Forms and Participants in Plato's Phaedo

Author(s): Mohan Matthen

Source: Nos, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1984), pp. 281-297
Published by: Blackwell Publishing
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215164 .
Accessed: 28/09/2011 23:57
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Blackwell Publishing is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Nos.

http://www.jstor.org

in
Formsand Participants
Plato's Phaedo
MOHAN MATTHEN
UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

It is quite clear that in Plato's theoryof forms,the bearers of properties like beauty, shortness, etc., are participants in the forms
correspondingto these properties.' For example, a beautifulthing,
Praxiteles' Aphrodite, say, is a bearer of beauty and according to
Plato this is explained by its participation in the form of beauty.
It is also fairlywell-establishedthat, in addition to the bearers
of properties and forms, Plato admitted into his ontology a third
For example, Plato recognized that
sort of thing,immanent
characters.
in addition to the Aphrodite and the form of beauty, there is the
beautyin theAphrodite,a character "immanent" in the statue.
An interestingquestion concerning these immanent characters
is what their relation is to the forms. In particular we should want
to know whetherthey,too, in addition to the bearers of properties,
are participants in the forms. Certainly, there is room in Plato's
theory for a relationship between characters and forms strongly
analogous to that between bearer and form.Thus consider the central claim of the theory: that bearers have their properties because
they participate in a form-for example, that the Aphrodite is
beautifulbecause it participatesin beauty. An analogous claim would
be that the relevant character in the Aphrodite (that is, the beauty
in the Aphrodite) is a beauty because it participatesin beauty. Admittedly,this might be regarded as an unnecessary wrinkle in the
theory-why should Plato not have said that the characteristicin
question is a beauty because the thing in which it is participates
in beauty? But this is a misguided proposal. There are many
characters in the Aphrodite aside from beauty-its whiteness,
heaviness, etc.-and none of these are its beauty. Thus it would
be false to say that a character is a beauty if the thing in which
it is participates in beauty. There seems thereforeto be no choice
NOUS 18 (1984): 281-297
? 1984 byNou'sPublications

281

282

NOUS

but to relate beauties more directlyto the formof beauty. But did
Plato see this?
I do not intend to settle this question here-in any case, the
textual evidence is probably too sparse for this. What I do want
to establish is that if we admit immanent charactersas participants
in forms,then we should have a philosophicallyand textuallyappealing interpretationof Plato's famous argument in Phaedo 74b7
- c6 to the effectthat the forms constitute a supersensible realm
knowable only by recollection.
The particular stretchof text with which I shall be concerned
is preliminaryto the discussion of recollection,an argumentin support of the conclusion that "these equals are not the same as theequal-itself'-this texthas philosophicaland stylisticdifficulties
that
have made it hard to interpret.The (conditional) interpretationthat
I shall propose overcomes these difficultiesand makes possible a
plausible and valid (though arguably unsound; see section X) argument in support of the doctrine that there is innate knowledge. It
also sheds light on some other issues: whetherthe formsare propertiesor paradigms, in what sense participationis resemblance, and
self-predication(section IX).
II

Let us turn now to our text-Phaedo 74b7 - c6. In these much discussed lines, Plato argued as follows:
(1) Equal sticksand stonessometimesseem equal [to] some, but not
[to] others.
never seem unequal to you, nor does
(2) But the-equals-themselves
equalityseem to be inequality.
(3) Therefore,those equals are not identicalwiththe-equal-itself.
(The parenthesized 'to' is an attempt to render the dative case of
the 'some' and 'others.' Anotherpossiblereadingis 'in some respects,
but not in others' and yetanother'to some thingsbut not to others.')
Commentators have generallyassumed that this is a proof that
"equal sticks and stones are not the same as the-equal-itself," or
in other words, that the sensible bearers of a property are nonidentical with the formcorrespondingto that property.(I shall call
this "the standard interpretation.")
First, I shall argue that the standard interpretationfaces three
grave difficulties.(a) It cannot explain the relevance of Plato's
premisses to his conclusion. (b) It gives an account of neither the
meaning nor the point of the repetition in (2), which firstsays
something about the-equals-themselvesand then something about
equality. (c) Perhaps most seriously,it is hard to see why this conclusion is relevant to Plato's purposes.2

PLATO'S PHAEDO

283

Then I shall advance a new interpretationof the argument.

