanding. As a rational being, hence one belonging to the intelligible world, the human being can never think of the causality of
his own will otherwise than under the idea of freedom. Now, with the
idea of freedom the concept of autonomy is inseparably bound up, and
with the latter the universal principle of morality. If we think of ourselves as free, then we transport ourselves as members into the world
of understanding and cognize the autonomy of the will, together with
its consequence, morality; but if we think of ourselves as obligated by
duty, then we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense
and yet at the same time to the world of understanding. Again, paragraph 1 of Sec. 4 is nothing but a recapitulation of these basic ideas.
I will now present them in several theses (D14).
Thesis 1 states that every human being must understand itself as a
rational being:
(D1) The human being finds in itself the faculty of reason, which, as an
epistemic faculty, is a faculty of pure spontaneity.
It is important to say in this perspective because only as an intelligence, and inasmuch a human being is an intelligence, he may con10
Cf. Schnecker (1999, pp. 196316); here it is important to take into account Kants
Review of Schulzs Attempt at Introduction to a Doctrine of Morals (1783).
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Dieter Schnecker
Cf. GMS, 448,1322.: Now one cannot possibly think a reason that, in its own
consciousness, would receive steering from elsewhere in regard to its judgments;
for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its power of judgment not
to its reason but to an impulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles
independently of alien influences, consequently it must, as practical reason or as
the will of a rational being, be regarded by itself as free, i. e. the will of a rational
being can be a will of its own only under the idea of freedom and must therefore
with a practical aim be attributed to all rational beings (m. e.). How are we to read
consequently? The transition from the thinking I to the willing (acting) I only
appears plausible if the reason, the freedom of which cannot be denied without a
performative contradiction, is the very same reason that also is practical. That Kant
actually has something like this in mind shows in a thought of his from the preface.
There he says that it can in the end be only one and the same reason that is distinguished merely in its application (GMS, 391,27, m. e.). Kant calls this a unity
(GMS, 391,25) between theoretical and practical reason in a common principle
(GMS, 391,26). Only if this unity is comprehensively exhibited, Kant continues, a
critique of pure practical reason can be ventured and this is something, he says, he
could not do in the Groundwork. However, the truth of the matter is that in chapter
three a transition to such a critique of pure practical reason does take place, if only
its main feature (GMS, 445,15) is exhibited. But there is no argument whatsoever
for that alleged unity or identity of theoretical and practical reason. How this unity
is to be understood, how Kant moves from the freedom to think to the freedom to
will, and how from the concept of an intelligence to the concept of an intelligence
with a will we are left in the dark.
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Dieter Schnecker
gence I will cognize myself, though on the other side as a being belonging
to the world of sense, as nevertheless subject to the laws of the first, i. e., to
reason, which in the idea of freedom contains the law of the understandings world, and thus to autonomy of the will; consequently I must regard
the laws of the world of understanding for myself as imperatives and the
actions that accord with this principle as duties. (GMS, 453,31454,5)
Grammatically speaking, there is no problem with this part. Reconstructing the next element of the sentence is also rather compelling
(although the hence will deserve more attention later):
(OP2) Hence the world of understanding also contains the ground of the
laws of the world of sense.
Now, one might think that because of the relationship between the
world of understanding and the world of sense laid out in OP1 and
OP2, the world of understanding is also immediately legislative in
regard to my will and hence must also be thought of wholly as such
(i. e. as immediately legislative). As we will see, that cannot be true.
Rather, a correct understanding is as follows:
(OP3) In regard to my will, which belongs wholly to the world of understanding, the world of understanding is immediately legislative and must
also, in regard to my will, be thought of such that it (the world of understanding) contains the ground of the world of sense and its laws.
The translation of the German folglich (GMS, 454,4) with consequently (and
the preceding colon) can be misleading. The folglich functions as an explanation
or elucidation rather than a consequence in any stricter sense; Ill come back to
this later.
