Applying Statutory Construction

to Resolve the Constitutional Issues

in Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Erap
Ejercito Estrada & COMELEC

Statutory Construction
1-D
Atty. Jun Pilares
Submitted by:
Dim, Peter
Gustillo, Reine
Rayos, Cristelle
Roque, Mika
Villavicencio, Salve

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Introduction
The case of Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada & Commission of
Elections involves the proper meaning of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. This
provision states that the President shall not be eligible for any reelection. The petition that would shed
light on its interpretation was denied due course out of an exercise of judicial restraint, because of the
controversy ceasing to be justiciable by virtue of the supervening event of former president Estrada
placing only second in the 2010 general elections.
The maxim Legis Interpretatio Legis Vim Obtinet provides that the authoritative interpretation
of a court of the written law, acquires the force of law by becoming a part of thereof. This is of great
importance especially when what is being subjected to exposition is the highest law of the land. The
Supreme Court is the final arbiter, entrusted with construing the fundamental law that stands as the
foundation of our judicial system.
The Supreme Court had already established that the moot and academic principle cannot be
used to deter the courts from resolving a case that meets the following requirements: (1) if there is a
violation of the Constitution, (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved, (3) when the constitutional issues requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar, and the public, (4) and when the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.1 The election of the nation's Chief Executive would certainly merit the clarification of the
constitutional issues hounding one of the candidates. Former presidents could very well decide to run
again in future elections and the votes of the people, who believed in their eligibility, could then be
invalidated if that candidate was not eligible to run in the first place. We believe that the Supreme
Court has wasted an opportunity to settle the issue with finality thereby leaving such an essential
question of the Presidential candidacy left in the dark. This paper seeks to use statutory construction
to analyze the constitutional question and conclude with an interpretation that would stay true to the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
Facts
Joseph Estrada was elected to the Presidency during the 1998 elections. He did not finish his
term as he was deemed to have resigned from his position during the so called EDSA dos that
occurred in 2001.2 After being restored of his civil and political rights, courtesy of the absolute pardon
given by President Arroyo, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010 Presidential elections
which was questioned by Atty. Pormento. The petition was denied by the Comelec Second Division
on the ground of the constitutional limitation barring re-election being applicable only to incumbent
presidents. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Comelec en banc.
Issue
The main issue is whether Section 4 of Art. VII of the Constitution can be construed to allow
a former president to run for a second term. In the area of statutory construction, the bone of
contention would fall squarely on the proper interpretation of the phrase shall not be eligible for any
re-election.

I.

ESTRADA IS ELIGIBLE FOR RE-ELECTIONS

1David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160, (2006)

2Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15., March 2, 2001
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Section 4, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides the manner on how the President and
the Vice President of the country may be elected. It states that these officials are to be elected by the
direct vote of the people. The ambiguity in the law commences on the second sentence which
provides as to who may not be re-elected. The provision is as follows:
The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six
years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and
shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years
shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.3
A. INTRINSIC AID OF RELATIVE CLAUSES
Applying the principles in statutory construction, a provision must be construed with the aid
of related clauses. In the aforementioned provision, the sentence The President shall not be eligible
for any re-election is followed by No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such
for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. The latter is
related to the former sentence, as it provides boundaries as to when a President cannot be re-elected,
that such President should have served for more than four years. In short, the President shall not be
qualified for re-election if he or she has already served for more than four years in his or her previous
term.
A president is given six years as his or her term. The Constitution provides that the President
cannot be re-elected if he or she has already served the complete term, or served for more than four
years. It was clearly shown that former President Estrada was ousted on his fourth year of service, in
2001. He only served his term from 1998 - 2001, which only consists of less than four years. That
being said, Estrada is eligible for re-election for the Presidency, as he has not served for more than
four years. The provision only sets the boundary for re-election for a service of more than four years.
Ad Proximum Antecendents Fiat Relation Nisi Impediatur Sentential means that relative words
refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise provides. In the case of Mapa v. Arroyo 4,
there was a misplaced application of the doctrine of last antecedence on the part of the petitioner as it
failed to appreciate all the words present to effectively construe the provision. In the case at bar, it
would be more effective if the last two sentences would be construed together as the last sentence
qualifies the previous one. Also, there would be no inconsistencies if it would be construed this way
as the modified sentence would only place limitations on the incumbent holder of the Office of the
President and those who have served for more than four years.
B. INTRINSIC AID OF UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE
DEBEMOS
One of the principles of statutory construction is also Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos
Distinguere Debemos: Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
In the case of Pilar v. COMELEC5, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to
whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every candidate must
PHIL. CONST. art VII, 4
4Mapa v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 78585, July 5, 1989
5 Pilar v. Comelec, G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995
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be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew
his candidacy.
In the case at bar, Section 4, Article 7, the word succeeded does not distinguish whether the
President who succeeded was by vote or by succession. Therefore, there should be no distinction
made between the two circumstances. It must be assumed that both are qualified to be re-elected, so
long as they do not serve for more than four years. Estrada, in this case, served for three years as
President from 1998 to 2001. He ran for the second time in the 2010 Presidential Elections. To
interpret succeeded as by vote or by succession, Estradas 2010 presidential candidacy would have
definitely been valid.
C. INTRINSIC AID OF IN RELATION TO OTHER PROVISIONS
The opposition may contend that the last sentence of Section 4, Article 7 solely pertains to the
successor, which is most likely to be the Vice President. At the time when former President Estrada
was ousted in 2001, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took over Estradas position for the
unexpired term of 4 years. During the 2004 elections, Vice President Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo was
eligible to be elected as President because she only served the unexpired term of 4 years of former
president Estrada.
However, it is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that words or provisions
should not be construed in isolation, but should be interpreted in relation to other provisions of a
statute. In the case of Claudio v. Comelec 6, the Court construed the word recall with the use of the
two sections of the same Code. In the case at bar, the last sentence of Section 4, Article 7, does not
pertain only to the Vice President as a successor but also to any candidate of President or Vice
President.
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term
of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from
office in the same manner as the President.7
To construe it in relation to other provisions of Article 7 of the Constitution, Section 3
provides that the President and the Vice President have the same qualifications, elections, and removal
from office. Because of Section 3, the President and Vice President, as a successor or for election of
President, are eligible to run for Presidency as long as they have only served for not more than 4 years
as President.
II.

ESTRADA IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR RE-ELECTION

During the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, there were numerous debates particularly
on whether or not the President will still be eligible to run for re-election to the same office provided
that it is not the immediate election or if he is permanently barred from any re-election. Thus, in
Proposed Resolution No. 517, it was first incorporated that the president will be disqualified only
from immediate re-election and it was agreed that He shall be disqualified from immediate reelection. It was however amended by the Commission to the provision that is now being followed in
the 1987 Constitution, The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. If the framers
sought to allow any chance of another bid for the Presidency, it would have not included the word
any.
6
7

Claudio v. Comelec, G.R. No. 140560. May 4, 2000

PHIL. CONST. art VII, 3
4

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A. Words construed in their ordinary sense

