DEMOCRATIZING JUSTICE:

JUDICIAL REFORMS UNDER THE DAVIDE WATCH

by Aqua Currens1

Justice today is no longer as simple as two mothers contesting custody of a baby

before King Solomon, who had in him the wisdom of God for giving judgment.2 In any
event, King Solomon was sui generis, for when God imbued him with wisdom and
understanding, God also told him that after you there will come no one to equal you. In
modern times, that infant would probably grow to school age before a court of justice gets
to pass judgment, for the court would be shrouded by mystifying procedural barriers that
only those who can afford competent lawyers can divine and pierce, and the courts docket
would be heavy with years worth of pending cases.
In that case, history may have reversed itself. It is not justice trying to keep pace
with its constantly evolving society. It is society or at least most of it failing to keep
pace with, and getting mesmerized by, the laws and the standards of justice, and getting
marginalized in the process.
But the masses, as always, have their profitless revenge: they conjure, in folklore
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, an image of justice that is skewed to favor the rich
and the powerful, and to condemn the masses to the laws of gravity those who are
burdened the most, sink the lowest, perhaps never to savor the winds of freedom and the
rights of legalis homo. And, sometimes, some lawyers join in the vilification of the
Judiciary, accusing it of partiality, abuse of discretion, incompetence, arbitrariness, and
everything else that may explain adverse judgments against them or their clients.
This highly abridged survey of justice (at least the Roman law variety) through the
millennia, transported from King Solomons Israel to the Philippines, will take time to
change. To many, the task of change is too gargantuan as to be disheartening. But such a
defeatist attitude perpetuates and worsens the problem.
True, the people do suffer when one-third of the courts of the land do not have their
own magistrates,3 for the want of lawyers willing and able to serve as judges; in addition,
many of these courts may be inadequately staffed in terms of the right numbers of the right
workers. The arbitration and village-level or barangay justice systems have their distinct
and statutory limitations, and cannot stop determined people with valid causes of action
from elevating their disputes to the judicial courts. Yet the problem is not that simple -- not
in a land where private lawyers can earn much more money than judges (or even Justices)
can, and with lesser risk from assassins bullets.
Our 1987 Constitution speaks of a regime of justice in its very first paragraph, the
Preamble. However, the word justice (except in the forms of Chief Justice, Justices, and
Secretary of Justice) is mentioned only a scant ten other times in what is probably the
worlds longest written constitution at well more than 21,000 words.4
But justice is not merely a magical word or mantra: it is a concept, a philosophy, or
a set of expectations that can be expressed in various forms. In the 1987 Constitutions Bill
of Rights, Section 11 affirms that Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty, to which
Section 16 adds that All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. These two sections
encapsulate the democratization of justice: it is for all, it is universal.
1
Pen name used by Jose Y. Dalisay, III, then a freshman at the University of the East College of Law, for his 2nd-prize winning entry in
the National Essay Writing Contest for Law Students sponsored by the Philippine Association of Law Schools, the Association of Law
Students of the Philippines, and the Supreme Court in 2005. This is a slightly abridged version for the authors Legal Philosophy class.
2
The Books of Kings, Chapter 3, verses 12 and 28, in The New American Bible (Manila: Philippine Bible Society), p. 300.
3

We are told that unless it is clearly provided otherwise, every provision of the
Constitution shall be presumed to be self-executing, i.e., not dependent upon the Congress
for supplementary or enabling legislation.5 But in this case, these constitutional rights
would remain hollow unless given substance and procedures by the superstructure of
justice for enjoyment by the people. What is free access, and what is speedy
disposition? The average mind cannot determine with certainty just what these phrases
mean. Are they metaphors? Are these standards? The average layman may have some
vague idea, probably based on familiar maxims like Justice delayed is justice denied. But
the average layman would not know how to go about availing of speedy justice; frustrated,
some laymen are tempted to simply take justice into their own hands.
To the Supreme Court belongs the power to Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.6
The Supreme Court was also mandated, within one year from the ratification of the
Constitution on February 2, 1987, to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to
the effectivity of the Constitution.7 These are the constitutional bases of judicial reforms.
The Judiciary is further mandated to speed up the wheels of justice. Article VIII,
Section 15(1) of the Constitution provides: All cases or matters filed after the effectivity
of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of
submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.
But did anyone have an idea just how massive the backlog of cases was at that
point in 1987? The general public certainly did not (and still does not) have an idea of the
judiciarys caseloads and backlogs through the years. Why bother to know? As far as the
public is concerned, the peoples entitlement to speedy trial renders the judiciarys
caseloads and backlog irrelevant.
Actually, the Institute of Judicial Administration had an idea of the extent of delays
in the trial courts, based on a study of postponements in criminal cases that it conducted in
1985. According to the IJA study, 62.92 percent of such postponements were attributable
to lawyers, 17.66 percent to the court system, 2.83 percent to court-related agencies, and
16.59 percent to other factors.8 However, the IJA report was published only in the Judges
Journal, and only in 1987. And what about civil and administrative cases?
In an article in June 1987 in the Philippine Law Journal, Atty. Emmanuel L.
Caparas and then Supreme Court Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano reported that
as of 31 January 1987, a total of 331,100 cases were found pending in the dockets of
Philippine trial courts nationwide.9 As of the same date, there were 5,688 cases pending at
the Supreme Court, of which 2,111 were submitted for decision; and as of 28 February
1987, there were 8,329 civil actions pending at the Court of Appeals, of which 2,961 were
ripe for decision.10 But because of the impetus and mandate given by the new Constitution,
the Supreme Court in 1987 disposed of 3,546 cases through resolutions and another 796

