Who is fighting who in Syria?

| 8/27/2016 12:00:00 AM
BEIRUT: Syria`s conflict broke out in March 2011 with peaceful protests against President
Bashar al-Assad`s government but has evolved into a complex war involving jihadist groups and
regional and international powers.
Over 290,000 people have been killed and more than half Syria`s population displaced in the
conflict, which Turkey entered this week, dispatching troops to battle the militant Islamic State
group and halt the advance of Kurdish forces.
Who is fighting who? Regime against rebels: The main battle line pits the approximately
300,000 soldiers of the Syrian army, and allied forces, against myriad rebel groups and Syrian
and foreign jihadists.
The largest anti-regime rebel alliance is the Army of Conquest, grouping Islamist factions like
Ahrar alSham and Faylag al-Sham with jihadists such as Fateh al-Sham Front, previously Al
Qaeda affiliate Al-Nusra Front.
The biggest battlefront at present is Aleppo city, divided between government and opposition
control but surrounded byloyalistforces.
The government is also fighting to retake control of Eastern Ghouta, next to Damascus, which is
largely controlled by the Jaish al-Islam rebel group.
Regime against IS: Syria`s army has fought IS in several parts of the country, expelling the
jihadists from the ancient city of Palmyra in March.
Regime against Kurds: Syria`s Kurds have largely stayed out of the conflict between the
government and armed opposition, but in August regime aircraft bombed Kurdish forces for the
first time in Hasakeh, a city jointly controlled by the regime and Kurds.
Kurdish forces now hold 90 per cent of Hasakeh.
Kurds against IS: Syria`s Kurds have carved out a semi-autonomous region in north and
northeasternSyria, with their People`s Protection Units (YPG) becoming a key partner of the
US-led coalition fighting IS.
Since January 2015, the YPG has ousted IS from the key towns of Kobane and Manbij in Aleppo
province, Tal Abyad in Raga province, and large parts of Hasakeh province.
The YPG is also the 1(ey component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which groups
diverse factions battling IS.
IS against rebels: IS considers all those who fail to pledge allegiance to its leader Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi its foes and has battled rebel groups and even rival jihadists.
Rebels backed by Turkey participated in this week`s capture of the border town of Jarabulus
from IS.Who supports whom? Regime: The army is bolstered by 200,000 irregular forces,
notably from the National Defence Forces. It also fights alongside between 5,0008,000 forces
from Lebanon`s powerful Shia militia Hezbollah, as well as Iranian, Iraqi and Afghan fighters.
Russia, a key regime bacl(er, began an aerial campaign in support of Assad`s government last
September and has helped Damascus recapture areasin severalprovinces.
Iran is another key ally, providing financial and military support.
Rebels: Opposition factions deemed `moderate` are backed by the West, particularly the United
States, France and the UK, though the forces have accused their sup-porters of providing
insufficient support.
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar also back the opposition, and they have also lent support to
Islamist factions.
Kurds: Syria`s Kurds are key partners of the anti-IS coalition headed by Washington, but Turl(ey
considers the YPG to be a branch of the Kurdistan Workers` Party (PKK), which Ankara brands
a `terror` group.
Jihadists: No country openly backs the jihadists of Fateh al-Sham and IS, although the latter has
been able to rely on funds from taxation and resources in the territory it holds in Syria and Iraq.
Who controls what?Regime: Syria`s government holds around 35 per cent of the country,
including strategic areas such as the capital Damascus, central Homs and Hama, the coast, and
large parts of Aleppo. Sixty per cent of the populationlives underitsrule.
IS: Despite setbacks since 2015, IS controls around 35pc of Syria, much of it uninhabited. It
dominates Deir Ezzor province on the Iraqi border and Raqa province. It is also present in a
number of other regions.
Kurds: Kurdish forces hold around 18pc of the country, including threequarters of the SyrianTurkish border. They have declared a federal region in areas under their control.
Fateh al-Sham, other rebels: Fateh al-Sham and other rebel forces hold some 12pc of the
country.
The largest expanse is in Idlib province and controlled by the Army of Conquest alliance.
What are goals of each party? Regime: President Assad has said he wants to retake the whole
country and will not stand down.
Rebels: Rebel forces seek to oust Assad, though factions differ on their vision for the country,

with Fateh alSham aspiring to an Islamic emirate.

