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Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of The Vatsiputriyas' Theory of Persons
Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of The Vatsiputriyas' Theory of Persons
Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of The Vatsiputriyas' Theory of Persons
INTRODUCTION
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JAMES DUERLINGER
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JAMES DUERLINGER
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
We exist.
If we exist, we must be either clearly and distinctly separable in existence from, or reducible in existence to, our
aggregates.
If we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from
our aggregates, we possess by ourselves just one nature and
are conceived on the basis of our possession of this nature.
If we possess by ourselves just one nature and are conceived on the basis of our possession of this nature, we are
ultimate realities.
If we are reducible in existence to our aggregates, by convention we are conceived in dependence upon the collection
of substances of different sorts called the aggregates.
If by convention we are conceived in dependence upon the
collection of substances of different sorts called the aggregates, we are deceptive conventional realities.
Therefore,
(vii)
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In other words, we are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities, as Vasubandhu defines them, since we are conceived
in reliance upon aggregates which possess the three attributes listed.
Let us set aside for the moment a discussion of the three attributes
of these aggregates so we may first come to an understanding of the
aya)
Vatsputryas use of in reliance upon (upad
in the claim that
we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates.
Although we exist, the Vatsputryas believe, we are inexplicable
phenomena in the sense that we are not ultimate realities, since we are
not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates, nor
deceptive conventional realities, since we are not reducible in existence
to our aggregates. We are neither clearly and distinctly separable in
existence from, nor reducible in existence to, our aggregates, because
we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates. But what is meant by
our being conceived in reliance upon aggregates? To understand its
meaning let us begin by seeing why inexplicable phenomena are not
conceived in the way substances are conceived.
Phenomena which are inexplicable, according to the Vatsputryas,
are like substances insofar as their existence is not reducible to that of
a collection of substances of different sorts. But they are also unlike
them insofar as they do not by themselves possess just one nature
and are conceived on the basis of their possession of this nature. The
Vatsputryas apparently believe that inexplicable phenomena do possess
by themselves natures by reason of which they exist, but not that they
can be conceived on the basis of possessing these natures. It is precisely
because the natures we possess by ourselves do not enable us to be
conceived that we must be conceived in reliance upon aggregates.
In the third article in this series I shall discuss Vasubandhus dispute
with the Vatsputryas concerning how we are known to exist. If we are
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(iii)
Therefore,
(iv)
(v)
Moreover,
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(vii)
(viii)
JAMES DUERLINGER
If we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, our aggregates are the cause, but not the object, of the concept of
ourselves.
If our aggregates are the cause, but not the object, of the
concept of ourselves, we are not reducible in existence to
our aggregates.
But,
(x)
Vasubandhu, we shall see, would reject premise (vii) of this reconstruction. But since the objection he is about to make against the reply
is directed against its unreconstructed form, the objection will merely
assume the falsity of premise (vii) rather than show it to be false.
We must be careful at this point not to draw the conclusion that
the Vatsputryas mean to deny the truth of the Buddhas doctrine of
two realities. They are, of course, denying the truth of that doctrine
as Vasubandhu interprets it. The Vatsputryas, we may assume, have
their own interpretation of the Buddhas doctrine of the two realities.
Indeed, the Vaibhas. ika interpretation, which is accepted by Vasuhandhu,
is rejected by scholars belonging to all of the other Indian Buddhist
philosophical schools except the school based on Vasubandhus Treasury
itself. The Vatsputryas, I suggest, would interpret the Buddhas doctrine
in such a way that the inexplicability of persons is their ultimate reality,
while such persons, as conceived, are deceptive conventional realities
insofar as the conceiving of them makes them appear to be entities of
a certain sort. Analysis would then show the falsity of our appearance
of being entities of a certain sort, and thereby, enable us to free our
perception of ourselves of the conceptual overlay which causes us to
15
see ourselves as selves (atmadr
. .s.ti).