5
Noli C. Diaz, Statutory Construction (Manila: Rex Book Store, Inc., 2003), p. 300, citing Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service
Insurance System, G.R. No. 122156 (February 3, 1997).
6
Sec. 5 (5), Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution.
7
Sec. 12, Art. XVIII.
8
D. Raval and R. Legada, Administration of Justice: Project Report on Modules I and III, 1987 JUDGES J. 30, cited in Emmanuel L.

cases through signed decisions; however, 4,739 new cases were filed with the high tribunal
in 1987,11 which promptly wiped out the gain and increased the backlog by 397 cases.
To be sure, the situation in 1987 was neither new nor hopeless. By the midpoint of
the 20th century, congestion of the Supreme Courts docket was already grave enough that
it became the obsession of Chief Justice Ricardo Paras to clear it; in almost a decade (April
1951-February 1961) as Chief Justice, however, he managed to only reduce it.12
Then, in 1991, along came an unassuming but much-accomplished lawyer, who
was born to educators in 1935 in the remote barrio of Colawin in Argao, Cebu. Like Chief
Justices Ricardo Paras, Querube C. Makalintal, Fred Ruiz Castro, Ramon C. Aquino, and
Marcelo B. Fernan, this lawyer was a product of the public school system. That lawyer,
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on January
24, 1991. On November 30, 1998, he was appointed Chief Justice. He has distinguished
himself as such, earning perceptibly higher public respect for the judiciary. But because the
1987 Constitution which he co-authored, along with the 1973 Constitution has fixed
the mandatory retirement age of the Members of the Supreme Court at seventy years, he is
due to leave the office at midnight of December 19, 2005, after a little over seven years as
Chief Justice.
In that flash of time too brief for so capable, resolute, and noble a statesman
Chief Justice Davide engineered the transformation of the judiciary into an efficient system
for the inexpensive dispensation of justice. This is not to say that the transformation has
been completed; the process of legal and judicial reform, as he describes it, is long and
tedious, in the light of the countrys imperfect capacity to support its pursuit.13 But he
started it on his first month on the job, in December 1998, by launching The Davide
Watch. Its direction: leading the Philippine Judiciary and the legal profession towards
the third millennium. It sounds so simple, so modest, so vague, and too easy.
However, in expounding upon The Davide Watch, Mr. Chief Justice presented a
stupendous agenda of reforms. The last paragraph of its Policy Statement provides a
succinct prescription: The system of administration of justice must be geared to achieve
the goal of delivering fair, impartial and swift justice. Hence, the core values of the rule of
law, equal justice, judicial independence and the pursuit of excellence should be preserved
and at all times be predominant. The Vision is just as concise: A Judiciary that is
independent, effective and efficient, and worthy of public trust and confidence; and a legal
profession that provides quality, ethical, accessible and cost-effective legal service to our
people and is willing and able to answer the call to public service.
This Vision is translated into a Mission consisting of definite tasks and objectives.
In turn, these serve as the guide for the Judiciarys Action Program for Judicial Reform
(APJR) which, thus far, is the most comprehensive reform package in the history of the
Philippine Judiciary. Lamentably, the general public may fail to appreciate many of these
reforms, particularly those that strike them as abstruse; the public appears largely
interested only in the end-results of immediate practical value to disputants or litigants.
Like it or not, the public has its own standards of justice, colored by its experiences
and history, as well as by expectations sanctified in the Constitution: because justice has
been too slow and too expensive for too long, it must become swift and inexpensive, right
here and right now. It is failing this that mob justice and revolutionary justice become the
tragic alternatives. It is failing this, through no fault of the courts but rather the perceived
failure of the political system, that we are now confronted with the grotesque spectacle of
the self-proclaimed Peoples Court set up in early November 2005 by the Citizens
Congress for Truth and Accountability; this court, although being presented as an
expression of the peoples sovereign power, possesses none of the judicial power vested by
the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law.

