Padilla vs. Sto. Tomas [G.R. No. 109444. March 31, 1995.

]
FACTS:
On 2 November 1988, an administrative complaint for gross dishonesty,
gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties and gross violation of the law, rules and reasonable office
regulations was filed against Delano Padilla, former officer-in-charge of the
Land Transportation Office (LTO) of Bacolod City. It was alleged that Padilla
succeeded in having caused and approved the registration and/or transfer of
ownership of 12 carnapped and stolen vehicles despite prior knowledge that
existing laws, rules and regulations were violated in the registration and
transfer thereof. As contended by LTO, Padilla failed to require confirmation
of the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipts corresponding to the
subject vehicles from the LTO district offices which issued the same. Had he
done so, no registration and/or transfer of the vehicles would have been
possible because all the supporting documents pertinent to them were
spurious. Padilla filed his answer dated 26 December 1988 vehemently
denying the charges against him. The matter was set for hearing on 20 April
1989. However, only prosecutor Ramon Cuyco and his witness, Alfonso
Alianza, were present. Padilla and his counsel failed to appear despite due
notice. Consequently, the case was heard ex-parte and was considered
submitted for decision. After considering the evidence on record, the
Administrative Action Board (AAB) of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) through then DOTC Secretary Rainerio Reyes
rendered a decision and found Padilla guilty of the charges filed against him,
and accordingly sentenced that he be dismissed from the service; that he be
disqualified for reemployment in the government service; that his leave
credits and retirement benefits be declared forfeited; and that his civil
service eligibility be recommended to be cancelled. Padilla filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, instead of ruling on the merits of the motion, the
AAB-DOTC deferred action thereon and scheduled the case for hearing.
Finally, on 20 November 1989, after several resets, his motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Padilla appealed to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) seeking

reversal of the AAB-DOTCs decision. On 25 March 1991, the MSPB rendered
a decision affirming the decision of the AAB-DOTC. His appeal was therefore
ordered dismissed. A motion for reconsideration of the same was denied on

17 February 1992. Aggrieved by the foregoing rulings, petitioner elevated

the case to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On 16 July 1992, the CSC
issued Resolution 92-888, affirming the MSPB decision and thus ruling that
Padilla is guilty of Gross Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty, Inefficiency and
Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties and Gross violation of
Law, Rules and Reasonable Office Regulations and is meted out the penalty
of dismissal. A motion for reconsideration of the same decision was denied in
Resolution 92-1849 dated 17 November 1992. Subsequently, Padilla filed a
Motion for New Trial seeking the reversal of Resolution 92-888 and 92-1849.
Said motion was considered a second motion for reconsideration, hence, was
accordingly denied on 16 February 1993 in Resolution 93-511-A by the CSC.
On 6 April 1993, Padilla filed a petition for certiorari.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
1. Due process; Essence, In Administrative proceedings; Formal trial-type
hearing not necessary
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support
of his defense. In administrative proceedings, due process simply means the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. In the present case, Padilla was given
ample opportunity to present his case. He was not denied his right to due
process. One may be heard, not only by verbal presentation but also,
sometimes more eloquently, through pleadings. Due process is not semper
et ubique judicial process. Hence, a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all
times, necessary. So long as a party is afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain his side, the requirement of due process is complied
with.
2. DOTC Memorandum Circular 123, s. 1989
For the purpose of determining the authenticity and genuineness of the
Certificate of Registration attached to an application for registration of a
transferred motor vehicle, the Department of Transportation and
Communications issued Memorandum Circular 123 on 27 December 1989
with the following pertinent provision on the mandatory requirement of a
Certificate of Clearance from the previous agency of registration, to wit In
the case where the transferred motor vehicle is being registered in any
Agency other than the Agency where the vehicle has been originally
registered, a Certificate of Clearance shall first be obtained from such