Kurds: The Kurds seek an autonomous region in areas where they form a majority.
IS:IS seeks to expand its self-proclaimed `caliphate` in territory underits controlin Syria andIraq.
United States: Washington has called on Assad to step down, but its efforts are now focused on
combating IS.
Russia: Moscow insists Assad will not be ousted, and seeks a diplomatic victory by competing
with Washington to shape negotiations between the regime and rebels.
Iran: Tehran seeks to protect key ally Assad, and assert its role in the Arab world.
Turkey: Ankara backs the opposition, but is currently focused on preventing the Kurds from
creating a contiguous autonomous region.-AFP

Putin Doubles Down In Syria Analysis By Stephen Blank

27 August 2016

by: Stephen Blank

in: World

A year ago, President Obama opined that Russian intervention in Syria would turn into a
quagmire. One year later, however, Russia is expanding and consolidating its positions and goals
in Syria. Bashar Assads rule looks more secure than ever, buttressed by Russian weapons
(including chemical weapons), intelligence, diplomatic support, and money. Moreover far from
reducing its military footprint, Russia is expanding it. The Duma is about to ratify agreements
essentially giving Russia permanent air bases like Hmeymim air base and Tartus. Thus Moscow,
for the first time in over forty years, now has permanent bases in the Middle East, both in Syria
and in Cyprus. Moreover, it is an open secret that Moscow would like to obtain a base at
Alexandria like the one it had in the 1970s. In August 2016 Moscow revealed that it is now
operating out of the Hamadan air base in Iran. However, within days the Iranian government
pulled the plug on Russia, criticizing its inconsiderate and ungentlemanly attitude. Iranian
Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan also noted that Moscow acts like and wants to show that it is
a great power.[1] Obviously this episode cries out for explanation but it should not be taken as
indicating that Moscow has now descended into a quagmire or, in the Russian phrase, stepped on
a rake.
While this episode strongly suggests that Russo-Iranian ties are more fragile than Moscow
believed, it does not disprove the fact that both sides have hitherto collaborated quite well up to
this point in Syria and that they share a common objective of preserving the Assad regime in
power. Iran apparently could not stand the publicity about this base and was upset that Moscow
had blown its cover by announcing it was flying missions form Hamadan. Evidently Tehran
would have preferred not to open itself up to charges from the entire Middle East (and
presumably Washington) or to the domestic opposition within Iran about letting foreign powers
have a military base in Iran from which they could launch sorties with impunity. Indeed, the
presence of this base was surprising for the following reasons. Moscows acquisition of the right
to use an Iranian air base is the first time the Iranian regime has allowed any foreign military
presence in Iran, something that contravenes the fundamental message of the Iranian revolution
of 1979 that is the regimes claim to legitimacy. It also represents a violation of UN Resolution
2231 forbidding foreign bases in Iran passed as part of the 2015 deal to prevent Iranian
nuclearization. It may well be the case though we cannot be certain that once the implications
of this fact became clear to Tehran, notably that it jeopardized the continuation of the agreement
with the 5+1 of 2015 regarding Iranian nuclearization and could lead to serious economic harm
that second thoughts about having this base prevailed. Beyond that, this base, especially if it had
continued, would have extended Moscows rapprochement with Tehran and the two states
military cooperation beyond arms sales. As it is, Iran has not only now acquired the formidable
S-300 surface to air anti-pair missile, it is now negotiating for Sukhoi fighter jets. And that
negotiation appears to be unaffected by the decision to suspend Russian use of the base.
Russias and Irans violation of UN resolutions in this context are not totally unexpected, since
Irans ongoing missile program is also a violation of Resolution 2231. The Russian use of
incendiary weapons against civilians in Syria violates the Chemical Weapons Convention going
back to 1925. Thus both Iran and Russia have ignored agreements while Washington and the
international community look the other way, and are basically saying, we will do as we please
whether you like it or not and you either cannot or will not do anything about it. So while this