In a democracy, people expect justice to be democratic. This is not to say that

judgments shall depend upon the popularity or notoriety of the parties to a dispute, the
route that the procurator Pontius Pilate was compelled to take when the mob demanded the
execution of Jesus Christ. What is meant is that justice, as promised by the Constitution,
shall be accessible to all and that all persons shall be equal before the law.
But reality often eludes the ideal. Inter rusticos -- among the unlearned justice
has been, or still is, not only unfathomable but also inaccessible or elusive. This is
especially true in remote areas, where the nearest court might not have a full-time judge
available. And even where there is such a court with a magistrate, there may be a lack of
lawyers available to serve as counsels de oficio for the destitute (which is why non-lawyers
are allowed to be appointed as counsels de oficio14).
Chief Justice Davide was acutely aware of this reality. He had occasion to speak of
this on April 29, 2005 when he addressed those who passed the 2004 Bar examinations, in
a speech entitled Unleashing the Spirit to Inaugurate Change: The Mission of Lawyers.
He noted that the 2003 roster of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines listed 44,000 lawyers;
assuming that three-fourths actively engaged in the practice of law, the ratio of practicing
lawyers to the population is 1:2,500.
Coupled with the ratio of one judge for every 35,000 people, this produces a
scenario where the people would have to compete amongst themselves to get legal services
and, having those, to get their causes heard by a judge. Thus, the equal protection of the
laws promised by Section 1 of the Bill of Rights in the 1987 Constitution can be availed of
only from the time that the claimant succeeds in invoking it before a court with a sitting
judge. As it so happens, in a democracy of theoretically equal citizens, some are more
equal than others. In fact, most citizens are disadvantaged. Chief Justice Davide observed:
Almost nine out of ten Filipinos who are potentially in need of legal
services live beneath the poverty line. This number grows daily. Members of
this sector of society cannot afford the standard attorneys fees charged
nowadays. They cannot even properly call upon public attorneys due to
distance, lack of knowledge, or other causes attributable to their poverty. As a
consequence, justice becomes inaccessible to the poor.
In our countrys ancient past, it was much different.
Our ancestors, too, dreamt of justice in their rudimentary societies. Back then,
justice was rough, but swift. A villager need not leave the barangay to seek justice: there
was always a judge available, in the person of the local chieftain, who also wielded
executive and legislative powers.15 Or the disputants could settle their conflict through
trial by ordeal or combat. 16 The Code of Kalantiaw (circa 1433), disputed as its
authenticity is, provides us an idea of a justice system that did not bother with
14

Sec. 7, Rule 116, Rules of Court.

Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, 8th Ed. (Quezon City: Garotech Publishing, 1990), p. 41. Agoncillo lauded the
promptness of decisions: Probably because there were no lawyers at the time, all trials were conducted efficiently and without any
delay.
The eminent anthropologist F. Landa Jocano, in Filipino Prehistory: Rediscovering Precolonial Heritage (Quezon City:
Punlad Research House, Inc., 1998), p. 158, affirms: The sociopolitical affairs of the barangay was [sic] led by the datu who acted as
the legislator, judge, arbiter, mediator, and leader in war. All authority, power, and influence emanated from the status of being a datu
and in his personal charisma, prowess in war, and wealth. In some barangays, the datu was aided by a council of elders. The datus
residence was the seat of governance.
Dr. Jocano adds (pp. 162-163, 199): The political leadership was legitimized and supported by sets of custom laws called
battasan in some barangays. Each barangay, as early Spanish accounts document, possessed an elaborate legal system. This system was
made up of a complex set of custom laws, which described the range and defined the limits of behavior in society. On the whole, it
served as the basis for local decision making, social control, and social justice. There were legal provisions on crime and its punishments,
property and contracts, and remedies and procedures. Similarly, these laws regulated domestic and family relations marriage, divorce,
parent-child relations (duties and obligations), inheritance, and servitude and dependency.
15

