VILLAFLOR v CA

G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997

PANGANIBAN, J.:
In this rather factually complicated case, the Court reiterates the binding force and
effect of findings of specialized administrative agencies as well as those of trial courts
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals; rejects petitioners theory of simulation of
contracts; and passes upon the qualifications of private respondent corporation to
acquire disposable public agricultural lands prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution.
FACTS:
The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty (140) hectares
to four (4) different owners in 1940. The land was part of the public domain, but the
petitioners predecessor in interest over which he acquired the property, have been in
open, exclusive and notorious possession of the same for sometime. After acquisition,
petitioner asserts exclusive rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.
In 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit Lumber Co.
Inc. However, an Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights was entered into by
both parties in 1950. The respondent having complied all the requirements agreed
upon, assumed ownership and possession of the property since then. Respondent
corporation likewise filed a sales application in 1950 over the property to bolster his
claim which the Bureau of Land otherwise granted on the same year as proof of an
Order of Award issued.
In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, questioned and made
several collateral and extraneous claims against the respondent. However, the Bureau
of Lands dismissed the claim, arguing that petitioner no longer has any substantial
rights to question the validity of acquisition of the respondent and the subsequent
issuance of free patent by the Bureau of Lands.
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration at the Ministry of Natural
Resources which likewise dismissed the petition. On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a
complaint in the trial court for "Declaration of Nullity of Contract (Deed of
Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land subject of the
contract), and Damages" at about the same time that he appealed the decision of the
Minister of Natural Resources to the Office of the President.
On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioners heir substituted in his behalf to
pursue the claim. The trial court in Butuan City who initially take cognizance of the case
ordered the case dismissed, on the grounds that: (1) petitioner admitted the due
execution and genuineness of the contract and was estopped from proving its nullity,

(2) the verbal lease agreements were unenforceable under Article 1403 (2) (e) of the
Civil Code, and (3) his causes of action were barred by extinctive prescription and/or
laches. The heirs appealed to the CA which likewise rendered judgment of dismissal by
uphelding the lower courts ruling.
Not satisfied, petitioner's heirs filed the instant petition for review which the court
granted, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
First Issue: WoN the petitioner still has cause of action to pursue claim of
ownership over the property since his rights thereon was already transferred
and relinquished to the respondent by virtue of the Deed executed thereon
NO. The court ruled that the petitioner no longer has a cause of action to demand
declaration of nullity over the rights conferred to respondents since his claimed thereof
was merely based on speculations, surmises and conjectures. The petitioners claim of
ownership and rights over the property was negated by proof that he ceded the same
to the respondent by virtue of an Agreement on the Relinquishment of Rights which
they have executed. The petitioner insistence that the court erred in affirming his cause
is misplaced. The finding of the court and the agency which acquire primary jurisdiction
over the petition, was accorded great weight by the court.
Second Issue: WoN the private respondent corporation is qualified to acquire
ownership over the land of public domain
As to the prohibition that xxxx corporation or association may not hold alienable land
of public domain except for lease not to exceed one thousand hectares, that court
declared that xxx where the applicant had, before the Constitution took effect, fully
complied with all this obligations under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a
Sales patent, there would be no legal or equitable justification for refusing to issue or
release the sales patent. The requirements for a sales application under the Public
Land Act for a corporation to acquire ownership of public domain, was essentially
complied upon by the respondent, hence no disqualification exist not to extend and
validly issued the confirmation of title over the land in question to the respondent
corporation.
All told, the only disqualification that can be imputed to private respondent is the
prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against the holding of alienable lands of the public
domain by corporations. However, this Court settled the matter, declaring that said
constitutional prohibition had no retroactive effect and could not prevail over a vested
right to the land. Application for patent for and in behalf of Nasipit has clearly no
impediment, for they have proven satisfactory compliance of the requirements of the
law. Petition is DISMISSED.
VIGILAR v AQUINO

G.R.

No.