III

On the standard interpretation,the conclusion of Plato's argument,

(3), is that the sensible bearers of equality, sticks and stones, etc.,
are non-identicalwithequality itself-the form.Now, a non-identity,
a statement of the form 'x is not identical with y,' is proved by
showing that x has a propertythat y lacks. Accordinglywe should
look to (1) and (2) to tell us of a property that equal sticks and
stones have and equality lacks.
To what fact does (1) allude? One claim has been that Plato
was here making a point derived from the qualified form of
statementsabout equality. When we say that a stick is equal it is
always to something that we claim it to be equal. But what did
Plato make of this importantgrammatical fact?It has been claimed
that he noticed that whenever a sensible thingis equal to one thing,
it is always unequal to something else. He might have concluded
fromthis that sensible equals are at the same time unequals,3 and
that they are therefore things that require the Law of NonContradiction to be modified.4 If this is the point of (1), then the
claim in (2) must be that equality itself(the form) is not both an
equal and unequal. How is this to be made out? There are two
possibilities.
The firstis to suppose that since (by the principle of the SelfPredication of Forms) equality is equal, therefore(if it is not also
unequal) it is equal to everything.5(If it were not, then it would
be unequal to something, and thus by reasoning parallel to that
applied to sensible equals, be both equal and unequal.) But if this
is what Plato is saying, then his premisses are inconsistent. For if
equality is equal to everything,then (by the transitivityand symmetryof equality) everythingis equal to everything.But it is claimed
that sensible things are not equal to everything.So we must rule
out this interpretation,at least ifwe hope to make sense of the argument. (It may be thought that a type-theoreticalmove might be
usefulhere, prohibitingthe comparisonof equalityto sensiblethings.
But there is no evidence that Plato envisaged any such restriction.
Quite the contrary-he thought that the form of beauty is more
a beauty than any earthlybeauty, similarlythe form of the bed.)
The other possibilityis that Plato believed that the addition of
the qualification (the 'to' clause in 'a is equal to b') to equality
claims is required only when these claims concern sensible things,
or in other words, that equality itselfis equal but not to anything.6
The contrast thereforewould be that whereas sensible things are
equal in a qualified way, equality is equal unqualifiedly. The con-

284

NOUS

trast between this and the previous interpretationis that while the
previous one assumes that the form is qualifiedly equal, albeit to
everything,thisone takes the 'to' clause to be inapplicableto equality
claims involving the form.
There is a purely textual objection to this interepretation.If
Plato's claim is merely that the relational dative qualifier makes
equality claims qualified, then why does he bother to say in (1),
that sensible things seem not to be equal to some things? The crux
after all is not (on this interpretation)that sensible equals are at
the same time unequal but that theirequality is a qualified equality
and, presumably, that this distinguishes them in a relevant
epistemological and ontological respect from the form of equality.
So to say that sensible equals are all unequal to somethingor other
is otiose.' On the other hand, the crucial point, namely that equality is equal but not to anything,goes unsaid in (2)-for there Plato
speaks only about the non-inequality of equality.
Telling though it is, this textual objection is fussy when advanced against an interpretationthat attributescomplete gibberish
to Plato. What is it to be equal but not equal to anything?G.E.L.
Owen calls this "the extremeof the Greek mistreatment
of "relative"
termsin the attemptto assimilate them to simple adjectives" ([11]:
310). It is my view that this remark rests on a fundamental
misunderstanding of what a relative is in Greek philosophy, but
I cannot go into this here.8 For my present purposes it will suffice
to point out that the fact that 'small' and 'large' are simple adjectives does not prevent Plato fromtreatingthem as a relatives later
in the Phaedo: that is, when he points out that Socrates may have
smallnesswithrespectto (pros)Simmias' largeness(102 c). Whatever
confusionshis understandingof relativesmay incorporate,therefore,
it seems unlikely that their source is just the surface grammar of
simple versuscomparative adjectival expressions.
In any case the claim that a is equal to b is not necessarily
made in those words. Put in this way the claim admittedlyhas some
potential to confuse-a seems to be the ontological subject of 'a
is equal to b' and it may be a problem to account for the role of
b in evaluatingthe truthof the sentence. However, thereis, in Greek
as in English, another way to make the same claim: 'a and b are
equals.' In this sentence equality is attributedto a pair of things
without any qualifying phrase. There is no reason in the text not
to take Plato as having had the latter form of words in mind.9 If
we so take him then we should have 'equal' characterizing pairs,
whethersensible or not. There would then be no need for qualifying phrases to indicate a second relatum, and some otherinterpretation would have to be given to the qualifiers in (1) and (2), above.