penitentiaries: the penalties were death, mutilation, beating or physical punishment, and
slavery.17 But pre-Hispanic justice systems evolved, as societies and the relations among
people became more sophisticated. Later, colonizers imposed their own laws and justice
systems upon the inhabitants of the colony; at times, however, these were adapted to local
practices where expedient, as when the provincial governor (alcalde mayor) was given
judicial powers18 reminiscent of those wielded by the pre-colonial village chieftains, albeit
much reduced. During the Spanish era, natives formed part of the judicial system, but only
up to the municipal level; the Filipino gobernadorcillo acted as judge in some civil cases.19
Although these foreign justice systems were quickly assimilated, this did not prevent
Filipinos from making modifications.
Under the Spanish yoke, for example, the Governor-General was also the president
of the Supreme Court (Real Audiencia).20 When Filipino patriots at the Malolos Congress
framed the constitution of 1899, they departed from this model: the dispensation of justice
was to be shared by the President and the Judiciary. The Malolos Constitution commanded
and empowered the President to see to it that justice is duly and promptly administered
throughout the Philippines (Article 67[4]); the Constitution also vested him with the power
to issue regulations for the compliance and application of the laws, (Article 69) 21
although the power to apply civil and criminal laws was vested exclusively in the Court
(Article 77). The Malolos Congress saw fit that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall be chosen by the legislature, in concurrence with the President and his Cabinet
(Article 80); too, anyone exercising judicial power may be criminally sued by any citizen,
and thus may be removed without need for impeachment (Article 81). The choice of Chief
Justice was a crucial one, given that in the event of a vacancy by death or resignation in the
Presidency, there being no Vice President, the Chief Justice shall exercise the functions of
the President until a new President had been chosen (Article 40).22
Interestingly, at least 45 members of the Malolos Congress were lawyers, led by
Congress President Pedro A. Paterno, Vice President Benito Legarda, and Secretaries
Gregorio Araneta, Pablo Ocampo and Pablo Tecson (whose vote broke the deadlock over
the separation of the Church and the State).
Unfortunately, the new Constitution that was promulgated by President Aguinaldo
on January 21, 1899 was practically stillborn, because two weeks later hostilities broke out
between Filipino and American forces. Similarly, Gracio Gonzaga, who was appointed
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in President Aguinaldos Revolutionary Government23
which was set up on June 23, 1898, may not have actually served as such; there appears no
showing that that high tribunal got constituted at all.24 On January 21, 1899, Gonzaga was
appointed to another post, as Secretary of Welfare,25 but in the Cabinet reorganization that
ousted Apolinario Mabini on May 7, 1899, he was not retained.
The Supreme Court of the Revolutionary Government (later the Malolos Republic)
appeared to have been a historical blip, no more than a flash of nationalist desire.
On May 29, 1899 Cayetano Arellano, a lawyer born to a Spanish father and a
Filipina mother, was appointed Chief Justice by the American military governor, General

17

Ibid., pp. 26-28.

Ibid., p. 76.
19
Ibid., p. 77.
20
Ibid., p. 75.
21
Under the 1987 Constitution, on the other, the President and Vice President shall swear, in their oaths of office, to do justice to every
man. However, the administration of justice is not under the Presidents jurisdiction, although he shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed (Sec. 17, Art. VII).
22
The full texts of the Malolos Constitution, in Spanish and English, may be found in the National Historical Institutes The Malolos
Congress (ISBN 971-538-122-7).
23
Gonzaga was identified as Chief Justice in the Official Directory of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines, 1898-1899, in
Appendix G of the National Historical Institutes The Malolos Congress. He was the last person in the list.
18

24

Elwell Otis. 26 Also appointed to the Supreme Court under the American military
government as Associate Justices were two high officials of Aguinaldos Revolutionary
Government and of the Malolos Congress: Justice Secretary Gregorio Araneta and political
adviser Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista. Arellano served as Chief Justice for 19 years until
his retirement in April 1920 at the age of 73; Justice Rianzares Bautista was such only until
1900, and Justice Araneta only until 1901.
However, there appeared to have been some hiatus. From the day they were
appointed by the American military authorities, until June 10, 1901, Chief Justice Arellano
and Justices Araneta and Rianzares Bautista did not have a true Supreme Court to speak of.
What they had, rather, was the Spanish-era Audiencia Territorial de Manila, which the
Americans reestablished on May 29, 1899. On June 11, 1901, the 2nd Philippine
Commission promulgated Act No. 136, the Judiciary Law, which created the Supreme
Court. It is from that Court that the present-day Supreme Court traces its roots, preferring it
because Act No. 136 granted it genuine judicial independence, unlike the tribunals
established earlier, which were subservient to colonial, military, or executive
sovereigns.27
Another member of the Malolos Congress, Ignacio Villamor, would later be
appointed to the Supreme Court (1920-1933), while another member, educator Ricardo
Paras, Sr., had a son (seven-to-eight years old at the time of the Malolos Congress),
Ricardo Jr., who would become Chief Justice for a decade (1951-1961).
Act No. 136 established the judicial system of the new civil government. That
systems architecture has since undergone changes, as a result of the Constitutions of 1935,
1973, and 1987, and their amendments, as well as the visions and priorities of the Chief
Justices who succeeded Arellano.
Now more than a century old, the Supreme Court of the Philippines is under the
leadership of Chief Justice Davide, the twentieth Chief Justice starting with Arellano.
Before he became Mr. Chief Justice, Davide was already a man with a cause and a
vision. That was why he entered political life. He was one of Cebus delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, where he chaired the Committee on Duties and Obligations of
Citizens and Ethics of Public Officials; he was among the top three delegates in terms of
reform proposals introduced. In 1978, he ran for elective office on the side of the
opposition, and won as one of Cebus delegates to the Interim Batasang Pambansa; he was
the first minority floor leader at a time when the legislature was heavily dominated by the
martial law administration.
Having established eminence as a reformer, he was picked as one of the fifty
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, which undertook the revision of the
1973 Constitution. He chaired the Committee on Legislative Power.
Then, in 1988, he was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Elections, where
he instituted reforms by sponsoring the Rules of Procedure. He was deemed resigned from
this sensitive post on December 7, 1989 when he accepted the chairmanship of a
commission to investigate the phenomenon of the coup dtat; the Fact-Finding
Commission submitted its final report on October 3, 1990. Part of the Fact-Finding
Commissions recommendations dealt with justice, specifically for the upgrading of the
facilities and capabilities of the Judiciary and the Department of Justice.28
Sixteen weeks after the Fact-Finding Commission became functus oficio, its former
chairman was sworn in as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, there to resume his
quest for reforms for good governance and the public good.
When he became Chief Justice, he could have opted for an unremarkable tenure, a
fairly routine one that would have flowed with the tide. But that would have been contrary

