People V Vera

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PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME065
[No.45685.November16,1937]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE
HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad interim of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG,
respondents.
1. PROBATION AUTHORITY OF PROBATION COURT TO
LOOK INTO CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENSE SUPERIOR
ANDINFERIORCOURTSLEGALRELATIONANDETHICAL
STANDARD.Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a
probation court hearing a probation case may look into the
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does
not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusions of the
Supreme Court, either directly or indirectly, especially where from
its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs,
averments, and pleadings of the parties. As observed in Shioji vs.
Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent
cases," if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilegeofoverrulingdecisionsoftheSupremeCourt,therewould
be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A
becomingmodestyofinferiorcourtsdemandsconsciousrealization
ofthepositionthattheyoccupyintheinterrelationandoperationof
theintegratedjudicialsystemofthenation.
2. CONSTITUTIONALLAW THE PRESIDENT AND HIS VETO
POWER PRESIDENT'S VETO NOT BINDING ON THE
SUPREMECOURT.Invetoingabill,thePresidentmayexpress
the reasons which he may deem proper, but his reasons are not
binding upon the Supreme Court in the determination of actual
controversiessubmittedtoitfordetermination.Whetherornotthe
Executiveshouldexpressorinanymannerinsinuatehisopinionon
amatterencompassedwithinhisconstitutionalpowerofveto
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but which happens to be at the same time pending determination

before the Supreme Court is a question of propriety for him
exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed
by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway the
judgmentofthecourtonewayoranotherandpreventitfromtaking
whatinitsopinionisthepropercourseofactiontotakeinagiven
case.
3. ID. INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.If it is ever
necessary to make any vehement affirmance during this formative
periodofourpoliticalhistory,itisthatthejudiciaryisindependent
of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our
governmentindependent in the performance of its functions,
undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to
popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of its
sworndutyasitseesitandunderstandsit.
4. ID. WHEN CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED.The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined
by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented
inappropriatecasesandisnecessarytoadeterminationofthecase
i. e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented.
5. ID. ID. RESORT TO EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL
REMEDIES ADJUDICATED CASES.The question of the
constitutionality of an Act of the legislature is frequently raised in
ordinaryactions.Nevertheless,resortmaybemadetoextraordinary
legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary
courseoflaw,evenifavailable,arenotplain,speedyandadequate.
Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42 Phil., 818), the
Supreme Court held that the question of the constitutionality of a
statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings
(see also 12 C. }., p. 783) and in Government of the Philippine
Islandsvs.Springer([1927],50Phil.,259,affirmedinSpringervs.
Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U. S., 189 72
Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an" action of., quo warranto brought in the
nameoftheGovernmentofthePhilippines.Ithasalsobeen.held
"that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas
corpus proceedings (12 C. 3., p. 783 Bailey on Habeas Corpus,
Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary
on an application for injunction to restrain action under the
challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56
Phil., 234) and even on an application for preliminary injunction
where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary
toadecisionofthecase.(12C.J.,p.783.)Thesamemaybesaid
asregardsprohibitionandcertiorari.(Yu
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Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385 [1926], 271 U. S.,
500 70 Law. ed., 1059 Bell vs. First Judicial District Court
[1905],28Nev.,28081Pac.,875113A.S.R.,8546Ann.Cas.,
9821L,R.A.[N.S.],843,andcasescited.)
6. ID. ID. ID. PROHIBITION RULE WHERE
JURISDICTION is EXCLUSIVELY DERIVED FROM
UNCONSTITUTIONALSTATUTE.Thewritofprohibitionisan
extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of
preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with
which it is not legally vested. The general rule, although there is a
conflictinthecases,isthatthewritofprohibitionwillnotliewhere
the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the
constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases the
inferior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the
constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to
review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily
has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of
prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its
jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be
preventedbythewritofprohibitionfromenforcingthatstatute.
7. ID. ID. ID. ID. ID. COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE
LIMITED JURISDICTION IN PROBATION CASES.A Court
of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of
limitedjurisdiction.Itsjurisdictioninsuchproceedingsisconferred
exclusivelybyActNo.4221ofthePhilippineLegislature.
8. ID.ID. CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST BE RAISED AT THE
EARLIESTOPPORTUNITYEXCEPTIONS.Asageneralrule,
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity,sothatifnotraisedbythepleadings,ordinarilyitmay
beraisedatthetrial,andifnotraisedinthetrialcourt,itwillnotbe
considered on appeal. But the general rule admits of exceptions.
Courts,intheexerciseofsounddiscretion,maydeterminethetime
whenaquestionaffectingtheconstitutionalityofastatuteshouldbe
presented. Thus, in. criminal cases, although there is a very sharp
conflictofauthorities,itissaidthatthequestionmayberaisedfor
thefirsttimeatanystageoftheproceedings,eitherinthetrialcourt
oronappeal.Evenincivilcases,ithasbeenheldthatitistheduty
of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for
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the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the

questionisnecessarytoadecisionofthecase.Andithasbeenheld
that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate
court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court
below.
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9. ID. ID. PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF

PARTY RIGHT AND INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINESTOCHALLENGECONSTITUTIONALITY.The
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes
withoutsayingthatifActNo.4221reallyviolatestheConstitution,
the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought,hasasubstantialinterestinhavingitsetaside.Ofgreater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
fundsisthemortalwoundinflicteduponthefundamentallawbythe
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that
'thestatecanchallengethevalidityofitsownlaws.
10. ID. ID. RELIANCE ON PROBATION ACT BY FISCAL
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE
PEOPLE.The mere fact that. the Probation Act has been
repeatedly relied upon in the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the
contrary,hasbeenimpliedlyregardedbyhimasconstitutional,isno
reasonforconsideringthePeopleofthePhilippinesestoppedfrom
nowassailingitsvalidity.Forcourtswillpassuponaconstitutional
question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised
beforeisnotavalidreasonforrefusingtoallowittoberaisedlater.
Thefiscalandallothersarejustifiedinrelyinguponthestatuteand
treatingitasvaliduntilitisheldvoidbythecourtsinpropercases.
11. ID.
ID.
WHEN
DETERMINATION
OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY NECESSARY WAIVER IF CASE
CANBEDECIDEDONOTHERPOINTS.Whilethecourtwill
meet the question with firmness, where its decision is
indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and a just respect for the
legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it
arises,canbedecidedonotherpoints.(ExparteRandolph[1833],
20 F. Cas. No 11,558 2 Brock., 447, Vide, also Hoover vs.Wood
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[1857],9Ind.,286,287.)Ithasbeenheldthatthedeterminationof
aconstitutionalquestionisnecessarywheneveritisessentialtothe
decisionofthecase,aswheretherightofapartyisfoundedsolely
onastatutethevalidityofwhichisattacked.(12C.J.,p.782.)
12. ID.ID. ID. REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFYING
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY.The Supreme Court will take
cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to
ourstatutebooksanditsvalidityhasneverbeforebeenpassedupon
bythe
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courts that many persons accused and convicted of crime in the

City of Manila have applied for probation that some of them are
alreadyonprobationthatmorepeoplewilllikelytakeadvantageof
the Probation Act in the future and that the respondent M. C. U,
has been at large for a period of about four years since his first
conviction.Allawaitthedecisionofthiscourtontheconstitutional
question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant
case has assumed and to prevent muItiplicity of suits, strong
reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act
No.4221benowresolved.
13. ID. THE JUDICIARY ITS DUTY TO ENFORCE THE
CONSTITUTION.UnderadoctrinepeculiarlyAmerican,itisthe
office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. The
Supreme.Court,byclearimplicationfromtheprovisionsofsection
2,subsection1,andsection10,ofArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,
may declare an act of the National Legislature invalid because in
conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from its sworn
duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not
hesitatetogiveeffecttothesupremelawbysettingasideastatute
inconflicttherewith.Thisisoftheessenceofjudicialduty.
14. ID.ID.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRESUMPTION IN
FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALITY RATIONALE OF
PRESUMPTION.All reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional
limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests
notonthecourtsalonebutonthelegislatureaswell."Thequestion
ofthevalidityofeverystatuteisfirstdeterminedbythelegislative
departmentofthegovernmentitself."(U.S.vs.TenYu[1912],24
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Phil.,1,10Casevs.BoardofHealthandHeiser[1913],24Phil.,
250,276U.S.vs.Joson[1913],26Phil.,1.)Andastatutefinally
comesbeforethecourtssustainedbythesanctionoftheexecutive.
ThemembersoftheLegislatureandtheChiefExecutivehavetaken
an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that
theyhavebeentruetothisoathandthatinenactingandsanctioning
a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution.
Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the
judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through
an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows
that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitutionexceptinclearcases.
15. ID. THE PARDONING POWER UNDER THE JONES LAW
ANDTHECON
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STITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.Section 21 of the Jones

Law,inforceatthetimeoftheapprovalofActNo.4221,vestsin
the GovernorGerieral of the Philippines "the exclusive power to
grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures." This
power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. The
provisionsoftheJonesLawandtheConstitutionofthePhilippines
differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the
JonesLawhasbeenomittedfromtheConstitution.UndertheJones
Law,asatcommonlaw,pardoncouldbegrantedanytimeafterthe
commission of the offense, either before or after conviction. The
GovernorGeneral of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the
President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts
of his case were fully brought to light. The framers of our
Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the
state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be
exercised"afterconviction".Sotoo,underthenewConstitution,the
pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This
isalsotherulegenerallyfollowedintheUnitedStates.
16. ID. ID.ROYAL PARDON UNDER ENGLISH LAW POWER
OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS.The rule in England is different.
There,aroyalpardoncannotbepleadedinbarofanimpeachment
"but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly
heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal
grace is further restrained or abridged." The reason for the
distinctionisobvious.InEngland,judgmentonimpeachmentisnot
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confined to mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold

and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" but extends to the whole punishment attached by law
to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction
may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual
banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of
the offense committed, together with removal from office and
incapacitytoholdoffice.
17. ID. ID. COMMUTATION AND AMNESTY UNDER THE
PHILIPPINECONSTITUTION.OurConstitutionmakesspecific
mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to
impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions
andlimitationsashemaydeemproper.Amnestymaybegrantedby
the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence
oftheNationalAssembly.
18. ID. ID. EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE PARDONING
POWER.The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the
Executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative
restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any
otherofficer
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or authority. The coordinate departments of government have

nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly
belonging to one, of the departments can exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly
provided for by the constitution. (20 R. C. L., pp. 540, 541.)
Where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without
express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the
legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it
elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof
(12C.J.,pp.838,839).
19. ID. PROBATION POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE
LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A PROBATION LAW.The
PhilippineLegislature,liketheCongressoftheUnitedStates,may
legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the
punishment of any and all penal offenses. The legislative power to
set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this
power the legislature may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the
largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the
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beginning and end of the punishment, and whether it should be

certain, or indeterminate, or conditional. Indeed, the Philippine
Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their
violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to
vest in the courtsparticularly the trial courtslarge discretion in
imposingthepenaltieswhichthelawprescribesinparticularcases.
Itisbelievedthatjusticecanbestbeservedbyvestingthispowerin
the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties
which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should
suffer.
20. ID.ID.PROBATION AND PARDON NOT COTERMINOUS
PROBATION DlSTINGUISHED FROM REPRIEVE AND
COMMUTATION.Probationandpardonarenotcoterminousnor
aretheythesame.Theyareactuallydistinctanddifferentfromeach
other, both in origin and in nature. In probation, the probationer is
in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completelyexonerated.Heisnotexemptfromtheentirepunishment
which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's
case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on
probation.Theprobationer,duringtheperiodofprobation,remains
inlegalcustodysubjecttothecontroloftheprobationofficerand
of the court, he may be rearrested upon the nonfulfillment of the
conditionsofprobationand,whenrearrested,maybecommittedto
prisontoservethesentenceoriginallyimposeduponhim.Probation
should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation
ofthesentence.
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21. ID. ID. ID. PROBATION NOT IN CONFLICT WITH

PARDONING POWER.The Probation Act does not conflict
withthepardoningpoweroftheExecutive.Thepardoningpower,in
respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as
full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted.
The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it
beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.
22. ID.DIVISION OF POWERS.Under our constitutional system,
the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate
and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive
and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government
derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the
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highest expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive

cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
withinitsownsphere.
23. ID. ID. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
HISTORICALDEVELOPMENT.The power to make lawsthe
legislativepowerisvestedinabicameralLegislaturebytheJones
Law and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution.
The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not
escapeitsdutiesandresponsibilitiesbydelegatingthatpowertoany
other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata
non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with
the glossators, was introduced into English law through a
misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency,
was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in
decisionsforbiddingthedelegationofjudicialpower,andfoundits
wayintoAmericaasanenlightenedprincipleoffreegovernment.It
has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of
separationofpowers.
24. ID. ID. ID. RULE FORBIDDING DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY
NOT
INFLEXIBLE
EXCEPTIONS.The rule, however, which forbids the delegation
of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice
permitsthecentrallegislativebodytodelegatelegislativepowersto
local authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress is
empowered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the
territories of the United States as it may select, Courts have also
sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large,
though some authorities maintain that this may not be done.
Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the
Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines ilippines provides that "The
NationalAs
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limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within

specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage
and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the Same article of the
Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national
emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the
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President,foralimitedperiodandsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasit
may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declarednationalpolicy."
25. ID.ID.ID.TESTOFUNDUEDELEGATIONDETAILSOF
EXECUTION.In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue
delegationoflegislativepowerornot,itisusualtoinquirewhether
thestatutewascompleteinallitstermsandprovisionswhenitleft
thehandsofthelegislaturesothatnothingwaslefttothejudgment
of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. In United
Statesvs. Ang Tang Ho {[1922], 43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court
adheredtotheforegoingrule.Thegeneralrule,however,islimited
byanotherrulethattoacertainextentmattersofdetailmaybeleft
tobefilledinbyrulesandregulationstobeadoptedorpromulgated
byexecutiveofficersandadministrativeboards.Asarule,anactof
the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay
down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegatedtoit.
26. ID. ID. ID. PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL
SURRENDER OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PROVINCIAL
BOARDS.TheProbationActdoesnot,bythe'forceofanyofits
provisions,fixandimposeupontheprovincialboardsanystandard
or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial
boardstoexercisearbitrarydiscretion.Bysection11oftheAct,the
legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits
oftheProbationActtotheprovincesbutinrealityleavestheentire
matterforthevariousprovincialboardstodetermine.Ifaprovincial
boarddoesnotwishtohavetheActappliedinitsprovince,allthat
it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of
legislativepowertotheprovincialboards.
27. ID. ID. ID. TRUE DlSTINCTION BETWEEN POWER TO
MAKE LAW AND DlSCRETION AS. TO ITS EXECUTION
ADJUDICATED CASES.The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuanceofthelaw.Thefirstcannotbedonetothelatternovalid
objection
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can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County

Comrs. [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on
StatutoryConstruction,sec.68.)Tothesameeffectaredecisionsof
theSupremeCourtintheMunicipalityofCardonavs.Municipality
ofBinagonan([1917],36Phil.,547)Rubivs.ProvincialBoardof
Mindoro([1919],39Phil.,660)andCruzvs.Youngberg([1931],
56Phil.,234).
28. ID. ID. ID. CONDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF A LAW
RELAXATION OF THE DOCTRINE.Laws may be made
effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the
executiveortheadoptionbythepeopleofaparticularcommunity(6
R.C.L.,118,170172Cooley,ConstitutionalLimitations,8thed.,
vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat, 1 6
Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that
the legisture may delegate a power not legislative which it may
itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a
power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially
legislativeinascertainingtheexistenceoffactsorconditionsasthe
basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process
common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the
apparent tendency to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of
legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from
social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age,
the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on
Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Professor
Willoughby'streatiseontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesandis
accepted.
29. ID. ID. ID. OPERATION OF PROBATION ACT NOT
CONTINGENT ON SPECIFIED FACTS OR CONDITIONS
DlSCRETION VESTED IN PROVINCIAL BOARDS
ARBITRARY.The legislature has not made the operation of the
Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be
ascertainedbytheprovincialboard.Itleavestheentireoperationor
nonoperationofthelawupontheprovincialboards.Thediscretion
vestedisarbitrarybecauseitisabsoluteandunlimited.Aprovincial
boardneednotinvestigateconditionsorfindanyfact,orawaitthe
happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule
limitedbynoprincipleofexpediencyannouncedbythelegislature..
It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions and,
again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It
need not give any reason or have any reason whatsoever for
refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a.
probation officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at its
pleasure.
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30. ID. ID. ID. LOCAL OPTION LAWS EIGHT OF LOCAL

