Fall

Political Reform in South Sudan

Hannah Parfitt
PLSC 351
Spring Semester
5/4/15

08

Introduction
In July of 2011, South Sudan gained independence from Sudan and formed a
representative democracy. Many in the international community hoped that the secession of
South Sudan would end the conflict between the predominantly Muslim north and the
predominately Christian south that had plagued Sudan for decades. However, the government of
South Sudan soon transformed into a kleptocracy led by corrupt political elites who prey upon
the resources of the population.1 The corruption of the political structures of South Sudan is a
major cause of state weakness and led to the conflict that erupted in 2013, when President Salva
Kiir attempted to consolidate power through the dismissal of his vice president Reik Machar and
cabinet ministers. In response to Kiirs actions Machar formed a rebel army, rallying support
along ethnic lines, with ethnic Nuers supporting Machar and ethnic Dinkas supporting Kiir.2
This conflict has plunged South Sudan into a state of total chaos. The government is extremely
fragile and has failed to provide basic public services such as infrastructure, education and health
and sanitation facilities. Although the constitution of 2011 established a representative
democracy complete with a bicameral legislative body, an executive branch, a judicial branch,
and democratic elections, the government has since then fallen prey to patronage politics and
heavy corruption. The unequal distribution of power within the government has allowed Kiir to
create an authoritarian government that does not serve the people. This unequal distribution of
power stems from a presidential and unitary system of government and currently all the power
and resources are concentrated in the executive branch. In order to restore sustainable peace in
South Sudan, major constitutional and electoral reforms must take place. The devolution of
1 Alex De Waal, When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of Civil War in South
Sudan, African Affairs 113, no. 452 (2014)
2 Ibid. 366
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power is a necessary component of these reforms, and is key to dismantling the current political
authoritarianism. These reforms are necessary in order to create stable and functioning political
structures that will ensure the sustainability of a peace agreement.

Pre Crisis Institutional Framework

The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan was created in 2011 at the time of
South Sudans independence.3 The constitution established executive, legislative and judicial
branches. The executive branch is comprised of a chief of state and a cabinet of national council
of ministers. Currently, Salva Kiir serves as the president of South Sudan. Riek Machar became
the vice president at the time of independence, but has since been dismissed by Kiir, along with
many other ministers from Kiirs cabinet. The president is elected through an absolute majority
system. Kiir was elected in 2010 and won with 93% of the vote. The constitution stipulates a
four-year presidential term, and during the transitional period the term of the president was four
years beginning from July 9, 2011.4 The next election was scheduled to take place in 2015,
however, lawmakers recently voted to extend Kiirs term for three more years. Government
officials cited the need to maintain stability in the region as the reason for the extension.5
The legislative branch of the South Sudanese government is comprised of a national
bicameral legislature. The bicameral legislature consists of the Council of States and the National
Legislative Assembly.6 The Council of States has 50 members and is currently comprised of a
mixture of members from the government of Southern Sudan before independence, and
3 CIA World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed May 2, 2015, www.cia.gov
4Juma Mabor Marial, 2015 Democratic Elections: The Legal Facts, Political Fictions and
Democratic Fantasies South Sudan News Agency, January 8, 2015.
www.southsudannewsagency.com
5 The Associated Press, South Sudan: Vote for the Status Quo, The New York Times, March 25,
2015, www.nytimes.com.
6National Elections Commission, NEC, accessed April 30, 2015, www.necsouthsudan.org
2

appointees by President Kiir post independence.7 The National Legislative Assembly consists of
332 seats that are elected through a mixed system. In this system 60% of the seats are allocated
through single member districts in simple majority elections.8 The other 40% of the seats are
allocated through proportional lists. The closed party lists reserve 25% of the seats for women
candidates and allot the other 15% for a general party list.9 Currently the National Legislature is
made up of members elected in the 2010 General Elections and seats appointed by Kiir post
independence. In the elections of 2010 the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement Party (SPLM)
won 255 of the 332 seats.10 No elections have been held since independence.
The judicial branch is made up of seven justices all appointed by the president. Currently,
the judicial branch is weak and is unable to operate independently from the executive branch. It
is therefore unable to function as a check on the powers of the executive branch.

