Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Torts Cases
Torts Cases
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983
JOSE "PEPITO" TIMONER, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, IV DIVISION, respondents.
Marciano C. Dating, Jr. and Jose & Fuentebella for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:+.wph!1
Petition for review of the affirmance in toto by the Court of Appeals, now the
Intermediate Appellate Court, of the judgment of conviction handed down by
the then Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, in Criminal Case No.
4281, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose Timoner, finding petitioner
guilty of the crime of grave coercion, as follows: t.hqw
WHEREFORE this Court finds the accused JOSE 'PEPITO'
TIMONER guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Grave Coercion as penalized under Art. 286 in the Revised
Penal Code, and hereby sentences the said accused
pursuant to the provision of Rule 64, Par. 3, to suffer SIX
MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT OF ARRESTO MAYOR IN
ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD, to pay a fine of P300.00 and to pay
the offended party in the amount of P5,000.00 as damages,
without subsidiary liability in case of insolvency. The other
accused SAMUEL MORENA and ERNESTO QUIBRAL are
hereby ordered ACQUITTED.
The salient facts are not disputed. At about 10:00 in the evening of December
13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by
two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six
laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main
thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers
proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which
protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures
thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining
witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These
establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health
Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation
requirements.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial
abatement of their stalls. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2257,
alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as
nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop
business.
Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were
charged with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of
Daet. As already noted, the said court exonerated the two policemen, but
convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal by inducement.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court.
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop
was done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful
authority.
We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question
did constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of
the Civil Code, to wit: t.hqw
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 19534CR, is hereby set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged.
Costs de oficio.
copy of a deposit slip indicating the list of checks deposited by Frias. But it
did not include the missing check. The deposit slip bore the stamp mark
"teller no. 7" instead of "teller no. 8" who previously received the checks.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and
De Castro, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167346
April 2, 2007
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the decision1 and resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
November 26, 2004 and March 1, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
58618,3 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 31.4
Art. 1173 of the Civil Code states that "the fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person of the
time and of the place"; and that "if the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the performance, the same as expected
of a good father of a family shall be required."
For failure to comply with its obligation, [petitioner] is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observe
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Arts. 1733 and 1735 of the Civil Code
(Art. 1756)
and CAs findings that petitioner was indeed negligent and responsible for
respondents lost check.
On the issue of damages, petitioner argues that the moral and exemplary
damages awarded by the lower courts had no legal basis. For the award of
moral damages to stand, petitioner avers that respondents should have
proven the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence.
According to petitioner, simple negligence cannot be a basis for its award. It
insists that the award of exemplary damages is justified only when the act
complained of was done in a wanton, fraudulent and oppressive manner.10
We disagree.
While petitioner may argue that simple negligence does not warrant the
award of moral damages, it nonetheless cannot insist that that was all it was
guilty of. It refused to produce the original copy of the deposit slip which
could have proven its claim that it did not receive respondents missing
check. Thus, in suppressing the best evidence that could have bolstered its
claim and confirmed its innocence, the presumption now arises that it
withheld the same for fraudulent purposes.11
Moreover, in presenting a false deposit slip in its attempt to feign innocence,
petitioners bad faith was apparent and unmistakable. Bad faith imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong
that partakes of the nature of fraud.12
As to the award of exemplary damages, the law allows it by way of example
for the public good. The business of banking is impressed with public interest
and great reliance is made on the banks sworn profession of diligence and
meticulousness in giving irreproachable service.13 For petitioners failure to
carry out its responsibility and to account for respondents lost check, we hold
that the lower courts did not err in awarding exemplary damages to the latter.