SERENO,

180388:

January

18,

2011
J.:

SHORT FACTS: Respondent Aquino was invited to bid for a dike project in Pampanga.
Respondent eventually won the bid, and finished constructing the dike. However,
petitioners, government officials of the DPWH, refused to pay respondent the contract
price because the contract is void for violation of P.D. 1445, for absence of an
appropriation. Respondent brought suit in the RTC, which petitioners sought to dismiss,
raising the non-suability of the state, as well as non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The lower court ruled for the validity of the contract and ordered payment for
the project. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the lower court
and declared the contract invalid. However, the CA ordered the Commission on Audit to
determine the value of the services rendered by respondent, and compensate him
based on quantum meruit.
LONGER FACTS:

Angelito M. Twao, petitioner, then the OIC District Engr. of DPWH 2nd
Engineering District of Pampanga sent an Invitation to bid to respondent Arnulfo
D. Aquino (owner of A.D. Aquino Construction and supplies). The bidding was for
the construction of a dike by bull-dozing a part of the Porac River at Brgy.
Ascomo-Pulungmasle, Guagua, Pampanga.
On July 7, 1992, the project was awarded to respondent, and a "Contract
Agreement" has been executed between him and petitioners for the amount of
Php 1,873,790.69 to cover the project cost. On July 9, 1992, the project was
completed, and respondent was issued a Certificate of Project Completion on July
16 (signed by Yumul, Supan and Twao).
Respondent Aquino, however claimed that Php 1,262,696.20 was still due to him,
but petitioners refused to pay. He thus filed a complaint for the collection of sum
of money with damages before the RTC of Guagua.
Petitioners has the following contentions: that the Complaint was a suit against
the State; that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and that
the Contract of Agreement was void for violating PD 1445 (Government Auditing
Code)- absent the proper appropriation and the Certificate of Availability of
Funds.
On November 28,2003, lower court ruled in favor of the respondent. The lower
court ordered DPWH to play Aquino the amount for the completion of the project
(Php 1,873,790.69- Take note Aquino said 1.2 M na lng kulang), Php 50,000
attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision. It said that Contract
Agreement is declared null and void ab initio. CA ordered COA to determine the
total obligation due to Aquino on a quantum meruit basis. [[quantum meruit
definition fr. net= When a person employs another to do work for him, without
any agreement as to his compensation, the law implies a promise from, the
employer to the workman that he will pay him for his services, as much as he
may deserve or merit]]

Dissatisfied with the Decision the Court of Appeals, petitioners are seeking for the
reversal of the appellate court's decision and dismissal of the Complain in civil
case
ISSUES:
First Issue: WON the case should have been dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
.NO. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and doctrine of primary
jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. There are numerous exceptions, and the pertinent
ones in this case are 1.) Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 2.) Where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by courts of justice. Also, the issues of the
present case involve the validity and enforceability of the Contract of Agreement
entered into by the parties which are questions of law and clearly beyond the expertise
of COA.
The Final Decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice.
Exhaustion of Administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical
knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and
application of law.
Second Issue: WON the CA erred in ordering the COA to allow payment to
respondent on a quantum meruit basis despite the latters failure to comply
with the requirements of PD 1445
NO. The Court has held that contracts which involved government projects undertaken
in violation ofn the relevant laws, rules etc. covering public bidding , budge
appropriations and release of funds were VOID for failing to meet the requirements
mandated by law. However, THE CONTRACTOR SHOULD BE COMPENSATED FOR
SERVICES RENDERED AND WORK DONE.
The government project was completed almost two decades ago, and the public has
benefitted from the work done by the respondent. The contractor should be duly
compensated. Not doing so would unjustly enrich the government. Justice and equity
demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit.
Third Issue: WON the CA erred in holding that the doctrine of non-suability of
the State has no application in this case
NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument
for perpetrating injustice to a citizen. This rule is not absolute anyway.
PAL INC v NLRC
G.R. No. 120567. March 20, 1998
MARTINEZ, J.:

Facts: Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed
from the service for their alleged involvement in the currency smuggling in Hong Kong.
Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for
injunction. The NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to
cease and desist from enforcing its Memorandum of dismissal.
In support of the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, the NLRC adopted
the view that: (1) private respondents cannot be validly dismissed on the strength of
petitioner's Code of Discipline which was declared illegal by this Court for the reason
that it was formulated by the petitioner without the participation of its employees (2)
the whimsical, baseless and premature dismissals of private respondents which
"caused them grave and irreparable injury" is enjoinable as private respondents are left
"with no speedy and adequate remedy at law' except the issuance of a temporary
mandatory injunction; (3) the NLRC is empowered not only to restrain any actual or
threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts but also to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute, which, if not restrained or
performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party; and (4) the
temporary mandatory power of the NLRC was recognized by this Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that the NLRC erred in granting a
temporary injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or
restraining order since this may be issued only under Article 218 of the Labor Code if
the case involves or arises from labor disputes.
The NLRC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The now petitioner, for
one, cannot validly claim that NLRC cannot exercise its injunctive power under Article
218 (e) of the Labor Code on the pretext that what NLRC have here is not a labor
dispute as long as it concedes that as defined by law, Labor Dispute includes any
controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment.
Issues:
1. WON the NLRC has jurisdiction to issue injunction order without a complaint for
illegal dismissal filed before the labor arbiter
2. WON injunction is proper
Ruling:
1.
NO. It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute
between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no
labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no
complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents
against the petitioner. The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in
reality an action for illegal dismissal. Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed Order granting private respondents' petition for injunction and
ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents.

Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed
employee is to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. In the case at
bar, private respondents disregarded this rule and directly went to the NLRC through a
petition for injunction praying that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing its dismissal
orders.
2.
NO. An examination of private respondents' petition for injunction reveals that it
has no basis since there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable injury which
the private respondents might suffer.
An injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law considering
that it generally has not proved to be an effective means of settling labor disputes. It
has been the policy of the State to encourage the parties to use the non-judicial
process of negotiation and compromise, mediation and arbitration. Thus, injunctions
may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal grounds clearly
established, after due consultations or hearing and when all efforts at conciliation are
exhausted which factors, however, are clearly absent in the present case.
Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive rights
or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid
injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of
compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an
emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly heard. The
essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint
alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction
and that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably
necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Injunction is
also a special equitable relief granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate
and complete remedy at law
NEW SUN VALLEY VS SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY
GR 156686 July 7, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J
Facts: The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV Sangguniang
Barangay") issued BSV Resolution No. 98-096 entitled "Directing the New Sun Valley
Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to Vehicular and
Pedestrian Traffic. The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), opposed
the ordinance and filed a Petition for a "Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent
Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO" with the RTC of Paraaque City. NSVHAI
claimed that the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 would:
(1) "cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as "[the] affected homeowners
acquired their properties for strictly residential purposes";

(2) that the subdivision is a place that the homeowners envisioned would provide them
privacy and "a peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public places";
(3) and that the passage of the Resolution would destroy the character of the
subdivision. The maintenance of peace and order in the residential area was one of the
reasons why entry and exit to the subdivision was regulated by the Association and
why the passing through of vehicles was controlled and limited; and that criminal
elements would take advantage of the opening to public use of the roads in question.
Issue:
1. WoN the homeowners association has a right to the protection of the law that
would entitle it to injunctive relief against the implementation of BSV Resolution
No. 98-096
2. WoN the case falls under exceptions to non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies
Ruling:
1. NO. The subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area
have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles
thereto already issued in the name of, the City Government of Paraaque since
the year 1964.
Having been already donated or turned over to the City Government of
Paraaque, the road lots in question have since then taken the nature of public
roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond
the private rights or claims of herein Appellant.
Homeowners association was not in the lawful exercise of its predicated rights
when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular
traffic.
The barangay resolution had for its purpose not the opening of a private road but
may be considered merely as a directive or reminder to the Appellant to cause
the opening of a public road which should rightfully be open for use to the
general public.
2. NO. We do not see how petitioners act could qualify as an exception to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have emphasized the
importance of applying this doctrine in a recent case, wherein we held:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our
judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within
the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this
doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice

to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed.
Other rulings:
(1) Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The
city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise
general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
(3) It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays actions to see if it
acted within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local
problem to be resolved within the local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the trial court committed no reversible error in dismissing the case
for petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement under
the Local Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to
an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject
roads belong to the City Government of Paraaque.
(4) The local government units power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is
clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides:
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant
to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park,
or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent
closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the
public facility that is subject to closure is provided.
FABIAN V DESIERTO
G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998
REGALADO, J:
[Express Limitations to Power of Legislation; Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court]
FACTS: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila
Engineering
District.
PROMAT
participated
in
the
bidding
for
government construction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage
of his official position, tricked petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted
for some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with public
works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint

against

private

respondent.

Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct. After private respondent

moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private
respondents new counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he
inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges.
Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
HELD:
NO. The Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45,
appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to
the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule
43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule
of appellate procedure
for
quasi-judicial
agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, without its concurrence.
QUARTO v OMB
October 5, 2011, G.R. No. 169042
Brion, J:
Doctrine:
Mandamus cannot be used if there is other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law
Facts:
Petitioner Quarto is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division
(CESPD), Bureau of Equipment (BOE), DPWH, Port Area, Manila. As CESPD Chief, he is

also the Head of the Special Inspectorate Team (SIT) of the DPWH. The respondents are
members of the SIT.
DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to investigate alleged
anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH
service vehicles in 2001.
DPWH-Internal Audit Service learned that the emergency repairs and/or purchase of
spare parts of DPWH service did not actually take place, resulting in government losses
of approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone.
DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint-Affidavit charging
several high-ranking DPWH officials and employees including the petitioner, the
respondents, and other private individuals who purportedly benefited from the
anomalous transactions with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation, and
violations of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code.
Petitioner Quarto denied the allegations claiming that he merely relied on his
subordinates when he signed the job orders and the inspection reports. In contrast, the
respondents admitted the existence of irregularities and offered to testify and to
provide evidence against the DPWH officials and employees involved in the anomaly in
exchange for their immunity from prosecution.
After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan charging a number of DPWH officials and employees with plunder,
estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of Section
3(e), RA No. 3019. Furthermore, the Ombudsman granted the respondents request for
immunity in exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the
cases filed.
The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan,
questioning the Ombudsmans grant of immunity in the respondents favor. However,
the Sandiganbayan, dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and advised the
petitioner to instead question the Ombudsmans actions before this Court. Hence, this
present petition.
In the petition, the petitioner argues that the Ombudsman should have
included the respondents in the informations since it was their inspection
reports that actually paved the way for the commission of the alleged
irregularities. By excluding the respondents in the informations, the Ombudsman is
engaged in selective prosecution which is a clear case of grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, there should be absolute necessity for the testimony of the proposed witness and
that he/she should not appear to be the most guilty. The petitioner claims that the
respondents failed to comply with these conditions as the Ombudsmans evidence.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petition for certiorari and mandamus is filed correctly
2. Whether or not an immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by
the Supreme Court of the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion
Held:

1. No. As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus),

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require, as a pre-condition for these remedies, that there
be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that he moved for a reconsideration
of the assailed resolutions based substantially on the same grounds stated in this
present petition. Petitioner did not file a motion for the inclusion of the respondents in
the informations before filing the present petition. These are adequate remedies that
the petitioner chose to forego and proceed to exercise certiorari.
Likewise, the petitioner has not shown that he filed the present petition with this Court
within the sixty-day reglementary period from notice of the assailed Ombudsmans
resolutions. He did not do so, of course, since he initially and erroneously filed
a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan. We remind the petitioner that the
remedy from the Ombudsmans orders or resolutions in criminal cases is to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65with this Court.
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty
imposed by law upon the respondent. In matters involving the exercise of judgment
and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take
action. It cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be
exercised.
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the
Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in
determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same latitude of
discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a
finding of probable cause (that must be established for the filing of an
information in court) and the degree of participation of those involved or the
lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject
to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion, which is when his
action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.
2. YES.
Like all other officials under our constitutional scheme of government, all their acts
must adhere to the Constitution. The parameters of the Supreme Court, however, are
narrow. In the first place, what the Supreme Court reviews are executive acts of a
constitutionally independent Ombudsman. Also, the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. Since the determination of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court is highly factual in nature, the Court must thus generally defer to the
judgment of the Ombudsman who is in a better position (than the Sandiganbayan or
the defense) to know the relative strength and/or weakness of the evidence presently
in his possession and the kind, tenor and source of testimony he needs to enable him
to prove his case. It should not be forgotten, too, that the grant of immunity
effectively but conditionally results in the extinction of the criminal liability the
accused-witnesses might have incurred, as defined in the terms of the grant. This point
is no less important as the grant directly affects the individual and enforces his right
against self-incrimination. These dynamics should be a constant reminder to the
Supreme Court to tread softly, but not any less critically, in its review of the
Ombudsmans grant of immunity. The Supreme Courts room for intervention only
occurs when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise of discretion is shown.

