Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs.

Secretary Reyes
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Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in
the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species,
which inhabit the waters in and around the Taon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo
Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as
friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and
seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling
co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Taon Strait, among others.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center
(FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization, established for the
welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon
Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and as
representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey
and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and
geophysical studies of the Taon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample
analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also
conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Taon
Strait.
DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development,
and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square
kilometers offshore the Taon Strait.
PETITIONERS:
o the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before
the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but
after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day.
They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the "payao" also
known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."
o that public respondents DENR and EMB abused their discretion when they issued
an ECC to public respondent DOE and private respondent JAPEX without ensuring
the strict compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements under the
Environmental Impact Assessment system, the Fisheries Code, and their
implementing rules and regulations.
Respondents: No legal standing; moot and academic (SC-46 has been mutually terminated
by the parties thereto June 21, 2008)
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases,51 which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action
before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen
suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the
cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to
manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general
circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987
Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in
length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission
(ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were
actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with
safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law
regime
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are
these requirements:
o

(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain

uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country. Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act
of 1972
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several
times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public
scrutiny. NOT COMPLIED

(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress
to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and
interpose timely objections, if any. NOT COMPLIED
The Taon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East
and Negros in the West. It harbors a rich biodiversity of marine life, including endangered
species of dolphins and whales. For this reason, former President Fidel V. Ramos declared
the Taon Strait as a protected seascape in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234
- Declaring the Taon Strait situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and
Negros Oriental as a Protected Area pursuant to the NIP AS Act and shall be known as
Taon Strait Protected Seascape
Consistent with this endeavor is the requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope of the management plan.
Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of
the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS Act are not without exceptions.
However, while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy
resources is allowed under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean that
it is exempt from the requirement to undergo an EIA under Section 12

Oh Cho vs. The Director of Lands

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The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable
to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141)
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had
acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws,
orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by
possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant below to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cario vs.Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not
come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in
interest begun in 1880.

The Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. CA

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On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with the then Branch I, Court
of First Instance of Laguna, a petition[1] for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an
area of forty-three thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less,
forming part of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala,
Cabuyao, Laguna.

Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa
Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911,[2] and later administered by him in behalf of
his five brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934

The petition for land registration[8] at bar is under the Land Registration Act.[9] Pursuant to
said Act, he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must
present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant,
a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or
a titulo de compraor title through purchase; and informacion possessoria or possessory
information title, which would become a titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title.[10]

In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not
produced a single muniment of title to substantiate his claim of ownership. [11] The Court has
therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration
of subject land under Act 496.

Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public
land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondents petition would meet the same
fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the
private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner,
in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of
imperfect title.

In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of
subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of
an extra-judicial settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly
effected, the private respondent has possessed the property thus partitioned for only
twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration thereof. To
bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what he theorized upon as
possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his unilateral assertion,
private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation
that his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.

Republic of the Philippines vs. dela Paz

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On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela
Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of
Pasig City an application for registration of land[3] under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD
1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a
parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig,
Metro Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan
of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping)
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the
inalienable public domain.[14] The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of theapplication is alienable
or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-000084 [16] (Conversion Consolidated
plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof
required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable
zone.Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to
establish that the subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is
already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still
inalienable public domain
Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name
of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only

prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona
fideclaim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[27] Respondents failed to explain why,
despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject
properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that
their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well
settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other
evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation
purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest
does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
Republic vs. CA
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These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February
11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria,
Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided
into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were
sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964.

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok
Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her
father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was
possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in
1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and
his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed
with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time,
who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her
tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and
Atok at that time
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok
having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935,
they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet
and Atok.
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from
the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the
right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the
public domain and the property of the locator."
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the
Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not
required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws;
his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured
by patent.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the
laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further
act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had
become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as
they did, to Benguet and Atok.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the

private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the
de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
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First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership.
They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in
1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial
judge, who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his
judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or
without sufficient basis. 17

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had

really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of
owner of the mining claim but of the property asagricultural land, which it was not. The
property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not
disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and
to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of
the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest,
the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.