PLATO'S PHAEDO

285
IV

Another line of interpretationis to take (1) as attributingto equal

stones the property of seeming to be equal to some people, and
seeming at the same time to be unequal to others. Whereas the
interpretationswe discussed in section III take 'seems' to govern
the whole sentence(and then ignoreit as rhetorical),here the 'seems'
is incorporatedinto the propertybeing attributedto sensible equals.
Thus on this account it is the variability of people's epistemic attitudes to sensible equals, and the invariabilityof their attitudes
to the-equal-itself,that establishes the distinctnessof the one from
the other.
This is, I think, a plausible rendering of the argument, and
my own is a variationof it. However, it faces some grave difficulties.
In the firstplace, is it fair to say that it is a propertyof sensible
equals that they seem to some to be unequal? 'Seems' is, afterall,
a psychological verb and because of this it might be thought that
it does not followfromits seeming to me that a is F, that a is such
as to seem to me to be F. But of course it is the latter that is required for (3). Moreover, it is hard to see why people's epistemic
attitudestoward the formsshould be invariable-if they can make
mistakes about sensibles why can theynot do so about the forms?'0
I shall return to this problem presentlyin the context of my
own interpretationof Plato's argument, which also must circumvent the apparent psychologicalnature of 'seems.' But even shunting this difficulty
to one side, the standard interpretationof the conclusion is stillthreatened.The difficulty
now is: what is the relevance
of (2) to the conclusion so interpreted?
If (1) says that equal stones appear to some but not to others
to be equal, then (if the standard interpretationis right) (2) must
say about equality (i.e. the-equal-itself)that it seems unequal to
nobody. But even reading the 'to you' of (2) to referto people in
general (and not to Simmias in particular), as seems fair, neither
of the two clauses of (2) asserts what is required. In the firstclause
it is the subject that is wrong-in that clause it is the-equalsthemselves that are said never to seem unequal, not equality nor
the-equal-itself.And in the second clause the predicate is wrongequality, the second clause says, does not seem to be inequality.
Non-identitywith inequality is, it would seem, differentfrombeing
unequal. (More on this in a moment).
As I said earlier, thereis anotherproblem as well with(2)-why
exactlydoes it have two clauses? Why does Plato firstsay something
about the-equals-themselves,then something about equality? This
problem is particularlyacute forthe standard interpretationbecause

286

NOUS

by its lightsPlato should be saying somethingonly about equality.

What then are the-equals-themselvesand of what relevance are they
here?
are the-equalGeach [7] has proposed that the-equals-themselves
itself,and has attempted to make the second clause of (2) out to
be a restatementof the firstclause. Now this sounds totallyabsurd
at firstblush-how can a plurality,the-equals-themselves,be identical with a single entity? But Geach has an answer to this. He
has suggestedthat formsare the paradigmatic bearers of properties,
and are not, as such, properties. Thus equality will be a
paradigmatically equal pair of things-not a single item such as a
property.If this is so, then it may sometimes be permissibleto use
the plural form to referto this pair (that is, when concentrating
on the fact that it has two members) and sometimes permissible
to use the singular(when emphasizing its unity). Even so, we might
wonder how it could be appropriate to use both the singular and
the plural within the compass of so short a sentence.
But let us waive thisobjection and accept Geach's proposal concerning the firsthalf of (2) (which I shall now divide into its two
clauses, (2a) and (2b)). Then, putting aside the problem concerning the intensionalityof 'seems,' we have least a valid argument
for the standardly interpretedconclusion, (3s):
Equal sticksand stonessometimesseem equal [to] some, but
not [to] others.
(i.e. equality)neverseem to you (nor
(2a) The-equals-themselves
to anybodyelse) to be unequal.
(3s) Therefore,equal sticks and stones are not identical with
equality.

(1)

But now what are we to make of the second half of (2):

(2b) Equalityneverseemsto be inequality?
Geach's claim is thatit restates(2a). But does it? Recall thataccording to the standard interpretationthe conclusion of the argument
is supposed to distinguishthe (sensible) bearers of a propertyfrom
the form of that property. Thus according to the standard interpretation something,x, could be non-identicalwith the formeven
though x had the propertyF. (Indeed, this would be the most common case.> But if so, then (substituting'equality' for 'x' and 'inequality' for 'F') to say that something seems not to be (identical
with) inequality is not tantamount to saying that it seems not to
be unequal! And of course if (2b) restates(2a) it ought to say that
equality does not seem unequal.
So even giving Geach his point about the-equals-themselveshe
leaves unexplainedly idle an assertion that seems to be part of the

PLATO'S PHAEDO

287

argument. I thereforeconclude that on the standard interpretation,

either (1) and (2) are irrelevantto the conclusion, or (2) contains
an inexplicable clause."
V

In the light of these difficultieslet us re-examine the question of

what Plato's conclusion is. I shall seek to show that the standard
interpretation makes it irrelevant to what Plato is trying to
accomplish.
In the firstplace, why should Plato want to argue that a number
of distinctpairs of sticks,stones, etc., are not all identical with theequal-itself? Even if, as Geach says, equality is not a single thing
but a pair, it is still one pair and a number of distinct pairs of
sticksand stones cannot all be identical with one pair. Why should
Plato have to cite (1) and (2) in supportof this truthof logic? (Some
commentators,e.g. Mills ([9]: 128), have taken (3) to say thatequality is not identical with any of the sensible pairs. But notice that
Plato quite clearly states that "those equals" are non-identicalwith
equality, not that no one of them is. It is a virtue of the interpretation I shall propose in section VI that it does not require any such
reading of quantifiers into the conclusion.)
Secondly, and much more importantly,we must recall that the
thesistowardswhich Plato is workingis that equality is non-sensible
and hence knowable only by non-sensible means, namely recollection. Now it is generallysupposed, I think,that our argumentcontributesto this grand scheme by demonstratinga certain form of
nominalismto be mistaken-namely, the thesisthat thereis nothing
aside fromthe concrete, sensible bearers of propertiesand, in particular,no propertiesin addition to theirbearers and hence no forms
correspondingto these. But if, as the standard interpretationwould
have it, the point of our argumentis to refutethisformof nominalism
by establishingthat propertiesare distinctfromtheir bearers, how
would this achieve Plato's goal? For afterall why should these properties not be, distinctthough they are from their sensible bearers,
neverthelesssensible properties,and hence known by sense perception? Where is the argument that refutes this possibility?
The point that I am trying to make can be summarized as
follows. Let us distinguish between two theses:
(A) The formsare non-identicalwiththeirsensibleinstances.
(B) The forms are super-sensible(and are knowable only by
recollection).
(B) entails (A) but not vice-versa. There are nominalists,forexample Goodman, who would concede that propertiesare not identical

