India-US Defence Cooperation: Expectations and Prospects

Author(s): Verghese Koithara

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 32 (Aug. 6-12, 2005), pp. 3585-3589
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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without highlighting its ugly character.

The kind of relationship that the Indian
government should be seeking with the

1 In return for the US trying to ease the way for

routine, and functional. As a democracy,

formal courtesies of language at the diplomatic state-to-state level can accompany
complete freedom of criticism outside it.
Finally, what is the vision that this Left
has for its kind of India? In particular, if
this Left opposes as it does and must do,
this kind of defence framework agree-

territorial boundaries. The other is to tie

'overload' will be for China to make more

missiles, more warheads on each missile and

bigger megatonnage of warheads so that the
impact would be greater if any to get through

de facto as a "responsible nuclear power"

the US defence shield. So to counter China's

enhanced capacities for a potential first-strike

powers in the existing club of five (who are also

on India. the latter will have to increase its

de jure nuclear powers) India is committing

missile and warhead strength thereby pushing

Pakistan to do the same.
strategic cooperation that signal a definitive
end to any idea that India will either stand up 3 See the excellent study of different intellectual
currents in Chiia today by Wang Chaohua, One
to the US's basic global ambitions (indeed it
Chinla Many Paths, Verso, London, 2004.
is committing itself to be a junior partner in

itself to various forms and schemes of political-

have for the nature of India's military

power? Does the Left want to chase the

ordinated by others? There are two directions that military preparations of a state,
big, medium-sized or small, can take. One
is to insist that the level of military preparations must be sufficient to protect one's

on effects elsewhere. One way of forcing an

alongside other so-called responsible nuclear

ment, then what perspective does the Left

it is not just the usual code phrase of

Realist inspiration for trying to make
oneself a regional or global bully and to
play what Realism considers the eternal
game of states dominating or being sub-

'overload' this defence system will have knock-

the further expansion of the Indian civilian

nuclear energy programme, India will have
to separate the programme into its civilian
and military parts and put the former under
international safeguards. To now be accepted

US is not strategic nor friendly but formal,

chimera of India becoming a 'major world

power'? What is this supposed to mean if

dominance". It is specifically directed against

Russia and China and in forcing the latter to
move towards the development of capacities to

Notes

promoting this project) or that it will attempt

4 A Gopalkrishnan's article ("Indo-US Nuclear

any serious role in promoting global nuclear

Cooperation: A Non-starter?" in EPW, July 2,

2005 issue) is inspired by a nationalist deter-

2 The BMD-TMDs are an integrated programme

aiming to provide the US with the capacity to
destroy 'enemy' nuclear missiles in all three

nuclear energy to become dependent on the US.

disarmament.

phases of its flight pattern (boost, in space, and

on re-entry) and which in conjunction with its

offensive nuclear capacities can promise the

US an altogether new kind of "full-spectrum

mination not to allow the country's civilian

It does not address the fundamental issues in the

case against nuclear energy production, nor does

it aim to provide the kind of critical and compre-

hensive historical account of the Indian civilian

programme that the public needs to have.

India-US Defence Cooperation

Expectations and Prospects

the notion of military-national security to

The dramatic upturn in India-US relations that, as many predict,

the notion of power projection well beyond one's territorial boundaries. In thewill follow from the establishment of strategic relations and its

latter case, there is no end to the supposed

subset, defence cooperation, is improbable. The US wants more
needs of power projection. It is this perthan the limited partnership India once had with the erstwhile
spective that dominates the thinking of
Soviet
Union but India's national interests and domestic politics
countries like the US, Russia, China and

are unlikely to permit that. Moreover, serious practical

exist in boosting ties beyond a point - at nuclear,
dominates the thinking of countries problems
like
Britain and Israel but not Vietnam and
defence-industrial and military levels.
India but not Brazil or South Africa. It

