Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean Edited by: Lorans Tanatar Baruh and Vangelis Kechriotis ® ALPHA BANK Historical Archives Athens 2010Ecumenical Ideology in the Orthodox Millet (19th-20th Century) Dimitris Stamatopoulos The call to ecumenicity by the Christian religion constituted the predominant ideology around which the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople operated from as early as its founding at the beginning of the Byzantine Empire.! The Christian ekumene was the natural, indivisible realm of ideological influence maintained by the Patriarchate until the end of the Empire; the schism with the West and Rome did, however, result in the identification of its dominion as being within the territory of the Orthodox Christian East.? The arrival of the Otomans in. 1 The formation of the high-ranked ecclesiastical position of Constantinople as the spiritual centre of the Christian ecumene took place at a very rapid pace. There is no mention of the Throne of Constantinople during the 1st Ecumenical Synod in 325 AD although the transfer of the capital had already been decided in 324. During the approximate fifty-year period between the Ist and 2nd Ecumenical Synod (325-381 AD), Constantinople evolves into a leading Church. The 2nd Ecumenical Synod regulated the entrenched in practice, primary position of the Church of Constantinople, designating in its 3rd canon that ‘the Bishop of Constantinople, however, shall have the prerogative of honour after the Bishop of Rome; because Constantinople is New Rome’, see for this issue among others, Deno John Geanakoplos, A Short History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, 330-1990. ‘First among Equals’ in the Eastern Orthodox Church, Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1990. 2 Sir Steven Runciman, The Eastern Schism. A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches during the XIth and XIlth Centuries, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971; Deno John Geanakoplos, Byzantine East and Latin West. Two Worlds of Christendom in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Oxford: Blackwell, 1966; Philip Sherrard, The Greek East and the Latin West. A Study in the Christian Tradition, Limini, Greece: D. Harvey, 1992.202 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN the Balkans modified the terms on which the Patriarchate operated, though without forcing it to betray its fundamental right to invoke ecumenicity.> In reality, ecumenicity corresponds to an imperial state scheme, and we might say that it constitutes the cultural distilment on the basis of which the Empire comprehends its relation with space and time. The Christian ecumene offers the connecting link between linguistically and ethnically distinct populations, completing the work of controlling the periphery from the centre. This political and cultural function, as it manifested itself historically, was absolutely necessary within the Ottoman Empire as well. In the only case where the Patriarchate of Constantinople’s prestigious position within the Christian ecumene was in doubt, the threat was no longer the Catholic and Protestant West — which had followed a different historical course — but rather Russia. The ideology of the Third Rome which accompanied the transfer of the Russian Empire's centre of gravity from Kiev to Moscow (from 13th to 15th c.) became a question of recognition not simply of its ecclesiastical independence but of the necessity for a new Patriarch in Russia, who would represent the millions of Orthodox living to the north. Therefore, the effort to achieve a balance in relations between the two Orthodox worlds and the only way for the Orthodox ecumene to continue to be seen as unitary was to confirm the Patriarchate as having the sole right to grant (ecclesiastical) autonomy or independence.* And 3 Paschalis Kitromilidis, ‘An6é my 090650En xowonoditela otis eBvixEés XOL- vomres. To ohms meQuexspevo toy ehknvoowomdy mvevpiortindy oXédEwV nord my Tovgxoxgatta’ [From the Orthodox Commonwealth to the National Communities. The Political Content of the Greek-Russian Spiritual Relations during the Ottoman Occupation], in idem (ed.), Xia yodvia EAviquos-Paotas [Hellas-Russia: One Thousand Years of Bonds] , Athens: Gnosis, 1994, pp. 139-65, included also in Paschalis Kitromilidis, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy. ‘Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-Eastern Europe, Aldershot- Brookfield: Variorum, 1994. 4 The Patriarchate of Constantinople in fact recognised the elevation of the Metropolis of Moscow to the status of Patriarchate during the Patriarchy: ofJeremiah II Tranos (1589) but assigned it the fifth place in the hierarchy so that it came afterECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 203 from the moment the Patriarchate remained the highest authority from. which any new (Orthodox) ecclesiastical organisation drew its legitimacy, the principle of ecumenicity could theoretically be preserved. The Patriarchate’s motivation for coming to an agreement with new ecclesiastical organisations, chiefly autocephalous churches like those which emerged during the nineteenth century as a consequence of national revolutions in the Balkans, was self-preservation. In fact, the crisis in relations with the autocephalous Greek Church ended in 1850 with the call for recognition by the latter,> while the plans proposed for a resolution to the Bulgarian ecclesiastical question were based on the establishment of an ‘Exarchate’, an ecclesiastical organisation which would function in a relation of dependency on the Patriarchate. During the nineteenth century, the national revolutions of the Greeks and the Serbs as well as the ongoing nationalist movements among Romanians, Bulgarians and Albanians created the prerequisites for a fragmentation of the unitary Orthodox ecumene represented by the Patriarchate within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. The cleavages in the Orthodox ecumene corresponded to a splintering of unity within the Orthodox millet. Thus, it was logical that the religious problem involving the relationship of the Patriarchate with new churches corresponded to another acute political problem: the dilemma of whether or not to preserve the Ottoman Empire itself, since Orthodox populations formed the overwhelming majority of non-Muslims in the Empire’s European territories. This dramatic period (essentially, all of the ‘long’ nineteenth century) coincided with the need for individual subjects and social groupings to confront the question of whether to form nation-states or preserve old imperials schemes, sometimes as if the latter were entirely not only Constantinople but also the ancient Orthodox Patriarchates of Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Antioch. See among others, Vasil T. Istavridis, Prerogatives of the Byzantine Patriarchate in Relation with the Other Oriental Patriarchates, Roma: ‘Tipografia P.U.G., 1968. 5 Charles A. Frazee, Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-1852, London-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.204 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN compatible with the principle of nationalities. Interestingly, this era also provided a chance for Greek historiography to escape from the nationalist stereotypes within which it had matured.® Historiographic issues If we wish to understand today’s discussion concerning the problem of ecumenicity, then we need to make a brief reference to three phases of development in Greek historiography vis-d-vis this problem. The first phase extended roughly until the mid-twentieth century and was dominated by a scheme of continuity between Ancient Greece and Modern Hellenism. In it, the Patriarchate, or the Great Church as it is usually referred to, constitutes the cradle for the survival of the genos in the difficult years of Turkish domination.’ To demonstrate this, the scheme presupposes one basic assumption, namely that Byzantium had been Hellenised.® Byzantium, as an intermediary link connecting the glorious civilisation of ancient Greece with the relatively impoverished Moder Greek reality, had to be interpreted as a phase in the development of Greek culture, and naturally not as a version of a multi- ethnic empire in which the Roman element remained powerful until its 6 Dimitris Stamatopoulos, Meragov@uoy xat Exxooptxevon. Hgos pia ava- ovvbeon mms totoplas tov Otxovuevors Hargiagyetov tov 190 aucva [Reform and Secularization. Towards a Reconstruction of the History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 19th Century], Athens: Alexandria, 2003, pp. 21-4. 7 loannis Chassiotis, Axé ty «avdgqwon» omy «avazceguyiaow» tov Té vous, H op8ddoen exninata nau n diaydopwon tys veoedapruzafe molucieafc wEO- Joylas xatd tay tovexoxeariay [From the ‘Recovery’ to the ‘Revival’ of the Genos. The Orthodox Church and the Configuration of the Modern Greek Political Ideology during the Ottoman Occupation], Thessaloniki: Aristotle University, 1999. 8 Some critical observations on this issue in Paschalis Kitromilidis, ‘On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Papartigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea’ , in David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds), Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity, London-Aldershot-Brookfield-Singapore-Sydney: Centre for Hellenic Studies, King’s College, 1998, pp. 25-33.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 205 end. From the moment that Byzantium was Hellenised, the Patriarchate as the natural inheritor of the Christian dimension in the Ottoman Empire, could not but constitute the official political representative to the Porte of the Orthodox, but basically Greek, populations. The second wave of Modem Greek historiography, which, we could say, began as early as the 1960s and ended in the 1980s, attempted to offer a critique of the previous paradigm. The starting-point of this critique in the 1960s was connected to a revisionist look at the fundamental problem. of ethnonyms: is it the same thing to be Greek as it is to be Romios, or Graecus (Graikos)? In .other words, this tendency attempted to deconstruct the dominant paradigm, recalling the related discussion which had taken place within the framework of what has been described by the same historians as ‘Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment’? during which it became clear that the choice of the terms Hellinas or Graikos (by the renown scholar Adamantios Korais!® (1748-1833) simultaneously meant the rejection of the medieval link — that of Byzantium —and a return to the sources of ancient Greek civilisation and consequently, direct recognition on the part of the West. On the other hand, the choice of Romios implied a decision to preserve the Empire since it called to mind the rejection of Hellenicity/Hellenism on the part of Christianity as being directly connected with idolatry and paganism; indeed, during the Byzantine times, Hellinas meant ‘idolater’. The original critiques were chiefly the works of philologists or historians concerned with the history of ideas, such as Ioannis Kakridis! or K.Th. Dimaras.!2 9 The term was introduced by Konstantinos Dimaras in 1945. 10 Adamantios Korais, Aiddoyos 5:0 Toarxdy: Th ovupéget eis rv ehevOequ- Hérqy and Tovoxovs Eldéa va medén e1¢ tas magovous neguotdoeis, 614 va un dovko6y e1s youotiavors rovexiCovrac [A Dialogue between Two Greeks: What is in Liberated from Turks Greece's Interest to Do in Order Not to Be Subjugated to the Turkified Christians] , Paris: Ek tis typografias K. Everatou, 1830-1831. 11 Ioannis Kakridis, Or agyalor “ElAnves orm veoediaviraj xagddooy [The Ancient Greeks in Modern Greek Tradition], 3rd edition, Athens: MIET, 1989, (First. published in German as Die alien Hellenen im neugriechischen Volksglauben, Mimchen: Heimeran, 1967.) 