THE DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr. v. Atty. Isidro L. Caracol

(A.C. No. 7325, 21 January 2015)
Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land, OCT No. 433, which was covered by
a homestead patent. Such patent was granted to Micael Babela who had two
legal heirs, Fernando and Efren. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCTs) were issued in their respective names.
When the agrarian reform law was enacted on October 21, 1972,
emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danila
Nipotnipot who sold the parcels of land to Raymunda Villaherosa,
Domicianos spouse.
On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the
emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was
not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and
affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as Addl Counsel for the
Plaintiffs-Movant, filed a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay,
Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision.
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second
Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition which he signed as Counsel for the
Plaintiff Efren Babela
Villahermosa alleged that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the
motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of
record. He claimed that certain Ernesto Aguirre was the client of Atty.
Caracol.
Atty. Caracol insisted that he was given authority by Efren and Ernesto.
In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol
committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It found that respondent did not
present credible evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not
authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent admitted that at the
time of the filing of the second motion, Efren was dead. It noted that Atty.
Caracol did not explain how he obtained the authority nor did he present any
proof of the authority.
Issue:

Whether Atty. Caracol is liable for representing Efren without authority.

Held:
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a
presumption of a lawyers appearance on behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for
his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes
the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which
he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of
the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as
justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court for a person without
being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt
as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
If a lawyer corruptly or wilfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.
It must be taken into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a
client, an attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client
or the lawyer.
In view of his actions of contravening his lawyer's oath and in violation of
Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
we deem it proper to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of
one year.
AREOLA vs. ATTY. MENDOZA
A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014
This refers to the administrative complaint filed by Edgardo D. Areola
a.k.a. Muhammad
Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, from the Public Attorney s Office
(PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In
the letter-complaint addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the
complaint in behalf of his co-detainees.
Areola alleged that, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the
Jail and called all
detainees with pending cases before the RTC, where she was assigned, to
attend her lecture.

Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pangareglo ay maging praktikal
sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak
kayo na hindi masasayang
ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang
pera at ako na ang
bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong
mga detenidong mga
babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge
Martin at palalayain na
kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in
drafting their pleadings and filing motions before the RTC, Atty. Mendoza
undermined his capability. Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the
administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola.
The Investigating Commissioner stated that Areola is knowledgeable in
the field of law.
While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he must, however, be
subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. The
commissioner however, found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty.
Mendoza received money from Areolas co-detainees as alleged.
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised
her clients and their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg
and cry" so that their motions would be granted and their cases against
them would be dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner, this is highly
unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of
and lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is liable for giving improper advice to her
clients in violation
of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty.
Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02
and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall
not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states that: a lawyer shall
impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.

Atty. Mendozas improper advice only lessens the confidence of the

public in our legal
system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas
careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice.
To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the
lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is
condemnable and unethical.
The Court held that the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as
excessive and not
commensurate to Atty. Mendozas infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a
lawyer, being the
most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great
caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza
made the remark Iyakiyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na
kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or
malice. While her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment
is not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to
the Judiciary.
Thus, Atty, Mendoza was reprimanded with stern warning.
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG V ATTY. ROGELIO CELERA
AC NO. 5581 January 14, 2014
FACTS:
On May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan, sister of
complainant, entered into a contract of marriage. Respondent however
contracted another marriage with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba. Bansig
stressed that the marriage between respondent and Gracemarie was still
valid when he contracted his second marriage, and that the first marriage
had never been annulled or rendered. Bansig alleged that respondents act
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
During the proceedings, the respondent repeatedly failed to file his
comment claiming that he was not receiving the complaint. Bansig however
averred that the Show Cause Order always came back unserved because of
respondents change of address which the latter failed to confer with the
court. Thus, the court referred the complaint to IBP and ordered his arrest.
However the return of warrant showed that the respondent cannot be

located. Respondent also failed to appear before the mandatory conference

and hearings. The IBP declared the respondent in default which the
respondent failed to take action on. IBP recommended that he be suspended
for a period of 2 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of
the court in the dispensation of justice.
RULING:
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its
officers. An administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the
desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against
him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the
Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent
must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering
the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that
respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first
marriage. Both marriages were proved by certified Xerox copies which are
sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages. The Marriage
Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing
evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to
continue as a member of the Bar.
The respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03. His
act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting
constituted grossly immoral conduct and is a ground for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous
directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have
preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders
of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in
itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.

Respondent is thus ordered disbarred.

FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO versus ATTY. PABLO
BERNARDO
AC. NO. 6368
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G.
Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty.
Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming
a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.
FACTS:
That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22,
1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo with the help and in connivance and collusion
with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent act
with intent to defraud herein complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N.
Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect that he would
expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay
City who are the acquaintance of complainants herein and they convinced
herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and deliver to him the amount
of [P]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling of the
subject land and further by means of other similar deceit like
misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective
buyer of the subject land, who is the owner of Plastic City at Canomay Street,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is the one handling William Gatchalians
business transaction and that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO
and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were false,
fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainant[s] to give and
deliver the said amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in possession of said
amount, far from complying with his obligation to expedite and cause the
titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the said amount to his personal use and benefit
and despite demand upon him to return the said amount, he failed and
refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and Oath as a
lawyer.
Respondent:
He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April
15, 1997 to July 22, 1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount of
[P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in turn
sought the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received
the said money from them. There was no connivance made and entered into
by Andy Magat and respondent. The arrangement for titling of the land was
made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of
respondent. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is
legal and allowed in law practice.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. On August 3, 2005, the case was
set for mandatory conference. The respondent failed to appear; thus, the IBP
considered the respondent in default for his failure to appear and for not
filing an answer despite extensions granted. The case was then submitted for
report and recommendation.
In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat,
complainants filed a complaint for Estafa against the former before the Third
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the said court, it
finds sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime
of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7 December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the
re-investigation thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to complainants the
amount of [P]200,000.00 because according to him the amount of
[P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent considering that the said
amount was turned over to respondent for expenses incurred in the
documentation prior to the titling of the subject land. Both respondent and
Magat requested for several extensions for time to pay back their obligations
to the complainants. However, despite extensions of time granted to them,
respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their
obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of compromise was
construed to be an implied admission of guilt.
The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment
despite due notice on several occasions and appear on the scheduled
hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer which deserves
disciplinary sanction x x x.
From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that
respondent committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his
attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which he was bound to obey the laws of the land. The commission of
unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty
in violation of the attorneys oath, grossly immoral conduct and deceit are
grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).
The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants
filed the case only on 16 April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of

Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March

2004, A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys
prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct
(Section 1, Rule VIII).
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
Bernardo be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARS from receipt hereof from
the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
IBP Board of Governors:
ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is
hereby ordered, the restitution of the amount of [P]200,000.00 and if he does
not return the amount with in sixty days from receipt of this Order then he
will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.
On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The respondent
averred that the IBP resolution is not in accord with the rules considering that
the complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the alleged misconduct
and therefore, must have been dismissed outright.
On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation stating that the RTC rendered a
decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo
and Magat guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under Article 315
par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the IBP resolution is in accord with the rules considering that
the complaint was filed more than 2 years from the alleged misconduct and
thus has prescribed?
Whether Atty. Bernardo is liable for violating the CPR?
HELD:
It is first worth mentioning that the respondents defense of prescription
is untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers
do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the
offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase
the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar
would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely
exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself
pleaded for several extensions of time to file the same, the respondent failed
to appear during the mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a
lawyer, the respondent is considered as an officer of the court who is called
upon to obey and respect court processes. Such acts of the respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the courts authority which cannot be
countenanced.
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the
administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined
whether in their professional or in their private capacity for any conduct that
is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
There is no question that the respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admitted in his answer that his legal services were
hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of
land supposedly purchased. While he begs for the Courts indulgence, his
contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer
in order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can expedite the
titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from
the money given by the complainants in the amount of P495,000.00.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration
of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and
distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having involved
the same set of facts. Jurisprudence has it that a finding of guilt in the
criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the

administrative case. Conversely, the respondents acquittal does not

necessarily exculpate him administratively.
As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for
the crime of Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced to
suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. Such criminal
conviction clearly undermines the respondents moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar.
Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.
Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the
amount of P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10)
DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance
thereof to the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10)
DAYS therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him
the additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants,

v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.; A.C. No. 9116, March 12,
2014
Facts:
-The Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity in
charge of the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon
City.
-On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil
suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag RTC of Quezon
City for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied
them
of
their
right
of
way.
-Respondents firm was the legal counsel for the Association with respondent
as
the
handling
lawyer
-After trial and hearing, RTC decided in favour of the Spouses Santander
-On appeal, CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the period had
expired
to
file
the
appellants
brief
for
the
appeal
-eight years later, complainants Figueras and Victoria filed a complaint for
disbarment against respondent for his negligence in handling the appeal and
for wilful violation of his duties as an officer of the court and for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12;
Canon 17 and Canon 18
Respondents Contention:

-Respondent claimed that although his firm represented the Association, the
case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. He only
exercised general supervision and signed the pleadings therein. Respondent
added that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment
complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no
jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD:
-The Commissioner found respondent liable for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17,
Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
Decision:
-the Court finds that the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is
proper. Any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate
disciplinary proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is
not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining
suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are
matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or
failure of proof of the charges.
-The court held that a lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears
the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. In
failing to file the appellants brief on behalf of his client, respondent had
fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12
and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
-Atty. Diosdado Jimenez is found administratively liable and is suspended for
one month

ATTY. POLICARPIO I. CATALAN v. ATTY . .JOSELITO M. SILVOSA

FACTS:
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a
Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in the Esperon case,
for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty.
Catalan was one of the private complainants.
Atty. Catalan filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Silvosa based
on the following allegation: that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the
accused are relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa
displayed manifest bias in the accuseds favour by causing numerous delays

in the trial by arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. That
after Atty. Silvosa was relieved from handling the said case he then later on
appeared as private lawyer and counsel for the accused and filed a motion to
reinstate bail after the RTC ruled against the accused on November 16, 2005.
That in a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalans brother was
a respondent, Pros. Phoebe Toribio downgraded the offense from frustrated
murder to less serious physical injuries. However, Atty. Silvosa allegedly
offered her 30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of
frustrated murder. This is based on the affidavit of Pros. Toribio
That in one homicide case, despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance
by the complainant in favor of Lanticses father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas
(Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two years. Atty.
Silvosa then demanded 15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case
and for the release of Cadinas. That he was convicted of Direct Bribery by
the Sandiganbayan in relation to this case.
Defenses of Atty. Silvosa: that he resigned as prosecutor from the Esperon
case on 18 October 2002. He also claims that his appearance was only for
the purpose of the reinstatement of bail and denies any relationship between
himself and the accused.
Pros. Toribios allegations is self-serving.
He admits his conviction , that he is under probation but asserts
the same does not involve moral turpitude since the act involved do
amount to a crime. He claims that it is not the lawyer in respondent
was convicted, but his capacity as a public officer. He further points out
complainant has no personal knowledge about the charge of extortion
that he was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in it.

that
not
that
that
and

IBP Report and Recommendation: guilty only of the first charge ,:

SUSPENSION for 2 yrs. He is only guilty of the first charge for violating the
prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As to the
claim of bribery that occurred more than seven (7) years ago, the allegations
are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another,
that the veracity of the facts and the existence of the bribe money could not
be ascertained and verified with certainty anymore because of the long
period that passed. Lastly, the findings in a criminal proceeding are not
binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented
relating to the alleged extortion case.
RULING; DISBARRED
Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his appearance on
the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot
Rule 15.03 which provides that A lawyer shall not represent conflicting

interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full

disclosure of facts.
His claim that his subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was
limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail is unmeritorious.
An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional
capacity as a lawyer or counselor when he is listening to his clients
preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just
as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his
clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court.
Contrary to the IBPs ruling, however, the records show that Atty.
Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio
executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery
attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the
IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false
testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely
denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. He failed to show
proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all
times is expected of him. Moreover, mere delay in the filing of an
administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically
exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No
matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the
act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring
members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the
Court.
The contention of the respondent that
Atty. Catalan is not the
complainant in the case of extortion is of no moment since under Section 1,
Rule 139-B, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested
person.
Furthermore, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity
in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Moral Turpitude in direct bribery can be inferred by the fact that the
offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the
accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all
respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. ATTY. DANIEL B.

LIANGCO
Facts:
Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun was in open and adverse
possession of subject land (Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030)
for a period of more than thirty years. His familys house was erected on the
land. The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot.
On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued
Resolution No. 26-96 stating that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis,
Pampanga consider the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 as the new site where the
Rural Health Center will rise. On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor,
on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the MTC, San Luis, Pampanga,
a petition for declaratory relief. However, Gozun was not served with
summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief. Respondent
Judge Daniel Liangco issued a resolution, reasoning:
1. First, the municipality of San Luis, Pampanga through its
Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and ordinances to
regulate the use of property within its jurisdiction.
2. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and
public policy.
3. Third, the municipal mayor through an executive order may order
the Philippine National Police or any government law
enforcement agency to enforce or implement the resolution,
using reasonable force if necessary and justified.
4. Fourth, squatting in government property is considered a
nuisance per se.
Furthermore, Liangco said that with the issuance by the Municipal
Mayor of an executive order, the municipality may order the Philippine
National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis, Pampanga to effect the eviction
of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons who may be claiming any right.
Subsequently, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc issued Executive Order
No. 1, series of 1996, ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96.
Gozuns house was demolished.
Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator. He averred that respondents issuance of the resolution
amounts to gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence. He
further accused the municipal mayor of having bribed respondent judge.
Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun that the respondent judge is in his
pocket because he has given him a lot of things.
The Court Administrator recommended the dismissal from office of
respondent judge. OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent.
OCA charged him with gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and

partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of wellestablished rules of procedure that challenged his competence to remain a
member of the legal profession.
The investigating commissioner found that there was clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of respondent.
Respondent had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established
rules and procedures. The present complaint was not the first of its kind to
be filed against him. Before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was
suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle,
fifty-four (54) cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation
of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated 23 September 1974. Also, pending
with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed against him
for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery
case, he was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in an
entrapment operation.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of
the Investigating commissioner.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Liangco should be disbarred.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court resolves to disbar Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for gross
misconduct in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and inexcusable ignorance of the
law in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory
Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the
mandatory notice to Gozun who would be affected by the action. The records
show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his
court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed
of the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition
was filed without notice and hearing. Moreover, the testimonial evidence on
record indicates that he maintained close relations with the municipal vicemayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant who had an obvious interest in
the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vicemayor of San Luis, Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his
impartiality as a judge.
In Edao v. Judge Asdala, the Court explained that:
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the
respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would
enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The

New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that
judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality;
but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which
may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well
as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper
discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This
standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by
which the decision is made.
As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is
presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal
opinion in the absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics confidence in the
competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the
power and responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a
judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know. Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold the
Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes. Contrary to this
edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of
Gozun not to be deprived of a right or property without due process of law.
Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe
the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
In this case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used
the powers of the court to inflict injustice. "A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)
In Samson v. Judge Caballero, the Court ruled that because membership in
the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral
fitness of a judge also reflects the latters moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge
who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyers
oath.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the
following offenses:
1.
GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
2.
INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and
10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
DISCIPLINE OF FILIPINO LAWYERS PRACTICING ABROAD

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, Complainant, - versus

ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, Respondent
FACTS: In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez
moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de
Vera based on the following grounds:
1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension
order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989
IBP Elections).
First Ground:
The following facts transpired in the administrative case against the
respondent in California:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the
State Bar of California. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled
involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty
de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given
authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying
in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case.
Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then
deposited to his personal account;
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended
that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years; and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was
accepted by the Supreme Court of California. The SC of California did not
decide whether Atty. De Vera will be suspended or not because before the
case went up to the Supreme Court, Atty De Vera surrendered his license.
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own
benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting
moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee of the State Bar of California.
Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or
surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the
recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the
respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the countrys
most noble profession.

In his defense, Atty De Vera claims that he was given authority to

handle the money by the father of the insured in the insurance claim.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the recommended suspension by the hearing
officer of the State Bar of California should be considered a ground for
disbarment or suspension against Atty De Vera.
2. Whether or not, independent of the recommended suspension, Atty
De vera should be held administratively liable for appropriating the funds of
his client.
RULING: 1. The recommended suspension against Atty De Vera cannot be
given effect in this jurisdiction.
The SC ruled in previous cases that the judgment of suspension against a
Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his
suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his
suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this
jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute
into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of
the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the
foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as
lawyer.
In this case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment
to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by
Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts
upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is
successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical
under Philippine law. However, the complainant failed to do this. Hence the
recommended suspension against Atty De Vera cannot be considered in this
case.
2. In the second issue however, The SC held that there is substantial
evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California. Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of
duty committed by a lawyer. By insisting that he was authorized by his
clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has
impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use. In
fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters
memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his

client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a
separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal
purposes.
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and
apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
The unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly
unethical. Thus when Attty De Vera appropriated the funds of his client, he
violated the above stated Canon and hence may be held administratively
liable.
The SC suspended Atty De Vera for two years.
Second Ground.
Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the
Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan
del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for
the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses
that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office
therein.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty de Vera violated the rotation rule
RULING: The act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for
disqualification for election as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the
IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less
than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his
membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or
behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not
necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in
transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule will produce
the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency
for the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the
Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP
National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such
goal.

IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN

THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines.
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law
when he became a citizen of the United States of America on August 28,
1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA;
that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the
practice of law.
Resolution:
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to
the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The
loss thereof means termination of the petitioners membership in the bar;
ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains
to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the
right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides
that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the
practice of law, the OBC required, and in compliance thereof, petitioner
submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by
the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting
to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual
membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos,
Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting
to his compliance with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance,
particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily
complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby
GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath
on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate
fees.