Sweden. There is thus an inescapable

VERGHESE KOITHARA
normative dimension to strategic political
thinking and ambitions. The vision of the

that "the US will need India more to sustain

its pre-eminence than India would need the

world that progressives want is tied to their
m T he New Framework for US-IndiaUS to keep (sic) its ranking in international
vision of the potential for good that huDefence Relations signed on June
hierarchy" (thereby positing that India will
mans have. It is not the least a coincidence
28, 2005 by the defence ministers
have equal leverage within the relationthat subscribers to economic neo-liberalof both countries and the joint statement
ship), and that "most countries, which rose

ism are usually subscribers to conventional

issued by the two heads of government on
to be world powers, did so only by dependrealist thinking in the field of international
July 19, 2005 have been seen by many as
ing initially on another".

relations. In both cases there lies a deeply

having transformed fundamentally the This piece argues that India-US relations
inadequate understanding of the character,
strategic and defence relationships between
shall no doubt strengthen on the basis of
motivations and potentials of human bethe two countries. The majority of India's
economic and political fundamentals, but
ings. For the first credo, humans are markedstrategic community, which sees the joint
any dramatic upturn in strategic relations,

above all by the will to consume. In the

statement as freeing India from NPT/NSG/
and its subset defence co-operation, as is
second credo, humans are marked above MTCR constraints are euphoric whilebeing
a
predicted by many, is improbable.

small number, concerned about the

The US wants more than the limited
all by the will to power. This may well be
country's strategic and technologicalpartnership
auIndia once had with the Soviet
of neoliberals and realists. But how forUnion but India's national interests and
tonomy, are dismayed.
tunate we are that there remain so many The former believes that we are making
domestic politics are unlikely to permit

an accurate characterisation of the nature

humans who are neither so morally debased an historic strategic alignment with thethat.
US Moreover, serious practical problems

nor so intellectually impoverished. [I3

that should stand us well during theexist

de- in boosting ties beyond a point - at

Email: pamela@del3.vsnl.net.in

cades of US supremacy that they see ahead.

nuclear, defence-industrial and military
levels.
It is argued by an eminent strategic thinker

Economic and Political Weekly August 6, 2005 3585

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The post-1962 military assistance relationship between India and the US was
short and soon unravelled. but the threads

were picked up again in 1985 when the

two signed an MOU on Defence Technology Co-operation. India's hesitant economic liberalisation and the easing of the
cold war made this possible. In 1983 India
initiated three ambitious defence projects
- Integrated Guided Missile Development
Project (IGMDP). Light Combat Aircraft

as other such states" and that the US

Pakistan) was seen as needing to be accommodated, not isolated.
president "would also seek agreement from
Congress to adjust US laws and policies,
Although Clinton had resolved post-test
and the United States would work with
tensions and had supported India strongly
on Kargil and terrorism, the Indian strafriends and allies to adjust international

to enable full nuclear energy

tegic community cheered Bush's arrival regimes
in
cooperation and trade with India."
Washington in January 2001. The reasons
were largely two- Bush's disdain for NPT,
a serious fetter on India, and his clear

Squaring the Nuclear Circle

desire to contain China. Bush's opposition

to CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-off TreatyOn the face of it, the joint statement

(FMCT) benefited India and so did his

constituted a huge triumph for India in
non-proliferation thinking that classifiednuclear and foreign policy fields. If the
Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) needed help with countries as 'responsible' and 'irrespon-statement, which makes India a de facto
all three. For good reasons India went forsible'. No wonder India jumped and sup-NWS (Nuclear Weapon State as defined
ported Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) inin NPT), is translated into action, not only
western rather than Soviet help.
Assistance fiom several sources includMay 2001, despite Russia, China and mostwill India's civilian nuclear industry esNATO countries voicing their opposition. cape its current stagnation but India's
ing US AirForce laboratories and the supply
of General Electric F404-GE engines Three major US policy statements re-defence industry, including its nuclear and
leased in 2002 - Nuclear Posture Review
missile sectors, will receive a big boost.
helped the LCA fly. Help for MBT came
India's
in
separation of its nuclear weapon
mainly from western Europe. In the casein January. National Security Strategy