Problems of the Current Political System

Although South Sudan was formed as a representative democracy and created a constitution that
established democratic political systems, in reality the government is a corrupt and kleptocratic
regime.11 The government of South Sudan has employed a system of patronage politics to prey
upon the wealth of the state and the oil rich nature of the state has given the government easy
access to resources that allow them to prop up their corrupt regime. The government provides
very few public services to the population and as a result there is very little infrastructure, and no
education or health and sanitation resources. There is only about 50 kilometers of paved road in

7 Inter-Parliamentary Union, accessed April 30, 2015, www.ipu.org

8 National Elections Commission, NEC, accessed April 30, 2015, www.necsouthsudan.org
9 ibid.
10 CIA World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed May 2, 2015, www.cia.gov
11 Dewall, When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent 347.
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South Sudan, a country roughly the size of France.12 South Sudan has a 27% literacy rate and
close to 80% of South Sudanese people do not have access to a toilet facility.13 These
development problems have stemmed from a largely ineffectual government. The incompetence
and corruption of the government, combined with the unequal distribution of power within the
governmental structures has contributed largely to the current crisis that is tearing South Sudan
apart and pushing the state to the point of collapse.
The problems within the political structures lie within the distribution of power within the
governmental system. Currently Salva Kiir holds the majority of the power within the
government. The concentration of power within the executive branch has stemmed from South
Sudans use of the presidential system of government.14 South Sudans Transitional Constitution
stipulates that the president must be elected every four years by the population.15 This system
differs from a parliamentary system where the elected party appoints a prime minister. In a
presidential system, the majority of the power lies with the president and the president is also not
subject to votes of no confidence by the parliament.16 In a presidential system the executive has
the power to name and direct the composition of the government, and has some constitutionally
granted lawmaking authority.17 In South Sudan, the powers given to the executive branch in the
Transitional Constitution are even greater than the presidential systems of other countries.
According to South Sudans constitution, the president has authority to dissolve parliament
under a state of emergency provision.18 This provision can be invoked under broad
circumstances and when this power is given to the leader of a new country that has fragile
12 The World Bank, South Sudan Overview, www.worldbank.org
13 Ibid.
14 Radon and Logan, South Sudan: Governance Arrangements, War and Peace, 155.
15 National Elections Commission, NEC, accessed April 30, 2015, www.necsouthsudan.org
16 Ibid., 156
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid
4

government institutions, the leader often becomes corrupt and assumes complete control over all
branches of the government. South Sudans strong presidency has allowed Kiir to abuse his
power, and monopolize the other governmental institutions. This concentration of power allowed
Kiir to dismiss his vice president and the majority of his cabinet and has led to the tensions
between Kiir and Machar and the outbreak of ethnic conflict.
Another problem that has hindered the effectiveness of South Sudans political structures is the
easy access the political elites have to the wealth and oil resources of the state. Alex De Wall
states that Kirrs strategy for managing the SPLMs fractious leaders was to indulge their
appetite for self enrichment.19 Kiir uses every opportunity to steal funds from the state and uses
those funds to buy the loyalty of political elites closest to him. De Wall describes the three
allocations for the national budget: the rulers private security spending, the money needed for
patronage politics, and the budget for public goods.20 If the amount of money needed to pay off
political elites grows, then the amount of money left over for public goods shrinks. Robert Bates
states that political order can only be achieved when rulers choose to employ means of coercion
to protect the creation of wealth rather than to prey upon it.21 South Sudans leaders are preying
upon the wealth of the state, and using the oil revenue to prop of their regime through patronage
politics, rather than distributing the wealth among the population. This predation hinders political
stability and peace efforts. It is easy for South Sudans political elites to engage in predation
because South Sudan is an oil rich state. South Sudans economy is completely reliant on oil
exports. Over 60% of South Sudans GDP comes from oil revenue.22 However, since 2014 oil