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Let us now discuss the attributes the Vatsputryas assign to the aggregates in reliance upon which they believe we are conceived. They say
that these aggregates are those which pertain to ourselves (adhy
atmik
an),
are appropriated (upattan), and exist in the present (varttamanan). The
aggregates which pertain to ourselves are our organs of perception and
mental states, and perhaps even our so-called bodily properties.16 The
aggregates are appropriated, the Vatsputryas seem to believe, in the
sense that they are clung to as possessions of the self which we falsely
appear to be because we form a concept of ourselves in dependence
upon the presence of these aggregates. The self we falsely appear to be,
they claim, is a permanent and partless substance.17 The effect produced
by the aggregates being appropriated in this sense would seem to be the
continued existence of their causal continuum from one lifetime to the
next.18 As causes of the continued existence of this continuum, we are
not selves, since we separately exist without being separate substances.
Vasubandhu verbally agrees with the Vatsputryas that the aggregates
in reliance upon which we are conceived are those which pertain to
ourselves and are appropriated. But he believes, first of all, that we are
conceived in reliance upon these aggregates in the way in which milk
is conceived in dependence upon its constituents, not in the special
way the Vatsputryas claim we are conceived. Secondly, he seems to
think that the inexplicable person the Vatsputryas believe to be the
appropriator of the aggregates is itself the self. For he does not, as the
Vatsputryas do, believe that we suffer by reason of assuming that
we are permanent and partless substances which exist apart from our
aggregates, yet does believe that we suffer by reason of assuming that
we exist without being reducible in existence to our aggregates. Thirdly,
he thinks that the appropriator of the aggregates is real in the way a
mental construction is, not in the way an inexplicable phenomenon is.
In truth, he insists, there is no appropriator of the aggregates which
exists apart from them.
When the Vatsputryas say that the aggregates in reliance upon which
we are conceived exist in the present, what they must mean by the
present is the time we are actually being conceived. The Vatsputryas
are implying that past and future aggregates, which are those not present
at the time when we are conceiving ourselves, are not phenomena in
reliance upon which we are conceived.19 It might be objected that
we conceive ourselves in reliance upon past aggregates when we
remember something we did or experienced in the past and that we
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Therefore,
(iii)
But
(iv)
Therefore,
(v)
But
(vi)
Therefore,
(vii)
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JAMES DUERLINGER
But
(viii)
Therefore,
(ix)
Hence, from (i), which is the first premise of the Vatsputryas reply
from aggregate-reliance, Vasubandhu has derived the alternatives he
first posed to the Vatsputryas. So the reason they give for rejecting
these alternatives, he is arguing, provides a reason for accepting them.
The theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts, as well as its use to
reject the content of our actual concept of ourselves, has its analogue in
the philosophy of David Hume, whose own phenomenalistic version of
the theory is that ideas are copies of impressions. He, like Vasubandhu,
uses a version of the theory to argue for the falsity of our actual
concept or idea of ourselves as a phenomenon irreducible in existence
to the phenomena in dependence upon which we are conceived. Like
Vasubandhu, moreover, he in effect argues that if we exist at all, we
must be reducible in existence to the phenomena in dependence upon
which we are conceived, since, if we exist, we must be either clearly
and distinctly separable in existence from, or reducible in existence to,
the phenomena in dependence upon which we are conceived, and we
know that we are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from
these phenomena, since we are not clearly and distinctly perceived. This
parallel helps us to see what is at stake in Vasubandhus use of the theory
of cause-dependent objects of concepts to reject the Vatsputryas theory
of persons. Vasubandhus acceptance of the theory of cause-dependent
objects of concepts is surely motivated by the same fundamental concern
that motivates Humes theory of concept formation, which is to provide
a way to verify claims about what exists.
