VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC. vs.

JOCELYN CATUBIG
G.R. No. 175512
May 30, 2011

On January 27, 1994, Respondent Catubigs husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr.

(Catubig), was on his way home from Dumaguete City riding in tandem on a
motorcycle with his employee, Emperado. Catubig was the one driving the
motorcycle. While approaching a curve at kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to
overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over to the opposite
lane, which was then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla,
headed for the opposite direction. When the two vehicles collided, Catubig and
Emperado were thrown from the motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot where he
was thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the hospital. Cabanilla was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide. After preliminary
investigation, the MCTC issued a Resolution, dismissing the criminal charge
against Cabanilla. It found that Cabanilla was not criminally liable for the deaths of
Catubig and Emperado, because there was no negligence, not even contributory,
on Cabanillas part. Thereafter, Respondent Catubig filed before the RTC a
Complaint for Damages against Vallacar Transit, Inc. dated November 12, 1999,
admitted all the evidence presented by petitioner. The RTC ruled that the proximate
cause of the collision of the bus and motorcycle was the negligence of the driver of
the motorcycle, Catubig. Respondent Catubig appealed to the Court of Appeals and
the Appellate court ruled Vallacar Transit Inc. is equally liable for the accident in
question which led to the deaths of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and Teddy Emperado.

ISSUE:
1) W/N THE IMMEDIATE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION IS THE
RECKELESS AND NEGLIGENT ACT OF CATUBIG
2) W/N CATUBIG HAS NOT OBSERVED REASONABLE CARE AND
CAUTION IN DRIVING HIS MOTORCYCLE WHICH AN ORDINARY
PRUDENT DRIVER WOULD HAVE DONE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCE
RULING:
1) Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,

and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom
The RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded that Catubigs overtaking
of a slow-moving truck ahead of him, while approaching a curve on the highway,
was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision which led to his own
death
Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision is the reckless and negligent act of Quintin
Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres Bus was running very fast. Even if
the
Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane, it could not have caused the
collision if
not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a cargo truck
and encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while approaching a
curve.
2) As the driver of the motorcycle, Quintin Catubig, Jr. has not observed
reasonable care and caution in driving his motorcycle which an ordinary
prudent driver would have done under the circumstances. Recklessness on
the part of Quintin Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a cargo
truck while approaching a curve in Barangay Donggo-an, Bolisong,
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental. Overtaking another vehicle while approaching a
curve constitute reckless driving penalized not only under Section 48 of
Republic Act No.4136 but also under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

G.R. No. 190022 PNRC et al v VIZCARA et al

Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a passenger jeepney with his
companions, namely, Cresencio Vizcara (Cresencio), Crispin Natividad (Crispin),
Samuel Natividad (Samuel), Dominador Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara
(Joel). While crossing the railroad track, a PNR train, then suddenly turned up and
rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the instantaneous death of
Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and
Joel, sustained serious physical injuries.[4]
At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad
crossing. Additionally, the Stop, Look and Listen signage was poorly maintained.
The Stop signage was already faded while the Listen signage was partly blocked by
another signboard.[5]
The survivor filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga, the
alternate driver of the train alleging that the proximate cause of the fatalities and
serious physical injuries sustained by the victims of the accident was the petitioners
gross negligence in not providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury to
persons and properties.
For their part, the petitioners claimed that they exercised due diligence in operating
the train and monitoring its roadworthiness.
After trial on the merits, the RTC favored respondents
Unyielding, the petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. Subsequently, the
CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming the RTC decision with modification
with respect to the amount of damages awarded to the respondents.
ISSUES:
I-THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PETITIONERS;
II-THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
CHANCE FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE;
III- WON THERE IS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
THE RESPONDENTS.[13]