12 Konstantinos Th. Dimaras, NeoeMnvinds Atapwtiquds (Modern Greek Enlightenment], Athens: Ermis, 1998, pp. 82-6.206 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN ‘After the 1970s, these constructive questions regarding national identity in the Ottoman Empire provided the inspiration for a series of works with the main goal of highlighting the importance of the presence of Greek Orthodox populations which remained within imperial borders. In actuality, the different course followed by these populations and their leadership with respect to national self-definition — often in contrast to the irredentist policies of the national centre — was useful in undermining the older paradigm. The interpretation of an entire historical era was no longer supported by the view that the national centre had imposed but by a bipolar scheme of nation state and empire. The problem of the rise of national consciousness became more complex, both in relation to Ottomanness as well as in relation to the nationalist movements of the rival Balkan states. Constantinople had taken its proper place next to Athens. Expressed in works dealing with specific topics rather than in large synthetic works (here, I recall only the names of Thanos Veremis,!> Evangelos Kofos!* and Paschalis Kitromilidis!), this historiographical tendency reserved a different treatment for the role of the Patriarchate, and Orthodoxy in general, within the framework of the Empire. The Patriarchate is now the successor of the Byzantine Empire!® and precisely for this reason does not represent the Greek nation but instead the Romaiko genos (Rum millet). The meaning of Romios, however, is identified with the designation ‘Orthodox Christian’; in the same fashion, the meaning of Romios is differentiated from that of Greek, while Byzantium is ‘re- 13. Thanos Veremis, ‘The Hellenic Kingdom and the Ottoman Greeks. The Experiment of the “Society of Constantinople’, Bulletin of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 12, 1997-1998, pp. 203-12. 14 Evangelos Kofos, ‘Patriarch Joachim IIL (1878-1884) and the Irredentist Policy of the Greek State’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 4/2, 1986, pp. 107-20. 15 Paschalis Kitromilidis, ““Imagined Communities” and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans’, European History Quarterly, 19/2, 1989, pp. 149-92. 16 By the way this idea also appear in Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos’ work, see Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, lorogla tov elnvixod ébvous and tov aoxatord- rov yodvuv péyot tov veatéoav (History of the Greek Nation from the Ancient Years to the Present], Athens: N.G. Passaris, 1874, vol. 5, p. 510.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 207 Christianised’ so that there is an emphasis on the religious and cultural dimension and not on the national or political. This historiographical tendency reached its zenith at the end of the 1980s with the works of Paschalis Kitromilidis. His 1989 article describes what he calls the ‘antinomy between Orthodoxy and Nationalism’, a contradiction which, in his view, was culminated with the proclamation of the 1872 Schism.!’ Later refinements include the proposal that we understand the role of the Patriarchate and the primary position it occupied within the framework of the ‘Orthodox commonwealth’, here having in mind not only the Orthodox world of the Ottoman Empire but that of the rest of Eastern Europe and, above all, Russia.!® It is obvious that the second as much as the first historiographic tendency was constructed on the basis of an interpretation of the Byzantine past. I will come back to this issue when | examine the ideological matrices from which these historiographic trends emerged. In actuality, the relation of the Modern Greek nation to the Byzantine Middle ages proposed by the intellectuals of the nineteenth century constitutes but a metonymy for negotiating their Ottoman present. Thus, a bipolar historiographic schema has been established: Athens- Constantinople, nationalism-ecumenism and a place of honour for national identity’s dominance over religious identity. The monolithic nationalist paradigm revealed its limitations within a process of its critical deconstruction. The second generation of historians, although not resorting to large historiographic syntheses, laid the groundwork for the development of a third wave of historical works which began to investigate exhaustively the complex relationship between nationalism and self-determination.'9 17 Paschalis Kitromilidis, ““Imagined Communities”...’, op. cit. 18 The term ‘Orthodox Commonwealth’ was naturally inspired by the corresponding term ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ coined by Dimitri Obolensky; see Dimitri Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth. Eastern Europe, 500-1453, London: Phoenix, 2000. 19 Some of these historians have been invited to participate in the ‘Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean’ seminar.208 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN The bipolar schema no longer appears to be sufficient for interpreting such a complex period. However, we could say that critiques of this schema have developed in two directions which are not always compatible. In the first one, there is a tendency to identify the ecumenical ideology of the Patriarchate with a version of Greek nationalist discourse. This is understandable when it is done by representatives of the old historiographic paradigm, those, that is, who identified the Church with the cradle of the nation. But it becomes hard to explain when it concerns a supposedly full fledged critique which draws its radical identity from the arguments of rival nationalist historiographies (here T am. referring basically to those of Bulgaria and Romania). For this tendency, the ecumenical ideology is nothing more than a deception, a latent strategy of Greek nationalism, to take over an empire and to weaken its possible rivals in preparation for its future apportioning or dismemberment.° On the other hand, there is an effort to interpret the phenomenon of ecumenicity within the historical framework of the nineteenth century, that is, within an empire where its chances of survival had not yet been definitively determined. One of the contributions which I will include in this category attempted to understand the discourse of ecumenicity, connecting it with the dominant ideology of the reign of Abdiilhamid, pan-Islamism.”! That being said, the idea that the Christian ekoumene was set up as an intellectual construct to correspond to the Islamic ummah is at the very least challenging and can contribute to a fruitful consideration of the issues involved.”* 20 — See for this issue the similarity of the arguments in Paraskevas Matalas, “E6v0s at opbodokla: o meginéretes mas oféons. Ané 10 «lRadixd» aro Povkyagixd ‘oyéoua. [Nation and Orthodoxy: Adventures of a Relationship. From the ‘Greek’ to the Bulgarian Schism], Herakleio: Crete University Press, 2002; and also in Zina Markova, Balgarskata Ekzarhije, 1870-1879 {The Bulgarian Exarchate, 1870- 1879], Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Balgarska Akademija na naukite, 1989. 21 See for example Sia Anagnostopoulou, ‘The Terms Millet, Génos, Ethnos, Oikoumenikotita, Alytrotismos in Greek Historiography’, in idem, The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States, Istanbul: Isis, 2003, pp. 37-55. 22. Asfaras1 know, for first time this idea was introduced by Elli Skopetea in her excellent article ‘Ou “Edayves xa 01 €xg0f tous. H xardéoraon tov EBvous oSECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 209 In fact, the period from Joachim’s first to his second Patriarchy (1878-84, 1901-1912) is very important for the consolidation of the ecumenical scheme. Of course, his good relations with the Hamidian regime were already established from his first ascent to the Patriarchal throne in 1878.73 It was well-known that Joachim was favoured by Georgios Zarifis, the personal banker of the new Sultan and an important figure in the financial circles of Constantinople at the end of the nineteenth century.* However the recent research has proved the close ties between Zarifis (the spiritual father of Joachim III since the middle of 1850s)?> and Joachim Il (1860-63, 1873-78), Konstantinos Spanoudis, in his now-classic work on Joachim’s second term as a Patriarch, has shown that Leonidas Zarifis, Georgios’s son, continued to offer unalloyed support to Joachim after his father death. From this, one can conclude that the relation between this high cleric and the Zarifis family remained agxés tov 2008 aussvar’ [The Greeks and their Enemies, The Situation of the Nation at the beginning of the 20th Century], in Christos Hadziiossif (ed.), lorooia ts Eladéas tov 2008 aubva. Ot anagyés, 1900-1922 [History of Greece in the 20th Century. The Beginnings, 1900-1922], Athens: Vivliorama, 1999, vol. 1/2, pp. 9- 35. Skopetea comments on the viewpoints of a Greek deputy in the Ottoman parliament in 1910, Charisios Vamvakas, as they were formulated in one of his articles in the journal oducts} Ezti@edgnorc [Political Review], who interestingly pointed out that ‘the Chaliphate and the Patriarchate were the two great powers, which create the “national” balance of our Empire [...] The Chaliphate and the Patriarchate are based on the same precious principles of religious unity, not of the national one’, Elli Skopetea, ibid., p. 25. 23. For example during his second term Joachim (who was the first patriarch, since the adoption of the famous General Regulations, to remain in office for all of eleven years, and indeed until his death), enjoyed the admiration not only of the Greek, Austrian and Russian embassies but of the Hamidian regime itself. Manuel Gedeon, Mveia twv go euov. 1800-1863-1913 [Recollection of Those who Came Before Me, 1800-1863-1913], Athens: Typ. Ta Chronika, 1934, p. 239. 24 Evangelos Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975, p. 20, note 2 and p. 32, note 1. For the issue of the financial support which Zarifis offered to the Hamidian regime, see among others, Murat Hulkiender, Bir Galata Bankerinin Portresi: George Zarifi [A Portrait ofa Galata Banker: George Zarifis], Istanbul: Osmanh Bankast Arsivi and Arastirma Merkezi, 2003, pp. 93-126. 25 Dimitris Stamatopoulos, Meraggvéjuio7..., op. cit., pp. 62-7.210 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN undisturbed.26 Consequently, it seems quite reasonable for someone to emphasise that the ecumenical ideology of the Patriarchate as it crystallised during and between this Patriarch’s two terms may be connected with the dominant ideological directions of the Hamidian regime. However, it is impossible to avoid identifying a number of important logical inconsistencies within this interpretative scheme. The pan-Orthodox dimension It is probably risky to consider the ecumenical ideology as a product of a relatively limited period of time at the end of the Ottoman Empire. Naturally a time frame is required if we are to avoid generalisations which accompany the adoption of a position such as that of the fundamental ‘antinomy between Orthodoxy and nationalism’. In fact, if a fundamental antinomy exists, it is difficult to explain the complexity of their relations during the nineteenth century: from the instrumental confrontation which the nationalists’ political programs reserved for the religion to the related attempt by the Orthodox clergy, whether within the Empire or within national states, to preserve its extended authority. Nevertheless, a fundamental characteristic of the ecumenical ideology is its pan-Orthodox dimension. Thus, the call for Orthodox unity concerned not only Orthodox Christians living in the territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Orthodox ekumene could not but include the Slavic Orthodox populations, in particular that of Russia. Therefore, if ‘one wished to investigate the genealogical formation of the Orthodox ekumene, one certainly should not go in search of it as if it were a likeness of the late nineteenth-century ummah, but perhaps seek its origins at the moment that the internal unity of the Orthodox world was first threatened, when it first experienced opposition and the pursuit of primacy from within. Thus, with respect to the nineteenth century in 26K. Spanoudis, Jovogimat okdibeg: Iwaxelu I’ [Pages of History: Joachim Il], Constantinople: Typois Adelfon Gerardon, 1902.