Article III

no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme
Court still finds that there is need to pass a RESOLUTION for the guidance
of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as this case.

Bill of Rights
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.

Ruling: Violation of due process and freedom of expression.

The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights.
Ang Tibay v. CIR provides the primary requirements in administrative
proceedings before a broadcast station may be closed.
The closure of the radio station is likewise a violation of the freedom
of speech and expression.
o All forms of media, whether print or broadcast are
entitled to freedom of speech and expression.
True, the government has the right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it and for such
purpose may limit the freedom of expression.
However, the limitation of freedom of expression must pass the clear
and present danger test.
o If in the circumstances that the media is used is of
such nature as to create the danger that will bring in such evils,
then the law has the right to prevent it.
However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a
rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising.
o The freedom to comment on public affairs is
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.
o The people continues to have the right to be
informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have
the pervasive influence on the people being the most accessible
form of media.
Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to
all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
the Constitution.

A. Prior restraint
There need not be total suppression.
o Even
restriction
of
circulation
constitutes
censorship.
Movie classification not censorship.
A public figures right to privacy is narrower than that of an ordinary
citizen.

1)
2)
3)
4)

OBrien Test
Test of valid government regulation:
Within the constitutional power of the government;
It furthers an important or substantial government interest;
The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
The incidental restriction is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Overbreadth Doctrine
Prohibits government from achieving its purpose by means that
sweep constitutionally protected and unprotected activity

(1)

Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. - 137 SCRA 628

DYRE, a radio station was summarily closed on ground of national

security.
o That it was being used to incite people to sedition.
A petition was filed to reopen DYRE.
DYRE contends that they were denied due process.
o That there was no hearing to establish factual
evidence for the closure.
o That the closure of the radio station violates
freedom of expression.
Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue
raised, DYRE, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to
withdraw the petition.
The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana;
who is no longer interested in pursuing the case.
Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are

(2)

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance - 235 SCRA 630

RA 7716 was enacted seeking to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the NIRC.
Before RA 7716, the NIRC included on its list of transactions from VAT:
Sec. 103(f): Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper,
magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for
subscription and sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of
advertisements.
RA 7716 removed these from its list of exempted transactions.
Although the exemption was restored by Revenue Regulation 11-94.
Also, RA 7716 requires that persons subject to VAT to register and pay a registration
fee of P1,000 for every separate/ distinct establishment or place of business.


o
o

o
o

The Philippine Press Institute (PPI) and Philippine Bible Society (PBS) question the
constitutionality of RA 7716.
PPI is a nonprofit organization organization of newspaper publishers established for
the improvement of journalism in the Philippines.
PBS is a nonprofit organization engaged in the printing and distribution of bibles and
other religious articles.
They claimed that it violated Sec. 4 of the Constitution because:
Even though the exemption was restored, there is still a possibility that it may be
removed; and
The required registration lays a prior restraint to the freedom of the press.
Issue: Whether or not the registration provision is invalid when applied to the press
because it lays a prior restraint on it essential freedom?

o
o
o

Ruling: No. Registration provision is valid. It does not impose censorship.

The press is not immune from general regulation by the State.
The publisher of a newspaper has not immunity from the application of general laws.
He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer
for libel. he may be punished for contempt of court. Like others, he must pay equitable
and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business.
The registration fee, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise
of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration.
The registration fee is a central feature of the VAT system.
It is designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person who is subject to
the payment of VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made
or services rendered.
The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise
of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.

(3)

Chavez v. Gonzalez, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello

Garci involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between thenPres. Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano, DOJ
Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD
and those broadcasting its contents could be held liable under the AntiWiretapping Act and that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest.
The NBI was ordered to go after media organizations which have
caused the spread of the contents of a tape.
Meanwhile, NTC likewise warned radio stations and TV network
owners/operators that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello
Garci conversations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law

and the conditions of their Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of

Authority, which could be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations.
Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against Secretary Gonzales
and the NTC directly with the SC questioning the constitutionality of the
directives as violation of the freedom of speech and press.
Ruling: The directive is a violation of the freedom of speech and the press.
A purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will
NOT justify punishing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press
absent a showing that it endangers national security.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the
press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny.
o The government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and
present danger rule.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not
abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and
present danger test.
o Confusion in the identity, integrity of the tape as
there are 2 versions, make violation of the anti-wiretapping law
arguable.
o Not every violation of a law will justify the
straitjacketing of the exercise of freedom of speech and press.
o A violation of law is just a factor, a vital one,
which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain such
freedom.
o There is no showing that the feared violation of
the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of
the State.
o The mere press statements of DOJ Secretary
and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.
Any act or speech for and on
behalf of the government in an official capacity is
covered by the rule on prior restraint.
As such, they should be
struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of
prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.
The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and
public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded
by the Constitution and by international covenants protecting freedom of
speech and of the press.
o But, the Court should not be misinterpreted as
devaluing violations of law.
o The need to prevent their violation cannot per se
trump the exercise of free speech and press, a preferred right

whose breach can lead to greater evils.

For this failure of the respondents to offer proof to satisfy the clear
and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the
exercise of free speech and free press.

B. Subsequent punishment

Tests of valid governmental interference:

Clear and present danger rule
Whether the words are used in such
circumstances and of such nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State
has the right to prevent.
Traceable to ideas expressed
Present
Time element.
Clear
Causal
connection between danger and the utterance
Danger
Not only probable but inevitable.

2)

Dangerous tendency rule

1)

o
o

o
o

Natural tendency and the probable effect of the

utterance were to bring about the substantive evil that the legislative
body seeks to prevent.
3)

Balance of interests test

When particular conduct is regulated in the interest
of public order and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional or
partial abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine
which of the 2 conflicting interests demands the greater protection
under the particular circumstance presented

(4)

People v. Perez - 45 Phil 599

Perez in a political discussion said "The Filipinos like myself must use bolos for
cutting off (Governor General) Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for
Filipinos for he has killed our independence."
Ruling: Perez was imprisoned for his remarks in violation of Act 292: Treason and
Sedition Law.
It was not necessary for him to actually create evil, a mere
tendency was enough.
Act 292 does not violate the freedom of speech and the right

of assembly.
o The provisions of Act 292 must not be
interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of
the people to assembly.
o Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the
foundations of Government.
o Criticism, no matter how severe, on the
Executive, Legislature or Judiciary is within the range of liberty of
speech unless the intention and effect be seditious.
But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes
the furthest bounds of free speech was intended.
o There is a seditious tendency in the words used,
which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to
the Government and obedient to the laws.
The Dangerous Tendency Rule.
o All that is required, for speech to be punishable
is that there be a rational connection between the speech and the
evil apprehended.
o
Under this test, the speech could be
punished when it "creates a dangerous tendency which the
State has the right to prevent".
Perez has uttered seditious words.
o He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes.
o He has made a statement and done an act
which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies.
o He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities.
o He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
or order of the Government.

(5)

Gonzales v. Comelec - 27 SCRA 835

RA4880, took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibited the too early
nomination of candidates and limited the period of election campaign or
partisan political activity and thus prohibited the speeches, announcements,
etc.
It was challenged for violation of free speech and free press,
freedom of assembly and freedom of association
Cabigao (Petitioner) was, at the time of the filing the petition, an
incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party
official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila, to which he was subsequently
elected on November 11, 1967.

 Gonzales (Petitioner), on the other hand, was a political leader of

his co-petitioner.
Senator Lorenzo M. Taada as amicus curiae, justified the
enactment under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the
substantive evil of elections, being debased and degraded by unrestricted
campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics
with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well.
Ruling: RA4880 is unconstitutional.
Cabansag v. Fernandez: There are two tests that may supply an
acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech:
1. Clear and present danger test; and
o That the evil consequence of
the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high before the
utterance can be punished.
o The danger to be guarded
against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented.
o It provides the criterion as to
what words may be publicly established.
2. Dangerous tendency test. The clear and
present danger test
o That if the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable.
o It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms.
o It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance brings
about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent.
The very idea of a republican government implies a right on the
part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs and to petition for redress of grievances.
o As in the case of freedom of expression, this
right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has
a right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any
party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or
distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of
votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign
literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant
to a constitutional command.

C. Freedom of Expression and the electoral process

(6)

Sanidad v. Comelec -181 SCRA 529

ORGANIC ACT FOR CAR (RA6766) was enacted into law.

A plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act was scheduled.
o COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to
govern the conduct of the plebiscite.
Pablito Sanidad was a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for
the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER.
o He assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
During the plebiscite campaign
period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no
mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time
to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Ruling: Unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression and the press
Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely
reports the news, a columnist, obviously and necessarily contains and
reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject which he
writes about.
o Thus, it constitutes a prior restraint on his
constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press.
Art. IX-C of the Constitution granted the Comelec the power to
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or
other grants to the end that equal opportunity, time and space for candidates
are ensured.
o Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither franchise holders
nor candidates.
o In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite.
o Therefore, the questioned provision has no
statutory basis.

(7)

Adiong v. Comelec - 207 SCRA 715

COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347, which regulated the

use of propaganda and limited where propaganda materials may be placed.
Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the 1992 elections,
questions the resolution, insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles.

Ruling: COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places

whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC
itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
1. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right
of free speech (Sec. 4, Article III).
o There is no public interest substantial enough to
warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
2. When faced with borderline situations where freedom to speak by
a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are
invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections,
the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom.
o The freedom of the citizen and the State's power
to regulate are not antagonistic.
o There can be no free and honest elections if in
the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to
know are unduly curtailed.
o The balancing of interests individual
freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the
other is made even more difficult in election campaign
cases because the Constitution also gives the COMELEC the
authority to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly
elections.

o
o
a.
b.
o

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles
does not endanger any substantial government interest.
There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the
curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.
Under the clear and present danger rule:
The danger must be patently clear and pressingly present;
The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear
public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present
danger.
Mere rational connection between the remedy and the evil to be curbed is not enough.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed is that of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. not
that of the candidate or the political party.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as
couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.
A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle
that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."

(8)

ABS-CBN v. Comelec - 323 SCRA 811

ABS-CBN is questioning a COMELEC resolution, prohibiting the

conduct of exit surveys.
o It claims that such prohibition violates freedom of
speech and of the press.
COMELEC, however, contends that the resolution is consistent with
its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean,

honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections;

and to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot.
o That an exit poll ha the tendency to sow
confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees,
which makes it unreliable;
o That the exit poll has a clear and present danger
of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process
since the results of the exit poll may not be in harmony with the
official count by the COMELEC.
Ruling: COMELEC may not totally ban exit polls. It would violate freedom of speech
and of the press.
Government restriction of freedom of speech is justified:
o If it is within the constitution power;
o If it furthers an important or substantial
government interest;
o If the interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and
o If the incidental restriction on the freedom of
speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Exit poll
o A species of electoral survey conducted by
qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of
determining the probable result of an election by confidentially
asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for,
immediately after they have officially cast their ballots.
o The results of the survey are announced to the
public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance
overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or
organizations, the electorate voted.
COMELECs concerns are untenable.
1. By the very nature of a survey, the interviewees/
participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much


centers.

as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment

or view of the community group polled.
2. The survey result is not meant to replace or be at
par with the official COMELEC count.
o It consists merely of the opinion
as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered.
3. Holding and reporting of the results of exit polls
cannot undermine those of the elections.
No showing exit polls would cause disorder and confusion in voting
o No showing that means to interview voters cause
chaos in voting centers.
o Neither has any evidence been presented proving
that the presence of exit poll reports near an election precinct tends
to create disorder or confuse the voter.
Finally, exit polls do not violate the sanctity of ballots.
o Contents of the official ballot are not actually
exposed.
o Revelation of whom an elector voted for is
voluntary not compulsory.

Voters may choose not to

reveal their identities.

(9)

SWS v. Comelec 357 SCRA 497

Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research
institution conducting surveys in various fields.
It brought an action to enjoin COMELEC from implementing Resolution 3636, which
provides that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published 15 days
before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven
7 days before an election.
Comelec justifies that it is for the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process
resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply and that
the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in
duration and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require
timeliness.
Ruling: The resolution constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to justify it.
1. It imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression;
2. It is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period; and
3. The governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than suppression of freedom of expression (by punishing

unlawful acts).

1.
2.
3.
4.

It did not pass the OBrien test:

Within the constitutional power of the Government;
It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
The incidental restriction on alleged freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Subject provision fails to meet criterion 3 & 4 of the O 'Brien test.
By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that
such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, it actually suppresses a
whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the
same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair
theorists, and other opinion takers.
In effect, it shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring
personal opinion to statistical results.

(10)

David v. Arroyo 489 SCRA 160

KMU marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention
of converging at the EDSA shrine.
Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently
dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police.
o The police used truncheons, big fiber glass
shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the
marching groups, and scatter the massed participants, citing PP
1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies. Rallyists
petitioners were arrested during the dispersal.
These 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari contending that officials
of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom
guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are
void for being unconstitutional.
Ruling: Violative.
"Assembly"
o A right on the part of the citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.
o It is a necessary consequence of our republican
institution and complements the right of speech.
As in the case of freedom of expression, the right to assemble is
not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
o The right to assemble is not subject to previous
restraint or censorship.

o It may not be conditioned upon the prior

issuance of a permit or authorization from the government
authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held
in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the
assembly itself, may be validly required.
The ringing truth here is that David, et al. were arrested while they
were exercising their right to peaceful assembly, not committing any crime,
neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted
the limitation of that right.

(11)

o
o

o
o

o
a)
b)
c)

Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

The Diocese of Bacolod posted a 6X10ft tarpaulin within its private compound, which
stated:
Conscience Vote
It also provided a list of candidates, classifying them as Team Buhay and Team
Patay depending on how they voted for the RH Law.
COMELEC considered the tarpaulin as campaign materials (election paraphernalia)
and ordered the Diocese to remove the tarpaulin because it was in violation of a
COMELEC Resolution limiting the siz of campaign materials to 2x3 ft.
The Diocese filed a petition due to concern of violation of its freedom of expression.
Ruling: The tarpaulin is not a campaign material and therefore, the COMELEC order to
remove it is unconstitutional for violating the freedom of speech.
The statements in the tarpaulin are merely opinions of the Diocese.
The message of petitioners in this case will certainly not be what candidates and
political parties will carry in their election posters or media ads.
The message of the Diocese, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it
deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of Diocese
that the positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be
determinative of how the public will vote.
It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily even almost
incidentally will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into
speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech
that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only.
The regulation:
Should be provided by law,
reasonable,
narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to
be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d)
demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.

The COMELEC resolution fails the reasonability test.