On the last issue, we hold that the trial court did not commit any
error.1awphi1.nt A cursory reading of its decision reveals that it anchored its
conclusion that petitioner was negligent on Article 1173 of the Civil Code. 14
In citing the different provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers, 15 the
trial court merely made reference to the kind of diligence that petitioner
should have performed under the circumstances. In other words, like a
common carrier whose business is also imbued with public interest, petitioner
should have exercised extraordinary diligence to negate its liability to
respondents.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court indeed used the provisions on
common carriers to pin down liability on petitioner, still we see no reason to
strike down the RTC and CA rulings on this ground alone.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
In one case,16 the Court did not hesitate to apply the doctrine of last clear
chance (commonly used in transportation laws involving common carriers) to
a banking transaction where it adjudged the bank responsible for the
encashment of a forged check. There, we enunciated that the degree of
diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family in
keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence
in handling their clients money.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Asscociate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
For review is the Decision1 dated March 16, 2004 as modified by the
Resolution2 dated July 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 69113, which affirmed with modifications the Decision 3 dated May 31,
2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 85 in Civil
Case No. 98-35332.
The factual antecedents:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana
Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing
inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry
manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an
Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
May 4, 2010
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express
Liner," Petitioner,
vs.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 164747
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner,
vs.
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express
Liner," FELIPE M. LANDICHO and VINCENT D. TECSON, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
(Petitioner Go)
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE RULES
OF COURT AND PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT RULING THAT THE
RESPONDENT IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST AND IN NOT
DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING HEREIN PETITIONER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREACH IN
THE ALLEGED EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT WITH
ALUMINIUM FAST FERRIES AUSTRALIA;
III. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW AND
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING PETITIONER
LIABLE IN SOLIDUM WITH THE CO-DEFENDANTS WITH RESPECT TO
THE CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT;
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FOUND PETITIONER LIABLE FOR UNPAID COMMISSIONS, DAMAGES,
ATTORNEYS FEES, AND LITIGATION EXPENSES; and
V. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED HEREIN PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS BY AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURTS DENIAL OF
PETITIONERS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.29
G.R. No. 164747
(Petitioner Cordero)
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT AWARDING PETITIONER ACTUAL DAMAGES FOR
HIS COMMISSION FOR THE SALE OF THE SECOND VESSEL, SINCE
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHICH PROVES THAT
THERE WAS A SECOND SALE OF A VESSEL.
such party as the one (1) to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The purposes of this
provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any
right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to
legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of
suits; and 4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds,
pursuant to sound public policy.31 A case is dismissible for lack of personality
to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence
grounded on failure to state a cause of action.32
On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and not
Pamana who is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines as shown
by the Certification dated June 1, 1997 issued by Tony Robinson. 33 Petitioner
Go mentions the following documents also signed by respondent Robinson
which state that "Pamana Marketing Corporation represented by Mr.
Mortimer F. Cordero" was actually the exclusive distributor: (1) letter dated 1
June 199734; (2) certification dated 5 August 199735; and (3) letter dated 5
August 1997 addressed to petitioner Cordero concerning "commissions to be
paid to Pamana Marketing Corporation."36 Such apparent inconsistency in
naming AFFAs exclusive distributor in the Philippines is of no moment. For
all intents and purposes, Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who
alone made decisions in the performance of the exclusive distributorship, as
with other clients to whom he had similarly offered AFFAs fast ferry vessels.
Moreover, the stipulated commissions from each progress payments made
by Go were directly paid by Robinson to Cordero.37Respondents Landicho
and Tecson were only too aware of Corderos authority as the person who
was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor of AFFA, which can be
gleaned from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies of bank
transmittals everytime Go remits payment to Robinson, who in turn transfers
a portion of funds received to the bank account of Cordero in the Philippines
as his commission. Out of these partial payments of his commission, Cordero
would still give Landicho and Tecson their respective "commission," or "cuts"
from his own commission. Respondents Landicho and Tecson failed to refute
the evidence submitted by Cordero consisting of receipts signed by them.