to his character. As one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, as a former legislator, as a
lawyer and as a jurist, he knew that the Judiciary that he inherited, despite the efforts of his
predecessors, lacked the strength and efficiency to live up to the peoples high expectations
as expressed in the Constitution. He saw his mandate as that of reform, for the many
reforms required by the 1987 Constitution have not been fully attained, if they had been
started at all.
The reforms enunciated under The Davide Watch cover a wide expanse. The six
major components are: (1) judicial systems and procedures; (2) institutions development;
(3) human resources development; (4) integrity infrastructure development; (5) access to
justice by the poor; and (6) reform support systems. But to the masses, nothing perhaps
could be more important than the fifth component: bringing swift and inexpensive justice
within their reach. If justice is to complement and sustain democracy, then this demand
must necessarily be addressed.
Ideally, justice must not end where the roads terminate, but must go beyond; justice
must be accessible, even by dwellers of remote communities. But to reach even just as far
as roads go is already a feat, in an archipelago as fragmented as the Philippines. True, the
Katarungang Pambarangay or the Barangay Justice System established in December 1978
through Presidential Decree No. 1508 should permeate the country at the grassroots;
however, it is not part of the Judiciary, but rather is a non-judicial, non-litigious mode of
dispute settlement at the barangay level aimed at discouraging parties from
indiscriminately filing in court cases which could otherwise be settled amicably out of
court.29 The Barangay Justice program is administered by the Department of the Interior
and Local Government, not by the Judiciary.30 The barangay-level conciliation panel
(Lupong Tagapamayapa) has limited jurisdiction and tenure; it also has political character,
being headed by an elective official, the punong barangay (barangay chairman) and being
dependent for its budget on the local government. Also, the parties to an amicable
settlement may subsequently repudiate the settlement. Thus, the Barangay Justice System
cannot fully satisfy the peoples need for justice. Nonetheless, it is felt that the Barangay
Justice System can be reoriented to make it more responsive to the needs of the poor;
accordingly, the European Community-funded Access to Justice for the Poor Project
(discussed farther down) envisions interfacing between the Barangay Justice System, the
Judiciary, and the poor.
How then to make justice accessible to the poor? One way is by making the court
of justice mobile. On June 8, 2004, the Davide Court launched the Justice on Wheels
Project.31 Through its Resolution in A.M. No. 04-6-02-SC, it created an ad hoc committee
for the purpose.
The Justice on Wheels Project was inspired by the concept showcased in
Guatemalas World Bank-funded Mobile Court project. The mobile court is described as
a big bus partitioned into the office of a judge, room for the clerical staff, mediation room,
and prosecutors room. It moves about in places where there are no judges; it hears cases
involving labor, domestic relations, and others; and it conducts mediation. Its principal
purpose is to bring justice closer to the people or to provide people in remote areas
adequate and inexpensive access to justice.
The Davide Court adopted the concept after noting that the many vacancies in
Philippine courts make delays in the resolution of cases inevitable. The Court observed:
Delayed justice creates a negative impact on the justice system, undermines social,
economic and even political stability, and impedes national progress.32
The Court conceded that due to various constraints, foremost of which is the lack
of interest on the part of lawyers to apply for appointment to vacant judicial posts in courts
of the first level, it is not possible to fill up the vacancies within the near future. Thus,

