Garcia VS Manzano

Justice Reyes | 1958

RELEVANT PROVISIONS

Art. 191 (NCC now superseded by Art. 134 of the FC)

The husband contends that the second paragraph of Art. 191, should
be interpreted as applicable to the husband, even if the letter of the
statute refers to the wife exclusively.
CFI MNL ruled in favor of the wife and dismissed the case. Thus this
current petition.

The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall
be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or
when legal separation has been granted.

ISSUE
W/N Art. 191 also applies to the husband, given the maladministration and
mismanagement of the wife of the conjugal partnership property

In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal

partnership property by the husband, or in case of abandonment by the
husband, separation of property may also be ordered by the court.

RATIO
1. NO GARCIAS INTERPRETATION OF ART. 191 IGNORES THE
INTENT OR PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE PROVISION

Art. 134 (FC)

In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the

separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may
either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.

FACTS

Gonzalo Garcia is a veterinarian who works in a slaughterhouse in

Manila, while his wife Consolacion Manzano is in the business of
slaughtering cattle and selling meat. They have living separately
since 1948.
Upon their separation, the wife assumed sole administration and
management of the conjugal partnership property and allegedly
alienated several properties, prejudicing the husband and their
conjugal properties.
She also allegedly refused to deliver to the husband his rightful share
in their property and its fruits.
Because of this, the husband filed before the CFI MNL a petition for
judicial separation of property.
The wife countered with a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
husband did not allege any of the grounds enumerated under Art.
191 (NCC) for the grant of a judicial separation of property.

The husband argues that in case of mismanagement and

maladministration by the wife, the husband should be entitled to the
same relief as the wife under Art. 191.
However, under the NCC, the wife does not administer the conjugal
partnership unless with the consent of the husband, or by decree of
court and under its supervision.
Legally, therefore, the wife cannot mismanage the conjugal
partnership property or affairs, unless the husband or the courts
tolerate it.
The remedy of the husband is not a judicial separation of property
but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resume the
administration of the community property and the conduct of the
affairs of the conjugal partnership.
He may enforce his right of possession and control of the conjugal
property against his, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any
unauthorized alienations, upon proper action filed for that purpose.
Art. 191 protect the wife (who is not the legal administrator of the
partnership) against the abuses of her husband because normally
only the latter can commit such abuses.

RULING
Petition DENIED, decision of CFI MNL AFFIRMED
DIGEST MADE BY: MALCONTENTO

Partosa-Jo VS Court of Appeals

Justice Cruz | 1992
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Art. 135 (FC)
Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property:

RATIO
1. YES AGGRIEVED SPOUSE MAY PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ON THE GROUND OF ABANDONMENT
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact
for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
Art. 128 (FC)
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with
his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the
court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority
to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to
such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
FACTS

Jose Jo and Prima Partosa-Jo are married and have 1 daughter

named Monina. The wife alleged that her husband cohabited with 3
other women and fathered 15 other children.
1958 - Before the RTC of Negros Negros Oriental, she filed a petition
for judicial separation of property and a claim for support against her
husband.
The RTC (Presiding Judge Lee Jr.) ruled in favor of the wife,
ordering the husband to pay a monthly support of 500 pesos;
however, the RTC did not decide on the judicial separation of
property, as there was no pronouncement on the matter in the
dispositive portion of RTCs decision.
The wife elevated the case before the CA, which denied the petition
for separation of property. CA ruled that the separation of the parties
was due to their agreement, which is not a valid ground for a grant of
judicial separation of property.
Thus, the current petition.

ISSUE
W/N the wife is may avail of a judicial separation of property

Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the intent

never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause,
and without providing for one's family although able to do so.
Records show that as early as 1942, the Jose had already rejected
Prima, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in
Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanga.
She was not accepted by Jo, demonstrating all too clearly that he
had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship.
Jose even refused to give financial support to the Prima.
The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by
the Jose to give support to Prima, constitutes abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

RULING
Petition GRANTED, decision of CA MODIFIED, granted both support and the
separation of property
DIGEST MADE BY: MALCONTENTO

In re Voluntary Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership

Justice Concepcion | 1965

RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Art. 191 4th paragraph (NCC now superseded by Art. 134 of the FC)
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.
All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval or the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors
may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
Art. 134 (FC)
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may
either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
Art. 131 (FC)
Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two
or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity
of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits
and income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may
be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to
which partnership the existing properties belong, the same shall be
divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the capital
and duration of each.
FACTS

their property pursuant to terms of the agreement (terms were not

specified in the case).
Later on, the spouses filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and separation of property before the CFI Zamboanga,
praying for the approval of the earlier agreement they executed.
However, CFI denied their petition on the ground that the conjugal
partnership can only be dissolved once a decree of legal separation
has already been issued. Hence, this current petition.