D. Freedom of Expression and the Courts

(12)

o
o
o
o

In re: Emil Jurado - 243 SCRA 299

Emiliano P. Jurado is a lawyer and journalist who writes for the Manila Standard.
His column is entitled Opinion.
Between Oct. 1992 to March, 1993, Jurado had been writing about alleged
improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary, among his claims being:
That a group of judges, he calls Makatis Magnificent Seven, fixes drug-related cases;
That a group of justices, he refers to as the Magnificent Seven of the SC, voted as
one;
That there are 12 judges, the Dirty Dozen, who acquired such reputation for graft and
corruption.
That 6 justices, their spouses and grandchildren spent a vacation in Hong Kong, all
expenses paid for by a public utility firm (it was suspected that he was referring to
PLDT because of a recent decision that had gone in PLDTs favor).
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order which created an Ad Hoc Committee
to investigate the allegations.
The Committee extended an invitation to Jurado to appear before it to give information
to assist it in its investigation.
Jurado failed to appear before the Committee.
PLDT filed an affidavit denying the allegations.
The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the
letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an
official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made
by Jurado are true.
Issue: Whether or not Jurado can invoke freedom of expression to justify his articles?

o
o

Ruling: No. Jurado is held in contempt of Court.

Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.
One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression
itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions
for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.
A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent
judiciary to a free press.
Freedom of expression, the right of speech and of the press is, to be sure, among the
most zealously protected rights in the Constitution. But every person exercising it is, as

the Civil Code stresses, obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
The law does not protect the law a journalist who deliberately prints lies or distorts the
truth; or that a newsman may escape liability who publishes derogatory or defamatory
allegations against a person or entity, but recognizes no obligation bona fide to
establish beforehand the factual basis of such imputations and refuses to submit proof
thereof when challenged to do so.
In this case, it was found that Jurado had published the articles without first having
talked to the parties concerned to ascertain the veracity of his serious accusations.
Finally, contrary to the dissents, Jurado is not being called to account for declining to
identify the sources of his news stories, or for refusing to appear and give testimony
before the Ad Hoc Committee. He is not being compelled to guarantee the truth of what
he publishes, but to exercise honest and reasonable efforts to determine the truth of
defamatory statements before publishing them. He is being meted the punishment
appropriate to the publication of stories shown to be false and defamatory of the
judiciarystories that he made no effort whatsoever to verify and which, after being
denounced as lies, he has refused, or is unable, to substantiate.

(13)

People v. Godoy - 243 SCRA 64

Judge Gacott presided over the rape case against Godoy, in which
Goday was later found guilty.
Judge Gacott cited Reynoso and Eva del Leon (columnist and
publisher, respectively, of the Palawan Times) for indirect contempt because
of an article, wherein it was stated that Judge Gacott himself said that he is
receiving death threats in relation to the Godoy case,:
o Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado,
in full battle gear. Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga
ito?... bale ba gumawa siya ng sariling MULTO Pagkatapos ay
takot na takot siya sa multong kanyang ginawa.
HELD: Citation for indirect contempt is dismissed.
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume
that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court.
Neither was the publication in question was intended to influence
this Court for it could not conceivably be capable of doing so.
The article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial comment
and criticism.
o Justifiable query.
Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a substantive
evil which is extremely serious and that the degree of its imminence is
so exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and
sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and
press.

There is a vast difference between criticism or fair comment on the

one side and defamation on the other.
o Where defamation commences, true criticism
ends.
Generally, criticism of a court's rulings or decisions is not improper,
and may not be restricted after a case has been finally disposed of and has
ceased to be pending.
o However, there may be a contempt of court, even
though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended
by either of these two circumstances:
1. Where it tends to bring the court
into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court;
2. Where there is a clear and
present danger that the administration of justice would be
impeded.
So long as critics confine their criticisms to facts and base them on
the decisions of the court, they commit no contempt no matter how severe the
criticism may be; but when they pass beyond that line and charge that judicial
conduct was influenced by improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such
conduct was affected by political prejudice or interest, the tendency is to
create distrust and destroy the confidence of the people in their courts.
The right of freedom of the press is only a specific instance of the
general right of freedom of speech; persons engaged in the newspaper
business cannot claim any other or greater right than that possessed by
persons not in that business.

(14)

Re: Radio/TV Coverage of Estrada Trial 360 SCRA 248

Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter

requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of
the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph
E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."
Held: Live media coverage is prohibited in order to protect former President Estradas
right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings
and to avoid miscarriage of justice.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the
weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the
right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of
the accused on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court
to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.
o When these rights race against one another,
jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be
preferred.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that

belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be
held critically in balance.
o A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt
with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago.

A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial.

o It only implies that the court doors must be open
to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
Experience has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting a
trial.
o Witnesses might be frightened, play to the
camera, or become nervous.
They
are
subject
to
extraordinary out-of-court influences, which might affect
their testimonies.
o It may also affect the judges performance.
Judges are also human beings
and are subject to the same psychological reactions as
laymen.
o For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental
harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure, and
distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the
press and the right to public information.
o It also approves of media's exalted power to
provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying
the proceedings to the public.
Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due
process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions.

o
o

That the organizer is in fact extorting money and have been name dropping the
President and DOTC secretary.
Wenceslao felt alluded to and wrote a rebuttal in Stars Letter to the Editor.
Filed criminal complaint for libel against Borjal and Soliven but was dismissed by the
Fiscal.
Filed another civil complaint for damages.

WON: Wenceslao should be awarded damages based on libelous column? = NO

HELD: Wesceslao should not be awarded damages.

E. Libel

No culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication

without doing violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the
freedom of the press.
Citing US jurisprudence, the Court deemed Wencesla a public figure within the purview
of the New York Times ruling as he was holding funds solicited from public.
When the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.
If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts.
Wenceslao was not identifiable in Borjals columns.
He himself was unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack.
To maintain a libel suit:
1. It is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named.
2.

It is not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the

person attacked or defamed.

3.

At least a 3rd person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication.

(15) Borjal v. Court of Appeals - 301 SCRA 1

o
o

Art Borjal used to write a regular column, entitled Jaywalker for PhilStar of which
(Max Soliven was the publisher
Wenceslao, a civil engineer, businessman and a technical adviser to Congressman
Sison.
He was also Executive Director of First National Conference on Land Transportation
(FNCLT), which organizes seminars in order to draft an omnibus bill for land
transportation policy for presentation to Congress.
FNCLT funded through solicitations from the public
Borjal wrote in his column a blind item about anomalous activities of an organizer of a
conference without naming or identifying anyone

1.
o
o
2.
o
o

Revelation of the identity of the person alluded to came from Wenceslao himself when
he supplied the information through his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. Valid defense
against libel/ slander.
A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.
Absolutely privileged communications
Those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith.
Example: parliamentary immunity of legislators.
Qualifiedly privileged
Contain defamatory imputations but not actionable
Unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive.

To this genre belong private communications and fair and true report without any
comments or remarks.
The enumeration in Art. 354 of the RPC is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press.

1)

A privileged communication may be either:

Absolutely privileged communication
Those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith.
Ex: Parliamentary immunity of legislators.

ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.

2)

Qualifiedly privileged communications

Those containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been
made without good intention AND/OR justifiable motive.
To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any
comments or remarks."

(16) Villanueva vs. PDI, G.R. No. 164437, May 15, 2009
Hector Villanueva was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais,
Negros Oriental during the 1992 elections.
2 days before the elections, Manila Bulletin published a story that
he was disqualified as the Lakas-NUCD candidate for having been convicted
in 3 administrative cases and harassment while he was OIC Mayor.
The next day, PDI also came out with a similar story.
He lost in the election.
Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the
stories, Villanueva sued PDI and MB as well for damages.
o He alleged that the articles were maliciously
timed to defeat him.

o He claimed that he should have won by landslide,

but his supporters reportedly believed the news items distributed by
his rivals and voted for other candidates.
PDI and Manila Bulletin disclaimed liability they asserted that no
malice can be attributed to them as they did not know Villanueva and that
they had no interest in the outcome of the election, stressing that the stories
were privileged in nature.
Ruling: Petition dismissed.
Although the stories were false and not privileged, as there is no
proof that PDI and Manila Bulletin were impelled by malice or improper
motive.
o There was also no proof that Villanuevas
supporters junked him due to the reports, and that he would win,
making his action unfounded.
While the questioned news item was found to be untrue, this does
not necessarily render the same malicious.
o It was incumbent upon Villanueva to prove this,
which he failed.
To fully appreciate the import of the complaint alleging malice and
damages, we must recall the essence of libel.
Libel
o A public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of
a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
o The presumption of malice, however, does not
exist in the following instances:
1. Private communication made by
any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral, or social duty;
2. Fair and true report, made in
good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.
Articles in question are neither private communications nor true
reports of official proceedings without any comments or remarks.
o
However, this does not necessarily mean that the
questioned articles are not privileged.
o The enumeration under Art. 354 is not an
exclusive list of qualified privileged communications.
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.

 In the instant case, there is no denying that the questioned articles

dealt with matters of public interest.
o These are matters about which the public has the
right to be informed, taking into account the very public character of
the election itself.
o For this reason, they attracted media mileage and
drew public attention not only to the election itself but to the
candidates.
o As one of the candidates, petitioner consequently
assumed the status of a public figure.

(17)
Disini vs. Secretary of Justice - G.R. No. 203335,
February 11, 2014

o
o

o
o

The Cybercrime law enacted to to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
Among the acts punished are cyber libel and those who aid and abets in the
commission of cybercrimes.
It therefore, also punishes those who aid and abets in the commission of cyber libel.
Petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of the law claiming that it violates the
freedom of expression.
Ruling: The provision which penalizes online libel was declared valid and
constitutional with respect to the original author of the post, but void and
unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it.
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person's image with just one click of the
mouse.
Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news.
Cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his
relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions.
However, governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace
communication technology to protect a person's reputation and peace of mind, cannot
adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected
freedoms.
"Aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who
express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.
Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious
chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or
abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.
"Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed
Like, Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may
think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting."

F. Obscenity and indecency

1)
2)
3)

Miller Test:
Whether the average person, applying contemporary standards, would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable statute;
Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious artistic, political or scientific value.

(18) Pita v. Court of Appeals - 178 SCRA 362

The City of Manila (Mayor Bagatsing and Western Police District)
initiated an anti-smut campaign which led to the seizure and confiscation of
magazines, publications, and other reading materials believed to be
obscene, pornographic, or indecent.
o
Among the publications which were
confiscated and later burned, was Pinoy Playboy, published and
co-edited by Leo Pita.
Pita filed a petition seeking to enjoin the Mayor and the police from
confiscating more of its magazines, alleging that they are not obscene per se
and are protected under the Constitution under freedom of speech and of the
press.

SC: Proof to justify a ban and warrant confiscation of the materials has not
been shown.
There is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate
exercise of police power, to suppress smutprovided it is smut.
For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it
is smut.
o So is it equally evident that individual tastes
develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the
rapid advance of civilization.
o What shocked our forebears, say, five decades
ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation.
o James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in
the thirties yet their works are considered important literature today.
Goyas La Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition
but now adorns the worlds most prestigious museums.
Immoral lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression,
although not its protection.
o Obscene speech is speech nonetheless.
Freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the
right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public
morals.
In free expression cases, the burden to show the existence of grave
and imminent danger that would justify adverse action lies on the

authorities."
In this case, Respondents have not shown the required proof to
justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature because they did not
follow proper procedure.
o They did not possess a court order which:
1.
Found
the
said
materials to be pornography; and
2.
Authorized them to
carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search
warrant.
Even if said act was sanctioned by mayor, law enforcers cannot
disregard due process in the exercise of police power, particularly in
enforcing the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Since magazines were destroyed, court declines to
grant affirmative relief, moot and academic.

G. Assembly and petition

If the assembly is to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and
not for the assembly, may be validly required.

(19) Primicias v. Fugoso - 80 Phil 71

Mayor Fugoso refused to issue a permit to the Nacionalist party to
hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the
government.
As a defense, he argued that there is a reasonable ground to
believe basing upon previous and upon the fact that passions, especially on
the part of the losing groups, remain bitter and high, that similar speeches
will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people
in their government and in the duly constituted authorities, which might
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order.
An action was filed against Mayor Fuguso.
Rulng: Mayor cannot bar the use of public place for lawful assemblies.
The Congress has delegated the exercise of police power to the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila, which has the power, among others,
to regulate the use of streets, avenues, parks, cemeteries and other public
places and to enact ordinances it may deem necessary.
However, the power of local officials is only one of regulation and
not prohibition.
The said provision does not confer the Mayor the power to refuse
to grant the permit, but only the discretion in issuing the permit to
determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or

procession may pass or the meeting may be held.

Fear of serious injury alone cannot justify suppression of free
speech and assembly.
o To justify suppression of free speech there must
be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe
that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one.
o The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression.

(20) JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing - 125 SCRA 553

Retired Justice JBL Reyes sought a permit from the City of Manila
to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2 to 5pm, from
Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy.
o Once there, and in an open space of public
property, a short program would be held 2 speeches, a petition for
General Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign
Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a
representative of the Embassy so that it may be delivered to the US
Ambassador.
o There was likewise an assurance of a peaceful
march and rally.
Barely a week before the scheduled rally, there was still no action
on the request.
Thus, he filed this petition for mandamus on Oct. 20.
o It turned out that on October 19, request was
denied on the ground of intelligence reports of subversive plans or
criminal elements to disrupt the assembly.
o Justice Reyes was unaware of such a fact as the
denial was sent by ordinary mail.
Mayor Bagatsing suggested, however that a permit may be issued if
it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any enclosed area where the safety
of the participants and the general public may be ensured.
Ruling: Violation of the freedom of assembly.
Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment.
Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably
for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern.
Freedom of speech and peaceful assembly provides for a safety
valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their-views, even if

contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion.

For the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to
property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided,
o To give free rein to one's destructive urges is to
call for condemnation.
Freedom of speech and peaceful assembly is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
o The sole justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of
democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, or any other legitimate public interest.

In the instant case, there can be no legal objection since the

existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil is absent to a
legitimate public interest.
The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators does not suffice.
o There is therefore no valid reason for
recommending another place because there is no showing that
there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such
change were made.
Mayor Bagatsing posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance
No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of 500ft from any foreign mission, in support
of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
o There was no showing, however, that the
distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than
500ft.
o Even if it could be shown that such a condition is
satisfied it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act
the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could
still be challenged.
o It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional
application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of
peaceable assembly presents itself.

the issue.
Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found
the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions some
were suspended, dismissed, expelled.
Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary
injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of the
Discipline Board.
Ruling: Miriam College Discipline Board has jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases filed against its students.
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all
institutions of higher learning academic freedom.
o This institutional academic freedom includes the
right of the school or college to decide for itself how best to attain its
objectives free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
o Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline
its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and
attitude.
The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute.
The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression
but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their
students.
Further, the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school
cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write
EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work involving substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
o The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct
of its power to suspend or expel.
o It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of
rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly
educational environment conducive to learning.
o That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is
an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning guaranteed by the Constitution.

The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and
decide the cases filed against respondent students.

(21) Miriam College v. Court of Appeals - 348 SCRA 265

Students of Miriam College, published articles that are sexually
explicit in the school paper and magazine.
They received a letter from the Chair of the schools discipline
committee that they are conducting an investigation regarding the matter and
were asked to submit their answers.
None of them submitted and instead, wrote to the Committee to
transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over

(22) Jacinto v. Court of Appeals - 281 SCRA 657

Petitioners were public school teachers from various schools in
Metro Manila.
Between Sept. 17 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences
in connection with the mass actions they staged.

