Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178451

Bank of Cabadbaran, Inc. (RBCI) and mortgage the subject properties. Armed with
the said SPA, Erna applied for and was granted a commercial loan by RBCI inthe
amount of 200,000.00 with 27% interest rate per annum, payable within a period
of 180 days.8 The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage9 over the subject
properties which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Agusan del Norte10
and annotated on Tax Declaration (TD) No. 425-R11 covering the mortgaged lot.

July 30, 2014

RURAL BANK OF CABADBARAN, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
JORGITA A. MELECIO-YAP, LILIA MELECIO PACIFICO (deceased, substituted
by her only child ERILL* ISAAC M. PACIFICO, JR.), REYNALDO A. MELECIO
DELOSO, and SARAH MELECIO PALMA-GIL, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari' are the Decision2 dated February
28, 2006 and the Resolution3 dated June 12, 2007 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70933 which (a) set aside the Decision4 dated
November 27, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 33,
in Civil Case No. 4406; (b) declared the Special Power of Attorney, the ExtraJudicial Adjudication of a Parcel of Land and the Addendum to th~ Extra-Judicial
Adjudication of the Estate of Isaac Melecio and Trinidad Melecio Both Deceased
as forgeries, and the extrajudicial foreclosure .sale, writ of possession, and all
proceedings relative thereto null and void as against respondents; and (c)
ordered the remand of the case to the court a quofor further proceedings.
The Facts
Erna Melecio-Mantala (Erna) and respondents Jorgita A. Melecio-Yap (Jorgita),
Lilia Melecio Pacifico (Lilia), Reynaldo A. Melecio, Rosie Melecio-Deloso (Rosie),
and Sarah Melecio Palma-Gil (Sarah) are the children of the late spouses Isaac
and Trinidad Melecio (Melecio Heirs). They inherited a 3,044 square meterresidential lot located in Tolosa, Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, togetherwith the
ancestral house and two (2) other structures erected thereon (subject properties).
The administration and management of the said properties were left to the care of
Erna5 who was then residing in their ancestral home.6
On August 24, 1990, the Melecio Heirs purportedly executed a notarized Special
Power of Attorney (SPA)7 authorizing Erna to apply for a loan with petitioner Rural

Erna, however, defaulted in the payment of her loan obligation when it fell due,
causing RBCI to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties 12in
accordance with Act No. 3135,13 as amended. In the process, RBCI emerged as
the highest bidder in the public auction sale held on August 26, 1992 for a total bid
price of 405,045.65.14 Since Erna failed to redeem the subject properties
withinthe redemption period despite notice,15 the latest tax declarations16 in the
names of the Melecio Heirs covering the subject properties were cancelled and
new tax declarations in the name of RBCI were issued.17 Thereafter, RBCI
informed Erna of its intent to take physical possession of the subject properties,18
while the actual occupant thereof, a certain Jimmyrando C. Morales, was directed
to pay rentals to RBCI beginning September 1995.19
In a letter20 dated October 11, 1995, respondents, through counsel, informed
RBCI that they were unaware of the loan obtained by Erna and did not authorize
the mortgage transaction over the subject properties which they co-owned. They
claimed that the SPA submitted by Erna in support of her loan application was
spurious, and that their signatures appearing thereon were falsified. As such,
theydemanded RBCI to release the subject properties from the coverage of Erna's
loan obligation to the extent of their shares.
In reply, RBCI maintained the validityof the SPA and its right to rely on it being a
notarized document. It likewise claimed that it was impossible for respondents not
to have known about the mortgage transaction considering that the publication
and notice requirements in foreclosure proceedings were followed and that
constant reminders were sent to redeem the subject properties which they failed
to heed.21
In view of respondents refusal tovacate the premises, RBCI applied for and was
issued a writ ofpossession dated March 22, 1996 by the RTC of Butuan City,
Branch 1 in Special Proceeding No. 899.22 The writ of Possession23 was,
thereafter, served and returned duly satisfied and complied with by the Sheriff who
turned over the subject properties to RBCI on April 11, 1996.24
Consequently, or on April 17, 1996, respondents filed a complaint25 for
declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession and ownership, and

damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
Spouses Erna and Bonifacio Mantala (Sps. Mantala), RBCI, the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff, and Spouses Jimmyrando and Teresita Morales (Sps. Morales)
before the RTC of Butuan City, Branch 2, docketed as Civil Case No. 4406. In the
said complaint, respondents averred that they learned of the foreclosure of the
subject properties only sometime in October 199526 and, upon investigation,
discovered that the said properties were mortgaged by their sister, Erna, bearing
ostensible authority under the subject SPA.27 They alleged that they did not
participate in the execution of the said SPA and prayed that the same, as well as
the mortgage contract, the writ of possession, the sheriffs turn-over receipt, and
all derivative titles, documents, issuances, and registrations arising therefrom be
declared null and void and that the subject properties be reconveyed back to
them.
Extraterritorial service of summons was effected upon Sps. Mantala28 who, at the
time of the filing of the aforementioned complaint, were found to be already living
in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.29 Despite receipt of the summons and a copy of
the complaint, however, they did not file an answer and, thus, were declared in
default.30
For their part, the other defendants, i.e., RBCI, Sps. Morales, and the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff, maintained the validity of the notarized SPA and the foreclosure
proceedings which carry the presumption of regularity that respondents failed to
overcome.31 Having relied on the SPA, RBCI invoked the defense of a mortgagee
in good faith whose subsequent ownership and possession of the subject
properties must be respected. Said defendants thereby prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint and the payment of damages, attorneys fees, and litigation
expenses for having been compelled to litigate against the baseless suit.32 RBCI
likewise filed a crossclaim against Sps. Mantala, praying for reimbursement of the
expenses incurred in relation to the foreclosure proceedings and the present
litigation in the event of a favorable judgment.33
During the trial, RBCI presented the notarized Extra-Judicial Adjudication of a
Parcel of Land and the Addendum to the Extra-Judicial Adjudication of the Estate
of Isaac Melecio and Trinidad Melecio Both Deceased (Extra-Judicial Adjudication
Documents) allegedly executed by respondents as further documentary bases for
its grant of Ernas loan application.34
On rebuttal, respondents denied having executed the Extra-Judicial Adjudication
Documents, contending that their signatures therein were likewise falsified, and
that they never met in Cabadbaran to execute the same before a notary public.
Nonetheless,they admitted to have discovered that the ownership of the subject

properties had already been transferred to RBCI in 1993, contrary to their earlier
claim that they learned about it only in 1995.35
Before the RTCs resolution of the case, respondent Lilia died36 and was
substituted by her only child, Erll Isaac M. Pacifico.37
The RTC Ruling
On November 27, 2000, the RTC ofButuan City, Branch 33 rendered a Decision38
in favor of RBCI, declaring the real estate mortgage and the consequential
foreclosure proceedingsto be valid and binding against respondents,
notwithstanding the allegation of forgery in the questioned documents. It noted
that despite constructive knowledge of the falsification as early as 1993,
respondents questioned the foreclosure proceedings only in 1996. It, thus,
concluded that they would not have raised the issue on forgeries or falsification
had Sps. Mantala paid the loan obligation or redeemed the properties and,
consequently, held them guilty of acquiescence and estoppel.39 Accordingly, the
RTC declared Sps. Mantala liable to both respondents and RBCI, and adjudged
them jointly and solidarily liable to pay: (a) respondents compensatory damages in
the amount of P1,000,000.00 with 12% interest rate for the loss of the family
ancestral house and lot foreclosed by RBCI, as well as moral and exemplary
damages in the amounts of P250,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, and
attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of P70,000.00; (b) RBCI
attorney's fees and litigation expensesin the total amount of P70,000.00; and (c)
the costs of suit.40
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision41 dated February 28, 2006, the CA reversed the RTC Decision,
finding that Erna had no authority to mortgage the subject properties to RBCI
since the SPA was actually a forgery, and, hence, null and void.42 It held that
while a notarized document generally carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution, respondents, nonetheless, were ableto
rebut by clear, positive and convincing evidence that their signatures on the
contested SPA were forged.43 The CA reached the same conclusion with respect
to the ExtraJudicial Adjudication Documents, and likewise declared the same
invalid.44 Moreover, contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA held that there
was no constructive knowledge of the falsification, noting that the respondents
were not furnished by RBCI with any notice relative to the loan obligation nor
impleaded in the foreclosure proceedings and the ex-partepetition for writ of

possession.45 In this relation, the CA pointed out that acquiescence cannot

validate or ratify an inexistent or void document nor can estoppel lie against
respondents who had no deliberate intent to mislead.46

presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, there are,
however, recognized exceptions, among which is when the findings of the trial
court and the appellate court are conflicting, as in this case.52

In view of the foregoing, the CA declared the real estate mortgage executed on
the strength of the falsified SPA as an invalid encumbrance of respondents
individual shares over the subject properties which cannot be bound by the
subsequent foreclosure proceedings conducted. Nevertheless, it held that a valid
transaction was executed between RBCI and Erna to the extent of the latters 1/6
share in the subject properties which portion respondents, as co-owners, may
redeem.47

The settled rule is that persons constituting a mortgage must be legally authorized
for the purpose.53 In the present case, while Erna appears to be a co-owner of
the mortgaged properties, she made it appearthat she was duly authorized to sell
the entire properties by virtue of the notarized SPA dated August 24, 1990.

Further, the CA ordered a remand of the case (a) to determine the exact extent of
the respective rights, interests, shares, and participation of respondents and RBCI
over the subject properties, (b) thereafter, to effect a final division, adjudication,
and partition in accordance with law, and (c) to re-compute the loan obligation,
inclusive of interests, penalties, and other charges due against Sps. Mantala.48
Finally, the CA deleted the awards of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, and litigation expenses for lack of factual and legal bases49 and ordered
Sps. Mantala to pay the costs.50
RBCIs motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution51 dated
June 12, 2007, hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issues for the Courts resolution are whether or not (a) the
presumption of regularity accorded to the notarized SPA and ExtraJudicial
Adjudication Documents was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence; (b)
respondents are guilty of lachesand, thus, estopped from questioning the validity
of the realestate mortgageand subsequent foreclosure proceedings; and (c) RBCI
can be considered as a mortgagee in good faith.

Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it

with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary
public have in their favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence.54 However, the presumptions that attach to
notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the
notarization was regular.55 A defective notarization will strip the document of its
public character and reduce it to a private document.56 Hence, when there is a
defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and
the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of
evidence.57
In the present case, RBCI failed toshow that the subject SPA which it relied upon
as proof of Ernas ostensibleauthority to mortgage the entirety of the subject
properties was regularlynotarized. Aside from the respondents who denied having
participated in the execution and notarization of the subject SPA, the witnesses to
the instrument, i.e., Guendelyn Lopez Salas- Montaus and Carmelita Cayeta
Bunga, categorically denied having appeared before Notary Public Alan M.
Famador (Atty. Famador) on August 24, 1990 to witness the respondents sign the
SPA in the notary publics presence.58 Despite this irregularity, RBCI did not
present Atty. Famador to refute the same and establish the authenticity of the
contested SPA. It may not be amiss to point out that the principal function of a
notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the
due execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives the
document the force of evidence.59

The Courts Ruling

The petition is partly granted.
Preliminarily, the rule is settled that the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law, not of fact. The
theory of forgery advanced by respondents involves a question of fact. While it is
not the function of the Court to undertake a reexamination of the evidence

Thus, having failed to sufficiently establish the regularity in the execution of the
SPA, the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized documents can
no longer apply and the questioned SPA is to be examined under the parameters
of Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[b]efore any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, itsdue execution
and authenticity must be proved either (a) [b]y anyone who saw the document

executed or written, or (b) [b]y evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker."
Correspondingly, the burden falls upon RBCI to prove the authenticity and due
execution of the subject SPA.60 In the case at bar, RBCI merely relied on the
presumption of authenticity and due execution accorded to a notarized document,
without presenting any other evidence to bolster their case.61 However, these
presumptions had been overcome and effectively negated by respondents claims
of forgery which had been duly substantiated by them through their testimonial
and documentary evidence.62 Hence, absent any cogent reason to the contrary,
the Court hereby sustains the CAs conclusion that respondents were able to
prove, by preponderance of evidence, that the subject SPA was a forgery.
To be clear, the above-stated conclusion is only made with respect to the subject
SPA and not the Extra-Judicial Adjudication Documents as the latter should be
excluded from any forgery analysis since they were not among those documents
sought to benullified by respondents in its complaint. Nevertheless, this
observation bears little significance to the resolution of the ultimate issue at hand.
This is because the forged status of the subject SPA alone is already enough for
the Court to declare the real estate mortgage contract null and void but only with
respect to the shares of the other co-owners (i.e., respondents)whose consent
thereto was not actually procured by Erna. While Erna, as herself a co-owner, by
virtue of Article 493 of the Civil Code,63 had the right to mortgage or even sell her
undivided interest in the said properties, she, could not, however, dispose of or
mortgage the subject properties in their entirety without the consent of the other
co-owners.64 Accordingly, the validity ofthe subject real estate mortgage and the
subsequent foreclosure proceedings therefor conducted in favor of RBCI should
be limited only to the portion which may be allotted to it (as the successor-ininterest of Erna) in the event of partition. In this relation, the CAs directive to
remand the case to the RTC in order to determine the exact extentof the
respective rights, interests, shares and participation of respondents and RBCI
over the subject properties, and thereafter, effect a final division, adjudication and
partition in accordance with law remains in order.Meanwhile, the writ of
possession issued in favor of RBCI, and all proceedings relative thereto should be
set aside considering that the latters specific possessory rights to the said
properties remain undetermined.
The Court, however, finds no need to conduct a remand of the case for the
purpose of re-computing the loan obligation inclusive of interests, penalties and
other charges due against Sps. Mantala65 for the reason that the said loan is the
principal obligation to which the subject realestate mortgage is merely an
accessory to. In Philippine National Bank v. Banatao,66 it was enunciated that:

[A] mortgage is merely an accessory agreement and does not affect the principal
contract of loan. The mortgages, while void, [however,] can still be considered as
instruments evidencing the indebtedness x x x.67
Similarly, in Flores v. Lindo, Jr.,68 the Court pronounced that:
The liability of x x x on the principal contract of the loan however subsists
notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage. Indeed, where a mortgage is not
valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null and
void. Thatobligation matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the
stipulation pertaining to it. Under the foregoing circumstances, what is lost is
merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying or
settling the indebtedness which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity, the
mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor
and the amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.69
Based on the foregoing, the partial invalidity of the subject real estate mortgage
brought about by the forged status of the subject SPA would not, therefore, result
into the partial invalidation of the loan obligation principally entered into by RBCI
and Sps. Mantala;thus, absent any cogent reason to hold otherwise, the need for
the recomputation of said loan obligation should be dispensed with.
As for RBCIs claim that it should be deemed a mortgagee in good faith for having
conducted exhaustive investigations on the history of the mortgagors title,70 the
Court finds the same untenable. Two reasons impel this conclusion: first, the
doctrine of mortgagee in good faith applies only to lands registered under the
Torrens system and not to unregistered lands, as the properties in suit;71 and
second, the principle is inapplicable to banking institutions which are behooved to
exercise greater care and prudence before entering into a mortgage contract.
Hence,the ascertainment of the status or condition of properties offered as
security for loans must be a standard and an indispensable part of its
operations.72
In this case, RBCI failed to observethe required level of caution in ascertaining the
genuineness of the SPA considering that Erna owns only an aliquot part of the
properties offered assecurity for the loan. It should not have simply relied on the
face of the documents submitted since its undertaking to lend a considerable
amountof money as a banking institution requires a greater degree of diligence.
Hence, its rights as mortgagee and, now, as co-owner, should only be limited to
Ernas share to the subject properties and not, absent the other co-owners
consent, to its entirety.