313
the world of understanding, the world of understanding is immediately legislative. What is problematic here is the relation of this part of
OP3 to OP1 and OP2, or to be more precise, problematic is both the
function of the conjunction because at the beginning of OP1 (But
because ) as well as the function of the adverb hence at the beginning of what we have reconstructed as OP3 (hence is immediately
legislative ). Clearly, it would make no sense to interpret Kant as
arguing that the world of understanding contains the ground of the
world of sense and the ground of its laws and therefore (hence) were
immediately legislative for the will; it would not, because this very will
already belongs wholly to the world of understanding anyway and
not to the world of sense. However, this problem of interpretation can
be solved by pointing out that the because at the beginning of the
whole sentence must be put (and read) also at the beginning of OP3,
such that one must read: Because the world of understanding also in
regard to my will, which belongs wholly to the world of understanding, is immediately legislative . The will is part of the world of understanding, and for this world of understanding it is true (according
to OP1 and OP2), that it contains the ground of the world of sense and
the ground of its laws. In what follows, Kant again avails himself (as
he did with the because) of an ellipsis; what is left out is in regard
to my will. The alleged fact that the will belongs wholly to the world
of understanding entails that the world of understanding must also
be thought of wholly as such; that is, however, not as a world which is
immediately legislative for this is clear anyway since the will belongs
to the world of understanding but as a world for which it is also
true in regard to the will as part of it, that it contains the ground of
the world of sense and its laws. Thus we get: It is also true in regard
to the will as part of the world of understanding that this will contains
the ground of the world of sense and its laws. As we will see later, it
is indeed the crux of Kants deduction that the pure will as a member
of the world of understanding contains the moral law as an imperative
for this very will as a member of the world of sense.
So we must reconstruct the first part of that sentence as follows:
(OP13) Because the world of understanding contains the ground of the
world of sense; and because hence the world of understanding also contains the ground of the laws of the world of sense; and because hence the
world of understanding also in regard to my will, which belongs wholly to
the world of understanding, is immediately legislative and must also, in
regard to my will, be thought of such that it (the world of understanding)
contains the ground of the world of sense and its laws
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315
The rest of the sentence is easy. It, too, makes clear that the moral law,
which describes the volition of perfectly rational beings, is an imperative for sensuous-rational beings:
(OP5) I must regard the laws of the world of understanding for myself as
imperatives and the actions that accord with this principle as duties.
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Dieter Schnecker
Cf. R 5086: In der Verstandeswelt ist das substratum: intelligentz, die Handlung
und Ursache: Freyheit, die Gemeinschaft: Glckseligkeit aus Freyheit, das Urwesen: eine Intelligentz durch idee; die form: moralitaet, der nexus: ein nexus der
Zweke. Diese Verstandeswelt liegt schon itzt der Sinnenwelt zum Grunde und ist
das wahre selbstandige (m. e., andere Hervorhebungen getilgt).
317
law for sensual-rational beings with the superiority of the ontic status
of the world of understanding. The human being as a thing in itself and
hence the eigentliche Selbst and its law is of higher ontic value then
the human being as an appearance; and this is why the law of the world
of understanding (the moral law) is binding upon the human being (as
a categorical imperative) who is a member both of the world of understanding and the world of sense. Thats the basic idea behind OP.
That this is, indeed, the basic idea behind OP can hardly be seen
just by reading OP itself (that sentence in GMS, 453). We have to look
at other passages. An external characteristic may lead the way: In that
passage in GMS, 453, OP1 and OP2 are emphasized, an emphasis that
at this length, as far as I know, hardly ever can be found in Kants writings (if at all). Exactly parallel to this, Kant again provides the answer
to the question of how a categorical imperative is possible in GMS,
461. And just as in GMS, 453 f., he again avails himself of a lengthy
emphasis to stress that the moral law
is valid [!] for us as [!] human beings, since [!] it has arisen from our will as
intelligence, hence from our authentic self; but what belongs to the mere
appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the constitution of
the thing in itself (GMS, 461,26).
The law of the world of appearances is the natural law of desires and
inclinations (GMS, 453,28); these desires and inclinations, as appearances (GMS, 453,24, m. e.), determine human actions. However,
this law just belongs to the mere appearance and therefore is necessarily subordinated by reason to the constitution of the thing in itself.
Here again it becomes clear that the whole force of Kants argument
depends on the ontic superiority of the authentic self.
And there is yet another passage that provides textual evidence for
this interpretation. The human being, Kant says, as a rational being is
a member of the world of understanding, and
since in that world he himself only as intelligence is the authentic self
(as human being, by contrast, only appearance of himself), those laws [of
the world of understanding] apply to him immediately and categorically
(GMS, 457,3336, m. e.)
