Central London [Justice Equity doing justice to soften the common law]

Property v High D leased a block of flats in London from C in 1937. When war
Trees House [1947] broke out, many flats were left empty as people were evacuated
KBD Denning J to escape bombings. C agreed to reduce the rent by half if D
stayed. D paid the reduced rent until the end of the war, and C
then claimed for the "arrears".

Held: Denning J "discovered" the equitable doctrine of

promissory estoppel, and said that although C were once again
entitled to the rent originally agreed after the war ended, they
could not go back on their promise to accept a reduced rent for
the earlier years.

When a party to a contract makes a promise to the other, which

he knows will be acted on, that he will not enforce his strict legal
rights; the equitable principle of promissory estoppel makes that
promise binding on him until such time as he gives reasonable
notice of his intention to resume those rights.

Denning J (obiter dicta) said that had Central London sued for
the arrears for the years 1940-45, it would have failed. It would
have been estopped from going back on its promise [as set out
in the 1940 agreement] to accept a reduction in rental, even
though that promise had not been supported by any
consideration from High Trees because to hold otherwise would
have been unjust
Also here

Chief Constable of [Justice - rules of natural justice - must be allowed to

the North Wales present his case]
Police v Evans D the Chief Constable dismissed C a probationer constable
[1982] HL because he had heard largely unfounded rumours about his
private life, but D believed them. The rumours included a former
"hippy" lifestyle, the keeping of 4 dogs and financial difficulties.

Held: The Chief Constables decision to force the resignation of

the respondent was vitiated by his erroneous assumption that
he had an absolute discretion and by his total failure to observe
the rules of natural justice in not giving the respondent the
opportunity to refute the allegations on which the chief
constable relied.

C won
Per curiam: Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but
a review of the manner in which the decision was made, and
therefore the court is not entitled on an application for judicial
review to consider whether the decision itself was fair and
reasonable.

Deen, R v [1994] CA ^[Justice - prosecutor's fallacy]

D was convicted of a series of rapes of young women DNA
 evidence linked him to three rapes.

Held: The first stage in DNA profiling is to achieve a match.

The second stage is the statistical evaluation of the match.
A forensic scientist said there was a match and wrongly said
that the possibility of it being somebody else was one in 3
million.
As to the statistical evaluation the chance of anyone other than
the defendant matching the profile was 1 in 3 million.
There are two distinct questions.
1. What is the probability that an individual will match the DNA
profile?
2. What is the probability that an individual is innocent, given
that he matches the DNA profile?
The 'prosecutor's fallacy' consists of giving the answer to the
first question as the answer to the second.

Retrial ordered

Glynn v Keele [Justice - rules of natural justice - must be allowed to

University (1972) present his case]
QBD D the University where C was a student. At the end of term C
and others were seen naked. There was not time before the
end of term to do other than send C a letter, fining him 10 and
suspending him.

Held: D had not complied with the rules of natural justice in

that he did not give C a chance of being heard before he
reached his decision to inflict a penalty. But as C had suffered no
injustice and the punishment was correct, there would be no
order.

C lost
[Comment] This can be viewed as a rogue decision as it sought
to deal with the decision and not what it should, and that was to
correct the procedure.

HM Coroner for [Justice - rules of natural justice - decision maker must

Inner London West not allow real possibility of unconscious bias]
District Ex p. During an adjournment of the inquest concerning the sinking of
Dallaglio, R v [1994] "The Marchioness", the coroner was reported as describing some
CA of the relatives of the deceased as "unhinged" and "mentally
unwell."

Held: The use of the expressions "unhinged" and "mentally

unwell" indicated a real possibility of unconscious bias. The
coroner's decision would be quashed and the matter remitted to
a different coroner for a fresh decision on whether to resume
the inquests. R v Gough [1993] followed.
Leicester City [Justice - rules of natural justice - must be allowed to
Justices, ex parte present his case - with assistance from "McKenzie Friend"]
Barrow and DD had not paid the Poll Tax, a solicitor asked that DD be
another, R v (1991) allowed the assistances of a McKenzie Friend, which the
CA magistrates refused. The case was heard and a liability order
made against DD.

The Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, DD appealed to the

Court of Appeal.

