The Province of Zamboanga vs City of Zamboanga

Facts:
In 1936, the province of Zamboanga was converted into Zamboanga City.
Sec. 50 of Act 39 states that " Buildings and properties which the province
shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be
acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the
Auditor General." In 1945 the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred
to Dipolog. Republic Act 286 was approved creating the municipality of
Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province. On June 6, 1952,
Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two
(2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. The funds, assets and
other properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be
divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Auditor General. However, on June 17, 1961,
Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act
39 by providing that
"All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province
of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga."
Plaintiff Zamboanga del norte prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without due
process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff's rights and obligations under
said law be declared; (c) The Secretary of Finance and the Internal Revenue
Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of P57,373.46 to
defendant City; and (d) The latter be ordered to continue paying the balance
of P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue
allotments. The RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff.
Issue: What is the nature of the properties and what is the extent of
legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a
province is one?
Held: Patrimonial, Congress has no absolute control.
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use
to which it is intended and devoted. Applying the above cited norm, all the
properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former
Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium
sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for
public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service".
If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation)
in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress
has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation.

It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the
City of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are
patrimonial in nature.
Republic vs CA, Josefina Morato, Sps Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan
Facts: In 1972, respondemt Morato filed a Free Patent Application for a lot in
Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon which was granted by the Register of Deeds
provided that it shall not be alienated nor encumbered within five (5) years
from the date of the issuance of the patent. However, it was noted that
Morato had encumbered the land. Thereafter, it was established that the
subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep
under water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not
suitable to vegetation. In 1974, a portion of the land was mortgaged by
respondent Morato to respondents Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan who
constructed a house thereon. Another portion of the land was leased to
Perfecto Advincula on 1976, where a warehouse was constructed. On
November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an amended complaint against
respondents Morato, spouses Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon for the cancellation of title and reversion of a
parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a free patent in favor of
respondent Morato, on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land and was
mortgaged and leased within the five-year prohibitory period. RTC dismissed
petitioner's complaint. In finding for private respondents, the lower court ruled
that there was no violation of the 5-year period ban against alienating or
encumbering the land, because the land was merely leased and not
alienated. It also found that the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan
covered only the improvement and not the land itself. CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
Issue: WON the patent granted and certificate of title issued to Respondent
Morato cannot be cancelled and annulled since the certificate of title
becomes indefeasible after one year from the issuance of the title.?
WON the questioned land is part of a disposable public land and not a
foreshore land.?
Held:
1.) It can be cancelled and is not indefeasible. The rule is well-settled that an
original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent
partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding,
as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the
public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of promulgation of the order of the
Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent. A homestead patent, one
registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a
Torrens Title. However, had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining
the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be
the proper remedy.

Section 118 of CA 141 states that "Except in favor of the Government or any
of its branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted banking
corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall
not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of
the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant."
Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract
made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one
hundred and eighteen xxx shall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant,
title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or
presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements
to the State. The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the
encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead
within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such
encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the
land to the public domain.
2.) It is foreshore land. While at the time of the grant of free patent to
respondent Morato, the land was not reached by the water, however, due to
gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea advances
had permanently invaded a portion of subject land. When the sea moved
towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became
foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. With relative
frequency the opposite phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea advances and
private properties are permanently invaded by the waves, and in this case
they become part of the shore or beach. They then pass to the public
domain, but the owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the
natural products resulting from their new nature; it is a de facto case of
eminent domain, and not subject to indemnity.
Macasiano vs Diokno
Facts: Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J.
Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a
flea market thereon. On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and
respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement
whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the
aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the
municipal government of Paraaque. On September 13, 1990, petitioner
Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic
Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz
and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent
Palanyag. RTC ruled in favor of the Municipality.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that municipal roads
are used for public service and are therefore public properties; that as such,

they cannot be subject to private appropriation or private contract by any

person, even by the respondent Municipality of Paraaque. Petitioner
submits that a property already dedicated to public use cannot be used for
another public purpose and that absent a clear showing that the Municipality
of Paraaque has been granted by the legislature specific authority to
convert a property already in public use to another public use, respondent
municipality is, therefore, bereft of any authority to close municipal roads for
the establishment of a flea market.
Issue: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal
council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or
thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid?
Held: No. The local roads used for public service and are therefore
considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the
local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and
are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have
no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties
unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of
public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in
general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or
leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the
requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a
road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when
circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary
for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use,
the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit
concerned. It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or
convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with
the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local
Government Code.
Rabuco vs Villegas
Facts: In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined
origin gutted the Malate area including the lot on which petitioners had built
their homes and dwellings. Respondents city officials then took over the lot
and kept petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings.
At petitioners' instance, the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents city officials "from performing any act
constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners' possession
of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610. The "dominant and inextricable issue" at bar,
as correctly perceived by the appellate court is the constitutionality of
Republic Act 3120 whereby Congress converted the lot in question together
with another lot in San Andres, Malate "which are reserved as communal

property" into "disposable or alienable lands of the State to be placed under

the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration" for
subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale
on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof 6 and
expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under
section 2 of the Act as quoted in the appellate court's certification resolution.
Issue: WON the lots may be declared by the Congress as disposable or
alienable lands of the State?
Held: Yes.
The lots in question and providing for their sale in subdivided small lots to
bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation is
untenable and without basis, since the lots in question are manifestly owned
by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public
property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from
patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which
it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation.
The Court therein reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of
the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality,
excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate
capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its
inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds
such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of
the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the
performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a
subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration.
Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the
property and puts it to a different use"
There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question (Republic Acts 4118
in Salas and Republic Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intended to
implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government
program of land for the landless and that they were not "intended to
expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as
communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the
National Government: ... The subdivision of the land and conveyane of the
resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization
does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just
compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the
Constitution, 11 but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal
with state property."
Laurel vs Garcia
Facts: In view of the Reparations Agreement between the Philippines and
Japan, four properties located in Japan were given to the Philippines. One of
these properties is the Roppongi property. The said property was formerly the
location of the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy until it was transferred to

Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. The Roppongi property has remained

abandoned from the time of the transfer due to lack of funds to develop the
said property. Consequently, Administrative orders were issued by the
President authorizing the study of the condition of the properties of the
Philippines in Japan. Subsequently, Executive Order 296 was issued by
President Aquino allowing non-Filipinos to buy or lease some of the
properties of the Philippines located in Japan, including Roppongi.
Petitioners now contend that the Roppongi property cannot be alienated as it
is classified as public dominion and not of private ownership because it is a
property intended for public service under paragraph 2, article 420 of the Civil
Code. On the other hand, respondents aver that it has already become part
of the patrimonial property of the State which can be alienated because it has
not been used for public service for over 13 years. They further contend that
EO 296 converted the subject property to patrimonial property.
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The
petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi
property to anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal
objection the alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine government in favor of
selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and entities.
Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one
of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil
Code. The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under
"property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision.
He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can
attach to it, not even by the State. The Roppongi and related properties were
acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings
and other improvements". The petitioner states that they continue to be
intended for a necessary service. They are held by the State in anticipation of
an opportune use.. Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is outside the
commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated
nor be the subject matter of contracts. Noting the non-use of the Roppongi
property at the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains property
of public dominion so long as the government has not used it for other
purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a removal of its original
purpose or use. The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's
contention by saying that the subject property is not governed by our Civil
Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located. The
respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil
Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of
public dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it has not been
used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years
now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because the intention by the
Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to private use has been
manifested by overt acts , such as, among others:
(1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai

(2) the issuance of administrative orders for the possibility of alienating the
four government properties in Japan; A mere transfer of the Philippine
Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi
property's original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the
building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply
was a shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative Orders
authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government properties in
Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify
a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
(3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; Executive Order No. 296,
though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not have a provision in its
text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan
for the government sector. The executive order does not declare that the
properties lost their public character. It merely intends to make the properties
available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or
other disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789
that reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred
(100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. Executive Order No. 296 is based on
the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the three other
properties were earlier converted into alienable real properties.
(4) the enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains a provision stating
that funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign
countries; Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which
provides as one of the sources of funds for its implementation, the proceeds
of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries,
did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of public
dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c)
refers to properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public
use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the
Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates
possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the
Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously
any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source
of funds.
(5) the holding of the public bidding of the Roppongi property but which
failed;
(6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a
future date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of the government's
intention to remove the Roppongi property from the public service purpose;
and
(7) the resolution of this Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding
Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin the second bidding
of the Roppongi property scheduled on March 30, 1989.

Respondents also contend that since the property is situated in Japan, its
laws shall govern over it. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1)
There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the
capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of
a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership
and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same
matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no
question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging
to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This
is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
Issue: WON the Roppongi property is for public dominion?
Held: Yes.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly
spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the
corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine
government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly
shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have
failed to do.
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the
recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi
property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in
the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does
not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her
legislative powers.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is
no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the
respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a
party. In cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or
to any other property the value of which is in excess of one hundred
thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the
necessary papers which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be
submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such
deed, instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the President
of the Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the
Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly
vested by law in another officer.

It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government
on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the
deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does not withdraw the
property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is a mere
resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of
the Roppongi property.
Javier vs Veridiano
Facts: On 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application
for a lot of the OlongapoTownsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo
City. Sometime in December 1970 she instituted a complaint for forcible
entry before the City Court of Olongapo City. The petitioner alleged that the
defendant, without express consent of plaintiff through scheme, strategy and
stealth, forcibly entered a portion of his lot, with the assistance of hired
helpers, started construction of riprap along the Kalaklan River perimeter of
said portion of land; said entry was further augmented by removing plaintiff's
chain link, fence with galvanized iron posts embedded in concrete, likewise
destroying plants introduced by plaintiff by removing existing BL (Bureau of
Lands) monuments thereon, and by these actions, defendant started
exercising illegal possession of said portion of land which contains an area of
200 square meters, more or less. The City Court of Olonggapo dismissed the
case since it appears that the area in question is outside the lot of the
plaintiff. Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted
Miscellaneous Sales Patent covering Lot No. 1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol
who was the defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had
sold the property he was occupying, including the portion of about 200
square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. On 29 June 1977, or
after about four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case No.
926, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of
possession with damages against Ben Babol and ReinoRosete before the
then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City. ReinoRosete
(private respondent herein) moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
res judicata. Defendant Ben Babol did not file any pleading. The then Court
of First Instance of Zambales, Br. 1, 8 sustained the argument of Rosete and
granted his motion to dismiss.
With regard to the cause of action, she maintains that there is no identity of
causes of action since the first case was for forcible entry, which is merely
concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case
was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed land.
On the issue of identity of causes of action, he simply states that neither of
the two cases, i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and the subsequent
petition for quieting of title, alleges a cause of action.

Issue: WON the case for accionreinvidicatoria is a cause of action?

Held: Yes.
Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two
actions is without merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to
apply, what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties.
In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent ReinoRosete is a
successor in interest of Ben Babol by title subsequent to the commencement
and termination of the first action. Hence, there is actual, if not substantial,
identity of the parties between the two actions. But, there is merit in
petitioner's argument that there is no identity of causes of action between
Civil Case
No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is
prior possession, regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed
property. Thus, "[t]he only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical
or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not
possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that
irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence
or terror." And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is
conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It
does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an
action for "Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in
reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accionreivindicatoriaunder
Art. 434 of the Civil Code, and should be distinguished from Civil Case No.
926, which is an accioninterdictal. From the averments of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff therein (petitioner herein) clearly sets up title
to herself and prays that respondent Rosete be ejected from the disputed
land and that she be declared the owner and given possession thereof.
Certainly, the allegations partake of the nature of an accionreivindicatoria.
Accionreivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby
plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession. 21 It is different from accioninterdictal or accionpubliciana where
plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.
22
In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior
possession over the disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be
distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged
ownership, specifically praying that she be declared the rightful owner and
given possession of the disputed portion. Hence, in Civil Case No. 926
petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true, lawful (possessor) and in
actual, prior physical possession" of the subject parcel of land, whereas in
Civil Case