In other words, the moral law is binding upon the human being because it stems from the pure will as the authentic self, which, as such,
is of higher ontic value (not only appearance of himself). Even in the
Critique of Practical Reason, in which Kant denies the possibility of
a deduction of the categorical imperative, he says that it is the status
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Dieter Schnecker
Steigleder (2006, this volume, pp. 225246) rejects my interpretation of Kants thesis of analyticity and therefore also my interpretation of Sec. 4. Although it would
be most interesting to have a detailed discussion, it is simply impossible to have it
here for lack of space. Hence just three brief comments: First, no interpretation can
be satisfying that is not comprehensive; its always easy, too easy indeed, to make
claims about what a text means by ignoring those passages that dont fit. (Thus,
Steigleder is right to point out that there are elements in Sec. 1 that pose a problem for my interpretation; I have addressed these elements in Schnecker, 1999.)
This being said, Id like to reply, second, that Steigleder correctly points out that
my interpretation is partly based on the overall structure of GMS III (that at least
part of GMS II and GMS III are preparation and that there is a Sec. 4 to say the
very least). However, it is certainly not sufficient to reply to this crucial element of
my interpretation by just asserting that there may conceivably be other readings
(Steigleder 2006, 242, m. e.) without actually providing an alternative reading that
is also in a position to account for the overall structure of GMS III. As did many
before him, Steigleder still argues that it is only Kants intention that we must
necessarily see ourselves as rational beings, which have a will (Steigleder, 2006,
p. 243). Clearly, however, this has been demonstrated no later than in Sec. 3. But
what then is the purpose of Sec. 4 and that long and complicated sentence that is (or
includes) what I call the ontoethical principle? Steigleder provides no answer, and
it is therefore no surprise that in his book (2002, 6796), Steigleder shows no interest whatsoever in that sentence either (he does, however, very briefly mention that
the Gesetz unserer Vernunft und das Verlangen unserer Bedrfnisse [] nicht
auf gleicher Stufe stehen, p. 89, m. e.). There may very well be other readings of it;
but whether there are any, we will not figure out by ignoring it. Leaving aside that
Steigleder, as I see it, pays no sufficient attention to Kants repeated claim that there
is no categorical imperative for perfectly rational beings and does not sufficiently
distinguish between the moral law as an synthetic imperative and as an analytical
319
17
18
law (though this distinction is, obviously, at the very heart of Kants question of how
a categorical imperative is possible), Id like to note, third, that Steigleder does not
have an explanation for Kants repeatedly posed question from whence the moral
law obligates. I do, by the way, agree that it is certainly worthwhile to consider the
option that Kant in the Groundwork already distinguishes, as Steigleder suggests,
between Wille and Willkr; but again, this issue I cannot possibly address here.
In the preface Kant already mentions the Grund der Verbindlichkeit of the CI
(ground of an obligation; cf. GMS, 389,12; 389,16; 391,11; 432,31; 439,31; 439,33;
448,34). He also speaks of the Realitt of the CI (reality; GMS, 425,14; 449,26), of
its Wirklichkeit (reality; cf. vgl. 420,1; vgl. 406,15), Geltung (validity; cf. GMS,
389,12; 389,14; 403,7; 408,18; 412,3; 424,35; 425,18; 442,8; 447,32; 448,6; 448,32;
449,29; 460,25; 461,3; 461,12), Richtigkeit (correctness; cf. GMS, 392,13), objektiven Notwendigkeit (objective necessity; cf. GMS 442,9; 449,26; 449,30); Kant
says that the CI gibt (is; cf. 419,18), that it wirklich stattfinde (is; cf. GMS, 425,9)
and that the human being ought to unterwerfen himself to it (subject himself to it;
cf. GMS, 449,12). All this concepts and formulations are probably best subsumed
under the idea of the Gltigkeit dieses Imperativs (validity of this imperative;
cf. GMS 461,12). Also note that Kant not only speaks of the deduction of the CI,
but also of its Beweis etc. (proof; cf. GMS, 392,4; 392,13; 403,27; 412,28; 425,8;
425,15; 427,17; 431,33; 440,2028; 445,1; 447,30448,4; 449,27).
For our context, I assume that answers which could be classified as formalistic
(such as Karl-Otto Apels or Habermas) fail from the word go; but they would classify as a third possible answer. On the Moral Question, cf. Schnecker (2006).