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET aun particular, ecumenical ideology cannot be interpreted only as an intellectual endeavour or undertaking of the period of pan-Islamism; we should search for traces of its formation quite a bit earlier, from as early as the end of the Greek Revolution and above all after the end of the Crimean War. In any case the establishment of the Greek autocephalus Church in 1833 contrary to the volition of the Patriarchate was a crucial moment in this process. The independence of the Greek Church has been correctly considered as an action aimed at decreasing Russian influence over the formation of the newly established state. For this reason it had the wholehearted support of the English and French embassies.” However, this fact revealed the continuing interference of the Russian factor in patriarchal life even after the end of the Greek revolution and especially since the 1833 Treaty of Hiinkar iskelesi, by which Russia acquired powerful influence within the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War changed 27 It is well known that the dispute between Theoklitos Pharmakidis and Konstantinos Oikonomou reflected the confrontation between the pro-Western political wing and the powerful pro-Russian party in post-revolutionary Greece. Pharmakidis undertook the role of the modernizer (pro-Western), while Oikonomou assumed the defence of Orthodox ideals (pro-Russian). However, it is interesting that Pharmakidis very often referred to the Russian reality to legitimate his ideas about the subjugation of the Church to the State. Itis noteworthy that after the significant reforms undertook by Peter the Great, the Russian Church had adopted governance by a synod and, consequently, had abolished the dominant position of the Metropolitan of Moscow as the Patriarch. These reforms had a dramatic influence on both the formation of the Greek, Serbian and Romanian autocephalous Churches in the Balkans as well as the reforms introduced by the Patriarchate after 1860. The Petrine model of the Church's reformation seemed to be the dominant pattern for the construction of the autocephalous Greek Church in Pharmakidis’ works. See for example his positive remarks on Theofanis Prokopovit's, Disquisitio historica Bigae quaestionum, Saint Petersburg, 1721, where the justification of the old idea that the King should be the head of the Church, Theoklitos Pharmakidis, O yevddvuuos Tequavds [The Pseude Germanos], Athens: Ek tis typografias Aggellou Aggelidou, 1838, pp. 26-45. In this discussion, we usually forget the cultural rift within Russia upon the challenge of its westernisation. The conflict between the Slavophiles and the Europeanists in the 19th was only the last act of this drama.212 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN the power relations in the Patriarchate. After the proclamation of the Islahat Fermant (1856), a Grand Assembly of the Rum millet, composed both of clergy and laity, took place in the Patriarchate’s headquarters (1858-60), during which the pro-Russian families of certain Neo- phanariotes (such as one Nikolaos Aristarches, Great Logothete of the Patriarchate for many years) were marginalized. The equilibrium which had been established since the end of Greek Revolution between pro- ‘Western and pro-Russian supporters among the leading groups of the Rum millet was shaken. The culmination of the Bulgarian issue during the years to come, made things worse. However, even if the various members of the old pro-Russian wing did not disappear, they were compelled to be transformed.” Hegemony and national ideology Asecond logical inconsistency in the view that ecumenical ideology was simply a version of the dominant state ideology has to do with its intended audience, i.e. with its function within the dominant political framework. Naturally, the answer here cannot be as obvious as in the case of pan-Islamism, which constituted a strategic proposal for the preservation of the Empire on the basis of the great mass of the Muslim populations. It is not as certain that the call for Orthodox ecumenicity was directed at all those of the Orthodox populations remaining in the Empire since the cycle of nationalist movements in the Balkans had already come to a close. The likely answer, that it was aimed at Greeks throughout the Empire (and thus constituted the thesis about the ‘Hellenisation of the millet’), has no meaning if it was directed at these groups through a latent irredentist message; in Istanbul and other cities of the Empire there were powerful ethno-centric circles, and they could have carried out such a task far more effectively. Therefore, if the 28 Dimitris Stamatopoulos, Meraggv#juo7..., op.cit., pp. 50-8.am ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 213 ecumenical ideology corresponded to the needs of a state ideology, like pan-Islamism, then what it needed was not to undermine the unity of the Ottoman state but, on the contrary, to marginalise those political circles that threatened unity. Thus, ecumenism should be understood as a strategy for the marginalisation of extreme nationalists (not only the Bulgarians and the Romanians, but the Greeks as well), and for this reason also, its appearance as the dominant component of the ideology of the Patriarchate should be traced to its origins long before the beginnings of the Hamidian regime.”? What means ‘hegemony’ in the political field of the Patriarchal life could be easily ascertained as regards the events of the Schism of 1872. As a result of the unilateral proclamation of an autonomous Bulgarian exarchate in Istanbul, traditional segments of the Patriarchate gave consent to the solution that the hard-line nationalists were pressing for. The supporters of the Exarchate were condemned as ‘schismatic’ in a theoretical context where ‘nationalism’ (ethnophyletismos) has been blamed as a kind of modern ‘heresy’. However, some of the extreme nationalists’ harsh arguments against the Bulgarians paved the ground for Joachim II’s triumphant return to the ecumenical throne in the following year. But when he returned in 1873, the Patriarch, who was so popular among the circle of Greek-Ottoman bankers, did not in fact follow a hard-line policy against the Bulgarians or the Russians as some of the more vocal supporters of the Schism had probably anticipated. To the contrary, he followed a manifestly Russophile policy until his death in 1878. The Patriarchy of his spiritual offspring, Joachim III, was simply the direct continuation of this policy, an idiosyncratic combination of a pan-Orthodox — and therefore, a Slavophile — policy and simultaneous support for the Ottoman state.” The fact that the foreign opponents of this group were the irredentists of the Greek state and domestic opposition came from the Greek 29 Ibid., pp. 360-70. 30 Bbid., p.363.214 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN embassy along with radical nationalists surrounding the newspaper Neologos confirms its political orientation." Consequently, if we have a picture of the rivals of this group during Joachim’s first Patriarchy, we should do the same for his second one as well, From Joachim’s fall in 1883/84 until he ascended to the patriarchal throne for the second time in 1901, the world of the Patriarchate was split into supporters and opponents of Joachim, the ‘Joachimites’ and the ‘anti-Joachimites’. I believe that the schemes proposed to interpret the ecumenical ideology in the course of the nineteenth century they are unable to interpret this internal split among the Orthodox millet’s leadership. For if Joachim propounded the ‘Hellenisation of the millet’, then what did his opponents represent? Was it simply blind opposition focused on the person of the Patriarch, or did its outcome have wider political consequences for the millet’s fortunes in the Empire? The two basic logical inconsistencies of an interpretation of the 31 Likewise, the ringleaders of Joachim’s fall in 1883/84 during the first crisis, surrounding the ‘Privileges Issue’ were Stavros Voutiras, the editor of Neologos, the ‘Metropolitan of Ephesus, Agathangelos, and Georgios Kazanovas, then a member of the Patriarchate’s mixed council as well as husband to the niece of the former Anglophile Patriarch Anthimos VI; Anthimos was moreover under the protection of the equally Anglophile Vogoridis and Mousouros families Manuel Gedeon, Mveia..., op.cit., pp. 166 and 221. 32 There are two interpretations contemporary with Joachim’s era concerning the split/break between the Joachimites and anti-Joachimites. The first is expressed quite early on by Georgios Papadopoulos (his book was published in 1895, therefore prior to the crucial second Patriarchy of Joachim). According to Papadopoulos, the political base of the Joachimites consisted of the Greek Orthodox populations of Asia Minor, while in contrast, that of the anti-Joachimites consisted of the populations of the European regions, that is, of those more directly concerned with the confrontation with the Bulgarians. See G.1. Papadopoulos, H o¥yoovos tegagxla ms o000ddEou avaroliajc Exxknotag (The Modem Hierarchy of the East Orthodox Church], Athens: Typografeion Alex. Papageorgiou, 1895, vol. 1. Gedeon for his part points out that the people supported Joachim, while the high clergy opposed him, Manuel Gedeon, Mveia..., op. cit., p. 240. Ina way, both sides were right: the former because their support points to his pan-Orthodox, and therefore Russophile, orientation, while the opposition of the high clergy points to something already evident from his first Patriarchy, i.e. his loyal submission to Ottoman legitimacy up to the contestation for the usefulness of the Privileges’ existence.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 215 ecumenical ideology as being a product of state policy as described above do not allow us to assign the proper dimensions to this phenomenon. These contradictions essentially overlook a factor which had been highlighted by earlier phases of Greek historiography, such as its pan- Orthodox dimension, and mask the internal tensions which the Patriarchate was experiencing, resulting in our consequent inability to understand the different versions of the dominant discourse as these were construed by the rival factions. The Romantic motif: from the (European) centre to the (Ottoman) periphery I referred earlier to the fact that the establishment of the ecumenical ideology, although comprising a hegemonic strategy for countering the arguments of Bulgarian and Romanian nationalism, also contributed decisively to the marginalisation of extreme ethno-centric elements among the Greek Orthodox community. But this second function does not become immediately obvious unless one traces the influence of these elements within the Patriarchate. This was precisely what occurred, although the renegotiation of the ecumenical ideology at the end of the nineteenth century repeated a dominant Romantic motif, that of the union of two mutually-exclusive schemes. In the mid-nineteenth century, particularly after the Crimean War, the two components of the ecumenical ideology — the pan- Orthodox and the imperial — ceased to be compatible. Supporting the unity of the Orthodox world not only did not ensure, but may have even undermined, the unity of the Ottoman Empire. But the Patriarchate’s leadership operated as if this cleavage, to which these groups had themselves contributed through their actions, had never taken place. Through the development of a monist scheme for comprehending the world and a corresponding ideologising and, naturally, idealisation of the past, they attempted to surmount the overwhelming problems which Russia’s aggressive behaviour was creating, at least before the Eastern crisis (1875-78).216 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN Here let me open a parenthesis concerning the concept of Romanticism.*> The issue of its definition constitutes a theoretical problem much larger than the definition of ecumenical ideology given that it is so intimately a part of the great European philosophical tradition. From Arthur Lovejoy to Isaiah Berlin, innumerable thinkers have attempted to provide a sufficiently comprehensive definition, one which would include all of the ideological or artistic currents which became known by this name in the important centres of Western Europe, such as Germany, England and France. Perhaps for this reason, the theoretical inability to arrive at an adequate conceptual abstraction has directed research primarily towards analyses of the comparative type, with that of Lilian Furst maybe being the most constructive.** In any case, the general scheme which appears to prevail is that what was essentially a literary or artistic movement in Europe, began petering out in the 1820s and was transferred to the periphery following the 1830s. It survived until the 1880s, primarily as political Romanticism, through the influence of German Romanticism and the successful undertaking of German unification in 1870. 