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Paul and Roman Stoicism PDF
Paul and Roman Stoicism PDF
Abstract
Exemplifying a rather widespread attitude among Pauline scholars, it has
recently been argued on the basis of Rom. 12 that Paul differed sharply from the
Stoics in his moral teaching. The present article aims to show that such a claim
does not hold if and when the sources of Roman Stoicism are taken into consideration. A comparison of Pauls moral teaching in Rom. 12 and contemporary
Stoic ethics reveals that, whereas the two differ somewhat in scope (particular
vs. universal), the differences are clearly outweighed by the many, striking
similarities.
Key Words
Paul, Romans, Stoicism, moral teaching, ethics, agape
Introduction
In a recent issue of New Testament Studies (2004), Philip F. Esler published an article entitled Paul and Stoicism: Romans 12 as a Test Case.
The article is a response to Troels Engberg-Pedersens claim that there is
a fundamental similarity between Stoic ethics and the moral teaching of
Paul (2000).1 With Rom. 12 serving as a test case Esler comes to the
conclusion that, while there indeed are some similarities with the Stoic
ethical tradition, the existence of differences in [Pauls] account produces
a total package which is, in the end, radically divergent from Stoicism
(p. 120; emphasis mine). Romans 12 reveals an interaction with Stoic
ethics, but Pauls paramount concern with the nature of face-to-face
1. Engberg-Pedersen has partlybut only partlyresponded to Eslers article in
his The Relationship with Others: Similarities and Differences between Paul and
Stoicism (2005).
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2. Translations of Pauline texts are more or less my own. Unless otherwise noted,
translations of other texts used in this article are from the LCL.
3. This piece of work is found in Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.7.5-12 (ed. Wachsmuth and
Hense), entitled The beliefs (do&gmata) of Zeno and the other Stoics about the ethical
part of philosophy. The other Stoics are, in addition to Cleanthes and Chrysippus
(third century BCE), Diogenes of Seleucia, Antipater of Tarsus, Archedemus of Tarsus
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which Esler draws in his comparison of Stoic ethics and Rom. 12.
What I nd surprising is this: although Esler chooses to follow the
close comparison in which phenomena existing together in time and
place are focused upon, he overlooks at least three important sources for
Stoic ethics which are closely related to Pauls letter to the Romans both
in time and place. The rst derives from Lucius Annaeus Seneca (c. 165
CE). Not only did Seneca write extensively on Stoic ethics but he was
also Pauls exact contemporary and operated in the city of Rome. The
second source comes from the great Roman Stoic teacher Musonius Rufus
(rst century CE), and the third from one of his students, namely Epictetus
(c. 50135 CE), who was a near contemporary of Paul and partly operated
as a moral philosopher in Rome.
Esler includes one single reference to Epictetus in his comparative
study of Rom. 12 (2004: 118 n. 60) and none whatsoever either to
Musonius or Seneca. This total absence of the latter two in particular is
even more striking when one takes into account Eslers social-scientic
approach, which stresses that ideas active in particular settings (such as
the respective teachings of Paul and the Stoics on ethical matters) can
have real social impacts (2004: 109), and which underlines the actual
form of these ideas in the social life of the rst century (2004: 110).
Esler then goes on to criticize those [w]estern intellectuals with a philosophic bent who, according to him, are mainly interested in deep
ideas divorced from their particular social settings.4 Quoting Anthony A.
Long, Esler insists that the work attributed to the Alexandrian philosopher
Arius Didymus is the longest and most detailed surviving account of
Stoic ethics (2004: 108), and makes a number of observations about
Stoicism in general on the basis of that account. However, according to
Arthur J. Pomeroy, the editor and translator of the text to which Esler
himself refers in his article,
[Arius Didymuss] very aim of offering a clear outline of Stoic principles
probably means that he harmonized conicting theories in earlier Stoic
thought in order to create logical consistency. It is also likely that he incorporated syncretising elements from other systems where this assisted his
aim. The result is not a history of the development of Stoic doctrine, but a
quite individualistic example of Stoic thought as it existed in the late rst
century BC (Pomeroy 1999: 3).
and Panaetius of Rhodes (all from the second century BCE); see Pomeroy 1999: 10-11
with n. 1.