episode suggests that Irano-Russian ties are more problematic than Moscow might have
imagined, there is no reason to see here a rupture of those ties or a divide in the fundamental
identity of Russian and Iranian interests regarding Syria. Nor is this an obstacle to these two
governments further cooperation on Syria and other issues.
None of this should surprise anyone. Since Catherine the Great, Moscow has sought bases in the
Mediterranean, and even the Adriatic Sea. Thus Catherines forces occupied Beirut for 18 months
in 1772-74, and a generation later Paul I went to war on behalf of Malta, undoubtedly with
similar objectives in mind. Throughout the nineteenth century Russian encroachments on the
Ottoman Empire and the Balkans were a fundamental aspect of European diplomacy. In World
War I, in the allied negotiations around bringing Italy into the war on the side of the Entente,
Russia sought to gain a naval base through Serbia in the Adriatic. Stalin sought bases and
colonies in the Mediterranean after World War II; Brezhnev obtained and lost the base at
Alexandria. And now Putin has obtained the bases in Cyprus and Syria and has sought a naval
base at Bar in Montenegro on the Adriatic and a land base at Nis in Serbia. Indeed, Moscow has
consistently sought bases for what is now its Mediterranean Eskadra (Squadron) even when it
did not have the capacity to operate or utilize them in order to lay down a marker, stake a
claim, and force others to recognize it as a great power with a sphere of influence in the
Mediterranean. These bases would also challenge NATOs Mediterranean presence, guarantee
Russian freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea, and encircle Turkey, a centuries-old Russian
objective.
But the loss of the base at Hamadan does upset Russian plans. Had it been able to preserve that
base, Russia would then have been able to project power constantly throughout the Levant, (the
Eastern Mediterranean) and the Middle East, and force its way to an equal status with
Washington in determining future security outcomes there. Apart from its logistical and tactical
advantages in having a base in Iran from which to pursue Syrian targets and objectives, Moscow
would also gain from a base in Iran because it could then project Russian air power all the way
out to the Gulf where the US Fifth Fleet is stationed. Acquiring such a capability is a longstanding Russian objective; so Irans decision does strike at Russias larger ambitions. In 2014,
Moscow indicated its desire, even well in advance of its actual naval capabilities, to project
power into the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, so this base could have been a down payment on that
ambition as well. Meanwhile Washington keeps appealing for Russian cooperation in Syria only
for Russia to break every agreement and intensify its support for Assad to the point of using
chemical weapons in Aleppo, if not elsewhere.
While Russia will undertake the occasional bombing of ISIS, it clearly is more interested in
equal status with Washington in an anti-terrorist coalition against Assads opponents, not
Washingtons. And this is the case even though ISIS clearly presents a threat to Russia by its own
admission and has evidently now carried out some small-scale terrorist operations in Russia,
even beyond the North Caucasus. Therefore we can expect that Moscow will use its everstronger position in Syria and the Middle East to coerce Assads opponents still further into
preserving his state if not his leadership. It will also likely demand that Washington support
Assads remaining in power, or at least his regimes remaining in power. Moscow appears
wedded to Assad personally, especially as Putin has told him that Russia would not let him down.
So while there may be interludes where the attack on Aleppo is stopped for a while ostensibly for