Held: In civil proceedings to which the public had a right of

access the court, as part of its duty to administer justice fairly
and openly, was under a duty to permit a litigant in person to
have all reasonable facilities for exercising his right to be heard
in his own defence, including quiet and unobtrusive advice from
another member of the public accompanying him as an assistant
or adviser.

D won
Per curiam: The term McKenzie friend with its connotations of a
certain status and mystique should not be used to describe the
assistance provided by another member of the public to a
litigant in person in the presentation of his case.

R v Nicholas Mullen [Justice - supremacy of the Rule of Law]

[1999] CA D was found to be in possession of terrorist bomb equipment,
such as used by the IRA. He fled to Zimbabwe but was illegally
kidnapped and deported to Britain where he stood trial and was
sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. The judge said he was a
highly dangerous man.

Seven years after his trial he appealed on grounds concerning

his deportation from Zimbabwe to England.

Held: Allowing the appeal, that "unsafe" in the Criminal Appeal

Act 1995 s. 2 was wide enough to encompass an abuse of
process prior to trial.

The methods employed by the authorities to procure M's

deportation represented a blatant failure to adhere to the rule of
law and the need to discourage such behaviour as a matter of
public policy was also an important factor.

Not guilty

Nettleship v Weston
[1971] CA Also here

Reeves, R v [1964]
CA
Ridge v Baldwin [Justice - rules of natural justice - must be allowed to
(1964) HL present his case]
D the watch committee for the police dismissed C who had been
acquitted at Crown Court on charges relating to conspiracy and
corruption. The trial judge intimated C had not given
professional and moral leadership to other officers.

Held: The decision to dismiss C was void because the watch

committee had not observed the principles of natural justice.
C had not been charged nor informed of the grounds on which
they proposed to proceed and had not been given a proper
opportunity to present his defence.

C won

Schmidt v Secretary [Justice - judicial review - legitimate expectation - Lord

of State for Home Denning Obiter]
Affairs [1969] CA CC were given leave to land in the United Kingdom for the
purpose of attending education in scientology. The British
Government, having been convinced that scientology was
socially harmful, rejected their applications for extension of their
stay in this country.

Held: The Home Secretary had power under the Aliens Order
1953 to refuse aliens permission to land or to extend their time
of stay and he had acted in the interest of society.

There being no right of entry or extension of stay, questions of

interference with rights and of the applicability of rules of
natural justice did not arise, because his act was administrative.

Obiter, per Lord Denning MR: The Home Secretary should, in

exceptional circumstances, listen to reason as to why he
should not apply a certain policy.

C lost

Secretary of State [Justice - judicial review - legitimate expectation]

for the Home A and his wife, both Pakistani nationals wanted to adopt a child,
Department ex p aged 5 1/2, born in Pakistan of a close relative.
Khan, R v (1985) A sought advice and was handed a letter issued by the Home
CA Office which declared the legal position.
A commenced the necessary procedures along the lines
indicated by the letter for such cases. Owing to an
administrative muddle the entry application for the child was
refused.

Held: By sending the circular letter the Secretary of State had

effectively made his own rules. The categories of
unreasonableness were not closed and an unfair action would
 seldom be a reasonable one. The Secretary of State had
misdirected himself according to his own criteria and had acted
unreasonably.

A won

Thames [Justice - rules of natural justice - D must be allowed to

Magistrates' Court, present his case, this includes time to prepare his case]
ex p Polemis, R v D, a Greek see captain was alleged to have allow oil to spill into
[1974] DC London Docks. He was served with a summons at 10.30 am he
was due to sail at 9.00 pm the same day. At 4pm his case was
heard, he was convicted and fined 5,000. D applied to the High
Court for a quashing order (certiorari) to quash the conviction.

Held: Certiorari granted because it was a requirement of the

rules of natural justice that a party to proceedings, and
particularly defendant in a criminal case, should be given a
reasonable opportunity to present his case, and that included a
reasonable opportunity to prepare his case before being called
on to present it.

Per curiam: When the court cannot conduct a trial in accordance

with the rules of natural justice in the time available before
defendants ship sails, the court should ensure that some
sensible provision is made for security for the appropriate
penalty in the event of a conviction, bearing in mind that, in the
absence of security being offered, the court has power, as a last
resort, to remand defendant in custody.