19 De Wall, When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent 348.

20 Ibid.
21 Robert Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 5.
22 The World Bank, South Sudan Overview, www.worldbank.org
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production has fallen by 20%.23 This decrease has affected revenue and will most likely
jeopardize the already fragile political system. Without the ability prop up his regime, Kiir may
be forced to engage in lasting peace negations with the rebel groups.
The overall fragility of the political institutions has also contributed to state weakness in
South Sudan.24 In most presidential systems the legislative and judicial branch safeguard against
political authoritarianism, however in the case of South Sudan, these branches are too weak to
keep the executive branch in check. The legislature is currently dominated by the SPLM, and it is
unlikely, even if elections are eventually held, that any other party will be able win a majority in
the legislature under the current electoral and government system. Currently, a party must win
4% of the national vote to make that party eligible for the proportional representation of seats.25
Although this rule is often put in place to keep extremist parties from gaining seats in the
national legislature, in the case of South Sudan it has prevented opposition parties from winning
seats in the legislature, and has effectively ensured that the SPLM remains the majority party.
The Judicial branch is equally as weak as the legislative, and is unable to place any checks on the
executive power. The 2011 Transitional Constitution granted the president immunity from any
legal proceedings during his or her tenure in office.26 This measure places the president out of
reach of the law and allows him to act free of the punishment of the law. In the current
governmental system, the legislative and judicial branches are unable to be independent of the
executive branch, and the system of checks and balances is unequal. This allows for the
corruption, patronage politics and ultimately the formation of an authoritarian and kleptocratic
regime.
23 Ibid.
24 Radon and Logan, South Sudan, Governance, Arrangements 158
25 Ibid., 158
26 Jenik Radon and Sarah Logan, South Sudan: Governance Arrangements, War and Peace,
Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2014): 155.
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Constitutional Reform
One way to limit the presidential power would be to switch from a presidential to a
parliamentary system. The legislative and judicial systems are currently unable to provide the
checks and balances necessary to prevent the concentration of power within the executive
branch. Under a parliamentary system, the parliament could stage a vote of no confidence if they
believed the prime minister was not performing his or her duties correctly and efficiently. A vote
of no confidence would create more accountability to the legislature and would hopefully curb
corruption within the political institutions. Parliamentary systems also place more emphasis on
political parties rather than individuals. The party that wins the majority of the vote elects a
prime minister on behalf of the population. The prime minister must then answer to his own
party as well as the political opposition when making decisions.27
Another constitutional reform that needs to take place to address the unequal distribution of
power within the South Sudan government is the decentralization of power. The South Sudanese
government needs to move away from a unitary structure and towards a federal governmental
structure. Before independence, one of South Sudans top requests from the Sudanese
government in Khartorum was the establishment of a more federal system of government that
would give the south more autonomy.28 The CPA of 2005 achieved this, with the establishment of
the Government of Southern Sudan, however after independence South Sudan did not continue
this trend of decentralization.29 Instead South Sudan leaders decided to centralize the government
and consolidate power within the executive branch. The centralization of power stemmed from
the patronage politics that began to take hold in the government, and the fear of opposition
27 Radon and Logan South Sudan: Governance Arrangements 156
28 Ibid., 152
29 Ibid.
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groups. South Sudan leaders feared that if the country was decentralized, opposition groups
could use that opportunity to rebel and break away from the state, just as South Sudan rebels had
done on their path to independence.30 While this is a valid concern in large countries, where the
government could have trouble controlling the entire state under a decentralized system, in South
Sudan where the country and population are both relatively small, a decentralized system is
unlikely to create that problem. Instead, a decentralized system could allow for greater autonomy
in regions of South Sudan that are currently neglected by the central government. A federal
system also brings the government closer to the people and increases accountability to the local
constituencies. Decentralization has been cited as increasing stability though enabling greater
political inclusivity, and consequently lessening civil unrest.31 A federal system would prevent
the concentration of power in weak centralized governmental institutions and would allow for a
more equal distribution of power and resources.
Another major issue that needs to be addressed in the new constitution is power sharing. Power
sharing is a difficult issue in South Sudan, due to the oil rich nature of the state, as well as the
current division of the country along ethnic lines. The current conflict stems from the fight over
the oil revenue of the state, and has transformed into an ethnic conflict. The restructuring of the
post conflict government will need to address both of these issues through effective power
sharing so that both groups will feel represented in the government. In South Sudan the
consociational power sharing approach would guarantee representation for the Nuer minority,
however, Timothy Sisk says the consociational approach can cause the ethnic divides of a
country to deepen and, in the case of South Sudan, could prevent the country from reunifying

30 Ibid. 154
31 Ibid., 153
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under a national identity after the conflict ends.32 In South Sudan an integrative approach would
be the best choice. The integrative power sharing approach would allow South Sudan to build
multiethnic political parties through political incentives that would encourage moderation and
help the nation to unite under a national identity, instead of sub national identities.33