No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee simple" of
the parcel of land "covered by Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P3259." The complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0 definitely raises the question
of ownership and clearly gives defendants therein notice of plaintiff's claim of
exclusive and absolute ownership, including the right to possess which is an
elemental attribute of such ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a
judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than
possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no
means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or
title of ownership.
Bustos vs CA Sps Viray
Facts: Four (4) children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all
surnamed Fajardo.On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate of Paulino Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela
sold her share to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed of
absolute sale. At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in
Masantol, Pampanga. Later, the cadastre was conducted, and the property
involved in the partition case were specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A
and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot
284 of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A
and 284-B.
Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the
land to her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.
On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance,
Pampanga a complaint for partition claiming the one fourth () share of
Manuela which was sold to him.
During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On
December 15, 1984, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the
estate of Trinidad Fajardo. On February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son
of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses VenancioViray and Cecilia NungaViray.
RTC Pampanga rendered decision in favor of Mendoza and on September
13, 1991, Moses sold the subject land to spouses Warlito Bustos and
Herminia Reyes-Bustos. In the meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses
VenancioViray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray, buyers of Lucio Ignacios share of
the property, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Macabebe-Masantol,
Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer[10] against spouses Bustos, the
buyers of Moses G. Mendoza, who were in actual possession as lessees of
the husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the subject land. The
municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. RTC
affirmed MCTC decision. CA declared Moses Mendoza is declared as owner
of the undivided share previously owned by Manuela Fajardo.
Issue: Whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land?
Held: No.

In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of

ownership. In the unlawful detainer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court as to possession on the ground that the decision
has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners may be
evicted. In the accionreinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court declared
petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.
Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory.
However, the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and
executory judgment admits of exceptions. In the present case, the stay of
execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of
the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by
ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in
grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when
the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid
deed of sale.
Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and
logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of
the property. One of the essential attributes of ownership is possession. It
follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to
possession of the same. An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) juses
or attributes of ownership--the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or
consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and
to the fruits--is a crippled owner.
Heirs of Roman Soriano vs CA Sps Abalos
Facts: The property subject of this case is a parcel of land containing an area
of 24,550 square meters, more or less, located in Lingayen, Pangasinan. The
land was leased to to spouses David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a
period of fifteen (15) years beginning July 1, 1967 with Roman Soriano, one
of the children of Adriano Soriano, acting as caretaker of the property during
the period of the lease. In 1971, Lot No. 60052 was sold by Lourdes,
Candido and the heirs of Dionisia to petitioner spouses Braulio and
AquilinaAbalos (hereinafter referred to as petitioners), while, Elocadio,
Francisca and Librada sold their three-fourths shares in Lot No. 8459 also to
petitioners.
On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as
caretaker and appointed Isidro Verzosa and Vidal Verzosa as his substitutes.
Thereafter, Roman Soriano filed CAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement
and reliquidation against the de Vera spouses. The agrarian court authorized
the ejectment of Roman Soriano but on appeal, the decision was reversed by
the Court of Appeals, which decision became final and executory.However,
prior to the execution of the said decision, the parties entered into a postdecisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman Soriano
to sub-lease the property until the termination of the lease in 1982. In an

Order dated December 22, 1972, the post-decisional agreement was

approved by the agrarian court.
On August 16, 1976, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38, an application for registration of title over
Lot No. 60052 and three-fourths (3/4) pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459, docketed
as LRC Case No. N-3405. Said application for registration was granted by
the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
land registration court.
Meanwhile, it appears that on July 15, 1983, a day after the promulgation of
the land registration courts decision, Roman Soriano, together with Elocadio
and Librada Soriano, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Branch 37, and against petitioners, an action for annulment of document
and/or redemption, ownership and damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
159568 (sic; should be 15958). Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata, pendency of another action, laches, misjoinder of
parties and lack of jurisdiction, which was denied by the trial court.
Thereafter, on August 22, 1984, or eleven (11) years after the approval of the
post-decisional agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de
Vera in CAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation,
petitioners filed with the agrarian court a motion for execution of said postdecisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the
property. The motion prayed that petitioners be placed in possession of the
subject property, jointly with Roman Soriano, and to levy so much of Romans
property to answer for the use and occupation by Soriano of 6/7 share of the
property. On October 25, 1984, Roman Soriano filed a motion to suspend
hearing on the rental demanded by petitioners, which, however, was denied
by the agrarian court. The agrarian court likewise authorized the substitution
of the de Vera spouses by petitioners. Sorianos motion for reconsideration
was also denied, prompting Soriano to file a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the
Resolution of the land registration court and ordered instead the issuance of
the corresponding writ of possession in favor of private respondents.
Issues: Whether or not a winning party (ABALOS) in a land registration case
can effectively eject the possessor (SORIANO) thereof, whose security of
tenure rights is still pending determination before the DARAB?
Held: There is no dispute that private respondents (petitioners below) title
over the land under litigation has been confirmed with finality. As explained
above, however, such declaration pertains only to ownership and does not
automatically include possession, especially so in the instant case where
there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in the
concept of an agricultural tenant.
While the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the
final judgment of the land registration court, the right of possession thereof is,
as yet, controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the security of

tenure case filed by petitioners (private respondents below) before the

DARAB.
However, petitioners status as tenant has not yet been declared by the
DARAB. In keeping with judicial order, we refrain from ruling on whether
petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject property. A judgment in a land
registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the land,
whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the
DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case
cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied by one
claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latters
occupancy was unlawful.
Garcia vs CA
Facts: Atty. Pedro Garcia sold Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati to
their daughter and her husband the Magpayos. On March 5, 1981, the
Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom) to secure a loan. On that same day, Atty. Garcia's Title was
cancelled and in its stead Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-108412/545 was
issued in the name of the Magpayos and the mortgage was annotated
therein. The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale,
PBCom which was the highest bidder bought the land.
"The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the
Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was consolidated
in favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo's title and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 138233 was issued in its name. On October 4, 1985,
the Magpayos filed at the RTC of Makati a complaint seeking the nullification
of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, and
PBCom's title. On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the
land. Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo's brother, Jose
Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it
and filed a motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which
motion was denied.
Garcia (petitioner) thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the
RTC Sheriff the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he
alleged, inter alia, that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother
Remedios T. Garcia, and that PBCom acquired no right thereover. The
Magpayos, on the other hand, asserted that title over the land was
transferred to them by Mrs. Magpayo's parents to enable them (Magpayos)
to borrow from PBCom. RTC in its summary judgment, the lower court held
that the mortgage executed by the Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was
void since the Magpayos are not yet owners of the property when it entered
into the mortgage with PBCOM. CA reversed the decision saying that the
deed of sale to the Magpayos took place on August 1, 1980 which was