33. For the definition of Romanticism, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, ‘The Meaning of Romanticism for the Historian of Ideas’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 2/3, 1941, pp. 257-78; idem, The Revolt against Dualism. An Inquiry Concerning the Existence of Ideas, La Salle, lll.: The Open Court, 1960; Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, London: Chatto & Windus, 1999 34 Lilian Furst, Romanticism in Perspective. A Comparative Study of Aspects of the Romantic Movements in England, France and Germany, New York: Macmillan- St. Martin’s Press, 1969. 35 Inrelation to the problem of the Romanticism’s spread in the Greek ‘semi- periphery’, see KTh. Dimaras, EMywixds Poyartiquds (Greek Romanticism), ‘Athens: Ermis, 1994; Elli Skopetea, To dIgéruno Baoiheto» xatn Meydhn 15éa. “‘Owers tov e6vin0d mooBhfuatos ony ENAdba, 1830-1880 [The ‘Model Kingdom’ and the Megali Idea. Aspects of the National Question in Greece, 1830-1880], Athens: Polytypo, 1988; Alexis Politis, Ponavtixd yodvia. Ideokoyles xa voorgo- aieg ory Elidda tov 1830-1880 [Romantic Years. Ideologies and Mentalities in Greece 1830-1880], 3rd edition, Athens: EMNE-Mnimon, 2003. For the most recent theoretical approaches on Greek Romanticism, see O Powavtquds ov EAdéa [The Romanticism in Greece] , conference proceedings, Athens: Society for the Modern Greek Culture Studies (Moraitis School), 1999.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 217 Specialised studies have shown that in the literatures of the periphery, and that of Greece in particular, we rarely encounter the use of pure Romantic motifs, but rather their combination with classicist motifs. Nevertheless, it is certain that Romanticism played a decisive role in the expression of the political arguments of peripheral nationalism. With respect to the latter, its influence needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The formation of schemes of historical continuity, the mythologising of the past and the elevation and reification of the role of collective subjects (corresponding to the reification of the role of individual subjects, and the passions and emotions which characterise them in Romantic literature) constituted constants in the formation of dominant narratives in the national historiographies of the Balkans. Personally, however, I don’t believe that Romantic motifs should be connected in a direct way with nationalism. As the analyses of Michael Lowy and Robert Sayre have very aptly shown, Romanticism also passed into ideologically critical movements of the nineteenth century (such as the labour and socialist movements), and their messianic character is often due to the influence of Romanticism itself.*° If we want to define the ‘Romantic motif’ in a codified fashion better inclusive of the differences which mark the appearance of the phenomenon in centre- periphery relations, literature or politics, and as a component of nationalism or socialism, we could say that it constitutes a call toa unity. This unity is usually lost, and for this reason, the element of nostalgia is decisive in understanding it. We could further say that the call for unity is an element of the critical questioning of the long-standing Cartesian tradition, which split the world in two: logic and emotions; res extensa and res cogitans, nature and man; and finally, subject and object. The Romantic legacy does not go back simply to the endeavour to create a unifying philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century or to the works 36 Michael Lowy and Robert Sayre, Révolte et mélancolie. Le romantisme a contre-courant de la modernité, Paris: Payot, 1992.218 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN of Fichte, Hegel and Hélderlin, but perhaps to Spinoza himself, or even to Leibniz.” Many Greek Orthodox residents of Constantinople were well- informed about this search, especially those who had studied in Paris or Berlin, Confrontations between supporters and opponents of the Romantic paradigm were on the agenda of many discussions held by the Greek Literary Society of Istanbul. However, we can not see a direct influence among representatives of the radical nationalists as one would expect on the basis of the dominant definition we have formulated for what ‘political Romantic’ and, correspondingly, ‘Romantic nationalism’ meant. In general, Romantic ideals were accepted only with reservation in the world of the Neo-Phanariots and Greek Orthodox men of letters. The most important reason for this was that such ideals endangered the rules governing the formation of the bourgeois morality, as these had been accepted by the end of the nineteenth century. And moreover, it was 37. Ibis very impressive that the Greek Orthodox intellectuals in Istanbul were well-informed in this latent genealogy. See for example the excellent lecture of ‘Alexandros Mavrogenis, ‘Ohtya. twé negt me ev Fadia neu Pequavia. prhooo- las xard tov 190 cuca, tSia. be EOC TOV emotnoviZ0s vitoHON" [Some Words on the Philosophy in France and Germany during the Nineteenth Century and Particularly on the Scientific Materialism], Journal of the Greek Literary Society (GLS), 6, 1873, pp. 79-85. 38 The foundation of the Greek Literary Society in September 1861 and the Medical Society earlier the same year, as well as the simultaneous establishment of the ‘Educational Tuition Center’ (Exstaidevtixdy Pgovtionfoiov) must be considered as results of the optimistic spirit which prevailed in the interior of the Greek-Orthodox community in Istanbul after the proclamation of the Islahat fermant (1856). For this issue see, Haris Exertzoglou, B0vvf tautétyta ony Kuv- oravtuvotxokn tov 190 auiva. O Edanvinds Pid ooyinds B6Aoyos Kovoravtivov- shewc, 1861-1912 [National Identity in Constantinople in the 19th Century. The Greek Literary Association of Constantinople, 1861-1912], Athens: Nefeli, 1996; Dimitris Stamatopoulos, ‘Hellenism versus Latinism in the Ottoman East. Some Reflections on the Decline of the French Influence on the Greek Literary Society in Istanbul’, Etudes balkaniques, 3, 2007, pp. 79-106. 39 Dimitris Stamatopoulos, ‘Neogavaguétes xct Powavtoyds’ [Neo- Phanariots and Romanticism], Egnatia. Scientific Yearbook of the Philosophical Faculty, Journal of the Department of History and Archaeology, addendum. of the vol. 9: H Avon aye Avarohaig nau n Avarol ms Avons. Ideohoyinés aveavaxhd-ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 219 certain that they would lead to the legitimisation of irredentist visions. Characteristically, even Herocles Vasiades, one of the leading founders of the Society and a radical nationalist (though fairly selective vis-a-vis Herder’s work), chose an austere version of classicism to support his views concerning the continuity of the Greek ethnos/nation.” Nonetheless, it seems that Romantic motifs, while banished from the field of secular politics, substantially influenced the way in which those intellectuals supporting the role of the Patriarchate in the new era understood the past and future of the genos, that is, the Orthodox millet. Thus, the question of unity in space and time imposed by the Romantic ideal corresponds to an attempt to confirm the Patriarchate’s primacy in a now irreversibly fragmented space (the heart of the pan-Orthodox point of view). Moreover, it corresponds to an effort to idealise the past, chiefly by conceiving of the transition from the Byzantine to the Ottoman Empire as smooth and uneventful. Here, the legitimation of the ‘privileges’ granted by Sultan Mehmed to the first Ottoman Patriarch Gennadios Scholarios (1453) is the key point for our understanding of the position of the Patriarchate within the Empire.*! What is interesting in the nineteenth century is not that the perception of the Patriarch as milletbast ceased or was transformed due the Tanzimat having institutionalised participation by the laity in the administration of the Patriarchate. What is interesting about the ecumenical ideology of the nineteenth century is that it nostalgically contemplates the reality of the oeig nan otegedrena (téln Iov-agyés 200% au.) [The West of the East and the East of the West. Ideological Reflections and Stereotypes (end of 18th-beginning of 20th c.)], Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2005, pp. 41-55. 40 Dimitris Stamatopoulos, ‘From Cratylus to Herder. Dimensions of the ‘Language Question in the Ottoman Empire (late 19th c.)’, in A-F. Christidis in collaboration with Maria Arapopoulou and Maria Chriti, Language, Society, History: The Balkans, bilingual edition, Thessaloniki: Centre for the Greek Language, 2007, pp. 253-64. 41 See the crucial contribution by Benjamin Braude to this subject. B. Braude, ‘Foundation Myths of the Millet system’, in idem and B. Lewis (eds), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985, vol. 2, pp. 69-88.220 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN milletbasi of earlier centuries, when it did not engage in such constructs. Asa result, it is in fact formulated as an ideology: through a nostalgic take on the past, it is imported into the modern era, We should stress that the call to ecumenicity is not to be understood as a pre-modern experience, as one would probably conclude from the older historiographic model involving bipolar oppositions such as religious identity versus national identity or empire versus nation state. On the contrary, it should be interpreted as a renegotiation of the place of the Orthodox clergy within the secular landscape during the age of nationalism. Ecumenical ideology reconstructed: Manouil Gedeon’s ‘defensive ecumenism’ The activity of specific interest groups within the Patriarchate and their relation to segments of the Ottoman political arena should be taken into consideration for our understanding of their ideological orientations. For interpreting the distance which separated their ideological declarations from their political practises it is necessary to describe the structure of the dominant one among them: the bankers’ interest group with leading figure Georgios Zarifis. ‘As we mentioned above the involvement of Georgios Zarifis in the internal affairs of the Patriarchate began as early as the mid-1850s. In fact, together with his fellow ex-Russophile Christakis Zografos, they succeeded the former Francophile Ioannis Psycharis, Bey of Chios, as the leaders of an important interest group.*? The leading clerical figure in this group was Joachim, at that time the Metropolitan of Cyzicus (near Bandirma), later Patriarch Joachim I and spiritual father and guide of Joachim II1.*? However, the most prominent 42. Dimitris Stamatopoulos, Metaggvju.07...., op. cit., pp. 62-7. 43 Of course some of the clergy under the Russophile Patriarch Gregory VI (1835-1840, 1867-1871) who himself was under the protection of the GreatECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 221 scholar and ideological representative of the same circle was Manouil Gedeon, Megas Chartophylax (The Grand Archivist)** and Official Chronicler of the Great Church. In order to be able to investigate the pan-Orthodox and imperial versions of the ecumenicalist scheme and the manner in which they were made use by members of the Patriarchate in the transition from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries, we must make reference to the period’s one of the most important sources of information on the Patriarchate, Manuel Gedeon’s, Mveia tov seo euov [Recollection of Those who Came Before Me]. There Gedeon related the famous phrase concerning Joachim III, with whom he had collaborated for long years: ‘He was an ecumenical Logothete (Megas Logothetis) Nikolaos Aristarchis, also took part in the ideological organisation of the ecumenical scheme. Clerics and scholars from these two circles contributed decisively to the organisation of the ecumenical ideology; from the first group we may point out Philotheos Vryennios, later Metropolitan of Nikomedeia while from the second group we might mention Elstathios Kleovoulos, later ‘Metropolitan of Caesarea, We should remember that the Russophile Gregory first became Patriarch in 1835. His first Patriarchy was marked by the founding of the Central Ecclesiastical Council (an organ to exert control over educational programs), and the condemnation of the ‘theosophist’/deist Theophilos Kairis. His hard-line stance against Catholic and Protestant missionaries as well as the issue of the mixed marriages of the Ionian subjects, then under Great Britain’s control guided to his resignation under the pressure of the English embassy. The berat Gregory received in 1835 gave the Patriarch jurisdiction in more areas than at any previous time in the history of the patriarchal institution. See Paraskevas Konortas, OBwpanxés Beworfosis yia to Ororperind Harguagyeto, 1os-agyés 2008 aubva {Ottoman Regards on the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 17th-beginning of the 20th Century], Athens: Alexandria, 1998, p. 73. Probably the berat reflected the influence of the Russian foreign policy after the Treaty of Hiinkar Iskelesi. 