Electoral Reform
Since the outbreak of the conflict, there have been many attempts at peace talks between the
two warring factions. The talks have been largely unsuccessful, and the two sides have failed to
sign a lasting peace agreement. 34 However, once a peace agreement is reached, electoral reform
will play a major role in the restructuring of the South Sudanese state. South Sudan currently has
a mixed electoral system. This system allows for 60% of the seats in the legislative assembly to
be elected by a simple majority, and the remaining 40% are elected through a proportional
system.35 Critics of the simple majority races often state that the system results in
disproportionate representation in correlation with the actual votes cast due to gerrymandering of
the districts.36 However, by combining this system with a proportional system for the remaining
40% of the seats the disproportionality, if there is any, can be corrected. Also, South Sudans
current system requires that parties put forth lists exclusively of women, this allows for 25% of
the seats in the National Legislative Assembly to be comprised of women.37 In theory this system
ensures accurate representation and promotes women involvement in what is a predominately
32 Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization and Peacebuilding: Perils and Promises (Washington
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001).
33 Ibid
34 Ismail Kushkush, South Sudan Peace Talks Stall, The New York Times, March 6, 2015,
www.nytimes.com
35 National Elections Commission, NEC, accessed April 30, 2015, www.necsouthsudan.org
36 Electoral Reform Society, accessed April 30, 2015, www.electoral-reform.org/uk
37 Ibid.
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patriarchal structure. The mixed electoral system is a sound approach, however this system has
not been implemented correctly under the presidential system. If South Sudan were to switch to a
parliamentary system a proportional representation electoral system would be most appropriate.
If South Sudan used proportional representation, preferential electoral systems could be
installed, such as the alternative vote system. If an alternative vote system was added to the
constitution this could help increase moderation within political parties, and prevent parties from
running on ethnic divides. The alternative votes system allows the voter to rank candidates in
order of their preference. If candidates gains more than half of the first preference votes they win
the election outright, however, if no candidate wins outright, the candidate with the least first
preferences is eliminated and their votes are redistributed to the other candidates, according to
the second preferences marked on those ballots.38 This system prevents parties from running on
extremist platforms because they want to be moderate enough to secure second preferences from
voters.39
One problem with the current electoral system is that the language in the transitional
constitution is not strong enough to enforce electoral rules. There have been no elections since
2010, though the first election since independence was supposed to be held in June of 2015.
However, lawmakers recently elected to extend the terms of both the president and the officials
of the Legislative branch for three more years. The government of South Sudan said that holding
elections during a time of conflict would be a huge drain on already scarce money and resources,
which would be better spent trying to end the conflict with the rebels and restoring peace within
South Sudan. While in part this is true, and free and fair elections cannot truly be held in the
midst of a violent conflict, this action sets a dangerous precedent for the future. Kiir clearly does
38 Electoral Reform Society, accessed April 30, 2015, www.electoral-reform.org/uk
39 Ibid.
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not want to relinquish his power, and it was extremely easy for him to extend his term three more
years. In the new constitution new language needs to be put in place to prevent power hungry
leaders from holding onto power. Formal provisions could be added to the constitution that
would create accountability such as sanctions for breaches of provisions listed in the
constitution.40 Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms could be put in place such as a human
rights commission, an independent auditor or requirements to submit reports to international
bodies.41 However, enforcement and implementation of constitutional policies is difficult,
because if the political will to implement does not exist, formal implement provisions are
irrelevant.42

International Actors and Support

In order to achieve a peace agreement and make the necessary constitutional and electoral
reforms, massive international support is required. Multiple regional and international
organizations as well as neighboring countries are attempting to work with the two warring
factions to mediate a peace agreement. Peace talks have been taking place in Ethiopia, and have
been mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Peace talks stalled
in March, with each side blaming the other for the failure to reach a peace agreement. Both
parties cited lack of security guarantees and disagreements over the structure of the new
government as reasons for the failures of the peace talks.43 There is a clear lack of trust between
the two parties and this has prevented the two sides from creating a lasting peace agreement. The
major obstacle currently preventing the signing of a peace agreement is the issue of power
40 Kirsti Samuels and Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth, State-Building and Constitutional Design after
Conflict International Peace Academy, (2006):12
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Integrated Regional Information Network, IRN, accessed May 1, 2015 www.irinnews.org
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sharing. In February IGAD proposed a government structure that included a president, a first
vice president and a vice president.44 However, both the current government and the rebel group
disliked the proposed structure, and peace talks have once again stalled. Multiple temporary
cease-fire agreements have been signed, however both sides have consistently violated these
agreements.45 IGAD recently announced they have deployed a team to South Sudan in an attempt
to monitor the cease-fire violations.46 In addition to regional players such as IGAD, international
players such as the United Nations are also involved in the crisis. The United Nations Mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS) has been working with local organizations to provide recommendations
and advise on political, judicial and security sectors.47 Currently the UN has 12,500
peacekeeping troops stationed in South Sudan to help with the humanitarian crisis.48 The UN also
recently passed a resolution that will impose sanctions on those who disrupt the efforts to
restore peace in South Sudan.49 This resolution sets up a UN panel that will identify people that
are interfering with peace processes in South Sudan and impose travel bans and assets freezes on
those people.50 Security guarantees are imperative if a peace agreement is to be reached. In Larry
Diamonds paper Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States he states that
democracy cannot be achieved without first establishing peace and order in the post conflict
country.51 Diamond talks about the importance of establishing an authoritative and capable
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Accessed May 1, 2015 www.igad.int
47 United Nations Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, Accessed May 1, 2015
http://www.unmiss.unmissions.org
48 United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, The United Nations, last modified
February 28, 2015, www.un.org
49 Somini Sengupta and Ismail Kushkush UN moves closer to UN Sanctions in South Sudan
Conflict March 3, 2015 www.nytimes.com
50 Ibid.
51 Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in Post Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and
Challenges, (2005).
12

