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Taking Exception To Decision PDF
Taking Exception To Decision PDF
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TAKING
TO
DECISION:
WALI'ER
CARL
EXCEPTION
BENJAMIN
AND
SCHMITT
SAMUELWEBER
... as in the epigramabove an engravingdepicting a stage on which there stand,
to the left, a buffoonand, to the right, a prince: "Whenthe stage is empty,fool
and king will no longer countfor anything."
-Walter Benjamin,The Origin of GermanTragicDrama
1
In December 1930 WalterBenjaminsends the following letter to Carl Schmitt:
EsteemedProfessor Schmitt,
Youwill receive any day nowfrom thepublishermy book The Originof the German
MourningPlay. Withthese lines I would like not merelyto announceits arrival, butalso
to express myjoy at being able to send it to you, at the suggestionof Mr.AlbertSalomon.
Youwill veryquicklyrecognizehow muchmybook is indebtedto youfor itspresentation
of the doctrine of sovereignty in the seventeenthcentury. Perhaps I may also say, in
addition, that I have also derivedfrom your later works, especially the "Diktatur,"a
confirmationofmymodesof researchin thephilosophyofartfromyours in thephilosophy
of the state. If the reading of my book allows thisfeeling to emerge in an intelligible
fashion, then the purpose of my sending it to you will be achieved.
Withmy expression of special admiration
Yourvery humble
WalterBenjamin [GS 1: 3.8871
Thisletteris notto be foundin thetwo volumesof Benjamin'sCorrespondence,published
in 1966. The esteem thatBenjaminexpressedfor the eminentpolitical thinkerwho, just
a few yearslater,was to publishtexts suchas "DerFiihrerschiitztdas Recht"("TheFiihrer
Protectsthe Law") (1934) and "Die deutsche Rechtswissenschaftim Kampfgegen den
jiidischen Geist" ("GermanJurisprudencein Its Struggle against the Jewish Spirit")
(1936) hardlyfits the picturethatBenjamin'stwo editors and formerfriends, Gershom
Scholem and Theodor Adomo, intended to make known to a broad audience. As
understandableas theirdecision to exclude thisletteris, it nonethelessexpressesa malaise
thatis relatedto the way in which thefigureof WalterBenjamintendsto resistanyattempt
at univocalclassificationor straightforward
evaluation. It is as thoughthe fact thathe had
been able to admireand drawinspirationfrom the work of a Catholicconservativewho
diacritics / fall-winter 1992
was soon to become a conspicuous member of the Nazi party could only muddy and
confuse the meaning of an oeuvre thatboth Adorno and Scholem, whatevertheir other
differencesaboutit might be, agreedwas of exemplarysignificance. It is as thoughthe
acknowledgmentof a debt amountedto a generalidentificationandthus,in view of later
developments,to a moral contaminationof Benjaminby Schmitt.
Sucha malaiseis palpablein theremarkof Rolf Tiedemann,who is to be creditedwith
publishingthe letter to Schmittin the critical apparatushe assembledfor the edition of
Benjamin's Collected Writingsthathe edited. The letter,he remarks,is "denkwiirdig,"
althoughhe does not sayjust whatsortof thoughtsit mightelicit or deserve[GS 1: 3.887].
One response that is often encounteredin this context traces Benjamin's interest in
Schmittback to the critiqueof liberal,parliamentarydemocracysharedby both. But this
explanation,as evident and as accurateas it may be, hardlysuffices to accounteitherfor
the "debt"mentionedby Benjaminin his letter,or for the mannerin which it manifests
itself in his book. Rather,the workof Schmittfiguresin thatbook for at least two related
but very distinctreasons. Firstof all, the "playof mourning"at work in the Trauerspiel
and above all the characterof its "origin"both imply a certainrelationshipto historyand
to politics.' Second, and more specifically, Benjamin encounters the question of
sovereigntynot simplyas a themeof Germanbaroquetheater,butas a methodologicaland
theoreticalproblem:as we shall see, accordingto Benjaminevery attemptto interpretthe
Germanbaroquerisks succumbingto a certainlack of sovereignty. Let us examinejust
how these two factorshelp to explain Benjamin'srecourseto Schmitt.
The German baroque mourning play has as its "true object" and "substance"
"historicallife as representedby its age." But the relationshipbetween the Trauerspiel
and historyis far from a one-way street: if baroquetheateris concernedprimarilywith
history,this historyis in turnconstruedas a kindof Trauerspiel.This is why Benjamin's
formulation,here as elsewhere,mustbe readas rigorouslyas possible: The "trueobject"
of baroque drama is not just "historicallife" as such, but rather"historicallife as
representedby its age [das geschichtliche Leben wie es jene Epoche sich darstellte]"
[Origin62/Ursprung51]. The primaryrepresentationandrepresentativeof historyin the
baroqueage, however,is the sovereign: "TheSovereignrepresentshistory. He holds the
course of history in his hand like a scepter"[65].