4. Esler notes that such an interest may lead to a return to the idealistic fallacy, a
phrase coined by Bengt Holmberg.
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The works of the Roman Stoics, on the other hand, are primary examples
of and witnesses to Stoicism as it was understood, interpreted, and experienced in the very city to which Paul dispatched his letter to the Romans.
Hence, not only does the close comparison call for their works to be
consulted, but a social-scientic perspective such as that advocated by
Esler would seem to do so also. We know that Seneca was highly inuential as a Roman politician and moralist, and the Emperor Neros tutor
and counsellor. Tacitus informs us that Seneca and his companion Burrus
guided the emperors youth with an unity of purpose seldom found where
authority is shared, and though their accomplishments were wholly different, they had equal inuence (Ann. 13.2).5 In fact, Senecas sociopolitical inuence was at its peak precisely when Pauls letter was
(presumably) being read and interpreted for the rst time(s) by the Roman
addressees. We also know that in the time of Nero, Musonius too was at
the height of his inuence.6 Moreover, unlike some philosophers, he was
no doctor umbraticus, but was rather a public gure, a conspicuous
participant in civic affairs (Lutz 1947: 24).7 As for Epictetus, he was a
slave owned for a time by Epaphroditus, the famous freedman and administrative secretary of Nero (see Epictetus, Diatr. 1.1.20; 1.19.19-22), which
suggests that in his early years Epictetus had direct experience of the
imperial court (cf. Long 2002: 10). While still a slave, he was a student of
Musonius (see, e.g., Diatr. 1.7.32; 1.9.29; 3.23.29), under whose patronage
Epictetus later began his teaching career in Rome, and whose legacy he
carried on far beyond the city walls.8
These, then, are the Stoic moralists who are (almost) entirely missing
in Eslers social-scientic comparison of Paul and the Stoics who coexisted in the rst-century Mediterranean world.9
5. Cf. Dio Cassius, Hist. Rom. 61.3-4. Cf. also Senecas De clementia, addressed
to the emperor.
6. Cf. Arnold 1911: 117: the inuence of Musonius was so great that we may
almost regard him as a third founder of the philosophy. Another student of his (in
addition to Epictetus) was the famous orator Dio Chrysostom (Dio of Prusa).
7. Lutz provides a most helpful collection of the texts attributed to Musonius (with
translations), to which I will refer in this article.
8. Cf. the following comments of W.A. Oldfather in his introduction to the LCL
edition of Epictetuss Diatribai (p. ix n. 4): the system of thought in the pupil is little
more than an echo, with changes of emphasis due to the personal equation, of that of
the master. While Oldfather may have overstated the case a bit, his words rightly call
attention to the rst-century Roman roots of Epictetuss teaching.
9. With respect to Eslers close comparison, it is possible that certain similarities
between Paul and these Stoics may simply be considered as given, but the problem is
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It may certainly be the case that some or all of these Stoics actually
reect a return to early Stoicism as well as a revival of its Cynic roots,10
and that the Stoic ethical tradition as a system of thought is better presented
by Ciceros account in De nibus11 or even by Arius Didymus.12 But, as
I am in basic agreement with Esler about the relevance of time and place,
and about the signicance of the texts particular social settings, I consider
it imperative (also) to examine what Pauls (near) contemporary Roman
Stoics have to say about matters addressed by him in Rom. 12. Let me put
it this way: Would Pauls rst-century Roman readers, who doubtless
were exposed to Stoic principles,13 have regarded Pauls total package
in Rom. 12 as radically divergent from Stoicism?
The purpose of this article, then, is to compare Pauls moral teaching in
Rom. 12 with contemporary Roman Stoic ethics. Since recent interpreters
of Pauls letters often take the differences for granted rather than the
similarities in spite of all cultural contiguity, I will pay attention to
differences and similarities.14 But let us begin with reading through Rom.
12.