44 In the early years of the Christian Church, the Grand Archivist (Megas Chartophylax) was usually a deacon who was a permanent representative of the Bishop. He composed and prepared episcopal documents over which he would also have the authority to sign in the absence of the Bishop. He read the minutes of the Holy Synod and was.a source of current information on all Church matters. The Megas Chartophylax was assisted by a secretariat and was given the privilege of being seated next to the Metropolitans and preceding them in processions while bearing a golden skullcap.222 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN Patriarch, he was a Greek Patriarch’.*> Many of the identifications of ecumenical ideology with versions of Greek nationalism derive from passages like these in Gedeon’s work. However, both the above passage, as well as other references which might tend towards the view of the ‘Hellenisation of the millet’, should be examined more critically. As with his other important writings, the aforementioned work was published in Athens after the author had left the Patriarchate and Constantinople. They were released in the 1930s, when a fundamental restructuring of the national ideology was occurring in Greece.*® Asa source, then, Gedeon must be considered while keeping in mind the period in which he is writing; the Gedeon of the 1930s attempted to plunt the anti-nationalist dimensions of the ecumenical ideology for obvious reasons. But even so viewed, in his citation of historical data concerning Joachim, one can find proof of Joachim’s Russophile, that is, pan-Orthodox, orientation in both his first and second terms as Patriarch. This dimension is underestimated in an analysis which would have it only as a reflection of the pan-Islamic ideology. The Orthodox ekumene did not necessarily want to be likened to the Islamic ummabut rather wished to repair the divisions separating it from the Orthodox Slavs. For example, Gedeon characteristically relates ‘I was a friend of the Russians’, here, referring to the Russophile Patriarchs Joachim II and Joachim 111.47 This comment revealingly shows the pan-Orthodox content of his ‘Ecumenism’. Gedeon organized his Weltanschauung as a friend of both the 45 Manuel Gedeon, Myeia..., op. cit., p. 263. It is also mentioned by Sia Anagnostopoulou, ‘The Terms....’, op. cit., p. 55,as factual support of her argument. 46 Amongst other subjects, this restructuring involved intensive discussions concerning the problem of Byzantium, see Dimitris Tziovas, O1 petapogpdoeis tov sbvionot nat 10 Weokdynua ms EMyvixdentas oro weoondlepo [The Transformations of the Nationalism and the Ideology of Hellenicity in the Interwar Period], Athens: Odysseas, 1989. 47 Manuel Gedeon, Mve/a..., op.cit., p. 224.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 223 Russians and the Patriarchs who were hostile to the Schism.** Indeed, he himself notes that he was ‘more (than anything else) the man of Joachim I, but we know that Joachim III also entrusted him with important missions, both during his first term as a Patriarch (he was the 48 A description of an incident reflected the mind-set of the entire Joachim's circle regarding the Schism’s issue. In 1906, in the midst of the Macedonian struggle, Joachim formed a committee to see to the publishing of specific articles of a political nature. At one of the committee’s meetings, the Patriarch began expostulating the view that articles should be written condemning the Bulgarian schismatic prelates because ‘they were ordained by defrocked and excommunicated priests, and the Bulgarian people must be enlightened; since its priests do not possess priesthood, consequently its people are neither baptised nor married, because its priests were ordained by individuals lacking in priesthood’. In the discussion which followed, Gedeon himself took part, expressing the view that such an article could not be published in the official review of the Patriarchate, Ekklisiastiki Alitheia (Ecclesiastical Truth) since it deviated from Orthodox dogma: ‘Your All-Holiness, the Patriarchate’s official newspaper cannot support such unknown teaching, or dogma foreign to scholarship. Who taught that unfrocking removes priesthood? Neither unfrocking, nor excommunication, nor marriage after ordination can remove it. Your All-Holiness, priesthood is of an indelible nature’. The Archimandrite Kallinikos Delikanis supported the same views as Gedeon during the discussion. In responding to the Patriarch’s querying why the Church unfrocks, Gedeon said, ‘I do not know why it unfrocks, Nor has any Ecumenical Synod ever removed priesthood from those it has itself excommunicated, nor did Your All-Holiness in the past insist on the idea that unfrocking removes priesthood’. Gedeon reminded Joachim of his stance in 1882 towards the Bulgarian prelates of the province of Sarkoy, who had supported the schism. They had been ordained as the Bishops of Nig and Nyssava by the excommunicated Ilarion Bishop of Makarioupolis, one of the leading figures in the Bulgarian nationalist movement. Michael, the metropolitan of Belgrade accepted both their priesthood as well as their priestly rank, and Joachim himself approved this decision. In the end, Joachim accepted Gedeon’s reasoning, see Manuel Gedeon, Mvefa..., op. cit., pp. 251-3. What is interesting about this incident is not that Joachim had adopted a tougher stance towards the Bulgarians, but that the old opponents of the Schism and supporters of pan-Orthodox tendencies such as Gedeon maintained absolute control over the ideologies of the leadership group. And what is even more interesting is that the pan-Orthodox stance was supported by a clergy-centred interpretation: if Priesthood was a status which is never lost, then the schism was actually insignificant. And as a consequence, the road to compromise with the Bulgarian Exarchates lay open.224 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN editor of the Ecclesiastical Truth (Ekklisiastiki Alithia] in 1883)"° as well as his second one (when Gedeon supervised the publication of documents concerning the Bulgarian and the Priviliges’ Questions).°° At this point, however, there is a gap: Gedeon’s favored patriarch, Joachim Il, on whom he lavished much praise, had co-signed the Schism.>! And this was not all: Joachim II, together with the laity who supported him, had played a leading role between 1867 and 1873 in relentlessly opposing Patriarchs such as Gregory VI and Anthimos VI, both of whom had attempted to resolve the question by employing more moderate means, viz. by recognizing some form of ecclesiastical autonomy for the Bulgarians. So how did Joachim II become a Russophile, and how can we justily Gedeon’s support for him? The problem is solved if we follow the course of events. As we mentioned above, in 1873, a year after the proclamation of the Schism, the opposition tactics of the Patriarch and the secular circles supporting him brought results. Joachim ascended to the patriarchal throne and once there followed an entirely different policy from that which he himself and the clerics dependent upon him had supported: he endeavored to blunt the consequences of the Schism by overtures to the Bulgarians and Russians, which climaxed in. his resolution of the question of the Monastery of Saint Panteleimon on Mt. 49 Manuel Gedeon, ibid., p. 288. 50 Manuel Gedeon, ‘Eyyeapa aargiagyixd xai cvvodixd meot tov Bovkyagt- nou tmrjpattos (1852-1873), exdiSdueva. evroyla xa xelevoes tov mavaywwtatov Onoverixods Haridgyov Iwaxeiu I” [Patriarchal and Synodical Documents on the Bulgarian Issue (1852-1873), edited under the Blessing and the Order of His Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim 11], Constantinople: no p.h., 1908; and idem, Exionua yoduata tovexixd avagegdueva eis ta exxhnotaotind nudy Sixara [Official Turkish Letters Regarding to our Ecclesiastical Rights], Constantinople: no p.h., 1910. 51 Manuel Gedeon, Eyyeaga narguagyimd..., op. cit., pp. 427-32, where the condemnation text against the supporters of the Bulgarian Exarchate, (Let me remind that the only one of the Orthodox patriarchs not to sign was Cyril, Patriarch of Jerusalem, who paid for his non-signing with excommunication.) Th.G. Stavrou, Russian Interests in Palestine, 1882-1914. A Study of Religious and Educational Enterprise, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963, p. 52.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 225 Athos with terms favorable to the Russians.> His successor, Joachim III, would improve relations to such an extent that he would receive (i.e. on behalf of the Ecumenical Patriarchate) the metochion*of Saint Sergios in Moscow as an indication of good will on the part of the Russians. Though in this uninterrupted flow of details with which Gedeon bombards us we are unable to easily discern any problem of cohesion among the actions of specific clerics, there remain a number of shadowy links in this strange narrative chain requiring further investigation. Despite the fact that Gedeon is frequently revealing with respect to the dependency relations of various clerics upon powerful lay members of the Greek Orthodox leadership elite - often one feels that he is supplying all the pieces of a puzzle, though not its solution — he seems to exempt from this rule his favorite patriarchs. Generally speaking, Gedeon’s language concerning the representatives of the banking world, which had become significantly more powerful in the mid-nineteenth century, particularly by reason of favorable conditions created by the Crimean War, displayed more fear than respect. For him, the question was directly concerned with the issue of reforms in the Patriarchate, which led to the introduction of the General Regulations and their most important consequence: the institutionalizing of lay participation in the administration of the Patriarchate (1860-1862). If one wished to characterize Gedeon’s pre-WWI writing, we could say that they show him to be one of the most important defenders of the model of a centralized Patriarchate — ‘cleric-centered’, one might say — suspicious towards the involvement of the laity in the administration of 52. Kallinikos Delikanis, Iegiygapixds xardhoyos taw ev to1s xcbdiét tov sa- ToIAQYLHOS agxetogvlaxcton cwtopErov EmoruoV Exxinolaotindy Eyyodqay segt twv ev Abw povév, 1630-1863 (Descriptive Catalogue of the Extant Official Ecclesiastical Documents Concerning the Monasteries of Mount Athos, 1630- 1863], Constantinople: no p.h., 1902, pp. 188-94, includes the sigilium of Joachim II, which recognized the Russian Makarios’ election as abbot of the Saint Panteleimon’s monastery. 