humanitarian reasons, it is most likely that the overall battle will continue on Assads and the
Russians part to vanquish the insurgents and force them to accept his rule over most, if not all of
Syria.
We may also expect broader diplomatic initiatives by Russia to extend its weapons and economic
connections to Iran, and not only regarding the Middle East. The revelations of a Russian base in
Iran suggest as well that Moscow is looking for other bases in the greater Middle East even if
this episode has had an unfortunate ending for Russia. In this context we should remember that,
since power projection activities are an input into the world order, Russian force deployments
into the greater Middle East and economic-political actions to gain access, influence and power
there represent competitive and profound attempts at engendering a long-term restructuring of
the regional strategic order.[2] And that region is not just the Middle East.
The recent tripartite summit with Azerbaijan and Iran clearly signals an effort to involve Iran in
the latest of Russias transcontinental trade and transportation initiatives of a railway from Russia
to Iran thorough Azerbaijan. Moscow will also undoubtedly continue to pursue expanded arms
sales to Iran and endeavor to persuade Iran and other Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, to raise
energy prices by curtailing production or by some other means. Russias position in Syria will
undoubtedly be used as leverage to induce Riyadh to accept such ideas although there are clearly
no guarantees of success. We can also expect Russian efforts to insert it into schemes for a Gulf
security bloc and to sell more weapons to Middle Eastern clients (e.g., Egypt and Algeria).
Indeed, past experience shows that energy deals, arms sales, and the quest for Russian military
bases are all intimately linked as part of a grand design. Russia will continue, for example,
building an anti-access area denial air and ship capability for its Mediterranean Squadron at its
bases in Syria, Cyprus, and in the Caucasus as it already is doing.
Finally, Moscow has successfully forced Turkish President Erdogan to come to St. Petersburg
and fawn all over Putin, and not just for supporting him against the insurgents who tried to oust
him in a coup on July 15, 2016. Erdogan now says Turkey will implement the Turkstream energy
pipeline, Akkuyu nuclear plant, and engage in military-technical cooperation with Russia.
Indeed, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has offered many recent statements attacking
NATO, and all but saying that Turkey will buy weapons in the future from Russia among other
producers. Both sides are also establishing a mechanism for ongoing military-intelligence
coordination, supposedly against ISIS. Apart from this Russo-Turkish cooperation against ISIS
there are signs that Turkey might have to agree to a decent interval for Assad to stay in power
before leaving as part of a projected settlement. Yet Putin has certainly not stopped supporting
the Turkish or Syrian Kurds whom Ankara suspects of having committed recent terrorist attacks
in Turkey. Neither is Russia going to be deterred from supporting Assad, and it will only lift its
economic sanctions on Turkey dating back to the end of 2015 only gradually. Meanwhile Turkish
officials have more than once hinted at offering Moscow access to Incirlik Air Base. Therefore it
is hardly surprising that there are mounting reports in the media sounding alarms that Turkey is
in fact compromising its membership in NATO as Erdogan ruthlessly moves to stamp out all
opposition and re-establish an authoritarian-cum-Islamist state in Turkey rather on the model of
what Putin has done in Russia.

Even with losing the base in Iran Russia has achieved virtually all of its strategic aims in Syria
including some it had not originally sought or expected. In addition we also see the evisceration
of the pro-Western Kemalist Turkey, the expansion of Russian military power throughout the
Middle East even if that expansion has hit a temporary bump in the road and the continuing
disarray to put it mildly of U.S. policy. Indeed, insofar as Syria is concerned, it is not
inaccurate to say that Washington neither has a strategy, nor a coherent policy, or any idea how to
use the instruments of power at its disposal to achieve anything in Syria. One year after
intervening, Putin rather than entrapping himself in a quagmire has achieved his avowed
political and military objectives: coordinating with virtually every Middle Eastern state, exposing
the fatuousness of U.S. policy, forcing Washington to accept its leadership in Syria, and
establishing permanent and expanding military lodgments, all at a very low and affordable cost.
Indeed, it is the U.S. that appears to be in a quagmire in Syria, not Russia. Given this unbroken
and consistent series of successes for Putin in the Middle East, the prospect of a Russian
quagmire seems low.
About the author:
*Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research institute as well as at the
American Foreign Policy Council.
Source: This article was published by FPRI
Source: http://www.eurasiareview.com/24082016-putin-doubles-down-in-syria-analysis/