SELFGOVERN
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MENT SUSPENSION OF OPERATION OF A GENERAL LAW

NOT COUNTENANCED.The legislature may enact laws for a
particularlocalitydifferentfromthoseapplicabletootherlocalities
and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove
expressed, courts in many jurisdictions have sustained the
constitutionalityofthesubmissionofoptionlawstothevoteofthe
people.(6R.C.L.,p.171.)Butoptionlawsthussustainedtreatof
subjects purely local in character which should receive different
treatment in different localities placed under different
circumstances. Without denying the right of local selfgovernment
and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the
handsoflocalauthoritiesorforthepeopleofsmallcommunitiesto
passuponinmattersofgenerallegislationlikethatwhichtreatsof
criminalsingeneral,andasregardsthegeneralsubjectofprobation,
discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and
absoluteasprovidedinActNo.4221.
31. ID. ID. ID. PROVINCIAL BOARDS EMPOWERED TO
SUSPEND OPERATION OF PROBATION ACT.The statute
doesnotexpresslystatethattheprovincialboardsmaysuspendthe
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but,
consideringthat,inbeingvestedwiththeauthoritytoappropriateor
not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers they
thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not
the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces,
theprovincialboardsareinrealityempoweredbythelegislatureto
suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces,
the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should
decideotherwisebyappropriatingthenecessaryfunds.Thevalidity
of a law is not tested by what has been done, but by what may be
doneunderitsprovisions.(WalterE.Olsen&Co.vs.Aldaneseand
Trinidad[1922],43Phil.,25912C.J.,p.786.)
32. ID. ID. ID. LEGISLATIVE POLICY EXECUTION
THEREOF CONSTITUTION BOTH A GRANT AND
LlMITATION OF POWER.A great deal of latitude should be
grantedtothelegislaturenotonlyintheexpressionofwhatmaybe
termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution
thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive
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andyetimbecile."(Peoplevs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been

said that popular government lives because of the unexhaustible
reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of
powersofgovernmentisvestedintherepresentativesofthepeople
and that these representatives are no further restrained under our
systemthanbytheexpresslanguageoftheinstrumentimposingthe
restraint,orbyparticularprovisionswhichby
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clear intendment, have that effect. But it should be borne in mind

thataconstitutionisbothagrantandalimitation.ofpowerandone
of these timehonored limitations is that, subject to certain
exceptions,legislativepowershallnotbedelegated.
33. ID. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS CLASS
LEGISLATIONCLASSIFICATIONONREASONABLEBASIS.
"***norshallanypersonbedeniedtheequalprotectionofthe
laws."ThisbasicindividualrightshelteredbytheConstitutionisa
restraint on all the three grand departments of our government and
on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and
on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and
eminent domain. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined.
No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made
arbitrarilyorcapriciously,ispermitted.Theclassification,however,
to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences it must be germane to the purposes of the
law it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
applyequallytoeachmemberoftheclass.
34. ID. ID. ID. RESULTANT INEQUALITY FROM
UNWARRANTEDDELEGATIONPROBATIONACTPERMITS
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION.In the case of Act No.
4221, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards. While inequality may result in the application of the law
andintheconfermentofthebenefitsthereinprovided,inequalityis
notinallcasesthenecessaryresult.Butwhatevermaybethecase,
itisclearthatsection11oftheProbationActcreatesasituationin
whichdiscriminationandinequalityarepermittedorallowed.There
are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the
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equalprotectionofthelawbeforecourtsshouldassumethetaskof
setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and
circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of
Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the
lawandisonthataccountbad.Weseenodifferencebetweenalaw
which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such
denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance,yet,ifitpermitsofunjustandillegaldiscrimination,it
iswithintheconstitutionalprohibition.Inotherwords,statutesmay
beadjudgedunconstitutionalbecauseoftheireffectinoperation.If
alawhastheeffectofdenyingtheequalprotectionofthelawitis
unconstitutional.
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Peoplevs.Vera.
35. ID. ID. ID. SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT

GOVERNMENT OF LAWS EQUALITY CLAUSE NOT "A
ROPE OF SAND".Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not
onlymaysaidActbeinforceinoneorseveralprovincesandnotbe
in force in the other provinces, but one province may appropriate
for the salary of a probation officer of a given yearand have
probation during that yearand thereafter decline to make further
appropriation, and have no probation in subsequent years. While
thissituationgoesrathertotheabuseofdiscretionwhichdelegation
implies,itishereindicatedtoshowthattheProbationActsanctions
a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to
prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the
equalityclausebut"aropeofsand."
36. ID. PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY PRESUMPTION
AGAINST MUTILATION OF STATUTE.In seeking the
legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a
statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an
unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise
valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will
leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act
substantiallyunaffectedbytheprocess.
37. ID. SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT INSEPARABLE
FROM REST OF ACT PROBATION AND PROBATION
OFFICERS.Section 11 of the Probation Act (No. 4221) is
inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the
eliminationofthesectionwhatwouldbeleftisthebareidealismof
the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of
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people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial results of

thatsystem.Theclearpolicyofthelaw,asmaybegleanedfroma
carefulexaminationofthewholecontext,istomaketheapplication
of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the
differentprovincialboards.Ifnotoneoftheprovincesandthisis
the actual situation nowappropriates the necessary fund for the
salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would
be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer.
Neithercantherebeaprobationofficerwithoutaprobationsystem.
38. ID. ID. PROBATION ACT ANALYZED SECTIONS 10 AND
11 OF ACT RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.The
probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in
section 10 are clearly not those probation officers required to be
appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be said,
reddendosingulasingulis,thattheprobationofficersreferredtoin
section10aretoactassuch,notinthevariousprovinces,butinthe
central office known as the Probation Office established in the
Depart
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Peoplevs.Vera.
mentofJustice,underthesupervisionofaChiefProbationOfficer,
Whenthelawprovidesthat"theprobationofficer"shallinvestigate
and make reports to the court that "the probation officer" shall
superviseandvisittheprobationerthattheprobationershallreport
tothe"probationofficer",shallallow"theprobationofficer"tovisit
him,shalltruthfullyansweranyreasonableinquiriesonthepartof
"theprobationofficer"concerninghisconductorconditionthatthe
court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period
and terms of probation, it means the probation officer who is in
charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never
could have been the intention of the legislature, for instance, to
requireaprobationerinBatanes,toreporttoaprobationofficerin
the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to
visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him
underhiscare,tosupervisehisconduct,toinstructhimconcerning
the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions
asareassignedtohimbylaw.
39. ID. ID. ID. ID. WlSDOM AND PROPRIETY OF
LEGISLATION PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATION AND
JUDICIALLEGISLATION.That under section 10 the Secretary
of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are
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provinces or groups of provinces is, of course, possible. But this

wouldbearguingonwhatthelawmaybeorshouldbe and not on
what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The
wisdomandproprietyoflegislationisnotforustopassupon.We
may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been
saidregardingprogressiveinterpretationandjudiciallegislationwe
declinetoamendthelaw.Wearenotpermittedtoreadintothelaw
matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose
noteventosaveastatutefromthedoomofinvalidity.
40. ID. ID. ID. ID. APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS
APPOINTMENTOFPROBATIONOFFICERSBYSECRETARY
OF JUSTICE JUDICIAL NOTICE.The clear intention and
policyofthelawisnottomaketheInsularGovernmentdefraythe
salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the
provincesdefraythemshouldtheydesiretohavetheProbationAct
apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the
purposesofthisAct",istobeapplied,amongotherthings,forthe
salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These
probationofficersaretoreceivesuchcompensationastheSecretary
ofJusticemayfix"untilsuchpositionsshallhavebeenincludedin
theAppropriationAct".Itwasnottheintentionofthelegislatureto
empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of probation
officers in the provinces or later on. to include said salaries in an
appropriationact.Considering,further,that
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Peoplevs.Vera.
the sum of P50,000, appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among

other things, the salaries of the administrative personnel of the
Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be
said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation
officers in the provinces, We take judicial notice of the fact that
there are 48 provinces in the Philippines, and we do not think it is
seriouslycontendedthat,withthefiftythousandpesosappropriated
forthecentraloffice,therecanbein.eachprovince,asintended,a
probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial
fiscal. If this is correct, the contention that without section 11 of
Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing under
the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that there can be a
systemofprobationintheprovinceswithoutprobationofficers.
41. ID. PROBATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN
PENOLOGY PROBATION ACT AS REPUGNANT TO
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FUNDAMENTAL LAW.Probation as a development of modern

penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been
enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern
criminologists call the "individualization of punishment", the
adjustment of the penalty to the character of 'the criminal and the
circumstancesofhisparticularcase.Itprovidesaperiodofgracein
ordertoaidintherehabilitationofapenitentoffender.Itisbelieved
that, in many cases, convicts may be reformed and their
development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes
advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids
imprisonment so long as the convict gives promise of reform. The
welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the
individual convict is merely incidental. But while probation is
commendableasasystemand'itsimplantationintothePhilippines
shouldbewelcomed,thelawissetasidebecauseofrepugnancyto
thefundamentallaw.
42. ID. CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DECISIONS OF UNITED
STATES
COURTS
LOCAL
CONDITIONS
AND
ENVIRONMENT.The constitutional relations between the
FederalandtheStategovernmentsoftheUnitedStatesandthedual
characteroftheAmericanGovernmentisasituationwhichdoesnot
obtain in the Philippines. The situation of a state of the American
Union or of the District of Columbia with reference to the Federal
Government of the United States is not the situation of a province
withrespecttotheInsularGovernmentthedistinctfederalandstate
judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace the
integratedjudicialsystemofthePhilippines"Generalpropositions
donotdecideconcretecases"and"tokeeppacewith***new
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Peoplevs.Vera.
developments of times and circumstances", fundamental principles

should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions and
environments.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

prohibition,
Thefactsarestatedintheopinionofthecourt.
SolicitorGeneral Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the
Government.
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DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong & Shanghai
BankingCorporation.VicenteJ.Francisco,Feria&LaO,Orense&
Belmonte,andGibbs&McDonoughforrespondentCuUnjieng.
NoappearanceforrespondentJudge.
LAUREL,J.:
ThisisanoriginalactioninstitutedinthiscourtonAugust19,1937,
for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and of prohibition to the
CourtofFirstInstanceofManilasothatthiscourtmayreviewthe
actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case
No.42649entitled"ThePeopleofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Mariano
Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the
provisionsofActNo.4221,andthereafterprohibitthesaidCourtof
FirstInstancefromtakinganyfurtheractionorentertainingfurther
the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to
prisoninaccordancewiththefinaljudgmentofconvictionrendered
1
bythiscourtinsaidcase(G.R.No.41200). Petitionersherein,the
People of the Philippine Islands and the Hongkong and Shanghai
BankingCorporation,arerespectivelytheplaintiffandtheoffended
party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the
defendants,inthecriminalcaseentitled"ThePeopleofthe
______________
135Off.Gaz.,738.SeealsoResolutionsofDecember17,1935.
72
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Peoplevs.Vera.
PhilippineIslandsvs.MarianoCuUnjieng,etal.",criminalcaseNo.
42649oftheCourtofFirstInstanceofManilaandG.R.No.41200
ofthiscourt.Respondentherein,Hon.JoseO.Vera,istheJudgead
interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjiengforprobationintheaforesaidcriminalcase.
Theinformationintheaforesaidcriminalcasewasfiledwiththe
Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner
hereinHongkongandShanghaiBankingCorporationinterveningin
thecaseasprivateprosecutor,Afteraprotractedtrialunparalleledin
the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time
spentbythecourtaswellasinthevolumeofthetestimonyandthe
bulkofexhibitspresented,theCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,on
January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the
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defendantMarianoCuUnjiengtoanindeterminatepenaltyranging
from four years and two months of prisin correccional to eight
yearsofprisinmayor,topaythecostsandwithreservationofcivil
action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified
thesentencetoanindeterminatepenaltyoffromfiveyearsandsix
months of prisin correccional to seven years, six months and
twentysevendaysofprisinmayor,butaffirmedthejudgmentinall
other respects, Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which
were denied on December 17,1935, and final judgment was
accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant
thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the
SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesbutthelatterdeniedthepetition
forcertiorariinNovember,1936.Thiscourt,onNovember24,1936,
deniedthepetitionsubsequentlyfiledbythedefendantforleaveto
fileasecondalternativemotionforreconsiderationornewtrialand
thereafterremandedthecasetothecourtoforiginforexecutionof
thejudgment.
Theinstantproceedingshavetodowiththeapplication
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Peoplevs.Vera.
forprobationfiledbytheherein.respondentMarianoCuUnjiengon
November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of
Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein
respondentMarianoCuUnjiengstatesinhispetition,interalia,that
heisinnocentofthecrimeofwhichhewasconvicted,thathehasno
criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the
future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason
presiding, referred the application for probation to the Insular
Probation Office which recommended denial of the same on June
18,1937.Thereafter,theCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,seventh
branch,JudgeJoseO.Verapresiding,setthepetitionforhearingon
April5,1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an
opposition to the granting of probation to' the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an
oppositiononApril5,1937,alleging,amongotherthings,thatAct
No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of
ArticleXVoftheConstitution,isneverthelessviolativeofsection1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is 'not
uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of said Act
No.4221endowstheprovincialboardswiththepowertomakesaid
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laweffectiveorotherwiseintheirrespectiveprovinces,Theprivate
prosecutionalsofiledasupplementaryoppositiononApril19,1937,
elaboratingontheallegedunconstitutionalityofActNo.4221,asan
undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of
several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal
concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with
respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of
ActNo.4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera
promulgated a resolution with a finding that "las pruebas no han
establecido de una manera concluyente la culpabilidad del
peticionarioyquetodosloshechosprobadosnoson
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Peoplevs.Vera.
inconsistentesoincongruentesconsuinocencia"andconcludesthat
the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda
racional"ofthecrimeforwhichhestandsconvictedbythiscourtin
G, R, No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for
thereasonthat:
" * * * Si este Juzgado concediera la probacin solicitada por las
circunstancias y la historia social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta
resolucin,quehacenalpeticionarioacreedor"delamisma,unapartedela
opinion pblica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podra levantarse
indignada contra un sistema de probacin que permite atisbar en los
procedimientosordinariosdeunacausacriminalperturbandolaquietudyla
eficacia de las decisiones ya recadas al traer a la superficie conclusiones
enteramente diferentes, en menoscabo del inters pblico que demanda el
respetodelasleyesydelveredictojudicial."
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu

Unjiengfiledanexceptiontotheresolutiondenyingprobationanda
notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by
counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented by an additional
motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The
aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said
hearingwaspostponedatthepetitionofcounselfortherespondent
MarianoCuUnjiengbecauseamotionforleavetointerveneinthe
case as amici curiae signed by thirtythree (thirtyfour) attorneys
had just been filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves
whosesignatureappearsintheaforesaidmotionsubsequentlyfileda
petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on
thegroundthatthemotionforleavetointerveneasamicicuriaewas
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circulatedatabanquetgivenbycounselforMarianoCuUnjiengon
theeveningofJuly30,1937,andthathesignedthesame"without
maturedeliberationandpurelyasamatterofcourtesytotheperson
whoinvitedme(him)."
OnAugust6,1937,theFiscaloftheCityofManilafiled
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Peoplevs.Vera.
amotionwiththetrialcourtfortheissuanceofanorderofexecution
of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit
the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to
saidjudgment.
On August 1, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition
tothemotionforleavetointerveneasamicicuriaeaforementioned,
askingthatadatebesetforthehearingofthesameandthat,atall
events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain
attorneyssigningthesamewhoweremembersofthelegalstaffof
theseveralcounselforMarianoCuUnjieng.OnAugust10,1937,
herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all
parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to
appearbeforethecourtonAugust14,1937.Onthelastmentioned
date,theFiscaloftheCityofManilamovedforthehearingofhis
motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for
leavetointerveneasamicicuriaebut,uponobjectionofcounselfor
MarianoCuUnjieng,hemovedforthepostponementofthehearing
ofbothmotions.Therespondentjudgethereuponsetthehearingof
the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to
consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in
order.Evidenceastothecircumstancesunderwhichsaidmotionfor
leavetointerveneasamicicuriaewassignedandsubmittedtocourt
was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture,
herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process
toputanendtowhattheyallegedwasaninterminableproceedingin
theCourtofFirstInstanceofManilawhichfostered"thecampaign
ofthedefendantMarianoCuUnjiengfordelayintheexecutionof
thesentenceimposedbythisHonorableCourtonhim,exposingthe
courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of
the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this
courtimposedonthedefendantMarianoCuUnjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly
suspendedupontheissuanceofatemporaryrestrainingorderbythis
courtonAugust21,1937.
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Peoplevs.Vera.
Tosupporttheirpetitionfortheissuanceoftheextraordinarywrits
of certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the
respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his
jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation for the following
reasons:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said Act of the
Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the
provinces of the Philippines it nowhere states that it is to
be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of
Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a
proviso to the effect that in the absence of a special
provision,theterm"province"maybeconstruedtoinclude
theCityofManilaforthepurposeofgivingeffecttolaws
of general application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is
notalawofgeneralapplicationbecauseitismadetoapply
only to those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation
officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a
province,still,ActNo. 4221 would not be applicable to it
because it has not provided for the salary of a probation
officerasrequiredbysection11thereofitbeingimmaterial
that there is an Insular Probation Office willing to act for
the City of Manila, said Probation Office provided for in
section10ofActNo.4221beingdifferentanddistinctfrom
theProbationOfficerprovidedforinsection11ofthesame
Act.
II.Becauseeveniftherespondentjudgeoriginallyhadjurisdiction
toentertaintheapplicationforprobationoftherespondentMariano
CuUnjieng,heneverthelessactedwithoutjurisdictionorinexcess
thereofincontinuingtoentertainthemotionforreconsiderationand
by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had
promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu
Unjieng'sapplicationforprobation,forthereasonthat:
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(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is

limited by Act No. 4221 to the granting or denying of
applicationsforprobation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu
Unjieng'spetitionforprobationonJune28,1937,itbecame
finalandexecutoryatthemomentofItsrendition.
(3) Norightofappealexistsinsuchcases.
(4) Therespondentjudgelacksthepowertograntarehearing
ofsaidorderortomodifyorchangethesame.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu
Unjiengisinnocentofthecrimeforwhichhewasconvictedbyfinal
judgmentofthiscourt,whichfindingisnotonlypresumptuousbut
without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in
contempt of this court and a violation of the respondents's oath of
officeasadinterimjudgeoffirstinstance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to
violatehisduty,whichbecameImperativewhenheissuedhisorder
ofJune28,1937,denyingtheapplicationforprobation,tocommit
hiscorespondenttojail.
Petitioners also aver that they have no other plain, speedy and
adequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the
petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation further
contendsthatActNo.4221ofthePhilippineLegislatureproviding
forasystemofprobationforpersonseighteenyearsofageorover
who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is
violativeofsection1,subsection(1),ArticleIII,oftheConstitution
ofthePhilippinesguaranteeingequalprotectionofthelawsbecause
it confers upon the provincial board of each province the absolute
discretiontomakesaidlawoperativeorotherwiseintheirrespective
provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and Improper
delegation to the provincial boards of. the several provinces of the
legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the
PhilippineLegislatureandbytheConstitution(section1,Art.VI)in
theNationalAssemblyandforthefurtherreasonthatitgives
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Peoplevs.Vera.
the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section

2,Art.VIII)andtheJonesLaw(section28),theauthoritytoenlarge
thepowersoftheCourtsofFirstInstanceofthedifferentprovinces
without uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated
September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of
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oneofthepetitioners,thePeopleofthePhilippineIslands,concurs
for the first time with the issues raised by the other petitioner
regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and in the oral
argumentheldonOctober6,1937,furtherelaboratedonthetheory
thatprobationisafformofreprieveandthereforeActNo.4221is
an encroachmenton the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to
grant pardons and reprieves. On October 1, 1937, the City Fiscal
filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221
notonlyencroachesuponthepardoningpoweroftheexecutive,but
alsoconstitutesanunwarranteddelegationoflegislativepoweranda
denialoftheequalprotectionofthelaws.OnOctober9,1937,two
memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor
General,actinginbehalfofthePeopleofthePhilippineIslands,and
by counsel f or the other petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to
impugn the validity of its own laws and the other contending that
Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative
power,werepresented.Anotherjointmemorandumwasfiledbythe
same persons on the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act
No.4221isunconstitutionalbecauseitdeniesthe.equalprotection
of the laws and constitutes an unlawfull delegation of legislative
power and, further, that the whole Act is void that the
Commonwealthisnotestoppedfromquestioningthevalidityofits
laws that the private prosecution may intervene in probation
proceedings and may attack the probation law as unconstitutional
and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in
prohibitionproceedings.
RespondentsintheiranswerdatedAugust31,1937,aswellasin
theiroralargumentandmemorandums,challenge
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Peoplevs.Vera.
each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the

petitioners.
Asspecialdefenses,respondentsallege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in
law to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari or of
prohibition.
(2) Thattheaforesaidpetitionisprematurebecausetheremedy
sought by the petitioners is the very same remedy prayed
for by them before the trial court and was still pending
resolution before the trial court when the present petition
wasfiledwiththiscourt.
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(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question

astotheexecutionofjudgmentbeforethetrialcourt,said
trialcourthasacquiredexclusivejurisdictiontoresolvethe
sameunderthetheorythatitsresolutiondenyingprobation
isunappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance to decide the
question as to whether or not execution will lie, this court
nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the
Court of First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the
sameuponmotionofhereinpetitionersthemselves.
(5) That the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in
seekingtodeprivethetrialcourtof"itsjurisdictionoverthe
caseandelevatetheproceedingstothiscourt,shouldnotbe
toleratedbecauseitimpairstheauthorityanddignityofthe
trialcourtwhichcourtwhilesittinginprobationcasesis"a
courtoflimitedjurisdictionbutofgreatdignity."
(6) Thatunderthesuppositionthatthiscourthasjurisdictionto
resolvethequestionsubmittedtoandpendingresolutionby
thetrialcourt,thepresentactionwouldnotliebecausethe
resolutionofthetrialcourtdenyingprobationisappealable
for although the Probation Law does not specifically
provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a
resolutionoftheCourtofFirstInstancedenyingprobation,
stillitisageneralruleinthisjurisdic
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Peoplevs.Vera.
tion thatafinalorder, resolution or decision of an inferior

courtisappealabletothesuperiorcourt.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng being appealable,
the same had not yet become final and executory for the
reason that the said respondent had filed an alternative
motionforreconsiderationandnewtrialwithintherequisite
periodoffifteendays,whichmotionthetrialcourtwasnot
able to resolve in view of the restraining order
improvidentlyanderroneouslyissuedbythiscourt.
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication
admitted that the resolution of the trial court denying
probation is not final and unappealable when he presented
hisanswertothemotionforreconsiderationandagreedto
thepostponementofthehearingofthesaidmotion.
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(9)
That under the supposition that the order of the trial court
denying probation is not appealable, it is incumbent upon
theaccusedtofileanactionfortheissuanceofthewritof
certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court,
although it believed that the accused was entitled to
probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of
criticismbecausetheaccusedisarichmanandthat,before
apetitionforcertiorarigroundedonanirregularexerciseof
jurisdiction by thetrial court could lie, it is incumbent
upon the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration
specifyingtheerrorcommittedsothatthetrialcourtcould
haveanopportunitytocorrectorcurethesame.
(10) Thatonthehypothesisthattheresolutionofthetrialcourt
is not appealable, the trial court retains its jurisdiction
within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in
accordancewithlawandjusticethatthispowertoalteror
modifyanorderorresolution is inherent in the courts and
may be exercised either motu proprio or upon petition of
the proper party, the petition in the latter case taking the
formofamotionforreconsideration.
(11) Thatonthehypothesisthattheresolutionofthetrialcourt
isappealableasrespondentsallege,saidcourt
81
81
Peoplevs.Vera.
cannotorderexecutionofthesamewhileitisonappeal,for
thentheappealwouldnotbeavailingbecausethedoorsof
probation would be closed from the moment the accused
commencestoservehissentence(ActNot.4221,sec.1U.
S.vs.Cook,19Fed.[2d],827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the
respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because,
contrarytotheallegationsofthepetitioners,itdoesnotconstitutean
undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon
the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional
memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents
reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from
constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private
prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less
questionthevalidityofActNo.4221thatboththeCityFiscaland
the SolicitorGeneral are estopped from questioning the validity of
theActthatthevalidityoftheActcannotbeattackedforthefirst
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time before this court that prohibition is unavailable and that, in

anyevent,section11ofActNo.4221isseparablefromtherestof
the Act. The last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was
admittedbyresolutionofthiscourtandfiledanewonNovember5,
1937.Thismemorandumelaboratesonsomeofthepointsraisedby
therespondentsandrefutesthosebroughtupbythepetitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various
aspectsofthepresentcase,wenotedthatthecourtbelow,inpassing
upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng and in denying the said application assumed the task not
onlyofconsideringthemeritsoftheapplication,butofpassingupon
the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final
pronouncementofguiltbythiscourt.(G.R.No.41200.) Probation
implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation court hearing a
probationcasemaylookintothe
82
82
Peoplevs.Vera.
circumstancesattendingthecommissionoftheoffense,thisdoesnot
authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusions of this court,
eitherdirectlyorindirectly,especiallywherefromitsownadmission
reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and
pleadingsoftheparties.Asalreadyobservedbythis.courtinShioji
vs.Harvey([1922],43Phil.,333,337),andreiteratedinsubsequent
cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilegeofoverrulingdecisionsoftheSupremeCourt,therewould
benoendtolitigation,andjudicialchaoswouldresult."Abecoming
modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the
position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the
integratedjudicialsystemofthenation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both
counselforthepetitionersandtherespondents,thiscourtprefersto
cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental
questionspresented,namely,(1)whetherornottheconstitutionality
ofActNo.4221hasbeenproperlyraisedintheseproceedingsand
(2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional.
Consideration of these issues will involve a discussion of certain
incidentalquestionsraisedbytheparties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to
certain guiding principles is necessary. It is a wellsettled rule that
the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determinedbythecourtsunlessthatquestionisproperlyraised\and
presentedinappropriatecasesandisnecessarytoadeterminationof
thecasei.e.,theissueofconstitutionalitymustbetheverylismota
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presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563,

5686R.C.L.,pp.76,7712C.J.,pp.780782,783.)
Thequestionoftheconstitutionalityofanactofthelegislatureis
frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be
made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the
remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not
plain,speedyand
83
83
Peoplevs.Vera.
adequate.Thus,inCuUnjiengvs.Patstone([1922],42 Phil., 818),

thiscourtheldthatthequestionoftheconstitutionalityofastatute
mayberaisedbythepetitionerinmandamusproceedings(see,also,
12 C. J., p. 783) and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Springer([1927],50Phil.,259[affirmedinSpringervs.Government
ofthePhilippineIslands(1928),277U.S.,18972Law.ed.,845]),
this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an
actionofquowarranto brought in the name of the Government of
the Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a
statutemaybequestionedinhabeascorpusproceedings(12C.J.,p.
783 Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there
are authorities to the contrary on an application for injunction to
restrainactionunderthechallengedstatute(mandatory,seeCruzvs.
Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234) and even on an application for
preliminaryinjunctionwherethedeterminationoftheconstitutional
questionisnecessarytoadecisionofthecase.(12C.J.,p.783.)The
same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari. (Yu Cong
Engvs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385 [1926], 271 U. S., 500 70
Law.ed.,1059Bellvs.FirstJudicialDistrictCourt[1905],28Nev.,
28081Pac.,875113A.S.R.,8546Ann.Cas.,9821L.R.A.
[N.S],843,andcasescited).ThecaseofYuCongEngvs.Trinidad,
supra,decidedbythiscourttwelveyearsagowas,likethepresent
one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The
constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese
BookkeepingLaw,wastherechallengedbythepetitioners,andthe
constitutional issue was met squarely by the respondents in a
demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the propriety of the
constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in
prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional
question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No. 2972
wasconstitutional.Thecasewaselevatedonwritofcertioraritothe
SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateswhichreversedthejudgmentof
thiscourtandheldthattheActwasinvalid.(271U.S.,
84
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84
Peoplevs.Vera.
500 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however,

theFederalSupremeCourt,thoughitsChiefJustice,said:
"BytheCodeofCivilProcedureofthePhilippineIslands,section516,the
Philippine supreme court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition
with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original
jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising
functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that
court that) the question of the validity of a criminal statute must usually be
raisedbyadefendantinthetrialcourtandbecarriedregularlyinreviewto
the Supreme Court. (CadwalladerGibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26
Phil., 192.) But in this case where a new act seriously affected numerous
personsandextensivepropertyrights,andwaslikelytocauseamultiplicity
of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue of
theact'svaliditypromptlybeforeitanddecideitintheinterestoftheorderly
administration of justice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex
parteYoung(209U.S.,12352Law.ed.,71413L.R.A.[N.S.],93228
Sup.Ct.Rep.,44114Ann.Cas.,764Trauxvs.Raich,239U.S.,3360
Law. ed., 131 L. R. A. 1916D, 545 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7 Ann. Cas.,
1917B,283andWilsonvs.New,243U.S.,332 61 Law. ed., 755 L. R.
A.1917E,93837Sup.Ct.Rep.,298Ann.Cas.,1918A,1024).Although
objection to the jurisdiction was raised by demurrer to the petition, this is
nowdisclaimedonbehalfoftherespondents,andbothpartiesaskadecision
on the merits. In view of broad powers in prohibition granted to that court
undertheIslandCode,weacquiesceinthedesireoftheparties."
Thewritofprohibitionisanextraordinaryjudicialwritissuingout
of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court,
for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdictionwithwhichitisnotlegallyvested.)(High,Extraordinary
LegalRemedies,p.705.)Thegeneralrule,althoughthere
85
85
Peoplevs.Vera.
isaconflictinthecases,isthattheWritofprohibitionwillnotlie
where the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute
the constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases
the inferior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the
constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to
review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily
has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of
prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its
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jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be