53 In Eastern Orthodoxy, a metochionis an ecclesiastical embassy, usually from one autocephalous or autonomous church to another. The term is also used to refer toa parish representation (or dependency) ofa monastery or a patriarch.226 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN the Great Church, But from the moment that the group to which he belonged (by his own admission) was directly dependent upon banking circles, his stance became ambiguous. Thus, the presumed authority of the historical researcher allowed Gedeon to selectively present the dependency relations of the clergy upon the laity, while the historiographic scheme he proposed for reforming the history of the Orthodox millet inchided the irrevocable condemnation of lay involvement in ecclesiastical matters. In actuality, Gedeon’s target in his writings following the 1880s was the banking circle on which his favorite Patriarchs depended. Nonetheless, in the books or articles he published, he never makes flattering references to Zarifis, Zographos, or the other members of the bourgeoisie who had been preeminent in patriarchal affairs during this period. And despite his acuteness, he avoided describing in clear terms the dependency relations between Joachim and Zarifis, though he did not do the same in cases of relations between other clergy and the laity, as e.g. between Stephanos Vogoridis and Gerasimos, Metropolitan of Chalcedon, or between Ioannis Psycharis and Joachim II, as we noted above. And how would it have been possible for him to proceed to ‘revelations’ of this sort, taking into consideration the important position he held in the organization of the Patriarchate’s ideological orientations? But his continual attacks against the text of the General Regulations and the consequences of its implementation for the internal workings of the Great Church can only be explained by the ambiguous position he maintained between the ‘ethnarch’-Patriarchs who supported him. personally and their own lay protectors. For Gedeon himself, it was a good thing that this circle of clerics retained control of the Patriarchate; but it was a bad thing that, despite its clericalist invocations, it (the circle) essentially developed into an ‘organ’ of political and social hegemony for the bankers. Of course, Gedeon expressed his judgments much later, and was aware of the continual defeats Joachim III had suffered in his attempt to return to the patriarchal throne. Gedeon strove to blunt the central contradiction that characterized the clerical-lay group to which heECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 227 himself belonged: the support of the ‘lay’ bankers made it ‘hegemonic’, and the involvement of laity controlled by ethnocentric circles in Constantinople and the Greek embassy prevented it from the possibility of returning to the control of the Patriarchate for seventeen long years (1884-1901). For Gedeon, however, it was impossible to criticize the intervention of the latter without criticising the ‘behind the scenes’ operation of the former: ‘laicisation’ in any of its manifestations. Consequently, we need to apply an intellectual/mental pattern to describe this group as it evolved from the years in which Ioannis Psycharis had created it.onward: if at its ‘center’ there appeared the hegemonic position of the clerics (Joachim II, Joachim Ill, Derkon Neophytos),>* at one edge there was the circle of bankers and the financial-political support it offered, while at the other, there arose the institutional promoter of its cultural capital, its ‘organic intellectual’. And if for the former the adoption of the arguments and positions of ethnocentric circles in the crisis of 1870-1872 was a matter of strategy, its sole objective being the imposition of the bankers’ political and social hegemony, for the latter, the defender of ‘pure’ ideas, such a thing was unthinkable. Gedeon could not haggle over the ‘ecumenical’ ideal for the sake of achieving a political objective. If for him the ‘ecumenism’ of the Patriarchate was something to be defended as a version of preserving the unity of the Orthodox world, for the bankers it was conceivable only within the framework of Ottomanism. Thus, between the two lay 54 —Neophytos has been considered as one of the leaders of the ‘ethnocentric’ circles of the Greek orthodox community and severe opponent of the Russian embassy as well as the Bulgarian nationalists at the beginning of 1870s. However he belonged to the sphere of influence of Joachim Il - he played a decisive role for the return of the latter to the patriarchal throne in 1873. Moreover he ought his clerical career to the support of Zarifis family. The co-existence in the same interest group of the ‘nationalist’ Neophytos and the ‘ecumenicalist’ Joachim III, under the protection of their common spiritual and political mentors, Joachim Il and Georgios Zarifis respectively, is a very good example of the gap which separated the ideological declarations from the political practices of these cleric-laic groups and especially the way they understood the defense of their collective interests, see Dimitris Stamatopoulos, Meragovuio7..., op. cit., pp. 473-5.228 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN “wings? of this group there occurred a fissure that in actuality reflected the fissure in the ecumenical model itself. And its reformulation and reorganization by Gedeon in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were designed to suppress this split, though without managing to heal the wound that had been opened. The bankers’ group predominated politically because it was the first group to realize that it needed to extend its support and transform political hegemony into social hegemony, both at the level of reorganizing the collective cultural capital of the Greek Orthodox communities in the Empire, as well as at that of controlling splinter political movements that threatened its integrity. We must ask how effective would have been the pressure exercised by ethnocentric circles, or even by the Greek Embassy (with its characteristic lack of systematic political initiatives), if the circle of bankers and the clerics they controlled Goachim II, Derkon Neophytos) had not embraced the arguments of the former, not as it appeared in the end because they endorsed them, but because this was the only way of preventing things from becoming even more dangerous for the Empire, and naturally, in order to safeguard the political control of the Patriarchate. When Joachim’s re-election confirmed the political-social hegemony of the bankers’ group in 1873, the patriarchs it had promoted - Joachim ILand Joachim Ill — would attempt to ‘glue back together’ the broken pieces of the ecumenical model. The group, that is, endeavored to annul the consequences of its temporary alliance with the coalition of ethnocentrists (a coalition that found its expression primarily in the activities of the Metropolitan Derkon Neophytos); efforts to reconnect with the Russian factor and the Exarchate were accompanied by a policy that within the framework of the Hamidian regime was not exactly what one would call support for the famous ‘privileges’. On the contrary, in the crises of both 1883-1884 and 1891,>° Joachim III was attacked by 55 ‘The major crisis in the relations between the Patriarchate and the Porte in 1801 is interesting because of the involvement in this of some ‘dogmatic’ issues. In fact Joachim, who by then had withdrawn to the monastery of Mylopotamos inECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 29 the anti-Joachimist wing, which of course was acting under the aegis of the Greek Embassy, for maintaining a stance that favored their concession/surrender.*° If the intervention by the bankers in the 1860s and 1870s resulted in the rupture of the ecumenical model, those who would attempt to heal the old wounds would be the clerics from this same circle, particularly during the various stages of the conflict regarding the Privileges Question: those who supported Joachim — among them, Gedeon ~ are a version of the incorporation into the Ottoman state, and simultaneously of the maintenance of an, equilibrium with the Russian factor - in other words, a refusal to accept the final and irrevocable splitting of the two strategies: ‘pan-Orthodox’ could no longer be identified with ‘imperial’. Joachim III would manage to be reelected in 1901 when he presented his credentials to the Greek Embassy, [saying] that he not only ‘understood’ but also accepted the incompatibility of the two strategies. Within such a framework, one may also perceived Gedeon’s political-theoretical intervention. / Gedeon developed what we would call ‘defensive ecumenism’, and Mount Athos, had reacted to the decision by the then-Patriarch Dionysus V to close down the churches; a considerable number of his supporters did the same, including Vasileios Asteriadis, who had become Metropolitan of Smyrna in 1884. However, students of the era rarely refer to the reaction Patriarch Dionysus V's decision prompted from amongst the ranks of the Orthodox clergy. This sui generis ‘strike’ appeared to be directed against the Porte’s decision to question the Patriarchal privileges with respect to bringing into court of cases involving priests, decision-making on educational programs and so on. Nonetheless, Gedeon informs us that the Janissary’ (that is, the Turcophile) Patriarch Dionysus, even at the high point of this crisis, maintained open channels of communication with the Porte. Consequently, even though it had direct results, the closing down of the churches appeared in the eyes of the Joachim’s supporters to do more harm to the authority of the Patriarchate itself, rather than constituting a means of exerting pressure on the Ottoman authorities; Manuel Gedeon, Mve(a. .., op. cit., pp. 233 and 236. 56 See also Manuel Gedeon, Beazela onuelwors xegl tov exxhnoiaotixdy mus dixatwv, vxoBhyBeloa ty 12n AexeuBolov 1908 rw navayordrw Omove- ‘zc, Haroréoyy [Short Note on our Ecclesiastical Rights Submitted to his Holliness the Ecumenical Patriarch in 12th December 1908], Constantinople: no p-h., 1909, p. 10, passim.230 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN he is defensive not only because he is defending himself against every sort of ethnic movement threatening to dissolve the Empire, but also against the ‘lay’ element bringing into doubt the hegemony of the ‘clerical’ element, against the secular element threatening to undermine the dominance of the religious one. ‘What is more interesting is the fact that Gedeon’s attempt to reunite the two parts and heal old wounds was made on the basis of the accusation of ‘laicisation’ of the Patriarchate, thus an accusation against the role the laity, bankers, and Neophanariotes had played in undermining the religious element. In his pre-WWI writings, in particular, Gedeon defended the clericalist model, because he was convinced that this was the only way to defend the autonomy of the Orthodox millet. But his insistence on attacking the ‘lay’ element in his autobiographical works of the 1930s (when irredentist programs had shown their limits), and the critique he develops, acquire a broader character. At the moment that eminent representatives of the generation of the 1930s were organizing anew the components of Modern Greek nationalist ideology through the discovery of popular figures such as the general Makrygiannis or poets such as Kavafis, Gedeon, in his wish to exercise a critique of the irrevocable process of nationalization of the millet, had recourse to historical research. Since he could not openly turn against the version of the millet as nation, he turned his attack on the laity, which had progressively denuded the clergy of its mediating characteristics. For this reason, he follows a different intellectual path than that followed by the representatives of the generation of the 1930s: he does not seek the lost/present essence of the nation in antiquity or Byzantium, but in the historical reality of the millet, or else of the Ottoman Empire. He attempts to restore this reality through a barrage of information, in which however, if it were to form a unified historiographic narrative, he ought to have taken an explicit stance concerning the only possibility that historical evolution had demonstrated as valid: the transformation of the millet into a nation. But to continue our investigation of the extent to which the Ecumenism of this group was or was not compatible with the model of the Greek Romantic national narrative, let us leave aside the Gedeon ofECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 231 the 1930s, even if he was speaking of his old self at the outset of the twentieth century.>” If there is one thing Gedeon did systematically during his long presence in the intellectual life of the Patriarchate, we could say that it was the re-establishment of a historicity for the Orthodox millet. From the very moment he was appointed editor-in-chief of Ekklisiastiki Alitheia, he began systematically publishing various historical documents from the Patriarchal archives. These concerned either the world of the Phanariots or the activities of the former Patriarchs (often in response to later criticisms lodged against them). In substance, the work he carried out was done to preserve the memory of the millet, except that here the implacable question arises: is the memory of the genos or that of the Orthodox millet to be identified with the memory of the ‘nation’? We could say that the normalising process that characterises his work in the 1930s does little to help answer this question. We need, therefore, to look more carefully at some of his initiatives during his term of service at Ekklisiastiki Alitheia,. Let us consider specifically a series of articles published in Ekklisiastiki Alitheia in 1883, the year following his appointment, with the title ‘Women during the period of Iconoclastic Disputes’.