IPUTRIYAS REPLY FROM FIRE AND FUEL
VATS
The crux of the dispute at this point between Vasubandhu and the
Vatsputryas concerns whether or not what causes a concept to be
formed must be the object of the concept. So what the Vatsputryas
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now need to do, and indeed, do, is to find a way to reject the theory of
cause-dependent objects of concepts. Their rejection of this theory is
built into their attempt to provide an example of a phenomenon other
than a person which is conceived in dependence upon a collection
of substances of different sorts and is neither clearly and distinctly
separable in existence from, nor reducible in existence to, that collection
of substances. The Vatsputryas reply is as follows:
A person is not conceived in this way, but rather in the way [in which] fire is
conceived in reliance upon fuel. Fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel, [they claim,
in the sense that] it is not conceived unless fuel is present, and it cannot be conceived
if it either is or is not other than fuel. If fire were other than fuel, fuel [which is
burning] would not be hot. And if fire were not other than fuel, what burns would
be the same as the cause of its burning.
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Each of these elements has by itself just one nature which is called
its defining property (laks. an. a) and which cannot be present in any of
the other elements. The defining property of the fire-element is heat
21 As the defining property of the fire-element, heat cannot be
(us. n. ata).
present in any of the other three primary elements. In addition to the
fire-element, which is an ultimate reality, there is the fire which is a
deceptive conventional reality and is reducible in existence to the special
collection of substances of different sorts of which it is composed. In
the Refutation itself Vasubandhu so analyzes fire, as conventionally
conceived, and claims that fuel, which is similarly analyzed, is the
cause of the arising of fire in the way that milk is a cause of the
arising of curds. Since the four primary elements exist in every body in
equal proportions, a body would seem to be called a fire not because it
contains more fire-elements than the elements of earth, air and water,
but because of the greater intensity of the heat of the fire-elements it
contains.22
It should be clear that when the Vatsputryas define fire as the
cause of the burning of fuel they are offering an alternative to the
Treasury accounts of fire as an ultimate reality and as a deceptive
conventional reality. In the Refutation, when Vasubandhu requests
from the Vatsputryas more specific accounts of fire and fuel, they
identify fire with the heat (aus. n. yam) which is present in burning fuel
(pradpta), and claim that fuel is comprised of the earth-, air- and
water-elements. It is likely that the Vatsputryas hold the view that
fuel is a collection of elemental substances, as they are defined in
the Treasury, since they seem to hold the view that the aggregates,
the analogue of fuel in their analogy, is a collection of substances of
different sorts. But we can be sure that the fire-element, as defined in
the Treasury, is not what the Vatsputryas call fire, because (a) the
fire-element is not the cause of the burning of fuel, (b) the fire-element
is not present in fuel if fuel is comprised solely of the earth-, air- and
water-elements, and (c) the fire-element is not perceived, as fire is, but
inferred to exist on the basis of a clear and distinct perception of its
defining property, heat. Nor can fire, which the Vatsputryas also call
heat, be the heat which defines the fire-element, since the heat with
which the Vatsputryas identify fire is present in fuel, while the heat
which defines the fire-element cannot be present in fuel. Fire, according
to the Vatsputryas, is the heat present in burning fuel which causes
the fuel to burn. This cause of the burning of fuel, we may suppose, the
Vatsputryas call heat because the heat present in fuel is generally
considered to be the cause of its burning. Moreover, this fire or heat
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ap
as
an
at).
bringing about an alteration in its continuum (santati vikar
If we suppose that the Vatsputryas accept as true Vasubandhus report
about what is commonly said about how fire burns fuel and that they
believe that what is commonly said is correct, how would they explain
this alteration?