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

The petitioners negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by
a person's act or omission constituting fault or negligence.
In the instant petition, this Court is called upon to determine whose negligence
occasioned the ill-fated incident. The records however reveal that this issue had
been rigorously discussed by both the RTC and the CA. To emphasize, the RTC
ruled that it was the petitioners failure to install adequate safety devices at the
railroad crossing which proximately caused the collision.
A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated Stop, Look and
Listen signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the
railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working
order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. [25] Having established
the fact of negligence on the part of the petitioners, they were rightfully held liable
for damages.
There was no contributory negligence
on the part of the respondents.
Here, we cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their injury
when they were not even aware of the forthcoming danger. It was established
during the trial that the jeepney carrying the respondents was following a tenwheeler truck which was only about three to five meters ahead. When the truck
proceeded to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo, the driver of the jeepney, simply
followed through. He did so under the impression that it was safe to proceed. It
bears noting that the prevailing circumstances immediately before the collision did
not manifest even the slightest indication of an imminent harm. To begin with, the
truck they were trailing was able to safely cross the track. Likewise, there was no

crossing bar to prevent them from proceeding or, at least, a stoplight or signage to
forewarn them of the approaching peril. Thus, relying on his faculties of sight and
hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to anticipate the impending danger.
The responsibility of the PNR to secure public safety does not end with the
installation of safety equipment and signages but, with equal measure of
accountability, with the upkeep and repair of the same.
The maintenance of safety equipment and warning signals at railroad crossings is
equally important as their installation since poorly maintained safety warning
devices court as much danger as when none was installed at all. The presence of
safety warning signals at railroad crossing carries with it the presumption that they
are in good working condition and that the public may depend on them for
assistance. If they happen to be neglected and inoperative, the public may be
misled into relying on the impression of safety they normally convey and eventually
bring injury to themselves in doing so.
The doctrine of last clear chance is not
applicable.
Finally, the CA correctly ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable
in the instant case. The doctrine of last clear chance provides the rule that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused
by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent
the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. [32] To reiterate, the proximate
cause of the collision was the petitioners negligence in ensuring that motorists and
pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and
passengers of the jeepney did not have any participation in the occurrence of the
unfortunate incident which befell them. Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act
manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on
the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied.

G.R. No. 162987 GUILLANG V BEDANIA

Petitioner Genaro M. Guillang (Genaro) was driving his brand new car with Antero Guillang
(Antero), Felipe Jurilla, Jose Dignadice (Dignadice), and Alvin Llanillo (Llanillo). At the other

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

side of the highway, respondent Rodolfo A. Bedania (Bedania) was driving a ten-wheeler

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving

Isuzu cargo truck. The truck was owned by respondent Rodolfo de Silva (de Silva).

a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic

Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a

regulation.

U-turn. When the truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Genaros car hit the right

In this case, the report[33] showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a

portion of the truck. The truck dragged Genaros car some five meters to the right of the

violation of traffic rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision, Bedania

road.

escaped and abandoned the petitioners and his truck.[34] This is another violation of a traffic

As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the De La Salle University
Medical Center. Antero died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision.
Petitioners instituted a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against respondents
Bedania and de Silva.

regulation.[35] Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania was negligent at the time of
the mishap.
Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the
life of Antero and injured the petitioners. The cause of the collision is traceable to the
negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper precaution, the

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found Bedania

mishap in all probability would not have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without

grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the

signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or

highway without due regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists. The trial court

minimize that risk. The trucks sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to the

also declared de Silva grossly negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver,

collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of petitioners.

Bedania.

We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedanias employer, is also liable for the

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn rendered its decision in favor

damages suffered by petitioners. De Silva failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence

of respondents.

of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.

ISSUE: who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. .[24]
There is no dispute that petitioners suffered damages because of the collision. However,
the issues on negligence and proximate cause are disputed.
On the Presumption of Negligence and Proximate Cause

Ramos vs. COL Realty Corporation; G.R. No. 184905

August 28, 2009

Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While Rodel was driving
the Ford Expedition of petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a
Corrolla Altis driven by Aquilino Larin and owned by Respondent COL Realty. Due
to the impact of the vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was injured.
A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver.
Ramos in his opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is
Aquilnio's negligence that is the proximate cause of the accident. He further argued
that when the accident happened, Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting
the crossing is the place where the accident happened.
Issue:
Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the proximate cause of the
accident is his employee's negligence.

person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from
Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward
event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and
intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred,
Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and
probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered
dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing
construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

Ruling:
No. There is no doubt that Aquilinos violation of the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of
the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent

As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary

to delve into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is
the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodels contributory negligence
has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent
whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the
effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor.

MERCURY
GR.

No.