Romans 12 in Context
In terms of the epistolary structure of Romans, the request formula in
12.1-2 (parakalw~ ou]n u9ma=j, a)delfoi/ etc.) can be taken as the letters
structural centre (see Thorsteinsson 2003: 47-54). With ch. 12 the dialogical exchanges of questions and answers so prominent in chs. 311 cease
that Esler does not even mention the latters relevance to the whole subject or attempt
to bring out the differences between them and Paul (in accordance with the purpose
of this type of comparison).
10. Although, on ethics, Seneca in particular may adhere more to middle Stoicism;
cf. Colish 1985: 48-49. On differences between Seneca, Musonius and Epictetus, see
Arnold 1911: esp. 111-27.
11. So Engberg-Pedersen 2000: 46.
12. So Esler 2004: 107-108.
13. Mostly owing to Cicero, already by the end of the rst century BCE Stoicism
was the predominant philosophy among the Romans. Besides the philosophical
schools and the court in Rome, Stoics (some of them prone to Cynicism) were also
found in public lecture-rooms and at street corners; cf. Arnold 1911: 99-127; Pohlenz
1964: 279-90; Sandbach 1989: 16-17.
14. An excellent survey of scholarly views of the similarities and differences
between Stoicism (esp. Seneca and Epictetus) and the New Testament is found in
Colish 1992.
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and that the concept of a)ga&ph is the principle upon which Pauls moral
teaching is based. Victor P. Furnish speaks in this respect of the universalism of the Pauline love ethic (1972: 107).21 But none of this is readily
apparent in Rom. 12. What vv. 9-21 offer is a series of exhortations which
seem to be singled out rather randomly. Replete as it is with asyndeta (cf.
also v. 8), the passage gives the impression that it simply contains a
jumble of loosely related maxims. Attempts have been made to identify
in vv. 9-21 a coherent, calculated pattern of structure, for instance,
through chiasmus (e.g. Black 1989; Wilson 1991: 175-77 [for vv. 14-21])
or aural repetition (Esler 2003: 318-19), but few without using considerable force. Not all Pauline passages are necessarily structured according to a thoroughly calculated pattern. When the words h9 a)ga&ph a)nupo&kritoj in Rom. 12.9a appear, they simply appear as one among many
maxims, without having any clear programmatic or thematic function.22
The unhypocritical love spoken of in this verse is instead a direct
continuation of v. 3 and following, where Paul urges the addressees not
to think [too] highly of themselves (mh\ u9perfronei=n) with respect to one
another (cf. v. 16), precisely as the words on brotherly love, honour
and so on immediately following v. 9 also suggest: th=| filadelfi/a| ei0j
a)llh/louj filo&storgoi, th=| timh=| a)llh/louj prohgou/menoi (v. 10).
In fact, neither the word a)ga&ph nor its cognates occur again in ch. 12.
It is not until 13.8 that a)ga&ph reappears, and there it is patently presented
as a basic principle for Pauls moral teaching. But, again, this is in no
way evident in ch. 12. Most signicantly, in 13.8 a)ga&ph is conned to
the very members of the group addressed in and by the letter. The act of
loving is an in-group act: Owe no one anything,23 except to love one
another (to_ a)llh/louj a)gapa=n). According to Paul, the one who loves
(o( a)gapw~n) the other (to_n e3teron) has fullled the Law. In absolute
terms, love (h9 a)ga&ph) does no wrong to the neighbour (tw~| plhsi/on)
(v. 10). In light of Pauls statement in v. 8a, o( e3teroj and o( plhsi/on (sc.
21. Furnish cites Rom. 12.18 as a mark of such universalism, but it should be
noted that in v. 18 Paul does not urge his readers to love all men but to live at peace
with all men. His concern seems to be that the addressees are to take care not to evoke
any unnecessary hostility on behalf of outsiders; cf. 13.1-7; 1 Thess. 4.12.
22. Cf. Ksemann 1974: 331: So wird anders als in 1.K 13 das Stichwort Agape in
9akeineswegs deutlich als berschrift herausgestellt, bezeichnet vielmehr eine
Verhaltensweise neben andern, nicht ihr Kriterium und ihre rechte Modalitt Dabei
sollte beachtet werden, da 9 weder stilistisch noch sachlich einen neuen Abschnitt
markiert.