Said amounts were apart from the earlier expenses shouldered by Cordero
for Landichos airline tickets, transportation, food and hotel accommodations
for the trip to Australia.38
Moreover, petitioner Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised petitioner
Corderos lack of personality to sue on behalf of Pamana, 39 and did so only
before the CA when they contended that it is Pamana and not Cordero, who
was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor for AFFA. 40 It was Robinson
who argued in support of his motion to dismiss that as far as said defendant
is concerned, the real party plaintiff appears to be Pamana, against the real
party defendant which is AFFA.41 As already mentioned, the trial court denied
the motion to dismiss filed by Robinson.
In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner Cordero was not paid the
balance of his commission by respondent Robinson. From the time petitioner
Go and respondent Landicho directly dealt with respondent Robinson in
Brisbane, and ceased communicating through petitioner Cordero as the
exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, Cordero was no longer
informed of payments remitted to AFFA in Brisbane. In other words, Cordero
had clearly been cut off from the transaction until the arrival of the first
SEACAT 25 which was sold through his efforts. When Cordero complained to
Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson about their acts prejudicial to his rights
and demanded that they respect his exclusive distributorship, Go simply let
his lawyers led by Landicho and Tecson handle the matter and tried to settle
it by promising to pay a certain amount and to purchase high-speed
catamarans through Cordero. However, Cordero was not paid anything and
worse, AFFA through its lawyer in Australia even terminated his exclusive
dealership insisting that his services were engaged for only one (1)
transaction, that is, the purchase of the first SEACAT 25 in August 1997.
Petitioner Go argues that unlike in Yu v. Court of Appeals 48 there is no
conclusive proof adduced by petitioner Cordero that they actually purchased
a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA and hence there was no violation of
the exclusive distributorship agreement. Further, he contends that the CA
gravely abused its discretion in holding them solidarily liable to Cordero,
relying on Articles 1207, 19 and 21 of the Civil Code despite absence of
evidence, documentary or testimonial, showing that they conspired to defeat
the very purpose of the exclusive distributorship agreement. 49
We find that contrary to the claims of petitioner Cordero, there was indeed no
sufficient evidence that respondents actually purchased a second SEACAT
25 directly from AFFA. But this circumstance will not absolve respondents
from liability for invading Corderos rights under the exclusive distributorship.
Respondents clearly acted in bad faith in bypassing Cordero as they
completed the remaining payments to AFFA without advising him and
furnishing him with copies of the bank transmittals as they previously did, and
directly dealt with AFFA through Robinson regarding arrangements for the
arrival of the first SEACAT 25 in Manila and negotiations for the purchase of
the second vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement which
Cordero signed in behalf of AFFA. As a result of respondents actuations,
Cordero incurred losses as he was not paid the balance of his commission
from the sale of the first vessel and his exclusive distributorship revoked by
AFFA.
Petitioner Go contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in holding
them solidarily liable for Corderos unpaid commission, which is the sole
obligation of the principal AFFA. It was Robinson on behalf of AFFA who, in
the letter dated August 5, 1997 addressed to Cordero, undertook to pay
commission payments to Pamana on a staggered progress payment plan in
Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to duty. It implies
an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
motive.55 In the case of Lagon v. Court of Appeals,56 we held that to sustain a
case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or
must have been driven by purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff; in
other words, his act of interference cannot be justified. We further explained
that the word "induce" refers to situations where a person causes another to
choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. As to the
allegation of private respondent in said case that petitioner induced the heirs
of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to petitioner despite an alleged
renewal of the original lease contract with the deceased landowner, we ruled
as follows:
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such
knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous
interference. x x x
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent
that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him.
The word "induce" refers to situations where a person causes another to
choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records
show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the
property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did
absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did
not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that
private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with
Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith
on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of
tortuous interference was never established.57
In their Answer, respondents denied having anything to do with the unpaid
balance of the commission due to Cordero and the eventual termination of
his exclusive distributorship by AFFA. They gave a different version of the
events that transpired following the signing of Shipbuilding Contract No.
