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Harris v. Davis
Harris v. Davis
Harris v. Davis
CA
May 6, 2005| Carpio-Morales, J. | Applicability of Rules in Civil
Actions
Digester: Alexis Bea
SUMMARY: The Ormoc City Regional Trial Court, granted the
petition declaring the absentee spouse, who had left his petitionerwife nine years earlier, presumptively dead. (In granting the
petition, the trial judge, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code.
Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous
marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse.)
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought
to appeal the trial court's order by filing a Notice of Appeal which
was subsequently disapproved by the trial court. MR, denied.
Petition for Certiorari to CA, also denied. Hence this petition,
which questioned the trial court's Order which declared Clemente
Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not
even a copy could be found in the records. On this score alone, the
petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with
Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. The principal issue in this
case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death
of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding The SC held
that it is NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING because the basis of
the TC decision was Art. 41 of the Family Code.
DOCTRINE: Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the
procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in
this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall
be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules.
FACTS:
The issue before us is whether a man who has given a woman
an engagement ring is entitled to return of the ring or its value
when his fiancee subsequently breaks the engagement.
When the plaintiff, Cecil "Chip" Harris, and the defendant,
Rebecca Davis, were engaged to be married, the plaintiff gave
2 There can be no question that the ring in the instant case was
given by the plaintiff to the defendant in contemplation of
marriage. Neither party disputes that fact. Neither is there any
question that it was the defendant fiancee who broke the
engagement. There is no allegation that plaintiff's acts caused the
defendant to break the engagement. The record does not reveal
the cause of the break-up. At any rate, the defendant failed to
perform on the condition of the gift and, therefore, had no right
either to retain the ring or to dispose of it. We, therefore, reverse
the judgment of the trial court and hold that the defendant is liable
to the plaintiff for the $1,390 value of the engagement ring.