We may be sure that the Vatsputryas do not believe that an alteration
in the continuum of fuel is a change of some sort in a substance, since
all Indian Buddhists reject the idea of a substance which undergoes
change. However, there remains the following possibility. When fire is
present in fuel, which is conceived in dependence upon a collection of
momentary substances of different sorts existing in a causal continuum,
it causes the part of the collection in which it is actually present in
one moment to cease, in the next moment, to be part of that collection;
then in that next moment, without changing or having ceased to exist,
it is present in another part of the collection, which it causes, in the
next moment, to cease to exist, etc., until the collection of momentary
substances in dependence upon which the fuel is conceived ceases to
exist. In this case, there is no element which undergoes a change of
any sort, but the continuum of the fuel is changed in the sense that
the collection of substances in dependence upon which it is conceived
as fuel is being reduced in number to the point where there are no
more phenomena in dependence upon which fuel is conceived. The
fuel, in this sense, is consumed by the fire. The general idea is that
the fire or heat present in fuel continues to exist, without changing,
in its continuum, until it gradually causes the continuum to cease to
exist. The changelessness of fire, of course, will be inexplicable in the
sense that it is not that of a permanent and partless substance or that
of a causal continuum of momentary substances of different sorts as a
collection.
The basic similarities to which the analogy between fire and persons
is meant to call attention, of course, are that both persons and fire
are not conceived on the basis of the single natures they possess
by themselves, since they are not substances, and that they are not,
respectively, reducible in existence to the phenomena in dependence
upon which they are conceived. One crucial difference, however, is that
fire would seem to come into existence at the time its fuel begins to
burn, while a person, according to the Vatsputryas, is a beginningless
phenomenon. Another difference is that fire would seem to cease to
exist once its fuel has been consumed, while a person, according to
the Vatsputryas, would not seem to cease to exist once the continuum
of the aggregates it appropriates ceases to exist.24 Neither of these
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The argument for fire not being clearly and distinctly separable in
existence from fuel may be reconstructed as follows:
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(iv)
(v)
(vi)
JAMES DUERLINGER
It is obvious that
(Xiv)
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We have seen how the Vatsputryas use the fire-fuel reply to overturn
Vasubandhus causal objection to their aggregate-reliance reply to his
two-realities objection to their theory of persons. Their reply is used to
show that our aggregates need not be, as Vasubandhu assumes, what
is conceived when we are conceived. Immediately after replying to
Vasubandhus objection, they introduce premises analogous to those
used in the reply to formulate their main argument for the view that
we are in fact inexplicable phenomena. This is the argument I have
called their middle-way argument.
Similarly, a person is not conceived unless the aggregates are present, [and] if it
were other than the aggregates, the reificationist theory [that a person is a substance]
would be held, and if it were not other than the aggregates, the nihilist theory [that
a person does not exist at all] would be held.
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(iii)
331
Therefore,
(vi)
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JAMES DUERLINGER
In the text, the claim that we are not clearly and distinctly separable
in existence from our aggregates is supported by the claim that if we
should say that we are so related to them, we would be committed to
the reificationist theory of persons rejected by the Buddha. The theory
rejected here, of course, is that we are substances which exist apart
from our aggregates. This theory, we have seen, is the same as the
theory that we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our
aggregates. Indian Buddhists offer a variety of arguments to show that
this theory is false. The very simplest of these arguments we could use
in this context is that we cannot be substances which exist apart from
our aggregates, since we are conceived in dependence upon aggregates.
We may represent this argument, which would also be accepted by
Vasubandhu, as follows:
(vii)
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Finally, on the basis of (viii) and (x), they conclude that their own
theory of persons is the middle way between the extremes of asserting
that we are separate substances and that we lack existence apart from
our aggregates. Hence,
(xi)
NOTES
What is known about the Vatsputryas theory is for the most part found in the
polemical works of their Indian Buddhist critics, which include, besides the Refu
. kara
and
Asan. gas Sutralam
tation of Vasubandhu, Mogalputtatissas Kathavatthu,
antidevas Bodhicaryavat
ara,
ara,
Candrakrtis Madhyamakavat
Madhyantavibhan. ga, S
and Kamalasilas Tattvasam
. graha, along with Santaraks. itas Pan~jika commentary on
Kamalasilas work. Of the texts of the Vatsputryas school, only the fifth century
. mityanikaya
Sastra survives, and that only in a Chinese translation. An
C. E. Sam
English translation of a Chinese translation of this text has been published, but
at least in their English translations, seems to me to
neither it nor the Kathavatthu,
portray a clear statement of the Vatsputryas theory of persons. In any case, in this
study, I confine my discussion to the Vatsputryas theory of persons as Vasubandhu
presents it.