Benjamin'sinsistence on the historicalsubjectmatterof Trauerspielthus leads him
necessarilyto the questionof political sovereigntyandits relationto history. But it is not
merely the thematicaspectof his subjectthatleads Benjaminto examinethe questionof
sovereigntyandhence to the theoriesof Schmitt. Inhis letter,Benjaminwritesthathe has
foundin Schmitt's worksa "confirmation"of his own style of research,"meine[n]eigenen
Forschungsweisen."JustwhatBenjaminmightbe referringto becomes clearerif we turn
to the beginning of the first chapterof his book, "Trauerspieland Tragedy." Benjamin
begins his study properwith a notion elaboratedin the "Epistemo-CriticalPrologue":
namely, thatthe "conceptualization"of a philosophicalinvestigationsuch as the one he
proposes must be "directedtowards the extreme [die notwendige Richtung aufs Extreme]"[57/45].
In thus foregroundingthe constitutiveimportanceof a "turntowardthe extreme"in
the process of "philosophicalconceptualization,"Benjaminplaces himself squarelyin a
traditionthatgoes backat least to Kierkegaard's essay on Repetition;butthe text in which
this mode of thinkingimpressed itself most profoundlyupon Benjaminwas probably
Schmitt'sPolitische Theologie[Political Theology],the firstchapterof which concludes
by insisting on the significance of "theextremecase":
1. I have discussed the historicalityof Benjamin'snotion of Ursprung,as elaboratedin his
"Epistemo-CriticalPrologue" to this book, in "Genealogy of Modernity: History, Myth and
Allegory in Benjamin'sOriginof the GermanMourningPlay" [MLN 106 (1991) esp. 467-74].
6
2
If the primaryobject of the GermanTrauerspielis historyas representedin the figure of
the sovereign, the destiny of the rulerin the baroquetheatermanifests a regularitythat
suggests the inevitabilityof a naturaloccurrence:"Theconstantlyrepeateddramaof the
rise andfall of princes... appearedto the writersless as a manifestationof moralitythan
as the naturalaspect of the course of history,essential in its permanence"[88]. History
as a repetitiveandineluctableprocessof rise andfall is identifiedwiththenatureof a fallen
creationwithoutany discernible,representablepossibilityof eithergraceor salvation. It
is the loss of the eschatologicalperspectivethatrendersthe baroqueconceptionof history
"inauthentic"and akin to a state of nature.
Sucha conceptionorconfusionof historywithnatureentailsatleasttwo fundamental
consequences for a theaterwhose primaryconcern is, as we have seen, precisely the
spectacleof this history. First,the loss of the eschatologicaldimensionresultsin a radical
transformationof the dramaticelement of the theater,insofar as it had been tied to a
narrative-teleologicalconceptionof history. The traditionalAristoteliananalysis of the
plot in terms of "unity of action" resulting from the exposition, development, and
resolutionof conflict, is no longer applicable. "History,"as Benjaminputs it, "wanders
onto the stage [Die Geschichte wandert in den Schauplatz hinein]" [92/89]. Second, the
decision; but Schmitt's thinkingis also historical,as the very title of his book, Political
Theology, suggests and as the following passage makes manifest:
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized
theological concepts not only because oftheir historical development-in which
they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for
example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver-but also
because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for
a sociological consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence
is analogous to the miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy can
we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas ofthe state developed
in the last centuries. [36]
To these "representations
of immanence"belong the identificationof rulerandruledand,
above all, that of the state with the legal order (Identitit des Staates mitderRechtsordnung)
[49/63]. But if the developmentof modem thoughthas thustendedto efface the originary
and constitutiverelationshipof the political to transcendence,in the name of notions of
autonomyand self-identity,Schmitt's own approachdoes not seem to be entirelyfree of
suchtendencies. This canbe seen in the mannerin whichhe conceives the "consciousness
of the analogy"between political and theological categories,which for him is the key to
authenticallyhistoricaland systematicalunderstanding.