ISSUE
W/N the spouses may avail of a judicial separation of property, pursuant to
the agreement they executed
RATIO
1. YES REFER TO ART. 191, BUT THE JOSES CHILDREN IN HIS
FIRST MARRIAGE MUST BE NOTIFIED REGARDING THE SEPARATION
OF PROPERTY BETWEEN JOSE AND PILAR
Said children by first marriage of Jose Bermas, Sr. were not notified
personally regarding filing of the current petition and of the date of
the hearing.
The agreement between Pilar and Jose intends to liquidate the
conjugal partnership. But this liquidation could adversely affect the
interests of the children in the first marriage of Jose. Why?
Because in case of doubt, the partnership property shall be divided
between the different (conjugal) partnerships in proportion to the
duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective
spouses.
Hence, there is a need to notify the children regarding this matter.
RULING
Case is remanded back to CFI for further proceedings
DIGEST MADE BY: MALCONTENTO

Spouses Pilar and Jose Bermas were married on Dec. 24, 1932 and
had two children named Ruben and Manuel.
Jose has another set of children from a former marriage.
On May 31, 1962, the spouses executed an agreement for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership and separation of property.
In this agreement, the spouses have mutually agreed to separate

Lacson vs San Jose-Lacson

Justice Castro | 1968
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Art. 191 4th paragraph (NCC now superseded by Art. 134 of the FC)
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.
All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval or the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors
may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
Art. 134 (FC)
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may
either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.

Art. 363 (NCC superseded by Art. 213 of the FC)

In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children the
latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her
child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure.
FACTS

Spouses Alfonso and Carmen Lacson got married on Feb. 14, 1953
and they had 4 children. On Jan. 9, 1963, the wife left their conjugal
home in Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod and she lived in MNL.
On March 1963, she filed a complaint before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of MNL (JDRC) for custody of all their
children and payment of support.
However, during the pendency of the case, the spouses entered into
a compromise agreement regarding the custody of their children,
payment of support and separation of property.
They filed a joint petition before the CFI Negros Occidental, claiming
that they have mutually agreed to the following:

Dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the separation of

their property.
o Custody of the two elder children (Enrique and Teresa) is
awarded to the husband, while custody of the two younger
children (Gerard and Ramon) is awarded to the wife.
Visitation rights included.
o Husband will pay P300 as monthly support.
CFI (Judge Fernandez) approved the compromise agreement. The
husband delivered all 4 children to the wife.
Later on, the wife filed a motion before the JDRC, claiming that she
only entered into the compromise agreement so that she could
immediately have custody over all of her children who were all below
the age of 7. She prayed that she be relieved from her obligation
stated in the agreement since she already has custody over the
children.
The JDRC dismissed her motion on the ground of res judicata (since
the issues of custody and support were already settled in the CFI).
Before the CA, the wife assails the validity of the compromise
agreement with respect to the custody of the children, maintaining
that she only entered into the compromise agreement so that she
could immediately have custody over all of her children and that she
should relieved from the said agreement.
CA granted her petition and declared null and void the compromise
agreement, thus the current petition by the husband.

ISSUES
W/N the compromise agreement is valid with respect to the separation of
property
W/N the compromise agreement is valid with respect to the custody of
children
RATIO
1. YES REFER TO ART. 191 (NCC)
Spouses obtained judicial approval regarding the voluntary
separation of property and the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.
2. NO REFER TO ART. 363

As correctly ruled by CA, the CFI erroneously deprived the wife of

the custody of the two older children, Enrique and Teresa, who were
both below the age of 7.

CFI did not state any compelling reason to support its order of
depriving the wife of her minor children's company by awarding
custody to the husband.
Given the absence of any justifying reason, the decision of CFI
awarding the custody of the two older children to the husband, in
effect separating them from their mother, is null and void for violating
Art. 363 (NCC).

RULING
Petition DENIED, CA affirmed
DIGEST MADE BY: MALCONTENTO