Pakistan's Role in the Syria Conflict

How Pakistan wound up on the same side as Iran in the Syria conflict.
By Samuel Ramani
August 24, 2016
On May 2, 2016, the Iranian government passed a law allowing families of
deceased foreign Iranian Revolutionary Guard fighters to gain Iranian citizenship.
Irans new citizenship legislation applies chiefly to relatives of Afghans and dissident
Iraqis who fought for Iran against Saddam Husseins regime during the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq War. However, the law has also been extended to include foreign
volunteers assisting Irans anti-Islamic State (ISIS) campaign in Syria.

Pakistanis are likely to be a major beneficiary of Irans new citizenship legislation. Since the start
of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard has recruited Pakistani
volunteers to participate in its pro-Assad military campaign in Syria. Meanwhile, the Pakistani
government has maintained a strong alliance with embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
The strength of the Islamabad-Damascus alliance is counter-intuitive;Pakistan is a Sunni
majority country and a close ally of Saudi Arabia, which has repeatedly called for Assads
overthrow.

Pakistans ongoing loyalty to Baathist Syria can be explained by historical legacies, and
Islamabads disdain for Western interference in Syrias internal politics. However, Pakistans
support for Assad comes with considerable risks. The Pakistani governments alliance with a
Shiite Syrian regime could inflame sectarian tensions within Pakistan and cause Saudi Arabia to
distance itself from Islamabad in favor of closer ties with India.
Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

The Foundations of the Pakistan-Syria Geopolitical Alliance

Even though air force cooperation between Pakistan and Syria already began during the 1960s,
the Islamabad-Damascus partnership has been defined by the strong alliance between the Assad
and Bhutto families. During the 1970s, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad forged a close
relationship with his Pakistani counterpart, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This friendship caused Assad to
become the first Syrian head of state to visit Pakistan during the 1974 Organization of Islamic
Cooperation summit in Lahore.
The strength of the Bhutto-Assad alliance was revealed by Assads fierce condemnations of
Bhuttos execution in 1979. Immediately after the 1978 military coup that propelled General
Mohammed Zia ul-Haq to power, Hafez al-Assad urged Zia to spare Bhuttos life. Zias defiance
of Assads advice ruptured Pakistans burgeoning partnership with Syria. After Zulfikar Ali
Bhuttos execution, some left-wing Pakistanis who supported Zias overthrow took refuge in
Damascus. Syria also granted asylum to three Bhutto family members in 1979.
Even though Syria and Pakistan normalized relations in 1987, Hafez al-Assad strongly supported
Benazir Bhutto during the 1988 Pakistani presidential election campaign. Assad was convinced
that Bhuttos victory would strengthen Pakistans relationship with Syrias principal international
ally, the Soviet Union. Assad also believed that Bhutto advocated left-wing principles that
resembled those of the Syrian Baath Party. The alliance between the Assad and Bhutto families
was revived in 2008, as Bashar al-Assad and Benazir Bhuttos husband, Asif Ali Zardari,
expanded Pakistan-Syria cooperation in the economic and security spheres.
Even though Nawaz Sharif replaced Zardari as prime minister of Pakistan in 2013, Islamabads
commitment to Assads survival has not wavered. Pakistans pro-Assad stance has corresponded
closely with Islamabads anti-Western foreign policy tilt. Pakistan has condemned the United
States willingness to violate Syrias sovereignty. Sharifs government also echoed Russias calls
for peace talks that include all major political factions in Syria.
After the Syrian militarys alleged use of chemical weapons in 2013, Pakistan strongly opposed a
potential U.S.-led military intervention in Syria to remove Assad. The Pakistani government
argued that Assads fall would make Syria a terminal failed state. Pakistans emphasis on