288

NOUS

with any one of their bearers, identifyingthem instead with some

sort of union (a set, fusion or what-have-you) of theirbearers. But
obviously this does not commit these philosophers to (B). Indeed,
they might well insist on denying (B), for they might insist that
a union of sensible things is sensible.
So, forPlato to establish (A) is not enough. As a matterof fact,
it seems clear fromthe textthat his conclusion is strongerthan (A);
for our argument is immediately preceded by the unanimous
acknowledgement of what seems to amount precisely to the nonidentityof instances and forms.
'We say, don't we, thatthereis [a certain]equal-I don't mean
a log to a log, or a stoneto a stone,or anythingelse of thatsort,
are we to
but some further
thingbeyondall those,the-equal-itself:
say, that thereis somethingor nothing?'
'We most certainlyare to say that there is,' said Simmias,
' unquestionably!
'
'And do we know what it is?'
'Certainly.'
'Where did we get knowledgeof it?'
(Phaedo,74a9 - b4, Gallop's translation,
exceptforthewordsin square
brackets)
And then followsour text: having conceded the existence and distinctnessof the equal-itself,which amounts to (A), we go on to provide a clue to the source of our knowledge of equality.
VI
There is another way to take (3), the conclusion of Plato's argument. The Greek constructionneuter definitearticle + adjective
is ambiguous. It can be used eitherto make referenceto the (neuter
gender) bearers of the propertyto which the adjective corresponds,
or to the propertyitself.The standard interpretation
takes the phrase
in the firstway, that is as referringback to the equal sticks and
stones of the preamble (74a-b) and (1). But I propose now to take
it in the second way, namely as referring
to the equalities exemplified
by the equal sticks and stones mentioned earlier.
My proposal has an immediateand importantadvantage, namely
that it makes Plato's argument directly relevant to showing that
equality itselfis not a thing knowable by sense-perception. Recall
thatSimmias has just conceded thatin additionto the sensiblebearers
of equality there is equality itself. Socrates asks: 'From where do
we get our knowledgeof it?' An empiricistwould presumablyanswer:
'By seeing it in the sticks and stones.' The opponent Plato has in
mind could well be such an empiricist:he concedes, of course, that

PLATO'S PHAEDO

289

equality is not a pair of sticks,but he maintains that our knowledge

of equality comes from our sense-experience of just such things.
And Plato will tryto refutehim by establishingthat what one sees
exemplifiedin sticksand stonesand othersensiblethingsis not equality itself. This is what my version of (3) says.
There is anotheradvantage as well in my reading. We saw earlier
that Plato says that "those equals" (plural) are not equality itself,
which was puzzling because it seems triviallytrue that the members
of a plurality,could not at all be identical to some one thing. We
now see why this has to be argued. Presumably, Plato's opponent
would say 'those equals' meaning, 'the relationshipsof equality exemplifiedby those things.' Yet he would not be committedto there
being more than one such relationship, since according to him it
is the same relationshipexemplifiedagain and again. I take Plato's
formof words to be addressed to this point of view; it says, in effect, 'Whether or not those equals are one, they are not the same
as equality itself.'
The proposal that immanent characters and/or relations figure
in this argument is not, by itself,new. But Bluck, who suggested
it in [3], claims that theyare the referenceof the phrase 'the-equalsthemselves' in (2), not, as I have it, of 'those equals' in (3). Bluck's
proposal seems to ignore the fact that if, as according to (1), equal
sticks and stones seem to be unequal, then, by the same token,
the relations they exemplifywill seem to be inequalities. (It might
be thought that this inferenceis denied by Plato at Phaedo 102d7
- e2. It would be impossible to deal with this objection without a
full discussion of this text. (For this, see my [8],. esp. section VI
and n. 15.) Thus on Bluck's reading the contrastbetween equal sticks
and the-equals-themselveswill be inapplicable.
It is important, in connection with Bluck's proposal, to emphasize once again the distinctionbetween the kind of arguments
that lead to a two-tierontology of bearers and propertiesfromthe
sortthatlead to the postulationof a thirdlevel of formsabove these.
As we have seen the empiricistcan quite easily concede a two-level
ontology provided he insists that properties are sensible. But, as
we shall see, Plato thinksthat epistemologydemands that there be,
over and above the sensible relations and properties immanent in
things, a furtherlevel of non-sensible forms.'2 Much of the confusion that surrounds this argument in the Phaedo comes from not
seeing clearly enough that properties do not have to be regarded
as abstract, non-sensible and transcendententities. Bluck, for example, seems to put into the transcendentalrealm everythingaside
fromthe bearers of properties: his only argument ([3]: 7) for supposing that immanentrelationsare not both equal and unequal rests