Using one of the intrinsic aids of construction, the word any should be construed in its
ordinary sense wherein no construction may be made to restrict or enlarge the meaning of the Act.
Hence, using this intrinsic aid and taking from the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission8 it can be shown that the intent of the framers was for the President to be barred not only
from immediate re-election but rather from any kind of re-election. Furthermore, the specific intent
was to ban the President from re-election to the same office but not from running for any office.
Thus, the intent was in order to ensure that the person who assumes the office of the President
realizes that he has only one chance to become a good President, and that one opportunity is enough
to be able to perform his very best. It is also to ensure that the President will not use his vast pow ers
to assure his re-election, in order to prevent the further accumulation of power and this will serve as a
structural safeguard. When the provision was drafted, the framers intended no less that we shall have
but a person, elected by the sovereign people and vested with such mandate, serve a single term of six
years. It is therefore a make or break scenario. When Erap was elected in 1998, on his shoulders were
carrying the peoples trust. Sad to say, he was not able to finish such term, because those gathered at
EDSA in 2001 ousted him from power, aside from the fact that he was deemed resigned by the
Supreme Court in the cases of Estrada v. Arroyo and Estrada v. Desierto.
This can be applied to the case at bar wherein the COMELEC was not correct in dismissing
the petition which questioned the candidacy of Erap for President. This is because the word any
should have been construed in its ordinary sense and should have not enlarged its meaning. According
to the case of Collector v. Manila Lodge 9, there was emphasis on the word business wherein it
embraces an activity or affair where profit is the purpose and livelihood. In this case, Manila Lodge
was clearly not involved in a business since it was a fraternal social club selling liquor in a limited
scale only to its members without the intention to obtain profit.
Furthermore, the word "re-elected" here should be understood in its ordinary, not technical,
meaning. It simply means a person, who once held an office and in this case the president cannot be
elected again to the same office, whether immediately or after a gap. The use of "re" in the word "reelected," means "back" or "again." In other words, when the Constitution says the president shall not
be eligible for any re-election, it simply means that the president cannot be elected again as president,
whether immediately after the end of his term or at any other time. It does not matter whether he is the
incumbent or the past President since the intent of the prohibition was for the President to not be
eligible for any re-election.
The maxim Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos should also be applied to
scrutinize the argument of the Comelec case that allowed Erap to run. Section 4 of Article VII does
not qualify the word President to those holding the office as the incumbent president and those who
had been previously elected and are not serving as President anymore. When the law does not
distinguish, the Courts should not distinguish, rendering the Comelec decision invalid.
i.

Erap failing to complete his full term of presidency

One of the arguments being presented was that Erap was not able to finish his full term as
President due to his resignation. He was only able to sit in office from June 30, 1998 to January 20,
2001. Hence, this was seen to be a reason to allow Erap to run again because he was only able to serve
for less than 4 years. It was stated in the Constitution that, No person who has succeeded as
8 Record of the Constitutional Commision Proceedings and Debates Volume 2 (1986)
9 Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Lodge & CTA, G.R. No. L-11176, June 29, 1959
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President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time. Thus, since Erap only served for less than 4 years then he is still eligible to run
again for the presidency.
However, it was stated that the intent of the framers was for this prohibition to apply to VicePresidents rather than the President. This applies particularly to a situation wherein the President dies
a year or less than two years in office thus the Vice President will become the President. Hence, this
prohibition was placed parallel to the situation wherein the President, after his term expires, can no
longer be allowed to run for re-election. In this case, the Vice President who thereby assumes the
mantle of the President under the situation of death of the President. He or she will be barred from
running again for the Office of the President since he or she has already succeeded as President and
has served for more than four years. It was never the intent of the framers to apply it to the President
since they wanted to put an absolute ban on his re-election as President in order to prevent the
tremendous use of executive powers to be used unfairly in another consecutive campaign for the
Presidency.
B. Context and related clauses
Using another intrinsic aid of construction, Verba Accipienda Sunt Secundum Subjectam
Materiam, statutes are construed with the context in mind. In this case, the prohibition to the Vice
President running again in the situation wherein the President would die was actually put in parallel to
the prohibition of the President not being able to run again for the Presidency again. The clauses were
specifically intended for prohibitions to certain people. Thus, a clause should be construed with other
related clauses in order to determine the legislative intent. Hence, the intent of the framers was for the
Vice President not to be able to run if he has succeeded as President and served for more than 4 years
while for the President, it was a perpetual ban from running again for President. Thus, since there is
an ambiguity in the law, then one must be able to look at the context and the intent on the different
clauses and afterwards, construe them with other related clauses.
In the case of Estrada v. Desierto 10, Estrada did not finish his term as President because of his
voluntary resignation from the said office. Estradas resignation was ruled upon by the Supreme
Court when Estrada filed a petition before the court to clarify his status of leaving the Malacanang in
January 2001. Estrada resigned as president and he cannot feign ignorance of this fact. The Supreme
Court held that the basis that Estrada truly resigned was his letter acknowledging the oath-taking of
then Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. In the said letter, he also thanked his supporters for
their support during the time that he was in office. Furthermore, the ayoko na words of Estrada were
words of resignation, which were considered as another evidence that Estrada had resigned. Estradas
voluntary resignation from the presidency in 2001 cannot be a valid ground to justify another bid for
the same position since according to Section 4 Article VII of the Constitution clearly provides that
voluntary renunciation of the office cannot be considered an interruption in the continuity of the
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Hence, in relation to the prohibition of the Vice President not being able to run again, it
should be construed in relation to Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who succeeded Estrada in January 2001.
However, she was qualified to run for president in 2004 because the remainder of Estradas terms that
she served was less than four years. This prohibition does not apply to Estrada, who was an elected
president and not a successor. Erap did not serve for more than four years but this doesnt mean that
he is still qualified to run for the presidency. The argument that the Arroyo government from 2001 to
2004 was illegitimate because Estrada did not resign does not hold any precedence because it is
10 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15., March 2, 2001