earlier that when plaintiff actually took possession of the land. When the land
is registered in the vendor's name, and the public instrument of sale is also
registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the buyer may
exercise the actions of an owner
Issues: WON plaintiff-appellee's possession which started only in 1986 could
ripen into ownership?
Held: No. Assuming that to be true, plaintiff-appellee's possession which
started only in 1986 could not ripen into ownership. He has no valid title
thereto. His possession in fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith
(to defeat PBCom's Writ of Possession). His possession is certainly not in the
concept of an owner. This is so because as early as 1981, title thereto was
registered in the name of the Magpayo Spouses which title was subsequently
cancelled when the property was purchased by PBCom in a public auction
sale resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the latter in 1985.
"A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one
who claims to be so." On the other hand, "one who possesses as a mere
holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong." The records show that
petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay
was merely tolerated by his parents. We held in Caniza v. Court of Appeals
that an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does
not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's
favor. Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of
the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a
hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership. On the other hand, petitioner's
subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother's share in the
conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not included in the
inventory of the estate submitted by his father to the intestate court. This
buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no longer considered
owned by petitioner's parents. We also uphold the Court of Appeals in
holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is valid
notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property was
issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration
does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over a
particular property.
Rodil Enterprises vs CA, Carmen Bondoc
Facts: Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides
O'Racca Building (O'RACCA) since 1959. It was a "former alien property"
over which the Republic of the Philippines acquired ownership by virtue of
RA 477, as amended. Sometime in 1980 RODIL entered into a sublease
contract with respondents Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria
Footwear and Chua Huay Soon, members of the Ides O'Racca Building
Tenants Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION).

On 4 September 1972 the lease contract between RODIL and the

REPUBLIC was renewed for another fifteen (15) years. At that time the
O'RACCA was under the administration of the Building Services and Real
Property Management Office (BSRPMO) then headed by Director Jesus R.
Factora. On 12 September 1982 BP 233 was enacted. It authorized the sale
of "former alien properties" classified as commercial and industrial, and the
O'RACCA building was classified as commercial property.
On 8 January 1987 RODIL offered to purchase the subject property
conformably with BP 233. On 22 July 1997 the ASSOCIATION also offerred
to lease the same building through the Department of General Services and
Real Estate Property Management (DGSREPM).
Pending action on the offer of RODIL to purchase the property, Director
Factora of the BSRPMO granted RODILs request for another renewal of the
lease contract on 23 September 1987 for another five (5) years from 1
September 1987. The renewal contract was forwarded to then Secretary
Jose de Jesus of DGSREPM for approval. On 30 September 1987 Secretary
De Jesus issued another memorandum to Director Factora disapproving the
renewal contract in favor of RODIL, at the same time recalling all papers
signed by him regarding the subject. On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an
action for specific performance, damages and injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against
the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas, Factora and the ASSOCIATION. RODIL
prayed that a restraining order be issued enjoining the ASSOCIATION or any
person acting under it from collecting rentals from the occupants or sublessees of O'RACCA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals favored RODIL and
upheld the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and ordered the
deposit of the monthly rentals with the lower court pendente lite.
On 31 May 1988 Factoran issued Order No. 1 designating the Land
Management Bureau represented by Director Abelardo Palad, Jr. as
custodian of all "former alien properties" owned by the REPUBLIC.
On 18 May 1992 RODIL signed a renewal contract with Director Palad which
was approved by Secretary Factoran. The renewal contract would extend the
lease for ten (10) years from 1 September 1987.
On 14 August 1972 the action for specific performance was dismissed by the
trial court upon joint motion to dismiss by RODIL and the Solicitor General.
The order of dismissal however was appealed by the ASSOCIATION to the
Court of Appeals. While the appeal of the ASSOCIATION from the order of
dismissal and the letter-appeal of the spouses Alvarez were pending, the
ASSOCIATION instituted Civil Case No. 92-63833 with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila praying for the setting aside of the renewal contract of 18
May 1992 wherein RTC dismissed. On 30 July 1993 RODIL filed an action
for unlawful detainer against Divisoria Footwear, and on 4 August 1993, a
similar action against Chua Huay Soon. On 19 January 1994 RODIL filed an
action for unlawful detainer against respondent Teresita Bondoc-Esto, and on
1 February 1994 filed another action against respondent Carmen Bondoc,

[25] both with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Meanwhile, the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila upheld RODIL's right to eject respondents
Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon. While the
consolidated appeals from the unlawful detainer cases were pending, the
Second Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on 12 April
1996 with regard to CA-G.R. No. 39919 declaring the renewal contract
between RODIL and the REPUBLIC null and void. On 29 November 1996 the
Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in
CA-G.R. No. 36381 and CA-G.R. No. 37243 setting aside the decisions of
the Regional Trial Court, which sustained the Metropolitan Trial Court, and
dismissing the action for unlawful detainer filed by RODIL against its lessees.
Issue: Whether or not Rodil has the right to occupy the building by virtue of
its lease contract with the Republic?
Held: Yes. RODIL now contends that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling
its renewal contract with the REPUBLIC and in dismissing its actions for
unlawful detainer against respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria
Footwear and Chua. RODIL claims that the assailed contracts are neither
void nor voidable as the facts show they do not fall within the enumerations
under Arts. 1305 and 1409, and an implied new lease still exists by virtue of
Art. 1670. As a result, the right to eject respondents properly belongs to it.
With regard to CA-G.R. No. 39919, RODIL argues that the REPUBLIC, the
only defendant who is a real party in interest, signified its assent to having
the action dismissed. Assuming arguendo that the ASSOCIATION was a real
party in interest, its counterclaim was nonetheless unmeritorious.
On the other hand, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear
and Chua contend that the lease contract which the lease contract of 18 May
1992 was to renew, never came into existence. Therefore, since there was
no contract to "renew," the renewal contract had no leg to stand on, hence, is
also void. Respondents then conclude that since there was no lease contract
to speak of, RODIL had no right to relief in its action for unlawful detainer.
The ASSOCIATION, for its part, argues that the counterclaim it filed against
RODIL cannot be dismissed because the trial court has not passed upon it.
We rule for RODIL. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the
freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and
this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed
property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in
the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the
right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements
required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present.
CORNELIO M. ISAGUIRRE vs. FELICITAS DE LARA
Facts: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a
Miscellaneous Sales Application over a parcel of land with an area of 2,342
square meters. Upon his death, Alejandro de Lara was succeeded by his