Manila
Finally, the Court cannot subscribe to RBCI's contention that respondents are
barred by lachesfrom laying claim over the subject properties in view of their
inexplicable inaction from the time they learned of the falsification. Lachesis
principally a doctrine of equity. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled toassert it
eitherhas abandoned or declined to assert it.73 In this case, the complaint for
nullification of the SPA was filed before the RTC on April 17,1996, or barely three
years from respondents' discovery of the averred forgery in 1993, which is within
the four-year prescriptive period provided under Article 114674 of the Civil Code to
institute an action upon the injury to their rights over the subject properties. A
delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to
be a delay that would bar relief. Laches applies only in the absence of a statutory
prescriptive period.75 Furthermore, the doctrine of !aches cannot be used to
defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the more prudent rule that
courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the
statute of limitations or the doctrine of !aches when by doing so, manifest wrong or
injustice would result,76 as in this case.
Neither is there estoppel. Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, an essential
element of estoppel is that the person invoking it has been influenced and has
relied on the representations or conduct of the person sought to be estopped.
Said element is, however, wanting in this case.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February
28, 2006 and the Resolution.dated June 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 70933 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS deleting (a) the
declaration of nullity of the ExtraJudicial Adjudication of a Parcel of Land and-the
Addendum to the ExtraJudicial Adjudication of the Estate of Isaac Melecio and
Trinidad Melecio Both Deceased, as well as ( b) the order to remand the case for
the purpose of re-computing the loan obligation of Spouses Erna Melecio-Mantala
and Bonifacio Mantala to Rural Bank of Cabadbaran, Inc. (RBCI).
The Writ of Possession issued in favor of RBCI, and all proceedings relative
thereto, are fui;-ther SET ASIDE considering that the latter's specific possessory
rights to the said properties remain undetermined.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133382

March 9, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EFREN MENDOZA y SALVADOR, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
True, a father and husband has the duty and the right to defend himself, his family
and his home. However, in order to successfully invoke self-defense and defense
of relative, he must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the concurrence of
three elements, the most important of which is unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. Absent unlawful aggression, these defenses collapse and the accused
must be convicted.
The Case
Efren Mendoza y Salvador was charged with murder for the July 14, 1993 killing of
Anchito A. Nano. Before the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, an
Information 1 was filed against him on September 9, 1993, alleging as follows:
That on or about 7:30 o' clock [o]n the evening of July 14, 1993, at Brgy.
Manlucugan, [M]unicipality of Vinzons, [P]rovince of Camarines Norte, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, assault, attack and hack with a bolo one ANCHITO A.
NANO, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple hacking wounds, which were the
proximate cause of his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
During his arraignment on October 22, 1993, appellant, with the assistance of Atty.
Leo Intia, entered a plea of not guilty. 3 On November 6, 1997, after trial in due
course, the court a quo rendered its assailed nine-page Decision, 4 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds the accused, Efren
Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER defined and

penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender will not affect the penalty imposed since it is
offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Wherefore, he is hereby
ordered to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the heirs of
the deceased the following:
a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; and
b) P30,000.00 as moral damages.
The bond posted for the provisional liberty of said accused is hereby
CANCELLED.

SPO4 Rafael asked the people present who was the perpetrator of the crime. The
Barangay officials led by Kgwd. Saman and Kgwd. Cribe informed Rafael that the
perpetrator was appellant Efren Mendoza. SPO4 Rafael later observed that the
appellant's house was in total disarray and he surmised that things might have
been taken in a hurry. He also noted that there was no weapon anywhere near the
victim's body (Ibid., pp. 12-14 and 17).
Later that night, appellant surrendered to Senior Police Officer Leonardo
Almadrones who promptly turned him over to Chief Investigator Joel Guinto for the
requisite investigation. During investigation, appellant claimed that Anchito
ransacked his house and hacked his seven (7) year old son Ernie Mendoza (TSN,
July 1, 1994, p. 5).