(LCA) and Main Battle Tank (MBT). The

of IGMDP, while two of its five missiles September and Strategy to Combat WMD
programme could ensure not only its own
(nuclear capable Prithvi and Agni) werein December- were judged as compatible
release from quarantine but also that of the
with, if not in furtherance of Indian interests.
beyond the possibility of securing outside
missile progralmme. This, in turn, could
In February 2002, the US cleared the sale
help, three others (anti-aircraft Trishul and
lower technology transfer barriers considAkash, and anti-tank Nag) were not. Thisof eight Raytheon counter-battery radars,
erably in other defence fields.
period also saw a slow enhancement ofthe first US-India arms deal in four deBut can the Bush administration square
the NPT circle for India? The US-India
military-to-military relationship, particucades. Equally important, the US supported
larly with the US Pacific Command. the sale of several advanced Israeli weapon
nuclear cooperation project calls for considerable domestic and international efIndia's sweeping economic liberalisationsystems including Phalcon mini-AWACS.
in the early 1990s and the collapse of the
India and the US signed a General Security
forts on the part of US administration.
of Military Information Agreement
Soviet Union paved the way for the January
Domestically there is the need to modify
1995 US-India 'Agreed Minutes of Defence
(GOSMIA) in August 2002 and a US-Indiathe 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act
Relations'. Through the constitution of a

High Technology Co-operation Group

and change entrenched policies and

(HTCG) was constituted in November 2002. mindsets across several agencies. Today
Defence Policy Group and a Joint Technology Group this agreement raised ties toDuring
a
spring-summer 2003 the USIndia enjoys considerable support within
markedly higher level. Structured strategic
exerted considerable pressure on India the
to US congress, but how this body will
consultations began, and cooperationprovide
in
a contingent of troops in Iraq. The
act when it comes to changing major
legislation, crafted after long consensustechnology as well as in training and
Indian security establishment was largely
exercises got a boost. A setback occurred
in favour, but the idea was politically
building, remains to be seen.

three years later because of India's May

scuttled by a parliamentary resolution. Internationally, the obstacles are greater.
1998 nuclear tests, but the US accepted the
Meanwhile, HTCG provided a forum to
The NPT is already under strain, as was
new reality very quickly. Some sanctions
discuss high technology transfers in defence
seen during the recently concluded review
were lifted within months and in October
conference, with the US accused of seekand dual-use areas. Building on HTCG,
1999 the US Congress authorised the then
the Next Steps in Strategic Co-operation
ing to change earlier bargains to its advanClinton administration to waive, at the
(NSSP) were announced in January 2004.
tage. Seeking to change the NPT in a major
latter's discretion, all nuclear related sanc-The four-element NSSP envisaged coopway, which is what the July 19 joint statetions against India and Pakistan.
eration in civilian nuclear energy, space
ment calls for, can open a can of worms.
It is true that countries like Russia and
The speed with which the US came and
to hi-tech commerce (including defence)
France which have an interest in nuclear
and a dialogue on missile defence.
terms with overtly nuclear India had good
reasons. India's steadfast refusal to signOn March 25, 2005 a senior US officialreactor sales would go along with amendsaid that the US viewed south Asia as
NPT since 1968, possession of nuclear

ments that serve that purpose. But it is

"vital to the future of the US" and that the

weapons for several years and the refusal
doubtful if many others would agree.
to sign CTBT despite intense pressure had
There are other concerns too. Many
US wanted to help "India become a major
rendered the 'cap. rollback, eliminate' stance
world power in the 21st century". Thiscountries
set
including China may not agree
the stage for the June 28, 2005 defence
wholly sterile. The US's long acceptance
to the idea of NPT. IAEA and NSG treating
of Israel's nuclear weapons and the shift
agreement and the July 19. 2005 heads of
India and Pakistan differently. On the other
hand. if Pakistan comes in. there will be
government joint statement. The latter
in emphasis in US non-proliferation thinking from NPT to counter-proliferation,
stated that "as a responsible state with
serious proliferation worries. There will
because of unipolar circumstances, were
advanced nuclear technology India should also be concern that if NSG (and MTCR)
other reasons. India (and to some extent
acquire the same benefits and advantages guidelines are bent, then countries like

3586 Economic and Political Weekly August 6, 2005

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China and Russia may exploit them for

their own strategic and commercial advan-

tage. Moreover, while the Bush regime

may have a cavalier attitude towards NPT,

most other countries and indeed many

influential quarters within the US consider

a strong NPT vital to contain WMD risk.