wife-respondent Felicitas de Lara as claimant. On this lot stands a two-story

residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes in the name
of respondents sons, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara. When Felicitas
encountered financial difficulties, she approached petitioner Cornelio M.
Isaguirre. On February 10, 1960, a document denominated as Deed of Sale
and Special Cession of Rights and Interests was executed by Felicitas and
Isaguirre, whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of the subject
lot, together with the two-story commercial and residential structure standing
thereon. Sometime in May 1969, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a
complaint against petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the
two-story building. However, petitioner filed a sales application over the
subject property and was issued an OCT. Due to overlapping of title,
petitioner filed an action for quieting of title. Judgment was rendered in favor
of the respondents. When respondent filed a motion for execution, petitioner
opposed, and alleged that he had a right of retention over the property until
payment of the value of the improvements he had introduced on the property.
Issues: The appellate court summarized the issues involved in the case as
follows: (1) whether or not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the
right to retain possession of the property pending actual payment to him of
the amount of indebtedness by the mortgagor; and (b) whether or not
petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect to the
improvements he made on the property before the transaction was declared
to be an equitable mortgage.
Held: The mortgagee merely has to annotate his claim at the back of the
certificate of title in order to protect his rights against third persons and
thereby secure the debt. There is therefore no necessity for him to actually
possess the property. Neither should a mortgagee in an equitable mortgage
fear that the contract relied upon is not registered and hence, may not
operate as a mortgage to justify its foreclosure. In the same vein, there is
nothing to stop the mortgagor de Lara from acquiring possession of the
property pending actual payment of the indebtedness to petitioner. He is
entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses which he may have
incurred over the property, in accordance with Art. 526 and Art. 452 of the
Civil Code. Moreover, considering that the transaction was merely an
equitable mortgage, then he is entitled to payment of the amount of
indebtedness plus interest, and in the event of non-payment to foreclose the
mortgage. Meanwhile, pending receipt of the total amount of debt, private
respondent is entitled to possession over the disputed property. The case is
remanded to the RTC to determine a) The period within which the mortgagor
must pay his total amount of indebtedness. b) The total amount of
indebtedness owing the petitioner-mortgagee plus interest computed from
the time when the judgment declaring the contract to be an equitable
mortgage became final. c) The necessary expenses incurred by petitioner
over the property.

A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a

principal obligation. It is constituted by recording the document in which it
appears with the proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not
recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties. Thus,
the only right granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the
execution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is
formalized. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the
mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property
does not pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does
not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security
since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon
which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay
his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the
mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged
property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds therefrom
given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan.
Apparently, petitioners contention that "[t]o require [him] to deliver possession
of the Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latters mortgage
loan would be equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage" is without
basis. Regardless of its possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold,
with the prescribed formalities, in the event of the debtors default in the
payment of his loan obligation.
Custodio vs Corrado
In 1993, an ejectment case against Custodio was filed bu the respondent. It
was dismissed by Metc and RTC. In 1995 respondent filed complaint for
recovery of possession and damages. Custodio as a defense said that he
was a leasehold tenat of the father of Corrado since 1961. RTC decided in
favor of Corrado and ordered Custodio to deliver possession and vacate the
lot. RTC CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issues: (a) whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable in this
case
Held: The principle of res judicata is inapplicable because Civil Case No. 116
for ejectment was not decided on the merits and its cause of action is
different from Civil Case No. 120 for recovery of possession and ownership.
In Civil Case No. 116, the case as found by the MTC is an ejectment suit and
for failure of plaintiff-private respondent to state the date when he was
deprived of his possession, the court held that it did not entitle him to file an
ejectment suit against herein defendant-petitioner. In Civil Case No. 120, the
cause of action is for recovery of possession and not ejectment. These are
two separate causes of action and therefore the principle of res judicata does
not apply to the present case.

Indeed, an ejectment case such as Civil Case No. 116, involves a different
cause of action from an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria, such as
Civil Case No. 120, and the judgment of the former shall not bar the filing of
another case for recovery of possession as an element of ownership. A
judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than
possession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no
means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or
title of ownership. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer
from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory
action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of
possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together
with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to
recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of
ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of
possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership
which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to
judicially recover possession.
Abejaron vs Nabasa
Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and
claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot
in Silway, General Santos City. Petitioner Abejaron and his family occupied
the 118-square meter land. At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed.
They fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a
small store. Petitioner later improved their abode to become a two-storey
house. This house, which stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot 1,
Block 5 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to
petitioners' daughter, Conchita. The small store was eventually destroyed
and in its stead, petitioner Abejaron another store. He later planted five
coconut trees on the property. Knowing that the disputed land was public in
character, petitioner declared only his house, and not the disputed land, for
taxation purposes. The last two declarations state that petitioners' house
stands on Lots 1 and 2, Block 5. Petitioner stated that respondent Nabasa
resided on the remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1. Nabasa built his
house about 4 meters away from petitioner Abejaron's house. Employees of
the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area. Abejaron did not apply for title of the
land on the belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government
property. Without his knowledge and consent, Nabasa applied for and
caused the titling in his name the entire Lot 1, including petitioner Abejaron's
118-square meter portion. Nabasa was issued an Original Certificate of Title
pursuant to a Free Patent covering Lot 1. As the title included petitioner
Abejarons portion of the lot, he filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands
against Nabasa's title and application. The protest was dismissed for failure
of the petitioner to attend the hearings. Petitioner Abejaron then filed an
action for reconveyance with damages against respondent Nabasa before