maintaining the status quo in Syria has strengthened its relationships with Russia and China, the
leaders of the pro-Assad bloc in the United Nations (UN).
Pakistan has also criticized international sanctions against the Syrian government. The Syrian
economys collapse has disrupted trade links between Damascus and Islamabad. Before the
Syrian civil wars outbreak, Pakistan regularly sold large quantities of wheat and cotton to Syria
in exchange for subsidized Syrian crude oil. Pakistan hopes to revive these economic deals by
ensuring that a negotiated solution to end the Syrian conflict is implemented on Assads terms.
Geopolitical Risks Associated with Pakistans Pro-Assad Position
Pakistans pro-Assad stance has reaffirmed Islamabads importance as an arbiter in Middle East
conflicts. However, the Pakistani governments Syria policy is accompanied by many risks.
There are two main reasons why Nawaz Sharifs handling of the Syrian crisis could destabilize
Pakistan.
First, Pakistans support for Assad could exacerbate sectarian tensions between Shiites and
Sunnis in Pakistan. Pakistani Shiite military volunteers have joined the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard in Syria, under the umbrella of the Zeinabiyoun unit. Supporters of Islamabads Syria
campaign argue that these recruitments will help unite Pakistan, as they give Pakistans
historically marginalized Shiite minority a rare opportunity to participate in politics.
Irans recruitment of military volunteers from Pakistan has also boosted the economic prospects
of some Pakistani Shiites. Iranian recruiters offer Pakistani Shiite men aged 18-35 a monthly
salary of 120,000 Pakistani rupees ($1,100). Iran has also offered to pay for the education of the
children of Pakistani soldiers killed in Syria and has agreed to fund annual pilgrimage trips to
Iran, Iraq, and Syria for the families of fallen soldiers.
Many Sunnis view Sharifs alignment with Assad as blatant pandering to Pakistani Shiites. Some
members of Pakistans Wahhabi community have turned to Islamic extremism, and the Pakistani
Taliban has sent militants to join the fight against Assad in Syria. To prevent unrest amongst the
Wahhabi community, Pakistani officials have insisted that Pakistans cooperation with Iran in
Syria has not jeopardized Islamabads alliances with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states.
To demonstrate the limits of the Pakistan-Iran partnership, the Pakistani government remained
neutral during the January 2016 Riyadh-Tehran diplomatic standoff. However, this neutral
stance did not appease Wahhabi community leaders in Pakistan. Pakistani Wahhabis wanted
Sharif to unconditionally support Saudi Arabia and condemn the Iranian government for its
alleged role in the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Dissatisfaction amongst Pakistani
Wahhabis could increase ISIS recruitment in Pakistan and weaken the loyalty of Islamists in the
Pakistani military to Sharifs government.