preventedbythewritofprohibitionfromenforcingthatstatute.(50
C.J.,670ExparteRoundtree[1874],51Ala.,42InreMacfarland,
30 App.[D.C.],365Curtisvs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384 84
A., 799 Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13 State vs.
Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54 46 S. E., 185 Arnold vs. Shields
[1837],5Dana,1930Am.Dec.,669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derive
their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in
detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused
personsaftertheirconvictionhasbecomefinalandbeforetheyhave
servedtheirsentence.Itistruethatatcommonlawtheauthorityof
the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of a sentence is
recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including
thoseofMassachusetts,Michigan,NewYork,andOhio,thepower
is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail
[1874],115Mass.,133Peoplevs.Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557
121N.W.,497Peopleexrel.Forsythvs.CourtofSessions[1894],
141N.Y.,288Webervs.State[1898],58OhioSt,616).But,inthe
leading case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27 61
Law. ed., 129 L. R. A., 1917E, 1178 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann.
Cas.1917B,355),theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesexpressed
theopinionthatunderthecommonlawthepowerofthecourtwas
limitedtotemporarysuspension,andbrushedasidethecontentionas
toinherentjudicialpowersaying,throughChiefJusticeWhite:
86
86
Peoplevs.Vera.
"Indiputablyunderourconctitutionalsystemtherighttotryoffensesagainst
thecriminallawsanduponconvictiontoimposethepunishmentprovidedby
law is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that, in exerting the powers
vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess ample right to
exercisereasonable,thatis,judicial,discretiontoenablethemtowiselyexert
theirauthority.Buttheseconcessionsaffordnogroundforthecontentionas
topowerheremade,sinceitmustrestuponthepropositionthatthepowerto
enforce begets Inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And
theeffectofthepropositionurgeduponthedistributionofpowersmadeby
the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable
also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is
legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial
discretion,forthepurposeofexecutingthestatute,elementsofconsideration
which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that
the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained
according' to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive
department."
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JusticeCarson,inhisilluminatingconcurringopinioninthecaseof
Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil.,
265),decidedbythiscourtin1915,alsoreachedtheconclusionthat
the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in
criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial function. "All are
agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory authority, it does
notliewithinthepowerofthecourtstogrant.suchsuspensions."(at
p. 278.) Both petitioners and respondents are correct, therefore,
when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation
proceedingsisacourtoflimitedjurisdiction.Itsjurisdictioninsuch
proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the
PhilippineLegislature.
Itis,ofcourse,truethattheconstitutionalityofastatutewillnot
beconsideredonapplicationforprohibition
87
87
Peoplevs.Vera.
wherethequestionhasnotbeenproperlybroughttotheattentionof
the court by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130
Ala.,59230S.,499Stateexrel.Kellyvs.Kirby[1914],260Mo.,
120168S.W.,746).Inthecaseatbar,itisunquestionablethatthe
constitutionalissuehasbeensquarelypresentednotonlybeforethis
courtbythepetitionersbutalsobeforethetrialcourtbytheprivate
prosecution.Therespondent,Hon.JoseO.Vera,however,actingas
judgeofthecourtbelow,declinedtopassuponthequestiononthe
groundthattheprivateprosecutor,notbeingapartywhoserightsare
affectedbythestatute,maynotraisesaidquestion.Therespondent
judgecitedCooleyonConstitutionalLimitations(Vol.I,p.33912
C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County
([1916], 225 Mass., 59 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the
proposition that a court will not consider any attack made on the
constitutionalityofastatutebyonewhohasnointerestindefeating
itbecausehisrightsarenotaffectedbyitsoperation.Therespondent
judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the
constitutionalquestionand,agreeingwithCooleythat"thepowerto
declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge,
consciousofthefallibilityofthehumanjudgment,willshrinkfrom
exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due
regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility"
(ConstitutionalLimitations,8thed.,Vol.I,p.332),proceededonthe
assumptionthatActNo.4221isconstitutional.While,therefore,the
courtaquoadmitsthattheconstitutionalquestionwasraisedbefore
it,itrefusedtoconsiderthequestionsolelybecauseitwasnotraised
by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterate this view. The
argumentisadvancedthattheprivateprosecutionhasnopersonality
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toappearinthehearingoftheapplicationforprobationofdefendant
MarianoCuUnjiengincriminalcaseNo.42648oftheCourtofFirst
InstanceofManila,andhencetheissueofconstitutionalitywasnot
properlyraisedinthelowercourt,Al
88
88
Peoplevs.Vera.
though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may
question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial
decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a
courtwithoutjurisdictionisvoid,wherethejurisdictionofthecourt
depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of
constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the
attentionofthecourtbypersonsinterestedintheeffecttobegiven
the statute. (12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to
concedethattheissuewasnotproperlyraisedinthecourtbelowby
the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here
raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true
that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not
raisedinthetrialcourt,itwillnotbeconsideredonappeal.(12C.J.,
p.786.See,also,CadwalladerGibsonLumberCo.vs.DelRosario,
26 Phil., 192, 193195.) But we must state that the general rule
admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion,
may determine the time when a question affecting the
constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey
[1884],95N.Y.,135,144.)Thus,incriminalcases,althoughthere
isaverysharpconflictofauthorities,itissaidthatthequestionmay
beraisedforthefirsttimeatanystageoftheproceedings,eitherin
thetrialcourtoronappeal.(12C.J.,p.786.)Evenincivilcases,it
has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the
constitutionalquestion,thoughraisedforthefirsttimeonappeal,if
it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a
decisionofthecase.(McCabe'sAdm'xvs.Maysville&B.S.R.Co.
[1910], 136 Ky., 674 124 S. W., ,892 Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis
Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685 113 S. W., 1108 Carmody vs.
St.LouisTransitCo.[1905],188Mo.,57287S.W.,913.)Andit
hasbeenheldthataconstitutionalquestionwillbeconsideredbyan
appellatecourtatanytime,whereitinvolvesthejurisdictionofthe
courtbelow(Statevs.
89
89
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Peoplevs.Vera.
Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561 57 S., 870,) As to the power of this
courttoconsidertheconstitutionalquestionraisedforthefirsttime
beforethiscourtintheseproceedings,weturnagainandpointwith
emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on
thehypothesisthattheHongkong&ShanghaiBankingCorporation,
represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to
raisetheconstitutionalquestionhereapointwedonotnowhave
todecideweareoftheopinionthatthePeopleofthePhilippines,
represented by the SolicitorGeneral and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statutemusthaveapersonalandsubstantialinterestinthecasesuch
thathehassustained,orwillsustain,directinjuryasaresultofIts
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really
violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose
name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in
havingitsetaside.Ofgreaterimportthanthedamagecausedbythe
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
uponthefundamentallawbytheenforcementofaninvalidstatute.
Hence,thewellsettledrulethatthestatecanchallengethevalidity
of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Springer([1927],50Phil,259(affirmedinSpringervs.Government
ofthePhilippineIslands[1928],277U.S.,18972Law.ed.,845),
this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an
actioninstitutedinbehalfoftheGovernmentofthePhilippines.In
AttorneyGeneralvs.Perkins([1889],73Mich,303,311,31241N.
W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney
General,institutedquowarrantoproceedingstotesttherightofthe
respondentstorenewaminingcorporation,allegingthatthestatute
under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional
becauseitimpairedtheobligationofcontracts.Thecapacityofthe
chieflawofficerofthestatetoquestiontheconstitutionalityofthe
statutewas
90
90
Peoplevs.Vera.
itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through

Champlin,J.:
"* * * The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning
thevalidityofalawenactedbytheirrepresentativesthattoanaccusationby
the people of Michigan of usurpation upon their government, a statute
enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The last
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proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is

unconstitutional,itisastatuteonlyinform,andlackstheforceoflaw,and
isofnomoresavingeffecttojustifyactionunderitthanifithadneverbeen
enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts,
the legislature, and the people must bow. * * * The legislature and the
respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such. constitutional
questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an
acquiescencebyapartyaffectedbyanunconstitutionalactofthelegislature:
'The people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the
constitutionallimitationsupontheexerciseoflegislativepowers.'(Allenvs.
Mckeen,1Sum.,314.)"
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435 158 Pac., 38, 40), an
originalaction(mandamus)wasbroughtbytheAttorneyGeneralof
Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In
disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the
action,'theSupremeCourtofKansassaid:
"* * * The state is a proper partyindeed, the proper partyto bring this
action. The state is always interested where the integrity of its Constitution
orstatutesisinvolved.
" 'lt has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not
disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of
fearingmorespecificinjury.(Statevs.KansasCity,GOKan.,518[57Pac.,
118]').(Statevs.Lawrence,80Kan.,707103Pac.,839.)
"Wheretheconstitutionalityofastatuteisindoubtthestate'slawofficer,
itsAttorneyGeneral,orcountyattor
91
91
Peoplevs.Vera.
ney,mayexercisehisbestjudgmentastowhatsortofactionhewillbringto
havethematterdetermined,eitherbyquowarrantotochallengeitsvalidity
(State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803 60 Pac., 1068 49 L. R. A., 662), by
mandamustocompelobediencetoitsterms(Statevs.Dolley,82Kan.,533
108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its
questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App.,
31945Pac.,122)."
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St.
LouisS.W.Ry.Co.[1917],197S.W.,1006Statevs.S.H.Kress&
Co. [1934], 155 S., 823 State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597
160S.,91Statevs.BoardofCountyComr's[1934],39Pac.[2d],
286FirstConst.Co.ofBrooklynvs.State[1917],221N.Y.,295
116 N. E., 1020 Bush vs. State [1918], 187 Ind., 339 119 N. E.,
417Statevs.Watkins[1933],176La.,837147S.,8,10,11).Inthe
caselastcited,theSupremeCourtofLouisianasaid:
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"It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district

attorney,beingchargedwiththedutyofenforcingthelaws,hasno
right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the
argument, three decisions are cited, viz.: Stateexrel. Hall, District
Attorney,vs.JudgeofTenthJudicialDistrict(33 La.Ann.,1222)
State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New
Orleans (41 La. Ann., 156 6 So., 592) and State exrel. Banking
Co.,etc.vs.Heard,Auditor(47La.Ann.,167918So.,74647L.
R.A.,512).Thesedecisionsdonotforbidadistrictattorneytoplead
that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds it in conflict with one
which it is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District
Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was that the judge should not,
merelybecausehebelievedacertainstatutetobeunconstitutional,
forbid the district attorney to file a bill of information charging a
personwithaviolationofthestatute.Inotherwords,ajudgeshould
notjudiciallydeclareastatuteunconstitutionaluntilthequestionof
constitutionality is tendered f or decision, and unless it must be
decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. State ex
rel.
92
92
Peoplevs.Vera.
Nicholls,Governor,etc.,isauthorityforthepropositionmerelythat
an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its
provisionscannotavoidthedutyuponthegroundthatheconsiders
thestatuteunconstitutional,andhenceinenforcingthestatuteheis
immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State
exrel.BankingCo.,etc.,isauthorityforthepropositionmerelythat
executiveofficers,e.g.,thestateauditorandstatetreasurer,should
not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a
statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is
unconstitutional.
"Itisthedutyofadistrictattorneytoenforcethecriminallawsofthestate,
and,aboveall,tosupporttheConstitutionofthestate.If,intheperformance
of his duty he finds two statutes in conflict with each other, or one which
repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two statutes is
unconstitutional,itishisdutytoenforcetheotherand,inordertodoso,he
iscompelledtosubmittothecourt,bywayofaplea,thatoneofthestatutes
isunconstitutional.Ifitwerenotso,thepoweroftheLegislaturewouldbe
freefromconstitutionallimitationsintheenactmentofcriminallaws."
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of

thegeneralpropositionthatthestatemayimpugnthevalidityofits
laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the
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opposite direction. In f act, they appear to have proceeded on the

assumption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no
application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City
Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the
petitionersherein,theprincipalreasonsbeingthatthevalidityofthe
ProbationActcannotbeattackedforthefirsttimebeforethiscourt,
thattheCityFiscalisestoppedfromattackingthevalidityoftheAct
and, not being authorized to enforce laws outside of the City of
Manila, cannot challenge the validity of the Act in its application
outsidesaidcity.(Additionalmemorandumofrespondents,October
23,1937,pp.8,10,17and23.)
93
93
Peoplevs.Vera.
ThemerefactthattheProbationActhasbeenrepeatedlyreliedupon
inthepastandallthattimehasnotbeenattackedasunconstitutional
by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly
regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the
People of the Philippines estopped from now assailing its validity.
For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when
presentedbeforeitinbonafidecasesfordetermination,andthefact
thatthequestionhasnotbeenraisedbeforeisnotavalidreasonfor
refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are
justifiedinrelyinguponthestatuteandtreatingitasvaliduntilitis
heldvoidbythecourtsinpropercases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the
constitutionalityofActNo.4221isnecessarytotheresolutionofthe
instantcase.For,"***whilethecourtwillmeetthequestionwith
firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of
wisdom, and a just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to
waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other
points."(ExparteRandolph[1833],20F.Cas.No.11,5582Brock.
447.Vide, also, Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has
been held that the determination of a constitutional question is
necessarywheneveritisessentialtothedecisionofthecase(12C.
J.,p.782,citingLongSaultDev.Co.vs.Kennedy[1913],158App.
Div.,398143N.Y.Supp.,454[aff.212N.Y.,1105N.E.,849
Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56 and app dism 242 U. S., 272] Hesse vs.
Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520 Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt
[63Va.],458UnionLineCo.vs.WisconsinR.Commn.,146Wis.,
523 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party is? founded
solely on a statute, the validity of which is attacked. (12 C. J., p.
782,citingCentralGlassCo.vs.NiagaraF.Ins.Co., 131 La., 513
59S.,972Cheneyvs.Beverly,188Mass.,8174N.E.,306).There
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is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to

probationsolelyfromActNo.4221nowbeingassailed.
Apartfromtheforegoingconsiderations,thiscourtwill
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also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new
additiontoourstatutebooksanditsvalidityhasneverbeforebeen
passeduponbythecourtsthatmanypersonsaccusedandconvicted
ofcrimeintheCityofManilahaveappliedforprobationthatsome
ofthemarealreadyonprobationthatmorepeoplewilllikelytake
advantageoftheProbationActinthefutureandthattherespondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four
years since his first conviction. All await the decision of this court
on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent
multiplicityofsuits,strongreasonsofpublicpolicydemandthatthe
constitutionalityofActNo.4221benowresolved.(YuCongEngvs.
Trinidad[1925],47Phil.,385[1926],271U.S.,50070Law.ed.,
1059.See6R.C.L.,pp.77,78Peoplevs.Kennedy[1913],207N.
Y., 533 101 N. E., 442, 444 Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616 Borginis vs.
FalkCo.[1911],147Wis.,327133N.W.,209,21137L.R.A.[N.
S.], 489 Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil.,
304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation
confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal
rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these
proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet
interpretedbythecourts,intheinterestofthepublicwelfareandfor
the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule
thedefenseofwantofjurisdictioninorderthatwemaydecidethe
mainissue.Wehavehereanextraordinarysituationwhichcallsfora
relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was
sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more
binding authority in support of the view we have taken can not be
found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the
constitutionalityofActNo.4221hasbeenproperlyraised.Nowfor
themaininquiry:IstheActunconstitutional?
UnderadoctrinepeculiarlyAmerican,itistheofficeanddutyof
thejudiciarytoenforcethe'Constitution.This
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court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2,

subsection1,andsection10,ofArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,may
declareanactofthenationallegislatureinvalidbecauseinconflict
with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to
enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to
giveeffecttothesupremelawbysettingasideastatuteinconflict
therewith.Thisisoftheessenceofjudicialduty.
Thiscourtisnotunmindfulofthefundamentalcriteriaincasesof
thisnaturethatallreasonabledoubtsshouldberesolvedinfavorof
theconstitutionalityofastatute.Anactofthelegislatureapproved
bytheexecutive,ispresumedtobewithinconstitutionalIimitations.
The responsibility of upholding the Constitution. .rests not on the
courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the
validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative
departmentofthegovernmentitself."(U.S.vs.TenYu,[1912],24
Phil.,1,10Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil.,
250,276U.S.vs.Joson[1913],26Phil.,1.) And a statute finally
comesbeforethecourtssustainedbythesanctionoftheexecutive.
ThemembersoftheLegislatureand.theChiefExecutivehavetaken
an oath. to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that
theyhavebeentruetothisoathandthatinenactingandsanctioning
aparticularlawthey,didnotintendtoviolatetheConstitution.The
courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the
solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the
government. (6 R. G. L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar
political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom
of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an
elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will
notsetasidealawasviolativeoftheConstitutionexceptinaclear
case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of
authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his
impassionedargument,calledattentiontothefactthatthePresident
of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the
constitutionalityoftheProbationAct,
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advertingthatastotheExecutivetheresolutionofthisquestionwas
a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence
intheintegrityandindependenceofthiscourt.Wetakenoticeofthe
fact that the President in his message dated September 1, 1937,
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recommendedtotheNationalAssemblytheimmediaterepealofthe
ProbationAct(No.4221)thatthismessageresultedintheapproval
ofBillNo.2417oftheNationalAssemblyrepealingtheProbation
Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned but that said
bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much
againsthiswish,"tohavestrickenoutfromthestatutebooksofthe
Commonwealthalaw***unfairandverylikelyunconstitutional."'
Itissufficienttoobserveinthisconnectionthat,invetoingthebill
referredto,thePresidentexercisedhisconstitutionalprerogative.He
mayexpressthereasonswhichhemaydeemproperfortakingsuch
astep,buthisreasonsarenotbindinguponusinthedetermination
ofactualcontroversiessubmittedforourdetermination.Whetheror
not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his
opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional
power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending
determination in this court is a question of propriety for him
exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed
by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our
judgmentonewayoranotherandpreventusfromtakingwhatinour
opinionisthepropercourseofactiontotakeinagivencase.Ifitis
evernecessaryforustomakeanyvehementaffirmanceduringthis
formativeperiodofourpoliticalhistory,itisthatweareindependent
of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our
governmentindependent in the performance of our functions,
undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to
popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our
sworndutyasweseeitandasweunderstandit.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three
principalgrounds:(1)ThatsaidActencroaches
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uponthepardoningpoweroftheExecutive(2)thatitconstitutesan
undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the
equalprotectionofthelaws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
commonly known as the Jones Law, in force at the time of the
approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act,
vests in the GovernorGeneral of the Philippines "the exclusive
power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and
forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the
Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the
Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The
adjective"exclusive"foundintheJonesLawhasbeenomittedfrom
the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon
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couldbegrantedanytimeafterthecommissionoftheoffense,either
before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United States,
Art. II, sec. 2 In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor
General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President
oftheUnitedStates,topardonapersonbeforethefactsofthecase
werefullybroughttolight.TheframersofourConstitutionthought
this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions,
provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after
conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning
power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the
rulegenerallyfollowedintheUnitedStates(VideConstitutionofthe
UnitedStates,Art.II,sec.2).TheruleinEnglandisdifferent.There,
aroyalpardoncannotbepleadedinbarofanimpeachment"but,"
says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard
and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is
further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18
How., 307 15 Law. ed., 421 Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109
Mass., 323 12 Am. Rep., 699 Sterlingvs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio
St., 457 23 Am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the distinction is
obvious. In England, judgment on impeachment is not confined to
mere"removalfrom
98
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office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor,