India too will face difficulties in keeping
to its end of the bargain. Splitting civilian
and military nuclear facilities will not be

easy. If India designates large chunks of

reactor and reprocessing plant as military,
they cannot feed into the power generation

programme thereby hurting the latter's

economic viability. If it designates too little

there may not be adequate fissile material

for an uncapped weapon programme.

Dividing R&D capabilities will be difficult too, considering that India has major

tasks ahead including weapon develop-

possible, elbowing out the Russians and and

the Israel have been good, but in both
cases there have been special underlying
French particularly. What they want to sell
relationships and also true burden sharing.
most are complete systems like F-16, F-18,
C-130 and P-3C aircraft. Because of far
The experience of Japan, though techno-

logically advanced, has not been good.

bigger production runs. US companies can
sell such systems. especially multi-decadeJapanese output from joint R&D has inold ones like those cited above, that are also
variably proved expensive. Viewed objectively, it is doubtful whether India-US joint
cheaper than west European systems. On the

R&D can give a great boost to indigenous

other hand, new sub systems, which add
equipping. India's non-strategic R&D
considerably to weapon potency will cost
record, exemplified by LCA, MBT, Trishul,
disproportionately more from the US and
Akash and Nag, does not engender concan also get mired in protracted clearance
fidence that it can take significant advantangles. This is also true of 'current' major
tage of technology partnerships.
systems like PAC-3 Patriot missiles.
US defence firms do relatively little co- There is also the fact that Indian armed
forces cannot be equipped on the US pattern.
production. Indians, who are accustomed
The US defence budget is 23 times the size
to progressively expanding local content
of India's and its equipment budget over 50
in major weapon deals with Russians and
times as big. This has clear equipping impliwest Europeans, will find the US harder
cations. Moreover, the operational requireto bend. US firms, in turn, will find dealing

ments and resultant hardware demands of the

with the Indian public sector, which has
a
near
monopoly
of
Indian
defence
protwo countries vary considerably. Spending
development and thorium exploitation.
duction, arduous work. Despite much talk.
money on things like BMD is affordable to
the US and Japan, but not to India, especially
there
is
little
likelihood
of
Indian
private
Defence Industrial Cooperation
since India cannot make technological gains
companies entering the defence sector in
relevant to its needs through such spending.
The June 28, 2005 agreement states that a big way. Structural barriers are consid"The United States and India will work to
The road towards defence industrial coerable both to their entry and to making
conclude defence transactions. not solelyattractive enough profits.
operation between the two countries is thus
as ends in and of themselves, but as a
more arduous than many imagine.
While the production sector of Indiali
means to strengthen our countries' security.
defence industry will be happy with a
reinforce our strategic partnership, achieve
reasonable amount of local production, the
Military Cooperation
DRDO's sights are set higher. It wants
greater interaction between our armed

ment. uranium enrichment, fast breeder

forces, and build greater understanding

transfer of high-end technology and sale

between our defence establishments". It

The June 28 agreement states that the

of sub systems and components that would two countries shall "conduct joint and
talks of increasing "opportunities for techenable it to produce its own major weaponcombined exercises and exchanges" and

nology transfer, collaboration, co-producsystems. But here US companies and the US also "collaborate in multinational operation, and research and development",
government, for commercial and security tions when it is in their common interest".
establishes a joint Defence Procurement
reasons, are likely to be even less forth-On the face of it, the cooperative ideas
and Production Group to "oversee defence
coming than the Russians and west Euro- spelt in the document commits India less
trade as well as prospects for co-producpeans. A BrahMos type joint development in the military field than in the defence
tion and technology collaboration". and
and production deal is difficult to conceiveindustrial one. But when both political and
promises to "expand collaboration relatwith the Americans. It is likely that techno- military leaderships are enthusiastic about
ing to missile defence".
logies that are approaching shelf life will military collaboration, which is the case
The key idea here is that each defence
be passed on, but that will be little help.today in both countries, the process can
transaction is to be looked at not only fromIt is crucial to recognise that technologi- gain momentum beyond what words can
the angle of its intrinsic worth but also from
cal superit)rity is the foundational basis ofindicate. It is worth noting that the military
the angle of its contribution to strengthUS military power and therefore technol- ties envisaged are unprecedented for India.
ening the strategic partnership between the
ogy control is a cornerstone of US defenceThe country's defence relationship with
two countries. This has major implications
policy. The US guards defence technology the Soviet Union had been confined to
for India, as the beneficiary of this logic will
tighter than any other country. A plethora equipment and technology; it had no
be the seller which is the US. It will be
of agencies in the US state. commerce and 'military' content. We are now entering
argued that mutual privileging will help
defence departments come into play on uncharted waters with the US.
India too by paving the way for easier
each transaction, be it a major system or With a military geared to operate in
technology transfer. But to judge if this
a sub system. Agreements like GOSMIA every part of the globe, the US has interests
('access to technology' matching 'purchase
that India signed in August 2002 play onlyin developing military-to-military ties with
of material') would happen it is important
a minor role. Political relations of the day as many countries as possible. The US has
to look at the scope that there exists for each.
as well as long-term confidence in alliance such ties, of varying intensity, with about
The US wants military sales to promote
integrity influence each clearance.
150 countries. India is particularly attracAs for joint R&D. there are few coun- tive because of its size and potential, the
inter-operability and garner commercial