Agency of previous registration; provided, however, that such clearance shall

state, among others, the description of the motor vehicle, name of the
registrant/owner, file number of the Registration Certificate, date of
registration, Official Receipt number of payment and the amount of
payment.
3. Certificate of Clearance mandatory for all transfer of ownership of motor
vehicles
A Certificate of Clearance or confirmation is mandatory for all transfers of
ownership of motor vehicles when done in an agency, or district office as the
case may be, other than the issuing agency of such certificate of registration.
When the requirement is dispensed with, the evil sought to be avoided and
eliminated, that is, the concealment of the true status and identity of the
motor vehicle, remains unabated. In the present case, it was clearly
established from the records that Padilla did not require the submission of
Certificates of Clearance from the agencies of previous registration affecting
the 12 motor vehicles in question.
4. Substantial evidence in administrative proceedings
In administrative proceedings where evidence submitted is substantial,
meaning, evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, the proper penalty must be imposed on that erring
official. In the present case, Padilla did not require the submission of
Certificates of Clearance from the agencies of previous registration affecting
the 12 motor vehicles in question. This amply demonstrates his obvious
disregard of the law, rules and regulations, gross neglect of duty, dishonesty
and incompetence in the performance of official functions. The evidence is
clear and substantial to support the conclusion that Padilla indeed failed to
discharge an essential official function reposed on him.
5. Duties and obligations as head of agency outlined in DOTC rules and
regulations
DOTC rules and regulations unequivocably outline Padillas duties and
obligations as head of an agency. He has to require a Certificate of Clearance
from the previous LTO issuing agency, in addition to a clearance from CHPG.
Anything short of that is an abdication of his duties as head of an LTO office.
Thus, the deed of sale, the certificate of registration and the PC Clearance of
the CHPG, do not properly approximate the legal requirement of a Certificate
of Clearance or confirmation from the previous agency.

6. Cause of cause
El que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado. He who is the cause
of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal,
12th ed. 1968, pp. 335-336) The rule applies in the present case.
7. Polestar of official performance
Among those in the service of the government, it has been a policy declared
that: It is the policy of the state to promote a high standard of ethics in
public service. Public officials and employees shall at all times be
accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties with utmost
responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and
justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.
(RA 6713, Section 2). The foregoing policy should always be the polestar of
official performance. Without such guiding star, the public service shall fail.
Padillas actions in the 12 motor vehicles did not only run afoul of the
pertinent laws, and rules connected therewith, but also did violence to the
foregoing basic policy of the state. The magnitude of the acts committed,
along with the massive evidence marshalled by the prosecution, dictate that
a finding of guilt against Padilla be a matter of duty.
8. Findings of administrative body supported by substantial evidence
accorded respect, if not finality
Where findings of an administrative body which has acquired expertise
because its jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are amply supported
by substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also
finality.

UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. CA, 313 SCRA 404

FACTS:
Private respondent Arokiasamy William was enrolled in a Doctoral
Program in Anthropology of the UP Diliman College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy.
An oral defense by the PR was held on February 5, 1993. After going over the
dissertations, the panel pointed out after it has been looked into that some
portion of it were lifted from other sources without proper acknowledgement,
hence requesting her to revise the dissertation which PR failed to do so