trust,orprofitundertheGovernment"(Art.IX,sec.4,Constitution
ofthePhilippines)butextendstothewholepunishmentattachedby
lawtotheoffensecommitted.TheHouseofLords,onaconviction
may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual
banishment,fineorimprisonment,dependinguponthegravityofthe
offensecommitted,togetherwithremovalfromofficeandincapacity
to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also
makesspecificmentionof"commutation"andofthepowerofthe
executivetoimpose,inthepardonshemaygrantssuchconditions,
restrictionsandlimitationsashemaydeemproper,Amnestymaybe
granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the
concurrenceoftheNationalAssembly.Weneednotdwellatlength
onthesignificanceofthesefundamentalchanges.Itissufficientfor
our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained
essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of
the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by the
ProbationAct?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power
exclusivelyintheChiefExecutive.Theexerciseofthepowermay
not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. " * * * The benign
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prerogativeofmercyreposedintheexecutivecannotbetakenaway
nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be
given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The
coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the
pardoningpower,sincenopersonproperlybelongingtooneofthe
departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the
others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution."
(20 R. C. L,, pp. 540, 541, and cases cited.) "* * * where the
pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or
implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can
neither exercise such power itself nor delegate It elsewhere, nor
interferewithorcontroltheproperexer
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99
Peoplevs.Vera.
cisethereof,***."(12C.J.,pp.838,839,andcasescited.)IfAct
No. 4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is
forthatreasonunconstitutionalandvoid.Butdoesit?
InthefamousKillittsdecisioninvolvinganembezzlementcase,
theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesruledin1916thatanorder
indefinitelysuspending sentence was void.(Ex parte United States
[1916],242U.S.,27 61 Law. ed.,129L. R. A. 1917E, 1178 37
Sup.Ct.Rep.,72Ann,Cas.1917B,355.)ChiefJusticeWhite,after
anexhaustivereviewoftheauthorities,expressedtheopinionofthe
courtthatunderthecommonlawthepowerofthecourtwaslimited
to temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentence
absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch of
thegovernmentandnotinthejudiciary.But,therightofCongressto
establishprobationbystatutewasconceded.Saidthecourtthrough
itsChiefJustice:"***andsofarasthefutureisconcerned,thatis,
thecausingoftheimpositionofpenaltiesasfixedtobesubject,by
probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind
maydevise,tosuchjudicialdiscretionasmaybeadequatetoenable
courtstomeetbytheexerciseofanenlargedbutwisediscretionthe
infinite variations which may be presented to them for judgment,
recourse must be had to Congress whose legislative power on the
subject is in the very nature of things adequately complete."
('Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This
decisionledtheNationalProbationAssociationandotherstoagitate
for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such
actionwasfinallytakenonMarch4,1925(chap.521,43Stat.atL.
1259, U. S. C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an
appropriationtodefraythesalariesandexpensesofacertainnumber
ofprobationofficerschosenbycivilservice.(Johnson,Probationfor
JuvenilesandAdults,p.14.)
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InUnitedStatesvs.Murray([1925],275U.S.,34748Sup.Ct.
Rep.,14672Law.ed.,309),theSupremeCourt
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Peoplevs.Vera.
of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a
person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to
servehissentence,thatcourthasnopowerundertheProbationAct
of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at
which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of
Murray, the constitutionality of the Probation Act was not
consideredbutwasassumed.ThecourttracedthehistoryoftheAct
and,quotedfromthereportoftheCommitteeontheJudiciaryofthe
United States House of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th
Congress,2dSession)thefollowingstatement:
"PriortothesocalledKillittscase,renderedinDecember,1916,thedistrict
courts exercised a form of probation either by suspending sentence or by
placing the defendants under state probation officers or volunteers. In this
case,however(ExparteUnitedStates,242U.S.,2761L.ed.,129L.R.
A., 1917E, 1178 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the
SupremeCourtdeniedtherightofthedistrictcourtstosuspendsentence.In
thesameopinionthecourtpointedoutthenecessityforactionbyCongress
ifthecourtsweretoexerciseprobationpowersinthefuture.***
"Sincethisdecisionwasrendered,twoattemptshavebeenmadetoenact
probationlegislation.In1917,abillwasfavorablyreportedbythe.Judiciary
Committee and passed the House. In 1920, the Judiciary Committee again
favorablyreportedaprobationbilltotheHouse,butitwasneverreachedfor
definiteaction.
"If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal
governmentwithreferencetoitstreatmentofthoseconvictedofviolationsof
its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states of the Union. At the
presenttimeeverystatehasaprobationlaw,andinallbuttwelvestatesthe
law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders." (See, also, Johnson,
ProbationforJuvenilesandAdults[1928],Chap.I.)
Theconstitutionalityofthefederalprobationlawhas
101
101
Peoplevs.Vera.
beensustainedbyinferiorfederalcourts.InRiggsvs.UnitedStates
supra,theCircuitCourtofAppealsoftheFourthCircuitsaid:
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"Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions
under consideration have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of
the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the constitutionality of the act fully
sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach upon the pardoning
power of the President. This case will be f found to contain an able and
comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we
havetoconsider,andtoitandtheauthoritiescitedthereinspecialreference
ismade(Nixvs.James,7F.[2d],590,594),asisalsotoadecisionofthe
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U. S., 10 F.
[2d],762),likewiseconstruingtheProbationAct."
Wehaveseenthatin1916theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates
in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as
possessingtherequisitepowertoenactprobationlaws,thatafederal
probation law was actually enacted in 1925, and that the
constitutionalityoftheActhasbeenassumedbytheSupremeCourt
of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by the
inferiorfederalcourtsinanumberofearliercases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the
Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation law
under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal
offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex
parteBates([1915],20N.M.,542L.R.A.1916A,1285151Pac.,
698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of the
Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to
prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment." And in
Statevs.Abbott([1910],87S.C.,46633L,R.A.[N.S.],11270
S. E., 6 Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative
powertosetpunishmentforcrimeisverybroad,andintheexercise
ofthispowerthegeneral
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Peoplevs.Vera.
assemblymayconferontrialjudges,ifitfit,thelargestdiscretionas
to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the
punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or
conditional."(QuotedinStatevs.Teal[1918],108S.C.,45595S.
E.,69.)Indeed,thePhilippineLegislaturehasdefinedallcrimesand
fixedthepenaltiesfortheirviolation.Invariably,thelegislaturehas
demonstrated the desire to vest in the courtsparticularly the trial
courtslarge discretion in imposing the penalties which the law
prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be
servedbyvestingthispowerinthecourts,theybeinginapositionto
bestdeterminethepenaltieswhichanindividualconvict,peculiarly
circumstanced,shouldsuffer.Thus,whilecourtsarenotallowedto
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refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking into

consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense,thepenaltyprovidedbylawisclearlyexcessive,thecourts
being allowed in such. cases to submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem
proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both
mitigating and aggravating circumstances are attendant in the
commissionofa,crimeandthelawprovidesforapenaltycomposed
of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such
circumstancestooffsetoneanotherinconsiderationoftheirnumber
andimportance,andtoapplythepenaltyaccordingtotheresultof
suchcompensation.(Art.63,rule4,RevisedPenalCodeU. S. vs.
Reguera and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64,
paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to
determine, within the limits of each period, in case the penalty
prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the penalty
according to the number and nature of the aggravating and
mitigatingcircumstancesandtheextentoftheevilproducedbythe
crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any
amountwithinthelimitsestablishedbylaw,consideringnotonlythe
mitigatingandaggravatingcircumstances,butmore
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Peoplevs.Vera.
particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised

PenalCode.)Article68,paragraph1,ofthesameCodeprovidesthat
"a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under
fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without
discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least than that
prescribedbylawforthecrimewhichhehascommitted.Article69
ofthesameCodeprovidesthatincaseof"incompleteselfdefense",
i.e.,whenthecrimecommittedisnotwhollyexcusablebyreasonof
thelackofsomeoftheconditionsrequiredtojustifythesameorto
exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in
articles11and12oftheCode,"thecourtsshallImposethepenalty
intheperiodwhichmaybedeemedproper,inviewofthenumber
andnatureoftheconditionsofexemptionpresentorlacking."And.
incasethecommissionofwhatareknownas"impossible"crimes,
"the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either
arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59,
RevisedPenalCode.)
Under our' Revised Penal Code, also, onehalf of the period of
preventive imprisonment is deducted from the entire term of
imprisonment,exceptincertaincasesexpresslymentioned(art.29)
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thedeathpenaltyisnotimposedwhentheguiltypersonismorethan
seventyyearsofage,orwhereuponappealorrevisionofthecaseby
the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in
theirvoting'astotheproprietyoftheimpositionofthedeathpenalty
(art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as
amendedbyCommonwealthActNo.3)thedeathsentenceisnotto
beinflicteduponawomanwithinthethreeyearsnextfollowingthe
date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person
over seventy years of age (art, 83) and when a convict shall
become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been
pronounced, or while he is serving his sentence, the execution of
saidsentenceshallbesuspendedwithregardtothe
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Peoplevs.Vera.
personalpenaltyduringtheperiodofsuchinsanityorimbecility(art.
79).
Butthedesireofthelegislaturetorelaxwhatmightresultinthe
undue harshness of the penal laws is more clearly demonstrated in
variousotherenactments,includingtheprobationAct.Thereisthe
Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and
subsequently amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of
parole (secs. 5 to 10) and granting the courts large discretion in
imposingthepenaltiesofthelaw.Section1ofthelawasamended
provides: "Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attendingcircumstances,couldbeproperlyimposedundertherules
ofthesaidCode,andtoaminimumwhichshallbewithintherange
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
saidlawandtheminimumshallnotbelessthantheminimumterm
prescribedbythesame."Certainclassesofconvictsare,bysection2
ofthelaw,excludedfromtheoperationthereof.TheLegislaturehas
also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which
was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the
original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become
article80oftheRevisedPenalCode,amendedbyActNo.4117of
the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by
CommonwealthActNo.99,oftheNationalAssembly.Finallycame
the (Adult) Probation Act now in question. In this Act is again
manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal
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laws.Itallows,ineffect,themodificationinparticularcasesofthe
penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the
execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after
duehearingandafterinvestigationofthepar
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Peoplevs.Vera.
ticular circumstances of the offense, the criminal record, if any, of

the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality
decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered
by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are faithfully
observed.Ifthisbeso,then,itcannotbesaidthattheProbationAct
comes in conflict with the power of the Chief Executive to grant
pardonsandreprieves,because,tousethelanguageoftheSupreme
CourtofNewMexico,"theelementofpunishmentorthepenaltyfor
thecommissionofawrong,whiletobedeclaredbythecourtsasa
judicialfunctionunderandwithinthelimitsoflawasannouncedby
legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of
criminalcauses,withwhichtheexecutivecanhavenothingtodo,"
(ExparteBates,supra.)InWilliamsvs.State([1926],162Ga.,327
133S.E.,843),thecourtupheldtheconstitutionalityoftheGeorgia
probationstatuteagainstthecontentionthatitattemptedtodelegate
tothecourtsthepardoningpowerlodgedbytheconstitutioninthe
governorofthestateandobservedthat"whilethegovernoraloneis
vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been
imposedbythecourts,thepowerofthecourtstoimposeanypenalty
which may be from time to time prescribed by law and in such
mannerasmaybedefinedcannotbequestioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases
disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in
the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentence, by
probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the
pardoningpoweroftheexecutive.(InreWebb[1895],89Wis.(354
27L.R.A.,35646Am.St.Rep.,84662N.W.,1779Am.Crim.
Rep.,702Stateexrel.Summerfieldvs.Moran[1919],43Nev.,150
182Pac.,927ExparteClendenning[1908],22Okla.,1031Okla.
Crim.Rep.,22719L.R.A.[N.S.],1041132Am.St.Rep.,628
97Pac.,650Peoplevs.Barrett[1903],202111.,28767N.E.,23
63L.R.A.,8295Am.St.Rep.,230Snodgrassvs.State[1912],67
Tex.Crim.
106
106
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Peoplevs.Vera.
Rep.,61541L.R.A.[N,S.],1144150S.W.,162ExparteShelor
[1910],33Nev.,361111Pac.,291Nealvs.State[1898],104Ga.,
50942L.R.A.,19069Am.St.Rep.,17530S.E.,858Stateex
rel Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630 181 N. W., 839
People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15 19 N. W., 571 State vs. Dalton
[1903],109Tenn.,54472S,W.,456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra.(Nixvs. James [1925 C. C.
A.,9th],7F.[2d],590Archervs.Snook[1926D.C.],10F.[2d],
567 Riggs. vs. United States [1926 C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5
Murphyvs.State[1926],171Ark.,6202863.W.,87148A.L.R.,
1189 Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166 122 Pac., 831 Re
Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530 265 Pac., 392 Ex parte De
Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730 300 Pac., 874 People vs. Patrick
[1897], 118 Cal., 332 50 Pac., 425 Martin vs. People [1917], 69
Colo.,60168Pac.,1171Beldenvs.Hugo[1914],88Conn.,5091
A.,369,370,371Williamsvs.State [1926], 162 Ga., 327 133 S.
E., 843 People vs. Heise [1913], 257 111., 443 100 N. E., 1000
Parkervs.State [1893], 135 Ind., 534 35 N. E., 179 23 L. R. A.,
859 St. Hilarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522 64 Atl., 882
Peoplevs.Stickle(1909],156Mich.,557121N.W.,497Statevs.
Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529 State ex rel. Bottomnly vs.
DistrictCourt[1925],73Mont,541237Pac.,525Statevs.Everitt
[1913],164N.C.,39979S.E.,27447L.R.A.[N.S.],848State
exrelBuckleyvs.Drew[1909],75N.H.,40274Atl,875Statevs.
Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430 82 Atl. 424 Ex parte Bates
[1915], 20' N. M., 542 L. R. A., 1916 A, 1285 151 Pac., 698
Peopleexrel.Forsythvs.CourtofSessions[1894],141N.Y.,288
23L.R.A.,85636N.E.,38615Am.Crim.Rep.,675Peopleex
rel.Sullivanvs.Flynn[1907],55Misc.,639106'N.Y.Supp.,928
Peoplevs.Goodrich[1914],149N.Y.Supp.,406Moorevs.Thorn
[1935],245App.Div.,180281N.Y.Supp.,49ReHart[1914],29
N. D.,38L.R.A.,1915C,1169149N.W.,568Ex parte Eaton
[1925],29Okla.,Crim.Rep.,275233P.,781
107
107
Peoplevs.Vera.
Statevs.Teal[1918],108S.C., 455 95 S. E., 69State vs. Abbot