For what emerges in Schmitt's discussion of the relationof politics and theology is
thathe construesthe analogy between them above all in termsof identity,ratherthanin
terms of transformationor of alteration. For instance, he finds confirmationof his
theological-political thesis in the position of Atger, for whom "the monarch in the
seventeenth-centurydoctrineof the statewas identifiedwithGodandoccupiedin the state
the position precisely analogous to that occupied in the world by God in the Cartesian
system" [45]. The methodthat Schmitt advancesin Political Theology,which he calls
"the sociology of concepts," thus employs the notion of "analogy"in orderto reduce
difference to identity, as the following programmaticdeclarationclearly demonstrates:
"Themetaphysicalimagethata particularepochforgesof the worldhas the samestructure
as what the world immediatelyunderstandsto be appropriateas a form of its political
organization. The determinationof such an identity is the sociology of the concept of
diacritics / fall-winter 1992
11
sovereignty" [46; my emphasis]. One would be temptedto say that Schmitt's critique
seeks to replace the Immanenzvorstellungen of modern political theory with
Identititsvorstellungenthatseek to recalltheheterogeneityof politicalconceptsoutof the
oblivion into whichtheyhave fallen,butonly succeedin once againreducingtheiralterity
to the same: to "the same structure"and to "thedeterminationof... an identity."
3
With the ambivalenceof Schmitt's approachto the political in mind, let us now turnto
the mannerin which the question of sovereignty emerges in Benjamin's study of the
Germanbaroquetheater:
Thesovereign representshistory. He holds the course of historyin his handlike
a scepter. This view is by no meanspeculiar to the dramatists. It is based on
certain constitutionalnotions. A new concept of sovereignty emerged in the
seventeenthcenturyfrom a final discussion of the juridical doctrines of the
middle ages .... Whereasthe modern concept of sovereignty amounts to a
supremeexecutivepower on thepart of theprince, the baroqueconceptemerges
from a discussion of the state of emergency,and makes it the most important
function of the prince to exclude this [den auszuschliessen].. [54-55; my
emphasis]
A note at the end of this passage refers to Political Theology. And yet the very words
whichseem only to paraphraseSchmittconstitutein facta slightbutdecisive modification
of his theory. Schmitt,we remember,defines sovereigntyas constitutedby the power to
make a decision that consists of two moments: first, the determinationthat state of
exception exists, and second, the effective suspensionof the stateof law with the end of
preservingthe stateas such. ForSchmitt,then,the stateof exceptionmustbe "removed,"
beseitigt, "done away with," but only in each particular case, never as such: that is
precisely what Schmittcriticizedmoder political theoryfor tryingto do, by excluding
considerationof the stateof exceptionfromthe determinationof sovereignty. Benjamin,
by contrast,describesthe taskof the sovereignin the very termsthatSchmittrejects: the
sovereign is charged with the task of "excluding" the state of exception, "den
auszuschliessen."In short,thatwhich is already"exterior,"the Aus-nahmezustand,is to
be exteriorizedonce again, aus-geschlossen, and this applies not simply to the state of
exception as an individual,determinatethreatto the state-the position of Schmitt-but
to the state of exception as such, thatis, as that which transcendsthe state in general.3
In short, the function assigned to the sovereign by the baroque, according to
Benjamin,is thatof transcendingtranscendenceby makingit immanent,an internalpart
of the state and of the world, of the state of the world. And the reasonwhy the baroque
is so attachedto the state of the world Benjaminexplains as follows:
The religious man of the baroqueera clings so tightlyto the world because of
thefeeling thathe is being drivenwithit towarda cataract. Thebaroqueknows
no eschatology;andfor thatveryreason itpossesses no mechanismby whichall
earthlythingsare gatheredtogetherand exaltedbeforebeing consignedto their
end. Thehereafteris emptiedof everythingwhichcontains the slightestbreath
3. "Aberob der extremeAusnahmefallwirklichaus der Weltgeschafftwerdenkannodernicht,
das ist keine juristische Frage. Ob man das Vertrauenund die Hoffnung hat, er lasse sich
tatsdchlichbeseitigen, hdngtvonphilosophischen,insbesonderegeschichtsphilosophischenoder
metaphysischenUberzeugungenab" [13].
12
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of this world, and from it the baroque extracts a profusion of things which
customarilyescaped the grasp of artisticformulation and, at its high point,
brings them violently into the light of the day, in order to clear an ultimate
heaven,enablingit, as a vacuum,one day to destroythe worldwithcatastrophic
violence. [66]
Whatthe baroquerejectsis any admissionof the limitationof immanence,andit does so
by emptying transcendenceof all possible representablecontent. Farfrom doing away
with transcendence,however, such emptying only endows it with a force that is all the
more powerful: that of the vacuum, of the absoluteand unboundedother,which, since
it is no longerrepresentable,is also no longerlocalizable"outthere"oras a "beyond."The
othernessthatis no longer allowed to remaintranscendentthereforereappearsthis side
of the horizon,representedas a "cataract,"abyss, or fall. Or, even more radically,such
transcendencewill be representedby, and as, allegory.