resulting to her not obtaining approval from 2 of the panels of the Oral
Defense.
When questioned by Dean Paz, PR sent a letter on April 17, 1993 explaining
the reasons why the signature of Dr. Medina (one of the panels) wasnt
affixed and advised that she relied on Dean Pazs remark dated March 5,
1993 when the former stated that a majority vote of the panel members was
sufficient for a student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the
consent of the Deans representative. She also expressed her
disappointment over the CSSP administration for maliciously working or the
disapproval of her dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against
encouraging perfidious acts against her.
On April 21, 1992, Dean Paz sent a letter to the Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs requesting the name of the PR to be excluded in the list of candidates
for graduation which failed to reach the recipient on time, hence, the PR was
able to graduate on April 24, 1993.
In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private
respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to
her be withdrawn which the PR was informed of dated June 7, 1993.
An ad hoc committee was formed and after thorough investigation, it was
reported that they found at least 90 instances or portions in the thesis which
were lifted from sources without due acknowledgement. Further
investigations and interviews with the PR were held to reinvestigate her case
which involved the Board of Regents until it has been established that PR is
guilty of the allegation of Plagiarism which was actually admitted by the PR
herself to the special committee.
A letter from the Board of Regents addressed to the PR was sent informing
the latter that it has been concluded by the committee that her doctorate
degree will be withdrawn. A petition has been filed to the Chairman of the
board of regents for reinvestigation which was hereby denied, hence, PR filed
a petition for mandamus to restore her degree which includes payment for
moral and exemplary damages which was also denied by branch 227 trial
court. On August 6, 1996, PR appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on
December 16, 1997 reversed the lower courts decision and ordered
petitioner to restore PRs degree. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Private Respondent was deprived of her right to

substantive due process.

RULING:
The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher
learning by Art XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding
whom a university will confer degrees on. If the degree is procured by error
or fraud then the Board of Regents, subject to due process being followed,
may cancel that degree.
Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that academic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
It is a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given
a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If
such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study
in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and
distinction of being its graduates.
The court held that in administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a
chance seeks reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party
who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably
claim to have been denied due process. In the case at bar, the PR was
informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to
refute them. Due process in an administrative context does not require trialtype proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy
that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

VICTORIAS MILLING CO. VS.

ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS

OFFICE

OF

THE

PRESIDENTIAL

FACTS:
On April 28, 1981, the Iloilo Port Manager of respondent Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA for short) wrote petitioner Victorias Milling Co., requiring
it to have its tugboats and barges undergo harbor formalities and pay
entrance/clearance fees as well as berthing fees effective May 1, 1981. PPA,

likewise, requiring petitioner to secure a permit for cargo handling operations

at its Da-an Banua wharf and remit 10% of its gross income for said
operations as the government's share.
To these demands, petitioner sent two letters wherein it maintained that it is
exempt from paying PPA any fee or charge because: (1) the wharf and an its
facilities were built and installed in its land; (2) repair and maintenance
thereof were and solely paid by it; (3) even the dredging and maintenance of
the Malijao River Channel from Guimaras Strait up to said private wharf are
being done by petitioner's equipment and personnel; and (4) at no time has
the government ever spent a single centavo for such activities. Petitioner
further added that the wharf was being used mainly to handle sugar
purchased from district planters pursuant to existing milling agreements.
On March 29, 1982, petitioner served notice to PPA that it is appealing the
case to the Court of Tax Appeals; and accordingly, on March 31, 1982,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the said Court, entitled "Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority," and docketed therein as CTA
Case No. 3466. The Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's action on the
ground that it has no jurisdiction. It recommended that the appeal be
addressed to the Office of the President. On April 2, 1984, petitioner filed an
appeal with the Office of the President, but in a Decision dated July 27, 1984
(Record, p. 22), the same was denied on the sole ground that it was filed
beyond the reglementary period. A motion for Reconsideration was filed, but
in an Order dated December 16, 1985, the same was denied (ibid., pp. 3-21):
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 30-day period for appeal under Section 131 of PPA
Administrative Order No. 13-77 was tolled by the pendency of the petitions
filed first with the court of tax appeals, and then with the honorable tribunal.