There are three translations of the Refutation in print. The most recent translation
is based on the Sanskrit text which was discovered in Tibet in 1934. It was composed
1
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JAMES DUERLINGER
by myself and published in The Journal of Indian Philosophy in 1988 (17: 137187)
On the basis of Yasomitras commentary and a Tibetan translation T. Stcherbatsky
composed an English translation, entitled The Soul Theory of the Buddhists, published
by the Bulletin de lAcademie des Science de Russie, 1919, pp. 823854, 937958
(reprinted in 1976 by the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi). A French translation,
by L. De la Vallee Poussin, which is in the last volume of his LAbhidharmakosa de
Vasubandhu (Paris, 19231931), is based on Yasomitras commentary and a Chinese
translation by Hsuan-tsang. There is also a complete English translation of Poussins
translation made by Leo Pruden in 1990 and published by the Asian Humanities
Press in Berkeley, California.
2
Since Vasubandhus subsequent criticisms of their theory of persons are based
primarily on scriptural quotations, they require a different sort of treatment which I
hope to provide elsewhere in the context of a more comprehensive account of the
argumentation of Vasubandhus Refutation. Discussions of the Vatsputryas theory
of persons can be found in Nalinaksha Dutts Buddhist Sects in India (Delhi, 1978),
ch. VIII, and Edward Conzes Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor, 1967), pp.
122134. In my 1982 paper, Vasubandhu on the Vatsputryas fire-fuel analogy,
in Philosophy East and West (32: 151158), I made an attempt to make sense of
Vasubandhus critique of the Vatsputryas use of the analogy to fire and fuel to
support their theory, but I have, since its publication, radically changed my view. A
completely new analysis is laid out in the second article of the three of which the
present article is the first. The discussions by Dutt and Conze do not carefully analyze
what I am here calling Vasubandhus philosophical objections to the Vatsputryas
theory of persons. Nor do they, in my opinion, adequately represent the Vatsputryas
theory as it is set out in Vasubandhus Refutation. Claus Oetke, in Ich und das
Ich (Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Stuttgart: 1988), presents a summary
of Vasubandhus Refutation and a close analysis of his own reductionist theory of
persons, but he does not carefully analyze Vasubandhus critique of the Vatsputryas
theory of persons.
3
Among the Indian Buddhist schools, only the Madhyamikas deny that we possess
an existence apart from beign perceived or conceived.
4
Vasubandhu often uses is not other than in place of is the same as, thereby
creating the impression that the Vatsputryas theory violates a law of logic. That
the theory does not in fact violate a law of logic I shall argue below.
5
Here and elsewhere when I use conceived by itself I mean conceived to be
an entity of a certain sort. Similarly, an object of a concept is assumed to be an
object conceived to be an entity of a certain sort, and to form a concept is assumed
to be to conceive an object to be an entity of a certain sort.
6
We need not enumerate and explain the very complicated theory of the aggregates
laid out in the Treasury in order to reconstruct and assess Vasubandhus philosophical
objections to the Vatsputryas theory of persons.
7
Alternatively, inexplicable phenomena may be defined as those which are neither
real in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mental construction is, or as
those which are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities. See
below.
8
Yasomitra, in his commentary on the Refutation, makes it clear that the Trthika
opponents Vasubandhu has in mind are primarily the Nyaya-Vaises. ikas.
9
A more detailed exposition of Vasubandhus argument can be found in James
Duerlinger, Reductionist and Nonreductionist Theories of Persons in Indian Buddhist
Philosophy. in Journal of Indian Philosophy (21: 79101), 1993.
10
Here and elsewhere I shall use the neuter pronoun and its correlates to refer to
a person, since the gender of the phenomena to which we apply I is irrelevant to
its analysis.
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