The DECS Secretary issued a Return to Work Order, ordering

them, in the interest of public service, to return to work in 24 hours,

otherwise, dismissal proceedings shall be instituted against them.

measures intended to benefit them materially, such as fringe

benefits, clothing allowance, and increase in minimum wage.

The Return to Work Order was ignored resulting to the DECS

Secretary issuing formal charges and preventive suspension order against
them.

Petitioners were not penalized for the exercise of their right to

assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.

o They were administratively charged with gross

misconduct, gross neglect of duty, etc.

o Rather, they were found guilty of conduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented
themselves without proper authority, from their schools during
regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their
absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and in
the deprivation of students of education, for which they were
responsible.

When Petitioner failed to file their answers or controvert the

charges against them, the DECS Secretary found them guilty of the charges
and imposed the penalty of dismissal.
Petitioners are now contesting the decision claiming a violation of
their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.
o

They insist that their gathering was not a strike.

Issue: Were the petitioners right to peaceably assemble violated?

Ruling: No.
There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful
assembly, to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that
matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as
well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities.
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution qualifies its exercise
with the proviso in accordance with law.
o This manifests that the state may by law, regulate
the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right.
o EO 189 enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service.
While government employees may through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of
those which are not fixed by law, they may not resort to strikes to pressure
the Government to accede to their demands.
In this case, the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners
resulted in the non-holding of classes in several public schools during the
corresponding period.
o The grievances for which they sought redress
concerned the alleged failure of public authoritiesessentially, their
employersto fully and justly implement certain laws and

o Had petitioners availed themselves of their free

timerecess, after classes, weekends or holidaysto dramatize
their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within
the bounds of law, no onenot the DECS, the CSC or even this
Courtcould have held them liable for the valid exercise of their
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
o As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes
resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services,
the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against
strikes by government workers.

(23) Bayan v. Ermita 448 SCRA 226

Executive Secretary Ermita released a statement: ordering the
strict enforcement of no permit, no rally, pursuant to BP 880, the Public
Assembly Act.
Petitioners question these on the ground of curtailment of petition
for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise
of that right.
o It was also said that it curtails the choice of
venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause
as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message for which the expression is sought.
Ruling: Constitutional.
The right cannot be abrogated through prior restraint except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
The clear and present danger standard embodied in The Public
Assembly Act is a well-recognized exception as it is not an absolute ban
on public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies.
o It is a content-neutral regulation of the time,

place, and manner of holding public assemblies.

The Philippine Supreme Court goes even one step further in
safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within
which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under The Public Act
Assembly of 1985.
o If, after that period, no such parks are so
identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks
and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be
deemed freedom parks.
No prior permit of whatever
kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein.
The only requirement will be
written notices to the police and the mayors office to
allow proper coordination and orderly activities.

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting

the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

1)
2)

A. Non-establishment of religion
The State cannot set up a church nor pass laws which aid one
religion, all or prefer one over another, nor force or influence a person to go
or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion

(24) IBP v. Atienza - GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010

IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila an application for
a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge.
The mayor issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given
date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola
Bridge.
The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge.
A criminal action was thereafter instituted against Cadiz for violating
the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the
permit.
SC: Criminal action must fail as there is no valid reason for denying the rally in
the venue indicated in the application.
In modifying the permit outright, Mayor gravely abused his discretion
when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first
on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil that may warrant the changing of the venue.
The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since
the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the
permit.
Mayor failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of
the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test, which is an
indispensable condition to such modification.
o Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial
or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate
court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

2 Guarantees:
Non-establishment
Freedom of Religion

(25) Aglipay v. Ruiz - 64 Phil 201

Director of Posts announced that he would order issuance of
postage stamps commemorating celebration of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church in Manila.
o Pursuant to Act No. 4052 which appropriates the
sum of P60,000 for the cost of plates and printing of stamps with
new designs and other expenses incident thereto, as often as may
be deemed advantageous to the Government.
Aglipay seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
Director of Post from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, under the sponsorship of the
Catholic Church.
o He alleges that the issuance and sale of said
postal stamp is violative of the Constitution since it favors a
particular religion.

Ruling: No violation.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.
It was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination.
The intention of the Director of Posts was to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists in the country.
The official concerned merely took advantage of an event of international importance to
give publicity to the Philippines and its people as revealed by the stamp design.
While the issuance and sale of the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked
with a religious event, resulting propaganda, if any received by the Catholic

Church was not the aim and purpose of the government.

The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental
results not contemplated.

The Barangay Council as owner of the image, has the right to

determine who should have custody of such image.

(27) Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers - 59 SCRA 94

(26) Garces v. Estenzo - 104 SCRA 510
The Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted Resolution
No. 5, reviving the traditional socio- religious celebration" every 5th of April
of the feast day of Senor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".
The resolution provided for the:
1. Acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer;
and
2. Construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's
projects.
Funds for the 2 projects would be obtained through the selling of
tickets and cash donations.
Resolution No. 6 provides that the chairman/hermano mayor of the
fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer.
The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic
church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint
during the mass for the fiesta.
A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Fr.
Osmena refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext
that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its
acquisition.
The replevin case was filed against Fr. Osmena, who the assailed
the constitutionality of the resolution.
Ruling: Resolution not violative.
There is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and
having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the
worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his
image).
o The barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair.
o Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural
communities.
The resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion
nor abridge religious liberty nor appropriate public funds for the benefit of
any religion.
o The image was purchased with private funds
(selling of tickets & cash donations.), not with tax money.
o The image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint not for
any religion nor interfering w/ religious matters of beliefs of the
barrio residents.

Benjamin Victoriano was a member of Iglesia ni Cristo and an

employee of Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
o As an employee, he was a member of the
Elizalde Rope Workers Union, which had a CBA containing a
closed shop provision, requiring membership in the union as a
condition for employment.
Victoriano later resigned from his affiliation the union because his
religion prohibits affiliation with any labor organization.
Initially, RA 875 provided that an employer was not precluded
"from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein.
o Amended by RA3350, providing that such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization."
Because of his resignation, the union wrote a letter to the
company to separate the Victoriano from the service.
The company then informed Victoriano that unless he makes a
satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be dismissed from the
service.
The union contends that RA3350 impairs obligation of contract
stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in
providing exemption to be affiliated with any labor unions.
Ruling: Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the constitutional inhibition of the
"no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution.
The Constitutional provision only prohibits legislation for the
support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus
forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship, and also assuring the free exercise of
one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude.
If the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a
general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the
state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden
on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose
without imposing such burden.
RA 3350 intended to serve the secular purpose of

advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise

of religion, by averting that certain persons be
refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be

dispossessed of their right to work and of being

impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by
reason of union security agreements.
o To help its citizens to find gainful
employment whereby they can make a living
to support themselves and their families is a
valid objective of the state.

authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related

regulatory activities.
Petitioner now contends that the EO violates the constitutional
provision on the separation of Church and State.
Ruling: Granted, unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and
guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a
function only religious organizations or scholars can lawfully and validly
perform for the Muslims.
A food product becomes halal only after the performance of
Islamic religious ritual and prayer.
o Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to
slaughter animals for food.
A government agency like OMA cannot therefore perform a
religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and
Islamic beliefs.
By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as
halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what
food products are fit for Muslim consumption.
Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications,
the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of
the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

RA3350 does not impair the right to association.

What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and
guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations which involves 2 broad
notions, namely:
1. Liberty or freedom - the absence of legal
restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and
2. Power, whereby an employee may join or
refrain from joining an association.
Therefore the right to join a union includes the right to abstain
from joining any union.
The exceptions provided by the assailed law is that members of
said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions
even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers;
that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious
sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the
sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union.

Thus, this exception does not

infringe upon the constitutional provision on freedom of
association but instead reinforces it.

(28) Islamic Dawah v. Executive Secretary 405 SCRA 497

Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a
corporation that operates under DSWD, an NGO that extends voluntary
services to the Filipinos, especially to Muslim communities.
The RISEAP accredited Petitioner to issue halal certifications in
the Philippines.
o Thus, among the functions petitioner carries
out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food
and issue halal certifications to qualified products and
manufacturers.
On 2001, Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465
creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating
Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation.
o Under the EO, OMA has the exclusive

(29) Imbong vs. Ochoa 721 SCRA 146 - TABAG

o
o

The RH Law (RA 10354: Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act) was
enacted.
Its constitutionality was questioned on the ground that it violates the religious freedom
because:
It mandates the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the
religious beliefs;
It compels medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under
pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious
objections;
It requires would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition.
Ruling:
The SC admitted that it cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or

participation in support of modern RH measures is (a) moral from a religious

standpoint; or (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, it has the
authority to determine whether the law contravenes the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom.
1. The State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives does not violate religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion.
To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause.
o This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a
state religion.
Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even
if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.
2. But, the provisions which compel a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately refer
a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible health
care provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs, violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to
refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7
and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH
procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section
24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion.
While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance, a constitutionallyprotected right must prevail over the effective implementation of the law.
3. Requiring would-be spouses to attend a family planning seminar as a condition to
issuance of a marriage license does not violate religious freedom.
This is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government.
The law does not mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar.
Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and
they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the
State.

B. Free exercise of religion

Aspects of freedom of religious profession and worship:
1) Right to believe
Absolute.
2) Right to act according to ones beliefs
Subject to regulation

Benevolent neutrality
Recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits
(30) American Bible Society v. City of Manila - 101 Phil 386
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit,
religious, missionary corporation, distributing and selling bibles (translated
into several Philippine dialects) throughout the Philippines.
On May 29, 1953, the City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed
the Society that the latter was conducting the business of general
merchandise since November 1945 without the necessary Mayors permit
and municipal license as required by Ordinance No. 3000.
o It was required to secure the corresponding
permit and license within 3 days, as well as to pay a compromise
fee of P5,891.45 for the period from 1945 to 1953 when it
operated without the said permit and license.
American Bible contends that the Ordinances are unconstitutional
as they amount to religious censorship and a restraint on the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession.
Ruling: American Bible Society should not be required to pay license fees but
it may be required to secure a Mayors permit.
The freedom to exercise and enjoy religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.
o Any restraint of such right can only be justified
on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
Imposing a license tax on the dissemination of religious
information amounts to censorship. Must be struck down.
o It is flat license tax levied and collected as a
condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is
guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise.
While it may be true that the Society charges a price slightly
higher than the actual cost of the bibles and other religious literature, this
still cannot be taken to mean that it is engaged in the business of selling
merchandise for profit.
Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot, therefore, be made to
apply to American Bible for doing so would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship and its right to disseminate
information of its religious beliefs.
However, requiring that a mayors permit be obtained before any
person can engage in any of the businesses, trades, or occupation
enumerated therein, can be made to apply to American Bible.
o An ordinance requiring a permit for the practice

of distributing either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks,

advertising, or literature of any kind, whether delivered free or are
being sold does not deprive American Bible Society of his
constitutional right of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship even though it prohibits him from
introducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees
fit to claim as part of his religious system.

Issue: Whether or not the Board violated INCs freedom to exercise their religion?

(31) Ebralinag v. Superintendent - 219 SCRA 256

Petitioners are students from various public schools in Cebu, who
were expelled because as members of Jehovahs Witnesses, they refused
to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge
pursuant to RA 1265.
They argue that these acts go against their religious beliefs on
idolatry and cannot therefore be imposed on them, thus violating their
constitutional right to:
1. Freely practice any religion of their choosing;
and
2. Receive free education from the state.
Furthermore, they stress that while they do not participate in such
activities, they do not engage in external acts that offend their fellow
countrymen in expressing their love of country through the performance of
such behavior.

Ruling: Granted, violative of their constitutional rights.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled the
highest protection of a persons human rights.
Here, the petitioners are only seeking exemption from the flag
ceremony, and not from the public schools where they may also learn other
ways to show and practice patriotism toward their country.
In using the law to force a religious group to participate in a
ceremony against their beliefs, this is violative not only of their right to
religious freedom, but also the right to free education of the state also
protected by the Constitution.

o
1.
2.
3.
4.

1.

o
2.

o
o

o
(32) Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals - 259 SCRA 529

Iglesia ni Cristo had a TV program entitled, Ang Iglesia ni Cristo aired on Channel 2
every Saturday and Channel 13 every Sunday.
The program presents and propagates INCs religious beliefs, doctrines and practices
oftentimes in comparative studies with other religions.

Several episodes of the program were given an X rating, not for public viewing, by the
Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television on the ground that they offend and
constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
INC filed the present petition claiming violation of freedom to exercise religion.

Ruling: Yes.
Freedom of religion is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience,
to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good.
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect:
Freedom to believe
Absolute, as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
Freedom to act on ones beliefs
Subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare.
Religious liberty, not civil immunity.
Freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law
because of religious dogma.
Ex: While one has full freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his
piety a human sacrifice, as that would be murder.
Exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the
clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public
morals, or public welfare.
The Clear and Present Danger Test is applied to 4 types of speech:
Speech that advocates dangerous ideas;
Speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction;
Out of court contempt; and
Release of information that endangers a fair trial.
In this case, There was no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the episodes would
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm.
Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical
fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the
life of a reality already on ground.
An examination of the evidence shows that the so-called attacks were mere criticisms
of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions.

(33) Estrada v. Escritor 408 SCRA 1

Estrada filed a letter-complaint for immorality against Escritor (court

interpreter) as he believes that she is committing an immoral act (living with

a man not her husband) that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed within the Judiciary.
Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference wherein Escritor
admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the
benefit of marriage for 20 yrs. but as a member of the religious sect known
as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs.
o In fact, after 10 yrs. of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.
Consequently, Deputy Court Administrator found Escritors defense
of freedom of religion unavailing to warrant dismissal of the charge of
immorality. Accordingly, he recommended that respondent be found guilty of
immorality and that she be penalized with suspension.
Ruling: Escritor should be acquitted.
The state interest sought to be upheld is the preservation of the
integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of
morality and decency.
However, there is nothing in the OCAs memorandum to the Court
that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override
respondents plea of religious freedom nor is it shown that the means
employed by the government in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondents religious exercise.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondents right to
religious freedom has been burdened.
o There is no doubt that choosing between keeping
her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice
and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and
keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a
burden on her free exercise of religion.
o The burden on Escritor is even greater as the
price she has to pay for her employment is not only her religious
precept but also her family which, by the Declaration Pledging
Faithfulness, stands honorable before God and men.
The second step is to ascertain respondents sincerity in her
religious belief.
o Escritor appears to be sincere in her religious
belief and practice and is not merely using the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness to avoid punishment for immorality.
o She did not secure the Declaration only after
entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and
defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality
was filed against her.
o It is also worthy of notice that the Report and
Recommendation of the investigating judge annexed letters of the
OCA to the respondent regarding her request to be exempt from

attending the flag ceremony in accordance with her religious beliefs.

o Also, she is a practicing member of the Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Jehovah ministers testified that she is a member
in good standing.
The Philippine Constitutions religion clauses prescribe not a strict
but a benevolent neutrality approach.
o Benevolent neutrality
Recognizes that government
must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest
extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
o Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws
is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interests.
(34) Romulo vs. People 728 SCRA 675

o
o

Joey Umada and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to get married.

