Stoic absolutes/relativism1

Again, they say that justice, as well as law and right reason, exists by nature and not by arbitrary
determination (), as Chrysippus says in his work On the Beautiful. (DL 7.128)
Cicero, Leg. 1.46-7: Or, when a farmer judges the quality of a tree by nature,] shall we not use the
same standard in regard to the characters of young men? Then shall we judge character by Nature, and
judge virtue and vice, which result from character, by some other standard? But if we adopt the same
standard for them, must we not refer the honourable and the base to Nature also? Whatever good
thing is praiseworthy must have within itself something which deserves praise, for goodness
itself is good by reason not of opinion but of Nature. For, if this were not true, men would also
be happy by reason of opinion; and what statement could be more absurd than that? Wherefore
since both good and evil are judged by Nature and are natural principles, surely honourable and base
actions must also be distinguished in a similar way and referred to the standard of Nature. But we are
confused by the variety of mens beliefs and by their disagreements, and because this same
variation is not found in the senses, we think that Nature has made these accurate, and say that
those things about which different people have different opinions and the same people not
always identical opinions are unreal. However, this is far from being the case. For our senses are
not perverted by parent, nurse, teacher, poet, or the stage, nor led astray by popular feeling; but
against our minds all sorts of plots are constantly being laid, either by those whom I have just
mentioned, who, taking possession of them while still tender and unformed, colour and bend them as
they wish, or else by that enemy which lurks deep within us, entwined in our every sensethat
counterfeit of good, which is, however, the mother of all evilspleasure. Corrupted by her
allurements, we fail to discern clearly what things are by Nature good, because the same
seductiveness and itching does not attend them.
[Von armin: Cf. Chalcidius in Timaeum cp. 165sq. Seneca ep. 115.]
Epictetus 2.11
Behold the beginning of philosophy Ia recognition of the conflict between the opinions of men, and
a search for the origin of that conflict, and a condenmation of mere opinion, coupled with scepticism
regarding it, and a kind of investigation to determine whether the opinion is rightly held, together with
the invention of a kind of standard of judgement, as we have invented the balance for the
determination of weights, or the carpenter's rule for the determination of things straight and crooked.
Is this the beginning of philosophy ? Is everything right that every man thinks ? Nay, how is it
possible for conflicting opinions to be right? Consequently, not all opinions are right [RELATIVISM
ii): truth impossible Cf. EPict.].But are our opinions right? Why ours, rather than those of the
Syrians ; why ours, rather than those of the Egyptians ; why ours, rather than my own, or those of soand-so.''There is no reason why.Therefore, the opinion which each man holds is not a sufficient
criterion for determining the truth ; for also in the case of weights and measures we are not satisfied
with the mere appearance, but we have invented a certain standard to test each. In the present case,
then, is there no standard higher than opinion? And yet how can it possibly be that matters of the
utmost consequence among men should be undeterminable and undiscoverable.Therefore, there is
some standard.Then why do we not look for it and find it, and when we have found it thenceforth
use it unswervingly, not so much as stretching out our finger without it? For this is something, I

1 CF MAXIMUS, GBS HANDBOOK 17P FOR REMARKS ABOUT OIKEIOSIS/

LIMITS OF HUMAN FRIENDSHIP

think, the discovery of which frees from madness those who use only
opinion as the measure of all things [relativism ii: universal (and personal)
conflict],
Cicero, Fin. 3.33-3 [NB: seems to be talking about absoluteness in terms of degree; but the talk of the
good having its own force also suggests absoluteness in terms of content]
The Stoics definitions do indeed differ from one another to a very minute degree, but they all point in
the same direction. Personally, I agree with Diogenes in defining the good as that which is perfect by
nature. He was led by this to also pronounce the beneficial - for so let us render the Greek,
to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now conceptions of things
are produced in the mind when something has become known, either by experience or by combination
or by analogy or by logical inference[analogy]. The fourth and last method in this list is the one that
has given us the conception of the good. The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance
with nature until finally it arrives at the conception of the good. At the same time, goodness is
absolute and is not a question of degree; the good is recognized and pronounced to be good
according to its own inherent properties and not by comparison with other things. Just as honey,
though extremely sweet, is yet perceived to be sweet by its own peculiar kind of flavour and not by
comparison with something else, so too this good which we are discussing is indeed superlatively
valuable, yet its value depends on kind and not on quantity.
Cicero, Rep. 3.33 True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application,
unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its
prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither
have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to
repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations
by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And
there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one
eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master
and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing
judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of
this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered
punishment

Atticus [Lack of forms tantamount to relativism]

The chief and determinative feature of Platonism, the scheme set out concerning intelligibles, has met
with disdain and insult and has been abused by Aristotle in every way possible for him. He could not
understand the theory, since things so great, divine, and transcendent require a like faculty for their
comprehension. But he relied on his own feeble and base cleverness, which was able to skulk about in
terrestrial matters and see the truth in them, but was not up to a vision of the plain of real truth
[Phdr. 248b]. He appealed to himself as the measure and criterion of things that were greater
than him, and did not recognise the existence of these distinctive things, as Plato did. He dared to call
the highest entities waffle and chatter and nonsense.... For he says that one cannot properly
express the cause of anything, except by referring to participation in forms. Nor can one allow that

there is knowledge of any truth that does not have reference to them... in these things and their
understanding are rooted wisdom and knowledge, through which comes the human end and the most
blessed form of life.

vs Empiricism
If, again, acts of learning are instances of remembering, then the soul is immortal. That learning is
remembering we may infer as follows. Learning cannot arise in any other way than by remembering
what was formerly known. If we had in fact to start from particulars in forming our conception of
common qualities, how could we ever traverse the infinite series of particulars, or alternatively how
could we form such a conception on the basis of a small number (for we could be deceived, as for
instance if we came to the conclusion that only that which breathed was an animal); or how could
concepts have the dominant role that they do have? So we derive our thoughts through recollection,
on the basis of small sparks, under the stimulus of certain particular impressions remembering what
we knew long ago, but suffered forgetfulness of at the time of our embodiment.
(Alcinous, Didaskalikos 25)
Oikeiosis:
Attic Nights 12..5.7 (Over-attachment to pleasure/juvenile attachments, are what lead us astray)
All other things which lay between, and were neither honourable nor dishonourable, were decided to
be neither good nor evil.1 But productiones and relationes, which the philosophers call , or
things desirable and , or1 things undesirable, are distinguished and set apart each by
their own qualities. Therefore pleasure also and pain, so far as the end of living well and happily is
concerned, are regarded as indifferent and classed neither with good nor with evil. But since the
newly-born child is endowed with these first sensations of pain and pleasure before the appearance of
judgment and reason, and is attracted to pleasure by nature, but averted and alienated from pain, as if
from some bitter enemytherefore reason, which is given to him later, is hardly able to uproot and
destroy those inclinations which were originally and deeply implanted in him. Yet he constantly
struggles with them, checks and tramples them under foot when they are excessive, and compels them
to obey and submit to him.