7825. According to them, several builder-competitors still entered the picture
after the said contract for the purchase of one (1) SEACAT 25 was sent to
Brisbane in July 1997 for authentication, adding that the contract was to be
effective on August 7, 1997, the time when their funds was to become
available. Go admitted he called the attention of AFFA if it can compete with
the prices of other builders, and upon mutual agreement, AFFA agreed to
give them a discounted price under the following terms and conditions: (1)
that the contract price be lowered; (2) that Go will obtain another vessel; (3)
that to secure compliance of such conditions, Go must make an advance
payment for the building of the second vessel; and (4) that the payment
scheme formerly agreed upon as stipulated in the first contract shall still be
the basis and used as the guiding factor in remitting money for the building of
the first vessel. This led to the signing of another contract superseding the
first one (1), still to be dated 07 August 1997. Attached to the answer were
photocopies of the second contract stating a lower purchase price
(US$1,150,000.00) and facsimile transmission of AFFA to Go confirming the
transaction.58
As to the cessation of communication with Cordero, Go averred it was
Cordero who was nowhere to be contacted at the time the shipbuilding
progress did not turn good as promised, and it was always Landicho and
Tecson who, after several attempts, were able to locate him only to obtain
unsatisfactory reports such that it was Go who would still call up Robinson
regarding any progress status report, lacking documents for MARINA, etc.,
and go to Australia for ocular inspection. Hence, in May 1998 on the
scheduled launching of the ship in Australia, Go engaged the services of
Landicho who went to Australia to see to it that all documents needed for the
shipment of the vessel to the Philippines would be in order. It was also during
this time that Robinsons request for inquiry on the Philippine price of a
Wartsila engine for AFFAs then on-going vessel construction, was
misinterpreted by Cordero as indicating that Go was buying a second
vessel.59
We find these allegations unconvincing and a mere afterthought as these
were the very same averments contained in the Position Paper for the
Importer dated October 9, 1998, which was submitted by Go on behalf of
ACG Express Liner in connection with the complaint-affidavit filed by Cordero
before the BOC-SGS Appeals Committee relative to the shipment valuation
of the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA.60 It appears that the purported
second contract superseding the original Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 and
stating a lower price of US$1,150,000.00 (not US$1,465,512.00) was only
presented before the BOC to show that the vessel imported into the
Philippines was not undervalued by almost US$500,000.00. Cordero
vehemently denied there was such modification of the contract and accused
respondents of resorting to falsified documents, including the facsimile
transmission of AFFA supposedly confirming the said sale for only
US$1,150,000.00. Incidentally, another document filed in said BOC case, the
Counter-Affidavit/Position Paper for the Importer dated November 16,
1998,61 states in paragraph 8 under the Antecedent facts thereof, that -8. As elsewhere stated, the total remittances made by herein Importer to
AFFA does not alone represent the purchase price for Seacat 25. It includes
advance payment for the acquisition of another vessel as part of the deal due
to the discounted price.62
which even gives credence to the claim of Cordero that respondents
negotiated for the sale of the second vessel and that the nonpayment of the
remaining two (2) instalments of his commission for the sale of the first
The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter
into another contract directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower price
for the second vessel resulted in AFFAs breach of its contractual obligation
to pay in full the commission due to Cordero and unceremonious termination
of Corderos appointment as exclusive distributor. Following our
pronouncement in Gilchrist v. Cuddy (supra), such act may not be deemed
malicious if impelled by a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives. The attendant circumstances, however, demonstrated that
respondents transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest to
benefit themselves at the expense of Cordero. Respondents furtively went
directly to Robinson after Cordero had worked hard to close the deal for them
to purchase from AFFA two (2) SEACAT 25, closely monitored the progress
of building the first vessel sold, attended to their concerns and spent no
measly sum for the trip to Australia with Go, Landicho and Gos family
members. But what is appalling is the fact that even as Go, Landicho and
Tecson secretly negotiated with Robinson for the purchase of a second
vessel, Landicho and Tecson continued to demand and receive from Cordero
their "commission" or "cut" from Corderos earned commission from the sale
of the first SEACAT 25.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Cordero was practically excluded from the transaction when Go, Robinson,
Tecson and Landicho suddenly ceased communicating with him, without
giving him any explanation. While there was nothing objectionable in
negotiating for a lower price in the second purchase of SEACAT 25, which is
not prohibited by the Memorandum of Agreement, Go, Robinson, Tecson and
Landicho clearly connived not only in ensuring that Cordero would have no
participation in the contract for sale of the second SEACAT 25, but also that
Cordero would not be paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the
first SEACAT 25. This, despite their knowledge that it was commission
already earned by and due to Cordero. Thus, the trial and appellate courts
correctly ruled that the actuations of Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho
were without legal justification and intended solely to prejudice Cordero.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule,
findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
conclusive on this Court.63 We see no compelling reason to reverse the
findings of the RTC and the CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in
utter disregard of the rights of Cordero under the exclusive distributorship
agreement.