10

the RTC. The RTC The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner in its
reconveyance case declaring the possession and occupancy of Abejaron
over 118 square meters of lot in good faith and thereby declaring the
inclusion of said portion in the OCT issued in the name of Nabasa erroneous.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the only
basis for reconveyance is actual fraud which in this case was failed to be
substantiated by Abejaron. Without proof of irregularity neither in the
issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor a claim that fraud
intervened in the issuance of the title, the title would become indefeasible.
The petitioner hence resorts to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the
action for reconveyance is proper?
Whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the disputed land.
Held:
An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner
whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's
name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the property has
not passed to an innocent purchaser for value.[25] The action does not seek
to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration
but only purports to show that the person who secured the registration of the
property in controversy is not the real owner thereof.[26] Fraud is a ground
for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper,
it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and
convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and
occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran
from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the
requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have started
on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds
that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law,
then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would
have already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the
doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly
stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest
have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may
apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act.
In doing so, it is necessary for this Court to wade through the evidence on
record to ascertain whether petitioner has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the 118-square meter
disputed land for 30 years at least since January 24, 1947. While the

petitioner has shown continued existence of these improvements on the

disputed land, they were introduced later than January 24, 1947. He has
failed to establish the portion of the disputed land that his original nipa house,
small store and wooden fence actually occupied as of January 24, 1947. In
the absence of this proof, we cannot determine the land he actually
possessed and occupied for thirty years which he may acquire under Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act. Petitioner's evidence does not constitute the
"well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through
possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since January 24,
1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A.
1942. The basic presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong
to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible."
As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any evidence of title to the land in
controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of title, or homestead, sale, or
free patent, he cannot maintain an action for reconveyance. It is well-settled
that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property
alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name.
Javier vs Lumontad
Facts: July 3, 2007 forcible entry filed by petitioner Homer C. Javier,
represented by his mother and natural guardian Susan G. Canencia
(petitioner), against respondent Susan Lumontad. On March 26, 2007,
respondent gained entry into the subject land and started to build a two (2)storey building (subject building) on a 150 sq. m. portion thereof. Respondent
presented a tax declaration in her name and averred that she took
possession of the said portion not as an illegal entrant but as its owner. MTC
dismissed the complaint. It found that Vicente actually subdivided the
subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot, with an area of 187.20 sq. m., was
given to petitioner, while the second lot, with an area of 172.80 sq. m. and
where the subject building was erected, was given to one Anthony de la Paz
Javier (Anthony), son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage, but was
eventually acquired by respondent from the latter through sale. CA remanded
the case to the RTC. CA found that the TD for the land is separate which was
cancelled when the land was subdivided into two (2) lots, one given by
Vicente to petitioner and the second given by Vicente to Anthony. Further,
the CA stated that petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish that
respondent employed force and intimidation in entering the 172.80 sq. m.
portion of the subject landas he failed to demonstrate the factual
circumstances that occurred during his dispossession of said property.
Issues: WON the case of forcible entry is with merit?
Held: Yes. The Court disagrees with the findings of both the MTC and the CA
that the allegations in the petitioners complaint do not make a case for
forcible entry but another action cognizable by the RTC.
In forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical
possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by

11

another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not

essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language
of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that
dispossession took place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff
must allege that he, prior to the defendants act of dispossession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical possession
of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the
allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. A plain reading of petitioners
complaint shows that the required jurisdictional averments, so as to
demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, have all been complied with.
The "how" (through unlawful entry and the construction of the subject
building), "when" (March 26, 2007), and "where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the
subject land) of the dispossession all appear on the face of the complaint.
Notwithstanding petitioners proper classification of his action, his forcible
entry complaint, nonetheless, cannot be granted on its merits, considering
that he had failed to justify his right to the de facto possession (physical or
material possession) of the disputed premises.
BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC. vs Ando
The filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer during the pendency of
an action for recovery of ownership of the same parcel of Land subject of the
summary action of unlawful detainer does not amount to forum-shopping.
Facts: The petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) filed a
Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against herein respondents
Dante Ando, Abenigo Augis, Edgar Cardones, Zacarias Gutierrez, Cornelio
Ibarra, Jr., Zenaida Ibarra, Teofilo Lirasan, Eunice Lirasan, Ruth Mission,
Dolly Resales and Eunice Tambangan, in their capacities as Members of the
Mandaue Bradford Church Council, the Mandaue Bradford Church (MBC),
and the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCPI). RTC
dismissed the unlawful detainer case. The RTC held that BUCCI was guilty of
forum-shopping because it failed to certify under oath that there was another
action involving the same parties and the same Lot 3-F still pending before
another court. CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA opined that whatever
decision mat would be rendered in the action for recovery of ownership of the
parcels of land in question would amount to res judicata in the unlawful
detainer case.
Issue: WON BUCCI is guilty of forum shopping for filing and ejectment case
or unlawful detainer while an action for recovery of ownership is still
pending?
Held: No.
BUCCI likewise maintains that there is only identity of parties between the
unlawful detainer case and the case for recovery of ownership; and that the
other three essential elements are absent, to wit: that mere be identity of
cause/s of action; that the reliefs sought are founded on the same facts; and

that the identity of the two preceding particulars be such that any judgment
which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Respondents counter that BUCCI's claim that the issues involved in the two
cases are dissimilar or different is of no moment or consequence because
the latter's deliberate non-disclosure in the certificate against non-forum
shopping in the summaiy action of unlawful detainer of the pendency-in-fact
of the action for recovery of ownership of the disputed parcels of land, which
involved the same parties and the same property, in the action for recovery of
ownership, is an irremissibly fatal defect that cannot be cured by mere
amendment pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and ejectment cases.
The issue of ownership was likewise being contended, with same set of
evidence being presented in both cases. However, it cannot be inferred that
a judgment in the ejectment case would amount to res judicata in the
annulment case, and vice-versa. It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits,
the only issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for
the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.
Therefore, the provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case
cannot be clothed with finality.
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA
Facts: Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal. On February 26, 1982,
the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner
German Management Services to develop their property to develop it into a
residential subdivision. Finding that part of the property was occupied by
private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the
occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Private respondents
filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner.
Petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process
of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence
enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit
bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force,
violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing,
coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents
from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815,
and 1028. The MTC dismissed private respondents complaint for forcible
entry. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON the petitioner is justified on destroying the crops of private
respondents through the doctrine of self help?