SO ORDERED. 5
Hence, this appeal. 6
The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution
In the People's Brief, 7 the Office of the Solicitor General presented the following
statement of facts:

Two days later, appellant's wife and son went to the Vinzon's police station to
blotter Ernie Mendoza's wound. Investigator Guinto interviewed Ernie Mendoza
and concluded that Ernie's wound was made by somebody other than the victim
since the said wound was not deep enough. Also, when he questioned the child
about the wound, the latter answered that when he woke up, he already had a
wound. Investigator Guinto later filed the present charge against appellant after
the victim's common-law wife brought several witnesses who each executed their
corresponding sworn affidavits. (ibid., pp. 7 & 11). 8
The Version of the Defense

At around 7:00 p.m. of July 14, 1993, in Barangay Manlucugan, Vinzons,

Camarines Norte, Anchito Nano and Marianito Rafael passed by appellant's house
and asked for a drink from appellant's wife, Emily Mendoza. Anchito began talking
with Emily and they were about four arms-length from Marianito when appellant
suddenly appeared. Appellant hacked Anchito on the nape, which prompted
Marianito to flee out of fear for his life. (TSN, March 9, 1993, pp. 1014).1wphi1.nt
Brgy. Kagawad Pedro Saman, together with Ernesto Cribe and Trinidad delos
Santos, arrived later at the scene of the crime. Kagawad Saman discovered
Anchito in a kneeling position already dead. He also found (3) three hack wounds
on the nape and two (2) hack wounds at the back of Anchito's body (TSN, March
10, 1997, pp. 7 and 18).
At around 9:00 p.m. of that day, Trinidad delos Santos reported the hacking
incident to the sub-station of Aguit-it, Vinzons. SPO2 Silverio Rafael proceeded to
the crime scene and saw Anchito's body still in a kneeling position with
hackwounds at the back of the neck and body (TSN, May 31,1994, p. 5).

The defense presented six witnesses: Appellant Efren Mendoza, his wife Emily
and his son Ernie; Bayani Aguilar; Dr. Gaudencio Albano and Carmen Herico. In
his Brief, 9 appellant summarized the defense witnesses' testimonies as follows:
EMILY MENDOZA, wife, of appellant, testified that at around 7:00 o' clock in the
evening, the victim Anchito Nano and his companion Marianito Rafael arrived at
their house and upon arrival, Anchito Nano destroyed the two (2) windows of their
house. She saw afterwards that her son, Ernie Mendoza, was hacked by Anchito
Nano while the former was peeping thru the destroyed window. She shouted for
help and appellant, her husband, responded to her call and saw Anchito Nano
who was about to attack her husband, but was hacked first by the latter. Marianito
Rafael who was just watching subsequently fled from the place of the incident.
She brought her son first to the faith healer for immediate treatment and the
following morning to the Provincial Hospital for medical treatment. She learned
later that her husband went to Vinzons Municipal Hall and surrendered voluntarily
to the police authority on the same day of July 14, 1993. (TSN, December 8, 1994,
no. 3-11).

EFREN MENDOZA, accused-appellant, testified that on July 14, 1993, at around

7:30 in [the] evening, he was at the comfort room 20 about meters away from their
house when he heard his wife shouting for help. He ran immediately towards the
direction of their house and saw Anchito Nano destroying the lock of their
window[;] hence he looked for a piece of wood but found a bolo instead. He later
heard his son shout, "Ama, tinaga ako." He approached Anchito Nano to prevent
him from entering their house but the latter tried to hack him. He was able to
deliver a hacking blow ahead of the victim on the right side of the neck. Thereafter,
he immediately went to the Municipal Hall of Vinzons and surrendered voluntarily
to the police authority (TSN, March 27, 1995, pp. 3-8).
ERNIE MENDOZA, appellant's son, testified that on July 14, 1993, at around 7:30
in the evening, he noticed that somebody was hacking their house, hence, he
peeped through the window and saw Anchito Nano who hacked him on the head,
thereby resulting [in] los[s] of consciousness while his mother [kept] on shouting
for help. He was brought first to a quack doctor for immediate treatment and the
following morning, to the provincial hospital where he was treated by Dr. Albano
for the head injury he sustained.
BAYANI AGUILAR, police chief of Vinzons PNP testified that he issued a
certification on August 3, 1993 about the voluntary surrender of appellant Efren
Mendoza and another certification regarding one in the report made by Emily
Mendoza relative to the hacking of his son by Anchito Nano which happened on
July 14, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening at their house (TSN, November 7,
1995, pp. 2-4).
DR. GAUDENCIO ALBANO, the attending doctor who treated appellant's son
testified that he treated Ernie Mendoza who suffered a wound laceration four (4)
cm. long at the middle of the head which could have been caused by a blunt
object. (TSN, July 31, 1996, pp. 4-6).
CARMEN HERICO testified that on July 14, 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening,
she heard her daughter, Emily Mendoza shouting for help, hence she ran towards
her daughter's house and they met halfway along the road. They proceeded back
to her daughter's house and she saw the fallen window. She and her daughter,
subsequently proceeded to the house of Pedro Saman, a barangay kagawad and
informed the latter about the incident. (TSN, October 22, 1996, pp. 3, 5-6). 10
Trial Court Ruling
The court a quo rejected appellant's plea of self-defense, ratiocinating as follows:

To bolster his claim of self-defense, accused Efren Mendoza declared: when he

heard the shouts for help of his wife, immediately he ran towards their house and
saw the victim destroying their house. There, he heard his son [shout], "Ama,
tinaga ako." He immediately approached the victim in order to prevent him from
entering the house. He delivered the first blow by hacking the victim, hitting the
victim at the right side of the neck, alleging that the victim, when they were facing
each other, hacked the accused first.
Indeed, a man's house is his castle. He has the right to protect it. He may repel
force by force in defense of person, habitation or property against anyone who
manifestly intends or endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a felony. But
these circumstances surrounding the incident negates the allegations of the
accused's self-defense. First, there is an eyewitness on the part of the
prosecution, that the accused suddenly attacked and hacked the victim outside
the house (tsn., March 9, 1994, pp. 12-13). Secondly, the physical evidence of the
number, location and severity of the [hack] and incised wounds found on the body
of the victim affirmed by the medical findings contained in the autopsy report that
all the hack wounds [came] from the back of the victim's body (tsn., Feb. 4, 1994,
p. 7), and the pictures presented in court (Exhibits "C" to "C-40") all indicate that
the victim was hacked from behind. Clearly, accused's act was no longer one of
self-preservation, but a determined effort to kill his victim. 11
Holding that appellant's claim was debunked by the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies which were more credible, the trial court explained:
Kagawad Pedro Saman was among the first persons who saw the vicinity of the
incident. He noticed that the victim was not carrying any weapon or knife or a
piece of wood and the house was in good condition (tsn, March 10, 1994, p. 14). It
was corroborated by SPO4 Silverio Rafael that there was indeed no weapon
within the vicinity where the corpse of the victim was found (tsn, May 31, 1994, p.
17) The allegations of the accused that the victim was the aggressor who hacked
him first is contrary to human nature. There was no altercation, warning or even a
challenge that [would] enable the victim to be aggressor. The aggression must be
real, or at least, imminent and not merely imaginary. The aggressor's intent must
be ostensibly revealed by his hostile attitude and other external acts constituting a
real, material, unlawful aggression. A threat, even if made with a weapon or the
belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that
the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts
showing the commencement of actual, material, unlawful aggression. This court
finds that [since] the accused was not in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm, an attempt to defend himself by means which appeared unreasonable by
using a long bolo is unjustifiable. Hence, the self-defense foisted by the accused

is not well-founded, but an alibi to exonerate him from the offense he committed.
12

Requisites of Self-Defense and

Defense of Relative

The Alleged Errors

In his Brief, appellant assails (1) the trial court's rejection of his plea of defense of
relative and (2) its characterization of the crime committed. Thus, he submits:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF DEFENSE
OF RELATIVE ESPOUSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SAME.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AS
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. 13
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should be appreciated in appellant's favor.
First Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Relative
The appellant admits to having hacked Anchito Nano, but vigorously insists that
he did so to defend himself, his family and his home.
Mendoza recounts that on that fateful night, he was relieving himself in their
comfort room situated about twenty meters outside their house, when he heard his
wife's frantic pleas for help. He immediately rushed to their house and saw Nano
destroying their windows. The former looked for something with which to arm
himself and found a bolo. He recalls that at this point, he heard his son shout,
"Ama, tinaga ako!" Thereafter, he approached Nano to prevent him from entering
the house. The latter allegedly faced him and was about to strike him with a bolo,
but the former was able to parry the blow, quickly retaliate and hit him on the neck.
14

Because the accused raises self-defense and defense of a relative, it is incumbent

upon him to prove the presence of the following requisites: unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim, lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and reasonable
necessity of the means he used to repel the aggression. 15 It is settled that the
accused who invokes self-defense or defense of a relative must present clear and
convincing evidence. Such person cannot rely on the weakness of the
prosecution, for even if it is weak, it cannot be disbelieved because the former has
admitted the killing. 16
Unlawful Aggression
Not Proven
We find that the appellant was not able to prove the all-important first requisite
unlawful aggression on the part of Anchito Nano. Mendoza contends that it was
the latter who started the aggression by acting in a manner that was threatening
and dangerous to the former and his family, wreaking havoc on his house and in
the process, injuring his seven-year-old son. Appellant likewise avers that Nano
was about to strike him when the former, acting instinctively, delivered the fatal
blows to the latter.
Emily and Ernie Mendoza, appellant's wife and son, corroborated this assertion.
They testified that the deceased had started the fracas and caused the wound on
Ernie's head. To further prove this claim, the defense presented Dr. Gaudencio
Albano, Ernie's attending physician, who testified that the boy had suffered a
laceration, four centimeters long at the middle of the head, which could have been
caused by a blunt object. 17
Despite this corroboration, however, several circumstances belie appellant's claim
of self-defense and defense of a relative. First, investigators found the deceased
in a kneeling position with five wounds three on the nape, and two at the back.
Thus, the nature and the location of such wounds debunked appellant's claim that
Nano was about to attack him.
Second, the bolo which Nano had allegedly used in his attack was not found
within the vicinity of the crime scene and was not presented in court. This point
was established by SPO4 Silverio Rafael's testimony 18 and the photograph 19
depicting the actual crime scene.

Third, granting that Ernie Mendoza was injured, the appellant and his witnesses
were nor able to prove adequately that such injury was caused by Nano, because
there were inconsistencies and improbabilities in their testimonies. Ernie claimed
that he had lost consciousness after being struck with a bolo by Nano. 20
However, appellant asserts that he heard his child cry, "Ama, tinaga ako!" while
the former was about to subdue the assailant. Moreover, appellant admits that he
did not see Nano hit his son.