NOUS

290

on pointingout that theyare distinctfromthe sticks,etc., in which

they reside.
VII

I shall attemptnow to reconstructPlato's argument with this new

conclusion in mind, leaving textual questions to the next section.
First, what does (1) say? For illumination on this, I turn to
Aristotle's 'On Ideas.' (See [12]: 124-5.) In giving a version of the
Phaedoargument,Aristotlethereclaims that sensiblethingsare never
reallyequal, since theyfluctuatecontinuallyin size and are (hence?)
indeterminate. But if this is so, why are they called 'equal'? It is
clear firstof all that they are not so-called by mere homonymyor
simple falsification-a carpenter, for instance, may use the
geometricalpropertiesof really equal things in reasoning about his
not reallyequal planks. For thisreason (Aristotlesays) Plato thought
that the 'things in this world' are called 'equal' because they are
"likenesses" (eikona) of "something equal-itself and strictlyso."
The match of Aristotle's argument to Plato's is not exact. For
it is not as clear fromPlato's text as fromAristotle's that the problem is semantic,that is, involvingthe application of a termto things
in the world. However, it is not an essential feature of Aristotle's
exposition that this be so-we mightsay that the problem forPlato
is simply how thingsnot exactly equal can be equals (i.e. how they
approximatelysatisfythe laws real equals conformto) and how they
can be recognized as equals. The answer to both these questions
would be: because of their resemblance to real equals.
It is timenow to considerwhyPlato uses 'seems' in his premisses.
Resemblance is a matterof degree. To a certain person using certain standards for certain purposes a pair of sensible things might
resemble a really equal pair of things closely enough to count as
being equal. But since this pair of thingsis sensible, it is not really
equal, and consequently there would be other stricterstandards of
judgment according to which the same pair fail to be equal. Really
equal things on the other hand are equal regardless of the standards used. Thus forpeople in a certain situation a pair of sensible
things might be equals-they might seem to some people to be
equal-but to others not. And in this they are differentfromreally
equal things.
Now note that this variability is not a question of how things
lookto differentpeople. Since the variabilitystems not fromdiffering appearances but fromthe differenttolerances used by different
people in to measuring equality in differentcontexts,the fact that
stems froman objective fact-for examtheyare treateddifferently
ple, that theyare within so many percentof being equal. (Consider

PLATO'S PHAEDO

291

the relevant relationshipexemplifiedby a car travellingat 58 mph

and a patrol car travellingat 55 mph. Without disagreeing about
actual speeds, the driverof the formermay disagree with the driver
of the latterconcerningthe equalityof the two speeds. This is because
according to the former-but not the latter-equality within ten
percent counts from the point of view of punishabilityas not exceeding the speed limit. This shows that the relationshipexemplified
by the two cars is not absolute equality. If it were no such disagreement could be relevant to whetherthe speeds are equal.) If we take
(1) as expressing this objective variability,there is no need to treat
the 'seems' in it as a psychological verb.
Given these interpretationsof (1) and (3) what is Plato's argument? Notice firstthat though the conclusion of the argument says
something about the relations of equality exemplified in sensible
things,the firstpremiss says, even on my interpretation,something
about equal sticks and stones:
(1) Equal sticksand stonessometimesseem equal [to] some, but
not [to] others.
I propose thereforeto add an unspoken lemma to the argument,
which logically follows from (1):
(lb) The relationsexemplifiedin sensibleequals sometimesseem
to some to be equality,and to othersnot to be equality.
where 'seeming to be equality' is a propertyof immanent relations
equivalent to 'approximates to equality within the tolerance prescribed by the standards now being used.'
But things that are really equal are by no standards whatever
unequal. So we have, parallel to (lb):
by real(i.e., the relationsexemplified
(2a) The-equals-themselves
ly equal things)never seem to you (nor to anybodyelse) to
be unequals.
And since the relations exemplifiedin really equal things are none
other than Equality itself(a perfectimmanent character is theform,
Parmenides134clO-11), we infer:
(2b) Equality (itself)does not ever seem to you (nor to anybody
else) to be (an) inequality.
(3), as I have interpretedit, followsfrom(lb) and (2b). (This
requires the principle (i) that if a and b seem not to be equal, they
seem to be unequal and (ii) that if a and b seem unequal then,
and only then, the relation theyexemplify,seems to be inequality.)
My interpretationof Plato's argument has certain advantages
over the others we have considered. First, it explains the "repeti-