The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with fairness,
honesty and good faith in securing better terms for the purchase of high-
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements:
(1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional.64
Petitioner Gos argument that he, Landicho and Tecson cannot be held liable
solidarily with Robinson for actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees awarded to Cordero since no law or contract provided for
solidary obligation in these cases, is equally bereft of merit. Conformably with
Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary.65 In Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc.
v. Continental Cement Corporation,66 we held:
[O]bligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary. We have
assiduously maintained this legal principle as early as 1912 in Worcester v.
Ocampo, in which we held:
x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to
recognize that the basis of the present action is tort. They fail to recognize
the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable
for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort
feasors. x x x
It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons
who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it
is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the
same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful
act themselves. x x x
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they
commit.1avvphi1 The persons injured may sue all of them or any number
less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all
together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued
alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with
him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort
was insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be
apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot insist
upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They
are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. x x x
A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of
course satisfies any claim which might exist against the others. There can be
but satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement
generally operates to discharge all. x x x
Of course, the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors
are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack
of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is
true even though they are charged jointly and severally.67 [emphasis
supplied.]
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual
relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party
who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable. 68 Respondents
Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance
of petitioner Corderos commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in
the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson
did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is
fully paid.
Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered
under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.69On the other hand, the requirements of
an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of
example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants
right to them has been established; (2) that they cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; and (3) the act
must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive or malevolent manner.70 The award of exemplary damages is thus
in order. However, we find the sums awarded by the trial court as moral and
exemplary damages as reduced by the CA, still excessive under the
circumstances.
Moral damages are meant to compensate and alleviate the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injuries
unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount
must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering
inflicted. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were never intended
to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. There is no hard-andfast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral
damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial
courts are given discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that
it "should not be palpably and scandalously excessive." Indeed, it must be
commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.71
We believe that the amounts of P300,000.00 and P200,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, respectively, would be sufficient and reasonable.
Because exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees may also be
awarded in consonance with Article 2208 (1).72 We affirm the appellate
courts award of attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated March 16,
2004 as modified by the Resolution dated July 22, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are
hereby reduced to P300,000.00 andP200,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the petitioner in G.R. No. 164703.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
February 6, 2002
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner
was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate
cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident
was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the
cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the
mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including
the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did
not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that
the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide
that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities,
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance
on Article 219 of the Family Code that "those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor"
was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was
Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of
the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
The primary question of interest before this Court is the only legal issue
in the case: It is whether a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left
with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests execute written
waivers holding the establishment or its employees free from blame for such
loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids such waivers.
Before this Court is a Rule 45 petition for review of the Decision[1] dated
19 October 1995 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision[2] dated
16 December 1991 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, of Manila,
finding YHT Realty Corporation, Brunhilda Mata-Tan (Tan), Erlinda Lainez
(Lainez) and Anicia Payam (Payam) jointly and solidarily liable for damages
in an action filed by Maurice McLoughlin (McLoughlin) for the loss of his
American and Australian dollars deposited in the safety deposit box of
Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel, owned and operated by YHT Realty
Corporation.