[1910], 87 S. C., 466 33 L. R. A. [N. S.], 112 70 S. E., 6 Ann.
Cas.,1912B,1189Fultsvs.State[1854],34Tenn.,232Woodsvs.
State [1814], 180 Tenn., 100 169 S. W., 558 Baker vs. State.
[1913], 70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618 158 S. W., 998 Cook vs. State
[1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548 165 S. W., 573 King vs. State
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[1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394 162 S. W., 890 Clare vs. State
[1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211 54 S. W. [2d], 127 Re Hall
[1927],100Vt.,197136A.,24Richardsonvs.Com.[1921],131
Va.,802109S.E.,460Statevs.Mallahan[1911],65Wash.,287
118Pac.,42StateexrelTingstad vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash.,
561 206' Pac., 29 26 A. L. R., 393 396.) We elect to follow this
long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally
authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the
establishmentofasystemofprobationhowevercharacterized.State
exrel.Tingstadvs.Starwich([1922],119Wash.,561206Pac.,29
26A.L.R.,393),deservedparticularmention.Inthatcase,astatute
enactedin1921whichprovidedforthesuspensionoftheexecution
ofasentenceuntilotherwiseorderedbythecourt,andrequiredthat
theconvictedpersonbeplacedunderthechargeofaparoleorpeace
officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms as the
courtmaydetermine, was held constitutional and as not giving the
courtapowerinviolationoftheconstitutionalprovisionvestingthe
pardoningpowerinthechiefexecutiveofthestate.(Vide,also,Re
Giannini[1912],18Cal.App.,166122Pac.,831.)
Probationandpardonarenotcoterminousnoraretheythesame.
They are actually distinct and different from each other, both in
originandinnature.InPeopleexrelForsythvs. Court of Sessions
([1894],141N.Y.,288,29436N.E.,386,38823L.R.A.,856
15Am.Crim.Rep.,675),theCourtofAppealsofNewYorksaid:
"* * * The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant
reprieves and pardons, as understood when the constitution was
adopted,aretotallydistinctanddifferent
108
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Peoplevs.Vera.
in their origin and nature. The former was always a part of the
judicialpowerthelatterwasalwaysapartoftheexecutivepower.
The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of
thecourttemporarilyorindefinitely,buttheconvictionandliability
followingit,andallcivildisabilities,remainandbecomeoperative
whenjudgmentisrendered.Apardonreachesboththepunishment
prescribedfortheoffenseandtheguiltoftheoffender.Itreleasesthe
punishment,andblotsoutofexistencetheguilt,sothatintheeyeof
thelaw,theoffenderisasinnocentasifhehadnevercommittedthe
offense.Itremovesthepenaltiesanddisabilities,andrestoreshimto
all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
himanewcreditandcapacity.(ExparteGarland,71U,S.,4Wall,
333 18 Law ed., 366 U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall, 128 20
Law.ed.,519Knotevs.U.S.,95U.S.,14924Law.ed.,442.)
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"The framers of the federal and state constitutions were perfectly familiar
with the principles governing the power to grant pardons, and it was
conferredbytheseinstrumentsupontheexecutivewithfullknowledgeofthe
lawuponthesubject,andthewordsoftheconstitutionwereusedtoexpress
the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its
representativesinthecolonies.(ExparteWells,59U.S.,18How,,30715
Law. ed., 421.) As this power was understood, it did not comprehend any
partofthejudicialfunctionstosuspendsentence,anditwasneverintended
that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any
degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments,
thatcriminalcourtshadsolongmaintained.Thetwopowers,sodistinctand
differentintheirnatureandcharacter,werestillleftseparateanddistinct,the
one to be exercised by the executive, and .the other by the judicial
department.Wethereforeconcludethatastatutewhich,interms,authorizes
courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after
conviction,a power inherent in such courts at common law, which was
understoodwhenthe
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109
Peoplevs.Vera.
constitutionwasadoptedtobeanordinaryjudicialfunction,andwhich,ever
since its adoption, has been exercised by the courts, is a valid exercise of
legislative power under the constitution. It does not encroach, in any just
sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been understood and
practiced from the earliest times." (Quoted with approval in Director of
Prisonsvs.JudgeofFirstInstanceofCavite[1915],29Phil.,265,Carson,
J.,concurring,atpp.294,295.)
Inprobation,theprobationerisinnotruesense,asinpardon,afree
man.Heisnotfinallyandcompletelyexonerated.Heisnotexempt
from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the
ProbationAct,theprobationer'scaseisnotterminatedbythemere
factthatheisplacedonprobation.Section4oftheActprovidesthat
the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer
finally discharged from supervision only after the period of
probationshallhavebeenterminatedandtheprobationofficershall
have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the
probationer has complied with the conditions of probation. The
probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal
custodysubject to the control of the probation officer and of the
court and, he may be rearrested upon the nonfulfillment of the
conditionsofprobationand,whenrearrested,maybecommittedto
prisontoservethesentenceoriginallyimposeduponhim.(Secs.2,
3,5and6,ActNo.4221.)
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"Theprobationdescribedintheactisnotpardon.Itisnotcompleteliberty,
andmaybefarfromit.Itisreallyanewmodeofpunishment,tobeapplied
by the judge in a proper case, in substitution of the imprisonment and fine
prescribedbythecriminallaws,Forthisreasonitsapplicationisaspurelya
judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed applicable to
the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the
criminallaw,whichbindsanddirectsthejudges,orratherisoutsideofand
aboveit.Thereisthusnoconflictwiththepardoningpower,andnopossible
unconstitutionality
110
110
Peoplevs.Vera.
of the Probation Act for this cause." (Archervs.Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d],

567,569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from

commutationofthe.sentence.Snodgrassvs.State ([1912], 67 Tex.
Crim.Rep.,61541L.R.A.[N.S.],1144150S.W.16'2),isrelied
uponmoststronglybythepetitionersasauthorityinsupportoftheir
contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having
beenvestedexclusivelyupontheChiefExecutivebytheJonesLaw,
maynotbeconferredbythelegislatureuponthecourtsbymeansof
a probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of
sentence. We have examined that case and found that although the
CourtofCriminalAppealsofTexasheldthattheprobationstatuteof
thestateintermsconferredonthedistrictcourtsthepowertogrant
pardonstopersonsconvictedofcrime,italsodistinguishedbetween
suspension of sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and
commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through
Harper,J.:
"Thatthepowertosuspendthesentencedoesnotconflictwiththepowerof
the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various
courtsitbeingheldthatthedistinctionbetweena'reprieve'andasuspension
ofsentenceisthatareprievepostponestheexecutionofthesentencetoaday
certain,whereasasuspensionisforanindefinitetime.(Carnalvs.People,1
Parker, Cr. R., 262 Inre Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264 40 N. E., 883), and
casescitedin7Words&Phrases,pp.6115,6116.Thislawcannotbeheld
inconflictwiththepowerconfidingintheGovernortograntcommutations
ofpunishment,foracommutationisbuttochangethepunishmentassessed
toalesspunishment."
InStateexrel Bottomly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541

237 Pac., 525), the Supreme Court of Montana had under
consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state
enacted in 1913, now found in sections 1207812086, Revised
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Codesof1921.Thecourtheldthelawvalidasnotimpingingupon
thepardoning
111
111
Peoplevs.Vera.
poweroftheexecutive.InaunanimousdecisionpennedbyJustice
Holloway,thecourtsaid:
"* * * the terms 'pardon,' 'commutation,' and 'respite' each had a
wellunderstood meaning at the time our Constitution was adopted, and no
oneofthemwasintendedtocomprehendthesuspensionoftheexecutionof
a judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 1207812086. A 'pardon'
isanactofgrace,proceedingfromthepowerintrustedwiththeexecutionof
the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the
punishmentthelawinflictsforacrimehehascommitted(UnitedStatesvs.
Wilson, 7 Pet., 150 8 Law. ed., 640) It is a remission of guilt (Statevs.
Lewis, 111 La., 693 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs.
MiddlesexCounty, 26 N. J. Law, 326 Exparte Powell, 73 Ala., 517 49
Am.Rep.,71).'Commutation'isaremissionofapartofthepunishmenta
substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs.
Murphy,22Grat.[Va.],78912Am.Rep.,563Richvs.Chamberlain,107
Mich.,38165N.W.,235).A'reprieve'or'respite'isthewithholdingofa
sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a
postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.],
272),atemporarysuspensionofexecution(Butlerus.State,97Ind.,373).
"Fewadjudicatedcasesaretobefoundinwhichthevalidityofastatute
similar to our section 12078 has been determined but the same objections
have been urged against parole statutes which vest the power to parole in
personsotherthanthosetowhomthepowerofpardonisgranted,andthese
statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous
casescitedinthenotestoWoodsvs.State(130Tenn.,100169S.W.,558,
reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L.,
524.)"
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the
pardoningpoweroftheExecutive.Thepardoningpower,inrespect
to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and
completeasiftheProbation
112
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Peoplevs.Vera.
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dontheprobationerandthusplaceitbeyondthepowerofthecourt
to order his rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States
[1926],14F.[2d],5,7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the
pardoning power of the executive and is not for that reason void,
does section 11 thereof constitute, as conrended, an undue
delegationoflegislativepower?
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent
organs:thelegislative,theexecutiveandthejudicial.Eachofthese
departments of the government derives its authority from the
Constitutionwhich,inturn,isthehighestexpressionofpopularwill.
Eachhasexclusivecognizanceofthematterswithinitsjurisdiction,
andissupremewithinitsownsphere.
The power to make lawsthe legislative poweris vested in a
bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a
unicameralNationalAssemblybytheConstitution(Art.VI,sec.1,
Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the
NationalAssemblymaynotescapeitsdutiesandresponsibilitiesby
delegatingthatpowertoanyotherbodyorauthority.Anyattemptto
abdicatethepowerisunconstitutionalandvoid,ontheprinciplethat
potestasdelegatanondelegarepotest.Thisprincipleissaidtohave
originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law
through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of
agency,wasestablishedbyLordCokeintheEnglishpubliclawin
decisionsforbiddingthedelegationofjudicialpower,andfoundits
wayintoAmericaasanenlightenedprincipleoffreegovernment.It
hassincebecomeanacceptedcorollaryoftheprincipleofseparation
of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66'.) The classic
statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative
neithermustnorcantransferthepowerofmakinglawstoanybody
else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on
Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine
inthefol
113
113
Peoplevs.Vera.
lowing oftquoted language: "One of the settled maxims in

constitutionallawis,thatthepowerconferreduponthelegislatureto
makelawscannotbedelegatedbythatdepartmenttoanyotherbody
orauthority.Wherethesovereignpowerofthestatehaslocatedthe
authority, there it must remain and by the constitutional agency
alonethelawsmustbemadeuntiltheConstitutionitselfischanged.
The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high
prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the
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responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power

shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people
have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with
approvalinU.S.vs.Barrias[1908],11Phil.,327.)Thiscourtposits
the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
interveningmindofanother.(U.S.vs.Barrias,supra,atp.330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative
power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An
exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
(Rubivs.ProvincialBoardofMindoro[1919],39Phil.,660U. S.
vs.Salaveria[1918],39Phil.,102Stoutenburghvs.Hennick[1889],
129 U. S., 141 32 Law. ed., 637 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256 State vs.
Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our
system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local
authorities, and general affairs by the central authority and hence
while the rule is also fundamental that the power. to make laws
cannot be delegated, the creation of municipalities exercising local
selfgovernmenthasneverbeenheldtotrenchuponthatrule.Such
legislationisnotregardedasatransferofgeneral
114
114
Peoplevs.Vera.
legislativepower,butratherasthegrantoftheauthoritytoprescribe
local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject of
course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity."
(Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle,
Congress is empowered to delegate legislative power to such
agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A
territorystandsinthesamerelationtoCongressasamunicipalityor
citytothestategovernment.(UnitedStatesvs.Heinszen[1907],206
U.S.,370 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742. 51 L. ed., 1098 11 Ann. Cas.,
688Dorrvs.UnitedStates[1904],195U.S.,13824Sup.Ct.Rep.,
80849Law.ed.,1281Ann.Cas.,697.)Courtshavealsosustained
the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some
authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841,
,842 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing Peoplevs.Kennedy [1913], 207 N.
Y., 533 101 N. E., 442 Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the
question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in
form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has
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beenheldnottobeajudicialbutapoliticalquestion(PacificStates
Tel.&Tel.Co.vs.Oregon[1912],223U.S.,11856Law.ed.,377
32Sup.Ct.Rep.,224),andastheconstitutionalityofsuchlawshas
beenlookeduponwithfavorbycertainprogressivecourts,thesting
ofthedecisionsofthemoreconservativecourtshasbeenprettywell
drawn.(OpinionsoftheJustices[1894],160Mass.,58636N.E.,
48823L.R.A,.113Kiernanvs.Portland[1910],57Ore.,454111
Pac.,379112Pac.,',0237L.R.A.[N.S.],332PacificStatesTel.
& Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power
maybedelegatedbytheConstitutionitself.Section14,paragraph2,
ofarticleVIoftheConstitutionofthePhilippinesprovidesthat"The
National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within
specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage
and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the
Constitutionprovidesthat"Intimesofwarorother
115
115
Peoplevs.Vera.
national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize

thePresident,foralimitedperiodandsubjecttosuchrestrictionsas
itmayprescribe,topromulgaterulesandregulationstocarryouta
declarednationalpolicy."Itisbeyondthescopeofthisdecisionto
determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing
constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to
exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand,
whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the
Constitutionitself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions
hereinabovementioned.
ThechallengedsectionofActNo.4221issection11whichreads
asfollows:
"This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which. the respective
provincialboardshaveprovidedforthesalaryofaprobationofficeratrates
not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation
officersshallbeappointedbytheSecretaryofJusticeandshallbesubjectto
thedirectionoftheProbationOffice."(Underscoringours.)
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of

legislativepowerornot,itisusualtoinquirewhetherthestatutewas
completeinallitstermsandprovisionswhenitleftthehandsofthe
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In
United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court
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adheredtotheforegoingrulewhenitheldanactofthelegislature
voidinsofarasitundertooktoauthorizetheGovernorGeneral,in
hisdiscretion,toissueaproclamationfixingthepriceofriceandto
makethesaleofitinviolationoftheproclamationacrime.(Seeand
cf. Compaa General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility
Commissioners[1916],34Phil.,136.)Thegeneralrule,however,is
limitedbyanotherrulethattoacertainextentmattersofdetailmay
be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgatedbyexecutive
116
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Peoplevs.Vera.
officersandadministrativeboards.(6R.C.L.,pp.177179.)
ForthepurposesoftheProbationAct,theprovincialboardsmay
be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to
determine when the Act should take effect in their respective
provinces.Theyaretheagentsordelegatesofthelegislatureinthis
respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to
administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least
indicativeoftherulewhichshouldbehereadopted.Anexamination
ofavarietyofcasesondelegationofpowertoadministrativebodies
will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be
broadlyassertedthattherationalerevolvesaroundthepresenceor
absenceofastandardorruleofactionorthesufficiencythereof
inthestatute,toaidthedelegateinexercisingthegranteddiscretion.
Insomecases,itisheldthatthestandardissufficientinothersthat
it is insufficient and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a
rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it
does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrativeofficerorboardmaybeguidedintheexerciseofthe
discretionarypowersdelegatedtoit.(SeeSchectervs.UnitedStates
[1925],295U.S.,49579L.ed.,157055Sup.Ct.Rep.,83797A.
L.R.,947Peopleexrel,Ricevs.WilsonOilCo.[1936],364111.,
4064N.E.[2d],847107A.L.R.,1500andcasescited.Seealso
R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec. 174.) In the case at bar,
whatrulesaretoguidetheprovincialboardsintheexerciseoftheir
discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act
shallapplyintheirrespectiveprovinces?Whatstandardsarefixed
bytheAct?Wedonotfindanyandnonehasbeenpointedtousby
therespondents.TheprobationActdoesnot,bytheforceofanyof
its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any
standardorguideintheexerciseoftheirdiscretionarypower.What
is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the
recentcaseofSchecter,supra,isa"rovingcommission"
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Peoplevs.Vera.
whichenablestheprovincialboardstoexercisearbitrarydiscretion.
Bysection11oftheAct,thelegislaturedoesseeminglyonitsown
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces
but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial
boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the
various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicabilityandapplicationoftheProbationActareentirelyplaced
inthehandsoftheprovincialboards.Ifaprovincialboarddoesnot
wishtohavetheActappliedinitsprovince,allthatithastodoisto
decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probationofficer.TheplainlanguageoftheActisnotsusceptibleof
anyotherinterpretation.This,toourminds,isavirtualsurrenderof
legislativepowertotheprovincialboards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of
powertomakethelaw,whichnecessarilyinvolvesadiscretionastowhatit
shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercisedunderandinpursuanceofthelaw.Thefirstcannotbedonetothe
latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
ClintonCountyComrs.[1852]1OhioSt.,77,88.Seealso,Sutherlandon
Statutory Construction, sec. 68.) To the same effect are decisions of this
court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917],
36 Phil., 547) Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil.,
660),andCruzvs.Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these
cases, this court sustained the validity of a law conferring upon the
GovernorGeneralauthoritytoadjustprovincialandmunicipalboundaries.In
the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non
Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be
selectedbytheprovincialgovernorandapprovedbytheprovincialboard.In
thethirdcase,itwasheldproperforthelegislaturetovestintheGovernor
Generalauthoritytosuspendornot,athisdiscretion,theprohibitionofthe
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Peoplevs.Vera.
importationofforeigncattle,suchprohibitiontoberaised"iftheconditions
of the country make this advisable or if disease among foreign cattle has
ceasedtobeamenacetotheagricultureandlivestockofthelands."
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It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned

with the simple transference of details of execution or the
promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and
regulationstocarryintoeffecttheprovisionsofalaw.Ifwewere,
recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs.
Barrias[1908],11Phil.,327U.S.vs.Molina[1914],29Phil.,119
Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394 Cebu
Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446 U. S. vs. Gomez
[1915],31Phil.,218Rubivs.ProvincialBoardofMindoro[1919],
39Phil.,660.)
It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to
theeffectaslawafteritleavesthehandsofthelegislature.Itistrue
that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by
proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a
particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170172 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs.
Southard([1825],10Wheat.16Law.ed.,253),theSupremeCourt
oftheUnitedStatesruledthatthelegislaturemaydelegateapower
not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. (Vide, also,
Dowlingvs.LancashireIns.Co.[1896],92Wis.,6365N.W.,738
31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power
which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
takingintoeffectofalaw.Thatisamentalprocesscommontoall
branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co.,
supralnreVillageofNorthMilwaukee[1896],93Wis.,61697N.
W., 1033 33 L. R. A., 938 Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120
108N.W.,210Fieldvs.Clark[1892],143U.S.,64912Sup.Ct.,
495 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency,
however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative
authorityon
119
119
Peoplevs.Vera.
account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces

at work in this modern industrial age (Petitioner, Public
Administration[1936]ch.XXLaski,"TheMotherofParliaments",
Foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569579 Beard,
"SquirtGun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930,
Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge
Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement
in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United
States in the following languagespeaking of declaration of
legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which
permitsthelegislaturetoprovidethattheadministrativeagentmay
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determine when the circumstances are such as require the

applicationofalawisdefendeduponthegroundthatatthetimethis
authorityisgranted,theruleofpublicpolicy,whichistheessenceof
thelegislativeact,isdeterminedbythelegislature.Inotherwords,
the legislature, as it is its duty to do, determines that, under given
circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be
taken,andthat,underothercircumstances,differentornoactionat
all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is
notthelegislativedeterminationofwhatpublicpolicydemands,but
simplytheascertainmentofwhatthefactsofthecase'requiretobe
done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed."
(WilloughbyontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,2nded.,Vol.
III,p.1637.)InMillervs.Mayer,etc.,ofNewYork([1883],109U.
S.,385 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said:
"TheefficiencyofanActasadeclarationoflegislativewillmust,of
course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the
contingencyuponwhichtheActshalltakeeffectmaybelefttosuch
agenciesasitmaydesignate."(See,also,12G.J.,p.864Statevs.
Parker[1854],26Vt.,357Blandingvs.Burr[1859],13Cal.,343,
358.)Thelegislature,then,mayprovidethatalawshalltakeeffect
upon the happening of future specified contingencies leaving to
some other person or body the power to determine when the
specifiedcontingencyhas
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Peoplevs.Vera.
arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the
operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or
conditionstobeascertainedbytheprovincialboard.Itleaves,aswe
have already said, the entire operation or nonoperation of the law
upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary
because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not
investigateconditionsorfindanyfact,orawaitthehappeningofany
specified contingency. It is bound by no rule,limited by no
principle of expediency announced by the legislature. It may take
intoconsiderationcertainfactsorconditionsand,again,itmaynot.
Itmayhaveanypurposeornopurposeatall.Itneednotgiveany
reason or have any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to
appropriateanyfundsforthesalaryofaprobationofficer.Thisisa
matter which rests entirely at Its pleasure. The fact that at some
future timewe cannot say whenthe provincial boards may
appropriatefundsforthesalariesofprobationofficersandthusput
the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the
statute.Thetimeofitstakingintoeffect,wereiterate,wouldyetbe
basedsolelyuponthewilloftheprovincialboardsandnotuponthe
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happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the

ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body
otherthanthelegislatureitself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed
withthepowerofsuspendingtheoperationoftheProbationLawin
their respective provinces. In some jurisdictions, constitutions
providethatlawsmaybesuspendedonlybythelegislatureorbyits
authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas
provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state shall be
exercisedexceptbythelegislature"andsection26,articleIofthe
Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation of the laws
shall never be suspended, except by authority of the General
Assembly."Yet,evenprovisionsofthissortdonotconferabsolute
power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be
undoubtedthatthelegislature
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Peoplevs.Vera.
maysuspendalaw,ortheexecutionoroperationofalaw,alawmay
notbesuspendedastocertainindividualsonly,leavingthelawtobe
enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be
made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs.
James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was
said:
"By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of
thiscommonwealth,itisdeclaredthatthepowerofsuspendingthelaws,or
theexecutionofthelaws,oughtnevertobeexercisedbutbythelegislature,
orbyauthorityderivedfromit,tobeexercisedinsuchparticularcasesonly
as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that
declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and
fromthebillofrightspassedinthereignofWilliamandMary.Thebillof
rightscontainsanenumerationoftheoppressiveactsofJamesII,tendingto
subvertandextirpatetheprotestantreligion,andthelawsandlibertiesofthe
kingdom and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of
dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws
withoutconsentofparliament.Thefirstarticleintheclaimordeclarationof
rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such power, by regal
authoritywithoutconsentofparliament,isillegal.Inthetenthsectionofthe
samestatuteitisfurtherdeclaredandenacted,that'Nodispensationbynon
obstanteofortoanystatute,oranypartthereof,shouldbeallowedbutthe
sameshouldbeheldvoidandofnoeffect,exceptadispensationbeallowed
of in such statute.' There is an implied reservation of authority in the
parliament to exercise the power here mentioned because, according to the
theory of the English Constitution, 'that absolute despotic power, which
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mustinallgovernmentsresidesomewhere,'isintrustedtotheparliament:1
BI.Com.,160.
"Theprinciplesofourgovernmentarewidelydifferentinthisparticular.
Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people and the
legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them according to the
constitution.
122
122
Peoplevs.Vera.
It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would be equally

oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to protection,
'accordingtostanding"laws,'whetherexercisedbyonemanorbyanumber
of men. It cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general
principlefromtheEnglishbillofrightsandinsertingitinourconstitution,
intended to bestow by implication on the general court one of the most
odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is
manifestlycontrarytothefirstprinciplesofcivillibertyandnaturaljustice,
and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should
enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like
circumstancesorthatanyoneshouldbesubjecttolosses,damages,suits,or
actionsfromwhichallothersunderlikecircumstancesareexempted,"
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs

madetheownerofanydogliabletotheownerofdomesticanimals
woundedbyitforthedamageswithoutprovingaknowledgeofits
vicious disposition, By a provision of the act, power was given to
the board of supervisors to determine whether or not during the
current year their county should be governed by the provisions of
theactofwhichthatsectionconstitutedapart.Itwasheldthatthe
legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it
could no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of
supervisorsofacountytoabolishinsuchcountythedaysofgrace
on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations.
(Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in
Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs. Field
([1853], 17 Mo., 529 59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general
statuteformulatingaroadsystemcontainedaprovisionthat"ifthe
countycourtofanycountyshouldbeofopinionthattheprovisions
of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion,
suspendtheoperationofthesameforanyspecifiedlengthoftime,
andthereupontheactshouldbecomeinoperativeinsuchcountyfor
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Peoplevs.Vera.
theperiodspecifiedinsuchorderandthereuponordertheroadsto
be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in
force."Saidthecourt:"***thisact,byitsownprovisions,repeals
the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it, is left to the
countycourttosaywhichactshallbeinforceintheircounty.The
act does not submit the question to the county court as an original
question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall
commenceitsoperationwithinthecountybutitbecamebyitsown
termsalawineverycountynotexceptedbynameintheact.Itdid
not, then, require the county court to do any act in order to give it
effect.Butbeingthelawinthecounty,andhavingbyitsprovisions
superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous
laws,thecountycourtis***empowered,tosuspendthisactand
revivetherepealedprovisionsoftheformeract.Whenthequestion
is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law
shall be in force, it is urged before us that the power then to be
exercisedbythecourtisstrictlylegislativepower,whichunderour
constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other
body of men in the state. In the present case, the question is not
presentedintheabstract,forthecountycourtofSalinecounty,after
the act had been for several months in force in that county, did by
order suspend its operation and during that suspension the offense
wascommittedwhichisthesubjectofthepresentindictment***."
(SeeMitchellvs.State[1901],134Ala.,39232S.,687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality
different from those applicable to other localities and, while
recognizingtheforceoftheprinciplehereinaboveexpressed,courts
in many jurisdictions have sustained the constitutionality of the
submissionofoptionlawstothevoteofthepeople.(6R.C.L.,p.
171.)Butoptionlawsthussustainedtreatofsubjectspurelylocalin
character which should receive different treatment in different
localitiesplacedunderdifferentcircumstances."They
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Peoplevs.Vera.
relatetosubjectswhich,liketheretailingofintoxicatingdrinks,or
the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently
regardedindifferentlocalities,andtheyaresustainedonwhatseems
toustheimpregnableground,thatthesubject,thoughnotembraced
within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make byIaws and
ordinances,isneverthelesswithintheclassofpublicregulations,in
respecttowhichitisproperthatthelocaljudgmentshouldcontrol."
(Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that,
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while we do not deny the right of local selfgovernment and the

proprietyofleavingmattersofpurelylocalconcerninthehandsof
local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass
upon, we believe that in matters of general legislation like that
which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general
subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so
unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the
statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may
suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces
but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to
appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation
officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine
whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their
respectiveprovinces,theprovincialboardsareinrealityempowered
by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in
particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the
provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the
necessaryfunds.Thevalidityofalawisnottestedbywhathasbeen
donebutbywhatmaybedoneunderitsprovisions.(WalterE.Olsen
&Co.vs.AldaneseandTrinidad[1922],43Phil.,259 12 C. 3.,p.
786.)
It is conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to
the legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed
legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof.
"Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet
imbecile."(Peoplevs.Reynolds,5Gilman,1.)Ithasbeensaidthat
popular
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Peoplevs.Vera.
government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power

behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of
government is vested in the representatives of the people and that
theserepresentativesarenofurtherrestrainedunderoursystemthan
bytheexpresslanguageoftheinstrumentimposingtherestraint,or
byparticularprovisionswhichbyclearintendment,havethateffect.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 23
Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it
should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a
limitationofpowerandoneofthesetimehonoredlimitationsis.that,
subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be
delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an
improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincialboardsandis,forthisreason,unconstitutionalandvoid.
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3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates, the

provision of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any
personoftheequalprotectionofthelaws(Art.III,sec.1,subsec.1,
ConstitutionofthePhilippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a
restraint on all the three grand departments of our government and
onthesubordinateinstrumentalitiesandsubdivisionsthereof,andon
many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and
eminent domain. The equal protection of the laws, sententiously
observestheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,"isapledgeofthe
protectionofequallaws."(YickWovs.Hopkins[1886],118U.S.,
356 30 Law. ed., 220 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464 Perley vs. North
Carolina,249U.S.,51039Sup.Ct.Rep.,35763Law.ed.,735.)
Ofcourse,whatmayberegardedasadenialoftheequalprotection
ofthelawsisaquestionnotalwayseasilydetermined.Norulethat
willcovereverycasecanbeformulated.(Connollyvs.UnionSewer
PipeCo.[1902],184U.S.,54022Sup.Ct.Rep.,43146Law.ed.,
679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring
othersisprohibited.Butclassificationona
126
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Peoplevs.Vera.
reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is

permitted.(Finelyvs.California[1911],222U.S.,2856Law.ed.,
7532Sup.Ct.Rep.,13Gulf.C.&S.F.RyCo.vs. Ellis [1897],
165U.S.,15041Law.ed.,66617Sup.Ct.Rep.,255Smith,Bell
& Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification,
however,tobereasonablemustbebasedonsubstantialdistinctions
whichmakerealdifferencesitmustbegermanetothepurposesof
thelawitmustnotbelimitedtoexistingconditionsonly,andmust
apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co.
[1911],147Wis.,327,353133N.W.,2093N.C.C.A.,64937
L.R.A.[N.S.],489Statevs.Cooley,56Minn.,54053055258
N. W., 150 Lindsleyvs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. [1911], 220 U.
S.,61,79,55Law.ed.,369,37731Sup.Ct.Rep.,337Ann.Cas.,
1912C,160LakeShore&M.S.R.Co.vs.Clough[1917],242,U.
3.,37537Sup.Ct.Rep.,14461Law.ed.,374SouthernRy.Co.
vs.Greene[1910],216 U. S., 400 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287 54 Law.
ed.,53617Ann.Cas.,1247Truaxvs.Corrigan[1921],257U.S.,
31212C.J.,pp.1148,1149.)
Inthecaseatbar,however,theresultantinequalitymaybesaid
to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adoptingtheexamplegivenbyoneofthecounselforthepetitioners
inthecourseofhisoralargument,oneprovincemayappropriatethe
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necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while