292

NOUS

tion" in (2) as in fact making a move froma claim about the relations immanent in really equal things to a claim about Equality
itself. Secondly, the argument is valid, for, given my contention
that (3) concerns relations, not sticks and stones, it follows from
(lb) and (2b). Finally, we have Aristotle's word for it that Plato
believed (1).
VIII
Let us now look more closely at Plato's text to discover whether
it will bear this interpretation.
First, let us examine my interpretationof 'seems.' At 74b 7-9,
Plato writes:
to(i)
tautaontato(i)menisaphainetai,
Ar' ou lithoimenisoikaixulaeniote
de ou.
I have rendered this question (in slightlyshortened form) by the
indicative
(1) Equal sticksand stonessometimesseem equal [to] some, but
not [to] others.
My line of reasoning gives us two choices with the datives I have
rendered as '[to].' First, they can be taken as the "dative of standards ofjudgment." (See [13]: 347, fora descriptionand examples
of this use of the dative.) Then, taking 'seems' as a rhetorical
equivalent for 'it is the case,' governing the whole sentence, we
might render (1) directlyin the form: 'It seems that equal sticks
and stones are equal according to some standards, but not according to others.'
But there are objections to this. First, even though there are
parallels for this use of the dative (see [13]: 347), the translation
might seem a little contrived. Secondly, the word 'soi' ('[to] you')
in (2) (at 74cl) mightbe regarded as parallel to the above datives.
If so, then because 'soi' is personal we might be forced to read the
earlier datives as '. . . to some people but not to others.'
In view of these facts it may be prudent not to insist on this
convenient short-cutto my interpretation,and to go instead with
the reading 'seem equal to some people, but not to others.' But
we should take into account that while in English the 'to' in 'seems
to me' can be interpretedonly as connectingthejudgment governed
by 'seems' to my psychological state, the Greek dative expresses
nothing so definite:it is used simply to express some relevant connection or other. Thus 'seems [to] me' can quite well mean 'seems
given my interests,' 'seems in my situation,' etc., and these locutions are in my view quite liberal enough to support the interpreta-

PLATO'S

293

PHAEDO

tion I want. I shall thereforetake Plato as expressinghimselfrather

vaguely on the point, and take Aristotle's exposition as giving him
a precise and cogent thought.
So much, then, for (1). A second textual point concerns:
by really
(2a) The-equals-themselves
(i.e. the relationsexemplified
equal things)never seem to you (nor to anybodyelse) to be
unequals.
There has been some discussion in the literatureof what these
really equal things might be: it has been suggested, for example,
that they might be the sides of an isosceles triangle, or some such
pair of ideal geometrical or arithemetical equals.
I do not think that this discussion is relevant; Plato is not, in
my view, committedto the existence of any pair of thingsthat are
really equal. In the firstplace, he is not committedto the existence
of real equals by the existence of equality itself.And secondly the
mere use of the words 'the-equals-themselves'does not so commit
him either. For they can naturally be read as containing a suppressed quantifier as in
The holdersof Series E bonds are entitledto. ...
which does not presuppose the existence of any such. Parallel to
this, I read (2a) as containing a suppressed universal quantifier,
and this makes it equivalent to
(2a*) No relationsexemplifiedin really equal thingsseem to be
unequals.

IX
I have said that my interpretationis advanced conditionally,subject to the plausibilityof treatingimmanent charactersor relations
as participants in forms. I say this for two reasons.
First, it can be argued that the whole context of the argument
we have been dealing with is of a dichotomy of participants and
forms, and that there is thereforeno question of a dichotomy in
this shortpassage alone of relations (taken as nonparticipants)and
forms. I think this is correct. Accordingly I hope that these relations can be regarded also as participants.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly,the account that I
have given of the relationshipof sensible equalities to equality itself
is approximation or resemblance. Clearly Plato does sometimes
regard the participation relation in this way. Therefore my interpretationsuggests(if not implies) that sensible equalities participate
in equality itself.

NOUS

294

Taking resemblance to an ideal to the central notion of participation in a form, Geach [7] has suggested that the forms are
paradigms, not properties. Thus he claims that equality is a pair
of paradigmatically equal things, and not the relation, equality. I
find appealing Geach's claim that resemblance is central to participation. However, it seems unacceptable to take the form of F
to be the bearer par excellence
of F; for it seems that in many places
Plato characterizes the relation of the bearers of F to the form of
F-ness as somethinglike predication, and of course the relation between an F and a paradigm of F is not that the formersatisfies
the latter.
I have advanced enables us to accept Geach's
The interpretation
notion of formsas paradigms withoutdenyingthat theyare properties or relations. Equality itself, for example, turns out to be a
paradigm not of the bearers of equality, but of the equality relations immanent in sensible things. The Platonic position as I would
see it then, is that the form of F is the propertythat would make
something a paradigm F (cf. Parmenides134cl0-1 1). An immanent
character would then be an F if it approximated to the form of
F. And an individual thing would be F if it contains an F. (Cf.
Timaeus5Oc6ff.;immanentcharactersin the receptacleare the copies
of the Form, not the receptacle itself.)
A paradigm of this sort does not, admittedly,give support to
Plato's Self-Predicationaxiom, at least not as it is usually taken.
Geach has pointed out that if Equality were a pair of things equal
then we could interpretliterallya statementthat Plato
par excellence
is committedto, namely that equality is equal. On my account this
is not so. Since 'equal' turns out to characterize a pair of things
it would not make sense to say that equality (a single thing)is equal,
period. However, equality is an equal, that is, it is an equality.
Recall that relations are equalities if they resemble the-equal-itself.
and so it is an equality.
The-equal-itselfdoes resemblethe-equal-itself,
Now, Greek plays fast and loose with indefinitearticles-in fact
it does not have one; the indefinitepronoun 'tis' is sometimes, but
not always, used instead. So thoughmy interpretationdoes not support 'Equality is equal' as it is usually taken, it does support a form
of those words. And it is possible to speculate that at least in the
case of monadic forms this form of words, 'Justice is (a) just' for
example, might have been confused for self-predicationproper.
X
Let us in conclusion examine brieflythe plausibilityof Plato's argument. Ignoring immanentrelations,the argumentI have attributed
to Plato can be cast into the following simplifiedform.