The factual backdrop of the case follow.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005]
YHT
TINGA, J.:
Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessmanphilanthropist, used to stay at Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the
Philippines prior to 1984 when he met Tan. Tan befriended McLoughlin by
showing him around, introducing him to important people, accompanying him
in visiting impoverished street children and assisting him in buying gifts for
the children and in distributing the same to charitable institutions for poor
children. Tan convinced McLoughlin to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to
Tropicana where Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez
served as manager of the hotel while Lainez and Payam had custody of the
keys for the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of McLoughlins
booking at the Tropicana where he started staying during his trips to the
Philippines from December 1984 to September 1987.[3]
On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered
with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as it was his practice to rent a
safety deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in previous trips. As
a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of the procedure observed by Tropicana
relative to its safety deposit boxes. The safety deposit box could only be
opened through the use of two keys, one of which is given to the registered
guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of the
hotel. When a registered guest wished to open his safety deposit box, he
alone could personally request the management who then would assign one
of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in opening the
safety deposit box with the two keys.[4]
that the stipulations are void for being violative of universal hotel practices
and customs. His lawyers prepared a letter dated 30 May 1988 which was
signed by McLoughlin and sent to President Corazon Aquino. [17] The Office of
the President referred the letter to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which
forwarded the same to the Western Police District (WPD). [18]
After receiving a copy of the indorsement in Australia, McLoughlin came
to the Philippines and registered again as a hotel guest of Tropicana.
McLoughlin went to Malacaang to follow up on his letter but he was
instructed to go to the DOJ. The DOJ directed him to proceed to the WPD for
documentation. But McLoughlin went back to Australia as he had an urgent
business matter to attend to.
For several times, McLoughlin left for Australia to attend to his business
and came back to the Philippines to follow up on his letter to the President
but he failed to obtain any concrete assistance.[19]
McLoughlin left again for Australia and upon his return to the Philippines
on 25 August 1989 to pursue his claims against petitioners, the WPD
conducted an investigation which resulted in the preparation of an affidavit
which was forwarded to the Manila City Fiscals Office. Said affidavit became
the basis of preliminary investigation. However, McLoughlin left again for
Australia without receiving the notice of the hearing on 24 November 1989.
Thus, the case at the Fiscals Office was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Mcloughlin requested the reinstatement of the criminal charge for theft. In the
meantime, McLoughlin and his lawyers wrote letters of demand to those
having responsibility to pay the damage. Then he left again for Australia.
Upon his return on 22 October 1990, he registered at the Echelon
Towers at Malate, Manila. Meetings were held between McLoughlin and his
lawyer which resulted to the filing of a complaint for damages on 3 December
1990 against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan
(defendants) for the loss of McLoughlins money which was discovered on 16
April 1988. After filing the complaint, McLoughlin left again for Australia to
attend to an urgent business matter. Tan and Lopez, however, were not
served with summons, and trial proceeded with only Lainez, Payam and YHT
Realty Corporation as defendants.
After defendants had filed their Pre-Trial Brief admitting that they had
previously allowed and assisted Tan to open the safety deposit box,
McLoughlin filed an Amended/Supplemental Complaint[20] dated 10 June
1991 which included another incident of loss of money and jewelry in the
safety deposit box rented by McLoughlin in the same hotel which took place
prior to 16 April 1988.[21] The trial court admitted the Amended/Supplemental
Complaint.