the urgent need to dispose of the pending cases in vacant courts of the first level and to
ensure efficient and effective administration of justice to the people in places within the
jurisdiction of the vacant courts may be properly attended to through what maybe known
as Justice on Wheels Project.33
The distinctive mobile court that may be seen occasionally in Metro Manila is the
projects first vehicle, commissioned on December 20, 2004. The purchase of two more
mobile courts (one each for the Visayas and Mindanao) has been approved by the Court.
Obviously, the archipelago would need a great many more. Incidentally, the Court may in
the future perhaps consider floating courts, given that out of the national total of around
1,500 municipalities, 832 are coastal, many of them difficult to access by land, and many
of them the island municipalities accessible only by sea.
Democratization is not just about bringing the courts physically closer to the poor
and the disadvantaged. It is also making information available as widely and as cheaply as
possible to the citizenry. In 1999, the Davide Court established the Public Information
Office. All decisions of the Supreme Court are uploaded to the Courts website
(www.supremecourt.gov.ph) within forty-eight hours from their promulgation.34 Expected
to follow suit soon are the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals. The Davide Court also launched the E-Library Project, which consists of the
Electronic Judicial Library and Research Facilities. Chief Justice Davide explained: The
idea behind these initiatives to build public awareness on the workings of the judiciary is
that the Bench, as a matter of policy, must be fully accountable to the public by being
transparent without betraying those aspects of the judicial process that require utmost
independence and confidentiality.35
Democratizing justice, however, does not extend to the softening or abandonment
of the exercise of the power of judicial review, insofar as judicial review is portrayed as
control by an unrepresentative minority (i.e., the Supreme Court) of an elected majority36
(i.e., the political branches). From time to time, as the need and occasion arises, such
undemocratic or counter-majoritarian exercise of the power of judicial review shall
continue, as it continues, to be made. We should not forget that judicial power is expressly
vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution, which has been ratified by the people,
and thus has democratic roots. The cautious and responsible exercise of this power
continues to be valid and necessary, even if only to protect the nation, or even a single
citizen, from the tyranny of the majority or a plurality of abuse of discretion, wellintentioned though they may be. Too, it must be considered that the exercise of this power
is not always negativing, but may also be legitimizing.
Nor does democratization imply relaxation of standards for admission to the Bar
and the Bench, and for remaining therein. In a Resolution that he penned in an
administrative case against a lawyer who represented conflicting interests, Chief Justice
Davide firmly stated: We are aware of the hapless fact that there are not enough lawyers
to serve an exploding population. This unfortunate state of affairs, however, will not seize
this Court from exercising its disciplinary power over lawyers culpable of serious
indiscretions. The incidence of public force must be deployed to bear upon the community
to eventually forge a legal profession that provides quality, ethical, accessible, and costeffective legal service to our people and whose members are willing and able to answer the
call to public service.37 And despite the dearth of lawyers, the Court denied admission to
the Bar of an applicant who would have qualified had he only been more prompt in

33

Ibid.
The Media and the Courts: Indispensable Allies in Good Governance, a speech delivered by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. at
the National Forum on Media Governance, Media in Governance, held on December 9, 2004 at the Asian Institute of Management in
34

electing Philippine citizenship.38 Intent on making the practice of law an ethical ministry,
The Davide Watch from its launching up to April 15, 2005 subjected 499 lawyers to
disciplinary sanctions: 26 were disbarred, 147 were suspended from the practice of law,
168 were fined, 61 were reprimanded, 56 were admonished, four were censured, ten were
warned, 12 were ordered arrested, and 16 were suspended from the exercise of their
notarial commissions.39
The Court has also been uncompromising in enforcing judicial ethics and standards.
For gross inefficiency while in the service, discovered in the course of a judicial audit, the
Court fined a retired judge in Chief Justice Davides hometown the sum of eleven
thousand pesos, deducted from his retirement benefits; the audit found 583 cases pending
in the judges sala, of which 87 had been submitted for decision but had remained
undecided within the reglementary period, some of them for seven years.40 Said the Court:
Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in
the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. In another case, although the Office of the
Court Administrator had recommended only a fine as penalty, the Court dismissed a judge
from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, and required him to show cause
why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar; the Court said
A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety,
comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his
honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue; it is a necessity. In
this case, it is not only improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused
without the presence of the complainant but the conduct of respondent shows
that his decisions are influenced by monetary considerations. His act alone of
demanding money from a party-litigant in exchange for a favorable verdict
constitutes serious misconduct in office. It is this kind of gross and flaunting
misconduct in office, which erodes the respect for law and the courts. The fact
that the complainant was not able to give him the money demanded does not
make the offense of the respondent nor the penalty therefor, any lighter
The Court again reminds all those who don judicial robes that no
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary. While a judge should possess proficiency
in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is
equally important that he must at all times maintain and preserve the trust and
faith of parties litigants in court.41
On April 28, 2005, Chief Justice Davide reported to the Philippine Bar Association
that within the last five years, the Supreme Court has, after appropriate proceedings,
imposed on 629 justices and judges and 757 court employees administrative sanctions
consisting of either dismissal from the service, suspension from office, fine, reprimand,
censure, or admonition. During the pendency of the cases, the salaries and other benefits of
the respondents were withheld.42
While there is no shortage of cases in which the Davide Court has failed to crack
the whip on erring members of the Judiciary, from judges down to clerks of court, sheriffs
and other court personnel, the Court has also not hesitated to dismiss unproven or