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Dieter Schnecker
Cf. Kants lecture Feyerabend (1319 ff.). I cannot get into this but one should not
forget that an important variant of the CI is based on the idea of the human being
as an end in itself; cf. Schnecker / Wood (22004, 140153).
321
that this law can motivate us: The moral ought is thus his own necessary volition as a member of an intelligible world and is thought by
him as an ought only insofar as he at the same time considers himself
as a member of the sensible world (GMS, 455,7, m. e.); this is why
Kant so often emphasizes that this ought is really a volition (GMS,
449,16, m. e.). Thus Kant not only attempts to demonstrate that there
is a good reason to be moral, but at the same time and this is partly
responsible for the confusion GMS can easily cause the deduction of
the moral law provides an incentive to be moral: Das Gute ist immer
das, was ieder Mensch will, und er wrde es auch immer thun, wenn
es ihm nur nicht schwer wrde, es auszuben, und wenn unsere Natur
so beschaffen wre, da wir immer nach dem Begriff des guten handelten, so wren wir recht frei. 20 The moral insight that Kant wants
to induce with the addressee of the moral law is that he, the addressee
himself, in some sense already wants what he ought to do.
2.4 Some brief critical points
As mentioned before, it is not the purpose of this paper to criticize (or
further develop) Kants deduction. However, let us briefly look at some
critical points which will also help us to better understand Kants argument. I dont find it convincing at all, neither from an external nor from
an internal point of view. Externally speaking, I would criticize Kants
axiology as much too narrow because it allows only rational beings to
have worth; but thats a long story and, in any case, not the issue here.
Internally speaking (i. e. presuming Kants own critical philosophy), it is quite obvious that Kant avails himself of an ontological interpretation of his own distinction between thing in itself and appearance that otherwise is merely a epistemological distinction. Lets have
a look at OP one more time. The first part of the ontoethical principle (OP13), we said, must be reconstructed as follows: Because the
world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense; and
because hence the world of understanding also contains the ground of
the laws of the world of sense; and because hence the world of understanding also in regard to my will, which belongs wholly to the world
of understanding, is immediately legislative and must also, in regard
to my will, be thought of such that it (the world of understanding) contains the ground of the world of sense and its laws . As seen earlier
in our detailed analysis, it seems that Kant has a general principle in
20
MM, 903.
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323
Literature
Kants writings
All textual references of the Groundwork are according to Allen Woods
translation and edition (Yale University Press, 2002). All references to the
German text of the Grundlegung are to the edition by B. Kraft and D. Schnecker (Felix Meiner Verlag, 1999). All other textual references are to The
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University
Press, 1992). Numbers in paranthesis refer to the AA.
Feyerabend Naturrecht Feyerabend, AA 27
GMS
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA, IV
KpV
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AA, V
MM
Metaphysik Mrongovius, AA 29
Other works
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Bibliography
General Index
a priori, apriority 3, 5, 7, 1116, 61, 142,
154 f., 158, 165, 171 ff., 186, 194, 196,
228233, 238 ff., 243, 249 f., 293 f.,
296 f., 304, 306 f., 316, 322
Achenwall, Gottfried 151 f., 157
Acton, Harry 325
agency 58, 60 f., 63, 65, 67, 78 ff., 88, 111,
165, 172, 195
Albrecht, Michael 325
Allison, Henry 74, 79 f., 83, 91, 94, 103,
106111, 112 f., 117, 134, 138, 248, 271,
283, 286, 291, 293, 296, 300, 325
Alqui, Ferdinand 325
Ameriks, Karl 214, 221, 325
analytic/synthetic 17 f., 145 f., 152 f.
analyticity, thesis of 241 f., 301, 303
307
Anaxagoras 54 f.
Annas, Julia 72, 91
anthropology 6, 15, 67, 250
Apel, Karl-Otto 115, 319
appearance 286, 297, 316 f., 321 f.
argument by elimination 201 ff., 211 ff.
Aristotelian biology 57
Aristotelian teleology 48
Aristotle 52, 127, 330
Atwell, John E. 325
Aubenque, Pierre 325
Aune, Bruce 96, 103106, 108111, 113,
117, 197, 325
automaton spirituale 275 f., 279
autonomy 61,129, 131, 178 f., 190 f., 229,
232 f., 236, 243, 245, 248, 250, 253 f.,
257, 259265, 268272, 275, 278,
280 ff., 320 f.