REINSTATEMENT AFTER DISBARMENT

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING
OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO

A criminal information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13)
other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the
death of one Raul Camaligan.
The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe
physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part
of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with
the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to
the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea
was accepted by the trial court.

In a judgment, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was

sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with
the lower court. The application for probation was granted. The period
of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's
initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal
conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the
1993 Bar Examinations.
He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take
the lawyer's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law,
averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation
period.

Ruling: (Failed to meet the standard of good moral character but was
allowed to submit evidence that he tried to make up for the senseless killing
of Raul Camaligan and to prove he is morally fit to be admitted for the
profession of law)

Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral

character. He deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent)
infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death
of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan. Participation in the prolonged and
mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was
then possessed of good moral character
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to
be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character
is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of
legal learning.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take
the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of

application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of
office..
Mr. Argosino must for its examination and consideration, he must
submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now,
that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and
learned profession of the law.

Re; Bar Examinations.(Atty: Danilo De Guzman)

FACTS:
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in
Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations
Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the
subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported the matter to
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other members of the Court,
recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified and that
an investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court
adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to nullify the
examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another examination on 04
October 2003 at eight oclock in the evening (being the earliest available time
and date) at the De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The resolution
was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would further take
on the matter.
Issue; Who is liable on the leakage?
Ruling;
The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer
without the latters knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other
persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who
voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman
revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his secretary
Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity brods, namely, Ronan Garvida, Arlan (whose
surname he could not recall), and Erwin Tan.
In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo
and James Bugain.Randy Iigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions
to another Betan, Alan Guiapal, who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma
[Lambdas] Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who ordered the
printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs 30 bar
candidates.Attorney Danilo De Guzmans act of downloading Attorney Balgos
test questions in mercantile law from the latters computer, without his
knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of
intellectual property; the test questions were intellectual property of Attorney

Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge.Besides theft,
De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos right to
privacy of communication, and to security of his papers and effects against
unauthorized search and seizure - rights zealously protected by the Bill of
Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution).He
transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal
processes.By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some
members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit
and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in the
mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by
his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
members of the Bar.
MACARUBO VS. MACARUBO
FACTS:
In 2004, Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and
DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show
satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to SC that
he is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two
children by complainant.
Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For
Extraordinary Mercy) seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll
of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present suit as a second motion
for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit. On December
18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office of the
Vice President for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the
substantive merits of the case.
Atty. Macarubo showed evidence has that he has asked forgiveness
from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship
with them. Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned
to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard
and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was
appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and
thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/
Office-In-Charge in the Assessors Office. Moreover, he is a part-time
instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College.
Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his
neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Macarubbo can be reinstated from disbarment.
RULING:

Yes.
The Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include
but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges
or judges associations and prominent members of the community with
proven integrity and probity.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving
him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise, as well as potential for public
service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may
justify clemency.
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like
any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant
petition meritorious.
Respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present
colleagues. His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is
faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church.
He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further reveal that
respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no
opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends
regular support to his children in compliance with the court.
From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that
respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age,
he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute
to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society.
IN RE: LETTER OF AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ
533 SCRA 534, 2010
FACTS:
Judge Augustus C. Diaz of MTC Branch 37 of Q.C is seeking judgeship in
one of the vacant RTC Branches in Metro Manila. During his interview with
the Judicial Bar Council, he was suggested to seek Judicial Clemency and in
particular to be allowed to again be nominated to one of the vacant RTC
branches. In a subsequent letter, he expressed deep remorse for the lapse of
which he was administratively held liable in a previous case (Alvarez v. Diaz).

In that case, he was found to be guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he
granted the following motions: (1) for an execution which was fatally
defective for lack of notice to the defendant and (2) a motion for demolition
without notice and hearing. His action on the motion for demolition also
made him liable for grave abuse of authority. He was fined 20k.
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial Bar Council provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualification. The following are disqualified from being
nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an
administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of
more than 10k, unless he has been granted judicial clemency.
Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated
for appointment to any judicial post, until and unless his request for judicial
clemency is granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Diaz should be granted Judicial Clemency.
HELD:
Yes. Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification,
should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts.
The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of
reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.
In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision
over all courts and personnel thereof, the Court lays down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:
There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include
but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the IBP, judges or judges associations and prominent members
of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of
guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give
rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation;
Sufficient time must have elapsed from the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reformation;
The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself;

There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude,

learning of legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills),
as well as potential for public service; and
There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may
justify clemency.
In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past
malfeasance. He humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three
years have elapsed since the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to
ensure that he has learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12 years
of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the
institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of further opportunities in
the judiciary for him