23. It is possible also to read the dative mhdeni/ as a dative of respect: Owe nothing
in any respect; cf. Thorsteinsson 2002: 540-41.
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w!n) must here refer to people within the group addressed, viz. fellow
24. Cf. Gal. 5.13-15 in which Paul exhorts his readers to serve one another through
love (dia_ th=j a)ga&phj douleu/ete a)llh/loij) and refers to Lev. 19.18 in that respect:
Love your neighbour as yourself (a)gaph/seij to_n plhsi/on sou w(j seauto&n). The
following verse is also concerned with in-group relations: But if you bite and devour
one another (a)llh/louj), take care not to be consumed by one another (u9p a)llh/lwn).
25. Contra Wilson who asserts that in Romans 12, Paul explicitly extends the
application of a)ga&ph to ones dealings with outsiders, people in general, even enemies
and persecutors (1991: 131). Paul does no such thing explicitly in Rom. 12.
26. A possible exception to this is found in 1 Thess. 3.12, where Paul expresses his
wish that his addressees may abound in love for one another and for all (ei0j
a)llh/louj kai\ ei0j pa&ntaj). However, the immediately following just as we [abound
in love] for you (kaqa&per kai\ h9mei=j ei0j u9ma=j) suggests that these all are in fact all
fellow Christ-believers (cf. also Pauls discussion of brotherly love [filadelfi/a]
shortly thereafter in 4.9-10: a)gapa=n a)llh/loujpa&ntaj tou\j a)delfou\j e0n o3lh| th=|
Makedoni/a)| . In Gal. 6.10 and 1 Thess. 5.15 Pauls all (pa&ntaj) probably refers to
outsiders too, but it is important to observe that here the issue is not the primary
virtue a)ga&ph but, more broadly, to_ a)gaqo&n.
147
wrath and revenge on such people. The vengeance is Gods and not
the addressees, whose task is instead to show charity to their enemies so
that the latter may be driven to repentance.27 Thus, to_ kako&n is defeated e0n
tw~| a)gaqw~.|
Pauls Moral Teaching in Romans 12 and Roman Stoic Ethics
Scholars have long been aware of Stoic echoes in Rom. 12.1-2. And yet,
for some reason, these echoes tend to be mentioned merely in passinga
startling default, considering the weight of Rom. 12.1-2 for the reading of
the letter as a whole.
When Paul speaks of the addressees living sacrice as their rational
or reasonable worship (h9 logikh\ latrei/a), he alludes to a popular Stoic
concept and utilizes a word (logiko&j)28 which was highly favoured
among the Stoics in particular to describe humans as rational beings and
how they relate to God (as lo&goj) (see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius 7.87-88,
134, 147; Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.7.6 [= Arius Didymus 6; ed. Pomeroy];
Epictetus, Diatr. 1.3.1-3; 2.8.2-3, 11-14; 3.1.25; Marcus Aurelius, Med.
4.4; 5.27. Cf. also Cicero, Nat. d. 1.39; Seneca, Epp. 66.12; 76.9-10;
92.1-2, 27; 124.23). Epictetus associates reason with worship as follows:
If we had sense (nou=n), ought we to be doing anything else, publicly and
privately, than hymning and praising the Deity, and rehearsing His benets
(xa&ritaj)? If, indeed, I were a nightingale, I should be singing as a
nightingale; if a swan, as a swan. But as it is, I am a rational being (logiko&j
ei0mi), therefore I must be singing hymns of praise to God and I exhort
(parakalw~) you to joint me in this same song (Diatr. 1.16.15, 20-21).
148
one who has learned and understood what he should do and avoid, is not
a wise man until his mind (animus) is metamorphosed (transguratus est)
into the shape of that which he has learned (Ep. 94.47-48; cf. Epictetus,
Diatr. 3.21.1-3).29 It appears that Paul wants his readers to learn and understand what they should do and avoid. The aim of their transformation is
to discern Gods will, viz. what is good and acceptable and complete
(to_ a)gaqo_n kai\ eu0a&reston kai\ te/leion).30 But, precisely as Seneca, Paul is
not only thinking of intellectual transformationthat of learning and
understandingbut of a metamorphosis of both discernment and deed.