However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed solemnizing officer refused to
solemnize the marriage, after he learned that the couple failed to obtain a marriage
license.
The couple then proceeded to the Aglipayan Church and asked Father Rene Ronulo
(an Aglipayan priest) to solemnize their marriage.
Father Ronulo agreed despite knowing that the couple had marriage license.
Father Ronulo was charged with conducting an illegal marriage ceremony, in violation
of Art. 352 of the RPC.
Although admitting that he conducted the ceremony, Father Ronulo denied that the
ceremony solemnized the marriage.
He further claimed that under the principle of separation of church and State, the State
cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony.
Therefore, the State cannot convert the blessing into a marriage ceremony.
Ruling: The principle of separation of church and State does not preclude the State
from qualifying the church blessing into a marriage ceremony.
Contrary to the Father Ronulos allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by
Article 6 of the Family Code when it pro-vides that no prescribed form or religious rite
for the solemnization of marriage is required.
Any religion or sect is given the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital
rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and
that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested.
The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and
the preservation of the sanctity of marriage.
To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.

In this case, it is clear clear that what the Father Ronulo conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with.
While the he may view this merely as a blessing, the presence of the requirements of
the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this blessing into a marriage
ceremony as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the
RPC.

flight from the PH, Manotoc, who was then in the US, came home with his
co-stockholders and filed a petition with the SEC for the appointment of a
management committee.
o Pursuant to this, SEC requested the Commission
of Immigration not to clear him for departure.
Later on, he was charged with estafa for submitting alleged fake
TCTs of its brokerage house.
In his several cases, he had been admitted to bail for P105,000 and
then filed a motion to leave the country for business transactions and
opportunities. RTC, Immigration Commissioner, SEC, and CA denied his
petition.
Manotoc argues that having been admitted to bail, the court cannot
prevent him from exercising his right to travel.

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.

SC: Denied.

A. Liberty of abode and of travel

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from

leaving the PH, as a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a
bail bond.
A condition imposed for his bail is to make himself available at all
times when the court requires his presence.
Contrary to the ruling in Shepherd, that he is invoking, he failed to
satisfy the court of the urgency of his travel and that he would fulfill the
conditions of his bond.
The constitutional right to travel is not an absolute right.
o The order releasing petitioner on bail constitutes
such lawful order contemplated by the provision as the exception to
this right.

(35) Marcos v. Manglapus - 177 SCRA 668

President Aquino banned the return of Mr. Marcos in the country.
They now contend that such is a violation of their right to abode and
travel.
Ruling: SC sustained the refusal of the government to allow the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines on the ground that it would endanger national security.
The right to return is not included in section 6 there is no express
provision in art 3 that protects the right to return to ones country under the
UN law.
o Right against being arbitrarily deprived of right to
enter his own country is provided in the UN Declaration of Human
Rights.
The right to return to ones country is not among the rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. But right to return may be considered, as
generally accepted principles of international law, and under our Constitution,
is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,against being arbitrarily deprived
thereof
(36) Manotoc v. Court of Appeals - 142 SCRA 149
Ricardo Manotoc, a principal stockholder in and former president of
stock brokerage houses, Trans-Insular and Manotoc Securities, transferred
the management of such to professionals.
o As such, he no longer holds an officer-position.
Because of the run on stock brokerages caused by a stock brokers

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
A. Right to information

1)
2)
3)
4)

Exceptions - Right does not extend to:

Matters recognized as privileged information rooted in separation of powers;
Information on military and diplomatic secrets;
Information affecting national security;
Information on investigations of crimes;

The right to information not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a
writ of mandamus.

(37) Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission - 150 SCRA 530

Legaspi filed request with the CSC for information on the CS

eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians (2 engineers) in the
Health Dept of Cebu City, Julian Sibonghanoy & Mariano Agas, contending
that they represented themselves as CS eligibles who passed the CS
examinations for sanitarians.
CSC denied that request, hence this petition for mandamus.
Issue: Can the right to information on matters of public concern be invoked in a
mandamus proceeding?
SC: YES, hence, mandamus granted.
Government agencies in custody of public records may regulate
the manner of examination of such records but the disclosure and access
cannot be discretionary on their part.
In every case, the availability of access to a particular record must
be circumscribed by the nature of the info sought:
1. Being of public concern
involves public interest
2. Not being exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guarantee
In this case, there nothing secret about ones CS eligibility, the
public, through any citizen has a right to verify it from the CSC and this is
self- executory which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be
subject to reasonable regulation by the govt agency in custody of it, the
duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of the agencies.
o Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional
right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of
agency discretion.
The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus.

PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately

before the Feb 7 election through the marginal note of then First
Lady Imelda R.Marcos;
2. To furnish them w/ CTCs of the documents
evidencing their respective loans;
3. To allow petitioners access to public records
for the subject information.
The public nature of the funds of GSIS & the public office held by
the alleged borrower make the info sought clearly a matter of public
interest and concern. Respondent denied but failed to cite any law
granting GSIS the privilege of confidentiality, merely stated that it would
violate the right to confidentiality of the borrower.
SC: Granted,
Petitioners are entitled access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the GSIS may
promulgate relating to the manner & hours of examination.
Right to privacy is constitutionally protected but this belongs to the
individual in his private capacity & not to public & governmental agencies
like the GSIS.
A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire
basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings & sensibilities of the
party & a corporation would not have such ground on relief.
Neither can it invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers as it is a
purely personal right & can only be invoked by the person whose privacy is
claimed to be violated w/c cannot be invoked considering the public
offices they were holding at the time loans were granted.
Further, the GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
government & its EES & the administrator of various insurance programs
for their benefit.
o Its funds assume a public character.
o Moreover, the supposed borrowers were
members of the defunct BP who themselves appropriated funds
for the GSIS & were therefore expected to be the 1st to see to it
that the GSIS performed its tasks w/ the greatest degree of fidelity
& that all its transactions were above board.

(39) Gonzales v. Narvasa 337 SCRA 733

(38) Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. - 170 SCRA 256
Valmonte filed a petition for mandamus w/ preliminary injunction
against the GSIS Deputy General Counsel, invoking the right to
information & praying that respondent be directed:
1. To furnish petitioners the list of the names of
the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO &

Pres. Estrada issued EO 43 to study and recommend proposed

amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution.
Pursuant to this, the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional
Reform (PCCR) was created.
Ramon Gonzales questions the constitutionality of the PCCR
asserting that it is a public office which only legislature can create by law and
that the president is intervening in a process which he is excluded by the

Constituion, through a petition for prohibition to act as such officers and

mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora to answer his letter
requesting for the names of the executive officials holding multiple positions in
govt, copies of their appointments, and list of the recipients of luxury cars
seized by the BOC and turned over to Malacanang.
SC: Petition for prohibition now moot and academic as the PCCR was dissolved
by the Pres. already. But his petition for mandamus is granted because of his
right to information.
The right to information is a public right.
However, Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the
access to information.
o Such limitations were embodied in RA 6713, which
provides that, all public officials and employees are obliged to
respond to letters sent by the public within 15 working days from
receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents
for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject
to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.
The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning
"matters of public concern", a term which embraces a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest
of an ordinary citizen.
Thus, Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a
constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioners letter dealing with
matters which are unquestionably of public concern that is, appointments
made to public offices and the utilization of public property.

(40) Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino

Akbayan petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from
respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto.
In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee requested herein
respondent Undersecretary Tomas Aquino to furnish the Committee with a
copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA.
Usec. Aquino did not heed the request, however.
o DFA explains that the Committees request to be
furnished all documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to
accomplish at this time, since the proposed Agreement has been a
work in progress for about three years.
Amid speculations that the JPEPA might be signed by the
Philippine government within December 2005, the present petition was filed
on December 9, 2005.

SC: Exception due to executive privilege.

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade
agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.
o This, respondents do not dispute.
They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to
information and the policy of full public disclosure.
We hold that the balance in this case tilts in favor of executive
privilege.
o It is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA
may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be
"ample opportunity for discussion before a treaty is approved"
the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.
But moot and academic since the full text of the JPEPA has been
published already.

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.

1)
2)

Scope: The right to form, or join, unions or associations, includes:

Right not to join; or
If one is already a member, the right to disaffiliate from the association.

The ability to strike is NOT ESSENTIAL to the right of association.

The right of association is NOT ABSOLUTE.

A. Government employees
(41) SSS Employees v. Court of Appeals - 175 SCRA 686
Officers & members of SSSEA staged a strike and barricaded the entrances to the
SSS building, preventing non-striking EEs from reporting to work & SSS members
from transacting business w/ the SSS. The strike was reported to the Public sector
LMC which ordered the strikers to return to work but they refused. SSS suffered
damages as a result of the strike.
SC: Even if the provision expressly guarantees the right to form unions in
public & private sectors, members of the CS may not declare a strike to enforce
economic demands. The consti provision recognizes the right of all workers

including those in the public sector even reiterated in the sub-article on the CSC
thus, while there is no question that the consti recognizes the right of govt EEs to
organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Deliberations of the framers of the consti reveal that in recognizing the right of govt
EEs to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of
unions or associations only without including the right to strike to prevent hampering
of public service and since employment are provided by law.

o
o

(42) United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma

United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union is a union of supervisory employees.

United Pepsi filed a petition for certification election on behalf of route managers of
Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
The petition was denied on the ground that route managers were managerial
employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, which provides:
Sec. 245: Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees. -- Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist, or form
any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in
a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organization of their own.
United Pepsi now question the constitutionality of the provision declaring managerial
employees ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Sec. 8, which provides:
Sec. 8: The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
Issue: Whether or not the provision declaring managerial employees ineligible to form,
assist, or join unions contravenes Sec 8?

o
o
o
o

Ruling: No.
The rights guaranteed in Sec. 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be
for purposes not contrary to law .
There is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining
labor organizations.
Managerial employees are confidential employees.
By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or
have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in
the field of labor relations.
If these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a union, the union
would not be assured of their loyalty to the union in view of evident conflict of interests.
The union can also become company-dominated with the presence membership.
In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission, when Commissioner Lerum
proposed to amend Sec. 8 by including labor unions in the guarantee of organizational
right, such was only towards the removal of the ban against security guards and
supervisory employees joining labor organizations.

Route managers, by the job description, are managerial employees.

Unlike supervisors who merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks
assigned to them, route managers are responsible for the success of the companys
main line of business through management of their respective sales teams.
Such management involves the planning, direction, operation and evaluation of their
individual teams and areas which the work of supervisors does not entail.
Dissenting opinion:
Ban on managerial employees from forming or joining unions violates Sec. 8.
It was the intent of the Constitutional Commission to abrogate the law prohibiting
supervisory, as well as managerial employees, from joining, assisting, or forming
unions or labor organizations.
However, due to an obvious conflict of interest, being closely identified with the
interests of management invof the inherent nature of their functions, duties, and
responsibilities, managerial employees may only be eligible to join, assist or form
unions or labor organizations of their own rank, and not those of the supervisory
employees nor the rank-and-file employees.

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
A. Elements of "taking"
(43) Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi - 58 SCRA 336
The govt entered into an annual lease contract with Castellvi for the purpose of using
its land for the AFP as a military base. Before the termination of the contract,
Castellvi informed the AFP that he would subdivide the property and would no longer
renew the property leased by the AFP. The govt refused to be ejected and filed
expropriation proceedings.
SC: The expropriation proceedings will not prosper because the 2 elements of
taking are not present:
1.
Entry was not for more than a momentary period. Here, it is transitory, based
on a year-to-year contract. The construction of permanent fixtures does not alter this
fact.
2. The use did not deprive the owner of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Castellvi was still the recognized owner and the govt was
merely a lessee.
Mere notice of intention to expropriate cannot bind the landowner. All
actions of expropriation must be commenced in court and just compensation
is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

(44) Garcia v. Court of Appeals - 102 SCRA 597

Petitioners Garcia, et al. are the owners for 2 parcels of land in Mexico
Pampanga, with a total area of 159,825 sqm. In 1957, NPC occupied a
20,439 sqm portion of the lot for the construction of steel towers and high power lines
for Ambuklao-MNL line and Mexico-Tarlac Line. The lots were then converted into a
subdivision, roads were constructed, lots were sold, and already 25 houses are
constructed. In 1969, NPC filed a complaint for expropriation for easement over the
land. The point of contention is the amount of just compensation. CA ruled that since
the constitution provides that just compensation is determined at the time of the
taking and since NPC entered the premises since 1957, the value then prevailing
must be the amount, P0.07 per sqm, reversing the RTC which declared that the value
must be at the time of the trial court ordering expropriation, P15.00 per sqm.
SC: P15.00. Pending completion of the negotiation for compensation, a document
was executed permission to occupy land which grants NPC a privilege to occupy
under conditions set forth therein.
As the private respondent's entry was gained through permission, it did not have the
intention to acquire ownership either by voluntary purchase or by the exercise of
eminent domain. And the fact remains that the private respondent never completed
the negotiation as to compensation. Since the lot was never entered into or
possessed for purposes of eminent domain, nor did they become the subject of an
action for eminent domain. The expropriation came about only when the trial court
declared that inasmuch as the private respondent cannot acquire easement of rightof-way, much less own it through prescription, the only way for the private respondent
to justify its continued occupation is to expropriate it. There being no taking of the
property for purposes of eminent domain nor condemnation proceedings, the time as
of which the market value should be fixed is the time when the trial court made its
order of expropriation.
(45) City Government of QC v. Judge Ericta - 122 SCRA 759
The Quezon City Council issued an ordinance regulating memorial type cemetery or
burial ground and stating that at least 6% of the total area of memorial park
cemeteries shall be set aside for charity burial for paupers who are QC residents for
5 years prior to death. Such was not enforced until 7 years later, the Council passed
a resolution requesting the City Engr. To stop further selling of memorial lots in QC
who have failed to donate 6% for paupers burial. Pursuant to this, the City Engr.
Informed private respondent Himlayang Pilipino that such would be enforced.
Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus.
QC is contending that it is a valid exercise of police power for the benefit of paupers.
The lower court granted and declaring such provision in the ordinance null and void,
which the
SC affirmed, null and void.

Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use
of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the
taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare. The ordinance is
not a police regulation but outright confiscation, it deprives a person of his private
property without due process of law and compensation. No reasonable relation as to
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
Taking without compensation is not covered by the QC charter or the LGC, it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries.