public security establishment.52 Implementing security guarantees will be the only way for
South Sudan to successfully end the conflict and make a peaceful transition to democracy.
Without impartial third party involvement in South Sudan peace cannot be achieved. Without
peace the two opposing parties cannot begin to implement constitutional reforms, and free and
fair elections cannot be held. The international community must commit large numbers of
security forces to the region to help facilitate DDRR and allow for the South Sudanese to put
down their weapons and begin the transition to peaceful democracy.

Conclusion
The crisis in South Sudan has stemmed, in part, from the corrupt, kleptocratic nature of the
governmental institutions. The unequal distribution of power within the government institutions,
the system of patronage politics and the overall weakness of the legislative and judicial branches
of government have allowed for the majority of political power to be concentrated in the
executive branch. The presidential system of government, combined with the governments
unitary structure has prevented accountability of government officials, local level autonomy and
the equal distribution of resources to the different regions of South Sudan. By implementing a
parliamentary and federal system of government, accountability could be increased, as well as
local level involvement in governance. An increase in political efficacy could help to prevent
rebellions and instability within South Sudan. In addition, the parliamentary system would
eliminate the concentration of power within the executive branch and curb corruption through
accountability measures such as the vote of no confidence. In terms of electoral reform, an
alternative vote system could increase moderation within political parties, and prevent elections
from increasing ethnic divides. South Sudans current mixed electoral system is a sound system
52 Ibid., 4
13

in conjuncture with a presidential system, however, if South Sudan were to switch to a

parliamentary system, elections through proportional representation would be more appropriate.
Constitutional and electoral reforms are the first step towards political stability and efficiency
within South Sudan. However, none of these reforms can occur without large support and
involvement from international organizations. With the support and involvement of international
and regional groups, South Sudan will hopefully be able to implement political reforms and
make the transition to a peaceful democracy.

Bibliography
The Associated Press. South Sudan: Vote for the Status Quo, The New York Times, March 25,
2015, www.nytimes.com.
Bates, Robert. When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
CIA World Fact Book. Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed May 2, 2015, www.cia.gov
De Waal, Alex. When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of Civil War in South
Sudan, African Affairs 113, no. 452 (2014): 347-369.

14

Diamond, Larry. Promoting Democracy in Post Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and
Challenges, (2005).
Electoral Reform Society, accessed April 30, 2015, www.electoral-reform.org/uk
Integrated Regional Information Network, IRN, accessed May 1, 2015 www.irinnews.org
Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Accessed May 1, 2015 www.igad.int
Inter-Parliamentary Union, accessed April 30, 2015, www.ipu.org
Johnson, Douglas H. The Political Crisis in South Sudan African Studies Review 57, no. 3
(2014): 168
Kushkush, Ismail. South Sudan Peace Talks Stall, The New York Times, March 6, 2015,
www.nytimes.com
Marial, Juma Mabor. 2015 Democratic Elections: The Legal Facts, Political Fictions and
Democratic Fantasies South Sudan News Agency, January 8, 2015.
National Elections Commission. NEC. Accessed April 30, 2015, www.necsouthsudan.org
Radon, Jenik and Sarah Logan, South Sudan: Governance Arrangements, War and Peace,
Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2014): 149-165.
Samuels, Kirsti and Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth. State-Building and Constitutional Design after
Conflict International Peace Academy, (2006):12
Sengupta, Somini and Ismail Kushkush UN moves closer to UN Sanctions in South Sudan
Conflict March 3, 2015 www.nytimes.com
Sisk, Timothy D. Democratization and Peacebuilding: Perils and Promises (Washington D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001).
The World Bank, South Sudan Overview, www.worldbank.org
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, The United Nations, last modified
February 28, 2015, www.un.org
United Nations Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, Accessed May 1, 2015
http://www.unmiss.unmissions.org

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