RULING:
The instant petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner, in holding that the recourse
first to the Court of Tax Appeals and then to this Court tolled the period to
appeal, submits that it was guided, in good faith, by considerations which
lead to the assumption that procedural rules of appeal then enforced still

hold true. It contends that when Republic Act No. 1125 (creating the Court of
Tax Appeals) was passed in 1955, PPA was not yet in existence; and under
the said law, the Court of Tax Appeals had exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs regarding,
among others, customs duties, fees and other money charges imposed by
the Bureau under the Tariff and Customs Code. On the other hand, neither in
Presidential Decree No. 505, creating the PPA on July 11, 1974 nor in
Presidential Decree No. 857, revising its charter (said decrees, among others,
merely transferred to the PPA the powers of the Bureau of Customs to
impose and collect customs duties, fees and other money charges
concerning the use of ports and facilities thereat) is there any provision
governing appeals from decisions of the PPA on such matters, so that it is but
reasonable to seek recourse with the Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioner,
likewise, contends that an analysis of Presidential Decree No. 857, shows
that the PPA is vested merely with corporate powers and duties (Sec. 6),
which do not and cannot include the power to legislate on procedural
matters, much less to effectively take away from the Court of Tax Appeals
the latter's appellate jurisdiction.
These contentions are untenable for while it is true that neither Presidential
Decree No. 505 nor Presidential Decree No. 857 provides for the remedy of
appeal to the Office of the President, nevertheless, Presidential Decree No.
857 empowers the PPA to promulgate such rules as would aid it in
accomplishing its purpose.

NICOLAS VS. DESIERTO, G.R. NO. 154668, DEC.16, 2004

FACTS:
On April 7, 1999, a 40-footer van declared to contain parts for rock
crusher arrived at the Manila International Container Port (MICP) from
Singapore on board vessel APL Lotus 0001. The subject cargo, which was
supposed to be transshipped to Cagayan de Oro City was consigned to Macro
Equipment Corporation with Catalysts Customs Brokerage as broker. It was
issued a Boatnote No. 51723253 directing/authorizing the transfer of the said
cargo from Manila International Container Port to north Harbor, Manila. Allan
Pagkalinawan was assigned to remain on duty until the cargo is received by
the Collector of Customs.

Rogelio Hurtado of the office of the Port Collector, North Harbor, Manila,
received the container van at the North Harbor Customs House, which was
under the control of Edward dela Cuesta, Collector of Customs subport of
North Harbor, Manila. Instead of being transshipped to Cagayan de Oro City,
the van and its cargo were allowed to exit North harbor, Manila.
On April 16, 1999, elements of Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) apprehended the shipment [based on reliable information that
duties and taxes of cargo contained therein were not properly paid along
Quirino Avenue, Paranaque City. On April 19, 1999, the [EIIB] turned over the
container van and its cargo to the AFP Logistics Command at Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City for safe keeping, and on the same date, respondent
Wilfredo A. Nicolas [the Commissioner of the EIIB issued Mission Order No.
04-10599 directing the inventory of the container van. It was only then when
it was discovered that the cargo consisted of various electronics and
communications equipment, appliances, parts, and accessories.
On May 6, 1999, upon the recommendation of J. Francisco Arriola, then Chief
of the EIIBs Special Operations group, petitioner Nicolas issued a Notice of
Withdrawal for the release of the subject shipment in favor of Trinity
Brokerage, after payment of the necessary customs duties and other fees.
However, it was discovered later that the documents presented in support of
the release of the cargo were spurious.
As a result thereof Ruben Frogoso filed a complaint against Wilfredo A.
Nicolas, J. Francisco Arriola, Edward dela Cuesta, Rogelio Hurtado, and Allan
Pagkalinawan before the office of the Ombudsman. Ruben Frogoso
contend[ed] that the act[s] of x x x petitioner Nicolas and Arriola in releasing
the cargo was irregular in view of the following reasons: (1) they failed to
inform the Bureau of Customs of the apprehension of the cargo; (2) they
failed to request the pertinent papers and documents relating to the
shipment; and (3) they did not verify the authenticity of the documents
relating to the payment of the customs duties.
After finding that petitioner Nicolas Arriola and the other person[s] cited in
the complaint appeared to be criminally and administratively liable, the Fact
Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) Investigation Panel of the Office of the
Ombudsman directed them to file their respective counter-affidavits to
controvert the charge against them.
A preliminary conference of the case was held on June 1, 2000 wherein dela
Cuesta manifested in open proceedings to submit the case for resolution