benefits. US firms are very keen to gaintries

as with which US has established such

competence and infrastructure of its milibig a share of India's defence market aspartnerships. The experiences of Britaintary, and its geographic position within

Economic and Political Weekly August 6, 2005 3587

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Asia and relative to the Indian Ocean.

India understands this and has assessed

ground support for its aircraft worldwide. cooperation. At the same time, military
India's geographic position and excellentaction in this context, except when integral

that military cooperation will secure for air

it force infrastructure make such support to intelligence operations, is not seen as

especially valuable. To avail of this thereimportant as it once was.

valuable US support in political, economic
is no need for a big US footprint. Appro- It is the last two items in the common
and technological domains.
priately positioned ground equipment, interest list - regional security and Asian
'Training and exercises' is an omnibus

partly under Indian control, and some power balance - that have a serious strategic
term that conceals within it a wide spectrum

dimension. India has always wanted to,

liaison staff would be enough.
of collaboration possibilities and military
closeness. India and the US have a trainingIt is in the intelligence field that military and some in the US now want India to,
can cruise ahead comfortably manage south Asian stability without exterassociation that goes back over halfco-operation
a
without much political fallout. Today, nal interference. The US position is not a
century and an exercise one that stretches
over two decades. But now India has moved
India's intelligence targeting spectrum hasnew development. From about 1985 (when
up several notches. Some development of a large overlap with the US's. The latter's it became evident in Sri Lanka) the US has
combined operations doctrine is inevitable. exceptional satellite and aircraft based not tried to undercut India in south Asia.

In the inter-operability field, communica- capabilities in reconnaissance and signal/But the US has also not been able to help
India solve its core problem in south Asia,
tion compatibility could be followed by electronic intelligence fields can be valuwhich is Pakistan. The latter's nuclear weaco-ordination of C&C systems and some able to India. India's human intelligence
pons have not made it coercion-proof, but
assets
and
ground
support
resources
can
sensor interfacing. By developing an inhas raised the coercion threshold not just
frastructure for co-operation. these steps be very useful to the US in turn.

will create combined operation possibilities

forIndia but also forthe US. Crafting a viable

that do not exist today. The Indian military Interests and Calculations

joint approach towards Pakistan, with a

thoughtful carrot-stick mix, is the crucial

regional challenge facing both countries.
Common interests underpin all strategic
Asian power balance is now the code
Fears of intelligence penetration, or more partnerships. In the US-India context these
pro- for managing China. The US straaccurately of its consequences, have abated. include economic relations, democracyphrase

is attracted by the opportunity to get exposed

to, and later acquiring, superior equipment.