(46) MERALCO v. Pineda - 206 SCRA 196

In 1974, Meralco filed a complaint for eminent domain against 42 defendants for the
purpose of constructing a transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Pililia, Rizal, with a
total area of 237,321 sqm, alleging that the parties failed to reach an agreement.
Private respondents in their motion to dismiss question Meralcos legal existence had
expired in 1969 and the area sought is too excessive. Despite these however, the
court authorized the expropriation. Thus, the private respondents filed a motion for
withdrawal of the amount they contend was due them pursuant to the expropriation,
which was denied. Later on, Meralco sold to NPC the powerplants and transmission
lines traversing the respondents properties. Because of this, Meralco lost its interest
in the properties under expropriation but respondents filed another motion for
payment, which was granted. In this petition, Meralco strongly maintains that the
court deprived it of due process in formulating its own opinion, based on the motions
of the private respondets, and without allowing the Baord of Commissioners to hold
hearings for reception of evidence, as provided in the ROC.
SC: Determination of just compensation violative of due process and ROC,
remanded for determination of Board of Commissioners. In an expropriation
case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the
parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Contrary to the
submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least three (3) competent
persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to
be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases.
(47) NPC v. Jocson - 206 SCRA 196
NPC filed 7 expropriation cases before the RTC in Bacolod for a right of way of
easement over parcels of land for its Negros Panay Interconnection project and it
needed the land for the construction thereon of its tower and transmission lines and
the parties failed to agree. Judge Jocson then fixed provisional values of the
properties for the purpose of issuing a writ of possession based on the market value
appearing in the tax declarations of the properties and notices of assessment issued

by the assessor. The owners petitioned for a higher price, which Judge Jocson
granted without hearing. Hence this petition.
SC: Granted as Judge Jocson does not have the discretion to determine the
provisional values of the properties. Pursuant to Sec. 2 Rule 67 of the ROC, the
court has discretion to determine the provisional value, which must be deposited by
the plaintiff with the National Treasurer to enable it to take or enter upon the
possession of the property. However, this has already been repealed by PD 42,
which effectively removes the discretion of the court in determining the provisional
value of the property to be expropriated. What is to be deposited is an amount
equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purposes, no hearing is required. All
that is needed is notice to the owner of the property sought to be condemned.

SC granted stating that the pilot farm and housing projects satisfy the public
use requirement for expropriation. The establishment of a pilot devt center would
inure to the direct advantage of the people of Camarines Sur. Once operational, it
would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on
agriculture, fishery, and cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the fishermen,
farmers, and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfied the
public use requirement. As declared in Sumulong, housing is a basic human need and
shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly
affects public health, safety, the environment, and the general welfare. The new
concept of public use means public advantage, convenience or benefit which tends to
contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.

C. Just compensation
B. Public use
(48) Sumulong v. Guerrero - 154 SCRA 461
Pursuant to PD 1224 for the creation of socialized housing, the National Housing
Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering
approximately 25 hectares in Antipol, Rizal which included lots of petitioner.
Petitioners contend that expropriation is not proper as the socialized housing is not
for public use, an element of the exercise of eminent domain, since it will only benefit
a handful of people and hence bereft of public character.
SC: socialized housing project falls within the confines of public use.
Socialized housing is defined as the construction of dwelling units for the lower and
middle class members of our society and support infrastructure and other facilities.
The narrow meaning of
public use as confined to use by the public has been rejected in favor of a broader
concept, which includes indirect benefit or advantage to the public. The determinative
element is not the size of the land expropriated but the number of people to be
benefited. Housing is a basic human need and shortage in housing is a matter of
state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment, and the general welfare.
(49) Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals
The province of Camarines Sur, through its governor, filed 2 expropriation cases
against private respondents Ernesto and Efren San Joaquin pursuant to a resolution,
which authorized the govt to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial capitol site for the establishment of a pilot farm for non-food and nontraditional agricultural crops and a housing project for govt EEs. Private respondent
contends that the pilot farm and housing projects do not satisfy the public use
requirement for expropriation. RTC ordered expropriation, which the CA reversed. In
this petition,

(50) EPZA v. Dulay - 149 SCRA 305

Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving parcels of land in Lapu Lapu
City, Mactan Island, Cebu for the establishment of the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA). However, not all reserved area was public land. The proclamation
included among others, the land of private respondent San Antonio Devt Corp. EPZA
offered to purchase the land but they failed to reach an agreement so EPZA filed an
action to expropriate. . The court ordered EPZA to pay the fair market value but EPZA
argued that pursuant to PD 1533, just compensation should be the market value as
declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
SC: Provision of PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The determination of just
compensation in eminent domain is a judicial function. The method of ascertaining
just compensation under PD 1533 is an impressible encroachment on judicial
prerogative. It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove
that the valuation in the tax declaration is wrong.
(51) Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals - 93 SCRA 503
In 1962, the Municipality of Daet instituted expropriation proceedings against Li
Sieng Giap & Co. for the purpose of constructing a public park. Li Sieng Giap filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that there is no genuine need, which the RTC
granted and dismissed mainly because there is no genuine need for expropriation.
CA reversed and remanded the case. Thereafter, the RTC fixed the provisional value
and required the Municipality of Daet to deposit such amount and appointed
Commissioners. The Municipality of Daet failed to make a deposit and take action
thereon for 17 years. Later on, appealed, invoking PD 42 that just compensation is
limited to the assessed value at the time of the filing of the complaint.
SC: value must be from the judgment of the court. PD 42 does not limit just
compensation to the assessed value. It only fixes the provisional value of the

property. This repealed Sec. 2 Rule 67. By not complying with the orders of the RTC
and CA, petitioner would benefit by its non-compliance and dilly-dallying in taking
possession of the property if the value were to be at the time of the filing of the
complaint. Thus, the value should be fixed at the date of rendition of judgment in
conformity with the doctrines that the value should be fixed as of the time of the
taking of possession because the judgment was rendered then and also, because the
value is just, fair, and reasonable. When the taking is made before the institution of
condemnation, the value is fixed at the time of taking. When the taking coincides with
or is subsequent to condemnation, the value is fixed as of the filing of the complaint.
Here, there has been no taking of the property prior to, coinciding with or subsequent
to the filing of the complaint. Upon the filing of the case, it must deposit immediately
the ascertained amount for 2 purposes:
1. Prepayment of expropriation is final
2. Indemnity for damages if expropriation is dismissed

o
o

The nature of the land at the time of taking by the Government is the principal criterion
for awarding compensation to the landowner.
The convertibility of the property into a subdivision is not controlling.
It is the time of taking and not as potential building site that is the determining factor.
Since San Diego bought the land in question in the interim and was issued a title only
on Dec. 7, 1962, the taking as to it should commence only from said date.
As regard the claim of damages, San Diego is entitled thereto in the form of legal
interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment
is made by the government, 6% from Dec. 7, 1962 up to the time that payment is made
by NPC.

(53) Republic of the Philippines vs. Primo Mendoza

(52) National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals

The National Power Corporation (NPC) negotiated with the spouses Esteben Sadang
and Maria Lachica for the purchase of a portion of the property owned by the spouses.
This was for the purpose of constructing an access road to NPCs Angat River
Hydroelectric Project.
Nov. 1961: Although negotiations were not yet concluded, NPC was granted
permission by the spouses Sadant to begin construction of the access road.
Dec. 7, 1962: B.E. San Diego, Inc., a realty firm, acquired the property at a public
auction and was issued a title.
Feb. 14, 1963: NPC instituted proceedings for eminent domain against the spouses
Sadant.
Jun. 20, 1963: Petition was amended to implead San Diego.
Issue: At what point in time should the value of the land subject of expropriation be
computed?

Ruling: In this case, basis for due compensation should be the value at the time it was
taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government.
Rule in determining just compensation:

When the government takes possession before the institution of

the condemnation proceedings

Time of take of
possession.

When the taking of the property coincides with or is subsequent

to the commencement of the proceedings

Time of filing of
the complaint.

In this case, NPC took the property on Nov. 1961, when it constructed the access road

Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by the govt through the
Department of Education. The schools stands on a portion of the land of the
Mendozas. The Mendozas consolidated and subdivided the titles of 2 properties. Lot 4
where the school was located was not issued a new title. Thus, the government claims
that the Mendozas had relinquished the lot to it as evidenced by the consolidation and
subdivision plan (where school erected = lot 4 exactly). On the other hand,
respondents claim that they only allowed PPS to occupy the property since they had
no need for it at that time, but they never relinquished their right to it. 36 years later,
Mendozas wrote PPS demanding them to vacate the disputed property. PPS declined,
thus the Mendozas filed an unlawful detainer case.
SC: The evidence on record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the property
to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare
the property in its name for tax purposes. The Court holds that, where the owner
agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he
thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering
such property. The Mendozas remedy is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment. As to the time when just compensation should be fixed,
it is settled that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before the
commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the
time of taking that is controlling.

D. Judicial review
(54) De Knecht v. Bautista - 100 SCRA 660
DPWH prepared a plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Blvd. through Cuneta Ave.

However, DPWH later on changed the plan by making the proposed extension go
through the Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, lined with old houses, petitioner is 1
of the owners. They then filed a petition to Pres. Marcos to order the DPWH to adopt
the original plan. The Pres. Referred the matter to the Human Settements
Commission for investigation, which recommended
the original route.
Notwithstanding, DPWH insisted on the 2nd route and the govt filed a complaint for
expropriation against the owners of the houses standing along the second route.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the choice of the 2nd route is
arbitrary and capricious.
SC: granted, order authorizing the govt to enter possession of the property is
set aside. There is no question that the govt has the right to take private property for
public use upon payment of just compensation. However, the govt may not
capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken. It is a judicial
question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is
the victim of partiality and prejudice, as in this case. The original plan was on Cuneta
Ave, and it is presumed that DPWH made studies before deciding on such original
plan. It is doubtful whether Cuneta Ave. would be objected to on social impact as
there, mostly motels will be affected.

(55) Republic v. De Knecht - 182 SCRA 141

After the decision in the above case, BP 340 was passed, which ordered the
expropriation of the San Fernando and Del Pan streets in order to connect EDSA to
Roxas Blvd. but the lower court declared that such expropriation is arbitrary and
should therefore not receive judicial approval hence this petition by the govt.
SC: granted, BP 340 superseded the previous decision. The basis of the
previous decision seems to have disappeared justifying their expropriation as all
residents have been relocated and duly compensated. BP 340 therefore effectively
superseded the final and executory decision of this court. The decision is not an
obstacle to the legislative arm of the govt.

Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

Impairment

It is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract.

Limitations:
1) Police Power
o Reason: Public welfare is
superior to private rights.
2) Eminent Domain
3) Taxation

Franchises, privileges, licenses, etc., do not come within the context of Sec. 10.
(56) Abella v. National Labor Relationship Commission
Abella leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona for 10 years, renewed for another 10 years.
During the lease, she employed private respondent Dionele and Quitao. Upon the
expiration of the lease, she dismissed them and turned over to the owners the land.
They resumed operations and absorbed the private respondents. They now filed with
the LA for illegal dismissal against Abella. NLRC declared that dismissal was valid
due to closure of establishment but ordered payment of separation pay pursuant to
Art. 284 of the Labor Code. Abella now questions the validity of Art. 284 against the
constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts because
when Abella leased the hacienda, they did not contemplate the creation of the
obligation to pay separation pay.
SC: Not unconstitutional. Non-impairment of obligations of contracts is not
absolute and unqualified. Despite the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to
possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of the people. Legislation impairing
obligation of contracts can be sustained when enacted for the promotion of the
general welfare and good of the people. Its purpose is to protect workers who are
terminated because of closure or reduction of personnel. Although absorbed by
owners, no showing that owner assumed the responsibilities of Abella, they will be
considered as new EEs and thus subject to separation pay.

(57) Ortigas & Co. v. Court of Appeals - 346 SCRA 748

Ortigas sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land with an area of 1,508 sqm in Greenhills
with conditions that it shall be exclusively for residential purposes and not more than 1
family residential building will be constructed and shall not erect any sign or billboard
on the roof for advertisement. These conditions were duly annotated on the TCT
issued to Emilia. Later on, MMDA issued an ordinance reclassifying as commercial
area a portion of Ortigas Ave. from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills
subdivision where the lot is located. Private respondent leased the lot from Emilia
Hermoso and Hermoso Realty Corp. under a lease contract that did not specify the
purpose of the lease. He then constructed a single story commercial building for
Greenhills Autocar, a car sales company. Hence, Ortigas filed a complaint against
Mathay for violation of the deed of sale and sought its demolition. Mathay denied any
restriction on the lot. Ortigas contends that since the conditions are annotated on the
TCT, they must prevail over the ordinance, and agreed upon before the passage of the
ordinance. The CA however ruled in favor of Mathay stating that the ordinance nullified
the conditions.
SC: Denied, the conditions are superseded by the ordinance. Generally, laws have
prospective application but this admits of certain exceptions, one of which is police
power. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to

those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will

have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare
of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into
every contract.

o
o
o
o

Corporate rehabilitation is one of many statutorily provided remedies for businesses

that experience a downturn.
Rather than leave the various creditors unprotected, legislation now provides for an
orderly procedure of equitably and fairly addressing their concerns.
A business in the red and about to incur tremendous losses may not be able to pay all
its creditors.
Rather than leave it to the strongest or most resourceful amongst all of them, the state
steps in to equitably distribute the corporations limited resources.

(58)
Pryce Corporation v. China Banking Corporation - G.R.
No. 172302 , February 18, 2014

o
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

o
o

Pryce Corporation filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation.

Court found Pryce eligible to be placed in a state corporate rehabilitation and identified
the assets to be held and disposed and the manner the manner by which liabilities
shall be paid and liquidated.
The approved rehabilitation plan included the following terms:
The indebtedness to China Banking Corporation and Bank of the Philippine Islands as
well as the long term commercial papers will be paid through a dacion en pago of
developed real estate assets of the petitioner.
All accrued penalties are waived[.]
Interests shall accrue only up to July 13, 2004, the date of issuance of the stay order[.]
No interest will accrue during the pendency of petitioners corporate rehabilitation[.]
Dollar-denominated loans will be converted to Philippine Pesos on the date of the
issuance of this Order using the reference rate of the Philippine Dealing System as of
this date.
China Bank contested the courts decision, claiming that the approval of the
rehabilitation plan impaired the obligations of contracts.
Ruling: No impairment of obligation of contracts.
Section 10 mandates that no law impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed.
This case does not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring the modification of
the contract among debtor, its creditors and its accommodation mortgagors.
Even assuming that the same may be invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield
to the police power of the State.
Property rights and contractual rights are not absolute.
The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by the exercise
of the police power of the State for the common good of the general public.
Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors,
employees, and the economy in general.
The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors
holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation
of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.

Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

Section 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well
as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.

Exclusionary rule
Confession or admission obtained in violation of Sec. 12 and 17 of
Art 3, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Exception: Failure of the accused to object to the offer in evidence
of the uncounseled confession

Confession

A declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or

inducement by a person acknowledging that he has committed or

participated in the commission of a crime.

Any allegation of force, duress, undue influence or other forms of

involuntariness in exacting such confession must be proved by clear,
convincing and competent evidence by the defense.