another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the
ProbationActwouldbeinoperationintheformerprovincebutnot
inthelatter.Thismeansthatapersonotherwisecomingwithinthe
purviewofthelawwouldbeliabletoenjoythebenefitsofprobation
in one province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination.Contrariwise,itisalsopossibleforalltheprovincial
boardstoappropriatethenecessaryfunds
127
127
Peoplevs.Vera.
forthesalariesoftheprobationofficersintheirrespectiveprovinces,
inwhichcasenoinequalitywouldresultfortheobviousreasonthat
probationwouldbeinoperationineachandeveryprovincebythe
affirmativeactionofappropriationbyalltheprovincialboards.On
that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the
ProbationActwouldbeentitledtoavailofthebenefitsoftheAct.
Neitherwilltherebeanyresultinginequalityifnoprovince,through
itsprovincialboard,shouldappropriateanyamountforthesalaryof
theprobationofficerwhichisthesituationnowand,also,it'we
acceptthecontentionthat,forthepurposesoftheProbationAct,the
City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the
municipalboardofsaidcityhasnotmadeanyappropriationforthe
salary of a, probation officer. These different situations suggested
show,indeed,thatwhileinequalitymayresultintheapplicationof
the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided,
inequalityisnotinallcasesthenecessaryresult.Butwhatevermay
bethecase,itisclearthatsection11oftheProbationActcreatesa
situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or
allowed.Thereare,tobesure,abundantauthoritiesrequiringactual
denialoftheequalprotectionofthelawbeforecourtsshouldassume
thetaskofsettingasidealawvulnerableonthatscore,butpremises
andcircumstancesconsidered,weareoftheopinionthatsection11
ofActNo.4221,permitsofthedenialoftheequalprotectionofthe
lawandisonthataccountbad.Weseenodifferencebetweenalaw
which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such
denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance,yet,ifitpermitsofunjustandillegaldiscrimination,itis
within the constitutional prohibition. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs.
Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275 23 Law, ed., 550 Henderson vs.
Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259 23 Law. ed., 543 Ex parte Virginia
[1880],100U.S.,33925Lawed.,676Nealvs.Delaware[1881],
103 U. S., 370 26 Law. ed., 567 Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885],
113U.S.,70328
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128
128
Peoplevs.Vera.
Law. ed., 1145 Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356 30
Law. ed., 220 Williamsvs.Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218 18
Sup. Ct. Rep., 583 42 Law. ed., 1012 Baileyvs.Alabama [1911],
219 U. S., 219 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145 55 Law. ed., 191 Sunday
Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450 38 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 495 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes may be
adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation
(GeneralOilCo.vs.Clain[1907],209U.S.,21128Sup.Ct.Rep.,
47552Law.ed.,754Statevs. Clement Nat Bank [1911], 84 Vt.,
16778Atl.,944Ann.Cas.,1912D,22).Ifalawhastheeffectof
denyingtheequalprotectionofthelawitisunconstitutional.(6R.
C.L.p.372CivilRightsCases,109U.S.,33Sup.Ct.Rep.,18
27 Law. ed., 835 Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra State vs.
Montgomery,94Me.,19247Atl.,16580A.S.R.,386Statevs.
Dering,84Wis.,58554N.W.,110436A.S.R.,94819L.R.A,,
858.)Undersection11oftheProbationAct,notonlymaysaidAct
be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in the
otherprovinces,butoneprovincemayappropriateforthesalaryofa
probation officer of a given yearand have probation during that
yearandthereafterdeclinetomakefurtherappropriation,andhave
noprobationinsubsequentyears.Whilethissituationgoesratherto
theabuseofdiscretionwhichdelegationimplies,itishereindicated
to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is
intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is,
under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a
ropeofsand".(Brewer,J.GulfC.&S.F.Ry.Co.vs.Ellis [1897],
165U.S.,150,15441Law.ed.,66617Sup.Ct.Rep.,255.)
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the
caseofOcampo vs. United States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91 58 Law.
ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to
upholdthecontentionthattherewasadenialoftheequalprotection
of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs.
Lewis)decided
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Peoplevs.Vera.
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in 1880 (101 U. S., 220 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the
equality clause does not require territorial uniformity,, It should be
observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary
investigationsincriminalcasesoriginallygrantedbyGeneralOrders
No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the
alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws was the result of
the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of
theCityofManila(ActNo.813)andprovidinginsection2thereof
that"incasestriableonlyinthecourtoffirstinstanceoftheCityof
Manila, the defendant * * * shall not be entitled as of right to a
preliminaryexaminationinanycasewheretheprosecutingattorney
after a due investigation of the facts * * * shall have presented an
information.againsthiminproperform***."Upontheotherhand,
an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the
investigationbytheprosecutingattorneyalthoughnotintheform
hadintheprovinceswasconsideredareasonablesubstituteforthe
City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the city as
foundandtakenintoaccountbythelegislatureitself.
RelianceisalsoplacedonthecaseofMissourivs.Lewis,supra.
That case has reference to a situation where the constitution of
Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from
finaljudgmentsofanycircuitcourt,exceptthoseincertaincounties
for which counties the constitution establishes a separate court of
appeals called the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The provision
complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the
constitutionthatmakestheapportionmentofterritorialjurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is
unconstitutionalandvoidbecauseitisalsorepugnanttotheequal
protection clause of our Constitution. Section 11 of the Probation
Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated,
thenextinquiryiswhetherornottheentireActshouldbeavoided.
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Peoplevs.Vera.
"In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation
of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an
unconstitutionalprovisionisinterjectedintoastatuteotherwisevalid,andis
so independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional
features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process."
(Ricciovs.Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662 63 L. R. A., 485 55 Atl.,
1109,quotedinWilliamsvs.StandardOilCo.[1929],278U.S.,235,240
73 Law. ed., 287, 309 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115 60 A. L. R., 596.) In
Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well
established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following
language:
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"***wherepartOfastatuteisvoid,asrepugnanttotheOrganicLaw,
while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid,
maystandandbeenforced.Butinordertodothis,thevalidportionmustbe
so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they
couldnotconstitutionallyenacttheother.(MutualLoanCo.vs.Martell,200
Mass., 482 86 N. E., 916 128 A. S. R., 446 Supervisors of Holmes Co.
vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739 55 Sou., 963.) Enough
mustremaintomakeacomplete,intelligible,andvalidstatute,whichcarries
out the legislative intent. (Pearsonvs.Bass, 132 Ga., 117 63 S. E., 798.)
Thevoidprovisionsmustbeeliminatedwithoutcausingresultsaffectingthe
main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the
Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642 47 Sou., 969
Harpervs.Galloway, 58 Fla., 255 51 Sou., 226 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794
Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565 People vs.
Strassheim, 240 111., 279, 300 88 N. E., 821 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135
Statevs.Cognevich,124La.,41450Sou.,439.)Thelanguageusedinthe
invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose
whatever,andwhatremainsmustexpressthelegislativewill,independently
ofthevoidpart,since
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Peoplevs.Vera.
thecourthasnopowertolegislate.(Statevs.Junkin,85Neb.,1122N.W.,
473 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839 Vide, also, U. S. vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38
Phil.,759Pollockvs.Farmers'LoanandTrustCo.[1895],158U.S.,601,
63539Law.ed.,1108,112515Sup.Ct.Rep.,9126R.C.L.,121.)"
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation

Act applicable only in those provinces in which the respective
provincialboardshaveprovidedforthesalariesofprobationofficers
wereinoperativeonconstitutionalgrounds,theremainderoftheAct
wouldstillbevalidandmaybeenforced.Weshouldbeinclinedto
accept the suggestion but for the fact that said section is, in our
opinion,soinseparablylinkedwiththeotherportionsoftheActthat
with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare
idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large
numberofpeoplewhomaybedeservingoftheintendedbeneficial
resultsofthatsystem.Theclearpolicyofthelaw,asmaybegleaned
from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the
application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative
actionofthedifferentprovincialboardsthroughappropriationofthe
salariesforprobationofficersatratesnotlowerthanthoseprovided
forprovincialfiscals.Withoutsuchactiononthepartofthevarious
boards,noprobationofficerswouldbeappointedbytheSecretaryof
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Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or

subdividedintoprovincesanditneedsnoargumenttoshowthatif
not one of the provincesand this is the actual situation now
appropriatesthenecessaryfundforthesalaryofaprobationofficer,
probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no
probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a
probationofficerwithoutaprobationsystem.
Section 2 of the Act provides that the probation officer shall
superviseandvisittheprobationer.Everyprobationofficerisgiven,
astothepersonsplacedinprobationunderhiscare,thepowersofa
policeofficer.'Itisthe
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Peoplevs.Vera.
duty of probation officers to see that the conditions which are

imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care are
complied with. Among those conditions, the following are
enumeratedinsection3oftheAct:
"Thattheprobationer(a)shallindulgeinnoinjuriousorvicioushabits
"(b) Shallavoidplacesorpersonsofdisreputableorharmfulcharacter
"(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or
probationofficers
"(d) Shallpermittheprobationofficertovisithimatreasonabletimesat
hisplaceofabodeorelsewhere
"(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the
probationofficerconcerninghisconductorcondition
"(h) Shallendeavortobeemployedregularly
"(g) Shallremainorresidewithinaspecifiedplaceorlocality
"(h) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for
actualdamagesorlossescausedbyhisoffense
"(i) Shallsupporthiswifeandchildren
"(j) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time
makeand
"(k) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by
laworregulation,promulgatedinaccordancewithlaw."
Thecourtisrequiredtonotifytheprobationofficerinwritingofthe
period and terms of probation. Under section 4, it is only after the
period of probation, the submission of a report of the probation
officerandappropriatefindingofthecourtthattheprobationerhas
complied with the conditions of probation that probation may be
definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from
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supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is non

compliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation
officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and
saidprobationermaybecommitted
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Peoplevs.Vera.
withorwithoutbail.Uponarraignmentandafteranopportunityto
be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the probation,
and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence
originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation
officers:"Itshallbethedutyofeveryprobationofficertofurnishto
allpersonsplacedonprobationunderhissupervisionastatementof
the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them
concerningthesametokeepinformedconcerningtheirconductand
condition to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and
admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the
conditionsimposedbythecourtasmayseemmostsuitable,tobring
about improvement in their conduct and condition to report in
writingtothecourthavingjurisdictionover.saidprobationersatleast
once every two months concerning their conduct and condition to
keep records of their work to make such reports as are necessary
fortheinformationoftheSecretaryofJusticeandasthelattermay
requireandtoperformsuchotherdutiesasareconsistentwiththe
functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may
direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as
parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults
whensorequestedbytheauthoritiesthereof,and,whendesignated
by the Secretary of Justice, shall act as parole officer of persons
released on parole under Act Numbered Fortyone Hundred and
Three,withoutanyadditionalcompensation,"
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation
officers may be appointed in the provinces under section 10 of the
Actwhichprovidesasfollows:
"There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its
supervision and control, a Probation Office under the direction of a Chief
Probation Officer to be appointed by the GovernorGeneral with the advise
and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of four thousand eight
hundred pesos per annum. To carry out the purposes of this Act, there is
herebyappropriatedout
134
134
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Peoplevs.Vera.
ofanyfundsintheInsularTreasurynototherwiseappropriated,thesumof
fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is
hereby authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative
personneloftheprobationofficeundercivilserviceregulationsfromamong
those who possess the qualifications, training and experience prescribed by
the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of such
probation officers and administrative personnel until such positions shall
havebeenincludedintheAppropriationAct."
Buttheprobationofficersandtheadministrativepersonnelreferred
to in the foregoing section are clearly not those probation officers
requiredtobeappointedfortheprovincesundersection11.Itmay
be said, reddendo singula, singulis, that the probation officers
referredtoinsection10abovequotedaretoactassuch,notinthe
various provinces, but in the central office known as the Probation
Office established in the Department of Justice, under the
supervisionofaChiefProbationOfficer.Whenthelawprovidesthat
"the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the
court(secs.1and4)that"theprobationofficer"shallsuperviseand
visittheprobationer(sec.2sec.6,par.d)thattheprobationershall
report to the "probation officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the
probationofficer"tovisithim(sec.3,par.d),shalltruthfullyanswer
any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer"
concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4) that the court
shallnotify"theprobationofficer"inwritingoftheperiodandterms
ofprobation(sec.3,lastpar.),itmeanstheprobationofficerwhois
inchargeofaparticularprobationerinaparticularprovince.Itnever
could have been the intention of the legislature, for instance, to
require a probationer in Batanes, to report to a probation officer in
theCityofManila,ortorequireaprobationofficerinManilatovisit
theprobationerinthesaidprovinceofBatanes,toplacehimunder
hiscare,tosupervisehisconduct,toinstructhimconcerningthe
135
135
Peoplevs.Vera.
conditionsofhisprobationortoperformsuchotherfunctionsasare
assignedtohimbylaw.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as
many probation officers as there are provinces or groups of
provincesis,ofcourse,possible.Butthiswouldbearguingonwhat
thelawmaybeorshouldbeandnotonwhatthelawis.Betweenis
andoughtthereisafarcry.Thewisdomandproprietyoflegislation
isnotforustopassupon.Wemaythinkalawbetterotherwisethan
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it is. But much .as has been. said regarding progressive

interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law.
We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions
whicharenotthere.Notforanypurposenoteventosaveastatute
fromthedoomofinvalidity.
Upontheotherhand,theclearintentionandpolicyofthelawis
nottomaketheInsularGovernmentdefraythesalariesofprobation
officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them
shouldtheydesiretohavetheProbationActapplythereto.Thesum
of P50,000,appropriated "to carry outthe purposes of this Act", is
tobeapplied,amongotherthings,forthesalariesofprobationoffi
cersin'thecentralofficeatManila.Theseprobationofficersareto
receivesuchcompensationsastheSecretaryofJusticemayfix"until
suchpositionsshallhavebeenincludedintheAppropriationAct".It
wasnottheintentionofthelegislaturetoempowertheSecretaryof
Justice to fix the salaries of probation officers in the provinces or
laterontoincludesaidsalariesinanappropriationact.Considering,
further, that the sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to
cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative
personneloftheProbationOffice,whatwouldbeleftoftheamount
can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to
probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice of the
fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not
think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos
appropriatedforthecentraloffice,therecanbein
136
136
Peoplevs.Vera.
each provin ce, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not

lowerthanthatofaprovincialfiscal.Ifthisiscorrect,thecontention
that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an
impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is
concededthatinourcasetherecanbeasystemofprobationinthe
provinceswithoutprobationofficers.
Probation as a development of modern penology is a
commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and
in other countries, to permit what modern criminologists call the
"individualization of punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to
thecharacterofthecriminalandthecircumstancesofhisparticular
case.Itprovidesaperiodofgraceinordertoaidintherehabilitation
ofapenitentoffender.Itisbelievedthat,inanycases,convictsmay
bereformedandtheirdevelopmentintohardenedcriminalsaborted.
It,therefore,takesadvantageofanopportunityforreformationand
avoidsimprisonmentsolongastheconvictgivespromiseofreform.
(UnitedStatesvs.Murray'[1925],275U.S.,347,357,35872Law.
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ed., 309 312, 313 48 Sup. Ct. Rep.,146Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F.

[2d],664,665.)Thewelfareofsocietyisitschiefendandaim.The
benefittotheindividualconvictismerelyincidental.Butwhilewe
believe that probation is commendable as a system and its
implantationintothePhilippinesshouldbewelcomed,weareforced
byourinescapabledutytosetthelawasidebecauseofrepugnancy
toourfundamentallaw.
Inarrivingatthisconclusion,wehaveendeavoredtoconsiderthe
differentaspectspresentedbyablecounselforbothparties,aswell
intheirmemorandumsasintheiroralargument.Wehaveexamined
thecasesbroughttoourattention,andotherswehavebeenableto
reach in the short time at our command for the study and
deliberationofthiscase.Intheexaminationofthecasesandinthe
analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt
the line of action which in our opinion, is' supported by better
reasonedauthoritiesandismoreconduciveto
137
137
Peoplevs.Vera.
the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40
Phil.,136.)Realizingtheconflictofauthorities,wehavedeclinedto
be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our attention,
exceptwherethepointortheprincipleissettleddirectlyorbyclear
implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the
Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach is
justifiedbecause:
(a.) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the
State governments of the United States and the dual
characteroftheAmericanGovernmentisasituationwhich
doesnotobtaininthePhilippines
(b) The. situation of a state of the American Union or of the
District of Columbia with reference to the Federal
Government of the. United States is not the situation of a
province with respect to the Insular Government (Art, I,
sec. 8, cl. 17, and 10th Amendments Constitution of the
UnitedStatesSimsvs.Rives,84Fed.[2d],871)
(c) The distinct federal and state judicial organizations of the
UnitedStatesdonotembracetheintegratedjudicialsystem
of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35
Off.Gaz.,p.1317)
(d) "Generalpropositionsdonotdecideconcretecases"(Justice
HolmesinLochnervs.NewYork[1904],198U.S.,45,76
49Law,ed.,937,949)and,"tokeeppacewith
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***newdevelopmentsoftimesandcircumstances"(Chief
JusticeWaiteinPensacolaTel.Co.vs.WesternUnionTel.
Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9 24 Law. ed., 708 Yale Law
Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142),
fundamentalprinciplesshouldbeinterpretedhavinginview
existinglocalconditionsandenvironments.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the
writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any
pronouncementregardingcosts.Soordered.
Avancea,C.J.,Imperial,Diaz,andConcepcion,JJ.,concur.
VILLAREALandABADSANTOS,JJ.:
Weconcurintheresult.
ActNo.4221declaredunconstitutionalwritgranted.
138
138
ElHogarFilipinovs.DeSantos
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People V Vera

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People V Vera

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1/22/2017

but which happens to be at the same time pending determination

the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the

9. ID. ID. PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF

courts that many persons accused and convicted of crime in the

STITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.Section 21 of the Jones

confined to mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold

or authority. The coordinate departments of government have

beginning and end of the punishment, and whether it should be

21. ID. ID. ID. PROBATION NOT IN CONFLICT WITH

highest expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive

limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within

can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County

30. ID. ID. ID. LOCAL OPTION LAWS EIGHT OF LOCAL

MENT SUSPENSION OF OPERATION OF A GENERAL LAW

andyetimbecile."(Peoplevs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been

clear intendment, have that effect. But it should be borne in mind

35. ID. ID. ID. SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT

people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial results of

provinces or groups of provinces is, of course, possible. But this

the sum of P50,000, appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among

FUNDAMENTAL LAW.Probation as a development of modern

developments of times and circumstances", fundamental principles

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu

(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is

the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section

each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the

(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question

tion thatafinalorder, resolution or decision of an inferior

time before this court that prohibition is unavailable and that, in

presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563,

adequate.Thus,inCuUnjiengvs.Patstone([1922],42 Phil., 818),

500 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however,

jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be

itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through

proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is

"It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district

The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of

opposite direction. In f act, they appear to have proceeded on the

is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to

court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2,

office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor,

refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking into

particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised

ticular circumstances of the offense, the criminal record, if any, of

Statevs.Teal[1918],108S.C., 455 95 S. E., 69State vs. Abbot

of the Probation Act for this cause." (Archervs.Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d],

Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from

InStateexrel Bottomly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541

lowing oftquoted language: "One of the settled maxims in

responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power

national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of

It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned

account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces

determine when the circumstances are such as require the

happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the

It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would be equally

To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs

while we do not deny the right of local selfgovernment and the

government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power

3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates, the