Collaboration is easiest between navies

tegic community is acutely sensitive to

motion, energy, terrorism, non-proliferation,

and it is here that US-India exercises first

China's
regional security and Asian power
bal- rise and the difficulties in engag-

started. While the potency of US ships, sub-ance. Economic relations is an arena where
ing that country economically and conmarines and naval aircraft has not declined,there is great scope for mutually beneficial fronting it politically. The position of US

their numbers have. Today, the US canexpansion. But economic vibrancy betweenas the dominant Asian power is under
certainly do with Indian help in keepingfree-market democracies does not need to
growing threat. With Japan in relative
track of happenings in the Indian Ocean.be propped up by strategic partnerships.
decline and South Korea's dependability
Indian ports would also be useful to USAnd promotion of democracy, while unin question, the US wants to increase India's
ships for R&R and logistics stops. Indiandoubtedly valuable, hardly lends itself toweight in the Asian power balance. Views
Ocean and its approaches are crucial arenasbe pursued as a joint project.
such as Washington must "not only acquifor the US-initiated Proliferation Security Energy is of vital interest to both counesce but support the active development
Initiative, intended to intercept WMD ship- tries. There is a scramble today to build
of India's strategic deterrent" and that
ments at sea. There is a good chance of India gas and oil pipelines, not only to achieve
"India's nuclear weapons at some point
could become an asset to the United States"
joining the current 11-member group.
cheaper transportation but also to create
It is the combat-toughened Indian Armystrategically advantageous pathways of
do not reflect broad US strategic thinking,
that Pentagon is eyeing keenly today, flow. Interests of countries, except ofbecause the military help that the US would
need in the future is not at the nuclear level.
although army operations are more politi-neighbours, are unlikely to coincide here.
cally sensitive than those at sea. The USNuclear electricity generation, as a propor-On the other hand, the US desire to see
army, marine corps and the national guardtion of total energy generation, has beenan economically and politically stronger
are all painfully stretched and desperatelyflat or declining in most countries for two
India is palpably obvious.
in need of supportive boots-on-ground. decades and more. Higher petroleum prices The security establishments of India and
Pentagon is still hopeful of getting the Indian and climate change fears are unlikely to the US share a largely common view of
army into Iraq and is looking for a combi-reverse this soon. Technological breakChina today, but this is unlikely to last
nation of UN cover and pacified areas throughs in cost reduction, plant safety and long. India's problems with China are
to make it possible. Peacekeeping, peace spent fuel disposal are still distant. Econo- not structural. Growing power and selfenforcement and combat operations nowmically decisive India-US cooperation in confidence will gradually open many
overlap considerably, and India and the USthe nuclearenergy field is not on the horizon. options for India relative to China. While
could find themselves moving across a large, India and the US have a vital interest in
India badly needs US political support in
politically problematic operational spectrum.combating terrorism and WMD prolifera-the current unipolar phase, it cannot afford
Airlift capabilities of the Indian Air Force,tion, and given Pakistan's involvement in to get locked into a 'follow-the-US' line
both fixed and rotary wing, are useful toboth activities, the two countries have
vis-a-vis China or any other country. A
the US. although Indian capabilities are considerable scope for cooperation.
distinguished south Asian observer recently
not very strong in this field and groundIntelligence is now the key issue in this
commented, "They (Indians) will ride our
logistics largely incompatible. Purchasesstruggle. Raising its quality and actionbus to the point where they think they can
of US aircraft could change this over acycle speed has become critical and so
ride their own bus". Very true, but equally
period. Pentagon is very keen to ensure has the need for much closer international
true would be the observation that the US

3588 Economic and Political Weekly August 6. 2005

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would let India ride its bus only so long

as India remains a compliant passenger.

Prospects
Many in the two security communities
perceive a window of opportunity today to

forge a lasting US-India strategic partnership. The paralleling of a US desire to bind

India quickly on its side vis-a-vis China and
an Indian desire to use US's current omnipo-

More specifically, there are serious prac-

tical difficulties in forging the kind of

defence-industrial and military relationships that are being talked about, and in
squaring the nuclear circle. What took
place recently in Washington, despite the
spin and the hype, is no more than an
expression of intent. It now has to be
fleshed out at many levels and in many
dimensions, a process that could stretch
over several years. Both sides have taken
on commitments, parts of which will be
difficult to deliver when internal equa-

temporal sequence. In brief remarks at

Vientiane, India's minister of state for
external affairs, Rao Inderjit Singh, claimed

that the incipient partnership of AsiaPacific nations would "develop and transfer cleaner, more efficient technologies to
meet not only...individual national pollu-

tion reduction targets but also...energy

security needs". A particularly far-sighted
feature of the partnership, in his estimation, was its emphasis on "nano-technolo-

monocular view. India and the US are choppy

tions change and external conditions alter.