PLATO'S PHAEDO

295

(4) (x)(y) (If x and y are sensible,thenx and y are notreallyequal.)

(5) (x)(y) (If x and y are relataof equalityitself,thenx and y are
reallyequal.)
(6) Therefore,(x)(y) (If x and y are sensiblethenx and y are not
relata of equalityitself.)
This is a valid argument, and its conclusion is now available to
be used in orderto establishthe epistemologicalconclusionthatsenseexperience does not furnishus with our knowledge of equality itself.
Is the argument sound? We have seen that Aristotleattempts
to justify (4) and that he attributesit to the Platonists in his 'On
Ideas.' All the same, it is not immediately plausible. Why should
there not be, among sensible things, a pair of real equals?
This response is not strong enough against Plato's argument.
Since (5) above is a logical truth('equality itself' is a name of the
relation expressed by 'really equal'), we can strengthenit to
(7) (x)(y) Nec. (If x and y are relataof equalityitself,thenx and
y are reallyequal.)
where 'Nec.p' stands for 'It is incompatible with what we know
that p is false,' or in other words, for epistemological necessity.
From (7) we can derive, by the "rule of necessitation,"
(8) (x)(y) (If Nec. x and y are relata of equalityitself,then Nec.
x and y are reallyequal.)
Now it is possible to weaken (4). Let us grant thereforethat
there is somewhere a pair of sensible things that are really equal.
But let us suppose that neverthelessour senses can judge equality
only to some degree of accuracy short of exactitude. Suppose also
that, as the empiricist claims, perceptual knowledge exhausts our
knowledge of this pair of sensible things. It followsthat it is compatible with what we know that even this pair of equals is not really
equal. Thus:
(9) (x)(y) (If x and y are sensiblethennot Nec. x and y are really
equal.)
From (8) and (9) it follows that:
(1O)(x)(y) (If x and y are sensiblethennot Nec. x and y are relata
of equalityitself.)
But if it is compatible with what we know (sensibly) about sensible
things that they are not relata of equality itselfthen it is plausible
that our knowledge of equality itselfis not derived fromour (sensible) knowledge of these things.
It can be argued that this too is unsound. For where x and

296

NOUS

y are identical, and we know this, (9) seems false, even if the thing
in question is sensible. Perhaps this objection too can be met. But
this would be another argument."
REFERENCES
' ThePhilosophical
'Plato'sPhaedo,
ReviewLXVII (1958):
[1] J.L. Ackrill,ReviewofHackforth,
106-8.
[2] J.L. Ackrill,'Anamnesis
in thePhaedo:Remarkson 73 c - 75 c,' in Exegesis
andArgument,
Lee et. al. (eds.) (Assen, 1973): 177-195.
[3] R.S. Bluck, 'Plato's Form of Equal,' Phronesis
4 (1959): 5-11.
[4] H.-N. Castafieda,'Plato's PhaedoTheoryof Relations,'JournalofPhilosophical
Logic1
(1972): 467-480.
[5] Gail Fine, 'The One Over theMany,' ThePhilosophical
LXXXIX (1980): 197-240.
Review
[6] David Gallop, Plato,Phaedo(Oxford, 1975).
[7] P.T. Geach, 'The Third Man Again,' in R.E. Allen (ed.), Studiesin Plato'sMetaphysics
(London, 1965): 265-278.
[8] Mohan Matthen,'Plato's Treatmentof RelationalStatementsin thePhaedo,
'Phronesis
27 (1982).
3 (1958): 128-147,and 4 (1959): 40-57.
[91 K.W. Mills, 'Plato's Phaedo,74 b7 - c6' Phronesis
[10] N.R. Murphy, The Interpretation
of Plato'sRepublic(Oxford, 1951).
[11] G. E.L. Owen, 'A Proofin thePeriIdeon,'in R.E. Allen(ed.), Studies
inPlato'sMetaphysics
(London, 1965): 293-312.
Selecta(Oxford, 1955).
Fragmenta
[12] W.D. Ross, Aristotelis:
[13] H.W. Smyth,GreekGrammar
(Cambridge, Mass, 1956).
[14] GregoryVlastos,'DegreesofRealityin Plato,' in Platonic
Studies
(Princeton,1973): 58-75.
(1977):
[15] Michael V. Wedin, 'Autata Isa and theArgumentat Phaedo74b7-c5,'Phronesis
191-205.
[16] Nicholas P. White, Platoon Knowledge
and Reality(Indianapolis, 1976).