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contrary to the Supreme Court ruling in Estrada v. Desierto. According to the Supreme court, Estrada
abandoned his office and this constitutes resignation.
Conclusion
The 1987 Constitution is the fundamental law that defines the powers and structures of the
system of governance, enacted by the sovereign Filipino people. It is constructed in a manner that is
different from ordinary statutes and laws. In the case at bar, the group unanimously leans towards the
interpretation that Erap is forbidden from running for another Presidential campaign.
Contemporaneous construction by another constitutional body may be used to resolve disputes within
their competencies, but they cannot create ambiguities when the language of the law is clear. The
possible arguments for an interpretation to favor Erap's candidacy are flimsy at best, for they rely only
on grammatical formulation of the provisions and an extensive re-imagination of the words that are
quite plain and explicit in construction.
General words should be construed in their general sense and to further ease any doubts, it
was clearly stated in the Constitutional conventions was that the intent of the framers was to limit the
President to have only one term without any re-election bid. The historical progression of the term
limitations is clear, the new constitution had purposely been made so that the President may focus on
his responsibilities for only one six-year run so that he may be unhampered by the prospect of another
election and that he may perform all the acts necessary for the benefit of the nation, even at the risk of
decreasing his or her popularity and approval with the citizens.
The maxim Interpretatio Talis In Ambiguis Sempre Fienda Est Ut Evitetur Inconveniens Et
Absurdum provides that the Constitution should not be given absurd, impossible, or mischievous
interpretations. The provisions can only be changed through amendments and revisions. The Supreme
Court should have stepped in to prevent such indirect Constitutional amendments that were taken by
Comelec, even if it is an independent Constitutional Commission, as the Courts have the final say on
the proper meaning of the words written in the highest law of the land. The case at bar was not given
such transcendental importance to merit an actual decision, but if the history were to have acted in
Erap's favor during the 2010, we would have been facing a Constitutional crisis that could have been
easily prevented by the Supreme Court. The integrity of the Court would be questioned for such a
post-mortem decision if he was elected and subsequently disqualified. Many would question if the
Supreme Court had gone beyond its judicial function and played in the political game rather than
acting as an impartial protector of the Constitution. Even if the live controversy had ceased to exist,
there should have been guidelines set down by the Court to prevent future misinterpretations and
discord amongst the citizens of the nation.
Obscurities in the Constitution are endemic to the political process. In order for a fullyfunctioning democracy to exist, the ground rules for participation and assumptions of public office
must be delineated with utmost clarity. The Court must apply the law as it is and fulfill its fiat as the
principal arbiter of judicial disputes. Joseph Estrada should have been stopped from even running in
the 2010 elections because he was disrupting the paramountcy of our most cardinal laws. Statutory
construction should be a tool to maintain the rule of law and not an instrument to be used to benefit
interests that are inimical to the established foundation which conserves the very fabric that binds our
nation together.

Bibliography

DIM | GUSTILO | RAYOS | ROQUE | VILLAVICENCIO

Claudio v. COMELEC. No. 140560. 4 May 2000.

Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Lodge & CTA. No. L-11176. 29 June 1959.
David v. Macapagal - Arroyo. No. 171396. 3 May 2006.
Estrada v. Desierto. No. 146710-15. 2 March 2001.
Mapa v. Arroyo. No. 78585. 5 July 1989.
Pilar v. Comelec. No. 115245. 11 July 1995.
Record of the Constitutional Commision Proceedings and Debates Volume 2. 1986, n.d.