Fruit of the poisonous tree

Once the primary source is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence derived from it is also
inadmissible.
Res Gestae
Declaration of the accused acknowledging guilt may be given in
evidence against him by the police officer to whom the admission was
made, as part of res gestae.

A. Rights under Section 12: origins and rationale

First institutionalized in the 1973 Constitution, rights guaranteed therein are to be given
only prospective effect.

(59) Magtoto v. Manguera - 63 SCRA 4

3 consolidated cases of murder against Magtoto, robbery against Longakit, and
homicide against Dailon. Their extra judicial confessions were taken during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Magtoto, et al. objected to the admission of their
extra-judicial confessions as evidence as they were taken while they were in the
preventive custody of the PH Constabulary without being informed of their right to
remain silent and to counsel.
SC: They are admissible in evidence. The 1973 Constitution does not provide the
same rights as the 1987 Constitution, like the right to remain silent and to counsel. A
confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense who has not been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel is
admissible in evidence if it was obtained and presented in evidence during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution as these are not yet existent as no law granted
such rights.
B.

When the rights become available

In-custody investigation
Any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.
Custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he
is suspected to have committed.
Rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is then
aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to
whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to
elicit incriminating statements.
DOES NOT apply to:
1) A spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the suspect orally admitted having committed the offense.
2) Admissions or confessions made by a suspect
before he was placed under custodial investigation.
(60) People v. Taylaran - 108 SCRA 373
Gregorio Taylaran went to Ofremia Atup, a quack doctor, for the treatment of his
snake bit. Once there, he stabbed her with his bolo several times. He went to the
house of her son and his wife to kill them as well but they refused to let him enter.
Thereafter, he surrendered himself to the police and declared that he killed Atup as
she vowed to kill him through witchcraft. The policemen used this statement at the
trial and Taylaran objected to the admission in evidence of his statement.
SC: Admissible, the constitutional rights are not available when he
surrendered as he is not yet under custodial investigation. Rights under
custodial investigation are not available upon surrendering. Also, what was testified
was only that he told the police why he is surrendering, which is just natural. Under
such circumstances, he is not yet under investigation within the meaning of the
Constitution as no written confession was presented as a result of formal
investsigation. If he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because of this
that he surrendered, his right to silence and counsel may not be invoked.
(61) Galman v. Pamaran - 138 SCRA 295
PD 1866 was promulgated to determine facts and circumstances surrounding the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. Pursuant to this, a fact finding committee was formed,
known as the Agrava Board. The board conducted hearings for investigation, and
private respondents Gen. Ver, et al. testified as witnesses against themselves before
the board. The pcs. Of evidence and testimonies obtained by the board were used in
the prosecution. The private respondents opposed the prosecutions offer of evidence
as such would be violative of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and
the right to remain silent as they were all suspects in the assassination. Petitioners
contend that since they did not invoke these rights before the Agrava Board, they

cannot now invoke it.

SC: They were deprived of their constitutional rights and hence, inadmissible in
evidence.

2.

These constitutional rights are available not only to criminal prosecutions as the
creation of the board was also for the purpose of determining the culprit. It is not the
character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The
privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and
to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a
party or not.

o
o
o
1.
2.

(62) People v. Judge Ayson - 175 SCRA 216

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of PAL.

It was alleged that Ramos was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane ticket.
Ramos was notified of an investigation to be conducted against him in accordance with
PALs Code of Conduct and Discipline and the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
On the day before the investigation, Ramos gave his superiors a handwritten note
reading stating that:
... he is willing to settle irregularities allegedly charged against him in the amount of
P76,000, subject to conditions as may be imposed.
During the investigation, Ramos answers, which were taken down on writing, were to
the effect that he had misused proceeds from ticket sales and that he was willing to
settle the obligation, offering a compromise to pay on a staggered basis.
No compromise agreement was reached resulting to an information being filed,
charging Ramos of estafa.
PAL offered into evidence Ramos handwritten note and written answers to the
investigation,wherein he admitted having misused the proceeds of sales tickets.
Judge Ayson rejected the evidence offered, declaring them inadmissible since it does
not appear that the accused was reminded of his constitutional right to remain silent
and to have counsel nor did it appear that such rights were waived with the assistance
of counsel, in violation of Sec. 20, Art. III of the 1973 Constitution.
Sec. 20: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence offered was inadmissible?

1.

o
o

Ruling: The evidence was admissible. The right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right are only available to persons under custodial investigation.
2 Rights provided in Sec. 20::
Right against self-incrimination
Right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Now provided in Sec. 17, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.

Accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under

compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings.
Rights of a person under custodial investigation
Rights of every suspect under investigation for the commission of an offense.
Now in Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
Includes:
Right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him.
Miranda v. Arizona provided the procedural safeguards for a person in police custody,
in custody interrogation:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights
must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been
given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
Unlike the right against self-incrimination however, these rights apply only to persons
under investigation for the commission for the commission of an offense.
It only applies to suspects under investigation by police authorities.
In summary, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently
charged with its commission in court have the following rights:
Before the case filed in court
Or with the public prosecutor, for
preliminary investigation) but after having
been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in some significant
way, and on being interrogated by the
police.

Continuing right to remain silent and to

counsel, and to be informed thereof;
Not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiates the free will; and
To have evidence obtained in violation
of these rights rejected.

After the case is filed in court

To refuse to be a witness;
Not to have any prejudice whatsover
result to him by such refusal;
To testify in his own behalf, subject to
cross-examination by the prosecution
While testifying, to refuse to answer a
specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other
than that for which he is then
prosecuted.

C. Police line -ups: paraffin test: signature

1)

2)

A police line-up is not considered a part of any custodial inquest.

o It is conducted before that stage of
investigation is reached.

Out-court identification may be made by:

Show-up
Accused is brought face to face with the witnesses for identification.
Police line-up
Suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose.
In a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted
from the investigatory to accusatory stage.
The signing of the accused of the booking sheet and arrest report is
not a part of custodial investigation.
o It is no more than a record of arrest and a
statement on how the arrest was made.

(63) Gamboa v. Judge Cruz - 162 SCRA 642

Petitioner Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy without a WOA brought to Precinct 2
where he was booked and detained. The following day, during the line up of 5
detainees, complainant pointed to petitioner as a companion in the robbery. After the
identification, only petitioner was told to stay, he was told to sit in front of complainant
while being interrogated by the police investigator. Thereafter, an information for
robbery was filed against him and was arraigned.
Was he denied the rights under the Miranda Doctrine?
SC: NO. Police line-up is not a part of the custodial investigation as at that time, he
had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. Accused should be assisted by
counsel the moment there is a move or urge of said investigators to elicit admissions
or even plain information w/c may appear innocent. Instead of extending the consti
right to police investigation, they should just be reminded that while the court finds no
real need to afford a suspect counsel during a police line-up, he should be once there
is a move or urge to elicit admissions or confessions
(64) People v. Dimaano - 209 SCRA 819
In 1987, Sorio, Upana, Dimaano and Borja robbed the house of Elizabeth Batara and
attempted to kill her and her husband. Later on, the executed sworn statements
before Sgt. Susara and Lascano and identified the 4 appellants at the Caloocan City
Police Station. Edna Alarcon, housemaid of Batara also identified them at the police
station. Appellants contend that their identification by the private complainants at the

police station in the absence of their counsel is a violation of their constitutional right
to counsel.
SC: The right to counsel is not available in police line up. When they were
identified by the private complainants at the police line up, they had not yet been held
to answer for the criminal offense for which they have been later on charged and
convicted. Thus, the police could not have violated their right to counsel.
(65) People of the Philippines vs. Musa
Musa, et al. were charged of robbery with homicide for robbing Nancy Bonifacio and
taking her wallet in a jeepney hold up. She testified that 4 clung on the jeep while the
2 were inside the rear portion of the jeep, she was seated on the 1st seat of the
jeepneys rear portion, and that it was Barredo who pointed the gun at Nancy (got
her wallet) and shot Harold, Nancys boyfriend. Nancy was given several pictures at
the hospital, identified only 6. Thereafter, went to the cell at Marikina Police station to
identify them. the appellants assail the out of court identification as inadmissible in
evidence.
SC: Admissible.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways:
1. SHOW-UPS - the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification.
2. MUG SHOTS - photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect.
3. LINE-UPS - a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined
up for the purpose
In resolving the admissibility of out of court identification, the courts have adopted
the TOTALITY of CIRCUMSTANCES TEST:
1. Witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
2. Witness degree of attention at that time;
3. Accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
4. Level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification;
5. Length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
6. Suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Here, her place, vantage point to see all accused. No competing event aside from
hold-up. Identification took place within 5 days. She described suspects to police
prior identification. Police Station merely informed of DATE of arrest.
People v Pineda: Procedure on photographic identification:
1. A series of photographs must be shown and not merely that of the suspect;
2. When a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement
and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains
to the suspect

Rights available under the Miranda Doctrine:

1. To remain silent may be waived
2. To competent and independent counsel may be waived must be done in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
3. To be informed of such rights cannot be waived
*BURDEN OF PROOF IN CASE OF WAIVER burden of proving that there was a
valid waiver rests on the prosecution. The presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence.

D. Right to counsel
It is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false
It attaches upon the start of the investigation.
The lawyer, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.
The right to counsel is not required in a police line-up, neither may
this be invoked when the suspect is given a paraffin test as he is not yet
under custodial investigation.
Before parents, brothers or sisters, spouse, mayor, municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel can appear, 2 conditions must be met:
1)
Counsel of the accused is absent
2)
A valid waiver had been executed
In the absence of a valid waiver, none of the
above-named persons can stand in lieu of counsel.
Competent and Independent
It is required for the lawyer to be willing to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the
individuals constitutional rights.
SC requires that the counsel be independent.
o Thus, he cannot be a special counsel, public or
private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney
these are those whose interest is admittedly adverse to the
accused
HOWEVER, the mere fact that the lawyer was a retired member of
the Judge Advocates Office does not case any doubt on his impartiality in
assisting the accused.
The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the

message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is

exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling the defense. The constitutional requirement is
satisfied when a counsel is engaged by anyone acting in behalf of the
person under investigation, or appointed by the court upon petition by said
person or by someone on his behalf.
o REASON: To hold otherwise, the tempo of
custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused
who can impede, nay obstruct the progress of the interrogation
by simply selecting a lawyer, who, for one reason or another, is
not available to protect his interest.
A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the
accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsels
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.

(66) People v. De Jesus - 213 SCRA 345

In the course of their investigation of the stabbing of a tricycle driver, police officers
asked the De Jesus and Tupaz if they knew anything about the incident. They
answered in the affirmative. One of them surrendered a dagger and a knife. They
were brought to the police headquarters and were interrogated without the
assistance of counsel. The next day, the investigator fetched a lawyer from the
Citizens Legal Aid Office and in the presence of the lawyer, the statements of De
Jesus and Tupaz were reduced in writing.
SC: They were denied their right to counsel. The right to counsel attaches upon
the start of an investigation, i. e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information or confession or admission from the accused. Thus,
there was a violation of
the right of the accused and the statements are inadmissible as evidence.
(67) People v. Lucero - 249 SCRA 425
Demetrio Madrid was robbed along Mindanao Ave & as a result, his driver Lorenzo
Bernales was killed when accused-appellant blocked his Benz with a handgun. 2
months later, the Special Operations Group of the CIS apprehended 3 men, 1 of which
is respondent in this case, Alejandro Lucero. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct
the investigation & declared that even before the investigation started, Lucero verbally
admitted his participation in the crime & that he was the one who shot Bernales. When
Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, Pursal informed the CIS Legal Dept in due
time, Atty Diosdado Peralta appeared at around 9pm at the investigators office &
conferred with Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no
reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero

understood his advice & the CIS investigator began taking down Luceros statements.
When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty Peralta left to
attend the wake of his friend.The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by 3 CIS
agents to Atty Peraltas residence where his extrajudicial statement was presented,
which was already signed by him. Atty Peralta explained & examined Lucero as to the
sworn statement & its legal implications; he asked whether it was voluntarily signed &
Lucero answered yes. Lucero was then convicted. He later on appealed, contending
that he was convicted solely on his extrajudicial confession which was obtained by
force and violence and w/o the presence of counsel.
SC: Statement is inadmissible in evidence. What the consti right requires is
effective and vigilant counsel. The facts demonstrate that Lucero received no effective
counseling from Peralta at the crucial point when the interrogation was starting, he
left; at that critical stage where accused gave his extrajudicial confession, he cannot be
unprotected. He arrived at 9pm during the 2nd night of the appellants
detention, talked to him about his rights. Petitioner was denied the right to
counsel

testimonial and documentary evidence on record have established the guilt of

appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

E.

Right to be informed
Contemplates transmission of meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.
Right to be informed carries with it the correlative obligation on the
part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates effective
communication which results in the subject understanding what is
conveyed.
o Degree of explanation required will necessarily
vary and depend on the education, intelligence and other relevant
personal circumstances of the person under investigation.

(69) People v. Pinlac - 165 SCRA 675

(68) Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines
The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief of the
Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary, Colonel Rolando Abadilla, who was ambushed in broad daylight while
driving his car along Katipunan Avenue. As a result of follow-up operations (pinpointed
by security guard Alejo, a witness), Joel de Jesus, was apprehended at his house at
Dahlia St., Fairview, Quezon City. He executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June
20, 1996, where he detailed the events and the plan of the group who killed Abadilla
and Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 21, 1996 wherein he identified
his cohorts from a police line-up. His cohorts, now petitioners, were convicted of
murder. Petitioners claim that there due to constitutional infirmities, they should be
acquitted.
SC: Affirmed, convicted even if there are violations of constitutional rights
because of other pcs. Of evidence. P/Insp. Castillo admitted that the initial
questioning of Joel began even before formal investigation took place, without
counsel. Thus, the possibility of appellant Joel having been subjected to intimidation
or violence in the hands of police as he claims is possible. Settled is the rule that the
moment police tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from
a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives
this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. Even assuming that custodial
investigation started only during Joels execution of his statement before Atty.
Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. The
prosecution failed to discharge the States burden of proving with clear and convincing
evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he
extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any
probative value. (Based on the requisite competent and independent). However,

Accused Ronilo Pinlac was charged in 2 separate informations & was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for robbery & another for robbery w/ homicide. Accused
contended that he was arrested without a WOA shown to him despite his demand
and that during the investigation at the police HQ in Makati, he was tortured & forced
to admit the crimes charged to make an extrajudicial confession without counsel,
which was admitted in evidence.
SC: Extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. What the constitution
requires for a person under investigation to be informed of his right to remain silent &
to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial & perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. As a rule therefore, it should not be sufficient for police to just
repeat the constitutional provision to the person. He should not only tell but explain
for the right to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain and contemplate an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed, otherwise, there is a denial of right as it cannot be
truly said that the person has been informed of his rights. Since he was not even
assisted by counsel, his alleged waiver was made without counsel; records of the
case is replete with evidence not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution that he
was maltreated for 7 solid hours before he signed the prepared extrajudicial
confession, the prosecution failed to prove compliance with the constitutional
requirements.