NOTES
'As willbecomeapparentlater,I actuallytaketheformsto be identicalwithproperties
or relations.But fornow I use the more neutral'correspondingto these properties.'
2Manyof thepointsrelevantto (a) and (b) are familiar;so I shallbe brief,rehearsing
only argumentsto whichI can contributesomething.For a more comprehensive
review,
see Mills [9], and Gallop [6].
3The suggestionthatPlato's problemarises fromthe factthatin 'x is equal to y and
unequal to z,' 'x' is the grammaticalsubjectboth of 'equal' and 'unequal' originates,I
believe,withMurphy([10]: 111 n. 1). It has since been endorsedby Owen ([1 1]: 310) and
White ([16]: 67).
4The statementthatx is both equal and unequal is not, Plato thinks,contradictory,
but the statementthatit is bothequal and unequal to the same thingin the same respect
is. For thisand similarreasonsPlato thinksthatthe Law of Non-Contradiction
shouldbe
statednotsimplyas prohibiting
a thingfrombeingF and non-F,but in thisqualifiedform"The same thingwill neverdo or sufferoppositesin thesamerespect,
in relation
to thesame
thingand at thesametime"(Republic436 b). However,he thinks(Republic475 - the end of
Book V) thatformssatisfythe stricter(i.e. unqualified)formof the law. Because sensible
thingsdo not satisfythe stricter
law, he refersto themas thingswhich"both are and are
not." A fullerdiscussionof thiswill be foundin Vlastos [14] and Matthen[8].
5It has been thoughtthatMurphywas committedto thisview - see forexampleMills
([9]: 129). But in viewof itsimmediateabsurdconsequences(not noticedby Mills) it would
be betternot to attributeit to anybody.
6This is Owen's interpretation
in [11] and White's in [16].
70f courseone mightholdthataccordingto Plato thesensibleclaimis qualifiedbecause
sensibleequals are unequal, and not viceversa.If one held this,thenthe relevanceof the
claim thatsensibleequals are all unequal would be to showthattheirequalityis qualified.
But thenone would have to show, independently
of the qualification,whysensibleequals

297

PLATO'S PHAEDO

are also unequal. My interpretation

(sectionVII) attemptsto do this. The interpretation
that is being discussed,on the otherhand, has Plato's claim to be thatthe simultaneous
equalityand inequalityof sensiblethingsis a resultoftheirbeingequal to somebut unequal
to others.
of Plato's theoryof relational
"For a thoroughdiscussion,and for interpretations
statements,see Castafieda[41and Matthen[8].
9For a more detailed treatmentof this point, see Matthen[8].
'0Ackrilldiscusseswell the ramifications
of these points,see [11 and J2J.
"For more on why Geach's interpretation
will not do, see Wedin ([15]: 193-6).
"2Thiscomes out clearlyin [5]. Fine arguesin thisarticlethatthe existenceof a one
over the manyis establishedsemantically
but thatit takesotherconsiderations
to establish
that the formsare transcendent.
l3I am gratefulto Jonathan Barnes, Myles Burnyeat,Jim Dybikowski.and two
anonymousreadersforNoilsfordetailedwritten
commentson an earlierversionofthispaper.

AUSTRALASIANJOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY

SPECIAL ISSUE
ON
WOMENANDPHILOSOPHY
EDITOR: BRIANEL-LIS
THOMPSON
CONSULTINGEDITOR: JANNA

Papersareinvited:
* Has maledominancein philosophy
factorin its
beenan important
history?
the
* Have assumptions
affected
aboutwomen,or sex differences,
developmentof philosophicaltheories- e.g. in ethics,political
orepistemology?
ontology
philosophy,
* Have philosophicaltheoriesor standardsof rationality
been
oracting?
influenced
waysofthinking
byassociationwithmasculine
* Are womendisadvantaged
in philosophy?
If so how?Why?What
shouldbe doneaboutit?
Papers on more general issues concerningwomen will also be
considered.
Papers shouldbeinthestyleand formatoftheJournal(see anyrecentissue
for details) and sent to the Editor, AustralasianJournalof Philosophy,
Bundoora, Victoria,
Department of Philosophy,La Trobe University,
1983, Australianotlaterthan31 December1984.~

issue.
theplanned
toproceed
with
willbemadeearlyin1985whether
A decision
issuewillautomatically
forthis
Ifitisdecided
nottogoahead,papers
submitted
innormal
forpublication
be considered
issues,unlessmarked
'SpecialIssue
Only'.