Second, Sharifs alliance with Assad could cause Saudi Arabia to rebalance its foreign policy in a
way that threatens Pakistans internal stability and vital interests. Many Saudi officials views
Pakistans refusal to contribute troops to Riyadhs air war in Yemen, while supporting Irans
objectives in Syria, as a betrayal of a long-standing alliance. Pakistans refusal to contribute
ground troops to Saudi Arabias 34- nation Islamic military alliance or participate in the U.S.-led
anti-ISIS campaign have further entrenched Riyadhs negative perceptions of Pakistans
involvement in Middle East affairs.
However, Saudi Arabias discontent with Pakistans Syria policy is unlikely to result in a
suspension of the long-standing Riyadh-Islamabad security partnership. Pakistan has been a
major manufacturer and exporter of arms to Saudi Arabia for decades. Many analysts also
believe that Pakistan would sell nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia if Iran were to violate the terms
of the nuclear deal.
Even though Saudi Arabia still wants to maintain a diplomatic partnership with Pakistan,
tensions over Syria have caused Riyadh to look for alternative trade and security partners in
South Asia. In recent months, Saudi Arabia has strengthened its security links with India. Saudi
officials believe that India is a rapidly developing country that can help Riyadh contain Irans
increasingly assertive foreign policy.
A deepening Saudi Arabia-Pakistan rift could cause Riyadh to pressure Pakistan to suspend
military activities that India believes are contributing to terrorism. If Sharif complies with Saudi
pressure to accommodate Indias interests, the risk of a military coup in Pakistan could increase
considerably.
To appease Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has downplayed its support for Assad by maintaining an
official stance of strict neutrality in the Syrian conflict. As Pakistans military cooperation with
Iran in Syria has grown dramatically in recent months, Saudi diplomats have become
increasingly skeptical of Islamabads neutrality pledge. Unless Saudi Arabias relationships with
Russia and Iran drastically improve, Sharif might be forced to soften his pro-Assad stance to
ensure the survival of his government.
Pakistans pro-Assad stance in the Syrian civil war is Islamabads most extensive foray into a
Middle East conflict in modern times. So far, Pakistans intervention in Syria has had mixed
results. Sharifs support for the Assad regime has strengthened Islamabads alliances with Iran
and Russia. Yet these diplomatic gains have countered by stronger Saudi Arabia-India ties and
the rising tide of Sunni Islamic extremism in Pakistan. Therefore, Nawaz Sharif faces an uphill
struggle to ensure that holding his ground in Syria does not cause Pakistan to spiral downwards
toward political instability and Sunni extremist violence.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil Candidate in International Relations at St. Antonys College,

University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post
and Huffington Post. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel
Ramani.
Syrian quicksand

BY O W E N B E N N E T T-J O N E S | 11/17/2016 12:00:00 AM

IT`S the crucial question in Syrian politics: is there a third way? Is the choice really between the
barbarism of the violent jihadis and the repression of President Assad? Aren`t there any
alternatives? It`s a subject full of `what ifs`. What if in 2011, right at the start of the antigovernment protests, President Assad had made some concessions? What if the Syrian army had
targeted the militant Islamic State (IS) group with as much ferocity as it used against its more
moderate opponents? What if President Obama had been more willing to intervene? All good
questions. But they are now a matter of history. We are where we are.
Some can see a third way. The Syrian Kurds now control a band of land alongside the TurkishSyrian border. Called Rojava, the Kurdish area carries with it the possibility of a degree of
autonomy not unlike that enjoyed by the Kurds in northern Iraq.
There could be obstacles ahead.The Syrian government has said that if the Kurds were to push
for full independence then the Syrian army would fight them. And if Damascus gains strength in
the coming years it could seek to crush even more limited aspirations for greater Kurdish
autonomy within Syria.
The Kurds also need to worry about Turkey, which now has troops in Syria.
President Erdogan would like to turn Rojava into a buffer zone in which it could place all the
Syrian refugees currently encamped in Turkey. Nonetheless, for all the uncertainties, the Kurds
can at least envisage a future in which neither Assad nor IS are dominating their lives.
But for most Syrians the Kurdish question is a sideshow. The central issue is what happens in
Damascus. Will the Syrian state survive and, if it does, who will be in control and how strong
will that state be? Even though the Russian intervention has significantly strengthened Assad, it
remains difficult to predict what lies ahead.
The government believes there are now fighters from 85 different countries active on Syrian soil.
Some outside powers such as the US, Russia, Turkey and Iran have conflicting interests which
will, no doubt, continue tobe expressedthroughtroops on the ground and proxy forces. It seems
unlikely that the central government in Damascus will, for the foreseeable future, be able to
reassert itself to the point of enjoying the sweeping powers that it wielded before 2011. There
will be instability in parts of Syria for years to come.
Those looking for a third way have two routes to follow. Either they could hope that there are
enough so-called moderate rebels to overthrow the Assad regimeand assert control.