Bagattini, Alexander 121
Baker, Judith 81, 91, 325
Barnes, Gerald W. 325
Baron, Marcia 7880, 83 f., 86, 88, 90 f.,
160, 197, 325, 336
Brthlein, Karl 332
Baumanns, Peter 325 f.
338
General Index
General Index
Galvin, Richard 165, 172, 195, 197
gap theorists 94, 103 ff.
Garve, Christian 331, 332
Gass, Michael 328
Gaut, Berys 204, 221
Geismann, Georg 327 f.
Genova, A. C. 328
Gerhardt, Volker 124, 138, 326, 328,
333335
gifts of fortune 26, 28
gifts of nature 2629, 214
Glasgow, Joshua 183, 194, 196 f.
Glass, Ronald 328
Glockner, Hermann 326
Glockner, Marie 326
God 10, 32, 122, 124, 131133, 213, 279
Gods existence 45, 66
good will 2543, 4553, 66, 72 f., 77 f.,
82 f., 89 f., 101, 104 ff., 113, 129133,
202, 212220, 238 f., 244, 278, 294,
306 f., 322
good, absolute 2830, 38, 133, 204 ,
212, 220, 238 f., 307 (see also good will)
good, highest (summum bonum) 47, 61,
63, 66
good-natured temperament 81 f.
goodness, objective 52, 201, 205 ff.,
210 ff.
goodness, preeminent 101, 212218
goodness,unconditional 201, 204, 206,
210 ff., 215
Gracia, Jorge J. E. 333
Green, Ronald M. 328
Gregor, Mary 248, 270 f.
Grnewald, Bernward 328
Gunkel, Andreas 328
Gupta, R. K. 328
Guyer, Paul 70, 83, 91, 328
Haardt, Alexander 328
Habermas, Jrgen 319
Hammacher, Klaus 335
happiness 20, 27, 29 f., 36, 41, 43, 4654,
60 f., 6669, 83,116, 136 f.,144, 153, 167,
172, 204, 226 f., 278, 308
Harbison, Warren 328
Hare, Richard 143, 157, 186, 197
Harris, N. G. E. 328
Harrison, Jonathan 172, 195, 197, 329
hedonism 53, 67, 69
Hegel, Georg F. W. 108, 158 f., 197
Heidemann, Ingeborg 329
Heimsoeth, Heinz 329
Heintel, Erich 326
339
340
General Index
General Index
moral motive (acting for the sake of the
law) 38 f., 100103, 214 (see also
duty, acting from)
moral principle 83, 106, 114 ff., 161,
168 f., 172, 180, 185, 190, 210, 217,
225 ff. (see also supreme principle of
morality; categorical imperative)
moral principle, justification of 225
243, 301323
moral principles 4, 10 f., 13, 15, 17, 43,
115, 122, 130, 167, 177 f.
moral question 307, 319
moral worth 35 f., 7273, 7778, 8081,
8788, 100, 113
morality 3, 611, 16 f., 31, 47, 54, 60, 63
69, 83 f., 102, 112, 131 f., 158, 188, 219,
225243, 248 ff., 268, 285 f., 288 f., 291
300, 305, 308311 (see also moral
motive)
Moritz, Manfred 332
Moritz, Michael 142, 157
Morrisey, B. E. 336
motivation 35, 67, 79, 82, 123, 134, 173,
229, 234, 247, 256, 291, 306, 319321
Mrongovius, Christoph C. 141
Mues, Albert 335
Mulholland, Leslie 198, 332
Nachtsheim, Stephan 335
Nagl-Docekal, Herta 325
Narveson, Jan 161, 198
naturalism 53, 62, 274, 276
naturalists 53
nature 5, 26 f., 28 f., 45, 47 ff., 51 f., 54 f.,
5766, 69 f., 81, 124, 158, 194, 204, 212,
214, 232, 236, 240, 248, 261, 273 f., 275,
277280, 308, 322
nature, gifts of 20, 27 f., 214
nature, human 14, 45 f., 53, 59, 66, 68,
171 f., 178 f., 190, 211, 318
necessitation 34, 123, 134 f., 139 ff.,
144 f., 148153, 226, 231, 243
necessity 315, 34, 36 f., 61, 97 f., 101,
107, 114 f., 133, 135, 141, 145, 148, 152,
162, 171, 188, 226 ff., 230 f., 236 f.,
242 f., 255, 269
necessity, natural 61, 65, 68, 137, 233
237, 253, 258, 275 f.