based on the evidence on record. On the other hand, Arriola, through his
counsel, and Pagkalinawan and Hurtado requested for the [resetting] of the
preliminary conference to June 16, 2000. However, petitioner Nicolas failed
to appear at the preliminary conference.
The CA held that due process merely required an opportunity to be heard.
This opportunity was accorded to petitioner upon his filing of his Motion for
Reconsideration. Appellate court further held that the jurisdiction of
respondent over the person of petitioner was not lost by the mere fact that
the latters public office had subsequently been abolished.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the
ombudsman rendered against petitioner without the benefit of a preliminary
conference required under the rules of procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman thus constituting a violation of petitioners right to due process.

RULING:
The cardinal requirements of due process in administrative proceedings were
highlighted in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations thus: (1) there must
be a right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and
submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself;
(4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision must be based on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges
must act on its own independent consideration of the law and the facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the
board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner as would allow the parties to know the various issues
involved and the reason for the decision rendered.
In the present case, Nicolas was not accorded the first requirement -- the
right to present his case and submit evidence in support thereof. Petitioner
was not notified of the preliminary conference, which would have afforded
him the opportunity to appear and defend his rights, including the right to
request a formal investigation.

The order requiring Nicolas to attend the preliminary conference was sent to
the EIIB office at EIIB-DOF, National Government Center, East Triangle,
Quezon City. A certain Baby Averion received the order, allegedly on behalf
of petitioner on May 19, 2000.
At the time the Notice was sent, however, Nicolas was no longer holding
office at the said address, because the EIIB had already been deactivated.
The ombudsman should have sent the notice to the home address of
petitioner, who had indicated it in his Counter-Affidavit that was submitted to
the ombudsman during the fact-finding investigation.
The absence of petitioner at the scheduled preliminary conference was
therefore justified. The ombudsman erred in declaring that the formers case
had been submitted for decision and in subsequently rendering the assailed
Decision.
The present case is an exception to the rule that questions of fact are not
cognizable by this Court. The ombudsmans finding of gross neglect, upheld
by the CA, was based on an obvious misapprehension of facts and was
clearly not supported by extant evidence.
The quantum of proof necessary to prove a charge in an administrative case
is substantial evidence, which is defined as relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Such
quantum was not met here. Even though petitioner had not adduced
evidence on his behalf, the facts on record show that his act or omission
does not constitute gross neglect of duty.

FORTICH VS. CORONA, 398 SCRA 685

FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision
converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agroindustrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries
staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of
publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming
1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.

On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win

Resolution which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution
substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long declared
the said Decision final & executory after the DARs Motion for
Reconsideration was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.
The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross disregard of
the rules & basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the win-win
Resolution of November 7, 1997 is not void since it seeks to correct an
erroneous ruling, hence, the March 29, 1996 decisioncould not as yet
become final and executory as to be beyond modification. They further
explained that the DARs failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on
time was excusable.
Because of this blackmail, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, politically
motivated, win-win resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially
modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Presidents modification of the Decision void
or a valid exercise of its powers and prerogatives.

RULING:
Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates
that decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall
become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof xxx
unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it
impossibleto file its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the said
decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot be considered
a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR
must not disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation.

The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to

the internal office procedure of an administrative body.

The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be

disturbed or substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the
adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest. Procedural rules should be
treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay
in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The
Constitution guarantees that all persons shall have a right to the speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly
& speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in the relaxation of rules
was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules
with impunity. A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure
can only be resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.
It is a question of substance & merit. A decision/resolution/order of an
administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground
that the same was rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with
Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or procedure.
Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory requirement before a case or
controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In the instant case, several
fatal violations of law were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules &
settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory,
vested rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all others who should be
benefited by the said Decision. In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of
his/her case.