During the trial of the case, McLoughlin had been in and out of the
country to attend to urgent business in Australia, and while staying in the
Philippines to attend the hearing, he incurred expenses for hotel bills, airfare
and other transportation expenses, long distance calls to Australia, Meralco
power expenses, and expenses for food and maintenance, among others. [22]
After trial, the RTC of Manila rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by this
Court in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, to wit:
1. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the
sum of US$11,400.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency
of P342,000.00, more or less, and the sum of AUS$4,500.00
or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of P99,000.00, or a
total of P441,000.00, more or less, with 12% interest from April
16 1988 until said amount has been paid to plaintiff (Item 1,
Exhibit CC);
2. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum
of P3,674,238.00 as actual and consequential damages
arising from the loss of his Australian and American dollars and
jewelries complained against and in prosecuting his claim and
rights administratively and judicially (Items II, III, IV, V, VI, VII,
VIII, and IX, Exh. CC);
3. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the
sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages (Item X, Exh. CC);
4. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the
sum of P350,000.00 as exemplary damages (Item XI, Exh.
CC);
5. And ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay litigation
expenses in the sum of P200,000.00 (Item XII, Exh. CC);
Moreover, the trial court ruled that paragraphs (2) and (4) of
the Undertaking For The Use Of Safety Deposit Box are not valid for being
contrary to the express mandate of Article 2003 of the New Civil Code and
against public policy.[27] Thus, there being fraud or wanton conduct on the part
of defendants, they should be responsible for all damages which may be
attributed to the non-performance of their contractual obligations. [28]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the disquisitions made by the lower court
except as to the amount of damages awarded. The decretal text of the
appellate courts decision reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED
but modified as follows:
The appellants are directed jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff/appellee the
following amounts:
1) P153,200.00 representing the peso equivalent of US$2,000.00 and
AUS$4,500.00;
2) P308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air fares from Sidney
[sic] to Manila and back for a total of eleven (11) trips;
3) One-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52 representing payment to
Tropicana Apartment Hotel;
4) One-half of P152,683.57 or P76,341.785 representing payment to
Echelon Tower;
5) One-half of P179,863.20 or P89,931.60 for the taxi xxx transportation
from the residence to Sidney [sic] Airport and from MIA to the
hotel here in Manila, for the eleven (11) trips;
6) One-half of P7,801.94 or P3,900.97 representing Meralco power
expenses;
7) One-half of P356,400.00 or P178,000.00 representing expenses for
food and maintenance;
8) P50,000.00 for moral damages;
9) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
issue, the established rule is that great respect is accorded to the evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court. [31] The trial court is in the best
position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. [32]
We are also not impressed by petitioners argument that the finding of
gross negligence by the lower court as affirmed by the appellate court is not
supported by evidence. The evidence reveals that two keys are required to
open the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. One key is assigned to the guest
while the other remains in the possession of the management. If the guest
desires to open his safety deposit box, he must request the management for
the other key to open the same. In other words, the guest alone cannot open
the safety deposit box without the assistance of the management or its
employees. With more reason that access to the safety deposit box should
be denied if the one requesting for the opening of the safety deposit box is a
stranger. Thus, in case of loss of any item deposited in the safety deposit
box, it is inevitable to conclude that the management had at least a hand in
the consummation of the taking, unless the reason for the loss is force
majeure.
Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who were employees of
Tropicana, had custody of the master key of the management when the loss
took place. In fact, they even admitted that they assisted Tan on three
separate occasions in opening McLoughlins safety deposit box. [33] This only
proves that Tropicana had prior knowledge that a person aside from the
registered guest had access to the safety deposit box. Yet the management
failed to notify McLoughlin of the incident and waited for him to discover the
taking before it disclosed the matter to him. Therefore, Tropicana should be
held responsible for the damage suffered by McLoughlin by reason of the
negligence of its employees.
The management should have guarded against the occurrence of this
incident considering that Payam admitted in open court that she assisted Tan
three times in opening the safety deposit box of McLoughlin at around 6:30
A.M. to 7:30 A.M. while the latter was still asleep. [34] In light of the
circumstances surrounding this case, it is undeniable that without the
acquiescence of the employees of Tropicana to the opening of the safety
deposit box, the loss of McLoughlins money could and should have been
avoided.