Confessions/admissions obtained in violation of rights are

inadmissible in evidence.
Two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions:

1)

2)
warning

Coerced confessions
Product of third degree methods.
o i.e. torture, force, etc.
Uncounseled statements given without the benefit of the Miranda
Even if the extrajudicial confession was in
writing and signed by counsel, because the accused was not
given the Miranda warnings, the confession was held to be
inadmissible in evidence.

recommendation for the fixing of the amount for bail.

Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply

to the spontaneous statements NOT ELICITED through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally
admitted having committed the crime.
o Reason: The bill of rights does not concern itself
with the relationship of private individual and another individual.

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Bail
The security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before
any court as may be required.
Basic principle: Right of bail can be availed of only by a person who is in custody of
the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty.
It would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for
bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
Any person under detention, even if no formal charges have yet
been filed, can invoke the right to bail.

1)
2)

Bail as a matter of right

Bail, when discretionary
Before or after conviction by the MeTC,
1) Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense
MTC, MTCC and MCTC;
not punishable by death, Reclusion
Before conviction by the RTC of an perpetua or life imprisonment.
offense not punishable by death,
Reclusion perpetual or life imprisonment.
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretionary, reasonable notice of hearing is
required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least he must be asked for his

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

When bail is denied: When the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher and evidence of guilt is strong
If the court imposes a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be
cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
1)
Accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteracion;
2)
Accused is found to have previously
escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
3)
Accused committed the offense while on
probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
4)
The circumstances of the accused or his
case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
5)
There is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
Standards for Fixing Bail:
Financial ability of the accused
The nature and circumstance of the offense
The penalty for the offense charged
The character and reputation of the accused
His age and health
The weight of the evidence against him
The probability of his appearing at the trial
The forfeiture of other bonds by him
The fact that he was a fugitive from justice when arrested
Pendency of other cases in which he is under bond

A. Right to bail or recognizance

Emanates from the right to be presumed innocent.

1)
2)

Exemptions to the right of bail:

When charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher and
evidence of guilt is strong.
Traditionally, the right to bail is not available to the military.
Does not violate EPC because there is a substantial distinction between the military
and civilians.

extradition of Muoz. Muoz filed a petition for bail which was opposed by HK. RTC
denied the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that Muoz is a high flight risk. The RTC judge inhibited
himself and the case was raffled to respondent Judge Olalia, who granted the petition
for bail on MR. HK now contends that bail cannot be granted in extradition cases.

(70) People v. Nitcha - 240 SCRA 283

One evening, a certain Jojo went out of his house to buy some cigarettes in a nearby
store. Before Jojo could buy the cigarettes, Doro Nitcha arrived, uttered the words
"Isa ka sa kanila!", then started mauling him. Jojo fought back. May, Joselito, Agustin
and Nenet, arrived and tried to pacify the two. The fighting stopped upon the arrival
of Doro's sister Victoria who, upon seeing the commotion, dragged Doro away from
the fight and brought him home. Nenet, Agustin, May and Joselito proceeded
towards their house located in front of the store where the incident occurred. While
they were walking toward their house, Florestan Nitcha, brother of Doro, arrived at
the sari-sari store brandishing a gun, shouted at them, and fired his gun hitting May
at the back of her head.

SC: Bail can be granted in extradition cases. The PH is a signatory to treaty

obligations concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II. Thus, the PH is under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding
but administrative, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also the machinery of criminal law. Temporary detention
may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable. Muoz had been detained for over 22 years without
having been convicted of any crime, a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to
liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a
motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. Failure to comply with
the extradition treaty to HK is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its
treaty obligations, the PH should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty,
and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
Court cannot ignore the modern trend in public international law, which places a
primacy on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. While
the universal declaration of human rights is not a treaty, its principles are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community.

Appellant then aimed his gun at Joselito but missed. May died on the way to the
hospital. Nitcha went back to his mother's house before proceeding to the police
station where he surrendered. He was charged with and convicted of murder. He then
filed a petition for bail during the pendency of his appeal.
SC: Bail should not be granted. If an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to
suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of
discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only
determined that the evidence of guilt is strong which would have been sufficient to
deny bail even before conviction it would have likewise ruled that the accused's
guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the
accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Thus, an
accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the
case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of
the offense charged is strong.

(71) Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, etc. vs. Felixberto T.
Olalia, Jr. 521 SCRA 470

B.

The PH and HK signed an Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted
Persons. Muoz was charged before the HK Court with 3 counts of bribery and 7
counts of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong.
Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted. The DOJ received from the
HK-DOJ a request for the provisional arrest of Muoz. NBI agents arrested and
detained him.
Muoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and/or writ
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. The CA & SC
declared the Order of Arrest void. HK filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the

Waiver of the right

Another of the constitutional rights which can be waived.
The failure of the accused to call the attention of the trial court to
the unresolved petition for bail is deemed a waiver of the right to bail.

(72) People vs. Judge Donato - 198 SCRA 130

An information was filed charging Rodolfo Salas, alias Commander Bilog and his coaccused with rebellion, under Art. 134 in relation to Art. 135 of the RPC.

o
o

Having earlier escaped from military detention, Salas and his co-accused were
arrested and were in military custody.
The accused filed a petition for habeas corpus, which was later dismissed, because of
an agreement of the parties wherein:
Salas was to remain in legal custody to face trial before the court over his person while
his co-accused would be released but shall submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person.
Salas filed a petition for bail which was opposed on the ground that since rebellion is a
capital offense, with a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, Salas is not entitled to
bail as the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Pending decision on the petition for bail EO 187 was issued which restored the original
penalty for rebellion, the original penalty being prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000.
Judge Donato granted bail.
Hence the present petition, claiming that Judge Donato committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting bail:
That the Judge did not take into consideration of circumstances, such as that the
accused had escaped military detention, indicating that the accused does not intend to
appear in court for trial, if released; and
That Salas had already waived his right to bail when he agreed to remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having custody of his person in consideration of
the release of his co-accused.
Issue: Whether or not Salas should have been granted bail?

Ruling: Although Salas had the right to be granted bail, rebellion being a bailable
offense, he had nevertheless, waived such right when he agreed to remain in legal
custody.
Bail may be matter of right or of discretion:
Bail as a matter of
right

When the offense is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion

perpetua.
Right is absolute.

Bail as a matter of
discretion

If the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

Bail shall be denied, if the evidence of guilt is strong.
But, once the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right.
Therefore, bail may be a matter of right in cases of capital
offenses if the evidence of guilt is not great.

In this case, as rebellion was punishable by prison mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000, lower than reclusion perpetua, bail cannot be denied to Salas.
However, the right bail may be waived.
The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived.

o
o

It is a right which is person to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.
A person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or
privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally
entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for
his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver
of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy.
In this case, Salas waived his right to bail when he agreed to remain in legal custody
provided his co-accused would be released.
Note: On Oct. 24, 1990, RA 6968 increased the penalty of rebellion to reclusion
perpetua.
However, it was not applied to Salas as such was not favorable to him.

C. Excessive bail
(73) De La Camara v. Enage - 41 SCRA 3
Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor in Misamis Oriental was arrested for his
alleged participation in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 laborers of the
Tirador Logging Co. He, together with his co-accused, were charged for multiple
frustrated murder and murder. An application for bail was filed by petitioner with the
lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him to the
killing, which Judge Enage granted, admitting that there was a failure on the part of
the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity, but
fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200, the sum of
P840,000 for multiple murder and P355,200 for frustrated murder. He contends that
bail was excessive.
SC: Bail is excessive. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses
charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated
murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the DOJ did recommend the total
sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. The guidelines in the fixing of bail:
1. Ability of the accused to give bail
2. Nature of the offense
3. Penalty for the offense charged
4. Character and reputation of the accused
5. Health of the accused
6. Character and strength of the evidence
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial
8. Forfeiture of other bonds

9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested

10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases
While the court is granted discretion to rule on question of bail, the court will
supervise where conditions imposed upon seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory this constitutional right to bail,

Section 14.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

1)
2)
3)

1)
2)
3)
4)

Standards whenever the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense:

Trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the
full comprehension of the consequences thereof;
The prosecution shall be required to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability;
The accused must be asked if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow
him to do so if he so desires.

Criminal Due Process (Mejia v. Pamaran):

The accused is heard in a court of competent jurisdiction;
The accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law;
The accused has been given notice and the opportunity to be heard;
The judgment rendered was within the authority of a constitutional law.

A. Military tribunals
(74) Olaguer v. Military - 150 SCRA 144
Olaguer and other petitioners were all civilians when they were arrested by the
military authorities in 1980 for being charged of unlawful possession of explosives,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, arson, and conspiracy to assassinate
high level officials including the President Marcos and his spouse. They were tried

and condemned to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution by the military

commission. During the period of the trial and at the time of the promulgation of their
sentence by the military commission, the civil courts were still operational.
Issue: WON a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts
are open and functioning?
Held: NO. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even
during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by
them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment
rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. A
different ruling would result to the violation of the right of due process.
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused
stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among
others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution,
in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or
military process. Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are
called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial system.

B. Due process
(75) Scotty's Department Store v. Micaller - 99 Phil 762
Nena Micaller was employed as a sales girl at Scotys. She was for three years the top
sales person. In 1953, she organized a union together with other employees, which
became affiliated with the National Labor Union. The union sent their demand to the
store. As such, the owners interrogated and threatened Micaller and the other
employees of the store. Also, the owners threatened to close the store if the employees
continued to affiliate themselves with the union. They filed a complaint against Nena for
threats, which was dismissed and slander, where she was fined P50. In November
1953, the owners dismissed Micaller. Micaller filed a case for illegal dismissal against
the owners with the CIR. CIR ruled in favor of Micaller, ordering her reinstatement and
punishing the owners to pay a fine of Php 100. Scottys now contends that the CIR, an
administrative court, has jurisdiction to impose a fine which is penal in nature.
SC: No jurisdiction and the decision is nullified insofar as the imposition of the
fine. The power to impose penalties provided in the Industrial Peace Act is lodged in
the ordinary courts. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to violation of the right of
due process of the law. Unlike ordinary courts, the CIR, in view of the speedy and
objective disposition of cases, may not apply the technicalities of the rules of
procedure. The constitution provides for the rights of the accused and the procedure for
criminal prosecution (here, ULP). Allowing the Court of Industrial Relation to have
jurisdiction over the criminal cases would in effect allow conviction upon lesser degree

of evidence and with disregard procedures that tend to protect the accused.

committed without unlawful intention.

(77) People v. Mingoa - 92 Phil 856

C. Presumption of innocence
Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be
taken into account.
Can be invoked ONLY by an individual accused of a criminal
offense, not a corporate entity.

Mingoa was the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon. He was unable to produce
the missing fund amounting to Php 3,938, which he, by mistake, put in a large
envelope and brought with him to a show and forgot it in his seat and when he
returned, it was no longer there. He was then charged and convicted with the crime of
malversation of public funds, premised on his inability to overcome the prima facie
evidence of guilt for the said felony. During trial, he did not appear and present
evidence. According to the RPC, the inability of the public officer in charge of
government funds or property to produce such would be a prima facie evidence of guilt
for the said crime. Mingoa assailed his conviction by contending that the finding of guilt
was only based on presumptions.

The presumption that official duty was regularly performed

cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Circumstantial evidence
In order that circumstantial evidence may warrant conviction,
the following requisites must concur:
1)
There
is
more
than
one
circumstance;
2)
The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven;
3)
The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

SC: Presumption of guilt is valid. The test for validity of a presumption is there be a
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that
the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. The statute in
the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes
the failure of public officer, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to
personal use. The ultimate fact presumed is that officer has malversed the funds
entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has
received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand.
Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it
cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the
statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an
opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will
stand the test of validity.

Equipoise rule
Applies only where the evidence adduced by the parties are evenly
balanced, in which case, the constitutional presumption of innocence
should title the scales in favor of the accused.
(76) United States v. Luling - 34 Phil 725
Luling was a wharf watchman of the customs. He received Php 100 from Rufino
Elord to ensure the facilitation of the importation of large quantity of opium.
According to section 316 of Act 355, the reception of a gift by any officer or
employee in the Philippine customs service from any importer or exporter, either
directly or indirectly, shall prima facie be deemed to be a violation of the provisions
of this section. Luling contends that Sec. 316 of Act no. 355 insofar as it requires
the accused to prove his innocence is unconstitutional.
SC: Constitutional. While presumption of innocence is the rule, it is established
also that certain facts only shall constitute prima facie evidence and that then the
burden is on the defendant to show that his acts are not criminal. In case of statutory
crimes (such in the case in the Philippines), no constitutional provision is violated by
a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that the burden is shifted to the
defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are

1)
2)

D. Right to counsel
During trial, it is not subject to waiver
Instances when right to counsel may not be waived:
During the trial;
No valid waiver of the right to remain silent or to counsel under custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel.

(78) People v. Holgado 86 Phil 752

Frisco Holgado detained Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero for about eight
hours. An information charging him of slight illegal detention was filed against him by
the fiscal. During the arraignment, without the assistance of counsel, he pleaded
guilty for the said crime. The trial court convicted him with kidnapping and serious

illegal detention.

by the fiscal believing it was a dilatory tactic because several postponements were
made in the past. The trial court waived her right to present evidence and considered
the case submitted for decision. They were found to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. Believing there was an irregularity in
sending notices and copy of the decision because her counsel was not notified by
her counsel on record, she filed an Urgent motion to set aside entry of Judgment.
Later, she filed an MR on the ground that she only came to know that her counsel
was not a member of the Philippine Bar but was denied.

SC: Conviction is invalid, remanded for a new arraignment and new trial after
he is apprised of his right to counsel. The right to be heard would be meaningless
since without the assistance of counsel, there can be no fair trial. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. Thus, the court
has 4 duties:
1. Inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before
being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires
the aid of an attorney
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must
assign attorney de oficio to defend him;
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant
him a reasonable time

SC: Delgado was deprived of her right to counsel. Delgado is entitled to be

represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her. Absent such
right would be a denial of due process. Without a counsel, there is danger that any
defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites
and skills needed in the court proceedings.

E. Right to be informed

(79) People v. Sim ben - 98 Phil 138

1)
Sim Ben was an owner of a restaurant in Cebu City, wherein he exhibited immoral and
indecent films. An information for violation of Article 201 of the RPC was filed against
him. Before his arraignment, the fiscal told him that the former would recommend that
only a fine would be imposed if he pleaded guilty. During his arraignment, the court
informed him of his right to have counsel and asked him if he wanted to have one. Sim
Ben answered that he did not want to have one. Also, he was asked if he was
agreeable to have the information read to him even without assistance of counsel. Sim
Ben agreed. The information was read to him in the local dialect and afterwards, Sim
Ben pleaded guilty. The trial court rendered its decision finding Sim Ben guilty and
was penalized by imprisonment and a fine of Php 200.
SC: Sentence valid.
During the arraignment the rights of the accused were fully protected. The court
informed him of his right to have counsel, which Sim Ben waived. Also, the court took
pains in ascertaining whether Sim Ben was aware of the consequences of his plea of
guilty. As to the promise of leniency, the courts decision cannot be declared void when
it disregards the recommendation of the fiscal of a lower penalty.
(80) Delgado v. Court of Appeals - 145 SCRA 357
Delgado, along with three others, were charged with Estafa thru falsification of public
and/or official documents for deceiving Rueda in arranging travel to the United
States. Having pleaded not guilty, Delgado was assisted by her counsel de parte.
However, her counsel failed to appear on the date set for presentation of evidence
for the defense and sent a telegram requesting for a postponement. It was denied

2)
3)

1)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Rationale:
To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to prepare for his defense.
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal from protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause.
To inform the Court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction.
Requisites:
Information must state the name of the accused;
The designation given to the offense by statute;
A statement of the acts or omission so complained of as constituting an offense;
Name of the offended party;
Approximate time and date of the commission of the offense;
Place where the offense had been committed;
Facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the
accused.