In thisperspective,the"function"of the sovereignto "exclude"the stateof exception
conformsfully to the attemptof the Germanbaroqueto exclude transcendence.But the
very same desire to exclude transcendencealso condemnsthe functionof the sovereign
to malfunction: for unlike the political-theological"analogy"of Schmitt, the baroque
sovereign-and particularly,the Germanbaroquesovereign-is definedpreciselyby his
difference from God, just as baroqueimmanence sets itself up in contradistinctionto
theological transcendence. At the very point in time when the political sovereign
successfullygainshis independencevis-a-vis the Church,the differencebetweenworldly
powerandthatof the divinecan no longerbe ignored. The result,as Benjaminformulates
it, turnsout to be directlycontraryto the conclusion of Schmitt: "Thelevel of the state
of creation,the terrainon which the Trauerspielis enacted,also unmistakablyexercises
a determininginfluence on the sovereign. However highly he is enthronedover subject
and state,his statusis confinedto the worldof creation;he is the lordof creatures,buthe
remains a creature"[85]. Schmitt, we recall, had construedthe theological-political
analogy in termsof a relationshipof essential similarity: The sovereign transcendsthe
state as God transcendsthe creation. By contrast,Benjamin'snotion of secularization
stresses precisely the incommensurabilityof the change it entails. Such incommensurability becomes even more evident in the specific case of Germanbaroquetheater: "The
rejectionof the eschatology of the religious dramasis characteristicof the new drama
throughoutEurope; nevertheless the rash flight into a nature deprived of grace is
specificallyGerman"[81]. TheGermanbaroquetheater"flees"wildly to nature-which,
we remember,is for it the otherface of history-only to discoverthatthereis no graceor
consolation to be had there, either. The undoing of the sovereign is the fact that in a
creation left entirely to its own devices, without any other place to go, the state of
exception has become the rule [see Garcfa-Diittmann211 ff.].
The resultis thatthe sovereign finds himself in a situationin which a decision is as
imperativeas it is impossible:
The antithesis betweenthe power of the ruler and his capacity to rule led to a
featurepeculiar to theTrauerspiel,whichis, however,onlyapparentlya generic
feature and whichcan be illuminatedonly against the backgroundof the theory
of sovereignty. The prince, who is responsiblefor making the decision to
proclaim the state of emergency, reveals, at the first opportunity,that he is
almost incapable of makinga decision. [70-71 ]
The sovereign is incapableof makinga decision, because a decision, in the strictsense,
is not possible in a worldthatleaves no place for heterogeneity:the inauthentic,"natural"
history of the baroqueallows for no interruptionor radicalsuspension of its perennial
14
The effects of this disproportiondo not stop at the dismantlingof the sovereign,who
is split into anultimatelyineffective if bloody tyrantanda no moreproductivemartyr;nor
does it come to rest at any of the compromisespossible betweenthese two poles, such as
that representedby the "stoic ostentation"that often characterizesbaroquerepresentations of the prince. Rather,the splittingof the sovereignis accompaniedby theemergence
of a thirdfigure, who standsin radicaldissymmetryto the othertwo. That figure, who
completes the baroque "political anthropology and typology," is the "plotter,"the
Intrigant:andit is he who turnsoutto hold thekey to thefate of sovereigntyin the German
baroquemourningplay.
4
To understandwhat distinguishesthe plotterfrom the other two figures in the baroque
political "typology,"it mustbe emphasizedthatthe incapacityof the sovereignto decide
involves the transformationnot merelyof an individualcharactertype, but of the manner
in which historyitself is representedin the Trauerspiel. And this in turndeterminesthe
way in which representationtakes place. With the split of the sovereign into tyrantand
martyr,what is dislocatedis not just the unity of a character,but the unity of character
as such. This disarticulationis of particularimportancefor baroque theater. If the
Aristoteliantheoryof tragedyassigns primaryimportanceto the unity and wholeness of
action,andrequiresto this end "consistency"of character[Poetics 1454a], it is precisely
this consistency and unity thatare underminedtogetherwith the statusof the sovereign.