ST MARTINS FUNERAL HOME v NLRC,

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

The remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of the NLRC is to promptly move
for the reconsideration of the decision. In observance of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts, the petition for certiorari and should be filed with the CA.
Because of St. Martin case, all special civil actions arising out of any decision,
final resolution or order of the NLRC filed with the SC after June 1,1999 shall no
longer be referred to the CA, but shall forthwith be dismissed. (AM No, 99-2-01
SC, Feb 9. 1999)

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: Private respondent was dismissed from work by petitioner for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00. Hence, a complaint was filed for illegal dismissal
before the NLRC. Petitioner argued that respondent was not its employee. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship
between the parties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the case. On
appeal, the NLRC set aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the
labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Hence the present petition
alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
WoN decision of NLRC are appealable to the CA
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court clarified and stressed that ever since appeals from the NLRC to
the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment is that the special civil
action of certiorari was and still the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be availed of only
under compelling and exceptional circumstances.
To further explain, (1) the way to review NLRC decision is through the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65; (2) the jurisdiction of such action belongs both to the
SC and CA; but (3) in line with the doctrine of hierarchy, of courts, the petition should
be initially presented to the lower court of the two courts, that is the Court of Appeals.

ROBERTO BORDOMEO v .COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 161596 : February 20, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:

IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (Union), representing the workers, had a
bargaining deadlock with the IPI management. This deadlock resulted in the Union
staging a strike and IPI ordering a lockout.
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres dismissed the Company petition to declare the
strike illegal and ordered reinstatement of employees.
IPI assailed the issuances of Secretary Torres directly with SC through a petition for
certiorari but the Court dismissed its petition on the ground that no grave abuse of
discretion had attended the issuance of the assailed decisions. Considering that IPI did
not seek the reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition, the entry of judgment
issued in due course on January 19, 1994.
With the finality of the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders of the DOLE
Secretary, Union moved in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board in
DOLE, for their execution and likewise filed a so-called Urgent Motion for Execution.
Both motions were granted.
On July 11, 1995, IPI challenged the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of
the 15 employees by filing its Appeal and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order in the Office of then DOLE Undersecretary Cresenciano Trajano.
On December 22, 1995 ,Acting DOLE Secretary Jose Brillantes, acting on IPI appeal,
recalled and quashed the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, and declared and
considered the case closed and terminated.
Aggrieved, the 15 employees sought the reconsideration of the December 22, 1995
Order of Acting DOLE Secretary Brillantes.
On August 27, 1996, DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing granted the Motion
for Reconsideration, and reinstated the May 24, 1995 writ of execution and
declared the quitclaims executed by the employees without the assistance of the
proper office of the DOLE unconscionable for having been entered into under
circumstances showing vitiation of consent; and ruled that the execution of the
quitclaims should not prevent the employees from recovering their monetary claims
under the final and executory decisions dated December 26, 1990 and December 5,
1991, less the amounts received under the quitclaims.
On September 3, 1996, and pending resolution of IPI motion for reconsideration,
Regional Director Macaray issued a writ of execution in favor of the 15
employees represented by Atty. Arnado to recover P3,416,402.10 pursuant to the order
dated August 27, 1996 of Secretary Quisumbing. Thereafter, the sheriff garnished the
amount of P3,416,402.10 out of the funds of IPI with China Banking Corporation, which
released the amount. Hence, on September 11, 1996, the 15 employees represented