Void for vagueness rule

Accused is denied the right to be informed and due process where
the statute itself is couched in such indefinite language.
Waiver
The right to be informed of the nature of the cause of the
accusation against the accused may not be waived, but the defense may
waive the right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of not guilty.
HOWEVER, it is different if the accused himself refused to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation by not reading the
information.

(81) People v. Regala - 113 SCRA 613

Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores were charged with murder with assault upon an agent
of a person in authority for the killing of Sgt. Desilor. During the town fiesta, while Sgt.
Desilor was on duty, he pushed Delfin Flores and admonished him not to get through
the exit gate. Regala was enraged and as such, stabbed him several times, resulting
in his death. RTC convicted them of the complex crime of murder with assault upon
an agent of a person in authority.
SC: Assault upon person in authority cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance. The information filed against Regala did not allege the essential
elements of assault, that he knew that before or at the time of the assault, the victim
was an agent or a person of authority. Such defect cannot be cured because there are
no allegations of facts which can be implied that the accused knew of such fact and
even if it was established by the prosecutions evidence as that would be convicting
the accused of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the information in violation
of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. However, since it was established by evidence and was in uniform at the
time of the incident, as stated in the case of Rodil, it could be proven as an
aggravating circumstance. Hence, convicted of homicide aggravated by in contempt
or with insult to public authorities.

The group of Ortega had a drinking spree with the Masangkay. When Masangkay
went to the back of the house to answer the call of nature, Ortega followed and
stabbed him several times. Garcia, Ortegas cousin, went to the scene of the crime
and helped Ortega carry the body of Masangkay and throw into the well with water
and buried to conceal the body. Autopsy reports stated that the victim was alive when
buried. Ortega and Garcia were charged with murder. Garcia appealed, claiming that
his responsibility relates only as an accessory in attempting to conceal the body of
the crime resulting to drowning of the victim.
SC: Garcia must be acquitted. Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through
drowning in an information that charges murder by stabbing. He has the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He cannot be
charged with an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Otherwise, it would violate his constitutional right under Section 14 (2) of the
Constitution.

Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested on the strength of a
warrant, which in turn, was issued because of an information charging him, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, allegedly committed during the
failed coup attempt from Nov. 29 to December 10, 1990.
Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional right in being, or having been held to answer for criminal offense which
does not exist in the statute books.
He claimed that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the
occasion thereof.

E.

Issue: Whether or not Enriles constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him had been violated?
Ruling: No. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple
rebellion.

The information does indeed Enrile with a crime defined and punished by the RPC:
simple rebellion.

(83) People v. Ortega - 276 SCRA 166

(82) Enrile v. Salazar - 186 SCRA 217

People v. Hernandez: Under the allegations of the amended information that the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by the perpetration of said offense or rebellion; the Court
held that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore,
simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and
robberies.
The claim that Enrile is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
while technically correct so far as that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric.

1)
2)

Right to speedy trial

A trial free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
Accused is entitled to dismissal, equivalent to acquittal, if trial is
unreasonably delayed.
o What offends the right are unjustified
postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of
time.
The right to a speedy trial does not preclude the peoples
equally important right to public justice.

Interests protected by the right to speedy trial:

To prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
To minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;

3)

To limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.

(84) Conde v. Rivera - 45 Phil 650

Aurelia Conde, a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, was charged w/ no less than
5 informations for various crimes & misdemeanors. The hearings, around 8 in
noumber, she attended w/ her witnesses and counsel, were postponed without her
consent. It was also more than 1 year ago since the 1st info against her was filed and
none of her cases have been resolved. Hence, she filed this petition for mandamus
and prohibition contending that there is a denial of her right to speedy trial.
SC: There was a denial and hence, the charges pending are ordered dismissed.
The constitutional guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Petitioner has such right so that if innocent, she
may go free. Investigations and trials arbitrarily postponed without accuseds
consent are palpably & openly prejudicial & unjust to accused & detrimental to the
public. Where a prosecuting officer, w/o good cause, secures postponements of
trials beyond a reasonable period of time, the accused is entitled to relief by a
proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the info, or if restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus, to obtain his freedom

G. Right to impartial trial

The accused is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.

Reyes subscribed before respondent judge an extra-judicial statement,

which he later repudiated on the ground that it was a product of intimidation by
government agents, he in effect ruled that such extrajudicial statement was entered
freely. This clearly negates the objectivity required in the Constitution. The judge
passed on a question that by implication has already been answered by him. He
refuses to act on the motion to dismiss since he was inclined to the extra-judicial
confessions earlier made by Reyes.
H. Right to public trial
Intended to prevent possible abuses which may be committed
against the accused (This right belongs to the accused not the public)
A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not
be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret
conclaves of long ago.
o Not synonymous with a publicized trial.
(86) Garcia v. Domingo - 52 SCRA 143
There are pending criminal cases consisting of charges and counter- charges against
2 respondent policemen Calo and Carbonel for allegedly employing physical injuries,
maltreatment and slander in effecting an arrest of private petitioner for a traffic
violation. All 14 trial dates were held in the chambers of petitioner Judge Garcia. Calo
& Carbonel filed with respondent Judge Domingo a petition for certiorari for
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging that they were denied their
right to public trial. Respondent judge issued a TRO on the ground that the
constitutional and statutory rights of the accused have been violated because the
trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the
court room open to public.

(85) Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz - 50 SCRA 18

American Express Bank in Cavite was robbed and an American serviceman was
killed. The information was filed against Mateo, et al. for robbery in band with
homicide. 1 suspect, Martinez filed a motion to dismiss but Judge Villaluz deferred it
until after the prosecution has presented evidence. Meanwhile, another suspect
Reyes was arrested and he executed an extra-judicial statement signed and sworn
to before Judge Villaluz implicating Martinez, Mateo, etc. Judge Villaluz. Despite the
pending action on the motion to dismiss, the prosecution filed a motion to present
additional evidence and was allowed to do so again by the Judge. When Reyes
testified, repudiated his statement on the ground of intimidation of a govt agent.
With all these being made of record in the case, Mateo, etal. filed a Joint Motion to
disqualify judge.
SC: Judge Villaluz is disqualified to hear the case. Due process of law requires
a hearing before an impartial trial and disinterested tribunal. Every litigant is entitled
to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

SC: TRO not valid, they were not denied their right to public trial. The
constitutional provision that trial must be public possesses the character that when
anyone is interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his
courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a
stranger to the litigants is of no moment. But there is the well recognized exception
that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized
as "offensive to decency or public morals." Here, there is no showing that the public
was excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would
reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Justice Black said that it suffices to satisfy
the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives
and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." Also, at least
14 hearings were already conducted in the chambers of Judge Garcia without any
objection on the part of the policemen, which implies lack of weight as to their
contention.

I. Compulsory process / confrontation

Confrontation
Right to cross-examine complainant and witnesses.
Right may be waived.
Testimony of a witness who has not submitted himself to crossexamination is not admissible in evidence.
Compulsory Process
To secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence.

petitioners. Respondent judge was asked to serve written interrogatories to Dr.

Academia, but he denied such request, hence this petition for certiorari, alleging that
respondent Judge Garcia was arbitrary and capricious.
SC: No grave abuse of discretion of Judge Garcia. While the Constitution grants
the accused full and unimpeded opportunity to cross-examine the evidence of the
prosecution, such contentions could have been also proven by other witnesses
present in the hospital present where herein petitioners were supposedly treated.
Given these circumstances, there is no compelling reason to require that Dr.
Academia be the particular person presenting evidence that can be substantiated by
other people present during the circumstances concerned.
(88) People v. Miyake - 279 SCRA 180

1)

2)

1.
o
o

1)

2 kinds of subpoena:
Subpoena ad testificandum
Used to compel a person to testify.
Subpoena duces tecum
Used to compel the production of books, records,
things, or documents therein specified.
Test when subpoena duces tecum may be issued:
The books, documents, or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to
the issue subject of the controversy.
Test of relevancy.
2. Such books must be reasonably described by the
parties to be readily identified.
Test of definiteness
Requisites for compulsory processes:
The evidence is really material;
2) The accused is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the
production of such evidence;
3) The evidence will be available at the time desired;
4) No similar evidence can be obtained.

(87) Fajardo v. Garcia - 98 SCRA 514

Case at bar stems from charges against herein petitioners for murder, where they
entered a plea of not guilty. Prosecution evidence shows that during the time of their
arrest, all the petitioners were suffering from injuries, and were examined and treated
by a Dr. Herminio Academia. Upon the inquiry of the respondent judge as to the
whereabouts of Dr. Academia, petitioner Oscar Fajardo who was being examined at
that time said that the doctor concerned was already in the United States. Defense
argued that the testimony of this doctor concerned is important to the case of the
defense, especially given the nature of the crime supposedly committed by the

Herein accused-appellant Lanie Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment

on a large scale, to which appellant pleaded not guilty.
Complaint was initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo, and Rosamar
del Rosario. Despite contradictory evidence given by both parties, herein
appellant was eventually found guilty of committing illegal recruitment on a large
scale. However, there is a contention as to the conviction of herein appellant,
since during the trial, only complainant Elenita Marasigan testified against
accused-appellant. As for the testimonies of the other two complainants, the
prosecution presented in lieu of their testimonies statements of their relatives. In
basing the ruling on evidence is argued to be illegal, since it violated the right of
the accused- appellant to confront the witnesses.
SC: Violation of her right to confront witnesses, only guilty of simple
illegal recruitment. The evidence by the prosecution only established that said
illegal acts were done to one person. This was supported by the evidence and
testimony presented by witnesses Elenita Marasigan. As for the other two
supposed complainants, no concrete proof that acts were done to all
complainants, especially since the prosecution failed to present them as
witnesses, therefore violating the right of the accused-appellant to confront
witnesses.
(89) People v. Seneris - 99 SCRA 92
This petition stems from an earlier case filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Zamboanga City against herein private respondent Pilar Pimentel, Mario Nemenio
and Salim Doe as principals by direct participation and Moises Andaya, with the
murder of Eduardo Pimentel, husband of Pilar Pimentel. Upon the filing of the case,
private respondent Pilar Pimentel was granted a separate trial from her other coaccused, while the other co-accused were eventually found guilty of murder. After
the judgment, Mario, 1 of the her co-accused agreed to testify in the trial of private
respondent Pilar Pimentel. Defense counsel meanwhile also was able to begin cross

examination, but due to lack of time requested for a continuation which did not push
through as Mario was shot dead while trying to escape from prison. Herein public
respondent Jude Seneris ruled that the testimony of Mario was inadmissible on the
grounds that the defense was not able to complete its cross-examination of the
witness. Petitioner now questions the decision of the lower court arguing that the
Judge Seneris gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the testimony of Mario was
inadmissible, saying that even if counsel for the defense was not able to continue its
cross-examination, the pertinent details related to the case were already covered by
both prosecution and defense during previous court sessions.

cash bond despite the objection of petitioners counsel pursuant to the waiver
executed. He now contends that the court order is improper as he already filed a
written waiver.
SC: Court order is proper. 1973C permits trial in absentia even of capital offenses,
provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of
identification by the witnesses of the prosecution or provided he unqualifiedly admits
in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in
the case on trial Reason: if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings
without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may
say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and,
therefore, is entitled to an acquittal. Furthermore, it is possible that a witness may not
know the name of the culprit but can identify him if he sees him again. His statement
in the waiver he admits he could be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution
even in his absence is not such unqualified admission - exception is when the
accused "unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment the he is the person
named as defendant in the case on trial - petitioner only admits that he can be
identified by the prosecution witnesses in his absence. He did not admit that he is the
very person named as defendant in the case on trial. His admission is vague and far
from unqualified. Also, waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that
the prosecution is deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for
purposes of identification by its witnesses, which is vital for the conviction of the
accused. Such waiver does not mean a release of the accused from his obligation
under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused may waive his
right but not his duty or obligation to the court. Thus, he can still be ordered arrested
by the court for non-appearance upon summons.

SC: Admissible. The testimony of a witness can be stricken if it is proven that the
defense was not given adequate time to cross-examine that witness. However, the
direct testimony of a witness who dies before conclusion of the cross-examination
can be stricken only insofar as not covered by the cross-examination. In this case,
the pertinent data were already covered prior to the death of Mario. As such, inability
to be present in court as a result of his death is not reason enough to strike out his
testimony. Such absence is not violative of private respondents constitutional rights
to confront the witness especially because even if the cross-examination of the
defense was not completed, the necessary information pertaining to the case were
already covered, thus not necessitating further examination.

J. Trial in absentia; right to be present

Purpose: to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could, in the past,
be indefinitely deferred and many times completely abandoned because of the
defendants escape.

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except
in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

Mandatory: Whenever the accused has been arraigned, notified of date/s of

hearing, and his absence is unjustified.

Even after the accused has waived further appearance during the
trial, he can be ordered arrested by the court for non-appearance upon
summons to appear for purposes of identification.

(90) Carredo v. People - 183 SCRA 273

Petitioner Elias Carredo was charged with malicious mischief before the MTC of
Cebu, to which he deposited a cash bond for his provisional liberty and pleaded not
guilty during the arraignment. He likewise filed a written waiver of appearance
resulting in a trial in absentia which stated that he admits that he could be identified
by witnesses who are testifying at the time that said accused was not present. During
the hearing, the prosecution moved for the recall of its principal witness in order to
identify the accused, thus a subpoena was issued against the accused but he failed to
appear. Thus, the judge ordered the arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of the

Writ of Habeas Corpus

A writ issued by the court directed to a person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and
cause of his caption and detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever the
court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf.
The writ will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of liberty is in the
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do
so.

Purpose of the writ: Relieve a person from unlawful restraint.

It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he was
detained.

When available:

1)
2)
a)
b)
c)

A speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and is the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom;
As a consequence of judicial proceeding when:
There has been deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of the
person;
The court has no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
An excessive penalty has been imposed, since such sentence is void as to the excess.

shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

Procedure: There is need to comply with the writ (officer), disobedience thereof
constitutes contempt of court.
Ground for suspension of the writ of habeas corpus: In case of invasion or rebellion,
the President may for a period not exceeding 60 days suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.

Article VII
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension
for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.

The suspension shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the right to bail.