democracies containing a multiplicity of

powerful interests and points of view. A
dispassionate analysis of the socio-political
makeup of the two countries would show

The agreements will not get rolled back

gies, advanced biotechnology, (and) next

generation nuclear fission and fusion".
The junior Indian minister's statements
are part non sequitur, since three of the

because they are elastic and caveated

nations involved in the 'Vision Statement'

tence as a ladder to move up globally is seen

as having created this window. This is a

enough to make that unnecessary. But

- China, India and South Korea - have no

that while there is plenty of common ground

what is being visualised and what will get

operationalised are likely to prove some-

targets" under the Kyoto protocol. Through

to support a strong politico-economic rela-

what different. [

tionship there is not enough to sustain a

strategic one centred on security interests.

binding "national pollution reduction

the arduous negotiations leading to the
treaty, the developing countries as a group

Email: koithara@sancharnet.in

managed to resist the demand that they

should accept firm commitments to reduce

Partnership and Its

Discontents

emissions of greenhouse gas pollutants.

This was a negotiating posture grounded
equally in the fact that developing countries were in per capita terms, insignificant

contributors to the global pollution load,

and the belief that their technological
options should not be curbed by environmental standards more appropriate to the

India is now being asked to choose between a course offinn commitment industrialised

to US geopolitical interests and a policy of multi-alignment that

safeguards the country's vital interests in diverse situations

countries that had created

the problem in the first place. But a diplomatic offensive by the US in particular,
demanding the 'meaningful participation'
defence minister Pranab Mukherjee's visitof developing countries, played a signifi-

SUKUMAR MURALIDHARAN

he intensive diplomatic engage-

to Washington, DC, which began with cant part in ensuring that the binding targets
modest expectations and ended with a agreed at Kyoto were rather modest. Even

ments between India and the US,

'framework agreement' on defence coop- so, the US after initially signing on, chose
beginning end-June and stretching eration over the next decade. It peakedto walk out of the Kyoto protocol in the
out over exactly a month, could be viewed mid-July, with prime minister Manmohancompany of Australia. And bringing up a

as the consummation of a process begun Singh's visit to the US capital when he third range of interests in this unlikely
many years before. 'Transformation' was issued a joint declaration with president 'Asia-Pacific partnership' is Japan,
the term of art applied to the process, a George Bush that seemingly injected India which accepted the binding commitments

term consecrated by the US embassy in

Delhi early last year, just ahead of the
general elections that the National Democratic Alliance, led by the right-wing
Bharatiya Janata Party, was expected to
win in a canter. In the event, it was the
left-oriented United Progressive Alliance
that came to power, led by the more centrist

into the exclusive orbit of recognised of Kyoto and has shown little reserve since
nuclear weapons states. Though it involvedabout implementing them.
relatively minor players and occurred on Specific details about the deal remain
the periphery of public attention, India's sketchy. Explanations offered by US deputy
accession at the end of July to a plurilateral secretary of state Robert Zoellick and
deal on climate change was also integrally Australian foreign minister Alexander
part of the cycle. Brokered by the US andDowner, have in no way cleared the conAustralia - two recalcitrant elements in the fusion. The 'Vision Statement' offers no

Congress. But all assurances that the di- context of the Kyoto Protocol on climate targets on reducing emissions and only
rection of foreign policy set by the NDA change - the deal also involves China, holds out a vague assurance to bring to-

would be reviewed have proved mere South Korea and Japan. It involves no gether all participants in a 'nonbinding
verbiage. The strategic alliance with the binding agreements and is provisionallycompact' that will function on the prinUS, which was a matter of moods and
titled a 'vision statement' uniting the sig-ciples of consensus and cooperation. Far
attitudes during the NDA regime, hasnatories
in
in a 'partnership for clean devel-from curbing growth, the partnership would
the dramatic space of one month, acquired
opment and climate'.
seek its enhancement through advanced
substance and form under its successor
The three events spread over a month technologies. The deal is portrayed by its
The cycle was set underway with are strongly interlinked in logical and authors as an effort to complement the

Economic and Political Weekly August 6, 2005 3589

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