DRUG
156037,

CORP.
May

v.
28,

BAKING
2007

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: (Proximate Cause) Sebastian M. Baking went to the

clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. After undergoing an ECG, and several
examininations, Dr. Sy found the respondents blood sugar and triglyceride were
above normal. The doctor then prescribed two medical prescriptions- Diamicron for
the blood sugar and Benalize for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to
Mercury Drug Alabang to buy the prescribed medicines. The sales lady misread the
prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus what was sold was
Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. Unaware of the wrong medicine, he took one
pill on three consecutive days. On the third day he took the medicine, he met an
accident while driving his car. He fell asleep while driving. He could not remember
anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting the tablet he took,
respondent went back to Dr. Sy who was shocked after finding that what was sold
was Dormicum instead of Diamicron. He filed the present complaint for damages
against petitioner. The trial court favored the defendant which was affirmed by the
CA
hence
this
petition.
ISSUE: Is petitioner negligent, and if so, is the negligence was the proximate cause
of
the
accident?
HELD: YES. Art. 2176 provide the requisites of negligence: 1. damage suffered by
the plaintiff, 2. fault or negligence of the defendant, 3. connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by
the plaintiff. It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with
public interest. Obviously, petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling the
wrong prescription. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and
death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in
dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave
respondent was indeed the one prescribed by the physician. Petitioner contends

that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents negligence in driving his
car. Proximate cause is that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred Proximate cause is determined from the facts of
each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and
precedent. Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners
employee been careful in reading the prescription. Without the potent effect of
Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while
driving his car, resulting in collision. Petition DENIED.

Sealoader Shipping v. Grand Cement Manufacturing

Sealoader executed a Time Charter Party Agreement with Joyce Launch for the
chartering of MT Viper in order to tow its unpropelled barges for a minimum of 15
days. Sealoder also entered into a contract with Grand Cement for the loading of
cement clinkers and the delivery thereof to Manila.
Eventually, Sealoders barge arrived at the wharf of Grand Cement tugged by MT
Viper. It was not immediately loaded as the employees of Grand Cement were
loading another vessel.
The barge was still docked at the wharf of Grand Cement when typhoon Bising
struck in the area of Cebu. As it became stronger, MT Viper tried to tow the barge
away but it was unsuccessful. The towing line connecting the vessels snapped
since the mooring lines were not cast off. As such, the barge rammed the wharf
which caused a significant damage.
Grand Cement filed a complaint for damages when Sealoader ignored its demands
for compensation of the damage caused. They allege that Sealoader was negligent
when it ignored its employees advice to move the vessels after it had received
weather updates. Sealoader filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Joyce
Launch is the one liable since it was the owner of MT Viper, and whose employees
were manning the vessel. Sealoader filed a cross-claim against Joyce Launch.
Joyce maintains that the damages were due to force majeure and faulted Grand
Cements employees for abandoning the wharf leaving them helpless and for not
warning them early on.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Grand Cement holding the two companies
liable since there was complete disregard of the storm signal, the captain of the
vessel was not present and the vessel was not equipped with a radio or any
navigational facility, which is mandatory. Joyce launch did not appeal. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the decision but on MR, it partly reversed its decision finding Grand
Cement to be guilty of contributory negligence since it was found that it was still

loading the other vessel at the last minute just before the storm hit, which was the
reason why Sealoders vessel did not move. The damages were reduced to 50%.
ISSUE:
Who should be liable for damage sustained by the wharf of Grand Cement?
HELD:
Sealoader was guilty of negligence, hence it is liable. First because it was not
equipped with a radio or a navigational facility and it failed to monitor the prevailing
weather conditions. Second, it cannot pass the responsibility of casting off the
mooring lines because the people at the wharf could not just cast off the mooring
lines without any instructions from the crew of the vessel. It should have taken the
initiative to cast off the mooring lines early on.
Moreover, there was no contributory negligence on the part of Grand Cement
Manufacturing Corporation. It had timely informed the barge of the impending
typhoon and directed the vessels to move to a safer place. Sealoader had the
responsibility to inform itself of the prevailing weather conditions in the areas where
its vessel was to sail. It cannot merely rely on other vessels for weather updates
and warnings on approaching storms. To do so would be to gamble with the safety
of its own vessel, putting the lives of its crew under the mercy of the sea, as well as
running the risk of causing damage to property of third parties for which it would
necessarily be liable. The evidence proffered by Sealoader to prove the negligence
of Grand Cement was marred by contradictions and are, thus, weak at best. Thus,
the contributory negligence of Grand Cement was not established in this case.

Hence, the award of damages in favor of the petitioner by the lower courts is
reversed.