Nothing, however, demonstratesthe distance of the Trauerspielfrom the Aristotelian
theoryof tragedymorethanthefact thatit is preciselythis disarticulationof unity-of the
sovereign and hence of the action-that contributesto the peculiar theatricality of
baroquedrama,as the following passage suggests:
Just as compositions with restful lighting are virtually unknown in mannerist
painting, so it is that the theatricalfigures of this epoch always appear in the
harsh light of their changing resolve. What is conspicuous about them is not so
much the sovereignty evident in the stoic turns ofphrase, as the sheer arbitrari-
15
corruptenergy of schemers"[88]. At the same time, however, the structureof the plot
changes:
It differsfrom the so-called antitheticalplot of classical tragedyby virtueof the
isolation of motives,scenes, and types.... the baroquedramaalso likes to show
the antagonistsin crudelyilluminatedseparatescenes [in grelles Lichtgestellte
Sonderszenen],where motivationusuallyplays an insignificantpart. It could
be said that baroque intriguetakesplace like a change of scenery, so minimal
is the illusionistic intention. [75]
The utter indifference to psychological or moral "motivation,"combined with the
encapsulationof conflicting figures through"in grelles Licht gestellte Sonderszenen"
precludesany sort of resolutionin a totalizingdenouement. Whatintereststhe baroque
is not so much the dramatic resolution of conflict as its representationthrough a
mechanismthat acknowledges and even flaunts its own theatricality. The buffeting of
individualfiguresin thewindsof passionfinds its adequaterepresentationin a stagingthat
demonstratesits own artifices.
The privileged site and scene of such emphaticallytheatricalartifice is the court:
"Theimage of the setting,or, more precisely, of the court,becomes the key to historical
understanding.Forthe courtis the settingparexcellence.... In the Trauerspielthe court
representsthe timelessnaturaldecorof the historicalprocess"[92]. The "eternal,natural"
characterattributedto the court in the baroquetestifies to the situationof a historical
periodin which "Christendomor Europeis dividedinto a numberof Christianprovinces
whose historicalactions no longer claim to be integratedin the process of redemption"
[78]. Thus, with the eschatological perspectiveblocked, the irreduciblepartialityand
provincialityof the local courtrendersit the exemplarysite and stage of a movementof
history thathas been reducedto conspiratorialplotting,the aim of which is the destabilizationratherthanthe takingof power. This is why the structuraldynamicsof the plotter
causes him to resemble comic figures or the fool ratherthan the prince who would be
sovereign. If the plotteris most at home in the court,it is only insofaras he knows that
therecan be "no properhome [keineeigene Heimstdtte]"for him [96].
In this sense the plottercan be said to be the Exponentdes Schauplatzesas thatplace
in which no one, includingthe sovereign,can be athome. Unlike the sovereign,however,
the plotter"knows"thatthe courtis a theaterof actionsthatcan neverbe totalizedbutonly
staged with more or less virtuosity. By thus heeding only the rules of the game without
seeking to reachultimateprinciples,the plotterbegins wherethe sovereignhopes to end:
with the ex-clusion of the stateof exception. The stateof exceptionis excludedas theater.
Whatcharacterizesthis theateris thatin it, nothingcan ever authenticallytakeplace, least
of all the stage itself.
In the EuropeanTrauerspielas a whole... the stage is also not strictlyfixable,
not an actual place, but it too is dialectically split. Bound to the court, it yet
remainsa travelling theatre;metaphoricallyits boards representthe earth as
the setting createdfor the enactmentof history; itfollows the courtfrom town
to town. [119]
If the stage of baroque theater is "dialectically split" and thus "inauthentic,"what
distinguishesthe Germanbaroqueis the impossibility of a dialecticalAufhebungthat
would constitutea totality: "Theintriguealone would have been able to bringaboutthat
allegorical totality of scenic organization,thanks to which one of the images of the
sequence stands out, in the image of the apotheosis, as different in kind, and gives
mourningat one andthe same time the cue for its entryandexit" [235]. But it is precisely
diacritics / fall-winter 1992
17
WORKS CITED
Walter.
Briefe [Correspondence]. Ed. GershomScholem and TheodorW.
Benjamin,
Adomo. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1966.
. The Originof GermanTragicDrama. Trans.JohnOsborne. London:New Left
Books, 1977. Translationsoccasionally modified.
GesammelteSchriften. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1980. [GS]
. Ursprungdes deutschenTrauerspiels. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1963.
Alexander. Das Geddchtnisdes Denkens: VersuchiiberAdornound
Garcia-Dtittmann,
Heidegger. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1991.
Schmitt,Carl. Political Theology:Four Chapterson the Conceptof Sovereignty.Trans.
George Schwab. Cambridge,MA: MIT P, 1985. Translationsoccasionally modified.
Politische Theologie, Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souverinitit. Berlin:
Duncker& Humblot, 1985.
18