12

Held: No. Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have
rationalized petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops
of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in
Article 429 of the New Civil Code. Such justification is unavailing because
the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When
possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code
which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who
believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a
thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse
to deliver the thing."
Caisip v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 17
Concepcion, C. J.
FACTS: Spouses Marcelino Guevarra and Gloria Cabalag cultivated a
parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in Nasugbu,
Batangas, the same land used to be tenanted by Cabalags father when he
was still alive. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia, administered by
Antonio Chuidian, and supervised by the overseer, Felix Caisip. Prior to the
incident involved, Guevarra sought recognition as a lawful tenant of Royas y
Cia from the Court of Agrarian Relations but his action was dismissed.
Thereafter, Roxas y Cia filed an action against Guevarra for forcible entry
with prayer that Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot 105-A. The
Justice of the Peace of Court of Nasugbu decided in favor of Roxas y Cia
and on June 6, 1959, a trouble between Cabalag and Caisip occurred
regarding the cutting of sugarcane.
A day later, Cabalag entered again the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to
be driven out by Caisip. Due to Cabalags tenacious attitude, Caisip sought
the help of the Chief of Police of Nasugbu. The Deputy Sheriff, however,
informed Caisip that his request to eject Cabalag cannot be acted upon
without a proper court order. Nevertheless, the Chief of Police assigned
Sergeant Ignacio Rojales and Corporal Frederico Villadelrey to Haciendo
Palico. On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding a portion of Lot 105-A
which was a ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she
refused to do so. So, Caisip went to Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey and
brought them to Cabalag. Rojales told Cabalag to stop weeding but she
insisted on her right to stay in the said lot. While in squatting position,
Cabalag was grabbed by Rojales who twisted her right arm and wrested the
trowel she was holding. Villadelrey held her left hand and together Rojales
forcibly dragged her towards a banana plantation while Caisip stood nearby,

with a drawn gun. Cabalag shouted, Ina ko po! Ina ko po! and was heard by
some neighbors. Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which
Cabalag was affiliated, went with them on their way to the municipal building.
Upon arrival, Cabalag was turned over by Rojales and Villadelrey to the
policemen on duty, who interrogated her. But upon representations made by
Rivera, she was released and allowed to go home. Cabagan then filed a
complaint charging Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey of the crime of grave
coercion.
The Court of First Instance of Batangas found them guilty as charged. On
appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the force employed by Caisip and others, in the
exercise of his right granted by Article 429, is reasonably necessary to repel
or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
his property.
HELD: No. Caisip was not even entitled to the right granted by Article 429.
This is totally inapplicable to the case, for, having been given 20 days from
June 6th within which to vacate the lot, Cabalag did not, on June 17th and
within said period, invades or usurps the said lot. She had merely remained
in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become
its co-possessor by reason of the prior order of the Justice of Peace Court of
Nasugbu. Caisip and others did not repel or prevent an actual or threatened
physical invasion or usurpation. They expelled Cabalag from a property
which she and her husband were in possession, despite the fact that the
Sheriff had explicitly authorized Guevarra and Cabalag to stay in said
property up to June 26th, and had expressed the view that he could not oust
them without a judicial order. It is clear, therefore, that Caisip, Rojales and
Villadelrey, by means of violence, and without legal authority, had prevented
the complainant from doing something not prohibited by law (weeding and
being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her to do something against her will
(stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), whether it be right or wrong,
thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Article 286 of the
Revised Penal Code.

People of the Philippines v. Pletcha

G.R. No. 19029-CR, June 27, 1977, 22 CA Rep. 807
Sison, J.
FACTS: Tito Pletcha, Jr., farmer, invoking self-help in defense of the land he
inherited from his father 19 years ago against the workers of Radeco

13

Corporation, who without court order, were constructing a fence in a

hacienda allegedly leased by the corporation from a certain Lopinco.
Claiming actual possession and ownership and believing that the land sought
to be fenced was an integral part of the land he inherited, Pletcha asked the
group to desist from fenicing pending a resurvey he proposed, but he was
totally ignored, thus he fought off and prevented the workers. As a result of
such resistance he was prosecuted and convicted of grave coercion by the
Municipal Trial Court. Pletcha appealed the decision of the MTC with the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the appellants action is a legitimate exercise of a private
citizens self-help.
HELD: Yes. In the instant case,the usurpers possession has not yet become
complete and the complainants were in the act of building a fence. Such an
act constitutes force in contemplation of the law. This act of trespass justified
the appellant to drive them away, even by means of bolo because they
refused to listen to his appeal which is reasonable. The appellant need not
rush to the court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of
his property. The situation required immediate action and Art. 429 gave him
the self executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance. The provision
in Art 429 of the New Civil Code confirms the right of the appellant, an owner
and lawful possessor, to use reasonable force to repel an invasion or
usurpation, actual, threatened or physical of his property. The principle of
self-defense and the protective measures related thereto, covers not only his
life, but also his liberty and property.
The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force, not
only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is a
sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses
force to defend his possession does not possess by force. The use of such
necessary force to protect propriety or possessory rights constitutes a
justifying circumstance under the Penal Code.
Diamond Farms, Inc. vs Diamond Farm Workers Multi Purpose Cooperative
Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged m commercial farming of bananas. A big
portion of this land measuring 958.8574 hectares (958-hectare land) was
initially deferred for acquisition and distribution under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). On November 3, 1992, Secretary Ernesto
D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) likewise approved
the Production and Profit Sharing (PPS) Scheme proposed by the Philippine
Banana Growers and Exporters Association as the mode of compliance with
the required production sharing under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6657,

otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Later,

on February 14, 1995, the Deferment Order was lifted and the aforesaid 958hectare land was placed under CARP coverage. Thereafter, 698.8897
hectares of the 958-hectare land were awarded to members of the Diamond
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARBMUPCO).
Petitioner, however, maintained management and control of 277.44 hectares
of land, including a portion measuring 109.625 hectares (109-hectare land).
On November 23, 1999, petitioners certificates of title over the 109-hectare
land were cancelled. In lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
T-154155 to T-154160 were issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. On August 5, 2000, the DAR identified 278 CARP beneficiaries
of the 109-hectare land, majority of whom are members of respondent
Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DFWMPC). On July 2,
2002, petitioner filed a complaint7 for unlawful occupation, damages and
attorneys fees against respondents.
Order distributing the 109-hectare land to 278 CARP beneficiaries was not
yet final on account of appeals, and therefore petitioner remains the lawful
possessor of the subject land (109-hectare land) and owner of the
improvements thereon. But while the CARP beneficiaries have not been
finally designated and installed, respondents its farm workers refused to
do their work from June 10, 2002, forcibly entered and occupied the 74hectare land, and prevented petitioner from harvesting and introducing
agricultural inputs. Thus, petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to
vacate the subject land; that it be allowed to harvest on the 74-hectare land;
and that respondents be ordered to pay it lost income. Respondents aver
that even after CLOAs were issued to the 278 CARP beneficiaries, petitioner
continued to manage the 109-hectare land, paying wages to respondents as
farm workers. Since 1995 they had been demanding from petitioner payment
of their production share to no avail.
In his Decision, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ruled that
petitioner lost its ownership of the subject land when the government
acquired it and CLOAs were issued in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries.
The appeals from the Distribution Order will not alter the fact that petitioner is
no longer the owner of the subject land. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the
DARAB, but the DARAB denied petitioners appeal. The CA held that the
issuance of the Republics TCTs and CLOAs in favor of the 278 CARP
beneficiaries implies the deposit in cash or LBP bonds of the amount initially
determined as compensation for petitioners land or the actual payment of
just compensation due to petitioner.
Issues: whether respondents are guilty of unlawful occupation and liable to
petitioner for damages and attorneys fees, (2) whether petitioner should turn
over possession of the subject land to respondents and respect their
possession thereof, and (3) whether the award of production share and
interest was proper.

14

Held: Now, the unrebutted claim of respondents in their answer and position
paper is that they guarded the 74-hectare land to protect their rights as farm
workers and CARP beneficiaries. They were compelled to do so when
petitioner attempted to install other workers thereon, after it conspired with 67
CARP beneficiaries to occupy the 35-hectare land. They were fairly
successful since the intruders were able to occupy the pumping structure.
The government, including this Court, cannot condone petitioners act to
thwart the CARPs implementation. Installing workers on a CARP-covered
land when the DAR has already identified the CARP beneficiaries of the land
and has already ordered the distribution of the land to them serves no other
purpose than to create an impermissible roadblock to installing the legitimate
beneficiaries on the land.
We also find the action taken by respondents to guard the land as
reasonable and necessary to protect their legitimate possession and prevent
precisely what petitioner attempted to do. Such course was justified under
Article 429 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he
may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
Being legitimate possessors of the land and having exercised lawful means
to protect their possession, respondents were not guilty of unlawful
occupation. However, we disagree with the finding of the Adjudicator and
DARAB that petitioner is guilty of unlawful occupation. Since respondents
themselves have asked petitioner to resume its farm operation, petitioners
possession cannot be said to be illegal and unjustified.
This notwithstanding, we sustain the order for petitioner to turn over
possession of the 109-hectare land.
Spouses Fuentes vs Roca
Facts:
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga
City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano)
under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have
the registered title transferred to his name.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). The sale was completed on 1998
and the spouses built a building therein. Eight years later in 1997, the
children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents Conrado G. Roca,
Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarcianos
sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad
(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses. The Rocas claimed
that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not

give her consent to it and her signature was forged. All the same, the
Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to
Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive
period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed. RTC
dismissed the case. It ruled that the action had already prescribed since the
ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery or fraud, already
prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years after its discovery.
In this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from the
date the deed of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new
title was issued. The RTC noted that Atty. Plagatas defective notarization of
the affidavit of consent did not invalidate the sale. The law does not require
spousal consent to be on the deed of sale to be valid. Neither does the
irregularity vitiate Rosarios consent. CA reversed RTC decision. CA
concluded that there was no consent and Rosarios signature is forged.
Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that
their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an
action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be
brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction.
Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within
10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale. Considering, however, that the sale
between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely voidable, the CA
held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they
paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until
actual payment. Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith,
they were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value
of the improvements they introduced on the lot. The CA did not award
damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of attorneys fees to the
Fuentes spouses.
Issues: 1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to
her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses
was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to
the spouses already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could
bring the action to annul that sale.
Held: (1) Yes. The Court agrees with the CAs observation that Rosarios
signature strokes on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her
specimen signatures, on the other hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke
and more fluid. The way the letters R and s were written is also remarkably
different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye. Significantly,
Rosarios specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed
the supposed affidavit of consent.
(2) Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this
case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario
got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes

15

spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code
does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may
assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without
the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the
same would be void. But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if
no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed,
an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what
has been given under it. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes
spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property
that Tarciano sold without their mothers (his wifes) written consent. The
passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.
(3) No. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the
Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990, 191 SCRA 195
Fernan, C.J.
FACTS: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is
adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent
corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused
a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during
rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
Petitioners instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors of
respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article
324 of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action

against respondent corporation for damages. The trial court dismissed the
civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted
ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. The appellate court affirmed the
order of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby
causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable
for damages.
HELD: Yes. Petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have
sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. It must be stressed that the use
of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage
caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. However,
responsibility for fault or negligence under the said article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. The plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. The decision is reversed and set aside.

16