38
En banc Resolution penned by Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching,
Applicant, Bar Matter No. 914 (October 1, 1999).
39
Unleashing the Spirit to Inaugurate Change, op. cit.
40

unmeritorious complaints against members of the Judiciary. Indeed, in one recent case,43
the Court said in fining the complainant the sum of ten thousand pesos for a filing a
baseless administrative complaint, not in good faith, against a judge
Clearly, this administrative case was filed not for the purpose of
obtaining justice to the aggrieved persons, however mistaken it may be, but for
the sole purpose of degrading respondents reputation and exposing her to
public ridicule. This should not be countenanced
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline
upon erring members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court
should not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. This Court
could not be the instrument that would destroy the reputation of any member of
the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.44
Keeping the Judiciary clean is salutary to the democratization of justice. For access
to the courts to lead only to access to corrupt judges and court personnel would do more
harm than good, more injustice than justice.
The Judiciarys focus on the poor took some time to thresh out, although
discussions with the European Commission (EC) for a funding grant began in early 2001
yet. After experts conducted a scoping mission and consulted various sectors, the financing
agreement between the EC and the Philippine Government was signed on August 10, 2004.
The project is projected to cost 3,472,324 euro (approximately P244,903,011.72 as of
February 11, 2005), of which the EC agreed to finance a maximum of 2,731,920 euro, with
the Philippine Government to contribute 740,404 euro (P52,220,694.12).
Under the agreement, the implementation of the Access to Justice for the Poor
Project starts this 2005 and will end in 2009. The declared purpose of the project per the
agreement:
To enable the poor in general and poor women and children in particular
in selected project areas (approximately 100 municipalities and 3000 barangays)
to pursue justice through their increased knowledge about basic rights and the
judicial system and to create an enabling, supportive environment to this effect
within the judiciary and the institution(s) of law enforcement as well as an
overall legal framework amended to ensure the rights of poor women and
children in particular.
There are over 1,500 municipalities in the Philippines, and there are 1,124
municipal courts (note the gap!). The project will make use of 100 of these courts, where
legal information desks will be established in cooperation with barangay officials. The
sensitivity of law enforcers and the Judiciary to the problems of the poor in these pilot
areas will be enhanced, and capacity-building will be pursued among those involved in the
Barangay Justice System.
However, a hitch arose, because the agreement had designated the Supreme Court
as the projects executing authority and implementing agency roles that normally pertain
to the Executive branch. On January 19, 2005, the Office of the Chief Attorney
recommended the withdrawal of the Court as the projects executing agency. The Court en
banc took up the matter in early February 2005. On the basis of Taada vs. Tuvera,45 and
Section 12 of the Rules on Violence Against Women, the Court concluded that there is no
constitutional prohibition against this Court educating the people, especially the
disadvantaged, on how to have access to the justice system. Because the EC-Philippines