In the present case, the victim's lack of awareness of the attack can be gleaned
from the nature, the number and the location of his wounds. Furthermore, the
testimony of Marianito Rafael, against whom no ill motive was imputed by the
appellant, likewise established this fact. The former testified:
Q You mean to say that you were present when he was hacked?
A Yes, sir.

Likewise, the testimonies of Carmen Herico (Emily's mother) and Pedro Saman
regarding the circumstances after the hacking incident negated Emily's claim that
she had rushed her wounded son to the faith healer. Herico went to her daughter's
house after hearing the latter's cries for help, but the former did not see anything
except a fallen window. 21 Surely, she would have noticed if her grandchild was
injured. Pedro Saman, the baranggay kagawad summoned by Herico, also
testified that appellant's children were in the house when he arrived at the crime
scene, 22 but he did not mention anything about an injured child.

Q In what place was he hacked?

xxx

xxx

xxx

A Near the house of Efren Mendoza.

Q Why were you there? . . .

In any event, the trial court disbelieved the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
The well-settled rule is that the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are accorded great weight and respect, in the absence of
any clear showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which
could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied. 23 Appellant failed to present any reason why this Court should
reverse or modify the court a quo's ruling.

A Because I asked for water from Emily Mendoza.

In all, the totality of the evidence presented by the appellant was not sufficient to
prove that it was Nano who had started the fracas, and that the former was just
acting to defend himself, his family and his home.

xxx

Second Issue:

A He came out suddenly.

Crime and Punishment

Q . . . [W]here did he come from?

We agree with the trial court that the killing of Anchito Nano was qualified by
treachery, as alleged in the Information. The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
attacked. 24 Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. 25

A He came from outside of the house.

Q And Anchito Nano was also there?

xxx

xxx

xxx

A We were together.
xxx

xxx

Q You mean to say that after you had a drink, Efren Mendoza came?

Q What did [he] do upon arriving, if any, this Efren Mendoza?

A He suddenly hacked.
Q Who?
A Anchito Nano.

xxx

xxx

xxx

cannot at the same time be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to

warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary
surrender.

Q How many times was Anchito Nano hacked by Efren Mendoza, if you know?
The Proper Penalty
A I only saw once, I ran away after seeing the first hack. 28
Voluntary Surrender
Appellant argues that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should
be appreciated in his favor, because he immediately went to the Municipal Hall
and surrendered to the police on the night of the incident.
We agree, To establish this mitigating circumstance, the following three requisites
must be shown: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender
surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (c) the
surrender is voluntary. 27 The defense must show intent to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because of an acknowledgment of guilt or
because of a wish to spare them the trouble and the expense concomitant to the
search and the capture of the accused. 28
In this case, all these requisites were proven. Appellant's assertion that he
surrendered was corroborated by Chief Inspector Bayani Aguilar, Vinzons chief of
police, who issued a Certification that "one Efren Mendoza . . . voluntarily
surrendered [to] this station, including his bolo . . . which was used to hack 3 times
a certain Yoyoy Nano . . ." 29 Contrary to the submission of the solicitor general,
30 the surrender of appellant was unconditional. He readily admitted that he had
hacked the victim and subsequently put himself under police custody.
Furthermore, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling that voluntary surrender
was "offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery." 31 The court a quo
failed to appreciate the distinction between a generic aggravating circumstance
and a qualifying one.
A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime. A generic aggravating
circumstance, on the other hand, does not affect the designation of the crime; it
merely provides for the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period. Thus, while a generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a
mitigating circumstance, a qualifying circumstance may not. 32
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating
circumstance.1wphi1 Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it

When the crime was committed on July 14, 1993, the penalty for murder was
reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death. 33 At the time, however, RA
7659 which reimposed the death penalty was not yet in effect. In any event, the
presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender impels the
imposition of the minimum period of the applicable penalty, 34 reclusion temporal
(maximum). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 35 appellant should be
sentenced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal also in its
maximum period.
Civil Indemnity
Citing People v. Victor, 36 the solicitor general argues that the civil indemnity
should be raised from P50,000 to P75,000. This is erroneous. In the said case, the
Court held that "starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the present amended law, the Indemnity for the victim shall be in the
increased amount of not less than P75,000.00." Obviously, that ruling, which
involved rape and imposed the death penalty, cannot apply to the present case.
Hence, consistent with current jurisprudence, 37 we affirm the award of P50,000
as indemnity ex delicto.
Likewise, we affirm the award of moral damages in the sum of P30,000 for the
anguish and the wounded feelings suffered by the victim's heirs, which were duly
proven.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED
with the modification that appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor (maximum) to 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal (maximum). All other awards are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8242