°* In this series of articles, which ostensibly appears to deal with the role of great Byzantine Empresses like Zoe and Irene in the age of Iconoclasm, Gedeon did something unexpected — directly attacking Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos. Along with those of 57 Also worth mentioning is that we can discern how different the ‘Athenian’ Gedeon of the 1930s was from Gedeon, the director and editor-in-chief of Ekklisiastiki Alitheia from the narrative of Chrysanthos Filipidis, later Metropolitan of Trabzon, whom Joachim appointed archivist and co-director of the periodical in 1911. Filipidis relates in his memoirs that ‘in the editing [of Ekklisiastiki Alitheial, Thad as a colleague Manuel Gedeon, a difficult co-worker, but one who adapted himself to reality’. See Ekklisiastiki Alitheia, 1, 1880, p. LVI. Gedeon’s adaptation to reality would certainly not have been painless, nor without contradictions on his part, as we showed in the quoted passages from his later works concerning the pan- Orthodox character of Ecumenism. 58 Ekklisiastiki Alitheia, 3, 1883, pp. 277-81, 561-4, 577-80.232 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN Spyrtidon Zambelios, Paparrigopoulos's works are considered the most important Greek historiographic efforts of the nineteenth century, mainly because they formed a dominant narrative of Greek history from antiquity to the modern period. We could say that their most significant contribution was the incorporation of Byzantium into this narrative. Byzantium was no longer the dark and despotic Eastern state rejected with repugnance by representatives of the Enlightenment. Instead, it constituted a glorious moment of ‘ecumenicalisation’ of the ancient Greek spirit, albeit within the Roman political scheme, with Christianity as the purifying element of its pagan origins. A reminder of the nineteenth-century influence of German Romanticism on the legitimisation of the ‘dark’ medieval years seems superfluous at this point. But from the moment Byzantium was included in the national narrative, would not this have rendered the undertaking completely acceptable by the world of the Patriarchate, which was the natural inheritor of the Byzantine Empire within the Ottoman Empire? The answer is not self-evident, and one cannot limit oneself to rejection by the Patriarchate or the Greek-Ottomans in general of the Greek state’s aspirations towards the Megali Ideaas the only explanation. Gedeon attacked the Greek historian, starting from Paparrigopoulos’s description of one particular incident in which the Patriarch Tarasios attempted to summon the seventh Ecumenical Synod in Constantinople efore it was to convene in Nicea (Iznik). The seventh Ecumenical Synod ultimately condemned iconoclasm and revived the worship of icons. Paparrigopoulos explained that, in Constantinople, the iconoclasts were in a majority and that Tarasios was forced to dissolve the meeting peacefully so as to avoid their victory. Paparrigopoulos wrote, ‘but on that day it was manifestly proven how much more powerful, both materially and morally, were the proponents of reform, no matter how great the personal worth of the Patriarch Tarasios’. He supported this position by interpreting a passage from the work of the famous chronicler, Theophanes. According to Paparrigopoulos, even though Theophanes was a supporter of the icon-worshippers, he was forced to concede the ‘moderation’ and good will of the ‘reformers’ since they did not wish to force a decision even though they had the upper hand at this synod.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 233 But Gedeon, interpreting the passage in a different way, revealed that ‘the distinguished Theophanes is being defamed by K. Paparrigopoulos’. This because Theophanes referred to the fact that the iconoclast soldiers ‘drew their swords’ and threatened the life of the Patriarch and prelates around him, something which Paparrigopoulos had omitted; thus this council was not exactly peaceful in nature. Naturally, Gedeon’s attack on Paparrigopoulos did not occur because of any misreading of Theophanes. Besides, Theophanes was a contemporary of these events and a very important source whose significance Paparrigopoulos acknowledged at many points in his work Theoretically, Gedeon’s attack concerned the critical approach, or distortion, as the case might be, which Paparrigopoulos reserved for Theophanes. But in actuality, Gedeon’s major problem appears to have been the overall interpretation of this period by the professor at the University of Athens. Paparrigopoulos indeed gave especially favourable treatment to the iconoclast Emperors Leo III and his son, Constantine V. He believed that the poor image which had been formed of these emperors — the latter in particular — was due to the works of chroniclers like Theophanes. The problem with Theophanes as well as with Kedrinos or Nikiforos, other chroniclers of the period, was that they sided with the icon-worshippers and consequently were prejudiced against their opponents, the iconoclasts. Above all, Paparrigopoulos’s basic stance towards the period of iconoclasm emerges from the term he employs to describe it: Reformation. He characteristically relates in his history: ‘Truly, if we still had need of proof of how necessary the reform was, it suffices to look at the disastrous situation to which the Empress Irene brought the state in attempting to overthrow the work of Leo III and Constantine V. It is understood here that it is not a question of restoring the icons. The restoration of the icons as it took place in the Seventh Ecumenical Synod did not harm the essential principles of reform in the slightest, at least as its moderate followers understood it’. What, then, did Paparrigopoulos mean exactly by the term ‘reform’? Leo Ill and Constantine V, apart from doing away with icons, undertook many other innovations capable of strengthening the234 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN powers of the nation and restoring it from the various types of reversals which it had experienced. They undertook to reduce the number of monasteries, to eradicate many of the abuses related to the use of external symbols of faith, to free public education from the control of the clergy, to do away with bondage, to reform the institution of the family on the basis of the principles of the gospel, to establish religious tolerance, to remove the eunuchs from public affairs, to remove many Greek regions from the jurisdiction of the Pope, to reorganise the army and to introduce sounder guidelines for amore just system of land taxation.>° It is obvious that the Byzantium of the dynasty of Isaurians was not precisely what someone belonging to the Patriarchate’s world or the millet like Gedeon, wished for. Paparrigopoulos’s view of the period of iconoclasm as one of reform really corresponds to a total reinterpretation of the Byzantine Empire. Clearly even if on the question of the icons, Paparrigopoulos could not have been completely honest, what he describes as a reform movement in Byzantium was motivated by nothing other than the need to make it acceptable to the West. The Byzantine Empire is included in the prevailing nationalist narrative, but it has been cleansed of its theocratic characteristics. But such a viewpoint, which retrospectively justified iconoclasm with respect not only to the issue of icons, but also to the hegemonic role which the clergy assumed in Byzantine society after the Seventh Ecumenical Synod, could not be accepted by the Patriarchate — all the more so from the moment that this ‘Reformation’ began closely resembling what they were attempting to implement during the Tanzimat period in the Ottoman Empire. We need to stress the fact that 59 Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, To éog ts exxovopayias [The Epic of Iconoclasm], Athens: Okeanis, 2005, pp. 253-4. This edition consists of a republication of K. Paparrigopoulos, Jorogia tov ellamxot é6vous and twv ag- yatordrov xodvev uézxgt tov 1930 (History of the Greek Nation from the Ancient Years to 1930], vol. 3, part I, book 10: Mecaumvinds EMaviondc: H weragguopu- aig [Medieval Hellenism: The Reformation], Athens: N.G. Passaris, 1867.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 235 the insistence on pan-Orthodox policies not only resulted in a moderate rapprochement with the Slavic churches, but that it also presupposed a model of internal administration of the millet wherein the Orthodox clergy would maintain its privileged position vis-a-vis the laity. Consequently, the interpretation of Byzantium proposed by Greek Romantic nationalism was impossible to accept. The Byzantium of Paparrigopoulos is fundamentally different from that of Gedeon. We could say that if the former sought to remove the negative characterisations with which the West had imbued it, the latter understood the Byzantine tradition only through the final arrangement which the end of Iconoclasm imposed and which was symbolically connected to the premier place acquired by the clergy and its most extreme segment, monasticism. But if this was the reconstruction of the historical past, as an important scholar like Gedeon proposed, what practical political effect was it to have for Patriarch Joachim III, Gedeon’s mentor during those years? Ecumenical ideology as transcendental factor Joachim’s second term began with a particularly important initiative with respect to the question of the Union of Churches. In June 1902, the Patriarchate of Constantinople addressed an encyclical to all the Orthodox autocephalous Churches and Patriarchates. The text 60 See the text in H e9l wv oxéoewv tur avtoxepddwy ogboddEay exaknousy xa neol Gdhov yerondv txrmudcov. Hatquagytxys xa Zovodue} Eyetxdios tov 1902: At e1g avojy anavajosis wy ayiov avtoxepddwv og0odéEun exxkjouiy nat n avraxdvinor ov Omovuerixod Hareiagyefov (The Patriarchal and Synodical Circular of 1902 on the Relations of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with the Other Autocephalous Orthodox Churches: Their Responses and the Answer from the Ecumenical Patriarchate], Constantinople, 1904. See also Sotiris Varnalides, ‘Ot ox€oetc perakd vov Omovevrxod Tlerovagyetou xox Barxavos xervé myy eQto- 80 me marguagyeias Twoxetu [7 [The Relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Vatican during the Age of Joachim III’s Patriarchy], Xovotravt-236 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN. constituted a proposal to broaden the removal of the reasons separating the Eastern Orthodox Church from the Catholics and Protestants during previous centuries, but it was at the same time a proposal to resolve the internal problems that had led to the splitting of the Orthodox ekumene. The encyclical also dealt with the problem of the Old Catholics, all those who had broken off from the Catholic Church after 1870 since they did not accept the doctrine of the Pope’s infallibility and who in some fashion were repeating the precedent of Luther’s followers when in the sixteenth century they saw in the doctrines of the Eastern Orthodox Church a related theology with which theirs could converge. Simultaneously, the Patriarchate called for the remaining Orthodox Churches to consider the possibility of unification in their use of the calendar; although apparently maintaining an equal distance from both the Julian and Gregorian calendars, it probably opened the way for acceptance of the latter, since it proposed that the results of science coincide with those of faith. Certainly the text was written in milder language than comparable encyclicals sent by Joachim’s predecessors, such as Constantine V in 1895, and for this reason it was considered a gesture by the Patriarchate to the Vatican under Pope Leo XIII. However, not long afterwards, in August of the same year, a new encyclical was issued that pointed out the dangers inherent in Orthodox Christians’ sending their children to schools run by those of other religions, especially those of the Uniates.®! This means that in practical terms, the Patriarchate’s objective was not rapprochement with the Catholic Church, but above all the confirmation of its own precedence within the Orthodox world. All the reciy ents replied in turn to the 1902 Encyclical, and the sah Maxedovia: O and Ocovaloviuns Orxomrenxds TMargidoyns Iwaxeiu I” 0 Meyadongemfc {Christian Macedonia: The ex-Metropolitan of Thessaloniki, the Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim Ill the Magnificent], conference proceedings, Thessaloniki: Thessaloniki History Centre, 1994, pp. 249-73. 