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin, by his act, made
its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she was always with him
most of the time. The evidence on record, however, is bereft of any showing
that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the management as his wife. Such an
inference from the act of McLoughlin will not exculpate the petitioners from
liability in the absence of any showing that he made the management believe
that Tan was his wife or was duly authorized to have access to the safety
deposit box. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to
warrant such conclusion considering that what is involved in the instant case
is the very safety of McLoughlins deposit. If only petitioners exercised due
diligence in taking care of McLoughlins safety deposit box, they should have
confronted him as to his relationship with Tan considering that the latter had
been observed opening McLoughlins safety deposit box a number of times at
the early hours of the morning. Tans acts should have prompted the
management to investigate her relationship with McLoughlin. Then,
petitioners would have exercised due diligence required of them. Failure to
do so warrants the conclusion that the management had been remiss in
complying with the obligations imposed upon hotel-keepers under the law.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance
of their obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. As to
who shall bear the burden of paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of
the same Code provides that the owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
on the occasion of their functions. Also, this Court has ruled that if an
employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the employer was negligent
in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to prove the
negligence of such employer.[35] Thus, given the fact that the loss of
McLoughlins money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas
employees in allowing Tan to open the safety deposit box without the guests
consent, both the assisting employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as
owner and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to
Article 2193.[36]
The issue of whether the Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit
Box executed by McLoughlin is tainted with nullity presents a legal question
appropriate for resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court and the
appellate court found the same to be null and void. We find no reason to
reverse their common conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus:
Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting
notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any
stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the
former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001[37] is suppressed or diminished shall be
void.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of
public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this
case. The hotel business like the common carriers business is imbued with
public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not
only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings.
The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does
not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary
stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms
imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
In an early case,[38] the Court of Appeals through its then Presiding
Justice (later Associate Justice of the Court) Jose P. Bengzon, ruled that to
hold hotelkeepers or innkeeper liable for the effects of their guests, it is not
necessary that they be actually delivered to the innkeepers or their
employees. It is enough that such effects are within the hotel or inn. [39] With
greater reason should the liability of the hotelkeeper be enforced when the
missing items are taken without the guests knowledge and consent from a
safety deposit box provided by the hotel itself, as in this case.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the undertaking manifestly contravene Article
2003 of the New Civil Code for they allow Tropicana to be released from
liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit
box for any cause whatsoever.[40] Evidently, the undertaking was intended to
bar any claim against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety
deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its
employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of the hotelkeeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests
even if caused by servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as
well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from any force majeure.[41] It is
the loss through force majeure that may spare the hotel-keeper from liability.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the act of the thief or robber was
done with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to qualify the same
as force majeure.[42]
Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on Article 2002 [43] which
exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of his
guest, his family, or visitors. Even a cursory reading of the provision would
alleged loss that took place prior to 16 April 1988 was not considered since
the amounts alleged to have been taken were not sufficiently established by
evidence. The appellate court also correctly awarded the sum
of P308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air fares from Sydney to
Manila and back for a total of eleven (11) trips; [49] one-half of P336,207.05
or P168,103.52
representing
payment
to
Tropicana; [50] one-half
ofP152,683.57 or P76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon Tower;
[51]
one-half of P179,863.20 or P89,931.60 for the taxi or transportation
expenses from McLoughlins residence to Sydney Airport and from MIA to the
hotel here in Manila, for the eleven (11) trips; [52] one-half of P7,801.94
or P3,900.97
representing
Meralco
power
expenses; [53] one-half
of P356,400.00 or P178,000.00 representing expenses for food and
maintenance.[54]
The amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages is reasonable. Although
trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages,
the appellate court may modify or change the amount awarded when it is
palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to
enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only
to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that
will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of
defendants culpable action.[55]
The awards of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P200,000.00
representing attorneys fees are likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 19 October 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioners
are directed, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent the following
amounts:
(1) US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of
payment;
(2) P308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air fares from Sydney to
Manila and back for a total of eleven (11) trips;
(3) One-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52 representing payment to
Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel;
(4) One-half of P152,683.57 or P76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon
Tower;