He is thinking of a total moral transformation. That is what he means when
he urges his addressees to offer their bodies as a living sacrice. They
are to learn how their way of life can be counted as holy and acceptable
to God, but they are also to strengthen their learning by action. Indeed,
as the subsequent discourse reveals, Paul wants them to present their
bodies and transform their minds in a way which fully embodies what
they have learned (cf. also 15.14, 16). Only thus will they put on the lord
Jesus Christ (13.14) or, in Stoic terms, become wise men.
It is clear that Paul in 12.1 makes use of traditional sacricial terms,
both Jewish and non-Jewish (cf. Dunn 1988: 708-12). But it is equally
clear that these are used guratively as a means of pointing to a particular
attitude of mind and way of life as the proper and sufcient worship. This
was a theme not uncommon in Graeco-Roman antiquity (cf. Behm 1965:
186-89), and would most likely have sounded familiar to those acquainted
with Stoic points of view. Seneca, for instance, states:
Precepts are commonly given as to how the gods should be worshipped
but God is worshipped by those who truly know Him Although a man
hear what limit he should observe in sacrice, and how far he should recoil
from burdensome superstitions, he will never make sufcient progress
until he has conceived a right idea of Godregarding Him as one who
29. On another occasion (Ep. 6.1-3), Seneca informs his friend Lucilius that he
feels that he himself is being not only reformed, but transformed (transgurari)
(immediately pointing out, however, that this does not amount to the total transformation of the wise man). With respect to Pauls move in Rom. 12 from the readers
transformation to their relation to others, it is interesting that the primary effect of
Senecas transformation in this case concerns his very relation to his friend: I should
then begin to place a surer trust in our friendshipthe true friendship, which hope
and fear and self-interest cannot sever [I]n such cases men know that they have all
things in common, especially their troubles (ibid.).
30. In Stoic ethics, te/leion kaqh=kon is a complete and appropriate moral act (as
opposed to an act para_ to_ kaqh=kon which is a(ma&rthma, cf. Rom. 1.28-31); see further
Rist 1969: 97-98.
149
possesses all things, and allots all things, and bestows them without price
Would you win over the gods? Then be a good man. Whoever imitates
them, is worshipping them sufciently (Ep. 95.47-50).31
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151
According to Epictetus, one should act like the foot or the hand, which,
if they had the faculty of reason and understood the constitution of nature,
would never exercise choice or desire in any other way but by reference
to the whole [viz. the body] (Diatr. 2.10.4). This thought was even better
expressed several decades later by the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius
(121180 CE): Reasonable beings, constituted for one fellowship of
cooperation (mi/an sunergi/an), are in their separated bodies analogous to
the several members (ta_ me/lh) of the body (tou= sw&matoj) in individual
organisms (Med. 7.13).38
here (although, unlike 1 Cor. 12, in Rom. 12.4-5 Paul does not speak of the body as
Christ; rather, the believers themselves are one body in Christ).
36. A much celebrated example is the tale of Menenius Agrippas attempt to restore
harmony among Roman citizens (concordia civium) by likening the city with a human
body (Livy, Hist. 2.32).
37. Seneca then proceeds by adding a likening of human relations to an arch of
stone: Our relations with one another are like a stone arch, which would collapse if
the stones did not mutually support each other, and which is upheld in this very way
(Ep. 95.53).
38. Marcus Aurelius continues: The idea of this will come home to you more if
you say to yourself: I am a member (me/loj) of the system made up of reasonable
beings. If, however, by the change of one letter, you call yourself a part (me/roj), you
do not yet love (filei=j) men from your heart; well-doing is not yet a joy to you for its
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own sake; you are still doing it as a bare duty, not yet as though doing good to
yourself (ibid.; trans. OWC). Cf. also Med. 2.1: For we have come into being for
co-operation (sunergi/an), as have the feet, the hands, the eyelids, the rows of upper
and lower teeth (trans. LCL).