Or they could bank on politics producing a solution in which less repressive politicians take over
the Syrian government and carry on the fight against the jihadis.
From the outset the US strategy has been to identify moderate rebels and back them.
But even the most devoted Obama supporters would have to concede that the policy has failed.
That is certainly the view of Donald Trump.
Those who follow Syrian opposition politics believe while there are still a significant number of
non-jihadi anti-government fighters, it is the jihadis that have the initiative, drive and
determination to impose their will. In the event of Assad falling, it is unlil(ely that moderates
would be the ones to emerge on top.
So what of a political solution might be possible? For that to work then Syria`s brightest and
best, now scattered all overthe world, would need to return to the country and be politically
active.
Understandably it`s a risk very few if any are willing to take.
Assad has shown no genuine interest in reaching out to those who have even mild disagreements
with him.
There are many cleavages in Syrian society such as those based on ethnicity, sect andclass. And
with the war causing a breakdown in many traditional structures, those differences are now
being expressed with violence. But there is one cleavage that is bigger than all the others the one
between the secularists and the Islamists.
Events in Egypt help illustrate the point.
Faced with a Muslim Brotherhood government, which had won successive elections and which
said it was committed to parliamentary politics, the country`s liberals decided they preferred the
authoritarian military rule offered by Gen Sisi. Even if their civil liberties were harshly curtailed,
they figured that was better than the Brotherhood.
Some Syrian liberals have said that the government in Damascus is so bad they would prefer the
Al Qaeda-sympathising Nusra Front. But if the Nusra Front were to actually win power and start
the violent imposition of Sharia, the liberals might have little choice but to rethink. The political
choices in the Middle East are stark. The writer is a British journalist and author of Pakistan:
Eye of the Storm.
Destination Syria

| 11/19/2016 12:00:00 AM

THE Syrian conflict today has become what the Afghan `jihad` was for many Muslim men in the
1980s: a magnet for radicalisation and extremism, with thousands of fighters from a variety of
countries abandoning their homes to participate in a `holy` war. And Pakistan no stranger to
religiously inspired militancy is also in the thick of things where the latest conflict is concerned.
Fighters, both Sunni and Shia, are heading for the battlefields of the Middle East, while militant
cells have been formed on Pakistani soil. As reported by our correspondent on Friday, sources in
Damascus have said that `hundreds` of Pakistanis are fighting in the conflict, both for and
against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Various independent analysts also assert that Pakistanis
are amongst the thousands of foreign fighters in Syria, while earlier this year, the National Crisis
Management Cell said that over 650 Pakistanis were believed to be fighting in various conflict
zones, including Syria and Iraq. The Counter Terrorism Department in Lahore has added to these
fears. On Thursday, the department claimed it had busted an eight-member cell of the militant
Islamic State group. The cell was reportedly responsible for sending fighters to Syria and
Afghanistan.
Fighters from over 80 countries are said to be present in Syria.
These include the offspring of Muslim immigrants in Europe -born and raised in that continent
as well as those from Muslim-majority states. However, the disclosures about the presence of
Pakistanis in Syria are particularly disturbing for two reasons: firstly, local fighters are getting
involved in an intensely bloody and complex foreign conflict. Secondly, their participation
threatens communal peace in Pakistan. There are various reasons why Sunni fighters would be
drawn to Syria. For example, factions of the TTP, who are pan-Islamists, would be drawn to a
`transnational jihad`, while Lashkar-i-Jhangvi cadres would be attracted to IS`s virulently
antiShia rhetoric. Others may be inspired by the idea of a `caliphate` or be self-radicalised. Many
Pakistani Shia fighters, on the other hand, would be motivated to travel to the Middle East to
defend holy shrines in cities like Najaf, Karbala and Damascus. Whatever the motivation, this
flow of fighters must be checked before a new, fullblown sectarian crisis erupts in Pakistan.
For long, the state`s reaction to the presence of IS or its sympathisers in Pakistan has been one of
denial. But the arrest of IS cadres and reports of the presence of Pakistani fighters in Syria
should be enough to shatter the illusion that the country is immune from the fallout of the Syrian
conflict. Greater effort is needed to both stop the flow of fighters proceeding abroad, and to keep
a check on groups or individuals who are keen to bring the fight home.