agreement failed to define legal information,46 it was decided that the Court provide
specific standards of conduct with regard to the disclosure and publication of legal
information in order to avoid even the appearance of impropriety and maintain the
integrity of the judicial branch.
The Court, however, conceded that its designation as executing agency would
indeed vest it with administrative supervision, even control, over partner agencies,47 in
violation of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. Also, the provision of additional
salary complement to the municipal court information officers (who are the Municipal
Trial Courts clerks of courts) was held to be violative of Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitution, which prohibits double or additional compensation without the consent of the
Congress, as well as acceptance of any emolument from any foreign government. Further,
the employment of paralegals in the project was held to violate existing jurisprudence,
because they would be practicing law without having been admitted as attorneys.
On the basis of the foregoing constitutional infirmities, the Court en banc resolved
on February 15, 2005 to request the Department of Foreign Affairs to renegotiate the
financing agreement, to ensure that the Courts participation would be within constitutional
limits and compliant with existing laws, jurisprudence, and issuances of the Court. Among
other changes, the renegotiated agreement should relieve the Court of responsibility as
executive or implementing agency, and limit its functions only to those that involve the
Judiciary and its personnel.48
Thus, we may have to wait some time before the Access to Justice for the Poor
Project gets to produce the results desired.
Indeed, democratizing justice cannot arise from a few basic reforms. And obviously,
various reforms have to be balanced and coordinated; for example, the rushed disposition
of cases by incompetent or corrupt court officers would only make a mockery of the ideal
of swift justice. Virtually all components of the entire machinery for dispensing justice
have to undergo some overhauling. This is why the Action Program for Judicial Reform is
being pursued on a comprehensive front. It is from the convergence of the totality of the
reforms under the Action Program that the democratization of justice will become a living
and institutionalized reality.
The Davide Watch has already resulted in several positive reforms, the full impacts
of which have yet to be appreciated. To name a few: the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel 49 and the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary; the
strengthening of the Judicial and Bar Council50; and the establishment of the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Office as a unit of the Supreme Court.51 On April 28, 2005,
Chief Justice Davide reported some major accomplishments under the APJR 24 in
all. 52 Among these are the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the
promulgation of new rules, such as on the examination of a child witness; the protection of
juveniles in conflict with the law; adoption; search and seizure in civil cases for
infringement of intellectual property rights; electronic evidence; the conduct of pre-trial
and use of deposition discovery measures; the implementation of the enhanced pre-trial
proceedings through conciliation and neutral evaluation; corporate rehabilitation; and intracorporate controversies; and recently, the rules on violence against women and their
children, and on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on
Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary,53 and the completion of the piloting stage of the
46
The Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAt) had expressed concern that legal information may amount to advisory opinions or the
rendition of legal advice on the merits of a prospective litigants case, in which case the Judiciary might be accused of bias and
impropriety. The OCAt was also concerned about potential overlapping, because the Department of Justice, particularly its Public
Attorneys Office, has already been rendering free legal assistance/representation to indigents in criminal cases and noncommercial
civil disputes.
47
Particularly, the Department of Justice, Department of Interior and Local Government, Department of Social Welfare and

Caseflow Management (CFM) and the Case Administration Management Information

System (CAMIS) Projects, with their nationwide expansion being now considered.54
More reforms are ongoing. Characteristically, Chief Justice Davide does not lay
exclusive claim to the credit, either for himself or for the Supreme Court. He takes pride,
rather, in sharing the credit with others, consistent with his invitations for all parties-ininterest to participate in or support the Judiciarys pursuit of reforms. On April 28, 2005,
he proudly informed the Philippine Bar Association that the reform program has received
the assistance of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the United States Agency
for International Development, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Asia
Foundation, and the United Nations Development Program. Not long after, on June 24,
2005, he explained in another venue:
To me, essential to a culture of reform is to confess an era of
interdependence. This means that we cannot always take but must give as well.
We must look at independence in a context of interdependence. The benefit of
one is the benefit of all. Injuries suffered by the weak affect the welfare of the
strong. Today there is no room for selfish sovereigns. Friends, peoples, and
countries rely on us, and we, on them. A case in point is that a major
component of the financial support for the Action Program for Judicial Reform
originates from munificent foreign donors. To be truly independent is to be able
to recognize our strengths and weaknesses as a country, to know when to seek
help and rely on the graciousness of others, but also to know when to assert
leadership and shimmer in the international arena. To be truly independent is
not to shut out the world. We welcome cooperation and interdependence not
because foreign interests tell us to do so, or because we have to pay our debts to
faceless creditors, but because it is right.55
International institutions are bankrolling the Action Program for Judicial Reform56
in furtherance of their advocacy of good governance as a medium for the countrys
salvation. But they could only do so upon the premise, or conclusion, that the Philippine
Judiciary, for all its faults and flaws, is capable of reforming itself. That bespeaks volumes
of trust and confidence by the international community in the Supreme Court under its
leader-by-example, Chief Justice Davide. The Filipino peoples faith in the Judiciary ought
not be any lesser, for theirs shall be the benefit, no doubt.
-end-

/07Jan2017

54

Ibid., accomplishment No. 11.

A New Idea of Independence, speech delivered by Chief Justice Davide on the occasion of the 107th Independence Anniversary at
the Forbes Park Pavilion, Makati City.
56
The Asian Development Bank assisted the project Strengthening the Judiciary and Defining the Accountability of the Judiciary
(December 2001-December 2004), with an ADB grant of US$1.3M and local counterpart funding of PHP29.478M. The CIDA is
supporting (1) the Court Administration Management Information System(CAMIS) and (2) the Judicial Reform Initiative Support
(JURIS) Project. CAMIS, which will establish a publicly accessible database of all cases in the lower courts, has a CIDA grant
55