39. Cf. also Cicero, Fin. 3.62-63; as well as the discussion of fraternal love by the
early second-century CE Stoic Hierocles (see Malherbe 1986: 93-95).
40. One striking example is found in Russell 1979: 263-64.
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41. The phrase amorem mutuum is translated as mutual affection in the LCL
edition. The verse quoted by Seneca derives from the Roman poet Terence (Haut.
77).
42. Cf. Ep. 110.14-20. In Vit. beat. 17-28 Seneca explains why he preferred to keep
his wealth rather than give it all away and become poor. It is noteworthy that by the
time of Juvenal (Sat. 5.108-11) Senecas generosity appears to have become proverbial, as may also be hinted at in Tacitus, Ann. 15.62.
154
Do they not cost great sums of money from which many people (pollou\j
a)nqrw&pouj) might have beneted by public and private charity (kai\
dhmosi/a| kai\ i0di/a|)? How much more commendable than living a life of
luxury it is to help many people (to_ pollou\j eu0ergetei=n). How much nobler
than spending money for sticks and stones to spend it on men (ei0j
a)nqrw&pouj) What would one gain from a large and beautiful house comparable to what he would gain by conferring the benets of his wealth
(xari/zesqai) upon the city and his fellow-citizens (Lutz no. 19, p. 122,
lines 24-32 [= Stobaeus, Ecl. 3.1.209]).
43. Cf. Sandbach 1989: 19: Many of the later Stoics were practical men of action
and one can see the relevance of their beliefs to their doings. Even those who were
primarily teachers were mainly concerned with the practical problems of life which
faced them and their pupils.
44. Cf. Ben. 7.1.3; Ep. 20.2 (Philosophy teaches us to act [facere], not to speak
[dicere]). Arnold observes that Senecas writings admirably illustrate for us Stoicism
in its practical application to daily life (1911: 115).
45. On the translation of to_ e1qoj as practice, see Lutzs note on line 32 on p. 49.
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156
157
lines 33-34; p. 79, lines 1-3).55 We are also informed that Musonius held
that
to share the common notion that we shall be despised by others if in every
way we do not strive to harm the rst enemies (e0xqrou/j) we meet is the
mark of mean-minded and ignorant men. For we [commonly] say that the
despicable man is recognized among other things by his inability to harm
his enemies, but actually he is much more easily recognized by his inability
to help them (kata_ to_ a)du/naton ei]nai w)felei=n) (Lutz no. 41, p. 136, lines
22-26 [= Stobaeus, Ecl. 3.20.61]).
54. Cf. Gal. 5.15: ei0 de\ a)llh/louj da&knete kai\ katesqi/ete
55. Contrast Arius Didymus 11d (= Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.7.11d), on whom Eslers claim
above is based.
158
cf. Ben. 7.31.1; Epp. 66.21; 95.63; Ira 2.10.6; 2.28.4; 2.32.1; 2.34.5;
3.27.1; Otio 1.4; Vit. beat. 20.5).
While Paul in Rom. 12.14, 17-21 comes strikingly close to the viewpoints of both Seneca and Musonius as to how to act toward evildoers,
viz. by meeting and defeating evil with good, he does not go as far as
Epictetus in urging his addressees to love (a)gapa=n, filei=n) their persecutors.56 As we have already seen, a)ga&ph for Paul is an in-group term; it is
something which Christ-believers (should) show to fellow Christbelievers. Thus, if ogged, they should truly speak well of those who og
them, but they are not required to love such misdoers. Interestingly,
Pauls more general urging in v. 18 that his addressees are to be at peace
with all men (meta_ pa&ntwn a)nqrw&pwn ei0rhneu/ontej) is in close harmony
with Epictetuss advice to his interlocutor to be at peace with all men
(ei0rh/nhn a!geij pro_j pa&ntaj a)nqrw&pouj) (Diatr. 4.5.24). But while Paul
sets the rather cautious condition if possible for your part (ei0 dunato_n to_
e0c u9mw~n), Epictetuss demand is absolute: no matter what they do (o3 ti
a2n e0kei=noi poiw~si). Again, Epictetus takes a step further in his ethical
instructions. And there are other differences to be noted, to be sure. When
Paul in v. 19 expresses his belief of the legitimacy of divine revenge, a
disagreement between him and the Stoics comes to the fore. There seems
to be little room even for that sort of revenge in Roman Stoicism (cf.,
e.g., Seneca, Ben. 6.27.5; Ira 2.30; 2.32.1).