Nida-Rmelin, Julian 20, 21
Nolan, Christopher 173
nondiminishability thesis 2830, 42
nonincreasability thesis 2830, 42
normativity 11, 13, 134, 187
norms 225 ff.
341
342
General Index
191, 201 f., 204, 206 ff., 213, 229, 232 f.,
240 ff., 247255, 260264, 267, 278
281, 285, 290, 292 ff., 302307, 315,
318
rational nature 31, 40, 74, 183, 200 ff.,
205 f., 210, 212, 217 f., 240, 262, 299
rationality 54, 67, 105, 110, 122, 127,
129, 145, 148 f., 150, 156, 250, 257,
259 ff., 264268, 272, 276, 278, 280 f.,
293, 295
Rawls, John 183, 195, 198
reason, law of 41, 125, 315
reason, practical 32, 39, 43, 46 ff., 61, 67,
121 ff., 126128, 149, 186, 233 f., 244,
249, 251254, 260 f., 263 f., 271, 275 f.,
278, 293, 304, 307, 309 f., 318 ff., 323 f.
reason, pure practical 16 , 111, 122, 155,
227 f., 231 ff., 235 ff., 249, 294, 307, 320
law of 111, 236 f.
reason, theoretical 232, 266 f., 293,
309 f.
Reath, Andrews 75, 92, 333
Reboul, Olivier 333
regressive argument 201 f., 206, 210,
212, 217
regulative principle 63, 65
Reich, Klaus 53, 70, 333
Reiner, Hans 82, 92, 333, 335
relevant descriptions 159 f., 163, 171,
177184
representations 121, 124 ff., 135, 147,
208, 233 f., 258, 264, 275 f., 287, 292,
297 f.
respect 34 ff., 75, 86, 93, 101, 104 f., 115,
123, 126 f., 133, 140, 144, 148, 150, 159,
165, 169, 182, 189, 249 ff., 261 ff., 278,
285 f., 290, 292 f., 295, 297, 300, 311,
318 ff.
Rickless, Samuel 333
Riedel, Manfred 329 f., 333
Ritzel, Wolfgang 326
Robinson, Hoke 327, 330
Rodriguez Lopez, Blanca 333
Rollin, Bernard E. 333
Rosenthal, Jacob 247
Ross, Sir William D. 27, 44, 163 f., 176,
180, 198, 333
Rossvaer, Viggo 333
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 53, 67, 259
Sandermann, Edmund 333
Sartiaux, F. 333
Scanlon, Thomas M. 187, 198
Scarano, Nico 10, 21
343
General Index
supreme law 9799, 115, 133, 210
supreme principle of morality 11, 16,
18, 21, 31, 37, 41, 43, 73, 89, 93, 100,
113 f., 172 f., 187 f., 200 ff., 204, 211 f.,
225, 229, 301, 308
Swoyer, Chris 172 f., 195, 198, 335
sympathy 34 f., 8082, 181
talents of the mind 26 f., 90
Teale, A. E. 335
teleological argument 45, 51, 278
teleology 4569, 195
Tenbruck, Friedrich 335
Terzis, George N. 335
theology 56, 57
thing-in-itself 28, 256, 277, 297311,
316 f., 321323
things-in-themselves 297
though experiments 10, 13 f.
Thucydides 59
Timmermann, Jens 15, 22, 123, 138,
269, 283, 335
Timmons, Mark 73, 166, 172, 177 f.,
195, 198, 335
transcendental idealism 6264, 286 f.,
293, 296299
Tropman, Elizabeth 90
Tugendhat, Ernst 5, 22, 94, 117, 335
unconditionality thesis 28 f., 37, 42
universality 37, 95, 97 f., 100, 105, 107
110, 133, 158 ff., 187, 189, 191, 193, 196,
236 f.
universalizability 97, 158199
Vialatoux, J. 335
virtue 39 f., 68, 116, 174
Vliet, JoAnn van 225
Wagner, Hans 335
Walsh, Dorothy 335
Ward, Keith 335
Wartenberg, Thomas 335
Weber, Raoul Simon 325
Weidemann, Hermann 68, 71
Weischedel, Wilhelm 329
welfare 49, 52, 67, 183, 215
Wenzel, Uwe Justus 336
Westphal, Kenneth R. 336
Whiting, Jennifer 330
332