by Atty. Arnado executed a Satisfaction of Judgment and Quitclaim/Release upon

receipt of their respective portions of the award, subject to the reservation of their right
to claim "unsatisfied amounts of separation pay as well as backwages reckoned from
the date after 15 March 1995 and up to the present, or until separation pay is fully
paid."
Notwithstanding the execution of the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release,
Atty. Arnado still filed an omnibus motion not only in behalf of the 15 employees but
also in behalf of other employees named in the notice of computation/execution, with
the exception of the second group, seeking another writ of execution to recover the
further sum of P58,546,767.83.
On December 24, 1997, Secretary Quisumbing, affirming his August 27, 1996 order,
denied IPI Motion for Reconsideration for being rendered moot and academic by the full
satisfaction of the May 24, 1995 writ of execution. He also denied Atty. Arnado omnibus
motion for lack of merit; and dealt with the issue involving the June 5, 1995 writ of
execution issued in favor of the second group of employees, which the Court eventually
resolved in the decision promulgated in G.R. No. 164633.
Ultimately, on July 4, 2001, DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas declaring that the full
execution of the case "completely CLOSED and TERMINATED."
Only herein petitioners Roberto Bordomeo, Anecito Cupta, Jaime Sarmiento and Virgilio
Saragena assailed the July 4, 2001 order of Secretary Sto. Tomas by petition for
certiorari in the CA. The CA denied the petition.
SHORT FACTS:
The petitioners submit that of the six groups of employees classified under the April 12,
1995 notice of computation/execution issued by Regional Director Macaraya,_________.
They further submit that the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the first
group of employees, including themselves, had only been partially satisfied because no
backwages or separation pay from March 16, 1995 onwards had yet been paid to them;
that the reduced award granted to the second group of employees was in violation of
the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution; that no writ of execution had been
issued in favor of the other groups of employees; and that DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas
thus committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to fully execute the December 26,
1990 and December 5, 1991 orders. IPI counters that the petition for certiorari should
be dismissed for being an improper remedy, the more appropriate remedy being a
petition for review on certiorari.
HELD:
REMEDIAL LAW

An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to be
taken to the Supreme Court within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order
raising only questions of law, was the proper remedy available to the petitioners.
Hence, their filing of the petition for certiorari on January 9, 2004 to assail the CA May
30, 2003 decision and October 30, 2003 resolution in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970 upon their
allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA was improper. The
averment therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not warrant the filing of
the petition for certiorari, unless the petition further showed how an appeal in due
course under Rule 45 was not an adequate remedy for them. By virtue of its being an
extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace or substitute an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, like an appeal in due course.
An appeal may also avail to review and correct any grave abuse of discretion
committed by an inferior court, provided it will be adequate for that purpose.
It is the adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines whether a
special civil action forcertiorari can be a proper alternative remedy. In Heirs of Spouses
Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v. Spouses Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez, the
Court held:
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari
if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is
inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure
of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A
remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is
understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy
remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently
void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available
as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look
beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to
exercise supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be
controlled to make it conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in which
certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the
comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and
range of the discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that
certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the
exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided
by all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require."
Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to
do substantial justice.

Even so, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court still requires the petition for certiorari to comply
with the following requisites, namely: (1) the writ of certiorari is directed against a
tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such
tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Jurisprudence recognizes certain situations when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
may be deemed proper, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable
damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where
an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one
purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.Yet, a
reading of the petition for certiorari and its annexes reveals that the petition does not
come under any of the situations. Specifically, the petitioners have not shown that the
grant of the writ of certiorari will be necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice to them.
In dismissing the petitionerspetition for certiorari, the CA in effect upheld the Secretary
of Labor declaration in her assailed July 4, 2001 decision that the full satisfaction of the
writs of execution had completely closed and terminated the labor dispute.
Yet, the petitioners have ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the CA for doing so.There
is no just cause to now issue the writ of certiorari in order to set aside the CA assailed
May 30, 2003 decision. There is nothing on the records to support the allegation of
petitioners that the Secretary of Labor and Employment abused her discretion.

DISMISSED