61 The Uniates are members of several Eastern Christian churches that are in communion with the Roman Catholic Church but retain their own languages, rites, and codes of canon law.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 237 Patriarchate sent a second encyclical in May 1904, with which it attempted to specify the means by which rapprochement would be achieved by addressing questions critical for the future of Orthodoxy (e.g., the publication of periodicals, etc.). To this second Encyclical, there was an interesting reply from the Russian Holy Synod. Many Orthodox Churches, including the Patriarchates of Alexandria and Antioch, the autocephalous Churches of Cyprus and Sinai, and the Bulgarian Exarchate, did not respond to the Patriarch’s invitation due to the serious internal problems they were confronting. The Encyclical noted this and would stress: Certainly it has not escaped the experience and the sagacity of Your Revered All-Holiness that the last century has been marked by the awakening throughout the world of the spirit of nationalism. This spirit, innovative at the time, destroyed many ancient [political] systems, and often brought about substantive transformations in the organisation and the mutual relations between various states and nations. This movement towards an independent national life evidently predominates today among the peoples of the East, from among whom many believe that they had long ago been hulled to sleep regarding their historical existence and had become accustomed to the idea of submission to the leadership and domination of other nations. The notables and spiritual leaders of these awakened nations know the incomparable importance in the work of preserving nationality and protecting faith and its bearer, the Church. For this reason, and desiring the independent existence and progress of their nation, they desire not only that the Church not confront their nation in a negative way but that it cooperate in order to achieve that progress, to the extent this is possible and permissible. In and of itself, this desire is secular, and does not always take account of the needs, nor the regulations, of the Church. Indeed, it sometimes eliminates nations and threatens their ecclesiastical existence and also the inviolability and integrity of the Ecumenical Church. Those illuminated by the Holy Spirit and dedicated to guarding the House of God [...] flying aloft like eagles above the interests and advantages of a single era and particular [historical] circumstance, looking only to the one and eternal goal of238 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN the Church, that is, the salvation of the entire world and men of all ages, they will be able to find within themselves the power to rise above nationalist passions and, for those suffering from these passions (that is, nationalism), to fulfil the command of the Apostle Paul: ‘We then that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak’. (Romans 15:1)°? And so, if the 1902 Encyclical has any important historical value, it is precisely because the undertaking to achieve ecumenicity not only concerned the Patriarchate of Constantinople but also corresponded to an Orthodox ecumenicity which was expressed and represented by the other great partner and one-time claimant to precedence in the Orthodox world, the Russian Church. And so that there would remain no doubts on this subject, the letter of the Russians in response continued as follows: ‘The sui generis awakening of national feeling observed in our day is, like events throughout the world, a transient and ephemeral phenomenon which has not now appeared for the first time in history but which had in the past descended on the world stage in a similar fashion. But in some way, the new ecumenicity would not havea pre-ethnic but a post-ethnic character. The text continues: The phenomenon of nationalism is simply a tide which will soon ebb away. The nations reborn [...] will together feel the need for the general unity of men and the Church [...] And they will then embrace and praise their common mother, who did not turn them away from her protective wings by reason of their transitory deviations and spiritual illnesses. ..© ‘What is truly surprising in this particular letter, however, is that the Synod of the Russian Church recognised not only the necessity for 62. Ekklisiastiki Alitheia, 25, 1905, p. 256. 63. Ibid., pp. 256-7.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 239 convergence among the autocephalous Orthodox Churches but also the precedence of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in this process: In this spirit and towards this purpose, the common effort of all the individual autocephalous Churches under the divinely-enlightened guidance of Your All-Holiness may accomplish much in clarifying the terms and measures to cure the ecclesiastical ailments of the present and may achieve that future which is desired by the entire Christian world.5* A little further on, wishing to define its own actions for dealing with the penetration of Catholic and Protestant influence into its territories, it gave a very interesting ‘self-definition’: With respect to its relations with Christians of other dogmas, the Russian Church, as one of numerous churches within the limits... The acceptance of this inferior (?) status within the Orthodox world and of the precedence of the seat of Constantinople in taking the initiative for the uniting of all Christian dogmas, shows that Joachim’s initiative was not unimpeded by but was in fact bolstered by Russian. support, Ecumenism, not just as a restraint on the process of nationalisation but also as a transcendent principle on the basis of which the wounds of this harsh age of nationalist conflicts would be mitigated was organised in common by the Ottoman and Russian extremes at the beginning of the twentieth century. The modern ideology of Ecumenism most probably emerged as a response to corresponding initiatives taken by the Vatican and Pope Leo XIII during the preceding years. And perhaps the turning- point in an apparent ‘nationalisation’ of the language of the Patriarchate in the first decade of the twentieth century did not occur in 1908, with the Revolution of the Young Turks, but in 1905, with Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. Of course, this does not mean that in both his first as well as second Patriarchy, Joachim was not identified with Ottoman legitimacy. And 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid.240 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN this was the basic reason he was supported by the Porte, especially in the case of the attack against him by the eight Synod members in 1904. Therefore, the ecumenical ideology cannot be understood unless one also takes the Russian factor into account. But I believe that what makes it difficult to grasp is not its call for the unity of the Orthodox world, but its resort to a Romantic utopian model in order to reunite that which in actuality had been irretrievably lost. Of course, we should stress precisely the fact that in the first period of Joachim’s reign, the demand for the unity of pan-Orthodoxy with the imperial vision actually acquired a Utopian-Romantic character. It was impossible for ‘pan- 66 During Dionysus's term as Patriarch, Gedeon managed to remain in the position of editor of Ekklisiastiki Alitheia, He narrated an interesting incident in which the Greek politician and diplomat, Alexandros Rizos Rangavis, a descendent of Phanariots, requested of Dionysus that the Patriarchate certify the ‘imperial descent’ of his family. The reason was that he wanted to marry his daughter toa Russian count who desired that his wife should on all accounts be a princess Dionysus addressed himself to Gedeon and asked his opinion, And Gedeon responded, ‘Master, I have heard from old Phanariots that this particular family comes from the Rizoi on the side of their father, while on that of their mother they are Rangavides. Now of course, as I have heard, they wish the Patriarch to certify their descent from the Byzantine emperors. But is it in our interest to certify fictitious pedigrees?’ To this, Dionysus replied, ‘Then take the burden of this bothersome family tree from off my shoulders’, agreeing with Gedeon that ‘the Patriarchy should not be transformed into a match-making bureau!” Gedeon undertook the writing of the relevant decision, in which it was made clear that there ‘was no case whatsoever to be made for the imperial descent of the Rangavis family. See Manuel Gedeon, Mve/a..., op. cit., pp. 231-2. It is noteworthy that the Patriarchate, in some way the genuine descendent of the Byzantine imperial tradition, refused to certify the ‘counterfeit’ relation to its medieval past which a representative of the newly-founded Greek state was so fervently trying to reconstruct. The Patriarchate’s relation to Byzantium was very different from that constructed by emergent Greek national irredentism. And even more interesting seems to be the reason for the request to certify ‘imperial descent’: a marriage to a Russian aristocrat. This failed match brings to mind the wedding of Anna Palaiologos to Ivan the Terrible, a bond upon which the imperial Russian ideology of the Third Rome was founded. We may say that once again the Patriarchate maintained the monopoly over the ideological employment of the Byzantine past and over the means by which the unity of the Orthodox oikoumene was guaranteed as the mediator between Greeks and Russians: without having to grant false certificates of aristocratic genealogies.ECUMENICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE ORTHODOX MILLET 241 Orthodox’ and ‘imperial’ to continue to coexist. In contrast, during Joachim’s second Patriarchy, it appears that the utopian character of the ecumenical synthesis was accepted. The establishment of the group advocating it as once more dominant in Patriarchal affairs due to the new geopolitical situation (the peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1894; Greece’s defeat in the war of 1897; and the concomitant collapse of the dream of the Megali Idea). Although the return of Joachim in 1901 had the character of a compromise with some of the basic directions of Greek foreign policy, such as the tougher stance he assumed towards the Bulgarian Exarchate, more careful investigation of this period has led us to believe that both components of the ecumenical scheme remained equally powerful. The different negotiation of the Byzantine past could form different or opponent matrices of understanding the nation. Within the framework of the Tanzimat, which set in motion a process of secularisation, the ecumenical ideology was closely connected with the argument that the clergy should preserve the pre-eminent political position it held in the Orthodox millet; as a result, the ecumenical ideology can also be identified with models of Patriarchal centralisation like those expressed by the Patriarchs Gregory VI, Joachim II and Joachim III. And so, if one wished to define the historical texture of ecumenism during the nineteenth century, could say that it attempted to reconnect the ‘imperial’ perspective with the ‘pan-Orthodox’ one, or even to reunite the Orthodox world of the Ottoman Empire with the Orthodox world of the Slavs. Both of these existing historical possibilities appear to have collapsed simultaneously with the fall of the two Empires at the end of the First World War. Still, it would be interesting to look at the successive transformations of ecumenical ideology in the twentieth century. These are responsible for many of the stereotypes we have formed about it; but this will be the task of another paper.242 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ON BOTH SHORES OF THE AEGEAN, Bibliography Anagnostopoulou, Sia (2003), ‘The Terms Millet, Génos, Ethnos, Oikoumenikotita, Alytrotismos in Greek Historiography’, in idem, The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States, Istanbul: Isis, pp. 37-55. Berlin, Isaiah (1999), The Roots of Romanticism, London: Chatto & Windus. Braude, Benjamin (1985), ‘Foundation Myths of the Millet system’, in idem and B. Lewis (eds), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society, vol. 2, New York: Holmes & Meier, pp. 69-88. 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