Despite such differences, however, there is clearly a fundamental similarity between Paul and the Roman Stoics relating to the question of how
to act toward ones enemies and misdoers.57 The Stoics in Rome would
no doubt have agreed wholeheartedly with Pauls words at the end of
Rom. 12: ni/ka e0n tw~| a)gaqw~| to_ kako&n.
Conclusions
In an apology pro Stoicis, Seneca writes:
I am aware that among the ill-informed (imperitos) the Stoic school is
56. In his recent study of the principle of loving ones enemies in pre-Christian
antiquity, M. Reiser concludes (2001: 426): As far as I can see the third level [i.e.
Never take revenge, love your enemywith all the consequences] is reached only
by Socrates, a few Roman Stoics, Lev 19.18 and Jesus Even Christianity, seen as a
whole, rarely transcended the second level [Try not to pay back evil with evil] and
often enough fell back to the rst level [Love your friend, hate your enemy]. Cf.
also the important article of Whittaker 1979.
57. Cf. also Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.20; 7.22, 26; 9.1; 11.13.
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unpopular on the ground that it is excessively harsh But the fact is, no
school is more kindly and gentle (benignior leniorque), none more full of
love to man (amantior hominum) and more concerned for the common
good (communis boni attentior), so that it is its avowed object to be of
service and assistance (usui esse et auxilio), and to regard not merely selfinterest, but the interest of each and all (universis singulisque) (Clem.
2.5.2-3).
This study has shown that nothing could be further from the truth than the
claim that Pauls moral teaching in Rom. 12 was radically different
from Stoic ethics. Provided that one does not simply ignore the sources of
Roman Stoicismthose sources which present Stoicism as it was
understood and recognized in rst- and second-century Rome, and are
thus of much, if not most, relevance for a comparative study of this kind
of Romansthe similarities clearly outweigh the differences. Unless they
were terribly ill-informed of the philosophical thought and way of life
which above others affected the lives of Roman residents, Pauls audience
would never have perceived his total package in Rom. 12 as being radically divergent from Stoicism. Quite to the contrary: the present study
suggests that the audience may even have been amazed by the many
striking, fundamental similarities between Pauls moral teaching and Stoic
ethics. Romans 12 may well have been understood as having a specically
Stoic framework. Moreover, if Paul is interacting with Stoicism in the
chapter, there are little signs of his refutation of its precepts. In fact, he
does not seem to be concerned at all with highlighting the differences
between his own proclaimed moral teaching and Stoic ethics. A Stoic
reader of Rom. 12 would not have found the step a giant one to present
his or her body to God as a living sacriceth\n logikh\n latrei/an.
What are the differences, then? Or better, what would a contemporary
Roman reader with at least some basic knowledge of the Stoic ethical
tradition have perceived as a notable difference? Most importantly, there
is the difference in ethical scope, so to speak: whereas the ethics of the
Roman Stoics is universal in its scope, Pauls love ethic is not. His
primary concern is the community of Christ-believers and morality within
that particular community. This means that those addressees of Pauls
letter who were perhaps accustomed to or inuenced by a more universal
ethical teachingnot necessarily Stoic, to be sureare now urged to
focus primarily on a very specic portion of humankind: their Christbelieving neighbours. For the Stoic reader this would imply a restriction
from an unconditional, universal love of human beings as such to a love of
particular neighbours dened in terms of religion.
Whether or not this basic difference between Pauls moral teaching in
160
Rom. 12 and Roman Stoic ethics also applied when words became deeds
is another question.
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