October 2, 2009

REBECCA J. PALM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The case before the Court is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca J. Palm
(complainant) against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. (respondent) for revealing information
obtained in the course of an attorney-client relationship and for representing an
interest which conflicted with that of his former client, Comtech Worldwide
Solutions Philippines, Inc. (Comtech).
The Antecedent Facts
Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business
of computer software development. From February 2003 to November 2003,
respondent served as Comtechs retained corporate counsel for the amount of
P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September to October 2003, complainant
personally met with respondent to review corporate matters, including potential
amendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on 1 October 2003,
respondent suggested that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow
participation during board meetings, through teleconference, of members of the
Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines.
Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant
became uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda
Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and
who was suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds.
Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer agreement with respondent
effective November 2003.
In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as
proxy for Gary Harrison (Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm,

members of the Board of Directors, were present through teleconference. When

the meeting was called to order, respondent objected to the meeting for lack of
quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven and Deanna Palm could not participate
in the meeting because the corporate by-laws had not yet been amended to allow
teleconferencing.
On 24 March 2004, Comtechs new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to
return or account for the amount of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized
disbursements when she was the Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April
2004, Comtech received Soledads reply, signed by respondent. In July 2004, due
to Soledads failure to comply with Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a
complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutors Office. In the
proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as
Soledads counsel.
On 26 January 2005, complainant filed a Complaint1 for disbarment against
respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In his Answer,2 respondent alleged that in January 2002, Soledad consulted him
on process and procedure in acquiring property. In April 2002, Soledad again
consulted him about the legal requirements of putting up a domestic corporation.
In February 2003, Soledad engaged his services as consultant for Comtech.
Respondent alleged that from February to October 2003, neither Soledad nor
Palm consulted him on confidential or privileged matter concerning the operations
of the corporation. Respondent further alleged that he had no access to any
record of Comtech.
Respondent admitted that during the months of September and October 2003,
complainant met with him regarding the procedure in amending the corporate bylaws to allow board members outside the Philippines to participate in board
meetings.
Respondent further alleged that Harrison, then Comtech President, appointed him
as proxy during the 10 January 2004 meeting. Respondent alleged that Harrison
instructed him to observe the conduct of the meeting. Respondent admitted that
he objected to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm because the
corporate by-laws had not yet been properly amended to allow the participation of
board members by teleconferencing.
Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented
Soledad in the case for Estafa filed by Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was
already a client before he became a consultant for Comtech. He alleged that the

criminal case was not related to or connected with the limited procedural queries
he handled with Comtech.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated 28 March 2006,3 the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and of representing interest in conflict with
that of Comtech as his former client.
The IBP-CBD ruled that there was no doubt that respondent was Comtechs
retained counsel from February 2003 to November 2003. The IBP-CBD found that
in the course of the meetings for the intended amendments of Comtechs
corporate by-laws, respondent obtained knowledge about the intended
amendment to allow members of the Board of Directors who were outside the
Philippines to participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. The IBPCBD noted that respondent knew that the corporate by-laws have not yet been
amended to allow the teleconferencing. Hence, when respondent, as
representative of Harrison, objected to the participation of Steven and Deanna
Palm through teleconferencing on the ground that the corporate by-laws did not
allow the participation, he made use of a privileged information he obtained while
he was Comtechs retained counsel.
The IBP-CBD likewise found that in representing Soledad in a case filed by
Comtech, respondent represented an interest in conflict with that of a former
client. The IBP-CBD ruled that the fact that respondent represented Soledad after
the termination of his professional relationship with Comtech was not an excuse.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that
herein respondent be found guilty of the charges preferred against him and be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.4
In Resolution No. XVII-2006-5835 passed on 15 December 2006, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification by suspending respondent from the practice of
law for two years.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.6

In an undated Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors First Division found

that respondents motion for reconsideration did not raise any new issue and was
just a rehash of his previous arguments. However, the IBP Board of Governors
First Division recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for only one year.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-703 passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors First Division. The IBP Board of Governors denied respondents motion
for reconsideration but reduced his suspension from two years to one year.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B7 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of this Court
We cannot sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Violation of the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Relationship
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even
after the attorney-client relationship is terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the IBP that in the course of complainants consultations,
respondent obtained the information about the need to amend the corporate bylaws to allow board members outside the Philippines to participate in board
meetings through teleconferencing. Respondent himself admitted this in his
Answer.
However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was not a board meeting but a
stockholders meeting. Respondent attended the meeting as proxy for Harrison.
The physical presence of a stockholder is not necessary in a stockholders
meeting because a member may vote by proxy unless otherwise provided in the
articles of incorporation or by-laws.8 Hence, there was no need for Steven and
Deanna Palm to participate through teleconferencing as they could just have sent
their proxies to the meeting.
In addition, although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate
by-laws may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a
confidential information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may

be effected by "the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and

the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a
majority of members of a non-stock corporation."9 It means the stockholders are
aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. While the power may be
delegated to the board of directors or trustees, there is nothing in the records to
show that a delegation was made in the present case. Further, whenever any
amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the
new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.10 The documents
are public records and could not be considered confidential.1avvphi1
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality.11 The client must intend the communication to be
confidential.12 Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a
majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with
the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus,
the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be
considered a violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the
contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Representing Interest in Conflict With the Interest of a Former Client
The IBP found respondent guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of
a former client, in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

We do not agree with the IBP.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,13 the Court enumerated various tests to determine
conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer
will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment.14 The Court has ruled that
what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence
or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in
which he previously represented him.15
We find no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case
filed by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa
case filed by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in the records
that would show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential
information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained counsel. Further,
respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer
agreement with Comtech. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not
cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the
client.16 The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client
and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.17
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.